Publications of Michael C. Munger
%% Books
@book{fds250197,
Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC},
Title = {Analytical Politics},
Pages = {253 pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {1997},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780521565677},
Abstract = {<jats:p>To 'analyse' means to break into components and
understand. But new readers find modern mathematical
theories of politics so inaccessible that analysis is
difficult. Where does one start? Analytical Politics is an
introduction to analytical theories of politics, explicitly
designed both for the interested professional and students
in political science. We cannot evaluate how well
governments perform without some baseline for comparison:
what should governments be doing? This book focuses on the
role of the 'center' in politics, drawing from the classical
political theories of Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, and
others. The main questions in Analytical Politics involve
the existence and stability of the center; when does it
exist? When should the center guide policy? How do
alternative voting rules help in discovering the center? An
understanding of the work reviewed here is essential for
anyone who hopes to evaluate the performance or predict the
actions of democratic governments.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/cbo9781139174725},
Key = {fds250197}
}
@book{fds302177,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Analyzing Policy Choices, Conflicts, and
Practices},
Pages = {430 pages},
Publisher = {W. W. Norton},
Year = {2000},
ISBN = {9780393973990},
Abstract = {Introduction to the conceptual foundations of policy
analysis including the basics of the welfare-economics
paradigm and cost-benefit analysis.},
Key = {fds302177}
}
@book{fds250200,
Author = {Munger, MC and Munger, KM},
Title = {Choosing in groups: Analytical politics revisited},
Pages = {1-255},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107070035},
Abstract = {This book is an introduction to the logic and analytics of
group choice. To understand how political institutions work,
it is important to isolate what citizens - as individuals
and as members of society - actually want. This book
develops a means of “representing” the preferences of
citizens so that institutions can be studied more carefully.
This is the first book to integrate the classical problem of
constitutions with modern spatial theory, connecting
Aristotle and Montesquieu with Arrow and
Buchanan.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781107707153},
Key = {fds250200}
}
@book{fds312801,
Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC},
Title = {Empirical studies in comparative politics},
Volume = {97},
Pages = {219-227},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1005057920748},
Key = {fds312801}
}
@book{fds19836,
Title = {Empirical Studies in Comparative Public Choice},
Editor = {M. Munger and Melvin J. Hinich},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds19836}
}
@book{fds312800,
Title = {Future of the Economy: Fifty Years},
Publisher = {Independent Institute},
Editor = {Whaples, R and Munger, MC and Coyne, C},
Year = {2015},
Abstract = {Authored essays on "Tomorrow 3.0" and "Concluding
Essay."},
Key = {fds312800}
}
@book{fds250196,
Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC},
Title = {Ideology and the theory of political choice},
Pages = {1-267},
Publisher = {University of Michigan Press},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780472084135},
Abstract = {There is no unified theory that can explain both voter
choice and where choices come from. Hinich and Munger fill
that gap with their model of political communication based
on ideology. Rather than beginning with voters and diffuse,
atomistic preferences, Hinich and Munger explore why large
groups of voters share preference profiles, why they
consider themselves “liberals” or “conservatives.”
The reasons, they argue, lie in the twin problems of
communication and commitment that politicians face. Voters,
overloaded with information, ignore specific platform
positions. Parties and candidates therefore communicate
through simple statements of goals, analogies, and by
invoking political symbols. But politicians must also commit
to pursuing the actions implied by these analogies and
symbols. Commitment requires that ideologies be used
consistently, particularly when it is not in the party’s
short-run interest. The model Hinich and Munger develop
accounts for the choices of voters, the goals of
politicians, and the interests of contributors. It is an
important addition to political science and essential
reading for all in that discipline.},
Key = {fds250196}
}
@book{fds350701,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Is Capitalism Sustainable?},
Publisher = {American Institute for Economic Research},
Year = {2019},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {978-1630691738},
Key = {fds350701}
}
@book{fds302178,
Author = {Anomaly, J and Brennan, G and Brennan, POSAPTG and Munger, MC and Sayre-McCord, G},
Title = {Philosophy, Politics, and Economics An Anthology},
Pages = {672 pages},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press, USA},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9780190207311},
Abstract = {The only book on the market to include classical and
contemporary readings from key authors in Philosophy,
Politics, and Economics (PPE), this unique anthology
provides a comprehensive overview of the central topics in
this rapidly ...},
Key = {fds302178}
}
@book{fds318622,
Author = {Munger, MC and Hinich, M},
Title = {Political Economy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2010},
Abstract = {Originally published in 1997. Reprinted in new Chinese
language edition, and in new Korean edition.},
Key = {fds318622}
}
@book{fds314265,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {The Thing Itself: Essays on Academics, Economics, and
Policy},
Pages = {188 pages},
Publisher = {Mungerella Publishing},
Year = {2015},
ISBN = {9780692364154},
Key = {fds314265}
}
@book{fds327639,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Tomorrow 3.0: The Sharing-Middleman Economy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2018},
Key = {fds327639}
}
@book{fds365860,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Tomorrow 3.0: Transaction Costs and the Sharing
Economy},
Pages = {1-174},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781108427081},
Abstract = {With the growing popularity of apps such as Uber and Airbnb,
there has been a keen interest in the rise of the sharing
economy. Michael C. Munger brings these new trends in the
economy down to earth by focusing on their relation to the
fundamental economic concept of transaction costs. In doing
so Munger brings a fresh perspective on the 'sharing
economy' in clear and engaging writing that is accessible to
both general and specialist readers. He shows how, for the
first time, entrepreneurs can sell reductions in transaction
costs, rather than reductions in the costs of the products
themselves. He predicts that smartphones will be used to
commodify excess capacity, and reaches the controversial
conclusion that a basic income will be required as a
consequence of this new 'transaction costs
revolution'.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781108602341},
Key = {fds365860}
}
%% Monographs
@misc{fds142637,
Author = {M.C. Munger},
Title = {"They Clapped: Can Price-Gouging Laws Prohibit Scarcity?”
Econlib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN,},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungergouging.html},
Key = {fds142637}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds250113,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {A Retrospective Assessment of Tullock’s THE VOTE
MOTIVE},
Pages = {131-138},
Booktitle = {The Vote Motive},
Publisher = {Institute of Economic Affairs},
Editor = {Kurrild-Klitgaard, P},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds250113}
}
@misc{fds250104,
Author = {Munger, M and Enelow, J and Endersby, J},
Title = {A Revised Probabilistic Spatial Model of Elections: Theory
and Evidence},
Pages = {125-140},
Booktitle = {An Economic Theory of Democracy in Contemporary
Perspective},
Publisher = {University of Michigan Press},
Editor = {Grofman, B},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds250104}
}
@misc{fds312942,
Author = {Munger, MC and Russell, D},
Title = {Business and Virtue},
Booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of Business Ethics},
Publisher = {Routledge/Taylor and Francis},
Editor = {Heath, E and et al.},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds312942}
}
@misc{fds363840,
Author = {Munger, MC and Russell, DC},
Title = {Can profit seekers be virtuous?},
Pages = {114-130},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Business Ethics},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9781315764818},
Key = {fds363840}
}
@misc{fds366928,
Author = {Munger, MC and Russell, DC},
Title = {Can profit seekers be virtuous?},
Pages = {113-130},
Booktitle = {ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO BUSINESS ETHICS},
Year = {2018},
ISBN = {978-1-138-78956-2},
Key = {fds366928}
}
@misc{fds303786,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Chadha v. I.N.S. and the Legislative Veto},
Pages = {93-105},
Booktitle = {Creating Constitutional Change},
Publisher = {Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press},
Editor = {Ivers, G and McGuire, K},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds303786}
}
@misc{fds14591,
Author = {M. Munger},
Title = {Chadha v. I.N.S. and the Legislative Veto},
Pages = {93-105},
Booktitle = {Creating Constitutional Change},
Publisher = {Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press},
Editor = {Gregg Ivers and Kevin McGuire},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Spring},
Key = {fds14591}
}
@misc{fds313453,
Author = {Munger, MC and McKay, A},
Title = {Chadha v. INS: Policy-making Outside the
Constitution},
Pages = {93-105},
Booktitle = {Creating Constitutional Change},
Publisher = {University of Virginia Press},
Editor = {Ivers, G and McGuire, K},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds313453}
}
@misc{fds313178,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Coase and the ‘Sharing Economy},
Pages = {187-208},
Booktitle = {Forever Contemporary: The Economics of Ronald
Coase},
Publisher = {Institute for Economic Affairs},
Editor = {Veljanovski, C},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds313178}
}
@misc{fds250274,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Commentary on 'The Quest for Meaning in Public
Choice},
Volume = {63},
Pages = {280 pages},
Booktitle = {The Production and Diffusion of Public Choice Political
Economy: Reflections on the VPI Center},
Publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
Editor = {Pitt, JC and Salehi-Isfahani, D and Eckel, DW},
Year = {2004},
ISBN = {978-1-4051-2453-9},
Key = {fds250274}
}
@misc{fds250111,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Committee Assignments},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {95-98},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Public Choice},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press.},
Editor = {Frey, B and Rowley, C and Schneider, F},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds250111}
}
@misc{fds313758,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Committee Jurisdictions and PACs},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {98-100},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Public Choice},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press},
Editor = {Frey, B and Rowley, C and Schneider, F},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds313758}
}
@misc{fds365859,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Corruption},
Pages = {314-324},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy, Politics, and
Economics},
Year = {2022},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9780367407674},
Doi = {10.4324/9780367808983-30},
Key = {fds365859}
}
@misc{fds340067,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Culture, order, and virtue},
Pages = {177-195},
Booktitle = {Liberalism, Conservatism, and Hayek's Idea of Spontaneous
Order},
Publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan US},
Year = {2007},
Month = {October},
ISBN = {9781403984258},
Doi = {10.1057/9780230609228},
Key = {fds340067}
}
@misc{fds250114,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Culture, Order, and Virtue},
Pages = {267-291},
Booktitle = {LIBERALISM, CONSERVATISM, AND HAYEK’S IDEA OF SPONTANEOUS
ORDER},
Publisher = {Palgrave},
Editor = {Hunt, L and McNamara, P},
Year = {2007},
ISBN = {9780230609228},
Doi = {10.1057/9780230609228},
Key = {fds250114}
}
@misc{fds250110,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Demobilized and Demoralized: Negative Ads and Loosening
Bonds},
Pages = {15-29},
Booktitle = {Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Breton, A and Galeotti, G and Salmon, P and Wintrobe,
R},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds250110}
}
@misc{fds250233,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Editors' Introduction: Empirical Studies in Comparative
Politics},
Volume = {97},
Pages = {219-227},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1998},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
Key = {fds250233}
}
@misc{fds313179,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Editor’s Introduction: The Basic-Income
Debate},
Volume = {19},
Number = {4},
Pages = {485-488},
Publisher = {The Independant Institute},
Year = {2015},
ISSN = {1086-1653},
url = {http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/toc.asp?issueID=81},
Key = {fds313179}
}
@misc{fds250119,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Euvoluntary Exchange and the Creation of
Wealth},
Booktitle = {Wealth Creation: Ethical & Economic Perspectives},
Publisher = {Cognella Academic Publishing},
Editor = {Schmidtz, D},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds250119}
}
@misc{fds318621,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Euvoluntary or Not, Exchange is Just},
Booktitle = {Liberalism and Capitalism},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Paul, EF and Miller, Jr., FD and Paul, J},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds318621}
}
@misc{fds318619,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Everything You Know About Recycling is Wrong},
Booktitle = {The Political Economy of Recycling},
Editor = {Kuznicki, J},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {Cato Unbound Symposium},
Key = {fds318619}
}
@misc{fds363841,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Government failure and market failure},
Pages = {342-357},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism},
Year = {2017},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9781138832169},
Key = {fds363841}
}
@misc{fds250118,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Hayek’s Insight: Order Without Direction, Benefit Without
Intent},
Booktitle = {Political Economy in Philosophic Perspective},
Publisher = {University Press of America},
Editor = {Butler, G},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds250118}
}
@misc{fds312937,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Hayek’s Political Insights: Emergent Orders and Laid-on
Laws},
Booktitle = {40 years after the Nobel: F.A. Hayek and Political Economy
as a Progressive Research Program},
Editor = {Boetke, P},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds312937}
}
@misc{fds250116,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {I have a real meeting at 10:30: Running for Office as a
Third Party Candidate},
Pages = {203-222},
Booktitle = {Inside Political Campaigns: Chronicles—And Lessons–From
the Trenches},
Publisher = {Lynne Rienner Publishers},
Editor = {Bowers, J and Daniels, S},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds250116}
}
@misc{fds250108,
Author = {Munger, M and Ensley, M},
Title = {Institutions, Ideology, and the Transmission of Information
Across Generations},
Pages = {107-122},
Booktitle = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Mudambi, R},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds250108}
}
@misc{fds313757,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Interest Groups},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {307-312},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Public Choice},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press},
Editor = {Frey, B and Rowley, C and Schneider, F},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds313757}
}
@misc{fds250122,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Kaldor-Hicks Coercion, Coasian Bargaining, and the
State},
Pages = {117-135},
Booktitle = {Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance: Economic and
Political Dimensions},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Martinez, J and Winer, S},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {Conference volume for Evergreen Resort Coercion Conference,
Oct. 1-2, 2010.},
Key = {fds250122}
}
@misc{fds314206,
Author = {Munger, MC and Denzau, AT},
Title = {Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests
Get Represented},
Pages = {338-357},
Booktitle = {The Classics of Interest Group Behavior},
Publisher = {Wadsworth Higher Ed Publishing},
Editor = {Wadsworth, RM},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds314206}
}
@misc{fds312939,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Market Failure and Government Failure (forthcoming)},
Booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism},
Editor = {Brennan, J},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds312939}
}
@misc{fds312954,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first
century world},
Pages = {115-133},
Booktitle = {Policy Challenges and Political Responses: Public Choice
Perspectives on the Post-9/11 World},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
Year = {2005},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780387280370},
Abstract = {Voting procedures nowadays are anachronistic on two counts:
the technology of recording and counting votes often is
outmoded and too much is expected from the mechanisms of
democratic choice. Even if votes always and everywhere were
counted perfectly, election outcomes would still be
arbitrary since no collective choice process can divine the
"general will". The crucial line in any state is the one
dividing private decisions from collective decisions.
Democracy is part of the package for nations freeing
themselves from totalitarianism's grip, but it may be the
last, rather than the first thing that should be added to
the mix. © 2005 Springer.},
Doi = {10.1007/0-387-28038-3_7},
Key = {fds312954}
}
@misc{fds366929,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first
century world},
Volume = {124},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {115-133},
Booktitle = {POLICY CHALLENGES AND POLITICAL RESPONSES: PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVES ON THE POST-9/11 WORLD},
Year = {2005},
Abstract = {Voting procedures nowadays are anachronistic on two counts:
the technology of recording and counting votes often is
outmoded and too much is expected from the mechanisms of
democratic choice. Even if votes always and everywhere were
counted perfectly, election outcomes would still be
arbitrary since no collective choice process can divine the
"general will". The crucial line in any state is the one
dividing private decisions from collective decisions.
