

Introduction • Workers
and Populism • Past and Present
in the Brazilian Labor Movement

Brazilian union leaders have only now learned, declared the charismatic head of São Paulo's most important autoworkers' union, that workers must fight their own battles and that trade unions must "become independent, once and for all." Speaking in 1978 on the heels of the first mass strikes since the military coup of 1964, the president of the metalworkers' union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema exuded a new confidence that workers could in fact win without outside aid or intervention. Luis Inácio da Silva ("Lula") drew a stark contrast with the populist era before 1964, when labor movements "were started for partisan [political] reasons . . . for the benefit of those in power or for those who were not in power but who desired to be."¹

Quickly attracting national attention, the May 1978 strikes that catapulted Lula into national and international prominence originated in the suburban industrial region of metropolitan São Paulo known as ABC (after the *municípios* of Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, and São Caetano do Sul).² Over the following four months, the strikes quickly spread to encompass between 300,000 and 400,000 workers throughout the state of São Paulo. For many observers, the down-to-earth Lula personified the emergence of a new, more independent Brazilian working class characterized by a form of militant unionism that was thought to have been absent since the rise to power of Getúlio Vargas in 1930.

Moreover, Lula openly criticized the state-sponsored union structures that were established in the 1930s and systematized in Getúlio Vargas's 1943 labor code, the famous *Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho* (CLT).

Lula attacked the *CLT* for castrating the unions and ridiculed the notion that this archaic industrial-relations structure, "constructed when there were hardly any workers in Brazil," was relevant to the "developed Brazil [of the 1970s] with a city like São Bernardo do Campo."³

Hailing the "greater class consciousness" of contemporary workers, Lula argued that they were no longer paralyzed by governmental paternalism. Today's workers, he asserted, had finally "ceased to believe in many things that had deceived them for a long time . . . [especially, the belief, due to] the pseudo-benevolences of Getúlio Vargas, . . . that governments could do many things for the working class." For too long, the worker's sense of being "impotent, weak, poor, and miserable" had conditioned him to "look to someone at the top, . . . [to] the people with power, . . . to do everything for him." For too long, the Brazilian worker had been exploited by elite politicians, who were pursuing interests that "were in fact far removed" from those of working people.⁴

Lula went even further and criticized the democratically elected presidents between 1946 and 1964 for having done little for workers. Speaking during a period of negotiated transition from military rule toward democracy, he also expressed skepticism about the opposition's calls for a Constituent Assembly. Such an initiative, he concluded, might repeat "the history of the Constituent Assembly of 1946 . . . [when the workers were] submitted to a constitution made by [and for] the elites" despite all the politicians' rhetoric about freedom and the working class.⁵

The thirty-two-year-old union leader spoke on the eve of an era of widespread industrial militancy that would reach millions in 1979. He used such historical contrasts to make sense of contemporary events that seemed, to most observers, to be without precedent. A striking historical personality, Lula heightened the effect of his carefully calculated naïveté and seeming guilelessness by consciously eschewing a leftist, populist, or nationalist rhetoric that could easily be associated with the past.

Lula's critical and iconoclastic stance highlighted the weaknesses of the legal trade unionism of the restrictive years that had followed the 1964 military coup in Brazil. Although quick to admit his lack of historical knowledge or of any personal experience with unionism prior to 1969,⁶ Lula found that his struggle was best served by dramatic emphasis on the total distinctiveness of the "new" or "authentic" unionism of the late 1970s. Indeed, the discovery of the worker as a social force to be reckoned with was, in many ways, the most striking feature of the Brazilian transition toward democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Brazilian and foreign observers, whether scholars, journalists, employers, or government officials, interpreted the labor militancy of 1978–79 as a break with the whole of Brazil's past, and not with just the dictatorial period after 1964. We are witnessing, sociologist José Álvaro Moisés argued in 1982, the "end of an old cycle and the opening of another, entirely new cycle in the history of Brazilian trade unionism." British scholar John Humphrey also detected, among São Bernardo's autoworkers, "a decisive break with the [older] populist style of mobilization and activity" before 1964.⁷

Such assessments quickly found their way into the scholarly mainstream. Discussing regime transitions in 1985, North American political scientist Alfred Stepan could confidently assert that Lula's "new brand of unionism" stood in marked contrast to the past, when unions were "encapsulated in state-crafted corporatist structures, which reduced the autonomy of worker organizations." The working class, a Brazilian political scientist wrote in 1985, had finally "become organized and imposed its presence" on national life through a "strong, democratic and effective grassroots popular movement."⁸

The innovative "new unionism" also produced what came to be seen as its necessary political by-product in 1979 when Lula founded the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT). Thus, the prevailing scholarly consensus on labor was broadened from the industrial relations sphere to politics; the creation of the PT was widely interpreted as marking a breakdown of entrenched patterns of elite political dominance in Brazil. According to enthusiasts such as Michael Löwy, Lula's Workers' Party marked the appearance "for the first time [in Brazilian history of] a mass party that is the authentic expression of the workers themselves."⁹

The PT, as seen by supporters like Löwy, marked a radical break with the "weighty heritage" of past popular and radical politics, which had been characterized by "rank-and-file passivity and demobilization, maneuvers at the top, and bureaucratic structures." Even North American political scientists have emphasized the PT's novelty as Brazil's first effort to establish working-class-based political organization under trade union leadership. The PT and the "increasingly independent and combative labor movement" that spawned the party, Margaret Keck argued in 1986, were historically unique in bringing "class-specific demands" into a political system where they "had not been important issues."¹⁰

We thus find a remarkable congruence between the self-perception of a contemporary participant like Lula and our current scholarly understand-

ing of Brazilian labor history. Indeed, the events of the late 1970s seemed to provide the definitive proof that confirmed the scholarly consensus on workers, populism, and the Left that had emerged since the 1960s.

Labor, Populism, and the Left: The Corporatist Consensus

Populism was a form of nationalist, cross-class reformist politics that came to regional prominence during the 1930s and 1940s. As twentieth-century Latin America's most original political creation, populist politics shaped the entire era of development that finally came to an abrupt end with the military coups of the 1960s and 1970s.

