The Energy Innovation System
A Historical Perspective

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While the importance of innovation in the energy technology arena is widely understood—particularly in the context of difficult problems like climate change—there is considerable debate about the specific role of public policies and public funding vis-à-vis the private sector. To what extent can the market drive innovation in new, lower-carbon energy technologies once regulatory constraints have been adopted and prices begin to capture the environmental externality associated with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions? Accepting that a rationale exists for direct public research and development (R&D) investment even in the context of a pricing policy, how much investment is justified, and what mechanisms and institutions would most effectively deliver desired results? What lessons can be drawn from the past thirty years of federal involvement in energy technology R&D, and what do they imply about government’s ability to pursue particular energy-related policy objectives?

These questions are important precisely because the potential economic payoff from well-designed policies is high, with annualized cost savings from advanced low- and no-GHG technologies being estimated in the tens to hundreds of billions of dollars per year (Newell 2008). At the same time, public resources are likely to be substantially constrained going forward given the current long-term fiscal outlook in the United States and elsewhere. This

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reality prompts additional questions: first, what options realistically exist for funding expanded investments in energy technology innovation? Second, what institutions are best positioned to direct and oversee publicly funded technology programs?

1.1 Highlights from the History of Energy Innovation

Technological innovation in the production and use of energy is inextricably interwoven with the larger history of human development—indeed, the ability to harness ever larger quantities of energy with ever increasing efficiency has been central to, and inseparable from, the improvements in living standards and economic prosperity achieved in most parts of the world since pre-Industrial times. Sketched in broad terms, progress has been dramatic. According to a recent report by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), for example, the simple progression from sole reliance on human power to the use of draft animals, the water wheel, and, finally, the steam engine increased the power available to human societies by roughly 600-fold (UNDP 2000). The advent of the steam engine, in particular, had a transformative effect, making the production of energy geographically independent of proximity to a particular energy source (because the coal used to power steam engines could be transported more or less anywhere) and ushering in the Industrial Age.

In the decades that followed, advances in energy technology continued and even accelerated, often with far-reaching implications for day-to-day aspects of human life, especially in the world’s industrialized economies. The electrical grid and other major system innovations were introduced, and individual technologies continued to improve. Ausubel and Marchetti (1996), for example, estimate that the efficiency of steam engines improved by a factor of roughly 50 since the 1700s; modern lighting devices, meanwhile, are as much as 500 times more efficient than their primitive forebears. As available means of producing and using energy became more convenient, portable, versatile, and efficient, overall demand also increased: citizens of developed countries now routinely consume as much as 100 times the energy their pre-Industrial ancestors did (UNDP 2000).

Additional compelling evidence for continued innovation in the energy realm can be found in broad macroeconomic indicators—most notably the fact that the amount of energy required to produce a unit of goods and services in the world’s industrialized economies has declined steadily since the mid-1970s. According to various estimates, the energy intensity of the United States and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries has been falling by approximately 1.1 percent per year over the last three decades. Importantly, similar trends also began emerging in a number of major non-OECD economies (such as China) in the 1990s as these countries began to modernize from a relatively
inefficient industrial base (UNDP 2000). As a result, the world as a whole now produces more wealth per unit of energy than ever before.

While these broad trends can be documented with relative ease, the specific role of innovation per se—as distinct from investment, learning during use, structural change in the economy, and other factors—is much harder to quantify. In part, this is because the energy sector itself is unusually large, diverse, and complex. There are numerous distinct technologies and industries for producing and converting primary sources of energy, such as petroleum, coal, and natural gas extraction and combustion; nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, and wind power; as well as biofuels. At the same time, there has also been significant investment in the technologies of energy distribution—such as the electrical grid and pipelines—and, perhaps even more critically, in the technologies of energy use, which include everything from home appliances to automobiles and office equipment. Entire books or reports have been written on innovation in each of these areas alone; undertaking an authoritative treatment of the subject for energy broadly defined would be extremely challenging to say the least.

Given the inherent difficulty of generalizing over such a broad and diverse set of technologies and industries, we focus in the next section on the record of innovation over the last half century or so in a few key areas: conventional energy resources, primarily oil, coal, gas, and nuclear; renewable energy technologies, primarily wind and solar; end-use energy efficiency; and pollution control. In all cases, we provide at most a brief review; a more extensive literature can be accessed through the sources cited here. Despite the limitations of this necessarily cursory overview, however, a few important themes or insights emerge:

1. Viewed from the standpoint of historic improvements in the efficiency of energy resource extraction and use, there are grounds for substantial optimism about the innovative potential of energy technology industries.

2. From the standpoint of efforts within the last half century to develop wholly new energy supply options and, in particular, to reduce humanity’s reliance on conventional fossil fuels, however, the record is far more mixed. With the possible exception of civilian nuclear power, which developed as a by-product of R&D investments undertaken for military purposes, substantial public investments in alternative energy have by and large not yielded game-changing technological advances that would allow for a fundamental shift in the distribution of primary energy sources.