Democracy is part of the package for nations freeing
themselves from totalitarianism's grip, but it may be the
last, rather than the first thing that should be added to
the mix. © Springer 2005.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-005-4749-9},
Key = {fds366929}
}
@misc{fds312951,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Orange blossom special: Externalities and the coase
theorem},
Pages = {192-196},
Booktitle = {Readings in Applied Microeconomics: The Power of the
Market},
Publisher = {Taylor & Francis},
Editor = {Newmark, C},
Year = {2009},
ISBN = {9780203878460},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2008/Mungerbees.html},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203878460},
Key = {fds312951}
}
@misc{fds250099,
Author = {Munger, MC and Roberts, BE},
Title = {Political and Economic Control of the Federal Reserve: A
Review of the Literature},
Booktitle = {The Political Economy of Monetary Policy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Mayer, T},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds250099}
}
@misc{fds250103,
Author = {Munger, MC and Roberts, BE},
Title = {Political and Economic Control of the Federal Reserve: A
Review of the Literature},
Booktitle = {The Political Economy of Monetary Policy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Mayer, T},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds250103}
}
@misc{fds250117,
Author = {Keech, W and Munger, MC},
Title = {Political Economy},
Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of Political Science},
Publisher = {Congressional Quarterly Press},
Editor = {Garrett, L and McClain, A and Chambers},
Year = {2010},
Abstract = {Originally published in 1997. Reprinted in new Chinese
language edition, and in new Korean edition.},
Key = {fds250117}
}
@misc{fds250105,
Author = {Munger, M and Hinich, M},
Title = {Political Ideology, Communication, and Community},
Pages = {25-50},
Booktitle = {Political Economy: Institutions, Competion, and
Representation},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Barnett, W and Hinich, M and Schofield, N},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds250105}
}
@misc{fds250102,
Author = {Munger, M and Hinich, M},
Title = {Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate
Strategy: An Equilibrium Spatial Analysis},
Pages = {49-68},
Booktitle = {Models of Strategic Choice in Politics},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Ordeshook, P},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds250102}
}
@misc{fds312958,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Political science and public choice},
Pages = {39-53},
Booktitle = {The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second
Edition},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781849802857},
Abstract = {Political science is the study of power, cooperation, and
the uses (legitimate or otherwise) of force. Public choice
is the application of a general model of rational individual
choice and action to a variety of problems of groups
choosing in non- market settings.},
Key = {fds312958}
}
@misc{fds250120,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Political Science and Public Choice},
Pages = {81-106},
Booktitle = {Elgar Companion to Public Choice II},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishers},
Editor = {Reksulak, M and Razzolini, L and Shughart, W},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds250120}
}
@misc{fds313173,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Public Choice Economics},
Volume = {19},
Pages = {534-539},
Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral
Sciences},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Editor = {Wright, JD},
Year = {2015},
ISBN = {9780080970868},
Abstract = {Public choice is the application of economic methods and
behavioral assumptions to nonmarket collective choice
institutions. There are six major questions that public
choice has focused on: collective action, controlling
Leviathan, delegation, democratic coherence, information
problems, and rent-seeking. Public choice has important
implications for institutional design, particularly under
the assumption that political actors may be motivated by
interests other than the public interest. Public choice has
given rise to important areas of study in empirical
behavioral economics, including experimental economics, and
to the study of common pool resource management
institutions.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.71071-3},
Key = {fds313173}
}
@misc{fds250115,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Regulation},
Pages = {418-420},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Libertarianism},
Publisher = {Cato Institute},
Editor = {Hanowy, R},
Year = {2008},
Doi = {10.4135/9781412965811.n257},
Key = {fds250115}
}
@misc{fds303785,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Regulation},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Libertarianism},
Publisher = {CATO Institute, Washington, D.C.},
Editor = {Palmer, T},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds303785}
}
@misc{fds312940,
Author = {Munger, MC and Larson, J},
Title = {Reimagine What You Already Know: Toward New Solutions to
Longstanding Problems (forthcoming)},
Booktitle = {Digital Kenya},
Editor = {Weiss, T},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds312940}
}
@misc{fds313756,
Author = {Munger, MC and Hinich, M},
Title = {Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson},
Volume = {II},
Pages = {284-286},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Public Choice},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press},
Editor = {Frey, B and Rowley, C and Scheider, F},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds313756}
}
@misc{fds361934,
Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC},
Title = {Spatial theory},
Pages = {295-304},
Booktitle = {Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political
Economy},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780387745749},
Abstract = {One of the fundamental building blocks in the analysis of
political phenomena is the representation of preferences.
Without some means of capturing the essence of goals and
trade-offs for individual choices, the mechanics of the
public choice method are stalled. While there are many ways
of representing preferences, the single most commonly used
approach is the spatial model. The idea of conceiving
preference in a kind of space is actually quite ancient, as
the quote from Aristotle's Politics below shows.
Furthermore, there are hints of several topics of modern
spatial theory, including the power of the middle, and the
problem of instability in political processes. © 2008
Springer-Verlag US.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-0-387-75870-1_18},
Key = {fds361934}
}
@misc{fds313755,
Author = {Munger, MC and Hinich, M},
Title = {Spatial Theory},
Volume = {II},
Pages = {305-312},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Public Choice},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press},
Editor = {Frey, B and Rowley, C and Schneider, F},
Year = {2003},
ISBN = {9780792386070},
Doi = {10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_26},
Key = {fds313755}
}
@misc{fds250101,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {The Cost of Protectionism: Estimates of the Hidden Tax of
Trade Restraints},
Booktitle = {World Trade and Trade Finance},
Publisher = {Matthew Bender},
Editor = {Norton, JJ},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds250101}
}
@misc{fds376561,
Author = {Munger, MC and Grier, K and Roberts, B},
Title = {The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978 -
1986},
Booktitle = {Business and Government},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar Press},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds376561}
}
@misc{fds250100,
Author = {Munger, M and Grier, KB},
Title = {The Empirical Accuracy of Sargent’s New Classical Macro
Model: Some Simulation Evidence},
Booktitle = {A Comparison of the Predictive Performance of Small
Macroeconometric Models},
Publisher = {St. Louis, MO: Center for the Study of American
Business},
Editor = {Meyer, L},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds250100}
}
@misc{fds250123,
Author = {Couyoumdjian, JP and Munger, MC},
Title = {The Entrepreneurial Virtues},
Booktitle = {Perspectives on Character},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Fileva, I},
Year = {2016},
Key = {fds250123}
}
@misc{fds250106,
Author = {Munger, M and Brewster, R and Oatley, T},
Title = {The European Court of Justice: An Agenda Control Analysis of
the Implications of EU Enlargement},
Booktitle = {Institutional Challenges in The European
Union},
Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press},
Editor = {canDeemen, A and Hosli, M},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds250106}
}
@misc{fds312952,
Author = {Gerard, D and Keech, W and Munger, M},
Title = {The Political Economy of Sustainability (forthcoming)},
Booktitle = {Introduction to Sustainable Engineering},
Publisher = {Prentice-Hall},
Editor = {Davidson, C},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds312952}
}
@misc{fds365150,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {404-416},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice: Volume
2},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190469788},
Abstract = {Political parties have been conceived variously as teams of
candidates, of ideological activists, or of groups of
voters. Their goals range range from winning office or
controlling government to implementing a shared vision of
policy. But candidates, activists, and voters often have
conflicting goals, and a desire to control government may
conflict with a particular conception of “good” policy.
This chapter considers how these conflicts play out in
parties as organizations. Parties are the means by which
democracies present, simplify, and differentiate competing
visions of governance. They also may be the most fundamental
informal institutions in democracies. Public choice
conceives of individuals as pursuing goals, with plans and
institutions used to the extent that individual goals are
advanced; this is the “parties as effective” argument.
Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, so organized
interests focus their power on the policy
process.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.19},
Key = {fds365150}
}
@misc{fds250112,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Voting},
Booktitle = {Public Choice Handbook},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar Press},
Editor = {Shughart, W and Razzolini, L},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds250112}
}
@misc{fds250107,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Voting},
Pages = {197-239},
Booktitle = {Elgar Companion to Public Choice},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar Press},
Editor = {Shughart, W and Razzolini, L},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds250107}
}
@misc{fds250097,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Why People Don’t Trust Government},
Booktitle = {Regulation},
Editor = {Joseph S Nye and J and Zelikow, P},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds250097}
}
@misc{fds250109,
Author = {Brewster, R and Munger, M and Oatley, T},
Title = {Widening vs. Deepening the European Union: An Institutional
Analysis},
Pages = {48-64},
Booktitle = {Institutional Challenges in the European
Union},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Hosli, M and van Deemen, A},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds250109}
}
@misc{fds250124,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {“How to Write Less Badly” (Reprint 2010 article as book
chapter)},
Booktitle = {Top Ten Productivity Tips for Professors, Edward Elgar
Publishers},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds250124}
}
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds250182,
Author = {Munger, KM and Munger, MC},
Title = {'Competencia Spatial en América Latina: Una visión general
de algunos modelos ilustrativos' (Spatial Competition in
Latin America: A Review of Some Illustrative
Models)},
Journal = {Revista Mexicana de Analisis Politico y Administracion
Publica},
Volume = {4},
Number = {2},
Pages = {33-40},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds250182}
}
@article{fds250217,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {'Thinking About Order Without Thought' In Tullock's
Contributions to Spontaneous Order Studies},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {135},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {79-88},
Year = {2010},
Abstract = {"Thinking About Order Without Thought." In Tullock's
Contributions to Spontaneous Order Studies, Public Choice
Special Issue, 135: 79-88.},
Key = {fds250217}
}
@article{fds250181,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {19th Century Voting Procedures in a 21st Century
World},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {124},
Series = {Special Issue on "Public Choice Perspectives at the Dawn of
the 21st Century"},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {115-133},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Editor = {Shughat, W and Tollison, R},
Year = {2005},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000231472200007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Voting procedures nowadays are anachronistic on two counts:
the technology of recording and counting votes often is
outmoded and too much is expected from the mechanisms of
democratic choice. Even if votes always and everywhere were
counted perfectly, election outcomes would still be
arbitrary since no collective choice process can divine the
"general will". The crucial line in any state is the one
dividing private decisions from collective decisions.
Democracy is part of the package for nations freeing
themselves from totalitarianism's grip, but it may be the
last, rather than the first thing that should be added to
the mix. © Springer 2005.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-005-4749-9},
Key = {fds250181}
}
@article{fds332797,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {30 years after the nobel: James Buchanan’s political
philosophy},
Journal = {Review of Austrian Economics},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {151-167},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {There are three main foundations of Public Choice theory:
methodological individualism, behavioral symmetry, and
“politics as exchange.” The first two are represented in
nearly all work that identifies as “Public Choice,” but
politics as exchange is often forgotten or de-emphasized.
This paper—adapted from a lecture given on the occasion of
the 30th year after Buchanan’s Nobel Prize—fleshes out
Buchanan’s theory of politics as exchange, using four
notions that are uniquely central to his thought:
philosophical anarchism, ethical neutrality, subjectivism,
and the “relatively absolute absolutes.” A central
tension in Buchanan’s work is identified, in which he
seems simultaneously to argue both that nearly anything
agreed to by a group could be enforced within the group as a
contract, and that there are certain types of rules and
arrangements, generated by decentralized processes, that
serve human needs better than state action. It is argued
that it is a mistake to try to reconcile this tension, and
that both parts of the argument are important.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11138-018-0418-3},
Key = {fds332797}
}
@article{fds312967,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {From Subsistence to Exchange, and Other Essays. Peter
Bauer},
Journal = {The Journal of Politics},
Volume = {63},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1273-1275},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2001},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0022-3816},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000172085500015&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/jop.63.4.2691819},
Key = {fds312967}
}
@article{fds250204,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Odd Markets in Japanese History: Law and Economic
Growth. J. Mark Ramseyer},
Journal = {The Journal of Politics},
Volume = {60},
Number = {1},
Pages = {289-291},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1998},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {0022-3816},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000072897400038&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2648028},
Key = {fds250204}
}
@article{fds366284,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {A 'Good' Industrial Policy is Impossible: With an
Application to AB5 and Contractors},
Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Policy.},
Volume = {17},
Number = {3},
Year = {2022},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds366284}
}
@article{fds361937,
Author = {Collier, K and Munger, M},
Title = {A comparison of incumbent security in the House and
Senate},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {78},
Number = {2},
Pages = {145-154},
Year = {1994},
Month = {February},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01050391},
Key = {fds361937}
}
@article{fds250174,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {A Fable of the OC},
Series = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungeropportunitycost.html},
Publisher = {EconLib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN},
Year = {2006},
Month = {Summer},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungeropportunitycost.html},
Key = {fds250174}
}
@article{fds312970,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {A Logic of Expressive Choice. By Alexander A. Schuessler.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 177p.
$49.50 cloth, $16.95 paper.},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {96},
Number = {1},
Pages = {218-219},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2002},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0003-0554},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000174946100065&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {<jats:p>An interesting aspect of life at Duke is the annual
construction of our local Brigadoon. The well-ordered but
ephemeral tent city is named “Krzyzewskiville,” after
Duke's head basketball coach. K-ville appears once a year in
the weeks before the game against UNC-Chapel Hill, our arch
rival. So many students want to see this game that an
elaborate nonprice rationing scheme, based on a queue, has
evolved to allocate tickets. “Tenting” students may have
to wait two weeks or more to get tickets. The game is in
January or early February, so they sleeping outside and try
to keep up with their school work despite rain, snow, and
subfreezing temperatures at night. Random checks (even in
the middle of the night) are conducted by student
representatives; if a tent is empty too often it is taken
down, and the residents lose their place in the
queue.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/s0003055402394322},
Key = {fds312970}
}
@article{fds313213,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {A Moral Basis for Markets},
Journal = {Public Discourse},
Publisher = {Witherspoon Institute},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/01/11845/},
Abstract = {Debate with James Stoner},
Key = {fds313213}
}
@article{fds250242,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {A Simple Test of the Thesis that Committee Assignments Shape
the Pattern of Corporate PAC Contributions},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {62},
Number = {2},
Pages = {181-186},
Year = {1989},
Abstract = {The results presented in the previous section tend to
confirm the hypothesis that committee assignments shape the
pattern of corporate PAC contributions. This note
corroborates existing research on corporate PACs at a
significantly lower level of aggregation than the samples on
which existing research has been conducted. Further, because
a nonparametric test was used (rather than the more standard
regressional analysis), these results should increase our
confidence that the essential institutions of government
affect, and engender responses by, economic agents. © 1989
Kluwer Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00124334},
Key = {fds250242}
}
@article{fds342282,
Author = {Guzmán, RA and Munger, MC},
Title = {A Theory of Just Market Exchange},
Journal = {Journal of Value Inquiry},
Volume = {54},
Number = {1},
Pages = {91-118},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
Doi = {10.1007/s10790-019-09686-5},
Key = {fds342282}
}
@article{fds250231,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Adjustment to Global Economy},
Journal = {Business and Society Review},
Volume = {55},
Pages = {8-9},
Year = {1985},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds250231}
}
@article{fds250238,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Allocation of Desirable Committee Assignments: Extended
Queues vs. Committee Expansion},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {32},
Number = {2},
Pages = {317-344},
Year = {1988},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds250238}
}
@article{fds250243,
Author = {Grier, K and Torrent, G and Munger, MC},
Title = {Allocation Patterns of PAC Monies: The U.S.
Senate},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {67},
Pages = {111-128},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1990},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
Key = {fds250243}
}
@article{fds361928,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Anthony Downs (1930–2021)},
Journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
Volume = {58},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-4},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1007/s00355-021-01377-0},
Key = {fds361928}
}
@article{fds350866,
Author = {Jenke, L and Munger, M},
Title = {Attention distribution as a measure of issue
salience},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {191},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {405-416},
Year = {2022},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {In spatial theory a central concept is salience, or the
relative importance of issues in a voter’s mind in
evaluating candidates’ platforms. Traditional,
self-reported measures of salience have either been national
in breadth (“which issues are most important to the nation
as a whole?”) or personal (“which issues do you care
most about personally?”). In the former case, the subjects
are being asked to guess what issues other voters think are
important; in the latter case, subjects are likely to report
issues that are “socially” important to avoid seeming
selfish or superficial. Unsurprisingly, such self-reported
measures have not been found to explain actual candidate
choices by individual voters very well. We introduce a
simple process-tracing measure of salience, using
mouse-tracking. Experimental participants were asked to rate
three hypothetical candidates, using information accessed in
a setting where the distribution of attention represents
salience in the decision process. Four models were tested:
standard city block distance and then the addition of each
of the two measures of traditional salience—national and
personal—and, finally, the attention distribution measure.
