Philosophy Faculty Database
Philosophy
Arts & Sciences
Duke University

 HOME > Arts & Sciences > Philosophy > Faculty    Search Help Login pdf version printable version 

Publications of Vincent Conitzer    :chronological  alphabetical  combined  bibtex listing:

Duke :: Philosophy :: Faculty :: Vincent Conitzer

Journal articles or Book chapters PUBLISHED

  1. Ueda, S; Iwasaki, A; Conitzer, V; Ohta, N; Sakurai, Y; Yokoo, M, Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations, Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, vol. 32 no. 4 (July, 2018), pp. 503-533, Springer Nature [doi[abs].
  2. Conitzer, V, A Puzzle about Further Facts, Erkenntnis (March, 2018), pp. 1-13, Springer Nature [doi[abs].
  3. Conitzer, V, Technical perspective designing algorithms and the fairness criteria they should satisfy, Communications of the Acm, vol. 61 no. 2 (February, 2018), pp. 92 [doi].
  4. Conitzer, V; Mcafee, P, Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future, edited by Conitzer, V; McAfee, P, Acm Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 5 no. 2 (May, 2017), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  5. Aziz, H; Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Elkind, E; Freeman, R; Walsh, T, Justified representation in approval-based committee voting, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48 no. 2 (February, 2017), pp. 461-485, Springer Nature [doi[abs].
  6. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Game-Theoretic Question Selection for Tests, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 59 (2017), pp. 437-462 [doi].
  7. Kolb, A; Conitzer, V, Boy Cries Wolf: Warnings About a Strategic Adversary, Kelley School of Business Research Paper no. 16 (October, 2016).
  8. Conitzer, V; Easley, D, Introduction to the special issue on EC'14, edited by Conitzer, V; Easley, D, Acm Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 4 no. 4 (August, 2016), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  9. Conitzer, V, On Stackelberg mixed strategies, Synthese, vol. 193 no. 3 (March, 2016), pp. 689-703, Springer Nature [doi].
  10. Jakobsen, SK; Sørensen, TB; Conitzer, V, Timeability of extensive-form games, Itcs 2016 Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (January, 2016), pp. 191-199, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  11. Li, Y; Conitzer, V; Korzhyk, D, Catcher-evader games, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2016-January (January, 2016), pp. 329-337 [abs].
  12. Conitzer, V, Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs?, Synthese, vol. 192 no. 12 (December, 2015), pp. 4107-4119, Springer Nature [doi[abs].
  13. Conitzer, V, A devastating example for the Halfer Rule, Philosophical Studies, vol. 172 no. 8 (September, 2015), pp. 1985-1992, Springer Nature [doi[abs].
  14. Aziz, H; Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Elkind, E; Freeman, R; Walsh, T, Justified representation in approval-based committee voting, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 784-790 [abs].
  15. Conitzer, V, A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists, Synthese, vol. 192 no. 9 (2015), pp. 2887-2899, Springer Nature [doi[abs].
  16. Conitzer, V; Easley, D, Notes from the EC'14 program chairs, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 13 no. 1 (November, 2014), pp. 2-4, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  17. Letchford, J; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, On the value of commitment, Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, vol. 28 no. 6 (November, 2014), pp. 986-1016, Springer Nature [doi].
  18. de Weerdt, MM; Harrenstein, P; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 86 (July, 2014), pp. 405-420, Elsevier BV [doi[abs].
  19. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 216 (January, 2014), pp. 287-308, Elsevier BV [doi[abs].
  20. Letchford, J; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, On the value of commitment, Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, vol. 28 no. 6 (January, 2014), pp. 986-1016 [doi[abs].
  21. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 43 no. 3 (January, 2014), pp. 599-618 [doi[abs].
  22. Conitzer, V; Easley, D; Babaioff, M, EC'14 foreword, Ec 2014 Proceedings of the 15th Acm Conference on Economics and Computation (January, 2014), pp. iii-iv.
  23. De Weerdt, MM; Harrenstein, P; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 86 (January, 2014), pp. 405-420 [doi[abs].
  24. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 43 no. 3 (2014), pp. 1-20, Springer Nature [doi].
  25. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders., CoRR, vol. abs/1401.3876 (2014).
  26. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Mechanism Design., CoRR, vol. abs/1408.1486 (2014).
  27. Conitzer, V, Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries., CoRR, vol. abs/1401.3449 (2014).
  28. Korzhyk, D; Yin, Z; Kiekintveld, C; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness., CoRR, vol. abs/1401.3888 (2014).
