Publications [#291783] of Giuseppe Lopomo

Journal Articles

1. Lopomo, G, Optimality and robustness of the English auction, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 36 no. 2 (January, 2001), pp. 219-240, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi]
   (last updated on 2024/04/19)

   Abstract:
   In Milgrom and Weber's (1982, Econometrica 50, 1089-1122) "general symmetric model," under a few additional regularity conditions, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within the class of all posterior-implementable trading procedures and fails to do so among all interim incentive-compatible procedures in which "losers do not pay." These results suggest that appropriate notions of robustness and simplicity which imply the optimality of the English auction for a risk-neutral seller must impose "bargaining-like" features on the set of feasible trading mechanisms. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D82. © 2000 Academic Press.