Populism is usually defined as a nationalist and multiclass movement, typically urban in nature, that is characterized by an eclectic ideology, a clientelistic mass following, and a charismatic or redemption-oriented leader. Populism emerged during the crisis of oligarchic parliamentary-ism and the region's search for alternatives to its traditional export-oriented economic strategies. Integrationist in orientation, populism has been widely viewed as the natural political complement to the era of import-substitution industrialization after 1930.¹¹

Under leaders such as Brazil's Getúlio Vargas and Argentina's Juan Perón, populism was also responsible for the transformation of the region's labor movement by linking the trade unions directly to the state. In this way, populists fostered a form of interest representation that is generally characterized as corporatist in nature. Within the broader regional context, the Brazilian example of state intervention in industrial and labor relations has long been viewed as the paradigmatic example of corporatism in which "the state plays a major role in structuring, supporting, and regulating interest groups with the object of controlling their internal affairs and relationships between them."¹²

The capstone of the whole populist structure in Brazil, according to the most authoritative recent exponents of this view of workers' struggles before 1964, lay in the subordination of the trade unions to the state. Labor leaders, it is said, had compromised themselves by accepting the fascistic, corporatist union structures established during the Estado Novo dictatorship (1937-45). They thus adapted themselves to an extremely rigid and overly bureaucratized system designed to inhibit the mobilization of work-

ers. Built from the top down and from the state outwards, official trade unionism derived its strength not from its membership but from its relationship to the elites holding state power.¹³

Unions in the populist era depended upon a strategy of political pressure and bargaining with the state that oriented their activities away from the factories and the rank and file. Subject to strict governmental control, the labor movement had only a limited ability to represent its members' interests within a system of state tutelage characterized not by free collective bargaining but by labor court litigation and governmental wage setting.¹⁴ Acceptance of the law's definition of unions as "collaborating organs of the state" led labor's leadership to emphasize the unions' legally defined role as providers of medical, dental, and legal assistance to individual workers (*assistencialismo*).

Trade union leaders, it is said, discouraged actions that went beyond the demobilizing strictures of Brazil's consolidation of labor laws enacted in 1943, the *Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho*. In establishing what were and what were not legally valid grievances, the intricately detailed *CLT* served as a straitjacket that excluded workplace complaints and emphasized state regulation of employment conditions. Yet populist unionism, it is argued, also failed to effectively represent the workers' interests in the regulatory field because union leaders preferred to rely on the good will of the state. Labor leaders routinely paid more attention to the electoral success of various non-working-class politicians and to the shifting factional alignments within the Labor Ministry than to conditions at the point of production.¹⁵

Leaders were freed from the pressures of accountability to their membership because they were legally guaranteed the right to represent all the workers employed in a given industry within a certain geographic radius. Organized on a municipio-wide level, the unions made no effort to achieve a foothold within the factories through union delegates or factory commissions. The system of union financing based on an involuntary, government-collected union tax (*imposto sindical*) received from all workers, whether union members or not, created further disincentives to mass membership.¹⁶

The unions did at times attain a numerically significant membership, but they continued to be characterized by a top-heavy bureaucratic structure and to lack real representativeness. Rank-and-file workers were not encouraged to participate in establishing the leadership or direction of their institutions. This demobilizing populist style of organization did,

however, preserve the positions and petty privileges of each union's bureaucratized leadership and prevented problems that might disturb its non-working-class allies. Not surprisingly, the result was the phenomenon of trade union *peleguismo* (derived from the word for saddle blanket)—a bureaucratic and progovernment tendency that thrived, given labor's symbiotic relationship with the state.¹⁷ Although strikes were by no means unknown, populist unionism was incapable of organizing the laboring masses for ongoing struggles. Rather than developing from within the factories, the sporadic strike movements of that era were marked by diffuseness, spontaneity, and lack of effective leadership. Indeed, union leaders on the whole shied away from militant strike actions that might invite repression by the state.¹⁸

Brazil's populist unionism before 1964 thus failed to effectively represent the workers' economic interests and workplace grievances. Can the excessive politicization of the unions in this period, the critics ask, be defended in terms of a conscious trade-off between piecemeal economic gains and concrete political advances? The populist era was, after all, a time of great nationalist enthusiasm and of much-acclaimed programs of fundamental social reforms. Yet the consensus view emphasizes that workers in fact gained very little in the political arena during this period of cross-class nationalist alliances symbolized by the amorphous *trabalhismo* (laborism) founded by Getúlio Vargas. Firm positions could hardly be expected from the "bag of cats" (*saco de gatos*) that was Vargas's Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), but the other so-called popular parties and opportunistic populist politicians like Adhemar de Barros and Jânio Quadros were even less interested in real change to benefit the workers than was the PTB. Despite all the political hoopla and populist rhetoric, workers remained dependents of the state, serving as a mass base for maneuvers by elements of the dominant classes. The populist experience, in this sense, represented no break with the Brazilian tradition of political subordination of the popular classes.¹⁹

Critics have also vigorously criticized the strategy adopted by the Left of participating in this amorphous populist alliance, saying that it further weakened the struggles of the popular classes before 1964. Despite its claim of being the vanguard of the working class, the relatively strong Communist Party (Partido Comunista do Brasil, or PCB), led by Luis Carlos Prestes, followed policies defined not by workers' needs but by nationalist mystifications, statist infatuations, and Soviet foreign policy. The Communists were characterized by their top-down approach and were

consistently opportunistic in both the trade union and the political-electoral arenas.²⁰

Communist unionists contented themselves with penetrating union leadership bodies at any price because they were eager to exploit the petty advantages of the corporatist labor structure. The "parallel organizations" that grouped unions horizontally outside of the law, the Left's greatest innovation, were little more than bureaucratic organisms of a leadership distant from the rank and file. Dedicated to infiltrating the state labor apparatus, the Communists forsook the option of independently mobilizing workers on behalf of their own interests. The actions of the PCB reinforced the state-sponsored labor system it criticized rhetorically, making these structures a more effective fetter on working-class advances.²¹

Sharing Brazilian statist ideology, the Communist Party subordinated class and democratic demands to general political questions of national development. As leaders of the only significant radical group with a popular base, they placed their following in tow behind a mythological "progressive national bourgeoisie." Opportunistic to the core, their electoral strategy became captive to the passing needs of so-called populists like Adhemar de Barros or Jango Goulart.²²

