Publications of Robert N. Brandon
%% Books
@book{fds244326,
Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Samson, R},
Title = {Integrating Development and Evolution},
Publisher = {The MIT Press},
Editor = {Samson, R and Brandon, R},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds244326}
}
%% Papers Published
@article{fds343339,
Author = {McShea, DW and Wang, SC and Brandon, RN},
Title = {A quantitative formulation of biology's first
law.},
Journal = {Evolution; international journal of organic
evolution},
Volume = {73},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1101-1115},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {The zero-force evolutionary law (ZFEL) states that in
evolutionary systems, in the absence of forces or
constraints, diversity and complexity tend to increase. The
reason is that diversity and complexity are both variance
measures, and variances tend to increase spontaneously as
random events accumulate. Here, we use random-walk models to
quantify the ZFEL expectation, producing equations that give
the probabilities of diversity or complexity increasing as a
function of time, and that give the expected magnitude of
the increase. We produce two sets of equations, one for the
case in which variation occurs in discrete steps, the other
for the case in which variation is continuous. The equations
provide a way to decompose actual trajectories of diversity
or complexity into two components, the portion due to the
ZFEL and a remainder due to selection and constraint.
Application of the equations is demonstrated using real and
hypothetical data.},
Doi = {10.1111/evo.13735},
Key = {fds343339}
}
@article{fds320303,
Author = {Fleming, L and Brandon, R},
Title = {Why flying dogs are rare: A general theory of luck in
evolutionary transitions.},
Journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of biological and
biomedical sciences},
Volume = {49},
Pages = {24-31},
Year = {2015},
Month = {February},
Abstract = {There is a worry that the 'major transitions in evolution'
represent an arbitrary group of events. This worry is
warranted, and we show why. We argue that the transition to
a new level of hierarchy necessarily involves a
nonselectionist chance process. Thus any unified theory of
evolutionary transitions must be more like a general theory
of fortuitous luck, rather than a rigid formulation of
expected events. We provide a systematic account of
evolutionary transitions based on a second-order regularity
of chance events, as stipulated by the ZFEL (Zero Force
Evolutionary Law). And in doing so, we make evolutionary
transitions explainable and predictable, and so not entirely
contingent after all.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006},
Key = {fds320303}
}
@article{fds320304,
Author = {Brandon, R and Fleming, L},
Title = {Drift sometimes dominates selection, and vice versa: A reply
to Clatterbuck, Sober and Lewontin},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {29},
Number = {4},
Pages = {577-585},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Clatterbuck et al. (Biol Philos 28: 577-592, 2013) argue
that there is no fact of the matter whether selection
dominates drift or vice versa in any particular case of
evolution. Their reasons are not empirically based; rather,
they are purely conceptual. We show that their conceptual
presuppositions are unmotivated, unnecessary and overly
complex. We also show that their conclusion runs contrary to
current biological practice. The solution is to recognize
that evolution involves a probabilistic sampling process,
and that drift is a deviation from probabilistic
expectation. We conclude that conceptually, there are no
problems with distinguishing drift from selection, and
empirically-as modern science illustrates-when drift does
occur, there is a quantifiable fact of the matter to be
discovered. © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media
Dordrecht.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z},
Key = {fds320304}
}
@article{fds244327,
Author = {Brandon, RN and McShea, DW},
Title = {Four solutions for four puzzles},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {27},
Number = {5},
Pages = {737-744},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Editor = {K. Sterelny},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
Keywords = {Zero-force law },
Abstract = {Barrett et al. (Biol Philos, 2012) present four puzzles for
the ZFEL-view of evolution that we present in our 2010 book,
Biology's First Law: The Tendency for Diversity and
Complexity to Increase in Evolutionary Systems. Our intent
in writing this book was to present a radically different
way to think about evolution. To the extent that it really
is radical, it will be easy to misunderstand. We think
Barrett et al. have misunderstood several crucial points and
so we welcome the opportunity to clarify. © 2012 Springer
Science+Business Media B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6},
Key = {fds244327}
}
@article{fds244322,
Author = {Ramsey, G and Brandon, R},
Title = {Why reciprocal altruism is not a kind of group
selection},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {385-400},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2011},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was originally formulated in terms of
individual selection and most theorists continue to view it
in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal
altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998).
