| Publications [#42301] of Nataliya Kuribko
Working Papers
- N. Kuribko, Coalition of Endogenous Size in First Price Auction
(Spring, 2003) (working paper.) [pdf]
(last updated on 2005/10/18)
Abstract: The paper considers first price auction
framework with non-strategic auctioneer and
no shill bidding. At most one ring is
allowed to be formed. The size of the ring,
however, is not fixed. I study conditions
which determine the size of the ring. I
develop the sufficient conditions under
which bidders with high valuations does not
join the ring, while the bidders with lower
valuations are in the ring. I also provide
a sufficient condition for a ring to be all-
inclusive. In this framework outside
bidders benefit from the presence of the
ring, while auctioneer loses
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