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Journal Articles
Abstract:
Scientific attention to subtypes of aggressive behavior in humans has increased significantly during the past 20 years. In particular, psychologists and other behavioral scientists have distinguished an instrumental (or proactive) style of aggression from a style that is reactive (or hostile). Whereas instrumental aggression is “cold-blooded,” deliberate, and goal-driven, reactive aggression is characterized by “hot blood,” impulsivity, and uncontrollable rage. Scholars have pointed to the distinction between murder (committed with malice aforethought) and manslaughter (enacted in the heat of passion in response to being provoked) in criminal law as a reflection of the instrumental/reactive aggression dichotomy. Recently, Bushman and Anderson (2001) argued that the instrumental/reactive aggression distinction has outlived its usefulness in psychology and pointed to inconsistencies and confusion in criminal law applications as evidence in favor of their position. But how similar is the legal distinction between murder and manslaughter to the instrumental/reactive aggression dichotomy advanced by behavioral scientists? This paper compares and contrasts the psychological and legal models and demonstrates that purposes for distinguishing between instrumental and reactive aggression in psychology and law are undeniably different in meaningful ways. As such, it is argued that a perceived shift in law away from differentiating murder and manslaughter has no bearing on the usefulness of the instrumental/reactive aggression distinction in psychological science.