They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other
forms of altruism) evolves by the process of group
selection. In this paper, we argue that the original
interpretation of reciprocal altruism is the correct one. We
accomplish this by arguing that if fitness attaches to (at
minimum) entire life cycles, then the kind of fitness
exchanges needed to form the group-level in such situations
is not available. Reciprocal altruism is thus a result of
individual selection and when it evolves, it does so because
it is individually advantageous. © 2011 Springer
Science+Business Media B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7},
Key = {fds244322}
}
@article{fds201669,
Author = {R.N. Brandon},
Title = {“Why Reciprocal Altruism is Not a Kind of Group
Selection” (with Grant Ramsey) in Biology and Philosophy,
(2011) Vol. 26, 3: 385-400.},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds201669}
}
@article{fds201670,
Author = {R.N. Brandon},
Title = {“The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary Theory,”
in The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol.
9 (ed. By M. O’Rouke and M. Slater)},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds201670}
}
@article{fds201671,
Author = {R.N. Brandon},
Title = {“A General Case for Functional Pluralism,” in Function:
Selection and Mechanisms (ed. by P. Huneman)},
Publisher = {Springer},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds201671}
}
@article{fds320305,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {A non-newtonian newtonian model of evolution: The ZFEL
view},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {77},
Number = {5},
Pages = {702-715},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Recently philosophers of biology have argued over whether or
not Newtonian mechanics provides a useful analogy for
thinking about evolutionary theory. For philosophers, the
canonical presentation of this analogy is Sober's. Matthen
and Ariew and Walsh, Lewins, and Ariew argue that this
analogy is deeply wrong-headed. Here I argue that the
analogy is indeed useful, however, not in the way it is
usually interpreted. The Newtonian analogy depends on having
the proper analogue of Newton's First Law. That analogue is
what McShea and Brandon call the Zero Force Evolutionary Law
(ZFEL). According to the ZFEL, change, not stasis, is the
default state of evolutionary systems. Copyright 2010 by the
Philosophy of Science Association. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/656901},
Key = {fds320305}
}
@article{fds244328,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {The Principle of Drift: Biology's First Law},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {CII},
Number = {7},
Pages = {319-335},
Publisher = {The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
Year = {2006},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds244328}
}
@article{fds320307,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {The difference between selection and drift: A reply to
Millstein},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1},
Pages = {153-170},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Millstein [Bio. Philos. 17 (2002) 33] correctly identies a
serious problem with the view that natural selection and
random drift are not conceptually distinct. She offers a
solution to this problem purely in terms of differences
between the processes of selection and drift. I show that
this solution does not work, that it leaves the vast
majority of real biological cases uncategorized. However, I
do think there is a solution to the problem she raises, and
I offer it here. My solution depends on solving the
biological analogue of the reference class problem in
probability theory and on the reality of individual
fitnesses. © Springer 2005.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9},
Key = {fds320307}
}
@article{fds320308,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {The Units of Selection Revisited: The Modules of
Selection},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {167-180},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Richard Lewontin's (1970) early work on the "units" of
selection initiated the conceptual and theoretical
investigations that have led to the hierarchical perspective
on selection that has reached near consensus status today.
