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Publications of Vincent Conitzer    :chronological  alphabetical  combined  bibtex listing:

Journal articles or Book chapters PUBLISHED

  1. Conitzer, V, A Puzzle about Further Facts, Erkenntnis, vol. 84 no. 3 (June, 2019), pp. 727-739, Springer Nature [doi]  [abs]
  2. Ueda, S; Iwasaki, A; Conitzer, V; Ohta, N; Sakurai, Y; Yokoo, M, Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations, Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, vol. 32 no. 4 (July, 2018), pp. 503-533, Springer Nature [doi]  [abs]
  3. Kolb, A; Conitzer, V, Crying about a Strategic Wolf, Kelley School of Business Research Paper no. 16 (March, 2018)
  4. Conitzer, V, Technical perspective designing algorithms and the fairness criteria they should satisfy, Communications of the Acm, vol. 61 no. 2 (February, 2018), pp. 92 [doi]
  5. Conitzer, V; Mcafee, P, Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future, edited by Conitzer, V; McAfee, P, Acm Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 5 no. 2 (May, 2017), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  6. Aziz, H; Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Elkind, E; Freeman, R; Walsh, T, Justified representation in approval-based committee voting, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48 no. 2 (February, 2017), pp. 461-485, Springer Nature [doi]  [abs]
  7. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Game-Theoretic Question Selection for Tests, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 59 (2017), pp. 437-462 [doi]
  8. Conitzer, V; Easley, D, Introduction to the special issue on EC'14, edited by Conitzer, V; Easley, D, Acm Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 4 no. 4 (August, 2016), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  9. Conitzer, V, On Stackelberg mixed strategies, Synthese, vol. 193 no. 3 (March, 2016), pp. 689-703, Springer Nature, ISSN 0039-7857 [doi]  [abs]
  10. Jakobsen, SK; Sørensen, TB; Conitzer, V, Timeability of extensive-form games, Itcs 2016 Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (January, 2016), pp. 191-199, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  11. Li, Y; Conitzer, V; Korzhyk, D, Catcher-evader games, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2016-January (January, 2016), pp. 329-337  [abs]
  12. Conitzer, V, Philosophy in the Face of Artificial Intelligence., Corr, vol. abs/1605.06048 (2016)
  13. Conitzer, V, Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs?, Synthese, vol. 192 no. 12 (December, 2015), pp. 4107-4119, Springer Nature, ISSN 0039-7857 [doi]  [abs]
  14. Conitzer, V, A devastating example for the Halfer Rule, Philosophical Studies, vol. 172 no. 8 (September, 2015), pp. 1985-1992, Springer Nature, ISSN 0031-8116 [doi]  [abs]
  15. Aziz, H; Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Elkind, E; Freeman, R; Walsh, T, Justified representation in approval-based committee voting, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 784-790  [abs]
  16. Conitzer, V, A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists, Synthese, vol. 192 no. 9 (2015), pp. 2887-2899, Springer Nature, ISSN 0039-7857 [doi]  [abs]
  17. Conitzer, V; Easley, D, Notes from the EC'14 program chairs, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 13 no. 1 (November, 2014), pp. 2-4, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  18. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 216 (January, 2014), pp. 287-308, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0004-3702 [doi]  [abs]
  19. Letchford, J; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, On the value of commitment, Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, vol. 28 no. 6 (January, 2014), pp. 986-1016, ISSN 1387-2532 [doi]  [abs]
  20. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 43 no. 3 (January, 2014), pp. 599-618, ISSN 0020-7276 [doi]  [abs]
  21. Conitzer, V; Easley, D; Babaioff, M, EC'14 foreword, Ec 2014 Proceedings of the 15th Acm Conference on Economics and Computation (January, 2014), pp. iii-iv
  22. De Weerdt, MM; Harrenstein, P; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 86 (January, 2014), pp. 405-420, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi]  [abs]
  23. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 43 no. 3 (2014), pp. 1-20, Springer Nature, ISSN 0020-7276 [doi]
  24. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders., Corr, vol. abs/1401.3876 (2014)
  25. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Mechanism Design., Corr, vol. abs/1408.1486 (2014)
  26. Conitzer, V, Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries., Corr, vol. abs/1401.3449 (2014)
  27. Korzhyk, D; Yin, Z; Kiekintveld, C; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness., Corr, vol. abs/1401.3888 (2014)
  28. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Game-theoretic question selection for tests, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2013), pp. 254-262, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  29. Conitzer, V, The exact computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 8289 LNCS (December, 2013), pp. 96-108, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  30. Guo, M; Markakis, E; Apt, KR; Conitzer, V, Undominated groves mechanisms, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 46 (April, 2013), pp. 129-163, AI Access Foundation [1203.1809v2], [doi]  [abs]
  31. Conitzer, V, The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks, 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 (January, 2013), pp. 1482-1487, IEEE [doi]  [abs]
  32. Conitzer, V; Mcafee, RP, The ACM transactions on economics and computation: An introduction, Acm Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 1 no. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 1-3, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  33. Letchford, J; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, On the value of commitment, Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, vol. 28 no. 6 (2013), pp. 1-31, Springer Nature, ISSN 1387-2532 [doi]
  34. de Weerdt, MM; Harrenstein, P; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 86 (2013), pp. 405-420, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi]  [abs]
  35. Guo, M; Markakis, E; Apt, KR; Conitzer, V, Undominated Groves Mechanisms., J. Artif. Intell. Res., vol. 46 (2013), pp. 129-163