  29. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Game-theoretic question selection for tests, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2013), pp. 254-262 [abs].
  30. Conitzer, V, The exact computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 8289 LNCS (December, 2013), pp. 96-108, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  31. Guo, M; Markakis, E; Apt, KR; Conitzer, V, Undominated groves mechanisms, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 46 (April, 2013), pp. 129-163, AI Access Foundation [1203.1809v2], [doi[abs].
  32. Conitzer, V, The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks, 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 (January, 2013), pp. 1482-1487, IEEE [doi[abs].
  33. Conitzer, V; Mcafee, RP, The ACM transactions on economics and computation: An introduction, Acm Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 1 no. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 1-3, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  34. Guo, M; Markakis, E; Apt, KR; Conitzer, V, Undominated Groves Mechanisms., J. Artif. Intell. Res., vol. 46 (2013), pp. 129-163.
  35. Bhattacharya, S; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, Computing a profit-maximizing sequence of offers to agents in a social network, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7695 LNCS (December, 2012), pp. 482-488, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  36. Letchford, J; MacDermed, L; Conitzer, V; Parr, R; Isbell, CL, Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 11 no. 2 (December, 2012), pp. 36-40, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  37. Letchford, J; MacDermed, L; Conitzer, V; Parr, R; Isbell, CL, Computing optimal strategies to commit to in stochastic games, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2012), pp. 1380-1386 [abs].
  38. Conitzer, V, Computing game-theoretic solutions and applications to security, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 3 (November, 2012), pp. 2106-2112 [abs].
  39. Conitzer, V, An undergraduate course in the intersection of computer science and economics, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 3 (November, 2012), pp. 2357-2362 [abs].
  40. Conitzer, V, Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 64 no. 1 (July, 2012), pp. 100-102, Elsevier BV [doi[abs].
  41. Conitzer, V; Taylor, CR; Wagman, L, Hide and seek: Costly consumer privacy in a market with repeat purchases, Marketing Science, vol. 31 no. 2 (March, 2012), pp. 277-292, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) [doi[abs].
  42. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 41 no. 1 (February, 2012), pp. 91-129, Springer Nature [doi[abs].
  43. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 78 no. 1 (January, 2012), pp. 2-14, Elsevier BV [doi[abs].
  44. Waggoner, B; Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Evaluating resistance to false-name manipulations in elections, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (2012), pp. 1485-1491 [abs].
  45. Zuckerman, M; Faliszewski, P; Conitzer, V; Rosenschein, JS, An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS (December, 2011), pp. 363-374 [doi[abs].
  46. Bhattacharya, S; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K, Approximation algorithm for security games with costly resources, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS (December, 2011), pp. 13-24 [doi[abs].
  47. Conitzer, V; Walsh, T; Xia, L, Dominating manipulations in voting with partial information, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2011), pp. 638-643 [abs].
  48. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V; Taylor, CR, Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases (October, 2011).
  49. Naoki, O; Vincent, C; Ryo, I; Yuko, S; Atsushi, I; Makoto, Y, Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations, Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, vol. 26 no. 3 (May, 2011), pp. 451-460, Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence [doi[abs].
  50. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Expressive markets for donating to charities, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 175 no. 7-8 (May, 2011), pp. 1251-1271, Elsevier BV [doi[abs].
  51. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 41 (May, 2011), pp. 25-67, AI Access Foundation [doi[abs].
  52. Korzhyk, D; Yin, Z; Kiekintveld, C; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Stackelberg vs. nash in security games: An extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 41 (May, 2011), pp. 297-327 [doi[abs].
  53. Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Solving stackelberg games with uncertain observability, 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, Aamas 2011, vol. 2 (January, 2011), pp. 953-960 [abs].
  54. Jain, M; Korzhyk, D; Vaněk, O; Conitzer, V; Pěchouček, M; Tambe, M, A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs, 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, Aamas 2011, vol. 1 (January, 2011), pp. 305-312 [abs].
  55. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, Aggregating value ranges: Preference elicitation and truthfulness, Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, vol. 22 no. 1 (January, 2011), pp. 127-150, Springer Nature [doi[abs].
  56. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Lang, J, Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (January, 2011), pp. 179-188, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  57. Conitzer, V; Korzhyk, D, Commitment to correlated strategies, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (2011), pp. 632-637 [abs].
  58. Guo, M; Naroditskiy, V; Conitzer, V; Greenwald, A; Jennings, NR, Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: Public goods and beyond, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS (2011), pp. 158-169 [doi[abs].
