Publications [#318193] of Huseyin Yildirim

Journal Articles

1. Name-Correa, AJ; Yildirim, H, 'Giving' in to Social Pressure, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 99 (September, 2016), pp. 99-116, Elsevier BV [doi]
   (last updated on 2024/04/25)

   Abstract:
   We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from a direct solicitation. We show that equilibrium donations are concentrated around a social norm. Despite a higher level of the public good, relatively poor and/or low altruism givers fare worse under social pressure and would avoid the solicitor at a cost. Aggregate donor welfare improves to the extent that the added social motive alleviates the underprovision of the public good; however, overprovision may result. Our theory therefore predicts a light-handed regulation for charitable solicitations, which is consistent with their exemption from the popular Do Not Call list in the U.S. We further show that contrary to pure altruism, a more equal income distribution may produce more of the public good. In fundraising campaigns where a social norm is not apparent, one may emerge endogenously if donors are not too heterogeneous.