  36. Bhattacharya, S; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, Computing a profit-maximizing sequence of offers to agents in a social network, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7695 LNCS (December, 2012), pp. 482-488, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  37. Letchford, J; MacDermed, L; Conitzer, V; Parr, R; Isbell, CL, Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 11 no. 2 (December, 2012), pp. 36-40, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  38. Waggoner, B; Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Evaluating resistance to false-name manipulations in elections, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2012), pp. 1485-1491  [abs]
  39. Letchford, J; MacDermed, L; Conitzer, V; Parr, R; Isbell, CL, Computing optimal strategies to commit to in stochastic games, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2012), pp. 1380-1386  [abs]
  40. Conitzer, V, Computing game-theoretic solutions and applications to security, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 3 (November, 2012), pp. 2106-2112  [abs]
  41. Conitzer, V, An undergraduate course in the intersection of computer science and economics, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 3 (November, 2012), pp. 2357-2362  [abs]
  42. Conitzer, V, Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 64 no. 1 (July, 2012), pp. 100-102, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0165-4896 [doi]  [abs]
  43. Conitzer, V; Taylor, CR; Wagman, L, Hide and seek: Costly consumer privacy in a market with repeat purchases, Marketing Science, vol. 31 no. 2 (March, 2012), pp. 277-292, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), ISSN 0732-2399 [doi]  [abs]
  44. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 41 no. 1 (February, 2012), pp. 91-129, Springer Nature, ISSN 0020-7276 [doi]  [abs]
  45. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 78 no. 1 (January, 2012), pp. 2-14, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0022-0000 [doi]  [abs]
  46. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal, Corr, vol. abs/1208.6501 (2012)
  47. Zuckerman, M; Faliszewski, P; Conitzer, V; Rosenschein, JS, An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS (December, 2011), pp. 363-374, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  48. Guo, M; Naroditskiy, V; Conitzer, V; Greenwald, A; Jennings, NR, Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: Public goods and beyond, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS (December, 2011), pp. 158-169, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  49. Bhattacharya, S; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K, Approximation algorithm for security games with costly resources, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS (December, 2011), pp. 13-24, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  50. Conitzer, V, Discussion of "a conditional game for comparing approximations", Journal of Machine Learning Research, vol. 15 (December, 2011), pp. 72-73, ISSN 1532-4435  [abs]
  51. Conitzer, V; Walsh, T; Xia, L, Dominating manipulations in voting with partial information, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2011), pp. 638-643  [abs]
  52. Conitzer, V; Korzhyk, D, Commitment to correlated strategies, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2011), pp. 632-637  [abs]
  53. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V; Taylor, CR, Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases (October, 2011)
  54. Naoki, O; Vincent, C; Ryo, I; Yuko, S; Atsushi, I; Makoto, Y, Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations, Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, vol. 26 no. 3 (May, 2011), pp. 451-460, Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, ISSN 1346-0714 [doi]  [abs]
  55. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Expressive markets for donating to charities, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 175 no. 7-8 (May, 2011), pp. 1251-1271, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0004-3702 [doi]  [abs]
  56. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 41 (May, 2011), pp. 25-67, AI Access Foundation, ISSN 1076-9757 [doi]  [abs]
  57. Korzhyk, D; Yin, Z; Kiekintveld, C; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Stackelberg vs. nash in security games: An extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 41 (May, 2011), pp. 297-327, ISSN 1076-9757 [doi]  [abs]
  58. Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Solving stackelberg games with uncertain observability, 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, Aamas 2011, vol. 2 (January, 2011), pp. 953-960  [abs]
  59. Jain, M; Korzhyk, D; Vaněk, O; Conitzer, V; Pěchouček, M; Tambe, M, A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs, 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, Aamas 2011, vol. 1 (January, 2011), pp. 305-312  [abs]
  60. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, Aggregating value ranges: Preference elicitation and truthfulness, Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, vol. 22 no. 1 (January, 2011), pp. 127-150, Springer Nature, ISSN 1387-2532 [doi]  [abs]
  61. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Lang, J, Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (January, 2011), pp. 179-188, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  62. Conitzer, V, AI and Economic Theory, Ieee Intelligent Systems, vol. 26 no. 1 (January, 2011), pp. 7-7, IEEE COMPUTER SOC
  63. Conitzer, V; Immorlica, N; Letchford, J; Munagala, K; Wagman, L, False-name-proofness in social networks, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 6484 LNCS (December, 2010), pp. 209-221, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  64. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 6484 LNCS (December, 2010), pp. 402-414, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  65. Conitzer, V; Yokoo, M, Using mechanism design to prevent false-name manipulations, Ai Magazine, vol. 31 no. 4 (December, 2010), pp. 65-77, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), ISSN 0738-4602 [doi]  [abs]
  66. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Compilation complexity of common voting rules, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2010), pp. 915-920  [abs]
