Philosophy : Publications since January 2023
%% , Ásta
@article{fds365121,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {Categories We Live By: Reply to Alcoff, Butler, and
Roth},
Journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {31},
Number = {1},
Pages = {310-318},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12744},
Abstract = {The author of Categories We Live By replies to critics Linda
Martín Alcoff, Judith Butler, and Abraham Sesshu
Roth.},
Doi = {10.1111/ejop.12744},
Key = {fds365121}
}
@article{fds373903,
Author = {Ásta},
Title = {What are Sex and Gender and what Do We Want them to
Be?},
Journal = {Metaphysics},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-44},
Publisher = {Ubiquity Press, Ltd.},
Year = {2023},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/met.118},
Doi = {10.5334/met.118},
Key = {fds373903}
}
%% Atkins, Jed W.
@article{fds376120,
Author = {Atkins, JW},
Title = {John Rawls’s Theology of Liberal Toleration},
Journal = {American Political Thought},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {56-82},
Year = {2024},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/728210},
Abstract = {Scholarship has shown that John Rawls’s theological
education at Princeton shaped his later theory of justice
but has overlooked a similar impact on his account of
toleration, which was also derived from the original
position in ATheory of Justice. Drawing on a variety of
published and unpublished works, I argue that in the account
of toleration in A Theory of Justice the original position
takes the place previously occupied by God in His roles as
“father of all” and “just judge.” Paying attention
to the theological origins of Rawls’s view of toleration
in liberal Protestantism explains why he thought that the
Western concept of the separation of church and state
follows logically from the original position, even though
his insistence on this point subjected his thought to
internal inconsistency and external criticism. Acknowledging
these limitations opens to liberal political theorists an
avenue for increased institutional flexibility that Rawls
prematurely closed.},
Doi = {10.1086/728210},
Key = {fds376120}
}
%% Brading, Katherine A.
@article{fds371353,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Du Châtelet and the philosophy of physics},
Pages = {519-532},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Women and Early Modern European
Philosophy},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781138212756},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315450001-45},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315450001-45},
Key = {fds371353}
}
@article{fds376144,
Author = {Brading, K},
Title = {Celebrating Emmy Noether},
Journal = {Physics Today},
Volume = {76},
Number = {8},
Pages = {48-49},
Publisher = {AIP Publishing},
Year = {2023},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/pt.3.5293},
Abstract = {<jats:p>The Philosophy and Physics of Noether’s Theorems:
A Centenary Volume, James Read and Nicholas J. Teh,
eds.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1063/pt.3.5293},
Key = {fds376144}
}
%% Buchanan, Allen E.
@misc{fds371632,
Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
Title = {Evolving Measures of Moral Success},
Pages = {270-294},
Booktitle = {Human Success: Evolutionary Origins and Ethical
Implications},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190096168},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0012},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0012},
Key = {fds371632}
}
@misc{fds372449,
Author = {Barrett, J and Buchanan, A},
Title = {Social Experimentation in an Unjust World},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {127-152},
Booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume
9},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780198877639},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198877639.003.0005},
Abstract = {There is a resurgence of interest in social experimentation
as a means of promoting social progress, including progress
in justice. In this chapter, we first advance an argument in
favor of social experimentation drawing on its capacity to
resolve uncertainty both about how to achieve socially
valuable goals and about which goals are worth pursuing. We
then identify four challenges: the information problem
(experiments may not yield relevant information), the
selection bias problem (potentially informative experiments
may not be undertaken), the uptake problem (the information
generated by experiments may not be put to good use), and
the risk problem (experiments may carry unacceptable risks).
Finally, we argue that certain injustices can exacerbate all
four problems, rendering social experimentation a less
reliable path to progress, and, in cases of severe
injustice, perhaps even a regressive force. The upshot is
not that we should abandon social experimentation, but that
we should temper our expectations and focus on constructing
conditions under which experimentation is more likely to be
progressive. Specifically, to render social experimentation
a more reliable engine for social progress of any sort, we
must remedy or mitigate the injustices that diminish its
value.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198877639.003.0005},
Key = {fds372449}
}
%% Conitzer, Vincent
@article{fds375182,
Author = {Tewolde, E and Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V and Goldberg,
PW},
Title = {The Computational Complexity of Single-Player
Imperfect-Recall Games},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2023-August},
Pages = {2878-2887},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781956792034},
Abstract = {We study single-player extensive-form games with imperfect
recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem or the
Absentminded Driver game. For such games, two natural
equilibrium concepts have been proposed as alternative
solution concepts to ex-ante optimality. One equilibrium
concept uses generalized double halving (GDH) as a belief
system and evidential decision theory (EDT), and another one
uses generalized thirding (GT) as a belief system and causal
decision theory (CDT). Our findings relate those three
solution concepts of a game to solution concepts of a
polynomial maximization problem: global optima, optimal
points with respect to subsets of variables and
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) points. Based on these
correspondences, we are able to settle various
complexity-theoretic questions on the computation of such
strategies. For ex-ante optimality and (EDT,GDH)-equilibria,
we obtain NP-hardness and inapproximability, and for
(CDT,GT)-equilibria we obtain CLS-completeness
results.},
Key = {fds375182}
}
@article{fds375183,
Author = {Kovařík, V and Oesterheld, C and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Game Theory with Simulation of Other Players},
Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {2023-August},
Pages = {2800-2807},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781956792034},
Abstract = {Game-theoretic interactions with AI agents could differ from
traditional human-human interactions in various ways. One
such difference is that it may be possible to simulate an AI
agent (for example because its source code is known), which
allows others to accurately predict the agent's actions.