Attention distribution improves model fit over the standard
distance model and improves classification compared to the
traditional salience measures.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-019-00711-6},
Key = {fds350866}
}
@article{fds250213,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Basic Income Is Not an Obligation, But It Might Be a
Legitimate Choice},
Journal = {Basic Income Studies},
Volume = {6},
Number = {2},
Pages = {1-13},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {A distinction is made between libertarian destinations and
libertarian directions. Basic income cannot be part of a
truly libertarian state unless it could be accomplished
entirely through voluntary donations. But basic income is an
important step in a libertarian direction because it
improves core values such as self-ownership, liberty and
efficiency of transfers while reducing coercion and
increasing procedural fairness. Practical approaches to
achieving basic income are compared to proposals by Milton
Friedman and Charles Murray.},
Key = {fds250213}
}
@article{fds250151,
Author = {Magee, S and Brock, W and Young, L},
Title = {Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy
Theory},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {70},
Pages = {108-110},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds250151}
}
@article{fds340335,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Blogging and political information: Truth or
truthiness?},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {134},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {125-138},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Does the blogosphere generate truth, or what Stephen Colbert
calls 'truthiness,' facts or concepts one only wishes or
believes were true? Bloggers and the mainstream media face
the same difficulties if they wish to rely on the
blogosphere as a generator of truth. First, both bloggers
and media converge on a small number of key blogs as sources
of information. But the proprietors of these elite blogs are
likely to resist information that doesn't conform to their
existing attitudes and beliefs, precisely because they are
already highly aware of politics. Second, blogs and blog
readers are likely to separate themselves into smaller
networks according to their particular tastes. However,
under some circumstances the blogosphere may still
approximate a parallel processing statistical estimator of
the truth with 'nice' properties. The key to this outcome is
that judgments are independent, and that problems of
polarization are mitigated. © 2007 Springer
Science+Business Media, BV.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-007-9205-6},
Key = {fds340335}
}
@article{fds337962,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Blogging and Political Information: Truth or
‘Truthiness’?},
Journal = {Public Choice: The Power and Political Science of
Blogs.},
Volume = {134},
Pages = {125-138},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds337962}
}
@article{fds359093,
Author = {Grier, KB and Munger, MC},
Title = {Breaking up is hard to do: Lessons from the strange case of
New Zealand},
Journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
Volume = {102},
Number = {6},
Pages = {2565-2577},
Year = {2021},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {Objective: To investigate historical antecedents for the
likely effects of Brexit, the “breaking up” of the
Commonwealth is considered. In particular, the effects on
New Zealand in the period following “Brentry,” or the
entry of the UK into the EU, are measured and used to
forecast the pattern of impacts the UK may encounter.
Methods: The technique of Synthetic Control. This
quasi-experimental method takes conscious advantage of
features of endogenous selection that enable the comparison
of predicted growth against an explicit counterfactual,
allowing for dynamic changes in each. Results: We find that
NZ's loss of preferential trade status after “Brentry”
in 1973 created a lost decade for NZ. Using the synthetic
control model, we find that current estimates understate,
perhaps substantially, the negative effect of a hard Brexit
on the U.K. economy. Conclusion: NZ's famous “liberal”
reforms in the 1980s did put the country back on a path
parallel to its pre-1973 path. But contrary to the
conventional wisdom, these reforms did not come close to
restoring NZ's income to its level had Brentry not occurred.
In fact, NZ is still almost 20 percent poorer even post
reforms, compared to its synthetic control.},
Doi = {10.1111/ssqu.13047},
Key = {fds359093}
}
@article{fds250148,
Author = {Eismeier, T and III, PP},
Title = {Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American
Elections},
Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {577-581},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds250148}
}
@article{fds250223,
Author = {M.C. Munger and Ensley, MJ and Munger, MC and de Marchi, S},
Title = {Candidate Uncertainty, Mental Models, and Complexity: Some
Experimental Results},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {132},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {231-246},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2007},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000247657500016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Since the work of Downs (1957), spatial models of elections
have been a mainstay of research in political science and
public choice. Despite the plethora of theoretical and
empirical research involving spatial models, researchers
have not considered in great detail the complexity of the
decision task that a candidate confronts. Two facets of a
candidate's decision process are investigated here, using a
set of laboratory experiments where subjects face a fixed
incumbent in a two-dimensional policy space. First, we
analyze the effect that the complexity of the electoral
landscape has on the ability of the subject to defeat the
incumbent. Second, we analyze the impact that a subject's
"mental model" (which we infer from a pre-experiment
questionnaire) has on her performance. The experimental
results suggest that the complexity of a candidate's
decision task and her perception of the task may be
important factors in electoral competition.},
Doi = {10.2307/27698137},
Key = {fds250223}
}
@article{fds374313,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Christopher Kam and Adlai Newson, The Economic Origins of
Political Parties},
Journal = {OEconomia},
Number = {13-1},
Pages = {115-118},
Publisher = {OpenEdition},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
Doi = {10.4000/oeconomia.13996},
Key = {fds374313}
}
@article{fds376562,
Author = {Cox, GW and Munger, MC},
Title = {Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House
Elections},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {83},
Number = {1},
Pages = {217-231},
Year = {1989},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Students of elections have repeatedly found that the
closeness of an election is modestly correlated with
turnout. This may be due to a direct response of
instrumentally motivated voters, but recent theoretical work
casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation. Another
possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with
greater effort at mobilization. We explore the latter
possibility by using FEC and state data on campaign
expenditures in House, Senate, and gubernatorial races. Our
results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the
mass and elite levels. We also provide quantitative
estimates of the effect of Senate and gubernatorial
expenditure on House turnout. © 1989, American Political
Science Association. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.2307/1956441},
Key = {fds376562}
}
@article{fds250206,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Coercion, the state, and the obligations of
citizenship},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {152},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {415-421},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000306791200030&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-012-9992-2},
Key = {fds250206}
}
@article{fds250141,
Author = {Ravenhill, J},
Title = {Collective Clientelism: The Lome Conventions and North-South
Relations},
Journal = {The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science},
Volume = {493},
Pages = {219-220},
Year = {1986},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds250141}
}
@article{fds250277,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Comment on 'Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law' by
John Ferejohn},
Journal = {Law and contemporary problems: The Law of
Politics},
Volume = {65},
Pages = {87-94},
Publisher = {Duke University School of Law},
Year = {2002},
Month = {Summer},
ISSN = {0023-9186},
Key = {fds250277}
}
@article{fds312966,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Comment on Michael C. Munger's "Political Science and
Fundamental Research" - Reply to Roelofs},
Journal = {PS-POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS},
Volume = {33},
Number = {3},
Pages = {518-519},
Publisher = {AMER POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOC},
Year = {2000},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {1049-0965},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000088910500002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1017/S1049096500063162},
Key = {fds312966}
}
@article{fds312972,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Commentary on "The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice" by
Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom},
Journal = {American Journal of Economics and Sociology},
Volume = {63},
Number = {1},
Pages = {149-160},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0002-9246},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000189098600008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {The Ostroms have created a paper that goes to the very heart
of the public choice enterprise. They suggest that we should
conceive of the evolution of constitutional procedures and
laws in analogy with biological evolution. One of the
paper's central goals is to establish the logical
foundations of political order. I take this goal seriously
and compare explicitly the task of explaining order in
biology and politics. In the case of biology, the task of
evolutionary theory has been to give an account of why there
are complex arrangements of genetic material called
"organisms" (including humans, giraffes, and whales) rather
than just a nutrient-rich primordial ooze with no apparent
structure. For the social scientist, the task is to explain
why there are rules, structure, and stability in
societies.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00278.x},
Key = {fds312972}
}
@article{fds250246,
Author = {Grier, K and Munger, MC},
Title = {Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign
Contributions to House Incumbents},
Journal = {Economic Inquiry},
Volume = {29},
Pages = {24-43},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {1991},
ISSN = {1465-7295},
Key = {fds250246}
}
@article{fds250252,
Author = {Torrent, GM and Munger, MC},
Title = {Committee Power and Value in the U.S. Senate: Implications
for Policy},
Journal = {Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {46-65},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {1993},
ISSN = {1477-9803},
Key = {fds250252}
}
@article{fds250149,
Author = {Alexander, H},
Title = {Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s},
Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {577-581},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds250149}
}
@article{fds361938,
Author = {Grier, KB and Munger, MC},
Title = {Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and
Senate Incumbents, 1980–1986},
Journal = {The Journal of Politics},
Volume = {55},
Number = {3},
Pages = {615-643},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Most work on the allocation patterns of campaign
contributions by interest groups focuses on the relative
productivity of legislators' effort in serving each group.
Short time-series and cross-sectional _ studies of PAC
activity have been done for the House of Representatives and
the Senate separately, but no study has used (1) longer time
series data or (2) made explicit comparisons among interest
group (corporations, unions, and trade associations)
activities, considering (3) differences in the time series
pattern of groups across the two chambers. We integrate all
three perspectives here, using data covering the 1980–1986
election cycles. The results represent preliminary estimates
of the dollar value to interest groups of the personal and
institutional characteristics of legislators, where these
characteristics are allowed for the first time to vary
across chambers. © 1993, Southern Political Science
Association. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.2307/2131991},
Key = {fds361938}
}
@article{fds250256,
Author = {Collier, K and Munger, MC},
Title = {Comparing Reelection Rates in the House and
Senate},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {78},
Pages = {45-54},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1994},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
Key = {fds250256}
}
@article{fds356921,
Author = {Potthoff, RF and Munger, MC},
Title = {Condorcet Loser in 2016: Apparently Trump; Condorcet Winner:
Not Clinton?},
Journal = {American Politics Research},
Volume = {49},
Number = {6},
Pages = {618-636},
Year = {2021},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {Using thermometer score data from the ANES, we show that
while there may have been no clear-cut Condorcet winner
among the 2016 US presidential candidates, there appears to
have been a Condorcet loser: Donald Trump. Thus the surprise
is that the electorate preferred not only Hillary Clinton,
but also the two “minor” candidates, Gary Johnson and
Jill Stein, to Trump. Another surprise is that Johnson may
have been the Condorcet winner. A minimal normative standard
for evaluating voting systems is advanced, privileging those
systems that select Condorcet winners if one exists, and
critiquing systems that allow the selection of Condorcet
losers. A variety of voting mechanisms are evaluated using
the 2016 thermometer scores: Condorcet voting, plurality,
Borda, (single winner) Hare, Coombs, range voting, and
approval voting. We conclude that the essential problem with
the existing voting procedure—Electoral College runoff of
primary winners of two major parties—is that it
(demonstrably) allows the selection of a Condorcet
loser.},
Doi = {10.1177/1532673X211009499},
Key = {fds356921}
}
@article{fds312946,
Author = {Potthoff, RF and Munger, MC},
Title = {Condorcet polling can yield serendipitous clues about voter
views},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {165},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {1-12},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
Abstract = {Condorcet polling provides additional information about
pairwise rankings often obscured in standard polls when
there are three or more candidates. This paper analyzes an
original dataset collected from Duke University students in
North Carolina concerning the 2014 Senate race, wherein a
Democrat, a Republican, and a Libertarian contested the
election. The results illustrate that Condorcet polling is
feasible in such a context, and that the information
provided changes the strategic calculus of voters in ways
that may have a positive impact on the way votes are cast
and choices considered.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-015-0285-4},
Key = {fds312946}
}
@article{fds250169,
Author = {Poole, K and Rosenthal, H},
Title = {Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call
Voting},
Journal = {The Independent Review},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds250169}
}
@article{fds312962,
Author = {Berger, MM and Munger, MC},
Title = {Congressional parties and primary election
challenges.},
Journal = {LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {450-450},
Publisher = {COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE RES CENTER},
Year = {1998},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0362-9805},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000075223300012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds312962}
}
@article{fds355327,
Author = {Munger, M and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Contractarianism, constitutionalism, and the status
quo},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {195},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {323-339},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {The constitutional political economy (CPE) approach as
developed by James Buchanan places emphasis on supermajority
rules—in particular, a unanimity requirement for
constitutional change. Critics argue that this approach
“privileges the status quo” in two problematic ways: (1)
alternatives are treated unequally, because the status quo
requires a smaller coalition to be “chosen” than any
other institutional arrangement selected to replace it; and
(2) individuals are treated unequally, because those who
happen to support the status quo have excessive power to
impose their will on the larger group, implying that a
minority illegitimately is privileged to block change. This
is a serious and important challenge. At the same time, we
argue that critics have conflated two analytically distinct
issues in arguing that the CPE paradigm (and
constitutionalism more generally) “privilege the status
quo”. Moreover, we aim to show that in rejecting the
“privileged position of the status quo”, critics must
confront an equally challenging task: Providing a
“measuring stick” by which the legitimacy of the status
quo, and changes to it, can be judged. It is precisely
skepticism regarding the possibility of providing a
criterion of legitimacy that is independent of agreement
that leads to the peculiar position of the status quo in
Buchanan’s thought.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-021-00878-x},
Key = {fds355327}
}
@article{fds250240,
Author = {Cox, G and Munger, MC},
Title = {Contributions, Expenditure, Turnout: The 1982 U.S. House
Elections},
Journal = {The American political science review},
Volume = {83},
Number = {1},
Pages = {217-231},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals},
Year = {1989},
ISSN = {1537-5943},
Abstract = {Students of elections have repeatedly found that the
closeness of an election is modestly correlated with
turnout. This may be due to a direct response of
instrumentally motivated voters, but recent theoretical work
casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation. Another
possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with
greater effort at mobilization. We explore the latter
possibility by using FEC and state data on campaign
expenditures in House, Senate, and gubernatorial races. Our
results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the
mass and elite levels. We also provide quantitative
estimates of the effect of Senate and gubernatorial
expenditure on House turnout. © 1989, American Political
Science Association. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.2307/1956441},
Key = {fds250240}
}
@article{fds250160,
Author = {Mitnick, EBB},
Title = {Corporate Political Agency: The Construction of Competition
in Public Affairs},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {88},
Pages = {1000-1001},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds250160}
}
@article{fds250255,
Author = {Grier, KB and Munger, MC},
Title = {Corporate, Labor, and Trade Association Contributions to the
U.S. House and Senate, 1978-1986},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {55},
Pages = {615-644},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds250255}
}
@article{fds250166,
Author = {Klein, DB and Moore, AT and Reja, B},
Title = {Curb Rights: A Foundation for Free Enterprise in Urban
Transit},
Journal = {Regulation},
Year = {1997},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds250166}
}
@article{fds250241,
Author = {Hart, D and Munger, MC},
Title = {Declining Electoral Competitiveness in the House of
Representatives: the Differential Impact of Improved
Transportation Technology},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {61},
Pages = {217-231},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1989},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
Key = {fds250241}
}
@article{fds250165,
Author = {Teske, P and Best, S and Mintrom, M},
Title = {Deregulation Freight Transportation: Delivering the
Goods},
Journal = {Regulation},
Year = {1997},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds250165}
}
@article{fds362299,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Desert? You Can't Handle Desert!},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {26},
Number = {3},
Pages = {325-332},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds362299}
}
@article{fds250230,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Destroy Trade Barriers},
Journal = {Business and Society Review},
Volume = {53},
Pages = {10-11},
Year = {1985},
Month = {Spring},
Key = {fds250230}
}
@article{fds250186,
Author = {Grynaviski, JD and Munger, M},
Title = {Did southerners favor slavery? Inferences from an analysis
of prices in New Orleans, 1805-1860},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {159},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {341-361},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {During the years immediately following the American
Revolution, it was common for Southern elites to express
concerns about the morality or long-term viability of
slavery. It is unclear, however, whether such expressions of
anti-slavery sentiment were genuine, especially given the
failure of so many slave owners to emancipate their slaves.
