Huseyin Yildirim, Professor

Huseyin Yildirim

Professor Yildirim's recent research concerns charitable giving, sequencing of bilateral negotiations, and the value of (non-)blind review. His papers have appeared in top economics journals such as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND journal of Economics.

Office Location:  205 Social Sciences Bldg, Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708
Office Phone:  (919) 660-1805
Email Address: send me a message
Web Page:  http://works.bepress.com/huseyin_yildirim

Teaching (Fall 2019):

Education:

Ph.D.University of Florida2000
M.A.Bilkent University (Turkey)1995
B.S.E.Bilkent University (Turkey)1993
Specialties:

Industrial Organization
Microeconomic Theory
Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
Microeconomics
Public Economics
Research Interests: Industrial Organization, Bargaining Theory, Political Economy, and Public Finance

Professor Yildirim's recent research concerns charitable giving, sequencing of bilateral negotiations, and the value of (non-)blind review. His papers have appeared in top economics journals such as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND journal of Economics.

Areas of Interest:

Industrial Organization
Multilateral Bargaining
Charitable Giving

Keywords:

Charitable giving • fund-raising targets • majority voting • pre-election polls • rent seeking contests • sequential bargaining

Current Ph.D. Students  

Working Papers

  1. Andreoni‐McGuire Algorithm and the Limits of Warm‐Glow Giving (January 2013)
  2. Time-Consistent Majority Rules with Interdependent Valuations (September, 2012) [pdf]
Representative Publications

  1. with Krasteva, S; Yildirim, H, Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations, The Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 43 no. 3 (Spring, 2012), pp. 514-536, WILEY, ISSN 0741-6261 [pdf], [doi]  [abs]
  2. with Taylor, CR; Yildirim, H, Subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 78 no. 2 (April, 2011), pp. 762-794, Oxford University Press (OUP), ISSN 0034-6527 [pdf], [doi]  [abs]
  3. Yildirim, H, Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 136 no. 1 (September, 2007), pp. 167-196, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0022-0531 [repository], [doi]  [abs]
  4. Yildirim, H, Contests with multiple rounds, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 51 no. 1 (April, 2005), pp. 213-227, Elsevier BV [pdf], [doi]  [abs]
  5. Romano, R; Yildirim, H, On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 120 no. 1 (January, 2005), pp. 73-107, Elsevier BV [repository], [doi]  [abs]
  6. with Lewis, TR; Yildirim, H, Managing dynamic competition, American Economic Review, vol. 92 no. 4 (September, 2002), pp. 779-797, American Economic Association [repository], [doi]  [abs]
  7. Lewis, TR; Yildirim, H, Learning by doing and dynamic regulation, The Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 33 no. 1 (January, 2002), pp. 22-36, WILEY [pdf], [doi]  [abs]
Conferences Organized