The dramatic mass strikes of 1978–79 seemed to confirm this already widely accepted view of the fatal weaknesses of earlier working-class and leftist movements. Moreover, the underdeveloped state of Brazilian labor historiography encouraged the teleological temptation of seeing past errors as leading inexorably to the "new unionism" and the PT. Much scholarly research took place during the 1970s, but it tended to focus almost exclusively on events during the First Republic (1889–1930); there were no empirically based studies of the workers' movement after 1930. When works on this period began to appear in the late 1970s, each established the falsity of one or another aspect of the established consensus—yet none challenged the total logic of this remarkably convincing corporatist synthesis of unionism, the state, radical movements, and conventional electoral politics.²³

Populism's Lasting Legacy: A Flawed Vision of Brazilian Labor History

This book is the outcome of an investigation that began in 1979 with the realization that the established wisdom about workers and populism in

Brazil was historically questionable and conceptually flawed. The opening of Brazil's Nova República in 1985 can help us to achieve historical perspective on the nation's last extended period of electoral democracy, the Populist Republic of 1946–64. As the books are closed on twenty-one years of military rule, the existing historiography can now be seen as the final by-product of the populist era itself. Although advanced as a conscious revolt against the populist heritage, the current corporatist consensus was still decisively shaped by the intellectual effort to come to terms with the radical disappointments of the populist past. To arrive at a new interpretation, we must grasp the intellectual trajectory of this antipopulist synthesis.

Brazilian intellectuals and leftists in the mid-1960s were anguished by the ease with which the Right's revolution triumphed in 1964. They were stunned as they witnessed the collapse of their hopes for imminent radical reform, if not revolution. Although the labor movement was widely believed to be the nation's "fourth power" in the early 1960s, the truth was dramatically revealed on 31 March 1964, when, as Francisco Weffort has put it, both the government and the labor movement that supported it fell "practically without struggle, . . . [collapsing] like a house of cards."²⁴ Whatever their individual political perspectives, the losers of 1964 went through a wrenching reevaluation of the past in an effort to make sense of this unexpected reversal. This reevaluation was especially difficult because so many had shared the optimistic postulates of the reformist ferment and the developmental nationalism of the populist era. Indeed, the general certainty of forward movement toward a better, more just, and more humane society in Latin America underlay the first serious effort to come to terms with populism in the early 1960s.

In his classic 1965 essay, Torcuato Di Tella concluded that populism, for all its limitations, was still Latin America's best hope for meaningful reform. He described populist movements as garnering mass popular support with an anti-status quo message that crossed class lines. He argued that populism did "not result from the autonomous organizational power" of the popular classes, but he did not see populism's admittedly non-working-class leadership as an inherently negative feature.²⁵

The reformist optimism reflected in Di Tella's essay soon gave way, however, to a more radical rethinking of the course of Latin American development. Over the next ten years, it became clear that Brazil's right-wing military coup was not an exception, but a portent of things to come. As disillusionment spread and deepened, Latin American intellectuals and foreign Latin Americanists were torn between their conviction that change

was essential and their despair about the military coups that had so soon followed a more hopeful time. In this frustrating context, the one thing that Left-leaning scholars could do was to revolutionize their own ideas through a wholesale rejection of the past. The more optimistic (if mechanistic) modernization theory was now replaced with the more pessimistic and critical dependency perspective. Many broke dramatically with their earlier belief in a "progressive national bourgeoisie" or in the democratic mission of the middle classes. Spurred by the Cuban Revolution, many became convinced that only a more radical and revolutionary course could alter the historical scenario in which cross-class nationalist alliances, as in Brazil, seemed to produce defeat rather than advances for the popular classes.

As the first of the new wave of military interventions, the 1964 Brazilian coup was viewed as marking the end of a whole historical era. Many concluded bitterly that the time had arrived for an intellectual autopsy of what Kenneth Erickson, writing about Brazil, called "the corpse of populism." Burying his own earlier hopes and illusions, Erickson criticized even the term *populista* for its "misleading implications" and argued that populism's "apparently antiestablishment policies" merely masked "the fact that political elites from the ruling class lead and control populist movements." Others, like Brazilian sociologist Florestan Fernandes, denied that there had ever really been an authentically populist or popular movement in Brazil before 1964 and claimed that there had been only "a 'trabalhista' manipulation of the masses, described with greater precision by the term demagoguery."²⁶

The new corporatist synthesis presented populism as primarily a form of social control that, "despite rhetoric to the contrary," served "the class aims [not of workers but] of . . . politicians from the ruling class or petty bourgeoisie." By preventing "workers from building autonomous organizations," the movement channeled popular energies in directions that did "not challenge the existing class structure." Denying any but transitory gains for workers, Erickson, Hobart Spalding, and other scholars emphasized that advances "received as favors granted by populist politicians" crippled and weakened the labor movement and left the popular masses without "the collective strength to defend their gains" against reactionary attack.²⁷ Criticism was directed against leftist political and trade union leaders who had allowed their movements to remain weak and subordinate in the populist era. These scholars were especially critical of the existing left, particularly the Communist parties, who had forsaken socialist revolu-

migrants were illiterate, inexperienced in political or associative life, and lacking in proletarian traditions. They were therefore thought to have exhibited traditional attitudes that inhibited a class perception of the world.³³ Seeking paternalistic relations similar to those in their areas of origin, these "available urban masses" responded readily to populist politicians who manipulated them for their own interests in both the labor and political arenas. The success of demagogic populists such as Getúlio Vargas and Adhemar de Barros is thus thought not only to reflect an absence of class consciousness, but at the same time to have inhibited its formation.

The conservatizing political impact of rural migration in the populist era also gained credibility through a contrast with the independent militancy of the anarchist-led workers' movement before 1930, based among European immigrants. Possessing traditions of working-class militancy, the immigrant working class of the First Republic was thought more capable of class-conscious behavior than the native-born workers of rural origin who predominated after the Revolution of 1930 that brought Getúlio Vargas to power.³⁴

As conceived by these analysts in the 1960s, the early workers' movement seemed, above all, an idealistic crusade in a nation where the social question was still treated as a matter for the police. Moreover, the dominant radical tradition of the First Republic, anarchism, was untainted by association with the failed legacy of communism, while its antistatist rhetoric had great appeal to scholars and activists living under a repressive military regime.