  67. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Stackelberg voting games: Computational aspects and paradoxes, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2010), pp. 921-926  [abs]
  68. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 3 (November, 2010), pp. 1676-1679  [abs]
  69. Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Complexity of computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in security resource allocation games, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2010), pp. 805-810  [abs]
  70. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Procaccia, AD, A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (July, 2010), pp. 275-284, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  71. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V, Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (July, 2010), pp. 83-92, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  72. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 9 no. 1 (June, 2010), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  73. Bhattacharya, S; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K; Xia, L, Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions, Proceedings of the Annual Acm Siam Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (May, 2010), pp. 554-572  [abs]
  74. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 174 no. 5-6 (April, 2010), pp. 363-381, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0004-3702 [doi]  [abs]
  75. Conitzer, V, Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, vol. 58 no. 3 (April, 2010), pp. 239-259, Springer Nature, ISSN 1012-2443 [doi]  [abs]
  76. Conitzer, V, Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents, Communications of the Acm, vol. 53 no. 3 (March, 2010), pp. 84-94, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), ISSN 0001-0782 [doi]  [abs]
  77. Conitzer, V, Using a memory test to limit a user to one account, Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol. 44 LNBIP (January, 2010), pp. 60-72, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 1865-1348 [doi]  [abs]
  78. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K, Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5814 LNCS (December, 2009), pp. 250-262, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  79. Guo, M; Conitzer, V; Reeves, DM, Competitive repeated allocation without payments, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5929 LNCS (December, 2009), pp. 244-255, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  80. Ohta, N; Sato, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M; Conitzer, V, Anonymity-proof shapley value: Compact and computationally efficient solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environment, Computer Software, vol. 26 no. 4 (December, 2009), pp. 181-196, ISSN 0289-6540  [abs]
  81. Shi, P; Conitzer, V; Guo, M, Prediction mechanisms that do not incentivize undesirable actions, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5929 LNCS (December, 2009), pp. 89-100, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  82. Conitzer, V, Approximation guarantees for fictitious play, 2009 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2009 (December, 2009), pp. 636-643, IEEE [doi]  [abs]
  83. Harrenstein, BP; De Weerdt, MM; Conitzer, V, A qualitative Vickrey auction, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2009), pp. 197-206, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  84. Conitzer, V; Rognlie, M; Xia, L, Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2009), pp. 109-115, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  85. Halvorson, E; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Multi-step multi-sensor hider-seeker games, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2009), pp. 159-166, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  86. Xia, L; Zuckerman, M; Procaccia, AD; Conitzer, V; Rosenschein, JS, Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2009), pp. 348-353, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  87. Conitzer, V, Prediction markets, mechanism design, and cooperative game theory, edited by Bilmes, JA; Ng, AY, Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Uai 2009 (December, 2009), pp. 101-108, AUAI Press  [abs]
  88. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2009), pp. 336-341, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  89. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 8 no. 2 (December, 2009), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  90. Ohta, N; Conitzer, V; Ichimura, R; Sakurai, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M, Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5732 LNCS (November, 2009), pp. 623-638, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  91. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 67 no. 1 (September, 2009), pp. 69-98, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi]  [abs]
  92. Conitzer, V; Taylor, CR; Wagman, L, Who Benefits from Online Privacy? (August, 2009)
  93. Conitzer, V, Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 35 (August, 2009), pp. 161-191, ISSN 1076-9757 [doi]  [abs]
  94. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 8 no. 1 (July, 2009), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  95. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, A multiagent turing test based on a prediction market, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2009), pp. 1435-1436, ISSN 1548-8403
  96. Conitzer, V; Lang, J; Xia, L, How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (January, 2009), pp. 103-108, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  97. Anand, SS; Bunescu, R; Carvcdho, V; Chomicki, J; Conitzer, V; Cox, MT; Dignum, V; Dodds, Z; Dredze, M; Furcy, D; Gabrilovich, E; Göker, MH; Guesgen, H; Hirsh, H; Jannach, D; Junker, U; Ketter, W; Kobsa, A; Koenig, S; Lau, T; Lewis, L; Matson, E; Metzler, T; Mihalcea, R; Mobasher, B; Pineau, J; Poupart, P; Raja, A; Ruml, W; Sadeh, N; Shani, G; Shapiro, D; Smith, T; Taylor, ME; Wagstaff, K; Walsh, W; Zhou, R, AAAI 2008 workshop reports, Ai Magazine, vol. 30 no. 1 (January, 2009), pp. 108-118, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), ISSN 0738-4602 [doi]  [abs]
  98. Sosa, JA; Romero, P, Editorial Introductions, Current Opinion in Oncology, vol. 21 no. 1 (January, 2009), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  99. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2008), pp. 190-195  [abs]
