Publications [#52754] of Marc F. Bellemare
Sanford Institute Working Papers
- Marc F. Bellemare. "Testing the Effect of Imperfect Supervision in Contract Farming: Evidence from Madagascar." (January, 2008).
(last updated on 2008/01/03)Abstract:
This paper tests whether supervision a combination of traditional contract enforcement and technical advice increases productivity in a sample of contracts between a processing rm and small agricultural producers in Madagascar. Building on a framework that incorporates adverse selection, moral hazard, and imperfect supervision, production functions are estimated that treat imperfect monitoring as an input and that control for unobserved heterogeneity at the district, agent, and plot levels. The empirical results show that supervision has a positive and significant effect on productivity, that supervision and agent education are substitutes in production, and that there exists a concave relationship between productivity and supervision.
