Conference articles PUBLISHED

1. Conitzer, V; Deng, Y; Dughmi, S, Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 12495 LNCS (January, 2020), pp. 444-458 [doi].
   (last updated on 2024/04/23)

   Abstract:
   We study infinitely-repeated two-player zero-sum games with one-sided private information and a persistent state. Here, only one of the two players learns the state of the repeated game. We consider two models: either the state is chosen by nature, or by one of the players. For the former, the equilibrium of the repeated game is known to be equivalent to that of a one-shot public signaling game, and we make this equivalence algorithmic. For the latter, we show equivalence to one-shot team max-min games, and also provide an algorithmic reduction. We apply this framework to repeated zero-sum security games with private information on the side of the defender and provide an almost complete characterization of their computational complexity.