In this paper, we show that there was a change in elite
rhetoric about slavery, initiated by Whig politicians in the
mid-1830s seeking a campaign issue in the South, in which
anti-slavery rhetoric became linked to attempts by
abolitionists to foment slave unrest, making anti-slavery an
unsustainable position for the region's politicians. Before
that development, we contend that some planters believed
that slavery might some day be abolished. After it, those
concerns largely went away. We argue that the change in
slave owners' beliefs about the probability of abolition in
the mid-1830s should have been reflected in slave prices at
auction and test that claim using evidence from the New
Orleans auction market. © 2014 Springer Science+Business
Media New York.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0150-2},
Key = {fds250186}
}
@article{fds250254,
Author = {Mitchell, WC and Munger, MC},
Title = {Doing well while intending good: Cases in political
exploitation},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Pages = {317-348},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications (UK and US)},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1460-3667},
Abstract = {Exploitation has a deservedly bad reputation as an analytic
concept in the social sciences. But this need not be so; a
simple definition of exploitation is advanced that has a
positive basis. Exploitation should be defined as the result
of rent-seeking activity that results in social outcomes
that are not Paretooptimal. Government, or the organization
with a constitutional monopoly on the legitimate use of
force, is ideally charged with balancing two competing kinds
of exploitation. The first is the private exploitation of
agents acting in unregulated markets where property rights
are undefined and unenforced. The second is political
exploitation using the powers of government itself. The
ideal task of government is to minimize the total
exploitative activity in the polity. Five case studies are
offered as illustrations of political exploitation, and how
difficult the task of balancing is. © 1993, Sage
Publications. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/0951692893005003002},
Key = {fds250254}
}
@article{fds312965,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Donald G. Saari, Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting
Paradoxes: Social Choice Analysis},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {140},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {539-542},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000268281200014&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-009-9435-x},
Key = {fds312965}
}
@article{fds327642,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Douglass C. North: The answer is "transactions
costs"},
Journal = {Independent Review},
Volume = {21},
Number = {1},
Pages = {143-146},
Year = {2016},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {Michael C. Munger found during conducting economic research
that professor Douglass C. North emphasized on the concept
of transactions costs as an answer to most of the economic
problems, suggesting that transactions costs played a
central role in solving most of the economic questions. The
problem was that ideology cannot be both a summary, an
information shortcut, which would have to be correct on
average, and a substitute for facts and reason. Once one
recognized that institutional arrangements were in part the
product of and in part supported ex post by ideologies, the
rational choice view of mass politics became much harder to
sustain. This recognition led Doug on a path that took him
away from traditional economics, which adopted its own
ideological requirement that incentives, not tastes, must be
the force that animated choices and changes in
choices.},
Key = {fds327642}
}
@article{fds250216,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Economic Choice, Political Decision, and the Problem of
Limits},
Journal = {Public Choice: Homo Economicus, Homo Politicus},
Volume = {137},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {507-522},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000260378900008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Assesses the arguments for the use of market, or political,
processes for making collective choices. The border between
"what is mine" and "what is ours" is contested, but it is
unguarded. Where should it lie? How would we know when it
should be adjusted? I uncover an old paradox: A society can
never use political means to guard against incursions across
the border for political ends. Some other mechanism, such as
constitutional or other extra-statutory rules, are required.
© 2008 Springer Science+Business Media,
LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-008-9353-3},
Key = {fds250216}
}
@article{fds250248,
Author = {Mitchell, W and Munger, MC},
Title = {Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory
Survey},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {35},
Pages = {512-546},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {1991},
ISSN = {1540-5907},
Key = {fds250248}
}
@article{fds250153,
Author = {Schwartzman, D},
Title = {Economic Policy: An Agenda for the 1990s},
Journal = {The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science},
Volume = {513},
Pages = {200-202},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds250153}
}
@article{fds250272,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Economists and fiscal policy advice: A deficit or a
deficiency?},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {118},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {235-249},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000220250100002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1023/b:puch.0000019988.50722.13},
Key = {fds250272}
}
@article{fds361935,
Author = {Shughart, WF and Kurrild-Klitgaard, P and Munger,
M},
Title = {Editorial announcement},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {132},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {255-256},
Year = {2007},
Month = {September},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-007-9164-y},
Key = {fds361935}
}
@article{fds318620,
Author = {Munger, MC and Hinich, M},
Title = {Editors' Introduction},
Journal = {Public Choice: Empirical Studies in Comparative
Politics},
Volume = {97},
Number = {2},
Pages = {3-3},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1998},
Doi = {10.1097/MCC.0b013e328352c6d6},
Key = {fds318620}
}
@article{fds327640,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Egalitarianism, properly conceived: We all are "Rawlsekians"
now!},
Journal = {Independent Review},
Volume = {22},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-70},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds327640}
}
@article{fds313172,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Empowering, Not Enfeebling: Beyond the ‘Market v. State’
Dichotomy},
Journal = {Conversations on Philanthropy},
Volume = {10},
Publisher = {Conversations on Philanthropy},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds313172}
}
@article{fds312975,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful: Elinor
Ostrom and the diversity of institutions},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {143},
Number = {3},
Pages = {263-268},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000277556500001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-010-9629-2},
Key = {fds312975}
}
@article{fds361933,
Author = {Grynaviski, JD and Munger, M},
Title = {Erratum to: Did southerners favor slavery? Inferences from
an analysis of prices in New Orleans, 1805-1860 (Public
Choice, 10.1007/s11127-013-0150-2)},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {160},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {293},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-014-0178-y},
Key = {fds361933}
}
@article{fds312948,
Author = {Guzmán, RA and Munger, MC},
Title = {Erratum to: Euvoluntariness and just market exchange: moral
dilemmas from Locke’s Venditio(Public Choice, (2014), 158,
39-49, DOI 10.1007/s11127-013-0090-x)},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {164},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {189},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-015-0269-4},
Key = {fds312948}
}
@article{fds312947,
Author = {Keech, WR and Munger, MC},
Title = {Erratum to: The anatomy of government failure(Public Choice,
(2015), DOI 10.1007/s11127-015-0262-y)},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {164},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {43-44},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-015-0268-5},
Key = {fds312947}
}
@article{fds312963,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Estimating market power and strategies},
Journal = {PUBLIC CHOICE},
Volume = {134},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {495-500},
Publisher = {SPRINGER},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000252801100024&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds312963}
}
@article{fds312956,
Author = {Guzmán, RA and Munger, MC},
Title = {Euvoluntariness and just market exchange: Moral dilemmas
from Locke's Venditio},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {158},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {39-49},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
Abstract = {It is a maxim of Public Choice that voluntary exchanges
should not be interfered with by the state. But what makes a
voluntary market exchange truly voluntary? We suggest,
contra much of the economics literature, that voluntary
exchange requires consent uncoerced by threats of harm, but
that this is not sufficient. In particular, a person
pressured to exchange by the dire consequences of failing to
exchange-e.g., dying of thirst or hunger-is still coerced,
and coerced exchange cannot be voluntary. The weaker party's
desperation gives the other party unconscionable bargaining
power. We argue for a distinction, based on a neologism: in
the case of coercion by circumstance but not by threat,
exchange is still voluntary in the conventional sense, but
it is not euvoluntary (i.e., truly voluntary). We will argue
that all euvoluntary exchanges are just, while
non-euvoluntary exchanges may or may not be unjust; that in
competitive markets all exchanges are just, even those that
are not euvoluntary, while in bilateral monopolies some
exchanges are neither euvoluntary nor just. We will propose
a mental device, the "fictitious negotiation", to determine
the just price in non-euvoluntary market exchanges. A
primitive version of these ideas can be found in a little
known monograph by John Locke, which we will analyze in
detail. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New
York.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0090-x},
Key = {fds312956}
}
@article{fds312957,
Author = {Guzmán, RA and Munger, MC},
Title = {Euvoluntariness and just market exchange: moral dilemmas
from Locke's Venditio},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Pages = {1-11},
Year = {2013},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
Key = {fds312957}
}
@article{fds250205,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Euvoluntary or not, exchange is just},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {28},
Series = {Summer},
Number = {2},
Pages = {192-211},
Booktitle = {Liberalism and Capitalism},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Editor = {EF Paul and FD Miller, Jr. and J Paul},
Year = {2011},
Month = {Summer},
ISSN = {0265-0525},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000292247500008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {The arguments for redistribution of wealth, and for
prohibiting certain transactions such as price-gouging, both
are based in mistaken conceptions of exchange. This paper
proposes a neologism, "euvoluntary" exchange, meaning both
that the exchange is truly voluntary and that it benefits
both parties to the transaction. The argument has two parts:
First, all euvoluntary exchanges should be permitted, and
there is no justification for redistribution of wealth if
disparities result only from euvoluntary exchanges. Second,
even exchanges that are not euvoluntary should generally be
permitted, because access to market exchange may be the only
means by which people in desperate circumstances can improve
their position. © Copyright Social Philosophy and Policy
Foundation 2011.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052510000269},
Key = {fds250205}
}
@article{fds42296,
Author = {M.C. Munger and Irwin Morris},
Title = {First Branch, or Root? Congress, the President, and Federal
Reserve},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds42296}
}
@article{fds250177,
Author = {Munger, MC and Morris, I},
Title = {First Branch, or Root? Congress, the President, and Federal
Reserve},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {96},
Pages = {363-380},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1998},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
Key = {fds250177}
}
@article{fds250269,
Author = {Munger, MC and Cooper, A},
Title = {Five Questions: An Integrated Research Agenda in
Public},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {103},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {1-12},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {2000},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000086020100001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1005048904160},
Key = {fds250269}
}
@article{fds361936,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Forum},
Journal = {PS: Political Science & Politics},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {187},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1017/S1049096500057085},
Key = {fds361936}
}
@article{fds250184,
Author = {Guzman, RA and Munger, MC},
Title = {Freedom of Contract and the Morality of Exchange: Examples
From Locke’s Venditio},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {(with Ricardo Guzman). Public Choice.},
Key = {fds250184}
}
@article{fds367345,
Author = {Theisen, A and Kiesling, L and Munger, M},
Title = {From Airbnb to solar: electricity market platforms as local
sharing economies},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {193},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {141-162},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Distributed energy resource (DER) technologies such as
rooftop solar change the structure of production and
consumption in the electricity industry. These changes will
be mediated by digital platforms in ways that will sharply
decrease scale economy entry barriers in generation, making
local generation and self-supply not only possible but
economically competitive. Digitally-enabled platform
business models and local electricity markets are
increasingly part of policy debates in electricity
distribution and retail due to the proliferation of digital
and DER technologies. Here we propose a two-stage model to
represent the effects of transaction cost-reducing
innovation on two aspects of such transactions: gains from
trade in sharing, and the ability to express and satisfy
heterogeneous, subjective preferences in a poly-centric
system. Our core insight is that excess capacity varies
inversely with transaction costs; digital platform
technologies and business models enable asset owners to rent
out this excess capacity. We analyze the equilibrium
comparative statics of the model to derive observable
predictions, and find that having a local electricity market
platform option makes the opportunity cost of excess
capacity economically relevant. As small- scale transactions
in energy capacity become more feasible, our results suggest
that ownership of DER capacity will be driven less by
one’s expected intensity of use and more by relative price
concerns and subjective preferences for energy
self-sufficiency or environmental attributes.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-022-00985-3},
Key = {fds367345}
}
@article{fds343718,
Author = {Kiesling, LL and Munger, MC and Theisen, A},
Title = {From Airbnb to Solar: Toward a Transaction Cost Model of a
Retail Electricity Distribution Platform},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds343718}
}
@article{fds374316,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Getting Right with Reagan: The Struggle for True
Conservatism, 1980-2016},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {26},
Number = {4},
Pages = {630-633},
Year = {2022},
Key = {fds374316}
}
@article{fds360001,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Giants among us: do we need a new antitrust
paradigm?},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {33},
Number = {4},
Pages = {445-460},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Traditional antitrust policy was formulated to control
pricing and output decisions that were not disciplined by
competitive forces, either because of monopoly power or
agreements in restraint of trade. Because there is no single
criterion for evaluating political policy outcomes,
antitrust regulators eventually settled on the “consumer
welfare standard,” correctly recognizing that any other
standard was incoherent. Recently “platforms” (defined
here as firms or apps that solve the key transaction costs
problems of triangulation, transfer, and trust) have tended
toward giantism. This had led to calls for a new approach to
antitrust, restoring the old multiple set of goals. But
every platform by definition defines an industry, and is a
monopoly within that industry. Such network economies or
advantages in managing trust are the reasons platforms exist
in the first place. This paper reviews the history of
antitrust, defines platforms and the problems of
“giantism,” and suggests some policies that certainly
won't work and should be abandoned. The problem is power,
not monopoly. So power is what the “new paradigm” needs
to address.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10602-021-09350-w},
Key = {fds360001}
}
@article{fds250163,
Author = {Ferguson, T},
Title = {Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and
the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems},
Journal = {The Independent Review},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {198-201},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds250163}
}
@article{fds340538,
Author = {Munger, M and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Gordon Tullock as a political scientist},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {194-213},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
Abstract = {We consider Gordon Tullock’s impact in political science,
focusing on his influence as a scholar and as an academic
entrepreneur. It is common to think of Tullock as a
“natural economist,” but his formal training at Chicago
encompassed considerable coursework related to political
science. We consider three sources of information to draw
conclusions about Tullock’s contributions in political
science: (1) Course syllabi; (2) Citations in academic
political science journals; and (3) Impact on the careers of
important political scientists, and shaping the intellectual
agenda. Our conclusion is that, while Tullock’s work is
clearly significant for central questions in political
science, and has received some attention, his primary legacy
lies in the impact he had on launching and shaping the
careers of prominent political scientists, and thus the
development of political science scholarship.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10602-016-9214-x},
Key = {fds340538}
}
@article{fds312941,
Author = {Munger, MC and Vanberg, G},
Title = {Gordon Tullock as a Political Scientist (forthcoming)},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds312941}
}
@article{fds250251,
Author = {Coates, DC and Munger, MC},
Title = {Guessing and Choosing: A Multicriterion Decision on a
Dispoal Technology for Low Level Radioactive
Waste},
Journal = {Journal of Public Policy},
Volume = {11},
Pages = {275-289},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals},
Year = {1992},
ISSN = {1469-7815},
Key = {fds250251}
}
@article{fds313211,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {How to Write Less Badly},
Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education},
Year = {2010},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0009-5982},
Key = {fds313211}
}
@article{fds312938,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Human Agency and Convergence: Gaus’s Kantian
Parliamentarian (forthcoming)},
Journal = {The Review of Austrian Economics},
Volume = {30},
Number = {3},
Pages = {353-364},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0889-3047},
Abstract = {Public reason is justified to the extent that it uses (only)
arguments, assumptions, or goals that are allowable as
“public” reasons. But this exclusion requires some prior
agreement on domains, and a process that disallows new
unacceptable reasons by unanimous consent. Surprisingly,
this problem of reconciliation is nearly the same, mutatis
mutandis, as that faced by micro-economists working on
general equilibrium, where a conceit—tâtonnement,
directed by an auctioneer—was proposed by Leon Walras.
Gaus’s justification of public reason requires the “as
if” solution of a Kantian Parliamentarian, who rules on
whether a proposal is “in order.” Previous work on
public reason, by Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls, have all
reduced decision-making and the process of “reasoning”
to choice by a unitary actor, thereby begging the questions
of disagreement, social choice, and reconciliation. Gaus, to
his credit, solves that problem, but at the price of
requiring that the process “knows” information that is
in fact indiscernible to any of the participants. In fact,
given the dispersed and radical situatedness of human aims
and information, it is difficult for individuals, much less
groups, to determine when norms are publicly justified or
not. More work is required to fully take on Hayek’s
insight that no person, much less all people, can have
sufficient reasons to endorse the relevant norm, rule or
law.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11138-016-0357-9},
Key = {fds312938}
}
@article{fds250268,
Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC and De Marchi and S},
Title = {Ideology and the construction of nationality: The Canadian
elections of 1993},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {97},
Number = {3},
Pages = {401-428},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000078315900008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Canada is one nation, but it is in many ways two
communities, one Francophone and the other Anglophone. We
employ a formal model of "ideology" and analyze how
nationality is constructed in people's minds. The magnitude
of the changes in expressed "preferences" in terms of
ideology depends on the salience of the new issue, the
extent to which it confirms with the existing ideological
cleavage, and the difference between the perceived status
quo on the new dimension and the voter's most preferred
alternative. Using data from the 1993 Canadian National
Election Study, we consider the relative importance of
different policy dimensions in explaining voting decisions
among educated Canadians. The issue of Quebec sovereignty,
alone, is shown to have significant power for predicting
vote choice. A plausible explanation, confirmed here by
regression analysis, is that Quebec sovereignty "stands" for
other issues in voters' conception of Canadian
politics.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1005089925291},
Key = {fds250268}
}
@article{fds42295,
Author = {M.C. Munger and Melvin Hinich and Scott de
Marchi},
Title = {Ideology and the Construction of Nationality: The Canadian
Elections of 1993},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds42295}
}
@article{fds357974,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Ideology and the Direction of Causation in the Acquisition
and Maintenance of Shared Belief Systems},
Journal = {Kyklos},
Volume = {73},
Number = {3},
Pages = {392-409},
Year = {2020},
Month = {August},
Abstract = {Preferences and beliefs are more widely and systematically
shared than might be predicted by a subjective,
idiosyncratic view arising out of neoclassical economics.