  59. Conitzer, V, Discussion of "a conditional game for comparing approximations", Journal of Machine Learning Research, vol. 15 (2011), pp. 72-73 [abs].
  60. Conitzer, V, AI and Economic Theory, Ieee Intelligent Systems, vol. 26 no. 1 (2011), pp. 7-7.
  61. Conitzer, V; Immorlica, N; Letchford, J; Munagala, K; Wagman, L, False-name-proofness in social networks, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 6484 LNCS (December, 2010), pp. 209-221, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  62. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 6484 LNCS (December, 2010), pp. 402-414, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  63. Conitzer, V; Yokoo, M, Using mechanism design to prevent false-name manipulations, Ai Magazine, vol. 31 no. 4 (December, 2010), pp. 65-77, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) [doi[abs].
  64. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Compilation complexity of common voting rules, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2010), pp. 915-920 [abs].
  65. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Stackelberg voting games: Computational aspects and paradoxes, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2010), pp. 921-926 [abs].
  66. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 3 (November, 2010), pp. 1676-1679 [abs].
  67. Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Complexity of computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in security resource allocation games, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2010), pp. 805-810 [abs].
  68. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Procaccia, AD, A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (July, 2010), pp. 275-284, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  69. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V, Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (July, 2010), pp. 83-92, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  70. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 9 no. 1 (June, 2010), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  71. Bhattacharya, S; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K; Xia, L, Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions, Proceedings of the Annual Acm Siam Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (May, 2010), pp. 554-572 [abs].
  72. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 174 no. 5-6 (April, 2010), pp. 363-381, Elsevier BV [doi[abs].
  73. Conitzer, V, Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, vol. 58 no. 3 (April, 2010), pp. 239-259, Springer Nature [doi[abs].
  74. Conitzer, V, Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents, Communications of the Acm, vol. 53 no. 3 (March, 2010), pp. 84-94, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi[abs].
  75. Conitzer, V, Using a memory test to limit a user to one account, Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol. 44 LNBIP (January, 2010), pp. 60-72, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  76. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K, Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5814 LNCS (December, 2009), pp. 250-262, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  77. Guo, M; Conitzer, V; Reeves, DM, Competitive repeated allocation without payments, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5929 LNCS (December, 2009), pp. 244-255, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  78. Ohta, N; Sato, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M; Conitzer, V, Anonymity-proof shapley value: Compact and computationally efficient solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environment, Computer Software, vol. 26 no. 4 (December, 2009), pp. 181-196 [abs].
  79. Shi, P; Conitzer, V; Guo, M, Prediction mechanisms that do not incentivize undesirable actions, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5929 LNCS (December, 2009), pp. 89-100, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  80. Conitzer, V, Approximation guarantees for fictitious play, 2009 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2009 (December, 2009), pp. 636-643, IEEE [doi[abs].
  81. Harrenstein, BP; De Weerdt, MM; Conitzer, V, A qualitative Vickrey auction, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2009), pp. 197-206, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  82. Conitzer, V; Rognlie, M; Xia, L, Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2009), pp. 109-115 [abs].
  83. Halvorson, E; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Multi-step multi-sensor hider-seeker games, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2009), pp. 159-166 [abs].
  84. Xia, L; Zuckerman, M; Procaccia, AD; Conitzer, V; Rosenschein, JS, Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2009), pp. 348-353 [abs].
  85. Conitzer, V, Prediction markets, mechanism design, and cooperative game theory, edited by Bilmes, JA; Ng, AY, Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Uai 2009 (December, 2009), pp. 101-108, AUAI Press [abs].
  86. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 8 no. 2 (December, 2009), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  87. Ohta, N; Conitzer, V; Ichimura, R; Sakurai, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M, Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5732 LNCS (November, 2009), pp. 623-638, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  88. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 67 no. 1 (September, 2009), pp. 69-98, Elsevier BV [doi[abs].
  89. Conitzer, V; Taylor, CR; Wagman, L, Who Benefits from Online Privacy? (August, 2009).
  90. Conitzer, V, Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 35 (August, 2009), pp. 161-191 [doi[abs].
  91. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 8 no. 1 (July, 2009), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  92. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, A multiagent turing test based on a prediction market, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2009), pp. 1435-1436.
  93. Conitzer, V; Lang, J; Xia, L, How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (January, 2009), pp. 103-108 [abs].