Thus by the end of the decade, Latin American intellectuals had arrived at an apparently satisfactory analysis of the politically challenging problem of populism. Yet these initial generalizations themselves soon came under attack from a number of angles in the 1970s. In Brazil, the development of a new line of historically oriented research into the workers' and radical movements during the First Republic invalidated the only substantive historical comparison underlying these views. Originating in an effort to identify the "elements of the genesis of populist mechanisms in Brazil," empirically based studies by Azis Simão, Paula Beiguelman, Sheldon Maram, Boris Fausto, Michael Hall, and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro all highlighted the weaknesses of the early labor movement.³⁵ Sheldon Maram, among others, emphasized the ephemeral and ineffective nature of the anarchist-led workers' movement, which was crippled by ethnic tensions and the fundamental class ambivalence of the average immigrant. Michael Hall

tion for ambiguous theories of national democratic revolution by stages based on multi-class alliances against imperialism. It had taken the military coup of 1964, Francisco Weffort argued, to unmask the previously dominant concept of "bourgeois-democratic revolution through populism and nationalism."²⁸

Yet even those who elaborated these new views of populism were aware, on some level, that the intellectual clarity of the revisionist postmortem was achieved at the expense of an understanding of the relationship between populism and the working class. Their confident judgments left unresolved the troubling question that had long bedeviled the Left: "Why did workers succumb to the blandishments of populist politicians," Erickson asked, "if the latter did not move the locus of political *power* down the social pyramid?"²⁹ If populism, as Weffort insisted, was indeed a "betrayal" of the popular masses, why did working people willingly "serve as a support for a [populist] regime in which they were dominated?"³⁰

In answering these questions, the revisionists built upon a small but important body of empirical sociological research on migration, urbanization, and industrialization begun in the late 1950s and early 1960s.³¹ Looking back with the advantage of hindsight, the disillusioned analysts initially made these sociological observations about rural-urban migration the key to understanding mass support for populism. Populism, for these authors, was closely related to the massive postwar industrial expansion in Brazil and elsewhere that had brought millions of migrants from rural or semirural backgrounds to burgeoning cities such as São Paulo to serve as unskilled factory workers.

The explanation of mass support for populism could thus be found, pioneering scholars like Francisco Weffort argued, in the absence of a developed sense of class consciousness on the part of a working class suffering from "premature massification." Brazil's rapid urbanization had created a mass society, without class cohesion, whose individual members were in a state of "political availability." Weffort went further in a polemical 1965 essay that categorized populism as typical of a situation where "the working class assumes the behavior of the masses," that is, of the "petty bourgeoisie." Brazil's atomized working class in the populist era, Weffort argued, lacked the distinct sense of class identity or "strong internal solidarity" characteristic of workers in nineteenth-century Europe.³²

Experiencing the move to the city as a step upwards, the migrants' individual revolution disposed them to support the status quo. These rural

Weffort contrasted the statist straitjacket of trade union *unicidade* (rejection of union pluralism) and state tutelage of civil society with the democratic pluralism and the free play of conflicting forces that should have characterized the newly established liberal democratic order.⁴⁰

Weffort's essays originated the current orthodoxy on the nature of what he called "populist unionism" after 1945. He was unequivocal in his condemnation of the policies of the Communist Party during its period of strength after World War II. By failing to break with the unions' dependence on the state, the PCB had condemned the working class to economic and political impotence. Reflecting a scholarly discourse increasingly based on a posited polarization between the "State" and "Civil Society," Weffort's persuasive antistatist stance also helped decisively to shift scholarly views of Getúlio Vargas, who had been looked upon with some sympathy in earlier debates.

As the man who had contributed more than any other to the consolidation of the centralized state, Brazil's preeminent populist leader Getúlio Vargas was now viewed more cynically.⁴¹ The reformist and nationalist claims of *trabalhismo* were now taken at less than face value. After decades of propaganda about Vargas's gifts to the workers, populism was now presented, without ambiguity, as a form of political and economic control of the working class by the state.⁴² Working-class support for populists could now be seen, in the words of Weffort's colleague José Álvaro Moisés, as a "spontaneous reaction" of a working class "unable to go beyond its instinctive reactions" due to the absence of correct revolutionary leadership.⁴³

Weffort's imaginative reconstruction of the history of the Brazilian working-class movement was not without its critics. Even in 1973, Carlos Estevan Martins and Maria Herminia Tavares de Almeida had challenged the logic of Weffort's critique of the Left in 1945. In 1979 Ricardo Maranhão's brief book, *Sindicatos e Democratização*, disputed the empirical foundation of Weffort's characterization of the postwar conjuncture. Yet these critiques lacked the compelling force of Weffort's reconceptualization of the sweep of Brazilian labor history.⁴⁴

For his readers, Weffort's essays were a radical rupture with past understandings, and his work had an extraordinary impact on Brazilian intellectual life and the Latin American debate on the nature of populism. Weffort's rejection of structural determinism seemed to offer a way out of the fatalistic notion that things had to turn out as they did. It also allowed a

argued that although it was politically convenient as "a way of criticizing the developments of the populist period," the "legend of immigrant radicalism . . . [marked by] exemplary class consciousness and militancy . . . did little justice to historical reality . . . [and had for too] long distorted perceptions of Brazilian labor history."³⁶

These studies undermined the stark contrast drawn earlier between an autonomous immigrant workers' movement before 1930, based on the violent rejection of capitalism, and a later domesticated movement, based on Brazilian-born rural migrants, that succumbed to populism. Moreover, scholars discovered that the co-optation and manipulation of workers and their organizations by politicians and the state were not unique to Getúlio Vargas and the populists. Although the new research did not cover events beyond 1930, it certainly suggested that scholars were still far from making sense of the actual historical experience of Brazilian workers.³⁷

At the same time, historically oriented research in Argentina and Brazil on the period immediately after World War II challenged the implicitly reductionist portrayal of the weak class-consciousness of Latin American workers of rural origin. A short essay by Argentine scholars Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero decisively rejected Gino Germani's rural migration hypothesis as an explanation for Perón's mass following in 1946. The initial triumph of the Argentine populist was better explained, they argued, as a rational effort by organized labor to enhance its leverage within the Argentine political system.³⁸

Breaking with elements of his earlier beliefs, the Brazilian scholar Francisco Weffort joined the attack by denying that the composition or outlook of the masses was responsible for popular failures before 1964. In his imaginative and forceful polemics of 1973 and 1974, he declared that such explanations were only the latest manifestation of the Brazilian elite's traditional belief in the inherent backwardness of the popular classes (*ideologia de atraso*). The blame for labor's repeated defeats, he argued, lay with the fatal and destructive misleadership offered to workers by their supposed leaders and self-proclaimed vanguards long before 1964.³⁹