This paper explores other aspects of his work, work on what
he termed "continuity" and "quasi-independence", that
connect to contemporary explorations of modularity in
development and evolution. I characterize such modules and
argue that they are the true units of selection in that they
are what evolution by natural selection individuates,
selects among, and transforms.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1006682200831},
Key = {fds320308}
}
@article{fds320309,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Does biology have laws? The experimental
evidence},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {64},
Number = {4 SUPPL. 1},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In this paper I argue that we can best make sense of the
practice of experimental evolutionary biology if we see it
as investigating contingent, rather than lawlike,
regularities. This understanding is contrasted with the
experimental practice of certain areas of physics. However,
this presents a problem for those who accept the Logical
Positivist conception of law and its essential role in
scientific explanation. I address this problem by arguing
that the contingent regularities of evolutionary biology
have a limited range of nomic necessity and a limited range
of explanatory power even though they lack the unlimited
projectibility that has been seen by some as a hallmark of
scientific laws. Copyright 1997 by the Philosophy of Science
Association. All rigts reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/392621},
Key = {fds320309}
}
@article{fds320310,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Discussion: Reply to Hitchcock},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {531-538},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Christopher Hitchcock's discussion of my use of
screening-off in analyzing the causal process of natural
selection raises some interesting issues to which I am
pleased to reply. The bulk of his article is devoted to some
fairly general points in the theory of explanation. In
particular, he questions whether or not my point that
phenotype screens off genotype from reproductive success (in
cases of organismic selection) supports my claim that the
explanation of differential reproductive success should be
in terms of phenotypic differences, not genotypic
differences. I will respond to this and show why the two
supposed counter-examples to my position
fail.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1006576129655},
Key = {fds320310}
}
@article{fds318355,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Rausher, MD},
Title = {Testing adaptationism: A comment on Orzack and
Sober},
Journal = {American Naturalist},
Volume = {148},
Number = {1},
Pages = {189-201},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1086/285918},
Key = {fds318355}
}
@article{fds320311,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Carson, S},
Title = {The indeterministic character of evolutionary theory: No "No
hidden variables proof" but no room for determinism
either},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {63},
Number = {3},
Pages = {315-337},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In this paper we first briefly review Bell's (1964, 1966)
Theorem to see how it invalidates any deterministic "hidden
variable" account of the apparent indeterminacy of quantum
mechanics (QM). Then we show that quantum uncertainty, at
the level of DNA mutations, can "percolate" up to have major
populational effects. Interesting as this point may be it
does not show any autonomous indeterminism of the
evolutionary process. In the next two sections we
investigate drift and natural selection as the locus of
autonomous biological indeterminacy. Here we conclude that
the population-level indeterminacy of natural selection and
drift are ultimately based on the assumption of a
fundamental indeterminacy at the level of the lives and
deaths of individual organisms. The following section
examines this assumption and defends it from the
determinists' attack. Then we show that, even if one rejects
the assumption, there is still an important reason why one
might think evolutionary theory (ET) is autonomously
indeterministic. In the concluding section we contrast the
arguments we have mounted against a deterministic hidden
variable account of ET with the proof of the impossibility
of such an account of QM.},
Doi = {10.1086/289915},
Key = {fds320311}
}
@article{fds320312,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Theory and experiment in evolutionary biology},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {99},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-73},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1994},
Month = {April},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01064530},
Key = {fds320312}
}
@article{fds320313,
Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN},
Title = {Sex and the individuality of species: A response to
Ghiselin},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {77-79},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00144042},
Key = {fds320313}
}
@article{fds320314,
Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN},
Title = {Individuality, pluralism, and the phylogenetic species
concept},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {2},
Number = {4},
Pages = {397-414},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1987},
Month = {October},
Abstract = {The concept of individuality as applied to species, an
important advance in the philosophy of evolutionary biology,
is nevertheless in need of refinement. Four important
subparts of this concept must be recognized: spatial
boundaries, temporal boundaries, integration, and cohesion.
Not all species necessarily meet all of these. Two very
different types of "pluralism" have been advocated with
respect to species, only one of which is satisfactory. An
often unrecognized distinction between "grouping" and
"ranking" components of any species concept is necessary. A
phylogenetic species concept is advocated that uses a
(monistic) grouping criterion of monophyly in a cladistic
sense, and a (pluralistic) ranking criterion based on those
causal processes that are most important in producing and
maintaining lineages in a particular case. Such causal
processes can include actual interbreeding, selective
constraints, and developmental canalization. The widespread
use of the "biological species concept" is flawed for two
reasons: because of a failure to distinguish grouping from
ranking criteria and because of an unwarranted emphasis on
the importance of interbreeding as a universal causal factor
controlling evolutionary diversification. The potential to
interbreed is not in itself a process; it is instead a
result of a diversity of processes which result in shared
selective environments and common developmental programs.
