Department of Mathematics
 Search | Help | Login | pdf version | printable version

Math @ Duke



Publications [#296270] of David P. Kraines

Papers Published

  1. Kraines, DP; Kraines, VY, Natural selection of memory-one strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma., Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 203 no. 4 (April, 2000), pp. 335-355, ISSN 0022-5193 [10736212], [doi]
    (last updated on 2018/04/26)

    In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, mutually cooperative behavior can become established through Darwinian natural selection. In simulated interactions of stochastic memory-one strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Nowak and Sigmund discovered that cooperative agents using a Pavlov (Win-Stay Lose-Switch) type strategy eventually dominate a random population. This emergence follows more directly from a deterministic dynamical system based on differential reproductive success or natural selection. When restricted to an environment of memory-one agents interacting in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games with a 1% noise level, the Pavlov agent is the only cooperative strategy and one of very few others that cannot be invaded by a similar strategy. Pavlov agents are trusting but no suckers. They will exploit weakness but repent if punished for cheating.
ph: 919.660.2800
fax: 919.660.2821

Mathematics Department
Duke University, Box 90320
Durham, NC 27708-0320