Weffort based his conclusions on a historical foundation that was firmer than that of earlier sociological studies. He was also the first scholar to stress the crucial nature of the post-World War II transition in Brazil. Following the pioneering labor analyst Evaristo de Moraes Filho, Weffort emphasized the postwar survival of the corporatist labor legislation established by Vargas under the dictatorial Estado Novo regime of 1937-45.

hopeful rediscovery of the working class as a historical actor capable of its own choices. Workers were no longer to be presented as the passive product of a given social process or historical experience, but as a group capable of self-directed action, if led properly.⁴⁵

Weffort's essays appeared in Brazil at the moment of the apparently definitive consolidation of an all-powerful military state. Writing at the height of the regime's much-touted "economic miracle," Weffort spoke to the feelings of political inefficacy that gripped an oppositional intelligentsia who had witnessed the collapse of the mass student movements and the armed opposition of the late 1960s. Yet his analysis was marked by an attractive optimism that held that, under the surface, something new was being born. Moreover, his discussion of the Brazilian Osasco and Contagem strikes of 1968 seemed to provide proof that the populist-communist-nationalist past was being overcome and replaced by a new radical thrust in the workers' movement.⁴⁶

The views of Weffort, which reflected the evolving ideas of a significant group of intellectuals, received empirical validation during the labor agitation of 1978-79, and Weffort went on to become secretary general of the newly established Workers' Party. But although he claimed to have rejected the notion of working-class weakness and backwardness, he had not in fact resolved the populist conundrum that had been answered in more pessimistic ways by previous observers of the working-class majority. In a voluntaristic fashion, Weffort and his followers merely counterposed a hidden or misled, yet inherently revolutionary, working class to the historical realities of the past.

While exalting the working-class-in-the-abstract, Weffort and many later scholars rejected everything that the working class and its leaders, whether Communists, *trabalhistas*, or independents, had done or stood for before 1964. Based on still shaky empirical foundations, the intellectually forceful arguments of these scholars did not represent any real coming to terms with a contradictory and complicated past. In finding the answer to the paradox of populism in wrong leadership by the Left, they merely reformulated the key question on a different plane: Why did the workers follow leaders whose policies not only failed to defend their interests effectively but also perpetuated their domination by employers and the state?

When the present research project began in 1979, it was already clear that the existing generalizations about workers, populists, and the Left in

Latin America were wildly speculative in nature.⁴⁷ In 1985, the year that my dissertation was completed, historian John J. Johnson noted the absence of "studies at the national and local levels that [would] provide a solid historiographical base [for] generalization about Latin American labor." And that uniquely Latin American phenomenon "commonly labelled populism," he went on, had been studied to date almost entirely on the national and elite levels. We know far too little, he suggested, about the meaning of populism or populist ideology for workers and other members of the popular classes.⁴⁸

Influenced by my extensive background in European and North American labor history, I realized in 1979 that only an empirically based grassroots study could provide new answers to replace the frustrating abstractions of the accepted historiography. A convincing refutation of the corporatist synthesis, I concluded, could be achieved only by approaching the problem of workers and populism from the bottom up—by moving from the specific to the general, from the local to the national, and not the reverse. Thus this book examines labor, industrial relations, and the political history of the suburban industrial region of Greater São Paulo known as ABC. As Brazil's fourth-largest industrial center since the 1930s, the ABC region was a natural choice for study, given its homogeneous industrial working-class composition and its wide spectrum of large-scale manufacturing enterprises. Moreover, labor militancy and working-class radicalism had characterized ABC long before the dramatic autoworkers' strikes of 1978-80 that produced Lula, the "new unionism," and the Workers' Party.

This book starts with the establishment of the first factories in ABC at the turn of the century, and it ends at mid-century with the consolidation of the Populist Republic that would endure until the military coup of 1964. *The Brazilian Workers' ABC* is not, however, a community study in the conventional sense. Rather, I place local developments firmly within their broader regional and national context in order to advance new causal explanations about the origin of the Brazilian industrial and labor relations system and the nature of urban electoral politics in the populist era.

My study of this important industrial region reveals a reality radically different from what we have been led to expect. While I expound on the fundamentals, the ABCs of working-class life and politics, I demonstrate the central importance of the clash of class interests between industrial workers and their employers. At the same time, I argue that a purely conflictual model cannot explain the outcome of these struggles, which

16 Introduction

are determined, above all, by the central importance of the workers' alliances with other social classes, groups, and individuals. Thus, the book provides a new approach to the classic question of workers and populists while shedding light on the nature of the populist politics identified with the figures of Getúlio Vargas and Adhemar de Barros.

Part One • Industrialization and

the Crisis of the Old Order, 1900–1945

will be made a trifle easier if they can feel at ease with past progressive and working-class struggles; if they can feel the pride, accomplishments, and heroism of earlier generations; and if, after tasting the bitterness of past defeats, they can still understand the flawed and incomplete victories—but victories nonetheless—that followed.

Notes

Introduction

1. "Interview with Luis Inácio da Silva ("Lula"), President of the Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de São Bernardo do Campo," translated from *Cara a Cara*, 1 no. 2 (1978), in *Latin American Perspectives* 6, no. 4 (1979): 90. Lula would reiterate these points over and over again in his interviews of the late 1970s; see João Guizzo, ed., *Lula, Discursos e Entrevistas*, 2d ed. (Guarulhos: O Reporter de Guarulhos, 1981), 28–29, 45, 56, 89, 94, 126, 139, 170.
2. The term "ABC" will be used throughout to refer to the entire region that is composed today of the municípios of Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano do Sul, Mauá, Ribeirão Pires, Diadema, and Rio Grande da Serra. The ABC region was one administrative unit until 1945. During the Empire, ABC was known as the parish of São Bernardo, attaining município status in 1889. The entire município of São Bernardo, with various district subdivisions, was rechristened Santo André in 1938. To avoid confusion, "Santo André" or "São Bernardo" will not be used to refer to the entire region of ABC. For a useful bibliography of studies of the region, see Grupo Independente de Pesquisadores da Memória do Grande ABC, *Levantamento Bibliográfico da Memória do Grande ABC* (São Bernardo: Prefeitura Municipal de São Bernardo do Campo [PMSBC], 1990).
3. "Interview with Luis Inácio da Silva," 93–94; quotation on 93. Elsewhere, Lula attacked the CLT as an antiquated fascist structure that lacked even originality; one dictator, Getúlio Vargas, had merely copied another, Benito Mussolini. This system, he argued, had tied Brazilian trade unionism to the government by an umbilical cord and bred union self-indulgence (*comodismo*). Indeed, Lula wavered between the argument that Brazilian unions had been asleep since their creation, and that they had been killed by the passivity of their leaders (see Guizzo, *Lula, Discursos*, 121, 185, 66, 102, 138, 104, 167).
4. "Interview with Luis Inácio da Silva," 90, 98, 91.
5. *Ibid.*, 98.
6. Guizzo, *Lula, Discursos*, 16, 207.
7. José Álvaro Moisés, *Lições de Liberdade e de Opressão: Os Trabalhadores e a Lula pela Democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1982), 118; John Humphrey, *Capitalist Control and Workers' Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 26.