Two works were published twenty five years ago on just this
question, contesting conceptions of belief acquisition:
Denzau and North (1994) and Hinich and Munger (1994). Denzau
and North argued that beliefs are simplified representations
of reality that provide conventional means of interpreting
the world around us; Hinich and Munger agreed. But Denzau
and North argued that beliefs were essentially
self-perpetuating, and not subject to optimizing revision
based on feedback, while Hinich and Munger followed the
orthodox Downsian notion of a heuristic that economizes (in
equilibrium) on the cost of becoming informed about
politics. The big difference is that the Hume-Denzau-North
conception follows the “Folk Theorem,” making no claim
about the optimality of the belief systems that a society
comes to share.},
Doi = {10.1111/kykl.12243},
Key = {fds357974}
}
@article{fds250164,
Author = {Gais, T},
Title = {Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest
Groups, and the Problem of Equality},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {92},
Pages = {442-446},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds250164}
}
@article{fds374314,
Author = {Munger, MC and Anderson, T},
Title = {In Memoriam: Richard L. Stroup (1943-2021)},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {27},
Number = {1},
Pages = {141-144},
Year = {2022},
Key = {fds374314}
}
@article{fds313454,
Author = {Munger, MC and Merolla, J and Tofias, M},
Title = {In play: a commentary on strategies in the 2004 U.S.
presidential election},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {123},
Pages = {19-37},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {2005},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
Key = {fds313454}
}
@article{fds312964,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Industrial organization and the digital economy},
Journal = {PUBLIC CHOICE},
Volume = {134},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {495-500},
Publisher = {SPRINGER},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000252801100023&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds312964}
}
@article{fds250159,
Author = {Parker, G},
Title = {Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of Modern
Congress},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {76},
Pages = {397-398},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds250159}
}
@article{fds340539,
Author = {Aldrich, J and Munger, M and Reifler, J},
Title = {Institutions, information, and faction: An experimental test
of Riker's federalism thesis for political
parties},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {158},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {577-588},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-012-0040-z},
Key = {fds340539}
}
@article{fds250208,
Author = {Aldrich, J and Munger, MC and Reifler, J},
Title = {Institutions, Information, and Faction: An Experimental Test
of Riker’s Federalism Thesis for Political
Parties},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds250208}
}
@article{fds250155,
Author = {North, DC},
Title = {Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance},
Journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
Volume = {58},
Pages = {296-297},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds250155}
}
@article{fds314436,
Author = {Jenkins, JA and Munger, MC},
Title = {Investigating the incidence of killer amendments in
congress},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {65},
Number = {2},
Pages = {498-517},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {While much empirical research has been devoted to the study
of "killer amendments" in recent years, few studies have
explicitly examined the theoretical foundations of the
phenomenon. The goal of this paper is to investigate why
some killer amendment attempts are successful, when theory
suggests that they should always fail. More specifically, we
examine the practical political constraints on legislators'
abilities to neutralize the imminent threat of killer
amendments through sophisticated voting. We also present two
new cases, both occurring during the Reconstruction era, in
which killer amendments were used successfully. In the end,
our findings support previous research on all successful
killer amendments detailed in the congressional literature:
race was the issue under consideration at the amendment
stage.},
Doi = {10.1111/1468-2508.t01-3-00012},
Key = {fds314436}
}
@article{fds250183,
Author = {Munger, MC and Salsman, R},
Title = {Is ‘Too Big to Fail’ Too Big?},
Volume = {11},
Pages = {433-456},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds250183}
}
@article{fds250257,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Judicial Interpretation in the Face of Uncertainty: A
Comment on Schwartz, Spiller, and Urbiztondo},
Journal = {Law and Contemporary Problems},
Volume = {57},
Pages = {87-90},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds250257}
}
@article{fds374317,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Karl Mittermaier Economic Theory vs. Reality},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {281-289},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds374317}
}
@article{fds250261,
Author = {Coates, D and Munger, MC},
Title = {Legislative Voting and the Economic Theory of
Politics},
Journal = {Southern economic journal},
Volume = {61},
Pages = {861-873},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {1995},
ISSN = {0038-4038},
Key = {fds250261}
}
@article{fds250235,
Author = {Denzau, AT and Munger, MC},
Title = {Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests
Get Represented},
Journal = {The American political science review},
Volume = {80},
Pages = {89-106},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals},
Year = {1986},
ISSN = {1537-5943},
Key = {fds250235}
}
@article{fds312974,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Long divisions},
Journal = {NEW REPUBLIC},
Volume = {229},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {4-4},
Publisher = {NEW REPUBLIC INC},
Year = {2003},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0028-6583},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000183855700002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds312974}
}
@article{fds342604,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Making the Voluntaryist Venn Work for Us, Not against
Us},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {23},
Number = {4},
Pages = {503-520},
Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds342604}
}
@article{fds250152,
Author = {Spulber, N},
Title = {Managing the American Economy from Roosevelt to
Reagan},
Journal = {The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science},
Volume = {513},
Pages = {200-202},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds250152}
}
@article{fds250168,
Author = {Taylor, A},
Title = {Mathematics and Politics},
Journal = {Chance, Magazine of the American Statiscal
Association},
Volume = {11},
Pages = {44-45},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds250168}
}
@article{fds376034,
Author = {Riess, H and Munger, M and Zavlanos, MM},
Title = {Max-Plus Synchronization in Decentralized Trading
Systems},
Journal = {Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control},
Pages = {221-227},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9798350301243},
Abstract = {We introduce a decentralized mechanism for pricing and
exchanging alternatives constrained by transaction costs. We
characterize the time-invariant solutions of a heat equation
involving a (weighted) Tarski Laplacian operator, defined
for max-plus matrix-weighted graphs, as approximate
equilibria of the trading system. We study algebraic
properties of the solution sets as well as convergence
behavior of the dynamical system. We apply these tools to
the 'economic problem' of allocating scarce resources among
competing uses. Our theory suggests differences in
competitive equilibrium, bargaining, or cost-benefit
analysis, depending on the context, are largely due to
differences in the way that transaction costs are
incorporated into the decision-making process. We present
numerical simulations of the synchronization algorithm
(RRAggU), demonstrating our theoretical findings.},
Doi = {10.1109/CDC49753.2023.10383918},
Key = {fds376034}
}
@article{fds361929,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Moral community and moral order: Buchanan’s theory of
obligation},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {183},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {509-521},
Year = {2020},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {In 1981, James Buchanan published the text of a lecture
entitled “Moral Community, Moral Order, and Moral
Anarchy.” The argument in that paper deserves more
attention than it has received in the literature, as it
closely follows the argument made by Adam Smith in Theory of
Moral Sentiments. Smith believed, and rightly, that moral
communities—to use Buchanan’s words—are indispensable.
Smith also believed that the system could be expanded to
encompass norms that foster commercial society. Buchanan
allows for the same possibility in his discussion of moral
community, in some ways similar to Hayek’s “great
society” norms. But Buchanan points out the dark
possibility that moral orders can collapse, relegating
interactions outside of small moral communities to moral
anarchy. Buchanan’s contribution is an important, and
unrecognized, link between Smith’s conception of propriety
and Hume’s conception of convention.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-020-00791-9},
Key = {fds361929}
}
@article{fds250273,
Author = {Banerjee, SG and Munger, MC},
Title = {Move to markets? An empirical analysis of privatization in
developing countries},
Journal = {Journal of International Development},
Volume = {16},
Number = {2},
Pages = {213-240},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2004},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {Aspects of the privatization experience are analysed for a
group of 35 low or middle-income developing countries, over
the period 1982 through 1999. The theory turns on net
political benefits, which in our model are the primary
determinant of privatization policies. The decision to
privatize is captured here in three related, but distinct,
dependent variables: (i) timing; (ii) pace; and (iii)
intensity. Our notion of the independent variable, 'net
political benefits', is not measured directly, but is
instead proxied by an array of macroeconomic, political, and
institutional variables. Our key finding is that, though
political benefits turn out to explain the timing, pace, and
intensity of privatization, the effects are very different
in each case. The timing hypothesis is tested using a Cox
proportional hazard model, the pace hypothesis is tested
using a random effects negative binomial model and the
intensity hypothesis is tested using the random effects
model. We find that the factors that improve timing delay
intensity-early adopters are later implementers.
Furthermore, we find that a privatization policy is much
more likely to be a crisis-driven, last ditch effort to turn
the economy around, rather than a carefully chosen policy
with explicit, long-term goals. A related, and very
important, finding in our analysis has to do with the
'lock-in' of institutions. The particular form of political
institutions, foreign aid regimes, and level of development
of property rights systems in the nation have significant
conditioning influences on the extent of lock-in. These
relationships may be important for informing policy
decisions, and for understanding apparent 'failures' of
privatization policies. © 2004 John Wiley and Sons,
Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1002/jid.1072},
Key = {fds250273}
}
@article{fds312968,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {New publications},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {134},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {495-500},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2008},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000252801100022&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-007-9225-2},
Key = {fds312968}
}
@article{fds250258,
Author = {Coates, D and Heid, V and Munger, MC},
Title = {Not Equitable, Not Efficient: U.S. Policy on Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Disposal},
Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {526-541},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {1994},
ISSN = {1520-6688},
Key = {fds250258}
}
@article{fds361930,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Objections to Euvoluntary Exchange Do Not Have
“Standing”: Extending Markets Without
Limits},
Journal = {Journal of Value Inquiry},
Volume = {51},
Number = {4},
Pages = {619-627},
Year = {2017},
Month = {December},
Doi = {10.1007/s10790-017-9620-y},
Key = {fds361930}
}
@article{fds343478,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {On the contingent vice of corruption},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {35},
Number = {2},
Pages = {158-181},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {This essay develops a notion of “functional corruption,”
adapted from sociology, to note that the harm of corruption
appears to be contingent. In a system of dysfunctional
institutions, corruption can improve the efficiency and
speed of allocative mechanisms of the bureaucracy, possibly
quite substantially. The problem is that this “short
run” benefit locks in the long run harm of corruption by
making institutions much more difficult to reform. In
particular, a nation with bad institutions but without
bureaucracy may be much more open to reform than a nation
with similarly bad institutions but with “efficiently
corrupt” bureaucrats. The idea of a “long run” is
developed using the North, Wallis, and Weingast conception
of open access orders. Corrupt systems are likely to be
locked into closed access orders indefinitely, even though
everyone knows there are better institutions
available.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052519000153},
Key = {fds343478}
}
@article{fds250234,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {On the Mutuality of Interest Between Bureaus and High Demand
Review Committees: The Case of Joint Production},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {43},
Number = {2},
Pages = {211-216},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds250234}
}
@article{fds331467,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {On the origins and goals of public choice: Constitutional
conspiracy?},
Journal = {Independent Review},
Volume = {22},
Number = {3},
Pages = {359-382},
Year = {2018},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds331467}
}
@article{fds250237,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {On the Political Participation of the Firm in the Electoral
Process: An Update},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {56},
Number = {3},
Pages = {295-298},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds250237}
}
@article{fds313180,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {One and One-Half Cheers for Basic-Income Guarantee: We Could
Do Worse, and Already Have},
Journal = {Independent Review},
Volume = {19},
Number = {4},
Pages = {503-513},
Publisher = {The Independant Institute},
Year = {2015},
ISSN = {1086-1653},
url = {http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/toc.asp?issueID=81},
Key = {fds313180}
}
@article{fds250232,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Pangloss was right: Reforming congress is useless,
expensive, or harmful},
Journal = {Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {133-146},
Year = {1998},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1064-3958},
Key = {fds250232}
}
@article{fds312935,
Author = {Munger, MC and Grynaviski, G},
Title = {Pathologies of Political Authority: Constructed Racism is
'Public Reason' Gone Wrong (forthcoming)},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals - No
Cambridge Open},
Year = {2016},
ISSN = {1471-6437},
Key = {fds312935}
}
@article{fds250150,
Author = {Sabato, L},
Title = {Paying for Elections},
Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {577-581},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds250150}
}
@article{fds250156,
Author = {Alt, J and Shepsle, K},
Title = {Perspectives on Positive Political Economy},
Journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
Volume = {58},
Pages = {1944-6},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds250156}
}
@article{fds312976,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Persuasion, psychology and public choice},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
Volume = {80},
Number = {2},
Pages = {290-300},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0167-2681},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000296682100004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {There has been a division of labor in the "behavioral
sciences" This is perhaps most striking in two of the
largest behavioral disciplines, economics and psychology.