3. Where there is no market demand (or “pull”) for a particular energy technology improvement, the investment of public resources to “push” innovation has typically yielded poor returns. In energy, markets for new technologies have usually emerged when one (or more) of the following occurs: (a) prices for conventional resources rise as a result of rising demand and stagnant or falling supply or production capacity; (b) technological possi-
abilities arise that more effectively meet energy demands; and (c) government imposes new policies or regulations that affect market conditions for energy technologies. Classic examples of the latter would include pollution control requirements, efficiency standards, technology mandates (such as renewable portfolio standards), or technology incentives (like the renewable energy production tax credit).

4. To the extent that markets for new energy technologies greatly depend on public policies or public funding, they are inherently vulnerable to fluctuations in political support. Uncertainty about the future continuity of policies or funding can discourage private-sector investment and create boom-bust cycles for new energy technologies (examples of this dynamic can be found in the history of several renewable energy industries and in the U.S. synfuels program of the late 1970s and 1980s).

1.2 The Record of Innovation in Energy Technology: A Brief Review

1.2.1 Fossil Fuels

Fossil fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—today supply over 80 percent of the world’s energy needs. Decades of incremental technology improvements have led to major productivity gains in the extraction and processing of these resources. For example, U.S. miners in 1949 produced 0.7 short tons of coal per miner hour; fifty years later, the rate was over 6 short tons per miner hour (EIA 2009a). Similarly, dramatic advances have occurred in the oil industry, which continues to improve the technology for locating and extracting new reserves. As a result, estimates of the remaining recoverable petroleum resource base are continually being revised upward, despite high rates of global consumption and periodic concerns about dwindling global supply.

For example, in 2000, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimated ultimately recoverable reserves of conventional oil at 3.3 trillion barrels worldwide (including natural gas liquids), of which roughly one-fifth had already been produced at that time (USGS 2000). Taking into account improvements in seismic tools, imaging software and modeling tools, and new extraction techniques (such as the use of horizontal wells), the consulting group Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA; 2006) estimated global recoverable reserves at as much as 4.8 trillion barrels. Advanced secondary and tertiary recovery technologies have also made it possible to extract more oil from existing fields. According to the New York Times, Chevron estimates that it can recover up to 80 percent of the oil at an existing field near Bakersfield, California, using advanced recovery techniques; originally, the company had estimated it could recover only 10 percent of the oil at this site (the industry average is approximately 35 percent; Mouawad 2007). Similar trends exist in natural gas extraction, with recent advances in gas shale significantly expanding U.S. gas resources.
The record of improvement in major fossil-fuel-based conversion technologies, by contrast, is more mixed. On the one hand, the typical thermal efficiency of conventional, steam-electric, coal-fired power plants has remained relatively unchanged for decades at 30 to 40 percent (InterAcademy Council 2007). More-recent innovations, such as fluidized bed or supercritical coal systems can boost generation efficiency and reduce emissions of key air pollutants, but these technologies—while commercially available and already in use at a number of facilities around the world—have been slow to achieve significant levels of market penetration. This is in large part because the rate of turnover of old coal plants and the construction of new plants in developed countries has been quite slow in recent years, while the cost of more-advanced systems remains a major impediment in the developing or emerging economies that have been adding coal capacity more rapidly. Gasified coal systems, which hold out the promise of facilitating further efficiency gains as well as cost-effective carbon capture, remain relatively untested at a commercial scale—in part because they face formidable deployment hurdles.¹

Thus, the most important efficiency gains in electricity generation in modern times have been achieved through the introduction of advanced, combined-cycle turbines that operate on natural gas. These types of systems have dominated new capacity additions in the United States and elsewhere for more than a decade, in large part because they have low pollutant emissions and can be built quickly, on a smaller scale, and at lower capital cost than other power options.

A similarly mixed picture applies to the major existing conversion technology for petroleum used in transportation applications: the internal combustion engine. On the one hand, engineering improvements have substantially boosted the output of power from such engines per unit of fuel input. On the other hand, the extent to which engine efficiency improvements have translated into improved fuel economy (as opposed to increased power or vehicle size and weight) has depended highly on fuel prices and government policies. In the United States, a boost in vehicle efficiency standards after the oil crisis of the 1970s was followed by a long period of stagnation in overall fuel economy after the mid-1980s. In Europe, by contrast, high fuel taxes and other factors have led to a higher-mileage auto fleet. In the last several years, U.S. policy and market trends have again shifted toward higher fuel economy.

Efforts to develop alternative transportation fuels, meanwhile, have produced some of the most problematic examples of U.S. energy policy to date. In particular, the launching of the Synfuels Corporation in 1980 repre-

¹. Although the component technologies involved in gasification systems have been widely used in the chemical and refinery industries for decades, they have not been widely demonstrated at a commercial scale for electric power production. Thus, the technology is perceived as more costly and more risky by the electric power industry, and first-mover projects have had difficulty attracting sufficient private-sector or utility investment.
presented the culmination of a multiyear, multibillion-dollar U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) effort to develop methods for producing petroleum from unconventional domestic sources such as coal or oil shale. The effort collapsed without achieving its major objectives in 1986 following a substantial decline in oil prices. A more recent focus on the development of biomass-based alternative transportation fuels has produced a rapid and dramatic expansion of ethanol production in some parts of the world, notably the United States and Brazil. However, significant technology advances involving the utilization of new feedstocks or conversion technologies that could dramatically reduce the cost, energy, and environmental requirements of biofuels production remain for the most part in the precommercial, research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) phases of development.