8. Alfred Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 332; Maria Helena Moreira Alves, "The PT and the New Republic," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 4 (1985): 96.
9. Michael Löwy, "Un Parti de Type Nouveau: Le Parti des Travailleurs au Brésil," *Amérique Latine* (October-December 1985): 23; appeared in English as "A New Type of Party, The Brazilian PT," *Latin American Perspectives* 14 (1987): 453-64.
10. Margaret Keck, "From Movement to Politics: The Formation of the Workers' Party in Brazil" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1986), 1; quotation on 44-45. See also Moisés, *Lições*, 209, 216, 210-11.
11. See Torcuato Di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, ed. Claudio Veliz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 47-74; Kenneth Erickson, "Populism and Political Control of the Working Class in Brazil," *Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies* 4 (1975): 117-44; Paul Drake, *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-1952* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 7-9; Steve Stein, *Populism in Peru* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980); David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 402; Michael Conniff, "Introduction: Toward a Comparative Definition of Populism," in *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Michael Conniff (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), 13.
12. Ruth Collier, "Popular Sector Incorporation and Political Supremacy: Regime Evolution in Brazil and Mexico," in *Brazil and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development*, ed. Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Richard S. Weinert (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982), 73. See also Kenneth Paul Erickson, "Corporatism and Labor in Development," in *Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development*, ed. H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler (New York: Praeger, 1972), 139-66; Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974); Kenneth Paul Erickson and Kevin J. Middlebrook, "The State and Organized Labor in Brazil and Mexico," in Hewlett and Weinert, *Brazil and Mexico*, 213-63. The definition of corporatism is from Kenneth S. Menckle, "Corporatist Control of the Working Class: Authoritarian Brazil Since 1964," in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed. James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 303.
13. Leôncio Martins Rodrigues, "Sindicalismo e Classe Operária (1930-1964)," in *História Geral da Civilização Brasileira*, ed. Boris Fausto, part 3, vol. 3 (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1981), 511, 530; Humphrey, *Capitalist Control*, 14, 16, 123, 23, 239; Moisés, *Lições*, 35, 83; José Pastore and Thomas Skidmore, "Brazilian Labor Relations: A New Era?," in *Industrial Relations in a Decade of Economic Change*, ed. Wilbur Daniels, Hervey Juris, and Mark Thompson (Madison: ILRA, 1985), 83-84.
14. Francisco Weffort, *O Populismo na Política Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e

- Terra, 1978), 68; Leôncio Rodrigues, "Sindicalismo e Classe Operária," 516, 544; Humphrey, *Capitalist Control*, 22-23.
15. Leôncio Rodrigues, "Sindicalismo e Classe Operária," 542; Humphrey, *Capitalist Control*, 235, 20-21; Moisés, *Lições*, 84, 92.
16. Leôncio Rodrigues, "Sindicalismo e Classe Operária," 522; Moisés, *Lições*, 94; Pastore and Skidmore, "Brazilian Labor Relations," 74.
17. Humphrey, *Capitalist Control*, 24, 238; Moisés, *Lições*, 83-84, 118-20; Pastore and Skidmore, "Brazilian Labor Relations," 85.
18. When labor did engage in strikes, such as the famous "political strikes" of the early 1960s, it is argued, union leaders did so because such movements were not only tolerated by the state but stimulated by the factional struggles within the government. Such directed mobilization gained little for workers (see Moisés, *Lições*, 118, 83; Pastore and Skidmore, "Brazilian Labor Relations," 88; Weffort, *Populismo*, 21).
19. Weffort, *Populismo*, 21, 62; Moisés, *Lições*, 213, 176, 85.
20. Francisco Weffort, "Origens do Sindicalismo Populista no Brasil: A Conjuntura do Após-Guerra," *Estudos CEBRAP*, no. 4 (1973), 65-104.
21. Moisés, *Lições*, 118-19, 85, 120; Weffort, "Origens," 82-83; Francisco Weffort, "Democracia e Movimento Operário: Algumas Questões para a História do Período 1945/1964 [Part Two]," *Revista de Cultura Contemporânea* 2 (1979): 4; Humphrey, *Capitalist Control*, 19.
22. Weffort, "Origens," 33, 37, 39; Moisés, *Lições*, 215; Ronald Chilcote, *The Brazilian Communist Party: Conflict and Integration, 1922-1972* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 299, 301.
23. For good examples, see Letícia Bicalho Canedo, *O Sindicalismo Bancário em São Paulo no Período de 1923-1944: Seu Significado Político* (São Paulo: Símbolo, 1978); Annez Andraus Troyano, *Estado e Sindicalismo* (São Paulo: Símbolo, 1978); Maria Andréa Loyola, *Os Sindicatos e o PTB: Estudo de um Caso em Minas Gerais* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980); Yonne de Souza Grossi, *Mina de Morro Velho: A Extração do Homem* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1981); Dennis Linhares Barsted, *Medição de Forças: O Movimento Grevista de 1953 e a Época dos Operários Navais* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1981); Ingrid Sarti, *Porto Vermelho: Os Estivadores Santistas no Sindicato e na Política* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1981).
24. Weffort, "Democracia," 4. Observers of all perspectives repeatedly emphasized this point. For Gino Germani, "the fact that President Goulart could not obtain the support of industrial workers [in March 1964] . . . can be considered another symptom of the lack of revolutionary potential of the urban lower class" (*Sociologia de la Modernización* [Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1969], 123). It would take a North American scholar twenty years later, however, to advance the absurd and undocumented claim that "the workers favored military intervention" in 1964 (Yusef Cohen, *The Manipulation of Consent: The State and Working-Class Consciousness in Brazil* [Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989], 3).
25. Di Tella, "Populism and Reform," 47, 71. In whole or in part, this influential essay was widely circulated in Latin America. See Torcuato Di Tella, "Populismo y Reforma en America Latina," *Desarrollo Económico* 4, no. 16 (1965); Fernando

Henrique Cardoso et al., *América Latina: Ensayos de Interpretación Sociológico-Política* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), 290–97; *Populismo y Contradicciones de Clase en Latinoamérica*, ed. Gino Germani, Octavio Ianni, and Torcuato Di Tella (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1973 and 1977), 38–82.