Since 1990, a number of economists have crossed this
boundary. But James Buchanan was one of the first economists
to take the problem of moral intuitions and the origins of
preferences seriously, and to treat them analytically. ©
2011 Elsevier B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2011.07.012},
Key = {fds312976}
}
@article{fds250157,
Author = {Schlesinger, J},
Title = {Political Parties and the Winning of Office},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {75},
Pages = {99-101},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds250157}
}
@article{fds250203,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Political science and fundamental research},
Journal = {PS - Political Science and Politics},
Volume = {33},
Series = {Special Issue: The Public Value of Political Science
Research},
Number = {1},
Pages = {25-30},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Editor = {Arthur Lupia},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1049-0965},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000085998600006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/420773},
Key = {fds250203}
}
@article{fds362300,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Populism, Self-Government, and Liberty},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-13},
Year = {2021},
Key = {fds362300}
}
@article{fds250267,
Author = {Flynn, BS and Goldstein, AO and Solomon, LJ and Bauman, KE and Gottlieb,
NH and Cohen, JE and Munger, MC and Dana, GS},
Title = {Predictors of state legislators' intentions to vote for
cigarette tax increases.},
Journal = {Preventive medicine},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {157-165},
Year = {1998},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0091-7435},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000073317500001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>This study analyzed influences on state
legislators' decisions about cigarette tax increase votes
using a research strategy based on political science and
social-psychological models.<h4>Methods</h4>Legislators from
three states representing a spectrum of tobacco interests
participated in personal interviews concerned with tobacco
control legislation (n = 444). Measures of potential
predictors of voting intention were based on the consensus
model of legislative decision-making and the theory of
planned behavior. Multiple logistic regression methods were
used to identify social-psychological and other predictors
of intention to vote for cigarette tax increases.<h4>Results</h4>General
attitudes and norms concerning cigarette tax increases
predicted legislators' intention to vote for cigarette tax
increases. More specific predictors included perceptions of
public health impact and retail sales impact of cigarette
tax increases. Constituent pressure was the strongest
perceived social influence. Political party and state also
were strong predictors of intention. Results were consistent
with related research based on political science
models.<h4>Conclusions</h4>Legislators' votes on cigarette
tax increases may be influenced by their perceptions of
positive and negative outcomes of a cigarette tax increase
and by perceived constituent pressures. This research model
provides useful insights for theory and practice and should
be refined in future tobacco control research.},
Doi = {10.1006/pmed.1998.0308},
Key = {fds250267}
}
@article{fds350702,
Author = {Story, M and Larson, N},
Title = {Preface},
Journal = {Adolescent Medicine: State of the Art Reviews},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Year = {2012},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds350702}
}
@article{fds250225,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Preference modification vs. incentive manipulation as tools
of terrorist recruitment: The role of culture},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {128},
Pages = {131-146},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds250225}
}
@article{fds312959,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Preferences and situations: Points of intersection between
historical and rational choice institutionalism},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {11},
Number = {4},
Pages = {623-626},
Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE},
Year = {2007},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1086-1653},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000245521900015&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds312959}
}
@article{fds250180,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Presidential Address: Give Questions for the Public Choice
Society},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds250180}
}
@article{fds250227,
Author = {Weidenbaum, ML and Munger, MC},
Title = {Protection At Any Price?},
Journal = {Regulation},
Number = {July/August},
Pages = {54-61},
Year = {1983},
url = {http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1983/7/v7n4-3.pdf},
Key = {fds250227}
}
@article{fds250245,
Author = {Dow, J and Munger, MC},
Title = {Public Choice in Political Science},
Journal = {PS: Political Science and Politics},
Volume = {23},
Pages = {604-610},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds250245}
}
@article{fds361932,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Public choice's homeric hero: Gordon Tullock
(1922-2014)},
Journal = {Independent Review},
Volume = {19},
Number = {4},
Pages = {599-604},
Year = {2015},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {Gordon Tullock, who was born in 1922 in Rockford, Illinois
gave the world public choice theory, the concept of rent
seeking, and bioeconomics. In early 1943, he enrolled in his
first economics class, taught by Henry Calvert Simons. But
later in 1943, before formally finishing the class, he was
drafted into the army and was assigned as a rifleman to the
Ninth Infantry Division. He returned to Chicago early in
1946 and finished the requirements for the J.D. Fortunately
for academic economics and public-choice theory, Gordon
learned to read and write a little Chinese, took the Foreign
Service Exam, and passed it on the first try. He was
assigned to Tientsin, China, in 1947. The Foreign Service
assigned him to do advanced study in Chinese back in the
United States, after which he returned to China and later
worked also in Korea and for the intelligence service in
Washington. He resigned from the Foreign Service in 1956 and
then knocked around, working several jobs. He has more than
fourteen thousand citations in many fields in Google
Scholar. He created a concept now called the 'Tullock
Contest' as a way of understanding efficient rent
seeking.},
Key = {fds361932}
}
@article{fds250224,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Public Policy Informatics: Does Better Information Produce
Better Public Policy?},
Journal = {International Journal of Public Policy},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {343-354},
Year = {2006},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds250224}
}
@article{fds371869,
Author = {Munger, M and Tilley, C},
Title = {Race, risk, and greed: Harold Black's contributions to the
institutional economics of finance},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {197},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {335-346},
Year = {2023},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Dr. Harold Black has made a career of investigating the
effects of different rules and institutional arrangements on
the extent to which market participants in finance can
exercise a taste for discrimination. This paper considers
the nature of Black's contributions, and reviews some
particulars of his voluminous published research, focusing
especially on his work on the number of "overages" charged
by banks, and the differences in the effects of the race of
bank owners, as explained by the race of customers. The
paper concludes by connecting Dr. Black’s work to his
“origin story,” which helps explain his consistent focus
on careful empirical distinctions rather than preconceptions
and biases.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-023-01073-w},
Key = {fds371869}
}
@article{fds327641,
Author = {Grynaviski, JD and Munger, MC},
Title = {RECONSTRUCTING RACISM: TRANSFORMING RACIAL HIERARCHY from
"nECESSARY EVIL" into "pOSITIVE GOOD"},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {144-163},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Our theoretical claim is that racism was consciously (though
perhaps not intentionally) devised, and later evolved, to
serve two conflicting purposes. First, racism served a
legal-economic purpose, legitimating ownership and savage
treatment of slaves by southern whites, preserving the value
of property rights in labor. Second, racism allowed slave
owners to justify, to themselves and to outsiders, how a
morally "good" person could own slaves. Racism portrayed
African slaves as being less than human (and therefore
requiring care, as a positive duty of the slave owner, as a
man cares for his children, who cannot care for themselves),
or else as being other than human (and therefore being
spiritually no different from cattle or horses, and
therefore requiring only the same considerations for
maintenance and husbandry). The interest of the historical
narrative presented here is the emergence of racial chattel
slavery as a coherent and fiercely defended ideal, rather
than the "necessary evil" that had been the perspective of
the Founders. The reason that this is important is that the
ideology of racism persisted far beyond the destruction of
the institution of slavery, through Reconstruction, Jim
Crow, and in some ways persisting even today. This work is
an example of the problems of assuming that there is a
"feedback" mechanism by which moral intuitions are updated
and perfected; to the contrary, as suggested by Douglass
North, even socially inferior ideologies can prove extremely
persistent.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052517000073},
Key = {fds327641}
}
@article{fds250172,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Regulation},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Libertarianism},
Publisher = {CATO Institute, Washington, D.C.},
Editor = {Palmer, T},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds250172}
}
@article{fds250145,
Author = {Meier, K},
Title = {Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics and The
Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of
Insurance},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {62},
Pages = {192-195},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds250145}
}
@article{fds250173,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Rent Seek and You Will Find},
Journal = {EconLib},
Series = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungerrentseeking.html},
Publisher = {EconLib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN},
Year = {2006},
Month = {Spring},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungerrentseeking.html},
Key = {fds250173}
}
@article{fds335630,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Reply to Roelofs},
Journal = {PS - Political Science and Politics},
Volume = {33},
Number = {3},
Pages = {518-519},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
Doi = {10.1017/S1049096500063162},
Key = {fds335630}
}
@article{fds361931,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Robert D. Tollison: A remembrance},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {171},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {63-65},
Year = {2017},
Month = {April},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-017-0430-3},
Key = {fds361931}
}
@article{fds250170,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Saari’s "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting
Paradoxes"},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {140},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {539-543},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds250170}
}
@article{fds250147,
Author = {Taagepera, R and Shugart, M},
Title = {Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral
Systems},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {84},
Pages = {676-677},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds250147}
}
@article{fds312971,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Self-interest and public interest: The motivations of
political actors},
Journal = {Critical Review},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {339-357},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0891-3811},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000300165700005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics showed
that the public, politicians, and bureaucrats are often
public spirited. But this does not invalidate public-choice
theory. Public-choice theory is an ideal type, not a claim
that self-interest explains all political behavior. Instead,
public-choice theory is useful in creating rules and
institutions that guard against the worst case, which would
be universal self-interestedness in politics. In contrast,
the public-interest hypothesis is neither a comprehensive
explanation of political behavior nor a sound basis for
institutional design. © 2011 Copyright Critical Review
Foundation.},
Doi = {10.1080/08913811.2011.635871},
Key = {fds312971}
}
@article{fds250244,
Author = {Richardson, LE and Munger, MC},
Title = {Shirking, representation, and Congressional behavior: Voting
on the 1983 amendments to the Social Security
Act},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {67},
Number = {1},
Pages = {11-33},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1990},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1990DY91500002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Our central goals at the outset of the paper were three: (1)
to report on the relative significance of a sophisticated
measure of constituent economic interest and a commonly used
variable, ADA score, that purports to measure the personal
ideology of the candidate; (2) demonstrate that the
constituent economic interest variable should be adjusted to
account for the fact that voters, not citizens, are the only
effective principals in influencing a legislator's voting
activities; and (3) call into question, on both theoretical
and empirical grounds, the claim that legislators shirk
their responsibilities to voters by voting their own
ideological preferences.[Figure not available: see
fulltext.] In order to evaluate our efforts, consider Table
5. For a large majority (15) of the 18 relevant runs, the
ideological variable is significant. Our measure of
constituent economic interests does not eliminate the
explanatory power of the ideological voting variable, but
this does not indicate shirking. As opposed to shirking, we
may observe ideological voting because (1) it provides brand
name capital, (2) it represents the ideological preferences
of the constituents, or (3) it acts as a measure of median
voter economic preferences. Further, ADA scores do not allow
us to differentiate between these competing explanations.
Table 5. Comparison of House and Senate resultsEconomic
variableIdeological variableHouseSenateTotalSignificantNot
significantSignificantNot significantKalt-Zupan
Insignificant--4-4Kalt-Zupan Significant332-8Peltzman
Insignificant--3-3Peltzman Significan--3-3Total3312018 For
11 of the 18 models one of the economic variables accounts
for a significant portion of the variance in the dependent
variables. The results derived from our measure of
constituent economic interests contradict most findings of
the LASI school and raise questions about the validity of
the empirical characterization of constituent interests in
that research. A breakdown of the results by chamber
indicates that significant differences in the degree of
ideological voting between the House and Senate may exist.
This is important in that most research has focused only on
the Senate where ideological voting is more prevalent. For
the House, Table 5 reveals the constituent economic interest
variable is always significant, and in fully one-half of the
relevant regressions it is the only significant variable,
knocking ADA out of the race. As noted earlier, the
insignificance of ADA is some indication of the absence of
ideological shirking though its significance may indicate
only measurement error, voter ideology, or reputational
capital. In the Senate, the results are more evenly split,
though it is clear that the adjusted (for reelection
constituency) economic interest variable is an improvement.
ADA is significant in all 12 Senate regressions, and the
respective economic variables are significant in 5, or just
under half. This side-by-side comparison is provocative,
though it remains to be tested in detail. But our
preliminary conclusions can be stated as follows. First, as
Peltzman (1984) suggested, a better specification of
economic interest and constituency representation reduces,
though it does not eliminate, the role of the ADA variable
in the Senate. Second, we find evidence that ideological
shirking, if it exists, is much smaller in the House. In
fact, from an institutional perspective, it can be argued
that economic interests are dominant, since House districts
are smaller and more homogeneous. Further, the shorter terms
for House members may make them more directly accountable to
voters, and smaller groups of voters may force a lesser
reliance on pure ideological campaigning and require a more
personal presentation of self. © 1990 Kluwer Academic
Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01890154},
Key = {fds250244}
}
@article{fds250144,
Author = {Kelly, JS},
Title = {Social Choice Theory: An Introduction},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {62},
Pages = {97-98},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds250144}
}
@article{fds312953,
Author = {Aldrich, J and Reifler, J and Munger, MC},
Title = {Sophisticated and myopic? Citizen preferences for Electoral
College reform},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {158},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {541-558},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
Abstract = {Different institutions can produce more (or less) preferred
outcomes, in terms of citizens' preferences. Consequently,
citizen preferences over institutions may "inherit"-to use
William Riker's term-the features of preferences over
outcomes. But the level of information and understanding
required for this effect to be observable seems quite high.
In this paper, we investigate whether Riker's intuition
about citizens acting on institutional preferences is borne
out by an original empirical dataset collected for this
purpose. These data, a survey commissioned specifically for
this project, were collected as part of a larger nationally
representative sample conducted right before the 2004
election. The results show that support for a reform to
split a state's Electoral College votes proportionally is
explained by (1) which candidate one supports, (2) which
candidate one thinks is likely to win the election under the
existing system of apportionment, (3) preferences for
abolishing the Electoral College in favor of the popular
vote winner, and (4) statistical interactions between these
variables. In baldly political terms, Kerry voters tend to
support splitting their state's Electoral College votes if
they felt George W. Bush was likely to win in that state.
But Kerry voters who expect Kerry to win their state favor
winner-take-all Electoral College rules for their state. In
both cases, mutatis mutandis, the reverse is true for Bush
voters. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New
York.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0056-z},
Key = {fds312953}
}
@article{fds250143,
Author = {Minsky, HP},
Title = {Stabilizing and Unstable Economy},
Journal = {The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science},
Volume = {494},
Pages = {205-206},
Year = {1987},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds250143}
}
@article{fds250265,
Author = {Munger, M and Goldstein, A and Cohen, J and Flynn, B and Gottlieb, N and Solomon, L and Dana, G and Baumann, K},
Title = {State Legislators' Attitudes and Voting Intentions about
Tobacco Control Legislation},
Journal = {American Journal of Public Health},
Volume = {87},
Pages = {11-7-2000},
Year = {1997},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds250265}
}
@article{fds250276,
Author = {Gottlieb, NH and Goldstein, AO and Flynn, BS and Cohen, EJE and Bauman,
KE and Solomon, LJ and Munger, MC and Dana, GS and McMorris,
LE},
Title = {State legislators' beliefs about legislation that restricts
youth access to tobacco products.},
Journal = {Health education & behavior : the official publication of
the Society for Public Health Education},
Volume = {30},
Number = {2},
Pages = {209-224},
Year = {2003},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {1090-1981},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000181791100006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Better understanding of the cognitive framework for decision
making among legislators is important for advocacy of
health-promoting legislation. In 1994, the authors surveyed
state legislators from North Carolina, Texas, and Vermont
concerning their beliefs and intentions related to voting
for a hypothetical measure to enforce legislation preventing
the sale of tobacco to minors, using scales based on the
theory of planned behavior. Attitude (importance),
subjective norm (whether most people important to you would
say you should or should not vote for the law), perceived
behavioral control (ability to cast one's vote for the law),
and home state were independently and significantly related
to intention to vote for the law's enforcement. The results,
including descriptive data concerning individual beliefs,
suggest specific public health strategies to increase
legislative support for passing legislation to restrict
youth tobacco sales and, more generally, a framework for
studying policy making and advocacy.},
Doi = {10.1177/1090198102251033},
Key = {fds250276}
}
@article{fds250264,
Author = {Munger, M and Flynn, B and Dana, G and Goldstein, A and Cohen, J and Gottlieb, N and Solomon, L and Baumann, K},
Title = {State Legislators' Intentions to Vote and Subsequent Votes
on Tobacco Control Legislation},
Journal = {Health Psychology},
Volume = {16},
Pages = {401-404},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds250264}
}
@article{fds313753,
Author = {Cohen, JE and Goldstein, AO and Flynn, BS and Munger, MC and Gottlieb,
NH and Solomon, LJ and Dana, GS},
Title = {State legislators' perceptions of lobbyists and lobbying on
tobacco control issues.},
Journal = {Tobacco control},
Volume = {6},
Number = {4},
Pages = {332-336},
Publisher = {BMJ},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0964-4563},
Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>To determine state legislators'
perceptions about health and tobacco lobbyists, their
frequency of contact with these lobbyists, and the amount of
campaign contributions from health professional
organisations and the tobacco industry.<h4>Design</h4>Cross-sectional
study.<h4>Subjects</h4>State legislators from North
Carolina, Texas, and Vermont (USA), serving in 1994.<h4>Main
outcome measures</h4>Perceptions about lobbyists
representing the tobacco industry, non-profit health
organisations, and state medical societies with respect to
their credibility, importance as sources of information, and
persuasiveness; extent of lobbying activities; campaign
contributions from health professional organisations and the
tobacco industry.<h4>Results</h4>Almost all legislators
reported that medical society and non-profit health
organisation lobbyists are credible on tobacco issues and
just over half believed that these lobbyists are important
sources of information. More legislators said they could be
persuaded by medical and health lobbyists than by tobacco
lobbyists. Although health professional Political Action
Committees (PACs) gave campaign contributions to more state
legislators, and gave higher amounts on average, than
tobacco PACs, legislators reported less contact with medical
society lobbyists than tobacco lobbyists about tobacco
issues.<h4>Conclusions</h4>State legislators have positive
attitudes toward lobbyists for non-profit health
organisations and state medical societies regarding tobacco
issues. These groups may be an underused resource for
educating legislators about tobacco control
measures.},
Doi = {10.1136/tc.6.4.332},
Key = {fds313753}
}
@article{fds250260,
Author = {Coates, D and Munger, MC},
Title = {Strategizing in small group decision-making: Host state
identification for radioactive waste disposal among eight
southern states},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {82},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {1-15},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
Abstract = {Experimental work in economics has long focussed attention
on strategic interaction amongst individuals. A robust
result is that a large fraction of participants in public
goods experiments act cooperatively. This paper tests for
the extent of strategic behavior in a non-laboratory
setting. These data were generated when representatives from
eight southeastern states voted to identify one state as
host for a regional disposal facility for low-level
radioactive waste. We find that no state plays its dominant
(free-riding) strategy, but none plays in a completely
cooperative fashion either. This result is similar to that
found in laboratory public goods experiments. © 1995 Kluwer
Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01047726},
Key = {fds250260}
}
@article{fds312955,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Strength in Numbers: The Political Power of Weak
Interests},
Journal = {Political Science Quarterly},
Volume = {128},
Number = {4},
Pages = {785-786},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0032-3195},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000328494200029&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1002/polq.12124},
Key = {fds312955}
}
@article{fds250270,
Author = {Cooper, A and Munger, MC},
Title = {The (un)predictability of primaries with many candidates:
Simulation evidence},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {103},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {337-355},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000086965800008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {It is common to describe the dynamic processes that generate
outcomes in U.S. primaries as "unstable" or "unpredictable".