These types of processes act in both sexual and asexual
organisms, thus the phylogenetic species concept can reflect
an underlying unity that the biological species concept can
not. © 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00127698},
Key = {fds320314}
}
@article{fds320315,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Hornstein, N},
Title = {From icons to symbols: Some speculations on the origins of
language},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {169-189},
Year = {1986},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {This paper is divided into three sections. In the first
section we offer a retooling of some traditional concepts,
namely icons and symbols, which allows us to describe an
evolutionary continuum of communication systems. The second
section consists of an argument from theoretical biology. In
it we explore the advantages and disadvantages of phenotypic
plasticity. We argue that a range of the conditions that
selectively favor phenotypic plasticity also favor a
nongenetic transmission system that would allow for the
inheritance of acquired characters. The first two sections
are independent, the third depends on both of them. In it we
offer an argument that human natural languages have just the
features required of an ideal transmission mechanism under
the conditions described in section 2. © 1986 D. Reidel
Publishing Company.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00142900},
Key = {fds320315}
}
@article{fds320316,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Biological teleology: Questions and explanations},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {91-105},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {This paper gives an account of evolutionary explanations in
biology. Briefly, the explanations I am primarily concerned
with are explanations of adaptations. ('Adaptation' is a
technical term and defining it requires a fairly lengthy
digression.) These explanations are contrasted with other
nonteleological evolutionary explanations. The distinction
is made by distinguishing the different kinds of questions
these different explanations serve to answer. The sense in
which explanations of adaptations are teleological is
spelled out. © 1981.},
Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7},
Key = {fds320316}
}
@article{fds320317,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Adaptation and evolutionary theory},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {9},
Number = {3},
Pages = {181-206},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1978},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5},
Key = {fds320317}
}
%% Papers Accepted
@article{fds363728,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Nijhout, HF},
Title = {The Empirical Nonequivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models
of Selection: A (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism
and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism},
Pages = {383-404},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {Genic selectionists (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976) defend the
view that genes are the (unique) units of selection and that
all evolutionary events can be adequately represented at the
genic level. Pluralistic genic selectionists (Dawkins 1982;
Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991) defend 278 ROBERT N.
BRANDON AND H. FREDERIK NIJHOUT the weaker view that in many
cases there are multiple, equally adequate accounts of
evolutionary events but that always among the set of equally
adequate representations will be one at the genic level.
There have been many arguments against these views (e.g.,
Wimsatt 1980; Brandon 1982; Sober and Lewontin 1982; Lloyd
1988), but the debate continues to animate contemporary
philosophy of biology (e.g., Lloyd 2005; Waters 2005). A
(perhaps the) reason for this is that the refutations have
primarily relied on philosophically contentious views on
scientific explanation and causation-views their opponents
have not been willing to accept. What both sides in this
debate have accepted is that the genic and higher-level
accounts are empirically equivalent (but see Brandon and
Burian [1984, introduction to part II] and Godfrey-Smith and
Lewontin [1993]). This paper will show that that is not the
case, that the two accounts give dramatically different,
incompatible, predictions in a broad class of cases. The
predictions are factually different and the genic models
consistently get it wrong. Given that virtually all
philosophers and scientists accept the position that
scientific theories should agree with known facts, we will
refute genic selectionism without resort to anything that is
philosophically controversial. 1 1. The Cases. Let us start
with the case that has been most discussed in this
literature, a case of heterozygote superiority. Let us
suppose that there is a single genetic locus with two
alleles, A and a. Thus there are three genotypes, AA, Aa,
and aa.. By definition the heterozygote Aa is superior in
fitness to the two homozygotes. In general the fitness of
the two homozygotes need not be equal, but for simplicity we
will assume that they are since nothing hinges on that
assumption. The standard genotypic model normalizes the
fitness of Aa at 1 and assigns the fitness of 1 - s to the
two homozygotes (where 1 ~ s > 0). Although the value of s =
1 GENIC AND GENOTYPIC MODELS OF SELECTION 279 is a
mathematical, and biological, possibility, for our purposes
we cannot focus on that value since it is what Brandon
(2005) has termed a value of maximal fitness difference.
Fitness values are at the point of maximal fitness
difference when some fitness values equal 1 and some equal 0
and there are no intermediary fitness values. Drift is
impossible at a maximal fitness differential point. Since we
are going to be interested in the interplay of drift and
selection, we will need to give s some intermediary value.