  94. Anand, SS; Bunescu, R; Carvcdho, V; Chomicki, J; Conitzer, V; Cox, MT; Dignum, V; Dodds, Z; Dredze, M; Furcy, D; Gabrilovich, E; Göker, MH; Guesgen, H; Hirsh, H; Jannach, D; Junker, U; Ketter, W; Kobsa, A; Koenig, S; Lau, T; Lewis, L; Matson, E; Metzler, T; Mihalcea, R; Mobasher, B; Pineau, J; Poupart, P; Raja, A; Ruml, W; Sadeh, N; Shani, G; Shapiro, D; Smith, T; Taylor, ME; Wagstaff, K; Walsh, W; Zhou, R, AAAI 2008 workshop reports, Ai Magazine, vol. 30 no. 1 (January, 2009), pp. 108-118, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) [doi[abs].
  95. Sosa, JA; Romero, P, Editorial Introductions, Current Opinion in Oncology, vol. 21 no. 1 (January, 2009), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  96. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2009), pp. 336-341 [abs].
  97. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2008), pp. 190-195 [abs].
  98. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2008), pp. 196-201 [abs].
  99. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Lang, J, Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2008), pp. 202-207 [abs].
  100. Conitzer, V, Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting, 10th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2008 (December, 2008), pp. 10P [abs].
  101. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2008), pp. 109-118, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  102. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2008), pp. 99-108, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  103. Apt, K; Conitzer, V; Guo, M; Markakis, E, Welfare undominated groves mechanisms, edited by Papadimitriou, CH; Zhang, S, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5385 LNCS (December, 2008), pp. 426-437, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  104. Conitzer, V, Anonymity-proof voting rules, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5385 LNCS (December, 2008), pp. 295-306, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  105. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2008), pp. 210-219, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  106. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V; Jain, K, An "ethical" game-theoretic solution concept for two-player perfect-information games, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5385 LNCS (December, 2008), pp. 696-707, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  107. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 7 no. 3 (November, 2008), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  108. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, New complexity results about Nash equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 63 no. 2 (July, 2008), pp. 621-641, Elsevier BV [doi[abs].
  109. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 7 no. 2 (June, 2008), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  110. Apaydin, MS; Conitzer, V; Donald, BR, Structure-based protein NMR assignments using native structural ensembles., Journal of Biomolecular Nmr, vol. 40 no. 4 (April, 2008), pp. 263-276 [18365752], [doi[abs].
  111. Ohta, N; Conitzer, V; Satoh, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M, Anonymity-proof Shapley value: Extending Shapley value for coalitional games in open environments, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 909-916 [abs].
  112. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Strategie betting for competitive agents, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 829-836 [abs].
  113. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 1029-1036 [abs].
  114. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 1021-1028 [abs].
  115. Chomicki, J; Conitzer, V; Junkar, U; Pern, P, AAAI Workshop - Technical Report: Preface, AAAI Workshop - Technical Report, vol. WS-08-09 (2008), pp. vii.
  116. Conitzer, V, Metareasoning as a formal computational problem, AAAI Workshop - Technical Report, vol. WS-08-07 (2008), pp. 29-33 [abs].
  117. Conitzer, V, Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (December, 2007), pp. 420-427, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  118. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, Acm Sigecom Exchanges, vol. 7 no. 1 (December, 2007), pp. 69-70, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  119. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Lang, J, When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate, Journal of the Acm, vol. 54 no. 3 (June, 2007), pp. 14-es, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi[abs].
  120. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents, Machine Learning, vol. 67 no. 1-2 (May, 2007), pp. 23-43, Springer Nature [doi[abs].
  121. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments, Proceedings of the 8th Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce Ec '07 (2007), pp. 30-39, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  122. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents, vol. 2006 (December, 2006), pp. 521-528, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  123. Conitzer, V; Garera, N, Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online), Acm International Conference Proceeding Series, vol. 148 (December, 2006), pp. 209-216, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  124. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a nash equilibrium, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents, vol. 2006 (December, 2006), pp. 537-544, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  125. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 627-634 [abs].
  126. Conitzer, V; Davenport, A; Kalagitanam, J, Improved bounds for computing kemeny rankings, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 620-626 [abs].
  127. Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M; Maruono, K; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 697-702 [abs].
  128. Conitzer, V; Garera, N, Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online), Icml 2006 Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Machine Learning, vol. 2006 (October, 2006), pp. 209-216 [abs].
  129. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computing the optimal strategy to commit to, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 2006 (September, 2006), pp. 82-90 [abs].