  100. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2008), pp. 196-201  [abs]
  101. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Lang, J, Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2008), pp. 202-207  [abs]
  102. Conitzer, V, Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting, 10th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2008 (December, 2008), pp. 10P  [abs]
  103. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2008), pp. 109-118, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  104. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2008), pp. 99-108, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  105. Apt, K; Conitzer, V; Guo, M; Markakis, E, Welfare undominated groves mechanisms, edited by Papadimitriou, CH; Zhang, S, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5385 LNCS (December, 2008), pp. 426-437, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743, ISBN 978-3-540-92184-4 [doi]  [abs]
  106. Conitzer, V, Anonymity-proof voting rules, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5385 LNCS (December, 2008), pp. 295-306, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  107. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2008), pp. 210-219, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  108. Chomicki, J; Conitzer, V; Junkar, U; Pern, P, AAAI Workshop - Technical Report: Preface, Aaai Workshop Technical Report, vol. WS-08-09 (December, 2008), pp. vii
  109. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V; Jain, K, An "ethical" game-theoretic solution concept for two-player perfect-information games, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5385 LNCS (December, 2008), pp. -707, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  110. Conitzer, V, Metareasoning as a formal computational problem, Aaai Workshop Technical Report, vol. WS-08-07 (December, 2008), pp. 29-33  [abs]
  111. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 7 no. 3 (November, 2008), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  112. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, New complexity results about Nash equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 63 no. 2 (July, 2008), pp. 621-641, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi]  [abs]
  113. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 7 no. 2 (June, 2008), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  114. Apaydin, MS; Conitzer, V; Donald, BR, Structure-based protein NMR assignments using native structural ensembles., Journal of Biomolecular Nmr, vol. 40 no. 4 (April, 2008), pp. 263-276, ISSN 0925-2738 [18365752], [doi]  [abs]
  115. Ohta, N; Conitzer, V; Satoh, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M, Anonymity-proof Shapley value: Extending Shapley value for coalitional games in open environments, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 909-916, ISSN 1548-8403  [abs]
  116. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Strategie betting for competitive agents, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 829-836, ISSN 1548-8403  [abs]
  117. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 1029-1036, ISSN 1548-8403  [abs]
  118. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 1021-1028, ISSN 1548-8403  [abs]
  119. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments, Ec'07 Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2007), pp. 30-39, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  120. Conitzer, V, Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (December, 2007), pp. 420-427, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  121. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 7 no. 1 (December, 2007), pp. 69-70, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  122. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Lang, J, When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate, Journal of the Acm, vol. 54 no. 3 (June, 2007), pp. 14-es, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), ISSN 0004-5411 [doi]  [abs]
  123. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents, Machine Learning, vol. 67 no. 1-2 (May, 2007), pp. 23-43, Springer Nature, ISSN 0885-6125 [doi]  [abs]
  124. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents, vol. 2006 (December, 2006), pp. 521-528, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  125. Conitzer, V; Garera, N, Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online), Acm International Conference Proceeding Series, vol. 148 (December, 2006), pp. 209-216, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  126. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a nash equilibrium, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents, vol. 2006 (December, 2006), pp. 537-544, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  127. Conitzer, V, Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 613-619  [abs]
  128. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 627-634  [abs]
  129. Conitzer, V; Davenport, A; Kalagitanam, J, Improved bounds for computing kemeny rankings, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 620-626  [abs]
  130. Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M; Maruono, K; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 697-702  [abs]
  131. Conitzer, V; Garera, N, Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online), Icml 2006 Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Machine Learning, vol. 2006 (October, 2006), pp. 209-216  [abs]
  132. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computing the optimal strategy to commit to, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 2006 (September, 2006), pp. 82-90  [abs]
  133. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 170 no. 6-7 (May, 2006), pp. 607-619, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0004-3702 [doi]  [abs]
  134. Yokoo, M; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A, A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 4012 LNAI (January, 2006), pp. 53-64, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  135. Yokoot, M; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A, Coalitional games in open anonymous environments, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (December, 2005), pp. 509-514  [abs]
  136. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Santi, P, Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2005), pp. 248-254  [abs]