For now let us assume s = 0.5. This model predicts a stable
equilibrium that will be reached in a number of generations
(depending on the initial starting point and population
size). At this equilibrium the frequencies of the two
alleles are both 50'%.},
Key = {fds363728}
}
@article{fds363776,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Rausher, MD},
Title = {TESTING ADAPTATIONISM: A COMMENT ON ORZACK AND
SOBER},
Pages = {133-146},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {One of the most heated areas of controversy within
contemporary evolutionary biology concerns adaptationism and
the importance of natural selection relative to other
evolutionary factors. Because these debates sometimes seem
to be more ideological than scientific, Orzack and Sober's
(1994) recent suggestion about how to test adaptationism is
likely to be well received. However, as we will show, both
their statement of the hypothesis of adaptationism and their
method of testing it are seriously flawed. We will try to
refine the relevant hypotheses and consider the extent to
which, and the methods by which, they can be tested. In this
way we do take Orzack and Sober's project seriously. But, we
wish to state at the outset that the status of the
"adaptationist program" does not stand or fall on the
outcome of their project or our revision of it here. That
is, even if the hypothesis of adaptationism cannot be stated
in a precise enough manner to be testable, or if it is so
statable but proves to be false, the value of an
adaptational approach to evolutionary biology is not
necessarily diminished (see Mayr 1983 and Williams 1992 for
further discussion). Nonetheless, we think it
uncontroversial that in science a well-posed thesis is
preferable, everything else being equal, to an ill-posed or
untestable one, and our purpose here is to demonstrate that
Orzack and Sober's thesis of what constitutes adaptationism
is ill posed.},
Key = {fds363776}
}
@article{fds363777,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Carson, S},
Title = {THE INDETERMINISTIC CHARACTER OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY: NO "NO
HIDDEN VARIABLES PROOF" BUT NO ROOM FOR DETERMINISM
EITHER},
Pages = {213-236},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {ET is also apparently indeterministic; certainly the best
and most influential treatments of the probabilistic nature
of ET have drawn this conclusion (Beatty 1984, Sober 1984,
Richardson and Burian 1992). Moreover, the propensity
interpretation of fitness (Brandon 1978, 1990; Brandon and
Beatty 1984; Burian 1983; Mills and Beatty 1979; Richardson
and Burian 1992), which has been accepted by most
philosophers of biology and many working evolutionary
biologists, presupposes that natural selection is
fundamentally probabilistic. Recently, however, two
philosophers, Rosenberg (1988, 1994) and Horan (1994), have
questioned this conclusion. They have argued that the
statistical character of evolutionary theory is best viewed
instrumentally, i.e., that the probabilities involved in
evolutionary theory are epistemic-they reflect our
ignorance-and that if we were smarter and/or if we had
different aims, evolutionary theory could be recast as a
purely deterministic theory. In other words they argue that
the process of evolution is deterministic while, for various
reasons, our best theory of evolution is indeterministic.
This is exactly the sort of position that has been ruled out
in QM by Bell's Theorem (Bell 1964, 1966). We want to show
that it is also ruled out in ET, though in a less decisive
way.},
Key = {fds363777}
}
@article{fds244324,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {A general case for functional pluralism},
Pages = {97-104},
Booktitle = {Functions: Selection and Mechanisms},
Publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
Editor = {Huneman, P},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9789400753037},
Abstract = {Using examples from functional morphology and evolution,
Amundson and Lauder (Biol Philos 9: 443-469, 1994) argued
for functional pluralism in biology. More specifically, they
argued that both causal role (CR) analyses of function and
selected effects (SE) analyses played necessary parts in
evolutionary biology, broadly construed, and that neither
sort of analysis was reducible to the other. Rather than
thinking of these two accounts of function as rivals, they
argued that they were instead complimentary. Frdaric
Bouchard (Chap. 5, this volume) attempts to make that case
stronger using an interesting example-the evolution of
ecosystems. This case is interesting in that it involves the
sudden appearance of things with functions, which also
evolve, but which do not, at least initially, have a
selected effect etiology. I am in complete agreement with
the above-mentioned positions. Here, I take a different tack
in arguing for functional pluralism. I abstract away not
only from the details of biological practice but even from
the details of the CR and SE accounts to argue for a more
general pluralism of historical and ahistorical
concepts.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
Key = {fds244324}
}
@article{fds359570,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {A General Case for Functional Pluralism},
Volume = {363},
Pages = {97-104},
Booktitle = {Synthese Library},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Using examples from functional morphology and evolution,
Amundson and Lauder (Biol Philos 9: 443–469, 1994) argued
for functional pluralism in biology. More specifically, they
argued that both causal role (CR) analyses of function and