1.2.2 Nuclear

Against this backdrop, nuclear power offers perhaps the most dramatic example of a major energy supply innovation that was deployed on a large scale within the last half century. Developed as an outgrowth of military R&D investments, civilian nuclear power experienced a relatively brief period of substantial commercial investment from the 1970s to the mid-1980s, based on the hope—especially compelling in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis—that it might eventually provide a near-limitless, domestic supply of energy at a price that was “too cheap to meter.” In a time span of fewer than two decades, nuclear power grew to contribute roughly 16 percent of global and 20 percent of U.S. electricity supply (in a few countries, such as France, it accounts for a significantly larger share; World Nuclear Association 2005; EIA 2009c).

Since the 1980s, however, further nuclear capacity additions have slowed dramatically due to a combination of high capital costs relative to other conventional generation options and concerns about a range of related issues, from waste management to weapons proliferation and public safety—concerns that were heightened in the wake of widely publicized accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986. Nevertheless, the nuclear industry worldwide has been able to maintain a roughly stable share of overall electricity supply, in large part because of ongoing improvements in the operating efficiency of existing plants. In fact, the average utilization or “capacity factor” of U.S. nuclear plants increased from 56 percent in 1980 to 66 percent in 1990 and over 90 percent currently (EIA 2009d).

Despite at best uncertain prospects for a second wave of nuclear power plant construction, governments around the world never stopped investing in the technology, which has continued to evolve through several generations of new designs. Most reactors operating today are considered Generation II; more recent reactors built in France and Japan utilize Generation III designs, which emerged in the 1990s with the idea of reducing costs through
increased standardization and other innovations. Generation III+ designs incorporate further improvements, including passive emergency cooling systems in place of conventional power-driven systems. In 2002, ten nations and the European Union launched a coordinated R&D effort, known as the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), to develop a new set of reactor designs that take advantage of high-temperature, high-efficiency concepts to substantially reduce waste output and fuel use. Participants in the GIF are pursuing focused research on six different types of reactor designs, including the very high temperature gas reactor, the supercritical water reactor, the lead-cooled fast reactor, the sodium-cooled fast reactor, the gas-cooled fast reactor, and the molten salt reactor.

Continued rapid growth in global electricity demand together with mounting concerns about climate change led to a widespread perception earlier this decade that the nuclear industry could be poised for a second major wave of expansion. Bolstering that perception, a number of new units utilizing recent technology or design innovations have been proposed in the United States and elsewhere in the last several years, even as a number of governments introduced or strengthened existing policies and subsidies—including loan guarantees or other incentives—to support new plant construction. More recently, however, construction cost increases across many large-scale engineered projects, a worldwide economic slowdown, and actual experience with the construction of a new reactor in Finland and France may have dampened prospects for a renaissance of the civilian nuclear power industry (Deutsche et al. 2009).

1.2.3 Renewables

Renewable energy has been another area of major public- and private-sector investment in new energy supply options—one that like nuclear power and synthetic fuels had its roots in the post-oil embargo era of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the 1970s, a number of countries began a major push to develop wind and solar technology; early R&D efforts in the United States were funded by the federal government, along with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Boeing. Efforts were soon bolstered by the introduction of generous tax incentives. These efforts led to a “wind rush” in the early 1980s that saw the construction of the first large-scale wind farms, mostly in California. Denmark also made an early and substantial investment in wind, emerging as a leader in the production and design of wind turbines by the 1980s. In the United States, the locus of innovative activity increasingly shifted to a number of smaller entrepreneurs who continued tinkering with different rotor and gearbox designs even as the commercial wind industry ground to an abrupt halt in the mid-1980s, when state and federal tax credits began to expire (see Economist (2008) for an overview of the history of wind technology development and Neij (1999, 2005) for a discussion of the cost dynamics of wind power).
With the benefit of the design improvements that emerged from these
efforts and those of the Danish manufacturers, wind investment in the
United States took off again in the early 2000s, propelled by the reintroduc-
tion of tax credits and a growing number of prorenewable state policies.
Recent years have seen dramatic worldwide growth in installed wind capac-
ity, which rose from 18 gigawatts in 2000 to a global total of 159 gigawatts by
the end of 2009—a trend that is projected to continue into the future (EIA
2010). Before the current economic downturn, in fact, some analysts were
predicting that wind would grow to as much as 2.7 percent of global electric-
ty generation by 2012 and nearly 6 percent by 2017 (Economist 2008).
Although under current policies, EIA (2010) projects more modest growth
to a 2.3 percent share by 2015 and 3.6 percent share by 2020, the rate of
growth is still almost 14 percent per year.