  130. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 170 no. 6-7 (May, 2006), pp. 607-619, Elsevier BV [doi[abs].
  131. Yokoo, M; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A, A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 4012 LNAI (January, 2006), pp. 53-64, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  132. Conitzer, V, Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (2006), pp. 613-619 [abs].
  133. Yokoot, M; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A, Coalitional games in open anonymous environments, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (December, 2005), pp. 509-514 [abs].
  134. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Santi, P, Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2005), pp. 248-254 [abs].
  135. Conitzer, V, Computational aspects of mechanism design, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 4 (December, 2005), pp. 1642-1643.
  136. Sandholm, T; Gilpin, A; Conitzer, V, Mixed-integer programming methods for finding Nash equilibria, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (December, 2005), pp. 495-501 [abs].
  137. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, A generalized strategy eliminability criterion and computational methods for applying it, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (December, 2005), pp. 483-488 [abs].
  138. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of (iterated) dominance, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2005), pp. 88-97, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  139. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Expressive negotiation in settings with externalities, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2005), pp. 255-260 [abs].
  140. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Communication complexity of common voting rules, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2005), pp. 78-87, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  141. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators, Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Uai 2005 (December, 2005), pp. 145-152 [abs].
  142. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3435 LNAI (2005), pp. 1-14 [abs].
  143. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computing shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2004), pp. 219-225 [abs].
  144. Santi, P; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Towards a characterization of polynomial preference elicitation with value queries in combinatorial auctions, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3120 (December, 2004), pp. 1-16, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  145. Conitzer, V; Derryberry, J; Sandholm, T, Combinatorial auctions with structured item graphs, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2004), pp. 212-218 [abs].
  146. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games, Proceedings, Twenty First International Conference on Machine Learning, Icml 2004 (December, 2004), pp. 185-192 [abs].
  147. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2004, vol. 1 (September, 2004), pp. 128-135 [abs].
  148. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computational criticisms of the revelation principle, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (August, 2004), pp. 262-263 [abs].
  149. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Expressive negotiation over donations to charities, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (August, 2004), pp. 51-60 [abs].
  150. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (August, 2004), pp. 132-141 [abs].
  151. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (2004), pp. 266-267 [abs].
  152. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Automated mechanism design: Complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting, Acm International Conference Proceeding Series, vol. 50 (December, 2003), pp. 17-24 [doi[abs].
  153. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2003), pp. 613-618, ACM [html], [doi[abs].
  154. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games, edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning, vol. 1 (December, 2003), pp. 91-98, AAAI Press [abs].
  155. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents, edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning, vol. 1 (December, 2003), pp. 83-90, AAAI Press [abs].
  156. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (December, 2003), pp. 17-24, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  157. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard, edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2003), pp. 781-788, Morgan Kaufmann [0307018v1[abs].
  158. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Definition and complexity of some basic metareasoning problems, edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2003), pp. 1099-1106, Morgan Kaufmann [0307017v1[abs].
  159. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity results about Nash equilibria, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. cs.GT/0205074 (December, 2003), pp. 765-771 [0205074v1[abs].
  160. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer, Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce (November, 2003), pp. 232-233 [abs].
  161. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-proofness, edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2002), pp. 392-397, AAAI Press / The MIT Press [abs].
  162. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates, edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2002), pp. 314-319, AAAI Press / The MIT Press [abs].
  163. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria, CoRR, vol. cs.GT/0205074 (2002).
  164. Lewin, AY; Knox Lovell, CA, Editor's introduction, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 46 no. 1-2 (January, 1990), pp. 3-5, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].
  165. Campbell, JY; Melino, A, Editors' introduction, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 45 no. 1-2 (January, 1990), pp. 1-5, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi].

Conference articles PUBLISHED

  1. Kramer, MF; Schaich Borg, J; Conitzer, V; Sinnott-Armstrong, W, When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?, Aies 2018 Proceedings of the 2018 Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai, Ethics, and Society (December, 2018), pp. 204-209 [doi[abs].
  2. Freeman, R; Conitzer, V; Zahedi, SM; Lee, BC, Dynamic proportional sharing: A game-theoretic approach, Sigmetrics 2018 Abstracts of the 2018 Acm International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (June, 2018), pp. 33-35, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  3. De Weerdt, M; Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Van Der Linden, K, Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart grid, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2018-July (January, 2018), pp. 4736-4742 [abs].
