Economics Faculty Database
Economics
Arts & Sciences
Duke University

 HOME > Arts & Sciences > Economics > Faculty    Search Help Login pdf version printable version 

Publications of Attila Ambrus    :chronological  alphabetical  combined  bibtex listing:

Journal Articles

  1. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 178 (October, 2019) [doi]  [abs]
  2. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Zednik, A, The Effects of a ‘None of the Above’ Ballot Paper Option on Voting Behavior and Election Outcomes, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 277 (March, 2019)
  3. Ambrus, A; Kolb, A, On Defining Ex Ante Payoffs in Games with Diffuse Prior, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 246 (March, 2018)
  4. Ambrus, A; Chaney, E; Salitskiy, I, Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with asymmetric information, Quantitative Economics, vol. 9 no. 1 (March, 2018), pp. 217-246, The Econometric Society [doi]  [abs]
  5. Ambrus, A; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A, A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 193 (February, 2018), pp. 45 pages  [abs]
  6. Ambrus, A; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A, Supplementary Appendix to 'A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise', Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 194 (February, 2018), pp. 16 pages  [abs]
  7. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Sastro, A, The case for nil votes: Voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 154 no. 199 (October, 2017), pp. 34-48, Elsevier BV [doi]  [abs]
  8. Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Delegation and nonmonetary incentives, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 171 no. 200 (September, 2017), pp. 101-135, Elsevier BV [doi]  [abs]
  9. Ambrus, A; Calvano, E; Reisinger, M, Either or Both Competition: A 'Two-Sided' Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 8 no. 3 (August, 2016), pp. 189-222, American Economic Association [doi]  [abs]
  10. Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Supplementary Appendix to 'Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives', Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 201 (December, 2015), pp. 21 pages  [abs]
  11. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 183 (August, 2015), pp. 27 pages  [abs]
  12. Ambrus, A; Rozen, K, Rationalising Choice with Multi‐self Models, The Economic Journal, vol. 125 no. 585 (June, 2015), pp. 1136-1156  [abs]
  13. Ambrus, A; Ishii, Y, On Asynchronicity of Moves and Coordination, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 185 (March, 2015), pp. 47 pages  [abs]
  14. Ambrus, A; Chandrasekhar, AG; Elliott, M, Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 179 (March, 2015)
  15. Ambrus, A; Ásgeirsdóttir, T; Noor, J; Sandor, L, Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) no. 168 (March, 2015), pp. 43 pages
  16. Ambrus, A; Asgeirsdottir, TL; Noor, J; Sándor, L, Supplement to 'Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences', Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 169 (March, 2015)  [abs]
  17. Ambrus, A; En Lu, SE, A continuous-time model of multilateral bargaining, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 7 no. 1 (January, 2015), pp. 208-249, American Economic Association [doi]  [abs]
  18. Ambrus, A; Lu, SE, Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 88 (November, 2014), pp. 174-189, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi]  [abs]
  19. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B; Pathak, PA, How Individual Preferences are Aggregated in Groups: An Experimental Study, Unsw Australian School of Business Research Paper no. 2014 (June, 2014), pp. 37 pages  [abs]
  20. Ambrus, A; Mobius, M; Szeidl, A, Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks, American Economic Review, vol. 104 no. 1 (January, 2014)  [abs]
  21. Ambrus, A; Ishii, Y; Burns, J, Gradual Bidding in Ebay-Like Auctions, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 129 (September, 2013), pp. 59 pages  [abs]
  22. Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Comment on "Commitment vs. Flexibility", Econometrica, vol. 81 no. 5 (January, 2013), pp. 2113-2124, The Econometric Society, ISSN 0012-9682 [Gateway.cgi], [doi]  [abs]
  23. Ambrus, A; Azevedo, EM; Kamada, Y, Hierarchical cheap talk, Theoretical Economics, vol. 8 no. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 233-261, The Econometric Society [pdf], [doi]  [abs]
  24. Ambrus, A; Azevedo, EM; Kamada, Y; Takagi, Y, Legislative Committees as Information Intermediaries, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 94 (2013), pp. 103-115, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0167-2681 [doi]  [abs]
  25. Ambrus, A; Greiner, B, Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment: An experimental study, American Economic Review, vol. 102 no. 7 (December, 2012), pp. 3317-3332, American Economic Association, ISSN 0002-8282 [Gateway.cgi], [doi]  [abs]
  26. Ambrus, A; Sándor, L; You, HY, Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives: Supplementary Appendix, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 122 (October, 2012), pp. 13 pages  [abs]
  27. Ambrus, A; Egorov, G, Commitment-Flexibility Trade-Off and Withdrawal Penalties, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 130 (March, 2012), pp. 29 pages  [abs]
  28. Ambrus, A; Chaney, EJ; Salitskiy, I, Appendix for Pirates of the Mediterranean: An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining with Transaction Costs, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (Erid) Working Paper no. 116 (December, 2011)
  29. Ambrus, A; Pathak, PA, Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95 no. 7-8 (August, 2011), pp. 500-512, Elsevier BV [pdf], [doi]  [abs]
  30. Ambrus, A; Field, E; Torero, M, Muslim family law, prenuptial agreements, and the emergence of dowry in Bangladesh, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 125 no. 3 (August, 2010), pp. 1349-1397, Oxford University Press (OUP), ISSN 0033-5533 [doi]  [abs]
  31. Ambrus, A, Theories of coalitional rationality, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 144 no. 2 (March, 2009), pp. 676-695, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0022-0531 [doi]  [abs]
  32. Ambrus, A; Argenziano, R, Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 1 no. 1 (February, 2009), pp. 17-52, American Economic Association, ISSN 1945-7669 [Gateway.cgi], [doi]  [abs]
  33. Ambrus, A; Weinstein, J, Price dispersion and loss leaders, Theoretical Economics, vol. 3 no. 4 (December, 2008), pp. 525-537, ISSN 1555-7561  [abs]
  34. Field, E; Ambrus, A, Early marriage, age of menarche, and female schooling attainment in Bangladesh, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 116 no. 5 (October, 2008), pp. 881-891, University of Chicago Press, ISSN 0022-3808 [doi]  [abs]
  35. Ambrus, A; Takahashi, S, Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces, Theoretical Economics, vol. 3 no. 1 (March, 2008), pp. 1-27, ISSN 1555-7561  [abs]
  36. Ambrus, A, Coalitional rationalizability, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121 no. 3 (August, 2006), pp. 903-929, Oxford University Press (OUP), ISSN 0033-5533 [doi]  [abs]

Duke University * Arts & Sciences * Economics * Faculty * Research * Staff * Master's * Ph.D. * Reload * Login