Publications [#289593] of David McAdams

Journal Articles

1. McAdams, D, Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 35 no. 3 (February, 2007), pp. 427-453, Springer Nature, ISSN 0020-7276
   (last updated on 2024/04/17)

   Abstract:
   I study monotonicity of equilibrium strategies in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, risk aversion, affiliated types, and interdependent values. Every mixed-strategy equilibrium is shown to be outcome-equivalent to a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium under the "priority rule" for breaking ties. This provides a missing link to establish uniqueness in the "general symmetric model" of Milgrom and Weber (Econometrica 50:1089-1122, 1982). Non-monotone equilibria can exist under the "coin-flip rule" but they are distinguishable: all non-monotone equilibria have positive probability of ties whereas all monotone equilibria have zero probability of ties. This provides a justification for the standard empirical practice of restricting attention to monotone strategies. © Springer Verlag 2007.