Publications [#52350] of Bruce W. Jentleson
Monographs
- B.W. Jentleson. Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the Contemporary World. Policy Analysis Briefs The Stanley Foundation, December, 2006. (Released and presented December 7, 2006 in Washington, D.C., at the Stanley Foundation Conference on National and Global Security as part of the conference panel "Enforcement of International Norms: Bringing and Keeping Dissenters in the Fold.") [pdf]
(last updated on 2006/12/27)Abstract:
Libya’s end to its WMD programs and terrorism shows that it is possible to gain cooperation even from “rogue” states through coercive diplomacy. While no two cases are the same, the Libya case has important lessons for the scope and limits of coercive diplomacy as a general strategy and with regard to Iran and North Korea.
The key to the Libya success was a strategy, started in the Clinton administration and continued in the Bush administration and pursued jointly with Britain and support from others, balancing carrots and sticks consistent with three criteria — proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility.
• Proportionality was in making the objective policy-rather than regime-change. The policy-not-regime-change reassurances provided through the secret talks and other channels were crucial to the progress that was made.
• Reciprocity involved carefully calibrated carrot-and-stick diplomacy establishing step-by-step linkages between the carrots offered and the concessions made and building trust after decades of bitter conflict.
• Coercive credibility came from multilateral economic sanctions and to some extent, although much less than claimed by the Bush administration, the backdrop of military force.
• Another key was forging substantial multilateral support. Having UN and not just US sanctions both strengthened the economic impact and sent a strong message of international political will.
• Political and economic shifts within Libya that made cooperation more in Qaddafi’s interests than defiance also were a factor. One of the main implications for Iran and North Korea is the counterproductivity of threats of regime change. Others include the need for multilateral support especially for coercive measures and the overall importance pf deft dipolmacy.
