Abstract:
Franson interferometers are increasingly being proposed as a means of securing high-dimensional energy-time entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Heuristic arguments have been proposed that purport to demonstrate the security of these schemes. We show, however, that such systems are vulnerable to attacks that localize the photons to several temporally separate locations. This demonstrates that a single pair of Franson interferometers is not a practical approach to securing high-dimensional energy-time entanglement-based QKD. This observation leads us to investigate the security of modified Franson-based-protocols, where Alice and Bob have two or more Franson interferometers. We show that such setups can improve the sensitivity against attacks that localize the photons to multiple temporal locations. While our results do not constitute a full security proof, they do show that a single pair of Franson interferometers is not secure and that multiple such interferometers could be a promising candidate for experimentally realizable high-dimensional QKD. © 2013 IOP Publishing Ltd.
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