This could lower the bar for trust and cooperation. In this
paper, we formalize games in which one player can simulate
another at a cost. We first derive some basic properties of
such games and then prove a number of results for them,
including: (1) introducing simulation into generic-payoff
normal-form games makes them easier to solve; (2) if the
only obstacle to cooperation is a lack of trust in the
possibly-simulated agent, simulation enables equilibria that
improve the outcome for both agents; and however (3) there
are settings where introducing simulation results in
strictly worse outcomes for both players.},
Key = {fds375183}
}
@article{fds375181,
Author = {Jecmen, S and Yoon, M and Conitzer, V and Shah, NB and Fang,
F},
Title = {A Dataset on Malicious Paper Bidding in Peer
Review},
Journal = {ACM Web Conference 2023 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web
Conference, WWW 2023},
Pages = {3816-3826},
Year = {2023},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9781450394161},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3543507.3583424},
Abstract = {In conference peer review, reviewers are often asked to
provide "bids"on each submitted paper that express their
interest in reviewing that paper. A paper assignment
algorithm then uses these bids (along with other data) to
compute a high-quality assignment of reviewers to papers.
However, this process has been exploited by malicious
reviewers who strategically bid in order to unethically
manipulate the paper assignment, crucially undermining the
peer review process. For example, these reviewers may aim to
get assigned to a friend's paper as part of a quid-pro-quo
deal. A critical impediment towards creating and evaluating
methods to mitigate this issue is the lack of any
publicly-available data on malicious paper bidding. In this
work, we collect and publicly release a novel dataset to
fill this gap, collected from a mock conference activity
where participants were instructed to bid either honestly or
maliciously. We further provide a descriptive analysis of
the bidding behavior, including our categorization of
different strategies employed by participants. Finally, we
evaluate the ability of each strategy to manipulate the
assignment, and also evaluate the performance of some simple
algorithms meant to detect malicious bidding. The
performance of these detection algorithms can be taken as a
baseline for future research on detecting malicious
bidding.},
Doi = {10.1145/3543507.3583424},
Key = {fds375181}
}
@article{fds375180,
Author = {Conitzer, V and Oesterheld, C},
Title = {Foundations of Cooperative AI},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2023},
Volume = {37},
Pages = {15359-15367},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781577358800},
Abstract = {AI systems can interact in unexpected ways, sometimes with
disastrous consequences. As AI gets to control more of our
world, these interactions will become more common and have
higher stakes. As AI becomes more advanced, these
interactions will become more sophisticated, and game theory
will provide the tools for analyzing these interactions.