Meanwhile, wind technology itself has also undergone substantial changes:
early wind turbines tended to be relative small, with generating capacities on
the order of tens of kilowatts and rotor diameters on the order of 15 meters.
More recent turbines benefit from the ability to operate at variable speeds
and use lighter-weight materials; this has allowed the introduction of much
larger units, which in turn has produced substantial cost reductions. Wind
turbines built in recent years typically generate 1.5 to 2.5 megawatts and have
rotor diameters as large as 100 meters; recent proposals have featured even
larger turbines. The per-kilowatt-hour cost of generating electricity from
wind, meanwhile, has fallen from an industry average of thirty cents in the
early 1980s to approximately ten cents in 2007 (Economist 2008).

As this brief review suggests, the development of wind and other new
energy technologies has been strongly influenced by financial incentives and
other policy support from the public sector.2 Federal tax incentives—for
electricity production in the case of wind and for investment in the case
of solar—were particularly critical drivers of deployment and innovation
for these technologies. The current federal renewable energy production
tax credit dates back to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which provided a
1.5 cent-per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for the first ten years of power output
from qualifying wind and biomass facilities. The tax credit was indexed to
inflation and now totals 2.1 cents per kilowatt-hour. Since its inception,
the production tax credit has been extended or renewed multiple times, but
always for periods of at most two to three years at a time. Moreover, on
five occasions since 1999, the program has actually expired before being
renewed, often with some changes in eligibility requirements and other rules.

2. Tax credits and other incentives have also been used to promote energy technologies other
than wind and solar. In the United States, for example, production tax credits have also been
available for advanced coal and nuclear power. Other prominent examples of energy technology
subsidies in the U.S. context include the excise tax credit for ethanol, liability protection for the
nuclear industry in the form of the Price-Anderson Act, and federal loan guarantees for the
construction of new nuclear power plants.
This pattern has created substantial investment uncertainty for the industry: in years when tax credits lapsed, capacity additions fell precipitously compared to the prior year.

Solar energy, meanwhile, has historically benefited from a 10 percent investment tax credit although it was also eligible for the production tax credit for a brief period from 2004 through 2005. Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and subsequent reauthorizations, the investment tax credit for solar energy increased to 30 percent of eligible system costs. Overall, solar technology has yet to achieve the level of cost-competitiveness and market penetration of wind—especially in centralized, grid-connected applications—but the solar industry has likewise experienced dramatic global growth in recent years and achieved significant cost reductions (Watanabe, Wakabayashi, and Miyazawa 2000). Earlier this decade, the solar energy industry as a whole—which includes solar thermal and photovoltaic (PV) technologies in both grid-connected and stand-alone applications—experienced average annual growth rates in excess of 40 percent (DOE 2009). Installed PV capacity, most of it grid-connected, grew especially quickly to a cumulative global total of more than 16 gigawatts (peak capacity) by the end of 2008 (REN21 2009). Meanwhile, the best commercially available PV cells now achieve conversion efficiencies above 23 percent, well above the current industry average of 12 to 18 percent (EIA 2010). Even higher efficiencies—in excess of 40 percent (NREL 2008)—have been achieved in the laboratory. By comparison, the conversion efficiency of the first solar cell developed by Bell Laboratories in 1954 was 6 percent (EIA 2010).

Despite this progress, however, remaining cost and deployment hurdles for solar are such that the industry’s commercial prospects going forward will continue to depend strongly on government support, including both direct support in the form of financial incentives and public R&D investments and indirect support in the form of GHG regulation and other public policies designed to advance renewable or alternative energy sources. With average levelized electricity production costs on the order of twenty-five cents per kilowatt-hour (EIA 2010), solar PV remains substantially more expensive at present than competing conventional power options and, like wind, it faces challenges related to siting, intermittency, and grid integration.

3. Much of the recent demand for solar technology has come from decentralized, stand-alone applications—including rooftop installations and as a power source in remote locations or developing-country settings.

4. An important deployment hurdle for both wind and solar technology is the availability of adequate transmission infrastructure, particularly to relatively remote sites where the underlying resource potential tends to be more concentrated. Continued advances in grid technology and capacity are also critical to support renewable energy technologies whose output—in contrast to conventional power sources—varies according to weather conditions and time of day.
1.2.4 Energy Efficiency

A rich and far-ranging record of technology innovation can also be found on the demand side of the energy equation, in the evolution of the wide variety of devices and appliances that use energy to do work and provide light, heat, refrigeration, mobility, air conditioning, and a host of other services and amenities. Although the topic of innovation in energy efficiency is more extensive than can be summarized adequately here, it is worth noting that public R&D investments in this area, according to at least one relatively recent study of the past record of DOE programs in the United States, have yielded far larger economic cost savings and other societal benefits than past public investments in fossil supply technologies (National Research Council [NRC] 2001). Energy efficiency advances also provide numerous examples of the interaction between innovation and regulatory policy in accelerating innovative progress.

The case of refrigerator technology, for example, has been frequently cited because it dramatically illustrates the potency of these interactions. In the United States in the early 1990s, publicly supported R&D efforts combined with innovative utility programs led to significant improvements in refrigerator and freezer technology. These improvements led to the enactment of state and eventually federal minimum efficiency standards for refrigerators, motivating further innovation and continued technology advances as the standards became more stringent in subsequent years. The resulting marketwide improvement in refrigerator and freezer efficiency has been credited with producing very substantial and highly cost-effective cumulative reductions in energy consumption over a period of multiple years. The average refrigerator today consumes 75 percent less energy than its 1975 counterpart, even though it typically has larger storage capacity, more features, and costs less in inflation-adjusted terms.

