Bahar Leventoglu, Assistant Professor

Bahar Leventoglu
Contact Info:
Office Location:  314 Perkins Library
Office Phone:  1-919-660-4314
Email Address:  
Web Page:   http://www.duke.edu/~bl38

Teaching (Spring 2010):

Education:

PhD, Political Science, University of Rochester, 2001
M.A., Political Science, University of Rochester, 1999
BS, Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Bilkent University, Turkey, 1994
Graduate Coursework, Economics, 1994-1996, Bilkent University, Turkey,
Specialties:

Methods
International Relations
Comparative Politics
Research Interests: Applied Game Theory, International Relations, Political Economy.

Bahar Leventoglu is a formal theorist with substantive interests in international relations and political economy. Currently, she has three different ongoing lines of research. One line of research focuses on how leaders use public statements to affect their bargaining position in international negotiations. A second line of research deals with rational explanations of war. A third line of research concerns regime transitions: One project focuses on the effect of social mobility on regime transitions, where as another one examines how coalition formation among groups that are ethnically as well as economically divided have an impact on democratization.

Curriculum Vitae
Recent Publications   (More Publications)

  1. Ahmer Tarar and Bahar Leventoglu, Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining, Forthcoming in International Studies Quarterly (2009) .
  2. Ahmer Tarar and Bahar Leventoglu, "Bargaining and Signaling in International Crises" (Submitted, 2008) .
  3. Bahar Leventoglu and Ahmer Tarar, “Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52 no. 3 (2008), pp. 533-553 .
  4. Bahar Leventoglu and Branislav Slantchev, The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 51 no. 4 (2007), pp. 755-771 .
  5. Bahar Leventoglu and Ahmer Tarar, Pre-negotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining, American Political Science Review, vol. 99 no. 3 (2005), pp. 419-433 .