selected effects (SE) analyses played necessary parts in
evolutionary biology, broadly construed, and that neither
sort of analysis was reducible to the other. Rather than
thinking of these two accounts of function as rivals, they
argued that they were instead complimentary. Frédéric
Bouchard (Chap. 5, this volume) attempts to make that case
stronger using an interesting example—the evolution of
ecosystems. This case is interesting in that it involves the
sudden appearance of things with functions, which also
evolve, but which do not, at least initially, have a
selected effect etiology. I am in complete agreement with
the above-mentioned positions. Here, I take a different tack
in arguing for functional pluralism. I abstract away not
only from the details of biological practice but even from
the details of the CR and SE accounts to argue for a more
general pluralism of historical and ahistorical
concepts.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
Key = {fds359570}
}
@article{fds244325,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary
Theory},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {19-35},
Booktitle = {The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {O'rourke, M and Slater, M},
Year = {2011},
ISBN = {9780262017404},
Key = {fds244325}
}
@article{fds320306,
Author = {Brandon, RN},
Title = {Teleology in self-organizing systems},
Pages = {267-281},
Booktitle = {Self-Organization and Emergence in Life Sciences},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9781402039164},
Abstract = {Teleological language, talk of function and purpose, has
long been associated with the appearance of order in the
biological world. Indeed, the pre-Darwinian tradition of
natural theology (e.g., Paley 1836) gave a clear
underpinning for such teleology. The order of nature was a
product of Gods design and reflected his purposes. In this
post-Darwinian era neural selection has taken the place of
Gods purposes in supporting teleological ascriptions -the
ultimate purpose or function of some biological trait, say a
wing, is just that effect acted on by natural selection to
produce, by evolution, the order of the trait in question.
But the recent recognition that order can emerge just from
the dynamics of complex systems -no natural selection is
needed -leads us to the question of this paper; namely, in
what ways, and to what extent, does teleological language
properly apply to the selfgenerated order of complex
dynamical systems in biology?© 2006 Springer. Printed in
the Netherlands.},
Doi = {10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16},
Key = {fds320306}
}
@article{fds244323,
Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Ramsey, G},
Title = {What’s Wrong with the Emergentist Statistical
Interpretation of Natural Selection and Random
Drift},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy of
Biology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Ruse, M and Hull, D},
Year = {2006},
Abstract = {Population-level theories of evolution—the stock and trade
of population genetics—are statistical theories par
excellence. But what accounts for the statistical character
of population-level phenomena? One view is that the
population-level statistics are a product of, are generated
by, probabilities that attach to the individuals in the
population. On this conception, population-level phenomena
are explained by individual-level probabilities and their
population-level combinations. Another view, which arguably
goes back to Fisher (1930) but has been defended recently ,
is that the population-level statistics are sui generis,
that they somehow emerge from the underlying deterministic
behavior of the individuals composing the population. Walsh
et al. (2002) label this the statistical interpretation. We
are not willing to give them that term, since everyone will
admit that the population-level theories of evolution are
statistical, so we will call this the emergentist
statistical interpretation (ESI). Our goals are to show
that: (1) This interpretation is based on gross factual
errors concerning the practice of evolutionary biology,
concerning both what is done and what can be done; (2) its
adoption would entail giving up on most of the explanatory
and predictive (i.e., scientific) projects of evolutionary
biology; and finally (3) a rival interpretation, which we
will label the propensity statistical interpretation (PSI)
succeeds exactly where the emergentist interpretation
fails.},
Key = {fds244323}
}
%% Papers Submitted
@article{fds52684,
Author = {R.N. Brandon and Grant Ramsey},
Title = {Toward a Pluralistic Account of Altruism: Why Reciprical
Alturism is Not a Kind of Group Selection},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {Philosophy of Science Association},
Year = {2006},
Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was origianlly formulated in terms of
individual selection and most theorists continue to view it
in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal
altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998).
They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other
forms of alturism) evolves by the process of group
selection. their view is thus monistic--all alturism evolves
via the sole mechanism of group selection. In this paper we
defend the view that reciprocal altruism involves individual
selection. By arguing that reciprocal altruism is
individually advantageous, while maintaining that other
forms of altruism evolve by group selection, we are arguing
for a pluralistic account of alturism.},
Key = {fds52684}
}