Similar examples of innovative progress can be found in other energy end-use technologies and in energy-intensive industries, such as steel and cement manufacturing, which face strong private incentives to improve energy efficiency as a means of enhancing overall cost-competitiveness. For example, according to figures compiled by the U.S. EIA, the average energy intensity of the U.S. iron and steel industry—as measured by the first use of energy for all purposes in thousand Btu divided by the value of production in constant 1992 dollars—declined by more than 25 percent in a single decade from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (from 46.47 thousand Btu per dollar in 1985 to 33.98 thousand Btu per dollar in 1994; EIA 2006). Moreover, data collected by EIA in subsequent years show that the energy intensity of the U.S. iron and steel industry continued to decline between 1998 and 2002. Research by Popp (2001) using patent data from thirteen energy-intensive industries suggests that investments in efficiency technologies by these industries have generally been highly cost-effective. Specifically, Popp
finds that the median patent leads to $14.5 million dollars in long-run energy savings, while the industries that use these technologies spent an average of $2.25 million of R&D per patent.

1.2.5 Pollution Control

A final area of energy technology that has been studied for evidence of its effects on innovation concerns pollution control. Here, too, numerous examples can be found where dramatic advances were achieved in technology performance and cost across multiple industries and types of pollution. In most cases, these improvements were prompted by the introduction of mandatory regulation given the public good nature of pollution reductions. When limits on sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from power plants were being debated in the United States in the late 1980s, for example, government and industry estimates indicated that the costs of pollution abatement would likely be on the order of $1,000 per ton or more. Under the market-based Acid Rain Program that was eventually introduced, however, abatement costs proved dramatically lower than expected. Indeed, SO2 allowance prices throughout the first decade of program implementation remained fairly stable at or below $200 per ton (EPA 2009).5

In fact, a number of studies have looked at the effects of innovation on the costs of pollution abatement as one measure—albeit an incomplete one—of returns to R&D investment. For example, Carlson et al. (2000) examine changes in the marginal abatement costs for air pollutant emissions at power plants and find that about 20 percent of the change in marginal abatement costs that have occurred from 1985 to 1995 can be attributed to technological change. Popp (2003) uses patent data to link innovative activity to lower operating costs of scrubbers for coal-fired electric power plants. He finds that a single patent provides a present value of $6 million in cost savings across the industry. Assuming approximately $1.5 million of R&D spent per patent granted, this yields a rate of return similar to those found in the more general technological change literature.

1.3 Drivers of Energy Technology Innovation: The Role of Markets and Government Policy

Historically, a number of market and regulatory conditions have influenced private- and public-sector spending on energy-related R&D. Trends over the last half century suggest that investment tends to decline when energy prices are low and when available production capacity and technol-
ologies are perceived to be ample, or at least adequate to meet market demand. When prices rise because of a perception of resource scarcity or because government policies—in the form of changed regulation or incentives—create a shift in market conditions, investment tends to increase. Following the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973, for example, energy prices rose sharply, and governments around the world instituted policies aimed at reducing dependence on imported oil. As a result, investments in energy-related R&D—by both the public and private sectors—grew rapidly, reaching a historic peak roughly around 1980. Subsequent spending, however, declined substantially in real terms, reflecting the fact that fossil-fuel prices were low for most of the 1980s and 1990s, along with market structure changes in the power industry (Sanyal and Cohen 2009). The trend of falling expenditures on energy R&D during this period was compounded in the United States by the deregulation or restructuring of the natural gas and electric utilities industries and efforts to balance the federal budget.

A more recent shift in market and regulatory conditions for energy technology occurred earlier this decade when oil and natural gas prices began to climb in response to rapidly growing global demand and governments began introducing policies motivated by a new set of environmental and energy security concerns. The result was a resurgence of public and private investment in energy-related R&D and rapid growth in some alternative energy industries, such as wind and biofuels. These trends have recently been complicated by the global economic slowdown and stresses within financial markets that began in 2008. The full impacts of the current crisis are not yet clear. On the one hand, an abrupt slackening of global demand led to a marked drop in energy prices, while tight credit markets have created new barriers to investment. On the other hand, economic stimulus efforts in the United States and elsewhere are contributing—at least in the short run—to increased investment in alternative energy sources and efficiency improvements. Energy prices have also advanced from their recent lows.

Historic shifts in public funding for energy R&D, both in terms of the overall level of spending and in terms of the emphasis on different types of resources, are illustrated by figure 1.1, which shows spending by the U.S. DOE on energy R&D. The figure indicates that current expenditures now total more than $5 billion annually. This represents a marked increase over funding levels at the start of this decade, but it remains about half, in inflation-adjusted terms, of the peak level of spending reached in 1979.

Data on energy-related R&D spending by private firms are more difficult to obtain. Broad estimates suggest that direct federal spending—which cumulatively totaled more than $100 billion in real terms over the last three decades (most of it spent through DOE programs)—represented about one-third of total national expenditures on energy R&D, with the balance being
spent by the private sector. However, the private-sector share of the total has fallen over the last decade.