26. Erickson, "Populism," 119, 117, 125; Florestan Fernandes, "Introdução," in Weffort, *Populismo*, 13. The elaboration of this new understanding of workers, labor militancy, and populism did not take place in an intellectual vacuum. In Brazil, as elsewhere, the late 1960s were not tranquil and uneventful years. In the face of apparent working-class weakness or quiescence, the oppositional impulse was carried forward through the lonely if heroic student struggles of 1968–69. Responding to imperatives that were very different from those that governed working-class life, the emerging student-based movement seemed to provide an example of a more principled, apparently resolute, and highly visible radical opposition that was capable of "settling accounts with the past" (Francisco Weffort, "Democracia e Movimento Operário: Algumas Questões Para a História do Período 1945/1964 [Part One]," *Revista de Cultura Contemporânea* 1 (1978): 7).

27. Hobart Spalding, *Organized Labor in Latin America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 151; Erickson, "Populism," 119, 117. Steve Stein, for example, provided a wonderfully sensitive and nuanced portrayal of the Peruvian populist phenomenon in 1930; yet his introduction still presented populism primarily as a form of social control that served "to bolster an exploitative status quo, . . . [by reducing] pressures on established social structures. . . . [managing] potential and real conflict, and . . . [maintaining] passive, nonrevolutionary popular masses" (*Populism in Peru*, 15).

28. Weffort, *Populismo*, 43. See also Octavio Ianni, "Populismo y Relaciones de Clase," in Germani, Ianni, and Di Tella, *Populismo*, 132–34; Octavio Ianni, *Crisis in Brazil* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 99, 111, 120, 199.

29. Citing the results of a survey of São Bernardo auto workers conducted in 1963, Erickson answered his own question by arguing that workers supported populists because they "had not yet developed a sense of class consciousness . . . [being bound together, at best, by] a vague sense of social solidarity" based on their similarity "as poor people" ("Populism," 127). For the survey in question, see Leônicio Martins Rodrigues, *Industrialização e Atitudes Operárias* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1970).

30. Weffort, *Populismo*, 34.

31. *Ibid.*, 25. For examples, see the influential work of Argentine sociologist Gino Germani, *Política y Sociedad en una Época de Transición* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1962). On Brazil, see Alain Touraine, "Industrialisation et Conscience Ouvrière à São Paulo," *Sociologie du Travail* 3 no. 4 (1961): 77–95; Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes, "O Ajustamento do Trabalhador a Indústria: Mobilidade Social e Motivação," in *Mobilidade e Trabalho: Um Estudo na Cidade de São Paulo*, ed. Bertram Hutchinson (Rio de Janeiro: INEP/NEC, 1960), 360–440; Brandão Lopes, *Sociedade Industrial no Brasil* (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1964); *idem*, *Crise do Brasil Arcaico* (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1967); Luis Pereira, *Trabalho e Desenvolvimento no Brasil* (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1965).

32. Weffort, *Populismo*, first and second quotations on 54–55; Francisco Weffort,

"Raízes Sociais do Populismo em São Paulo," *Revista Civilização Brasileira* 1 (1965): 39–60 (third quotation on 46–47); Weffort, *Populismo*, fourth quotation on 54.

33. Leônicio Rodrigues, "Sindicalismo e Classe Operária," 520; Spalding, *Organized Labor*, 183; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Le Proletariat Brésilien: Situation et Comportement Social," *Sociologie du Travail* 3, no. 4 (1961): 50–65 (Portuguese ed.: "Proletariado no Brasil: Situação e Comportamento," *Revista Brasileira* 41 [1962]: 98–122); Leônicio Martins Rodrigues, *Sindicalismo e Conflito Industrial no Brasil* (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1966).

34. Leônicio Rodrigues, "Do Anarquismo ao Nacionalismo," in *Sindicalismo*, 101–211.

35. Azis Simão, *Sindicato e Estado* (1966; reprint, São Paulo: Ática, 1981); Paula Beiguelman, *Os Companheiros de São Paulo* (São Paulo: Símbolo, 1977); Sheldon Maram, *Anarquistas, Imigrantes e o Movimento Operário Brasileiro, 1890–1920* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1979); Boris Fausto, *Trabalho Urbano e Conflito Social* (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1976); Michael Hall and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, *A Classe Operária no Brasil*, 2 vols. (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1979; Brasilense, 1981). Quotation from Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, *Política e Trabalho no Brasil, dos Anos Vinte à 1930* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1975), 9.

36. Sheldon Maram, "Labor and the Left in Brazil, 1890–1921: A Movement Aborted," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 57 (1977): 255; Sheldon Maram, "Anarcho-Syndicalism in Brazil," *Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies* 4 (1975): 100. Quotations from Michael Hall, "Immigration and the Early São Paulo Working Class," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte* 12 (1975): 393, 407.

37. Leônicio Rodrigues, *Sindicalismo*; Hall, "Immigration," 407. See also Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, "O Proletariado Industrial na Primeira República," in *História da Civilização Brasileira*, part 3, vol. 2, ed. Boris Fausto (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1977), 136–78; Fausto, *Trabalho Urbano*.

38. Miguel Murrís and Juan Carlos Portantiero, *Estudios sobre los Orígenes del Peronismo* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1971).

39. Weffort, "Origens," 71; Francisco Weffort, "Sindicato e Política" (Ph.D. diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 1972).

40. Evaristo de Moraes Filho, *O Problema do Sindicato Único no Brasil* (1952; reprint São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1978); Weffort, "Sindicato," II.8.

41. It is only in the 1980s that scholars, having abandoned an iconoclastic stance, have begun to grapple with popular mythologies about Getúlio Vargas. See Verena Stolcke, *Coffee Planters, Workers, and Wives: Class Conflict and Gender Relations on São Paulo Plantations, 1850–1980* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 193–96.