  137. Conitzer, V, Computational aspects of mechanism design, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 4 (December, 2005), pp. 1642-1643
  138. Sandholm, T; Gilpin, A; Conitzer, V, Mixed-integer programming methods for finding Nash equilibria, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (December, 2005), pp. 495-501  [abs]
  139. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, A generalized strategy eliminability criterion and computational methods for applying it, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (December, 2005), pp. 483-488  [abs]
  140. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of (iterated) dominance, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2005), pp. 88-97, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  141. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Expressive negotiation in settings with externalities, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2005), pp. 255-260  [abs]
  142. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Communication complexity of common voting rules, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2005), pp. 78-87, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  143. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3435 LNAI (December, 2005), pp. 1-14, ISSN 0302-9743  [abs]
  144. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators, Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Uai 2005 (December, 2005), pp. 145-152  [abs]
  145. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computing shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2004), pp. 219-225  [abs]
  146. Santi, P; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Towards a characterization of polynomial preference elicitation with value queries in combinatorial auctions, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3120 (December, 2004), pp. 1-16, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  147. Conitzer, V; Derryberry, J; Sandholm, T, Combinatorial auctions with structured item graphs, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2004), pp. 212-218  [abs]
  148. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games, Proceedings, Twenty First International Conference on Machine Learning, Icml 2004 (December, 2004), pp. 185-192  [abs]
  149. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2004, vol. 1 (September, 2004), pp. 128-135  [abs]
  150. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computational criticisms of the revelation principle, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (August, 2004), pp. 262-263  [abs]
  151. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Expressive negotiation over donations to charities, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (August, 2004), pp. 51-60  [abs]
  152. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (August, 2004), pp. 132-141  [abs]
  153. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (August, 2004), pp. 266-267  [abs]
  154. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Automated mechanism design: Complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting, Acm International Conference Proceeding Series, vol. 50 (December, 2003), pp. 17-24 [doi]  [abs]
  155. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2003), pp. 613-618, ACM, ISBN 1-58113-679-X [html], [doi]  [abs]
  156. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games, edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning, vol. 1 (December, 2003), pp. 91-98, AAAI Press, ISBN 1-57735-189-4  [abs]
  157. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents, edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning, vol. 1 (December, 2003), pp. 83-90, AAAI Press, ISBN 1-57735-189-4  [abs]
  158. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (December, 2003), pp. 17-24, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  159. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard, edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2003), pp. 781-788, Morgan Kaufmann [0307018v1]  [abs]
  160. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Definition and complexity of some basic metareasoning problems, edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2003), pp. 1099-1106, Morgan Kaufmann [0307017v1]  [abs]
  161. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity results about Nash equilibria, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. cs.GT/0205074 (December, 2003), pp. 765-771 [0205074v1]  [abs]
  162. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (November, 2003), pp. 232-233  [abs]
  163. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-proofness, edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2002), pp. 392-397, AAAI Press / The MIT Press  [abs]
  164. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates, edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2002), pp. 314-319, AAAI Press / The MIT Press  [abs]
  165. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria, Corr, vol. cs.GT/0205074 (2002)
  166. Lewin, AY; Knox Lovell, CA, Editor's introduction, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 46 no. 1-2 (January, 1990), pp. 3-5, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  167. Campbell, JY; Melino, A, Editors' introduction, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 45 no. 1-2 (January, 1990), pp. 1-5, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]

Conference articles PUBLISHED

  1. Kramer, MF; Schaich Borg, J; Conitzer, V; Sinnott-Armstrong, W, When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?, Aies 2018 Proceedings of the 2018 Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai, Ethics, and Society (December, 2018), pp. 204-209, ISBN 9781450360128 [doi]  [abs]
  2. Freeman, R; Conitzer, V; Zahedi, SM; Lee, BC, Dynamic proportional sharing: A game-theoretic approach, Sigmetrics 2018 Abstracts of the 2018 Acm International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (June, 2018), pp. 33-35, ACM Press, ISBN 9781450358460 [doi]  [abs]
  3. De Weerdt, M; Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Van Der Linden, K, Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart grid, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2018-July (January, 2018), pp. 4736-4742, ISBN 9780999241127  [abs]
  4. Deng, Y; Conitzer, V, Disarmament games with resources, 32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2018 (January, 2018), pp. 981-988, ISBN 9781577358008  [abs]