In fact, the way we choose candidates may amount to a
lottery. This paper uses a simulation approach, assuming
10,000 voters who vote according to a naive, deterministic
proximity rule, but who choose party affiliation
probabilistically. The voters of each party then must choose
between two sets of ten randomly chosen candidates, in
"closed" primaries. Finally, the winners of the two
nominations compete in the general election, in which
independent voters also participate. The key result of the
simulations reported here is the complete unpredictability
of the outcomes of a sequence of primaries: the winner of
the primary, or the party's nominee, varied as much as two
standard deviations from the median partisan voter. The
reason is that the median, or any other measure of the
center of the distribution of voters, is of little value in
predicting the outcome of multicandidate elections. These
results suggest that who runs may have more to do with who
wins than any other consideration.},
Doi = {10.1023/a:1005150101110},
Key = {fds250270}
}
@article{fds312950,
Author = {Keech, WR and Munger, MC},
Title = {The anatomy of government failure},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {164},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {1-42},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
Abstract = {Government failure is a much bigger problem than its
contemporary treatment implies. Setting aside natural
disasters, most of the great catastrophes of human history
have been government failures of one sort or another. We
argue that many so-called market failures are government
failures because government defines the institutions in
which markets succeed or fail. The concept of government
failure has been trapped in the cocoon of the theory of
perfect markets. Narrowly defined deviations from market
perfection have been designated market failures, for which
government corrections may or may not really be a solution.
Government failure in the contemporary context means failing
to resolve a classic market failure. We propose an
alternative approach for evaluating whether government
fails: the Pareto standard. If an available Pareto
improvement is not chosen, or is not implemented, that is a
government failure. We organize government failure into two
types: substantive and procedural. Substantive failures
include the inability or unwillingness to maintain order, to
maintain sound fiscal and monetary policies, and to reduce
risks of transaction costs, which we classify as corruption,
agency and rent-seeking. Procedural failures are
inadequacies of available social choice mechanisms, causing
collective decisions to be arbitrary, capricious, or
manipuated. We conclude with some reflections on human
rationality and the implications of behavioral
economics.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-015-0262-y},
Key = {fds312950}
}
@article{fds250259,
Author = {Grier, K and Roberts, B and Munger, MC},
Title = {The Determinants of Industry Political Activity,
1978-1986},
Journal = {The American political science review},
Volume = {88},
Pages = {911-932},
Booktitle = {Business and Government},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals},
Editor = {Coen, D and Grant, W},
Year = {1994},
ISSN = {1537-5943},
Key = {fds250259}
}
@article{fds250271,
Author = {Munger, M and Berger, M and Potthoff, R},
Title = {The Downsian Model Predicts Divergence},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {78-90},
Year = {2000},
ISSN = {0951-6298},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000086986700005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1177/0951692800012002005},
Key = {fds250271}
}
@article{fds250218,
Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC},
Title = {The dynamics of issue introduction: A model based on the
politics of ideology},
Journal = {Mathematical and Computer Modelling},
Volume = {48},
Number = {9-10},
Pages = {1510-1518},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2008},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0895-7177},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000259637500019&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Many topics might be discussed in the course of any
election, but problems that are in fact discussed, and which
affect the electorate's choice, are located in the issue
space of a relatively small dimension. Two factors
contribute to this phenomenon: (a) party platforms are
usually presented to the electorate as packages of issues,
and (b) candidates tend to emphasize only a few particular
issues in the campaign. We model a dynamic process of
changing the issue space by candidates as a matter of their
campaign strategy and study factors causing changes in the
dimensionality or/and in the structure of the set of issues
shaping the political conflict in the election. We show how
particular features of an added new issue can change voter
perceptions of the candidates or the structure of the
political conflict in the election when the new issue is
such that (1) voters care about it, (2) a majority of voters
are interested changing the status quo of anything
associated with this issue, and (3) the existing ideological
differences among the candidates have clear reflections in
voters' minds. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.022},
Key = {fds250218}
}
@article{fds250161,
Author = {Holcombe, R},
Title = {The Economic Foundations of Government},
Journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
Volume = {61},
Pages = {892-894},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds250161}
}
@article{fds250140,
Author = {Hughes, JJ and Perlman, R},
Title = {The Economics of Unemployment: A Comparative Analysis of
Britain and the United States},
Journal = {Journal of Labor Research},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {381-382},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds250140}
}
@article{fds250253,
Author = {Enelow, J and Munger, MC},
Title = {The Elements of Candidate Reputation: The Effect of Record
and Credibility on Optimal Spatial Location},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {77},
Pages = {757-772},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1993},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
Key = {fds250253}
}
@article{fds250146,
Author = {Coase, RH},
Title = {The Firm, The Market, and the Law},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {65},
Pages = {295-296},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds250146}
}
@article{fds374318,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies: A
Computational Social Science Approach},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {334-339},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds374318}
}
@article{fds250229,
Author = {Rehbein, MMWKA},
Title = {The High Cost of Protectionism},
Journal = {Europe},
Volume = {243},
Pages = {10-11},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds250229}
}
@article{fds250236,
Author = {Grier, KB and Munger, MC},
Title = {The Impact of Legislative Attributes on Interest Group
Contributions},
Journal = {Journal of Labor Research},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {349-361},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1986},
Month = {Fall},
ISSN = {1936-4768},
Key = {fds250236}
}
@article{fds250249,
Author = {Endersby, J and Munger, MC},
Title = {The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Union PAC
Contributions},
Journal = {Journal of Labor Research},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {79-97},
Year = {1992},
ISSN = {1936-4768},
Key = {fds250249}
}
@article{fds250247,
Author = {Grier, K and Roberts, B and Munger, MC},
Title = {The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political
Activity},
Journal = {Southern Economics Journal},
Volume = {57},
Pages = {727-738},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds250247}
}
@article{fds374315,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {The Journey Beyond Fear: Leverage the Three Pillars of
Positivity to Build Your Success},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {317-318},
Year = {2022},
Key = {fds374315}
}
@article{fds312945,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {The Leadership Crisis and the Free Market Cure: Why the
Future of Business Depends on the Return to Life, Liberty,
and the Pursuit of Happiness},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {466-469},
Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST},
Year = {2016},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1086-1653},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000367025200021&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds312945}
}
@article{fds250167,
Author = {Dixit, AK},
Title = {The Making of Economic Policy: A Transactions-Cost Politics
Perspective},
Journal = {Regulation},
Volume = {21},
Pages = {73-76},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds250167}
}
@article{fds250142,
Author = {Dumas, LJ},
Title = {The Over-Burdened Economy},
Journal = {The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science},
Volume = {494},
Pages = {205-206},
Year = {1987},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds250142}
}
@article{fds250202,
Author = {Munger, MC and Wintrobe, R},
Title = {The Political Economy of Dictatorship},
Journal = {The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne
d'Economique},
Volume = {31},
Number = {4},
Pages = {992-992},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1998},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0008-4085},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000077736800018&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/136507},
Key = {fds250202}
}
@article{fds250219,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {The principal difficulty: Besley’s neo-Rousseavian
aspirations},
Journal = {The Review of Austrian Economics},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {169-175},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2009},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0889-3047},
Abstract = {The use of the "principal-agent" model makes an implicit
assumption about the existence of an underlying global
optimum or "general will." This assumption is debatable, and
Besley does not defend it sufficiently or even seem to
realize how strong an assumption it is. Still, it is
standard in the literature, and Besley's book is a very
strong contribution to that literature. Its two greatest
strengths are its solid microfoundations, and its use of the
classical "comparative statics" approach to analyze
dynamics. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media,
LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11138-009-0075-7},
Key = {fds250219}
}
@article{fds250263,
Author = {Schaller, MMWT},
Title = {The Prohibition and Repeal Amendments: A Natural Experiment
in Interest Group Influence},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {90},
Number = {1-4},
Pages = {139-163},
Year = {1997},
Abstract = {The pattern of state support for Prohibition (18th
Amendment, 1919) and Repeal (21st Amendment, 1933) is
analyzed and compared. This comparison is important because
Prohibition is the only amendment ever to be repealed. The
main thesis is that there was no wholesale change in
preferences of citizens. Instead, producer interests failed
to mobilize effectively in 1919, and the coupling of moral
and economic arguments that worked in 1919 broke apart in
1933. Regression analysis is conducted on state legislatures
(for Prohibition) and state referenda on convention
delegates (for Repeal), so states are observations in the
cross-sectional regression analysis. The results broadly
support the main thesis.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_6},
Key = {fds250263}
}
@article{fds250239,
Author = {Dougan, WR and Munger, MC},
Title = {The Rationality of Ideology},
Journal = {Journal of Law and Economics},
Volume = {32},
Pages = {213-239},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds250239}
}
@article{fds341734,
Author = {Munger, MC and Vilarreal-Diaz, M},
Title = {The Road to Crony Capitalism},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {331-344},
Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds341734}
}
@article{fds250210,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {The Social Science of Democracy},
Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {2},
Pages = {374-376},
Year = {2011},
Abstract = {Symposium on Jon Elster’s Tocqueville: The First Social
Scientist},
Key = {fds250210}
}
@article{fds250185,
Author = {Brennan, G and Munger, M},
Title = {The soul of James Buchanan?},
Journal = {Independent Review},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {331-342},
Publisher = {The Independant Institute},
Year = {2014},
Month = {Winter},
ISSN = {1086-1653},
Abstract = {The article reflects on the views and life of James M.
Buchanan. The Buchanan family had a political past:
Buchanan's grandfather had briefly been governor of
Tennessee in the early 1890s as a member of the populist
People's Party. This party was a coalition of agrarian
interests mainly poor cotton and wheat farmers from the
South and the West. Throughout his professional career,
Buchanan called himself a classical liberal. As indicated,
this was something he learned from Frank Knight and that he
held accordingly as a matter of intellectual conviction
rather than personal inclination, which he always
acknowledged was closer to 'libertarian socialist.'. He
viewed politics as arising from agreements. But the
agreements were founded in a notion of exchange rather than
in some fixed notion of consensus on a single policy or
choice. As a consequence, his conception of politics was
encompassing and multidimensional, allowing agreement to be
achieved through accommodations or compromises such as
logrolls.},
Key = {fds250185}
}
@article{fds250250,
Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC},
Title = {The Spatial Theory of Ideology},
Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {5-27},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications (UK and US)},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1460-3667},
Key = {fds250250}
}
@article{fds346773,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {The State of the First Amendment: 2018},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {24},
Number = {2},
Pages = {295-305},
Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST},
Year = {2019},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds346773}
}
@article{fds250158,
Author = {Mizruchi, M},
Title = {The Structure of Corporate Political Action: Interfirm
Relations and Their Consequences},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {87},
Pages = {219-221},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds250158}
}
@article{fds250154,
Author = {Sullivan, EBNO},
Title = {The Structure of Modern Ideology: Critical Perspectives on
Social and Political Theory},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {72},
Pages = {95-96},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds250154}
}
@article{fds313456,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Thinking About Order Without Thought},
Journal = {Public Choice: Tullock's Contributions to Spontaneous Order
Studies},
Volume = {135},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {79-88},
Year = {2008},
Abstract = {Philosophers tend to think of them as "conventions."
Economists and some biologists conceive of them as
"spontaneous orders," a concept discussed at some length in
other papers in this issue. Perhaps the most general
conception is "systems" theory, with roots in many
disciplines. Many scholars in the sciences have tried to
advance their research agendas by bringing systems theory to
the study of human civilization. Gordon Tullock, a scholar
who in the future will be recognized as someone well ahead
of his own time, traveled the reverse path, in many cases
being the first to suggest that the path even exists. ©
2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-008-9283-0},
Key = {fds313456}
}
@article{fds312944,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Tomorrow 3.0 the sharing economy},
Journal = {Independent Review},
Volume = {20},
Number = {3},
Pages = {391-395},
Year = {2016},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1086-1653},
Abstract = {A third great economic revolution will come about as the
sharing economy slashes transaction costs and turns almost
every product into an asset with the potential to earn
rental income for its owner. Although the demand for
manufactured goods will fall, costing many people their
jobs, the quality-adjusted price level will also fall and
pressures on the environment will lessen. All of us will
rent more and own less. Some of us may specialize in being
sellers in these new rental markets for things we do own.
But, overall, each of us will have actual possession of far,
far less stuff at any given time. But the bad news is that
an economy in which entrepreneurs have always been focused
on making new products or on making more old products more
inexpensively will be shaken to its foundations.},
Key = {fds312944}
}
@article{fds357975,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Tomorrow 3.0: Transaction Costs and the Sharing Economy (an
excerpt)},
Journal = {Ekonomicheskaya Sotsiologiya},
Volume = {20},
Number = {5},
Pages = {74-97},
Year = {2019},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {According to Michael Munger, there is some evidence of the
Third Great Economic Revolution, which can be traced within
two dimensions: the sharing economy and the brokerage
economy. Although in many industries, these two dimensions
are far from each other, in some spheres where they
interact, their intersection results in extending the new
economy. In his book, Prof. Munger describes the features of
the sharing economy; entrepreneurship is oriented toward
cuts of transactional expenses rather than production
expenses, use of new basic program tools, a business running
with the help of mobile intellectual equipment, and an
internet connection. In turn, the emergence of a brokerage
economy results from skills used to sell cuts of
transactional costs, opening new opportunities for mutually
gained exchanges that have not yet been perceived as
commercial. The Journal of Economic Sociology publishes the
first chapter, "The World of Tomorrow 3.0," where the author
describes key features of the new economy resulting from the
Third Great Economic Revolution. It means that innovations
with the usage of digital technologies come to the fore,
allowing more intensive usage of durable goods and reducing
the total number of circulated goods. As a result, the human
experience turns out to be more important than the obtained
things, thus changing the idea of private property
dramatically.},
Doi = {10.17323/1726-3247-2019-5-74-97},
Key = {fds357975}
}
@article{fds250162,
Author = {Bianco, W},
Title = {Trust: Representatives and Constituencies},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {85},
Pages = {395-397},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds250162}
}
@article{fds339419,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption: there is a
“political Coase Theorem”},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {181},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {83-100},
Publisher = {Springer Nature America, Inc},
Year = {2019},
Month = {October},
Abstract = {Gordon Tullock developed an approach to understanding
dynamic processes of political change and policy outcomes.
The key insight is the notion that political insiders have
a comparative advantage—because they face lower
transaction costs—in manipulating rules. The result is
that political actors can collect revenues from threatening
to restrict, or offering to loosen, access to valuable
permissions, permits, or services. To the extent that the
ability to pay for such favorable treatment is a consequence
of private activities that produce greater social value,
there is a “political Coase theorem”: corruption makes
bad systems more efficient. But the dynamic consequences are
extremely negative, because of the inability to institute
reforms resulting from application of Tullock’s
“transitional gains trap.”.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-018-0610-9},
Key = {fds339419}
}
@article{fds250176,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Two Steves and One Soichiro: Why Politicians Can’t Judge
Innovation},
Journal = {EconLib},
Series = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungercollectivism.html},
Publisher = {EconLib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN},
Year = {2006},
Month = {Winter},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungercollectivism.html},
Key = {fds250176}
}
@article{fds250175,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Unintended Consequences 1, Good Intentions
0},
Journal = {EconLib},
Series = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungergood
intentions.html},
Publisher = {EconLib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN},
Year = {2006},
Month = {Fall},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungergoodintentions.html},
Key = {fds250175}
}
@article{fds250275,
Author = {Potthoff, RF and Munger, MC},
Title = {Use of integer programming to optimize the scheduling of
panels at annual meetings of the Public Choice
Society},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {117},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {163-175},
Year = {2003},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000185858600007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Preparation for the annual meetings of an organization such
as the Public Choice Society involves scheduling various
panels (sessions) in the available time slots. No person can
be scheduled for more than one panel in the same time slot.