  4. Deng, Y; Conitzer, V, Disarmament games with resources, 32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2018 (January, 2018), pp. 981-988 [abs].
  5. Freedman, R; Dickerson, JP; Borg, JS; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Conitzer, V, Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values, 32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2018 (January, 2018), pp. 1636-1643 [abs].
  6. De Weerdt, MM; Conitzer, V; Albert, M; Van Der Linden, K, Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart grid, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 3 (January, 2018), pp. 1924-1926 [abs].
  7. Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Shah, N, Fair public decision making, Ec 2017 Proceedings of the 2017 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation (June, 2017), pp. 629-646, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  8. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Game-theoretic question selection for tests, edited by Rossi, F, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 59 (May, 2017), pp. 437-462, AI Access Foundation [html], [doi[abs].
  9. Conitzer, V; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Borg, JS; Deng, Y; Kramer, M, Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence, 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017 (January, 2017), pp. 4831-4835 [abs].
  10. Deng, Y; Conitzer, V, Disarmament games, 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017 (January, 2017), pp. 473-479 [abs].
  11. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Stone, P, Automated design of robust mechanisms, 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017 (January, 2017), pp. 298-304 [abs].
  12. Freeman, R; Zahedi, SM; Conitzer, V, Fair and efficient social choice in dynamic settings, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (January, 2017), pp. 4580-4587 [abs].
  13. Conitzer, V; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Borg, JS; Deng, Y; Kramer, M, Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence, Aaai Workshop Technical Report, vol. WS-17-01 - WS-17-15 (January, 2017), pp. 105-109 [abs].
  14. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Stone, P, Mechanism design with unknown correlated distributions: Can we learn optimal mechanisms?, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 1 (January, 2017), pp. 69-77 [abs].
  15. Kephart, A; Conitzer, V, The revelation principle for mechanism design with reporting costs, Ec 2016 Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation (July, 2016), pp. 85-102, ACM Press [doi[abs].
  16. Bergemann, D; Chen, Y; Conitzer, V, EC 2016 foreword, Ec 2016 Proceedings of the 2016 Acm Conference on Economics and Computation (July, 2016), pp. iii-iv.
  17. Xu, H; Freeman, R; Conitzer, V; Dughmi, S; Tambe, M, Signaling in Bayesian stackelberg games, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas (January, 2016), pp. 150-158 [abs].
  18. Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Shah, N, False-name-proof recommendations in social networks, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas (January, 2016), pp. 332-340 [abs].
  19. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas (January, 2016), pp. 1413-1414 [abs].
  20. Conitzer, V, Computing equilibria with partial commitment, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 10123 LNCS (January, 2016), pp. 1-14, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [doi[abs].
  21. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Lopomo, G, Maximizing revenue with limited correlation: The cost of ex-post incentive compatibility, 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016 (January, 2016), pp. 376-382 [abs].
  22. Brill, M; Freeman, R; Conitzer, V, Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan setwinners), 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016 (January, 2016), pp. 418-424 [abs].
  23. Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Brill, M; Li, Y, Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs, 30th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2016 (January, 2016), pp. 460-467 [abs].
  24. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2016-January (January, 2016), pp. 416-423 [abs].
  25. Andersen, G; Conitzer, V, ATUCAPTS: Automated tests that a user cannot pass twice simultaneously, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2016-January (January, 2016), pp. 3662-3669 [abs].
  26. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Lopomo, G, Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility., edited by Schuurmans, D; Wellman, MP, AAAI (2016), pp. 383-389, AAAI Press.
  27. Jakobsen, SK; Sørensen, TB; Conitzer, V, Timeability of Extensive-Form Games., edited by Sudan, M, Itcs (2016), pp. 191-199, ACM [doi].
  28. Brill, M; Freeman, R; Conitzer, V, Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners)., edited by Schuurmans, D; Wellman, MP, AAAI (2016), pp. 369-375, AAAI Press.
  29. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation: (Extended Abstract)., edited by Jonker, CM; Marsella, S; Thangarajah, J; Tuyls, K, AAMAS (2016), pp. 1413-1414, ACM.
  30. Brill, M; Conitzer, V, Strategic voting and strategic candidacy, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 819-826 [abs].
  31. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Lopomo, G, Assessing the robustness of Cremer-McLean with automated mechanism design, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 763-769 [abs].
  32. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Cooperative game solution concepts that maximize stability under noise, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 979-985 [abs].
  33. Kephart, A; Conitzer, V, Complexity of mechanism design with signaling costs, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 1 (January, 2015), pp. 357-365 [abs].
