We've launched a new site so please go to People & Research for current information on our faculty and staff.
Journal Articles
Abstract:
Convert action is an inherently fraught undertaking. It can produce important diplomatic or strategic gains at a relatively low price, but it can also result in substantial "blowback" when it fails to remain covert. This article traces the impact of two covert operations-US support for a Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq in the 1970s, and US arms sales to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war-on Saddam Hussein's strategic perceptions of the United States. It argues that revelations of US covert action interacted symbiotically with Saddam's preexisting suspicions of the United States, helping to forge a legacy of mistrust and hostility that did much to shape his views of the relationship. Saddam's personality and worldview inclined him toward conspiratorial thinking; US policies made this outlook seem prophetic. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.