Publications [#322436] of Curtis R. Taylor

Journal Articles

1. Green, B; Taylor, CR, Breakthroughs, deadlines, and self-reported progress: Contracting for multistage projects, American Economic Review, vol. 106 no. 12 (December, 2016), pp. 3660-3699, American Economic Association [doi]
   (last updated on 2024/04/24)

   Abstract:
   We study the optimal incentive scheme for a multistage project in which the agent privately observes intermediate progress. The optimal contract involves a soft deadline wherein the principal guarantees funding up to a certain date-if the agent reports progress at that date, then the principal gives him a relatively short hard deadline to complete the project-if progress is not reported at that date, then a probationary phase begins in which the project is randomly terminated at a constant rate until progress is reported. We explore several variants of the model with implications for optimal project design. In particular, we show that the principal benefits by imposing a small cost on the agent for submitting a progress report or by making the first stage of the project somewhat "harder" than the second.