Estimates of private-sector spending further suggest that energy companies, at least in the United States, invest a far smaller share of sales in R&D than do high-technology industries such as the pharmaceutical, aircraft, or office equipment/computing industries. Given the scale of the innovation challenge presented by current energy-related public policy concerns—particularly with respect to climate change—this observation prompts further questions: how can government stimulate additional private-sector investment in energy R&D? More specifically, what combination of “market-shaping” policies—including direct spending and incentives, as well as policies related to intellectual property, pricing and taxes, competition, technology mandates, and environmental standards and regulation—would most effectively accelerate the process of innovation and the introduction of innovative technologies to the marketplace? What is the overall level of private-sector R&D investment that could be brought to bear on the climate

6. This is notwithstanding the fact that many companies that provide energy-using goods and services—examples might include manufacturers of automobiles and electronic equipment—make substantial investments in R&D. In fact, some of these companies have very large R&D budgets (Newell 2010; U.K. Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills 2007). However, it is often difficult to discern what portion of the R&D budgets of major corporations goes to innovations that specifically affect the energy use characteristics of their product offerings.
technology challenge, and how does that level depend on the specific policy context in which companies make investment decisions (Newell 2010)? Economists have investigated this process of induced innovation for many years in the context of a broad set of industries, and more-recent evidence supports the inducement mechanism specifically in the context of environmental and energy technology innovation in response to increases in cost of energy and environmental emissions (for surveys, see Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2003; Popp, Newell, and Jaffe 2010). Studies have, for example, looked at these questions using past examples of changes in regulatory or market conditions for energy technologies. The basic starting premise is that policies to address negative environmental externalities (such as standards or taxes) raise operating costs and create incentives for innovation. Indeed, a number of studies (e.g., Lanjouw and Mody 1996; Hasic, Johnstone, and Michel 2008; Popp 2006a) find that environmental regulations that impose emission reduction costs lead to increased private expenditures on abatement technologies and increased innovation (as measured by patents issued). Energy-related patenting activity also increases when energy prices rise, suggesting that policies that increase the cost of using fossil fuels can be expected to stimulate new research quickly (Popp 2002).

Other research suggests that changing regulatory conditions or simple uncertainty about future conditions tend to have a dampening effect on private-sector investment in new technologies. An analysis of data from the U.S. electric industry by Sanyal and Cohen (2009) suggests that R&D efforts by electric utility companies declined precipitously during the decade from 1990 to 2000, in large part because of the advent of electric industry restructuring. This created uncertainty about future regulatory and market conditions, which tended to discourage longer-term investments, including investments in R&D. Once restructuring legislation was adopted, exposure to competition tended to depress R&D investment even further. Sanyal and Cohen conclude that a sharp reduction in utility R&D expenditures is likely a permanent consequence of efforts to restructure the industry in the 1990s.

1.4 U.S. Government Investment in Energy RD&D

U.S. Department of Energy energy research has gone through several transitions over the last three decades, both in terms of its relative focus on precommercial basic research versus technology demonstration and in terms of the emphasis placed on different technology areas (e.g., nuclear power, fossil fuels, energy efficiency, and renewables). During the Nixon administration in the early 1970s, the primary goal was energy independence. This goal quickly proved impractical, but U.S. policy—especially after the 1973 OPEC oil embargo—continued to stress the development of alternative liquid fuels until well into the 1980s. The emphasis on finding domestic alternatives to
imported oil culminated in the creation of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, which became emblematic of the large, expensive demonstration projects undertaken during this era.

The Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) was established in 1980 as an independent, wholly federally owned corporation to help create a domestic synthetic fuel industry as an alternative to importing crude oil. Under political pressure to backstop international oil prices, the SFC established a production target of 500,000 barrels per day. It had a seven-member board of directors, one of whom was a full-time chairman, and all of whom were appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The SFC had the authority to provide financial assistance through purchase agreements, price guarantees, loan guarantees, loans, and joint ventures for project modules. After predicting oil prices of $80 to $100 per barrel and a synfuel price of $60 per barrel, the SFC was crippled when oil prices plummeted to below $20 per barrel. It was eventually canceled in 1986 after several billion dollars in expenditures. Many experts have criticized the SFC as an example of a failed involvement of government in large-scale commercial demonstration, an area thought better left to the private sphere (Cohen and Noll 1991).

Under the Reagan administration, national energy policy and federal research were dramatically reoriented, with a new stress on long-term, pre-competitive R&D and lower overall budgets. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, DOE spending had dropped to less than half the peak levels of a decade earlier, and congressional appropriations were beginning to emphasize environmental goals, with large expenditures for the Clean Coal Technology Demonstration Program. The shift away from a focus on energy independence and resource depletion to a greater emphasis on environmental goals, energy efficiency and renewable energy, public-private partnerships, and cost sharing continued over the course of the Clinton administration in the 1990s. Meanwhile, federal support for basic energy research continued to receive the most consistent levels of funding, including in recent years.