42. In his 1989 book, Youssef Cohen produced a particularly grotesque perversion of the revisionist critique popular in the early 1970s when he conducted his survey of workers' attitudes. Entirely eschewing the problematic that framed this debate, Cohen's thinly researched work simply ignores the issue of populism. Instead, he presents Brazilian history since 1930 entirely in terms of the success of "the frankly authoritarian [state] ideology" introduced by Brazilian elites in the 1930s. Beyond ignoring all subsequent research, Cohen does violence to the argu-

ments of the early advocates of the corporatist consensus. In his crude oversimplification, for example, corporatist institutions enabled elites "to control the working class and secure its acquiescence" (and even consent) by "indoctrinating" the workers with authoritarian and antidemocratic beliefs and values that "served the interest of the elites far better than the interests of the working class" (Cohen, *Manipulation*, 5, 4, 9, 29, 33, 48, 50).

43. José Álvaro Moisés, *Greve de Massa e Crise Política (Estudo da Greve dos 300 Mil em São Paulo—1953–54)* (São Paulo: Polis, 1978), 111.

44. Carlos Estevan Martins and Maria Herminia Tavares de Almeida criticized Weffort for ignoring the extent to which popular support for Getúlio Vargas represented a barrier to alternative political projects for the working class: "Varguismo had succeeded in converting itself," they argued, "into a kind of mass political mentality within the heart of popular consciousness"; unable to ignore these realities, the Left had no choice in 1945 but to embrace a policy of "competition in alliance with Varguismo" ("Modus in Rebus: Partidos e Classes na Queda do Estado Novo" [Mimeograph, undated (1974)], 18–19). For additional critiques of Weffort's thesis, see Ricardo Maranhão, *Sindicatos e Democratização (Brasil 1945/1950)* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1979); Raimundo Santos, "Uma História Obrera de Brasil: 1888–1979," in *História del Movimiento Obrero en América Latina*, ed. Pablo González Casanova (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM, 1984), 4:9–72.

45. Maria Celia Paoli, Eder Sáder, and Vera da Silva Telles, "Pensando a Classe Operária: Os Trabalhadores Sujeitos ao Imaginário Acadêmico," *Revista Brasileira de História* 6 (1984): 129–49.

46. Francisco Weffort, "Participação e Conflito Industrial: Contagem e Osasco, 1968," *CEBRAP Caderno* no. 5 (1972).

47. As Christopher Abel and Colin Lewis noted in 1984, "the role of urban labor [in Latin America] is subject to conflicting interpretations," especially in terms of understanding the meaning of state-sponsorship of trade unionism after 1930; the whole field, they concluded, remains "fraught with problems of categorization and conceptualization" (*Latin America, Economic Imperialism, and the State* [London: Athlone Press, 1984], 24, 278).

48. John J. Johnson, "One Hundred Years of Historical Writing on Modern Latin America by United States Historians," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 65 (1985): 752–53, 760. Great progress has been made in the last decade in meeting this lacuna in studies on Latin American labor. For recent work, see the two bibliographies by John D. French ("Latin American Labor Studies: An Interim Bibliography of Non-English Publications (1989)" and "Latin American Labor Studies: A Bibliography of English Publications through 1989" [Miami: Center for Labor Research and Studies, Florida International University, 1989]). Among the English-language monographs, particularly excellent are Steve Stein, *Populism in Peru*; Daniel James, *Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946–1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Peter Winn, *Weavers of Revolution: The Yarrur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Jeffrey Gould, *To Lead as Equals:*

Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Chinandega, Nicaragua, 1912–1979 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).

Chapter One

1. See "Appendix I: The São Paulo Railway and the Evolution of ABC to 1900," in John D. French, "Industrial Workers and the Origin of Populist Politics in the ABC Region of Greater São Paulo, Brazil 1900–1950" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1985), 577–93.

2. The figure of 1,000 industrial wage earners in ABC in 1907 is the most conservative estimate based on known employment levels at various factories. See "Appendix II: The Development of Industry in ABC to 1920," in French, "Industrial Workers," 594–601.

3. Founded in 1893 by Silva, Seabra & Cia., this textile plant had several different names and owners over the next seventy years but has been commonly known in Santo André as the "Ipiranguinha." See Maria Alice Rosa Ribeiro, *Condições de Trabalho na Indústria Têxtil Paulista (1870–1930)* (São Paulo: Hucitec/Unicamp, 1988), 39, 64, 194, 197; Juergen Richard Langenbuch, *A Estruturação da Grande São Paulo: Estudo de Geografia Urbana* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação IBGE, 1981), 109.

4. Azis Simão, *Sindicato e Estado* (1966; reprint, São Paulo: Ática, 1981), 38.

5. Paula Beiguelman, *Os Companheiros de São Paulo* (São Paulo: Símbolo, 1977), 20–34.

6. "Os Presídios Industriais—Fábrica do Ipiranguinha," *A Terra Livre* (São Paulo), 24 March 1906, reprinted in Edgard Carone, ed., *Movimento Operário no Brasil*, 2 vols. (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1979–81), 1:51–53 (quotation on 52); Ademir Medici, "A Mais Antiga Greve e um Velho Livro de Atas," *Diário do Grande ABC* (DGABC, Santo André), 22 March 1981; Everardo Dias, *História das Lutas Sociais no Brasil* (1962; reprint, São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1977), 252; "Greve," *O Estado de São Paulo* (ESP, São Paulo), 21 March 1906. The ESP citation was originally mentioned in Barbara Weinstein's important article, "Impressões da Elite sobre os Movimentos da Classe Operária: A Cobertura da Greve em *O Estado de São Paulo*," in *O Bravo Matutino. Imprensa e Ideologia: O Estado de São Paulo*, ed. Maria H. Capelato and Maria L. Prado (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1980), 135–76. Stanley J. Stein, *The Brazilian Cotton Manufacture: Textile Enterprise in an Underdeveloped Area, 1850–1950* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 64–65, reports that the earliest strikes at Rio's Petropolitana textile mill in 1891 and 1897 also originated in the weaving section alone.

7. Edgard Leuenroth, *Anarquismo, Rotetiro da Libertação Social* (Rio de Janeiro: Mundo Livre, 1963). Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro and Michael Hall, eds., *A Classe Operária no Brasil, 1889–1930, Documentos*, 2 vols. (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1979), 1:226.

8. Edgar Rodrigues, *Socialismo e Sindicalismo no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Laemmer, 1969), 106.