  5. Freedman, R; Dickerson, JP; Borg, JS; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Conitzer, V, Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values, 32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2018 (January, 2018), pp. 1636-1643, ISBN 9781577358008  [abs]
  6. De Weerdt, MM; Conitzer, V; Albert, M; Van Der Linden, K, Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart grid, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 3 (January, 2018), pp. 1924-1926, ISBN 9781510868083  [abs]
  7. Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Shah, N, Fair public decision making, Ec 2017 Proceedings of the 2017 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation (June, 2017), pp. 629-646, ACM Press, ISBN 9781450345279 [doi]  [abs]
  8. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Game-theoretic question selection for tests, edited by Rossi, F, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 59 (May, 2017), pp. 437-462, AI Access Foundation, ISBN 978-1-57735-633-2 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  9. Conitzer, V; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Borg, JS; Deng, Y; Kramer, M, Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence, 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017 (January, 2017), pp. 4831-4835  [abs]
  10. Deng, Y; Conitzer, V, Disarmament games, 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017 (January, 2017), pp. 473-479  [abs]
  11. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Stone, P, Automated design of robust mechanisms, 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017 (January, 2017), pp. 298-304  [abs]
  12. Freeman, R; Zahedi, SM; Conitzer, V, Fair and efficient social choice in dynamic settings, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (January, 2017), pp. 4580-4587, ISBN 9780999241103  [abs]
  13. Conitzer, V; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Borg, JS; Deng, Y; Kramer, M, Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence, Aaai Workshop Technical Report, vol. WS-17-01 - WS-17-15 (January, 2017), pp. 105-109, ISBN 9781577357865  [abs]
  14. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Stone, P, Mechanism design with unknown correlated distributions: Can we learn optimal mechanisms?, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 1 (January, 2017), pp. 69-77, ISBN 9781510855076  [abs]
  15. Kephart, A; Conitzer, V, The revelation principle for mechanism design with reporting costs, Ec 2016 Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation (July, 2016), pp. 85-102, ACM Press, ISBN 9781450339360 [doi]  [abs]
  16. Bergemann, D; Chen, Y; Conitzer, V, EC 2016 foreword, Ec 2016 Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation (July, 2016), pp. iii-iv, ISBN 9781450339360
  17. Xu, H; Freeman, R; Conitzer, V; Dughmi, S; Tambe, M, Signaling in Bayesian stackelberg games, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas (January, 2016), pp. 150-158, ISBN 9781450342391  [abs]
  18. Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Shah, N, False-name-proof recommendations in social networks, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas (January, 2016), pp. 332-340, ISBN 9781450342391  [abs]
  19. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas (January, 2016), pp. 1413-1414, ISBN 9781450342391  [abs]
  20. Conitzer, V, Computing equilibria with partial commitment, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 10123 LNCS (January, 2016), pp. 1-14, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISBN 9783662541098 [doi]  [abs]
  21. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Lopomo, G, Maximizing revenue with limited correlation: The cost of ex-post incentive compatibility, 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016 (January, 2016), pp. 376-382, ISBN 9781577357605  [abs]
  22. Brill, M; Freeman, R; Conitzer, V, Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan setwinners), 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016 (January, 2016), pp. 418-424, ISBN 9781577357605  [abs]
  23. Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Brill, M; Li, Y, Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs, 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016 (January, 2016), pp. 460-467, ISBN 9781577357605  [abs]
  24. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2016-January (January, 2016), pp. 416-423  [abs]
  25. Andersen, G; Conitzer, V, ATUCAPTS: Automated tests that a user cannot pass twice simultaneously, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2016-January (January, 2016), pp. 3662-3669  [abs]
  26. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Lopomo, G, Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility., edited by Schuurmans, D; Wellman, MP, Aaai (2016), pp. 383-389, AAAI Press, ISBN 978-1-57735-760-5
  27. Jakobsen, SK; Sørensen, TB; Conitzer, V, Timeability of Extensive-Form Games., edited by Sudan, M, Itcs (2016), pp. 191-199, ACM, ISBN 978-1-4503-4057-1 [doi]
  28. Brill, M; Freeman, R; Conitzer, V, Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners)., edited by Schuurmans, D; Wellman, MP, Aaai (2016), pp. 369-375, AAAI Press, ISBN 978-1-57735-760-5
  29. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation: (Extended Abstract)., edited by Jonker, CM; Marsella, S; Thangarajah, J; Tuyls, K, Aamas (2016), pp. 1413-1414, ACM, ISBN 978-1-4503-4239-1
  30. Brill, M; Conitzer, V, Strategic voting and strategic candidacy, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 819-826, ISBN 9781577357001  [abs]
  31. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Lopomo, G, Assessing the robustness of Cremer-McLean with automated mechanism design, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 763-769, ISBN 9781577357001  [abs]
  32. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Cooperative game solution concepts that maximize stability under noise, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 979-985, ISBN 9781577357001  [abs]
  33. Kephart, A; Conitzer, V, Complexity of mechanism design with signaling costs, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 1 (January, 2015), pp. 357-365, ISSN 1548-8403, ISBN 9781450337694  [abs]
  34. Freeman, R; Brill, M; Conitzer, V, General tiebreaking schemes for computational social choice, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 3 (January, 2015), pp. 1401-1409, ISSN 1548-8403, ISBN 9781450337717  [abs]