Attempts to analyze the success or cost-effectiveness of past federal research relating to energy and the environment have come to mixed conclusions. Cohen and Noll (1991) documented the waste associated with the breeder reactor and synthetic fuel programs in the 1970s (noted in the preceding), but Pegram (1991) concluded that the photovoltaics research program undertaken during the same time frame had significant benefits. More recently, the U.S. National Research Council (NRC) conducted a comprehensive overview of energy efficiency and fossil energy research at the DOE during 1978 to 2000 (NRC 2001). Using both estimates of overall return and case studies, the NRC concluded that there were only a handful of programs that proved highly valuable. Returns on these programs, however, were such that their estimated benefits—including substantial direct economic benefits as well as external benefits such as pollution mitigation and knowledge creation—justified the overall portfolio investment.
Specifically, the NRC found that R&D investments in three types of energy efficiency technologies—advanced refrigerator and freezer compressors, electronic ballasts for fluorescent lamps, and low-emissivity glass—delivered cumulative estimated cost savings on the order of $30 billion when coupled with efficiency standards mandating their deployment. This amount compares to an estimated DOE and private-sector investment in these technologies of only $12 million. By contrast, DOE investments in fossil energy R&D were far less successful. The NRC concluded that cumulative economic savings from these programs only barely exceeded costs (which totaled nearly $11 billion over the period 1986 to 2000), and most of those savings came from improved technologies for extracting oil and gas, not from efforts to develop alternative fossil energy supplies. For the period 1975 to 1985, which included the synfuels era, the DOE invested roughly $6 billion in fossil energy programs that yielded—according to the NRC estimates—about $3.4 billion in benefits.

Although some projects can be expected to fail in any R&D program, the DOE's approach to fossil fuel R&D prior to 1985, with its focus on a narrow set of very expensive projects, did not pay off. Moreover, funding for some programs continued long after it was known that they were ineffective or unlikely to succeed. In some cases, this was for political reasons (Congress continued to appropriate funds for some programs even after the DOE recommended they be cancelled); to some extent, this occurred because neither the DOE, nor the outside agencies charged with evaluating the DOE, applied a consistent, comprehensive, and objective methodology for assessing the costs and benefits of different programs.

U.S. government-sponsored energy R&D programs are commonly thought to have improved substantially since the 1970s and early 1980s, both in terms of the way they are managed and in terms of the objectives they target. To address problems of waste, the DOE launched a series of reforms in the 1990s that were intended to strengthen its contracting and project management practices, hold contractors more accountable for their performance, and demonstrate progress in achieving the agency's missions (Norberg-Bohm 2000; Wells 2001). The improvement in the DOE's more recent track record—particularly with respect to its fossil energy programs—may also be attributed to the shift that occurred in the essential nature of the agency's R&D portfolio during the 1980s. According to the NRC study:

The fossil energy programs of the 1978 to 1986 period, which was dominated by an atmosphere of crisis following the 1973 oil embargo, empha-

7. As the authors of the NRC report point out, an R&D strategy that never produced any failures would not be desirable either; rather, it would indicate an overly conservative approach to the selection of research priorities that almost surely would result in missed opportunities. Rather than striving to minimize risk and avoid failure, the NRC recommends a portfolio approach that emphasizes diversity, goal-setting, objective assessment, and performance tracking.
sized a high-risk strategy for circumventing commercial-scale demonstrations by going directly from bench-scale to large-scale demonstrations to make synthetic fuels from coal and shale oil and to produce oil using enhanced oil recovery techniques. In the second period, however, the fossil energy R&D program was systematic and involved a more diverse portfolio and greater emphasis on increasing the efficiency of electric power generation using natural gas, on reducing the environmental impact when burning coal, and on advanced oil and gas exploration and production. (NRC 2001, 63)

Despite this shift, interest in large-scale, government-sponsored demonstration projects has continued. A recent example is the FutureGen Initiative, which was launched in 2003 as a public-private effort to demonstrate a near-zero-emission, 275 megawatt (MW) coal-fired power plant for producing hydrogen and electricity with carbon capture and storage. FutureGen has already had a turbulent history: By the end of 2007, a consortium of thirteen power producers and electric utilities from around the world had agreed to participate, and a project site had been selected in Illinois. In January 2008, the DOE—citing cost concerns—abruptly cancelled funding for the project. In June 2009, the Obama administration announced its intent to reinstate federal funding for FutureGen; shortly thereafter, however, two large U.S. utility companies—American Electric Power and Southern Company—withdrew from the project (in all, four participants have withdrawn, leaving a total of nine companies in the FutureGen Alliance). In addition, a number of controversies have arisen in connection with the project design, including the choice of a project site, the size of the federal cost-share, the fraction of carbon dioxide emissions to be captured and stored, and project cost.

A small number of papers have also attempted to evaluate the success of government efforts to accelerate the “transfer” of knowledge from basic to applied research (a step that can be seen as bridging the processes of invention and innovation). Such efforts typically combine basic and applied research and are often implemented through government-industry partnerships (National Science Board 2006). The United States passed several policies in the 1980s specifically designed to improve transfer from the more basic research done at government and university laboratories to the applied research done by industry to create marketable products.