Each panel belongs to a specific subject area; one tries to
spread the panels in each area among the time slots as
evenly as possible. We develop an integer-programming model
to produce a schedule that maximizes the evenness subject to
the constraints. We successfully applied the model
retrospectively, as a test case, to schedule the 2001 annual
meetings of the society.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1026101608593},
Key = {fds250275}
}
@article{fds250226,
Author = {Potthoff, R and Munger, M},
Title = {Voter Uncertainty Can Produce Non-Single-Peaked But Not
Cyclic Preferences: A Clue to the Fate of Ross
Perot?},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {67},
Number = {2},
Pages = {429-453},
Year = {2005},
Month = {May},
Key = {fds250226}
}
@article{fds250209,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and
demand-revealing procedures},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {152},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {61-72},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2012},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000304170600004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Gordon Tullock made fundamental conceptual contributions to
the understanding of collective choices. Tullock balanced an
optimism about the capacity of political choices to
facilitate gains from exchange with a pessimism about the
negative externalities attending having majorities control
power and dictate choices for all. Tullock's work on both
sides of this divide is surveyed, examining both the
problems of voting procedures, and the promise of the
demand-revealing process he helped invent, in guiding the
choice of political institutions. © 2011 Springer
Science+Business Media, LLC.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-011-9856-1},
Key = {fds250209}
}
@article{fds312960,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Voting with dollars: A new paradigm for campaign
finance.},
Journal = {JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE},
Volume = {41},
Number = {3},
Pages = {904-906},
Publisher = {AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC},
Year = {2003},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0022-0515},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000185575200009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds312960}
}
@article{fds250171,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {War, the American State, and Politics since
1898},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2},
Pages = {301-304},
Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {1086-1653},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000309028100015&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds250171}
}
@article{fds350700,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Was Karl Marx a Public-Choice Theorist?},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {24},
Number = {4},
Pages = {509-520},
Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds350700}
}
@article{fds338183,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {What Is "Actually Existing Socialism"?},
Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
Volume = {23},
Number = {2},
Pages = {297-299},
Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST},
Year = {2018},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds338183}
}
@article{fds356989,
Author = {Bram, C and Munger, M},
Title = {Where you stand depends on where you live: county voting on
the Texas secession referendum},
Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1},
Pages = {67-79},
Year = {2022},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {During the first half of the 19th century, Western Texas was
a “trap baited with grass” that attracted migrants
hoping to farm. When settlers on the wrong side of an
unknown, invisible line could not build successful farms,
residents in those counties voted to remain in the Union at
far higher rates than residents in neighboring counties who
could farm. The connection between the vote and economic
interest was obvious, as those without suitable land could
not make use of enslaved labor, which was too expensive
given the implicit marginal product of labor. Because the
location of settlement was plausibly random, these results
highlight the importance of economic interest as a
determinant of even fundamental moral beliefs that affect
vote choice.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10602-021-09334-w},
Key = {fds356989}
}
@article{fds250262,
Author = {Coates, D and Munger, M},
Title = {Win, Lose, or Withdraw: A Categorical Analysis of Career
Patterns in the House of Representatives,
1948-1978},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {83},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {91-115},
Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)},
Year = {1995},
ISSN = {1573-7101},
Abstract = {Winner of the "Duncan Black Award" for best paper published
in Public Choice for 1995.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01047686},
Key = {fds250262}
}
@article{fds312943,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {‘Euvoluntary’ Exchange and the ‘Difference
Principle’},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
Abstract = {Takes up the problem of “truly voluntary” (euvoluntary)
exchange argued in Munger (Social Philosophy and Policy,
Summer 2011) and extends it to apply to the problem of
inequality of income. In particular, it is argued that there
exists a link between Rawls’ difference principle and
Hayek’s conception of a safety net within an otherwise
pure free market.},
Key = {fds312943}
}
@article{fds250221,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {’Basic Income’ is Not an Obligation, But It Might Be a
Legitimate Choice},
Journal = {Basic Income Studies},
Volume = {5},
Number = {2},
Year = {2010},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds250221}
}
@article{fds374354,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {“Apparently, You Don’t”: Economist Jokes as an
Educational Tool},
Journal = {Journal of Private Enterprise},
Volume = {38},
Number = {3},
Pages = {61-82},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {This paper addresses the growing literature on the
comparative statics of rhetorical equilibrium, using humor
as the animating device that corrodes existing norms for
understanding the commercial system. Three motivations for
economics jokes are advanced: to be funny, to illustrate,
and to mock. A simple model of humor is advanced, with three
independent variables—whether the joke is funny,
insightful, or accurately mocking—that are argued to
generate different levels of amusement, the dependent
variable. One conclusion is that jokes economists tell each
other, jokes economists tell outsiders, and jokes outsiders
tell themselves about economists have different mixes of the
essential arguments of the amusement function.},
Key = {fds374354}
}
%% Other
@misc{fds314267,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {'A' Hire vs. 'the' Hire},
Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education},
Year = {2008},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0009-5982},
url = {http://chronicle.com/article/A-Hire-vs-the-Hire/45775},
Key = {fds314267}
}
@misc{fds314201,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {10 Suggestions for a New Department Chair},
Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education},
Year = {2010},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0009-5982},
url = {http://chronicle.com/article/10-Suggestions-for-a-New/64963},
Key = {fds314201}
}
@misc{fds314203,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {10 Tips on How to Write Less Badly},
Journal = {The Chronicle of Higher Educaiton},
Year = {2010},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0030-2201},
url = {http://chronicle.com/article/10-Tips-on-How-to-Write-Less/124268},
Key = {fds314203}
}
@misc{fds250129,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {A Time-series Investigation into Factors Influencing U.S.
Auto Assembly Employment},
Booktitle = {Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade
Commission},
Publisher = {Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade
Commission},
Year = {1985},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds250129}
}
@misc{fds318628,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {A Time-series Investigation into Factors Influencing U.S.
Auto Assembly Employment},
Booktitle = {Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade
Commission},
Year = {1985},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds318628}
}
@misc{fds250125,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {America’s Costly Trade Barriers},
Pages = {F29-F29},
Publisher = {The New York Times},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds250125}
}
@misc{fds314343,
Author = {Hayward, A and Dimino, M and Jones, CA and La Raja and RJ and Milyo, J and Munger, MC and New, NJ and Primo, DM and Samples,
J},
Title = {Brief Amicus Campaign Finance Scholars in Support of
Appellant, Citizens United},
Publisher = {Wilson - Epes Printing Co., Inc},
Year = {2002},
url = {http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/CU-SuppABrief-Aplt17.pdf},
Abstract = {Supreme Court of the United States: Citizens United v.
Federal Elections Commission},
Key = {fds314343}
}
@misc{fds250137,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Democracy is a Means, Not an End},
Journal = {Econ Lib.},
Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2005/Mungerdemocracy.html},
Key = {fds250137}
}
@misc{fds250139,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Everybody Loves Mikey},
Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2005/Mungerinvisiblehand.html},
Key = {fds250139}
}
@misc{fds250195,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Everything You Know About Recycling is Wrong},
Journal = {Cato Unbound (On-line journal, not refereed)},
Series = {Symposium, The Political Economy of Recycling, edited by
Jason Kuznicki.},
Booktitle = {The Political Economy of Recycling},
Editor = {J Kuznicki},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://www.cato-unbound.org/issues/june-2013/political-economy-recycling},
Abstract = {Cato Unbound Symposium},
Key = {fds250195}
}
@misc{fds250134,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Forum: The Dead Cats of November},
Journal = {PS: Political Science and Politics},
Year = {1995},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds250134}
}
@misc{fds314341,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Idaho Republican Party v Ysursa},
Publisher = {Idaho Gov},
Year = {2011},
url = {http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/ClosedPrimaryOrder.pdf},
Key = {fds314341}
}
@misc{fds250215,
Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC},
Title = {In Memoriam: Otto "Toby" Davis},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {128},
Number = {3},
Pages = {357-359},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds250215}
}
@misc{fds250211,
Author = {Ordeshook, P and Munger, M and Lin, TM and Jones,
B},
Title = {In memoriam: Melvin J. Hinich, 1939-2010},
Journal = {Public Choice},
Volume = {146},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-8},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0048-5829},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000285103500001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/s11127-010-9743-1},
Key = {fds250211}
}
@misc{fds250189,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {I’ll Stick With These: Some Sharp Observations on the
Division of Labor},
Publisher = {Econlib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN,."},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungerpins.html},
Key = {fds250189}
}
@misc{fds314204,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {L'Affaire LaCour: What it can teach us about academic
integrity and 'truthiness'},
Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0009-5982},
Key = {fds314204}
}
@misc{fds314202,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Lean on Your Staff},
Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education},
Year = {2010},
Month = {May},
url = {http://chronicle.com/article/Lean-on-Your-Staff/65699},
Key = {fds314202}
}
@misc{fds314342,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Libertarian Party, et al v. State, et al},
Publisher = {Southern Coalition for Social Justice},
Year = {2009},
url = {https://www.southerncoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/LPNCamicusbrief.pdf},
Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Supreme Court of North Carolina},
Key = {fds314342}
}
@misc{fds250194,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Locking Up Political Speech: How Electioneering
Communications Laws Stifle Free Speech and Civic
Engagement},
Publisher = {Institute for Justice},
Address = {Arlington, VA},
Year = {2009},
Month = {June},
url = {http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/locking_up_political_speech.pdf},
Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Broward County v. Browning
(Florida)},
Key = {fds250194}
}
@misc{fds314393,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Locking Up Political Speech: How Electioneering
Communications Laws Stifle Free Speech and Civic
Engagement},
Year = {2009},
Month = {June},
url = {http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/locking_up_political_speech.pdf},
Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Broward County v. Browning
(Florida)},
Key = {fds314393}
}
@misc{fds250193,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Market Makers or Parasites?},
Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Inc.},
Address = {Indianapolis, IN},
Year = {2009},
Month = {February},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2009/Mungermiddlemen.html},
Key = {fds250193}
}
@misc{fds314339,
Author = {Mellor, WH and Berliner, D and Sherman, PM and et. al., and Munger,
MC},
Title = {NC Dental Examiners v FTC, "Scholars of Public Choice
Economics in Support of FTC"},
Year = {2014},
url = {http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/nc-teeth-whitening-amicus.pdf},
Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Supreme Court of the United
States},
Key = {fds314339}
}
@misc{fds314268,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {No Turtles: Faculty-Media Relations},
Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education},
Year = {2009},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0009-5982},
url = {http://chronicle.com/article/No-Turtles-Faculty-Media/44489},
Key = {fds314268}
}
@misc{fds250130,
Author = {Munger, M and Coates, D},
Title = {Nuclear Waste and the Bug Letter},
Pages = {7J-7J},
Publisher = {Raleigh News and Observer},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds250130}
}
@misc{fds250192,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Planning Order, Causing Chaos: Transantiago},
Publisher = {EconLib, OLL, Liberty Fund},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2008/Mungerbus.html},
Key = {fds250192}
}
@misc{fds313754,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Political Parties and Campaign Finance},
Year = {2000},
Month = {April},
url = {http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2000/04500hrg.htm},
Key = {fds313754}
}
@misc{fds250135,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Political Parties and Campaign Finance, Written
Testimony},
Publisher = {Rules and Administration Committee, U.S.
Senate},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds250135}
}
@misc{fds250127,
Author = {Munger, M and Weidenbaum, ML},
Title = {Protectionism: Who Gets Protected?},
Pages = {16-19},
Publisher = {Consumer’s Research Magazine},
Year = {1983},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds250127}
}
@misc{fds376786,
Title = {Regulation},
Publisher = {Sage Publications, Inc.},
Year = {2008},
Doi = {10.4135/9781412965811.n257},
Key = {fds376786}
}
@misc{fds314338,
Author = {Prins, AD and Tamayo, AP and et. al., and Munger,
MC},
Title = {Sensational Smiles, LLC, dba Smile Bright v. Mullen, No.
15-507, “Brief of Public Choice Economics Scholars as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner”},
Year = {2015},
url = {http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ct-teeth-whitening-brief-of-public-choice-economics-scholars-as-amici-curiae-in-support-of-petitioner-11-18-2015.pdf},
Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Supreme Court of the United
States},
Key = {fds314338}
}
@misc{fds313830,
Author = {Munger, MC and Bluestein, F},
Title = {Single Prime and Multi-Prime Contracting in North Carolina
Public Construction},
Pages = {43 pages},
Year = {1994},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds313830}
}
@misc{fds250132,
Author = {Munger, M and Bluestein, F},
Title = {Single Prime and Multi-Prime Contracting in North Carolina
Public Construction: A Report Submitted Under Contract to
the N.C. State Building Commission},
Pages = {43-43},
Publisher = {Raleigh, NC: State Building Commission},
Year = {1994},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds250132}
}
@misc{fds314199,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Sorry I'm Late},
Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education},
Year = {2009},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0009-5982},
url = {http://chronicle.com/article/Sorry-Im-Late/49148},
Key = {fds314199}
}
@misc{fds250128,
Author = {Munger, M},
Title = {Tax Implications of Reagan’s Trade Policy},
Journal = {Policy Report},
Publisher = {Cato Institute},
Year = {1984},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds250128}
}
@misc{fds314266,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {The Beauty of the Virtual Discussion Section},
Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education},
Year = {2016},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0009-5982},
url = {http://chronicle.com/article/The-Beauty-of-the-Virtual/236065},
Key = {fds314266}
}
@misc{fds250131,
Author = {Munger, M and Coates, D and Heid, V},
Title = {The Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste in America:
Gridlock in the States},
Publisher = {St. Louis, MO: Center for the Study of American Business,
Occasional Paper No. 119},
Year = {1992},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds250131}
}
@misc{fds318627,
Author = {Munger, MC and Coates, D and Heid, V},
Title = {The Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste in America:
Gridlock in the States},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds318627}
}
@misc{fds250133,
Author = {Munger, M and Stockard, W},
Title = {The Environmental Protection Agency in the
Triangle},
Publisher = {Center for Urban and Regional Studies, University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds250133}
}
@misc{fds250188,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {The Five Sorry Rules of Lateness},
Publisher = {Econlib, Liberty Fund},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungerlateness.html},
Key = {fds250188}
}
@misc{fds314200,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {The Right Kind of Nothing},
Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0009-5982},
url = {http://chronicle.com/article/The-Right-Kind-of-Nothing/63344},
Key = {fds314200}
}
@misc{fds250138,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {The Thing Itself},
Journal = {Econ Lib.},
Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN},
Year = {2005},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2005/Mungerthing.html},
Key = {fds250138}
}
@misc{fds250190,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {They Clapped: Can Price-Gouging Laws Prohibit
Scarcity?},
Publisher = {Econlab},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungergouging.html},
Key = {fds250190}
}
@misc{fds250191,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Think Globally, Act Irrationally: Recycling},
Publisher = {Econlib, Liberty Fund},
Year = {2007},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungerrecycling.html},
Key = {fds250191}
}
@misc{fds250126,
Author = {Munger, M and Weidenbaum, ML and Penoyer, RJ},
Title = {Toward a More Open Trade Policy},
Booktitle = {Formal Publication No. 53},
Publisher = {St. Louis, MO: Center for the Study of American Business,
Formal Publication No. 53},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds250126}
}
@misc{fds318629,
Author = {Munger, MC and Weidenbaum, ML and Penoyer, RJ},
Title = {Toward A More Open Trade Policy},
Booktitle = {Formal Publication No. 53},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds318629}
}
@misc{fds314205,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Trade Barriers and Deficits: The Hidden Tax of
Protectionism},
Booktitle = {Policy Report},
Year = {1984},
Month = {February},
url = {http://www.cato.org/policy-report/february-1984},
Key = {fds314205}
}
@misc{fds250136,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {Tragedy of the Malecon: Is Cuba ’Domestic
Politics?},
Journal = {Econ Lib.},
Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN},
Year = {2004},
url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2004/MungerCuba.html},
Key = {fds250136}
}
@misc{fds314340,
Author = {Munger, MC},
Title = {“Many Cultures, One Message,” et al. v. Clements, et
al.},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Washington Western District
Court},
Key = {fds314340}
}