  34. Freeman, R; Brill, M; Conitzer, V, General tiebreaking schemes for computational social choice, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 3 (January, 2015), pp. 1401-1409 [abs].
  35. Conitzer, V; Brill, M; Freeman, R, Crowdsourcing societal tradeoffs, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2015), pp. 1213-1217 [abs].
  36. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Maximal cooperation in repeated games on social networks, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2015-January (January, 2015), pp. 216-223 [abs].
  37. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Complexity of stability-based solution concepts in multi-issue and MC-net cooperative games, 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas 2014, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 581-588 [abs].
  38. Freeman, R; Brill, M; Conitzer, V, On the axiomatic characterization of runoff voting rules, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 675-681 [abs].
  39. Conitzer, V; Vidali, A, Mechanism design for scheduling with uncertain execution time, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 623-629 [abs].
  40. Sørensen, TB; Dalis, M; Letchford, J; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, Beat the cheater: Computing game-theoretic strategies for when to kick a gambler out of a casino, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 798-804 [abs].
  41. Xu, H; Fang, F; Jiang, AX; Conitzer, V; Dughmi, S; Tambe, M, Solving zero-sum security games in discretized spatio-temporal domains, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (January, 2014), pp. 1500-1506 [abs].
  42. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '14, Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014, edited by Babaioff, M; Conitzer, V; Easley, D, EC (2014), ACM.
  43. Andersen, G; Conitzer, V, Fast equilibrium computation for infinitely repeated games, edited by desJardins, M; Littman, ML, Proceedings of the 27th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2013 (December, 2013), pp. 53-59, AAAI Press [php[abs].
  44. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V, Solving security games on graphs via marginal probabilities, edited by desJardins, M; Littman, ML, Proceedings of the 27th Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2013 (December, 2013), pp. 591-597, AAAI Press [php[abs].
  45. Todo, T; Conitzer, V, False-name-proof matching, edited by Gini, ML; Shehory, O; Ito, T; Jonker, CM, 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, Aamas 2013, vol. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 311-318, IFAAMAS [citation.cfm[abs].
  46. Jain, M; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Security scheduling for real-world networks, edited by Gini, ML; Shehory, O; Ito, T; Jonker, CM, 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, Aamas 2013, vol. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 215-222, IFAAMAS [citation.cfm[abs].
  47. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Optimal internet auctions with costly communication., edited by Gini, ML; Shehory, O; Ito, T; Jonker, CM, AAMAS (2013), pp. 683-690, IFAAMAS [citation.cfm].
  48. Conitzer, V, The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks., Allerton (2013), pp. 1482-1487, IEEE [doi].
  49. Conitzer, V; Xia, L, Approximating common voting rules by sequential voting in multi-issue domains, International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2012 (December, 2012) [AcceptedPapers[abs].
  50. Conitzer, V; Xia, L, Paradoxes of Multiple Elections: An Approximation Approach., edited by Brewka, G; Eiter, T; McIlraith, SA, KR (2012), AAAI Press [html].
  51. Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Security games with multiple attacker resources, edited by Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2011), pp. 273-279, IJCAI/AAAI [html], [doi[abs].
  52. Conitzer, V; Lang, J; Xia, L, Hypercubewise preference aggregation in multi-issue domains, edited by Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2011), pp. 158-163, IJCAI/AAAI [html], [doi[abs].
  53. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, A maximum likelihood approach towards aggregating partial orders, edited by Walsh, T, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2011), pp. 446-451, IJCAI/AAAI [html], [doi[abs].
  54. Jain, M; Korzhyk, D; Vanek, O; Conitzer, V; Pechoucek, M; Tambe, M, A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs., edited by Sonenberg, L; Stone, P; Tumer, K; Yolum, P, AAMAS (2011), pp. 327-334, IFAAMAS.
  55. Iwasaki, A; Conitzer, V; Omori, Y; Sakurai, Y; Todo, T; Guo, M; Yokoo, M, Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 1 (January, 2010), pp. 633-640, IFAAMAS [html], [doi[abs].
  56. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Lang, J, Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 1 (January, 2010), pp. 399-406, IFAAMAS [html], [doi[abs].
  57. Yin, Z; Korzhyk, D; Kiekintveld, C; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: Interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2010), pp. 1139-1146, IFAAMAS [html], [doi[abs].
  58. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Aamas, vol. 2 (January, 2010), pp. 881-888, IFAAMAS [html], [doi[abs].
