Publications [#239274] of Huseyin Yildirim

Journal Articles

1. Romano, R; Yildirim, H, On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 120 no. 1 (January, 2005), pp. 73-107, Elsevier BV [repository], [doi]
   (last updated on 2024/04/18)

   Abstract:
   We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and rent-seeking games. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.