Jaffe and Lerner (2001) studied the effectiveness of DOE-funded research and development centers in this regard, supplementing a detailed analysis of patents assigned either directly to the laboratories or to private contractors who collaborated on research at the labs with case studies of two DOE laboratories where technology transfer efforts increased in the 1980s and 1990s. They find that both the number of patents obtained and the number of citations received per patent increased at DOE laboratories since the policy shifts of the 1980s. That the number of citations also increased after the 1980
policy changes contrasts with the findings of researchers who have studied academic patenting, where patent activity increases over time, but the quality of patents appears to decline. Jaffe and Lerner also find that the type of research performed at a laboratory affects technology transfer. Transfer is slower when more basic research is performed or when the research has national security implications. Interestingly, the national laboratories with greater contractor turnover appeared to be more successful at commercializing new technologies.

Popp (2006b) examined citations made to patents in eleven energy technology categories, such as wind and solar energy. He finds that energy patents spawned by government R&D are cited more frequently than other energy patents. This is consistent with the notion that these patents are more basic. More important, after passage of the technology transfer acts in the early 1980s, the privately held patents that are cited most frequently are those that themselves cite government patents. This suggests that publicly sponsored research continues to provide benefits even after the results of that research are transferred to private industry.

1.5 Conclusion

Even a cursory review of the history of energy technology suggests tremendous potential for innovation, both in the technologies available for energy production and in the technologies for energy use. Where a market exists or emerges for technological improvements, innovation has produced significant gains. Thus, for example, advances in the tools and techniques available for extracting energy resources like oil and natural gas have made it possible for accessible reserves to keep pace with rising demand for these fuels over time. However, the most pressing energy challenges that now confront humanity involve environmental and other societal externalities for which there has historically been little or no market.

Among those challenges is climate change, which has emerged—alongside continuing concerns about energy supply security—as one of the central issues motivating most current discussions about energy technology innovation. The remainder of this book explores patterns of technological innovation in other industries to see what lessons might be applicable in the energy context and, more specifically, to understand what roles government and the private sector might play in accelerating the process of innovation. Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the public role has at least two dimensions: (a) creating a market for technological improvements through policy intervention (environmental regulation provides a classic example) and (b) investing directly in innovation, for example, through support for R&D, which tends to be underprovided if left to the private sector alone. The case for public investment in R&D is based on knowledge spillovers
and other societal benefits; it is the subject of a well-established economic literature.

In the first role—eliciting technological innovation through policies and regulations—governments in the developed world have been, on the whole, quite effective. Very substantial improvements in efficiency and environmental performance have been achieved across a wide array of energy production and end-use technologies in response to various standards and other requirements. A number of studies over the past several years have also evaluated the performance of federal energy R&D programs. Although these R&D programs have produced some notable failures and although their performance has varied widely, these evaluations support the finding that federal energy R&D investments have yielded, on the whole, substantial direct economic benefits as well as external benefits such as pollution mitigation and knowledge creation. However, as the NRC concluded in its study of DOE’s fossil fuel and efficiency R&D programs, “forced” government introduction of not-yet-economic new technologies has not been successful (also see Fri 2003).

In addition, suggestions for strengthening the organization, management, and priorities of federal energy R&D efforts emerge from every recent major study of these activities (Newell 2008; Ogden, Podesta, and Deutch 2008; Chow and Newell 2004; National Commission on Energy Policy 2004). Headway has been made at the DOE along several of these lines, and a number of provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 codify recent trends in research management, including nonfederal cost-sharing for projects, increased merit review and competitive award of proposals, external technical review of departmental programs, and improved coordination and management of programs. Interest has also increased in further cultivation of partnerships linking firms, national laboratories, and universities. Particularly in the context of increasing the transfer of knowledge to technology application, experts have highlighted the importance of improving processes for communication, coordination, and collaboration within the DOE among the basic research programs in the Office of Science and the applied energy research “stovepipes” within the DOE program offices (fossil fuel, nuclear, renewables, end-use efficiency, electricity reliability).

The lessons from past private and public innovation efforts suggest that a well-targeted set of climate policies, including those targeted directly at science and innovation, could help lower the overall costs of climate change mitigation. It is important to stress, however, that poorly designed technology policy could raise rather than lower the societal costs of climate mitigation. To avoid this, policymakers may want to examine the idea of creating substantial incentives in the form of a market-based price on GHG emissions. Furthermore, directed government technology support has been shown to be most effective when it emphasized areas least likely to be
undertaken by a private sector. As discussed, this would tend to emphasize use-inspired basic research that advances science in areas critical to climate mitigation and other energy goals. In addition to generating new knowledge and useful tools, such funding also serves the critical function of training the next generation of scientists and engineers for future work in the private sector, at universities, and in other research institutions. As the largest single supporter of U.S. basic research in the physical sciences—accounting for 40 percent of federal outlays in this area—the DOE Office of Science has an important role in this process.

Innovation policy has been most efficient in the energy arena when it has complemented rather than attempting to directly substitute for market demand. Nonetheless, R&D without market demand for the results is like pushing on a rope and has resulted in little impact. The scale of the climate technology problem and our other energy challenges suggests a solution that maximizes the impact of the scarce resources available for addressing these and other critical societal goals. Evidence indicates that an emissions price plus RD&D approach could provide the basic framework for such a solution.

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