  59. Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010, edited by Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, Computational Foundations of Social Choice, vol. 10101 (2010), Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany.
  60. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal., edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Aamas (2010), pp. 1475-1476, IFAAMAS [doi].
  61. Bhattacharya, S; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K; Xia, L, Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions., edited by Charikar, M, SODA (2010), pp. 554-572, SIAM [doi].
  62. Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, 10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of Social Choice., edited by Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, Computational Foundations of Social Choice, vol. 10101 (2010), Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany.
  63. Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, 10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of Social Choice., edited by Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, Computational Foundations of Social Choice, vol. 10101 (2010), Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany.
  64. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, A hybrid of a Turing test and a prediction market, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 14 LNICST (December, 2009), pp. 61-73 [doi[abs].
  65. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market, edited by Das, S; Ostrovsky, M; Pennock, D; Szymanski, BK, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 14 (2009), pp. 61-73, Springer Berlin Heidelberg [978-3-642-03821-1], [doi].
  66. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market., edited by Sierra, C; Castelfranchi, C; Decker, KS; Sichman, JS, Aamas (2) (2009), pp. 1407-1408, IFAAMAS [doi].
  67. Conitzer, V, Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory., edited by Bilmes, JA; Ng, AY, UAI (2009), pp. 101-108, AUAI Press.
  68. Apt, KR; Conitzer, V; Guo, M; Markakis, E, Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms., edited by Papadimitriou, CH; Zhang, S, WINE, vol. 5385 (2008), pp. 426-437, SPRINGER.
  69. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, Aamas (2) (2008), pp. 1047-1054, IFAAMAS [doi].
  70. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Strategic betting for competitive agents., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, Aamas (2) (2008), pp. 847-854, IFAAMAS [doi].
  71. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, Aamas (2) (2008), pp. 1039-1046, IFAAMAS [doi].
  72. Ohta, N; Conitzer, V; Satoh, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M, Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, Aamas (2) (2008), pp. 927-934, IFAAMAS [doi].
  73. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Incremental mechanism design, edited by Veloso, MM, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2007), pp. 1251-1256 [html[abs].
  74. Sandholm, T; Conitzer, V; Boutilier, C, Automated design of multistage mechanisms, edited by Veloso, MM, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2007), pp. 1500-1506 [html[abs].
  75. Conitzer, V, Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness, edited by Cramton, P; Müller, R; Tardos, É; Tennenholtz, M, Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, Tark 2007, vol. 07271 (December, 2007), pp. 102-111, ACM Press [html], [doi[abs].
  76. Conitzer, V, Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness., edited by Cramton, P; Müller, R; Tardos, É; Tennenholtz, M, Computational Social Systems and the Internet, vol. 07271 (2007), Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany.
  77. Conitzer, V, Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules., edited by Cramton, P; Müller, R; Tardos, É; Tennenholtz, M, Computational Social Systems and the Internet, vol. 07271 (2007), Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany.
  78. Conitzer, V, Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award., edited by Durfee, EH; Yokoo, M; Huhns, MN; Shehory, O, Aamas (2007), pp. 253-253, IFAAMAS [doi].
  79. Yokoo, M; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A, Coalitional games in open anonymous environments, edited by Kaelbling, LP; Saffiotti, A, Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2005), pp. 1668-1669, Professional Book Center [html].
  80. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core., edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, IJCAI (2003), pp. 613-618, Morgan Kaufmann [html], [doi[abs].
  81. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents., edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, ICML (2003), pp. 83-90, AAAI Press.
  82. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard., edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, IJCAI (2003), pp. 781-788, Morgan Kaufmann.
  83. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems., edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, IJCAI (2003), pp. 1099-1106, Morgan Kaufmann.
  84. Conitzer, V; Lang, J; Sandholm, T, How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?, edited by Halpern, JY; Tennenholtz, M, Tark (2003), pp. 201-214, ACM [doi[abs].
  85. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games., edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, ICML (2003), pp. 91-98, AAAI Press.
  86. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness., edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, AAAI/IAAI (2002), pp. 392-397, AAAI Press / The MIT Press.
  87. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Mechanism Design., edited by Darwiche, A; Friedman, N, UAI (2002), pp. 103-110, Morgan Kaufmann.
  88. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates., edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, AAAI/IAAI (2002), pp. 314-319, AAAI Press / The MIT Press.

Duke University * Arts & Sciences * Philosophy * Faculty * Staff * Grad * Reload * Login