  35. Conitzer, V; Brill, M; Freeman, R, Crowdsourcing societal tradeoffs, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2015), pp. 1213-1217, ISSN 1548-8403, ISBN 9781450337700  [abs]
  36. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Maximal cooperation in repeated games on social networks, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2015-January (January, 2015), pp. 216-223, ISSN 1045-0823, ISBN 9781577357384  [abs]
  37. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Complexity of stability-based solution concepts in multi-issue and MC-net cooperative games, 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2014, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 581-588, ISBN 9781634391313  [abs]
  38. Freeman, R; Brill, M; Conitzer, V, On the axiomatic characterization of runoff voting rules, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 675-681, ISBN 9781577356776  [abs]
  39. Conitzer, V; Vidali, A, Mechanism design for scheduling with uncertain execution time, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 623-629, ISBN 9781577356776  [abs]
  40. Sørensen, TB; Dalis, M; Letchford, J; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, Beat the cheater: Computing game-theoretic strategies for when to kick a gambler out of a casino, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 798-804, ISBN 9781577356776  [abs]
  41. Xu, H; Fang, F; Jiang, AX; Conitzer, V; Dughmi, S; Tambe, M, Solving zero-sum security games in discretized spatio-temporal domains, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (January, 2014), pp. 1500-1506, ISBN 9781577356783  [abs]
  42. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '14, Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014, edited by Babaioff, M; Conitzer, V; Easley, D, Ec (2014), ACM, ISBN 978-1-4503-2565-3
  43. Andersen, G; Conitzer, V, Fast equilibrium computation for infinitely repeated games, edited by desJardins, M; Littman, ML, Proceedings of the 27th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2013 (December, 2013), pp. 53-59, AAAI Press, ISBN 9781577356158 [php]  [abs]
  44. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V, Solving security games on graphs via marginal probabilities, edited by desJardins, M; Littman, ML, Proceedings of the 27th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2013 (December, 2013), pp. 591-597, AAAI Press, ISBN 9781577356158 [php]  [abs]
  45. Todo, T; Conitzer, V, False-name-proof matching, edited by Gini, ML; Shehory, O; Ito, T; Jonker, CM, 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, Aamas 2013, vol. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 311-318, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-1-4503-1993-5 [citation.cfm]  [abs]
  46. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Optimal Internet auctions with costly communication, edited by Gini, ML; Shehory, O; Ito, T; Jonker, CM, 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, Aamas 2013, vol. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 683-690, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-1-4503-1993-5 [citation.cfm]  [abs]
  47. Jain, M; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Security scheduling for real-world networks, edited by Gini, ML; Shehory, O; Ito, T; Jonker, CM, 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, Aamas 2013, vol. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 215-222, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-1-4503-1993-5 [citation.cfm]  [abs]
  48. Conitzer, V, The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks., Allerton (2013), pp. 1482-1487, IEEE [doi]
  49. Conitzer, V; Xia, L, Paradoxes of multiple elections: An approximation approach, edited by Brewka, G; Eiter, T; McIlraith, SA, 13th International Conference on the Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Kr 2012 (December, 2012), pp. 179-187, AAAI Press, ISBN 9781577355601 [html]  [abs]
  50. Conitzer, V; Xia, L, Approximating common voting rules by sequential voting in multi-issue domains, International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2012 (December, 2012) [AcceptedPapers]  [abs]
  51. Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Security games with multiple attacker resources, edited by Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2011), pp. 273-279, IJCAI/AAAI, ISBN 9781577355120 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  52. Conitzer, V; Lang, J; Xia, L, Hypercubewise preference aggregation in multi-issue domains, edited by Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2011), pp. 158-163, IJCAI/AAAI, ISBN 9781577355120 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  53. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, A maximum likelihood approach towards aggregating partial orders, edited by Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2011), pp. 446-451, IJCAI/AAAI, ISBN 9781577355120 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  54. Jain, M; Korzhyk, D; Vanek, O; Conitzer, V; Pechoucek, M; Tambe, M, A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs., edited by Sonenberg, L; Stone, P; Tumer, K; Yolum, P, Aamas (2011), pp. 327-334, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9826571-5-7
  55. Iwasaki, A; Conitzer, V; Omori, Y; Sakurai, Y; Todo, T; Guo, M; Yokoo, M, Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 1 (January, 2010), pp. 633-640, IFAAMAS, ISBN 9781617387715 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  56. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Lang, J, Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 1 (January, 2010), pp. 399-406, IFAAMAS, ISBN 9781617387715 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  57. Yin, Z; Korzhyk, D; Kiekintveld, C; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: Interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2010), pp. 1139-1146, IFAAMAS, ISBN 9781617387715 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  58. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2010), pp. 881-888, IFAAMAS, ISBN 9781617387715 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  59. Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010, edited by Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, Computational Foundations of Social Choice, vol. 10101 (2010), Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany
  60. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal., edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Aamas (2010), pp. 1475-1476, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9826571-1-9 [doi]
  61. Bhattacharya, S; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K; Xia, L, Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions., edited by Charikar, M, Soda (2010), pp. 554-572, SIAM, ISBN 978-0-89871-701-3 [doi]
  62. Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, 10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of Social Choice., edited by Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, Computational Foundations of Social Choice, vol. 10101 (2010), Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany
  63. Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, 10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of Social Choice., edited by Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, Computational Foundations of Social Choice, vol. 10101 (2010), Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany
  64. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, A hybrid of a Turing test and a prediction market, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 14 LNICST (December, 2009), pp. 61-73, ISSN 1867-8211, ISBN 3642038204 [doi]  [abs]
  65. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, A hybrid of a Turing test and a prediction market, edited by Das, S; Ostrovsky, M; Pennock, D; Szymanski, BK, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 14 LNICST (2009), pp. 61-73, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISBN 9783642038204 [978-3-642-03821-1], [doi]  [abs]
  66. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market., edited by Sierra, C; Castelfranchi, C; Decker, KS; Sichman, JS, Aamas (2) (2009), pp. 1407-1408, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9817381-7-8 [doi]
  67. Conitzer, V, Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory., edited by Bilmes, JA; Ng, AY, Uai (2009), pp. 101-108, AUAI Press
  68. Apt, KR; Conitzer, V; Guo, M; Markakis, E, Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms., edited by Papadimitriou, CH; Zhang, S, Wine, vol. 5385 (2008), pp. 426-437, SPRINGER, ISBN 978-3-540-92184-4
  69. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, Aamas (2) (2008), pp. 1047-1054, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9817381-1-6 [doi]
  70. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Strategic betting for competitive agents., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, Aamas (2) (2008), pp. 847-854, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9817381-1-6 [doi]
  71. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, Aamas (2) (2008), pp. 1039-1046, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9817381-1-6 [doi]
  72. Ohta, N; Conitzer, V; Satoh, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M, Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, Aamas (2) (2008), pp. 927-934, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9817381-1-6 [doi]
  73. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Incremental mechanism design, edited by Veloso, MM, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2007), pp. 1251-1256 [html]  [abs]
  74. Sandholm, T; Conitzer, V; Boutilier, C, Automated design of multistage mechanisms, edited by Veloso, MM, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2007), pp. 1500-1506 [html]  [abs]
  75. Conitzer, V, Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness, edited by Cramton, P; Müller, R; Tardos, É; Tennenholtz, M, Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, Tark 2007, vol. 07271 (December, 2007), pp. 102-111, ACM Press [html], [doi]  [abs]
  76. Conitzer, V, Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness., edited by Cramton, P; Müller, R; Tardos, É; Tennenholtz, M, Computational Social Systems and the Internet, vol. 07271 (2007), Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany
  77. Conitzer, V, Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules., edited by Cramton, P; Müller, R; Tardos, É; Tennenholtz, M, Computational Social Systems and the Internet, vol. 07271 (2007), Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany
  78. Conitzer, V, Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award., edited by Durfee, EH; Yokoo, M; Huhns, MN; Shehory, O, Aamas (2007), pp. 253-253, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-81-904262-7-5 [doi]
  79. Yokoo, M; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A, Coalitional games in open anonymous environments, edited by Kaelbling, LP; Saffiotti, A, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2005), pp. 1668-1669, Professional Book Center, ISBN 0938075934 [html]
  80. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core, edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2003), pp. 613-618, Morgan Kaufmann, ISBN 1-58113-679-X [html], [doi]  [abs]
  81. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents., edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, Icml (2003), pp. 83-90, AAAI Press, ISBN 1-57735-189-4
  82. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard., edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, Ijcai (2003), pp. 781-788, Morgan Kaufmann
  83. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems., edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, Ijcai (2003), pp. 1099-1106, Morgan Kaufmann
  84. Conitzer, V; Lang, J; Sandholm, T, How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?, edited by Halpern, JY; Tennenholtz, M, Tark (2003), pp. 201-214, ACM, ISBN 1-58113-731-1 [doi]  [abs]
  85. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games., edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, Icml (2003), pp. 91-98, AAAI Press, ISBN 1-57735-189-4
  86. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness., edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, Aaai/Iaai (2002), pp. 392-397, AAAI Press / The MIT Press
  87. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Mechanism Design., edited by Darwiche, A; Friedman, N, Uai, vol. cs.GT/0205075 (2002), pp. 103-110, Morgan Kaufmann, ISBN 1-55860-897-4
  88. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates., edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, Aaai/Iaai (2002), pp. 314-319, AAAI Press / The MIT Press

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