However, AI agents are in some ways unlike the agents
traditionally studied in game theory, introducing new
challenges as well as opportunities. We propose a research
agenda to develop the game theory of highly advanced AI
agents, with a focus on achieving cooperation.},
Key = {fds375180}
}
@article{fds375179,
Author = {Zhang, H and Cheng, Y and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with
Extensive-Form Correlation},
Journal = {EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation},
Pages = {1161-1186},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9798400701047},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597665},
Abstract = {We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form
correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our
main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for
computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated
equilibrium (SEFCE), which runs in time polynomial in the
size of the game, as well as the number of bits required to
encode each input number. (2) We give an efficient algorithm
for approximately computing an optimal extensive-form
correlated equilibrium (EFCE) up to machine precision, i.e.,
the algorithm achieves approximation error ϵ in time
polynomial in the size of the game, as well as log(1/ϵ).Our
algorithm for SEFCE is the first polynomial-time algorithm
for equilibrium computation with commitment in such a
general class of stochastic games. Existing algorithms for
SEFCE typically make stronger assumptions such as no chance
moves, and are designed for extensive-form games in the less
succinct tree form. Our algorithm for approximately optimal
EFCE is, to our knowledge, the first algorithm that achieves
3 desiderata simultaneously: approximate optimality,
polylogarithmic dependency on the approximation error and
compatibility with stochastic games in the more succinct
graph form. Existing algorithms achieve at most 2 of these
desiderata, often also relying on additional technical
assumptions.},
Doi = {10.1145/3580507.3597665},
Key = {fds375179}
}
@article{fds375178,
Author = {Oesterheld, C and Demski, A and Conitzer, V},
Title = {A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality},
Journal = {Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science,
EPTCS},
Volume = {379},
Pages = {421-440},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.379.33},
Abstract = {The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical
omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a
decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant
computations and determine the truth value of all relevant
logical/mathematical claims. This assumption is unrealistic
when, for example, we offer bets on remote digits of π or
when an agent faces a computationally intractable planning
problem. Furthermore, the assumption of logical omniscience
creates contradictions in cases where the environment can
contain descriptions of the agent itself. Importantly,
strategic interactions as studied in game theory are
decision problems in which a rational agent is predicted by
its environment (the other players). In this paper, we
develop a theory of rational decision making that does not
assume logical omniscience. We consider agents who
repeatedly face decision problems (including ones like
betting on digits of π or games against other agents). The
main contribution of this paper is to provide a sensible
theory of rationality for such agents. Roughly, we require
that a boundedly rational inductive agent tests each
efficiently computable hypothesis infinitely often and
follows those hypotheses that keep their promises of high
rewards. We then prove that agents that are rational in this
sense have other desirable properties. For example, they
learn to value random and pseudo-random lotteries at their
expected reward. Finally, we consider strategic interactions
between different agents and prove a folk theorem for what
strategies bounded rational inductive agents can converge
to.},
Doi = {10.4204/EPTCS.379.33},
Key = {fds375178}
}
@article{fds376876,
Author = {Conitzer, V},
Title = {The Complexity of Computing Robust Mediated Equilibria in
Ordinal Games},
Journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {38},
Number = {9},
Pages = {9607-9615},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28817},
Abstract = {Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify
utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions
we compute are not robust to errors in this specification.
Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they
require specifying only which outcomes are preferred to
which other ones. Unfortunately, they provide little
guidance for how to play unless there are pure Nash
equilibria; evaluating mixed strategies appears to
fundamentally require cardinal utilities. In this paper, we
observe that we can in fact make good use of mixed
strategies in ordinal games if we consider settings that
allow for folk theorems. These allow us to find equilibria
that are robust, in the sense that they remain equilibria no
matter which cardinal utilities are the correct ones - as
long as they are consistent with the specified ordinal
preferences. We analyze this concept and study the
computational complexity of finding such equilibria in a
range of settings.},
Doi = {10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28817},
Key = {fds376876}
}
@article{fds376877,
Author = {Xu, YE and Zhang, H and Conitzer, V},
Title = {Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups},
Journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence},
Volume = {38},
Number = {9},
Pages = {9952-9959},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28857},
Abstract = {Bilateral trade is one of the most natural and important
forms of economic interaction: A seller has a single,
indivisible item for sale, and a buyer is potentially
interested. The two parties typically have different,
privately known valuations for the item, and ideally, they
would like to trade if the buyer values the item more than
the seller. The celebrated impossibility result by Myerson
and Satterthwaite shows that any mechanism for this setting
must violate at least one important desideratum. In this
paper, we investigate a richer paradigm of bilateral trade,
with many self-interested buyers and sellers on both sides
of a single trade who cannot be excluded from the trade. We
show that this allows for more positive results. In fact, we
establish a dichotomy in the possibility of trading
efficiently. If in expectation, the buyers value the item
more, we can achieve efficiency in the limit. If this is not
the case, then efficiency cannot be achieved in general. En
route, we characterize trading mechanisms that encourage
truth-telling, which may be of independent interest. We also
evaluate our trading mechanisms experimentally, and the
experiments align with our theoretical results.},
Doi = {10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28857},
Key = {fds376877}
}
%% De Brigard, Felipe
@article{fds365621,
Author = {Murray, S and Krasich, K and Irving, Z and Nadelhoffer, T and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent
wrongdoing.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {152},
Number = {1},
Pages = {120-138},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0001262},
Abstract = {Third-personal judgments of blame are typically sensitive to
what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act
negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not
desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do
people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose
that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based
on perceived <i>mental</i> <i>control</i>, or the degree to
which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over
time. To acquire information about others' mental control,
people self-project their own perceived mental control to
anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and
concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four
experiments (<i>N</i> = 841), we tested whether perceptions
of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame
for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with
which people can counterfactually imagine an individual
being non-negligent mediated the relationship between
judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated
that perceived mental control has a strong effect on
judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that
first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately
correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for
negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical
memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of
forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal
episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent
wrongdoers less harshly compared with a control group for
whom past episodes of negligence were not salient.
Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal
judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments
of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role
for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of
responsibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all
rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0001262},
Key = {fds365621}
}
@article{fds372917,
Author = {Uddin, LQ and Betzel, RF and Cohen, JR and Damoiseaux, JS and De
Brigard, F and Eickhoff, SB and Fornito, A and Gratton, C and Gordon,
EM and Laird, AR and Larson-Prior, L and McIntosh, AR and Nickerson, LD and Pessoa, L and Pinho, AL and Poldrack, RA and Razi, A and Sadaghiani, S and Shine, JM and Yendiki, A and Yeo, BTT and Spreng,
RN},
Title = {Controversies and progress on standardization of large-scale
brain network nomenclature.},
Journal = {Network neuroscience (Cambridge, Mass.)},
Volume = {7},
Number = {3},
Pages = {864-905},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/netn_a_00323},
Abstract = {Progress in scientific disciplines is accompanied by
standardization of terminology. Network neuroscience, at the
level of macroscale organization of the brain, is beginning
to confront the challenges associated with developing a
taxonomy of its fundamental explanatory constructs. The
Workgroup for HArmonized Taxonomy of NETworks (WHATNET) was
formed in 2020 as an Organization for Human Brain Mapping
(OHBM)-endorsed best practices committee to provide
recommendations on points of consensus, identify open
questions, and highlight areas of ongoing debate in the
service of moving the field toward standardized reporting of
network neuroscience results. The committee conducted a
survey to catalog current practices in large-scale brain
network nomenclature. A few well-known network names (e.g.,
default mode network) dominated responses to the survey, and
a number of illuminating points of disagreement emerged. We
summarize survey results and provide initial considerations
and recommendations from the workgroup. This perspective
piece includes a selective review of challenges to this
enterprise, including (1) network scale, resolution, and
hierarchies; (2) interindividual variability of networks;
(3) dynamics and nonstationarity of networks; (4)
consideration of network affiliations of subcortical
structures; and (5) consideration of multimodal information.
We close with minimal reporting guidelines for the cognitive
and network neuroscience communities to adopt.},
Doi = {10.1162/netn_a_00323},
Key = {fds372917}
}
@article{fds369341,
Author = {Boone, T and Van Rooy and N and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Not Every Thing Must Go.},
Journal = {Journal of cognitive neuroscience},
Volume = {35},
Number = {3},
Pages = {376-379},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01931},
Abstract = {In The Entangled Brain, Pessoa criticizes standard
approaches in cognitive neuroscience in which the brain is
seen as a functionally decomposable, modular system with
causal operations built up hierarchically. Instead, he
advocates for an emergentist perspective whereby dynamic
brain networks are associated, not with traditional
psychological categories, but with behavioral functions
characterized in evolutionary terms. Here, we raise a number
of concerns with such a radical approach. We ultimately
believe that although much revision to cognitive
neuroscience is welcome and needed, Pessoa's more radical
proposals may be counterproductive.},
Doi = {10.1162/jocn_a_01931},
Key = {fds369341}
}
@article{fds371448,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {"Repressed Memory" Makes No Sense.},
Journal = {Topics in cognitive science},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12677},
Abstract = {The expression "repressed memory" was introduced over 100
years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an
unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's
seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized
cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked-yet
the term "repressed memory" seems to remain. In this paper,
I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this
theoretical term as well as an argument to question its
scientific status by comparing it to other cases of
theoretical terms that have either survived scientific
change-such as "atom" or "gene"-or that have perished, such
as "black bile." Ultimately, I argue that "repressed memory"
is more like "black bile" than "atom" or "gene" and, thus,
recommend its demotion from our scientific
vocabulary.},
Doi = {10.1111/tops.12677},
Key = {fds371448}
}
@article{fds369853,
Author = {Murray, S and Bermúdez, JP and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Moralization and self-control strategy selection.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {30},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1586-1595},
Year = {2023},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-023-02257-7},
Abstract = {To manage conflicts between temptation and commitment,
people use self-control. The process model of self-control
outlines different strategies for managing the onset and
experience of temptation. However, little is known about the
decision-making factors underlying strategy selection.
Across three experiments (N = 317), we tested whether the
moral valence of a commitment predicts how people advise
attentional self-control strategies. In Experiments 1 and 2,
people rated attentional focus strategies as significantly
more effective for people tempted to break moral relative to
immoral commitments, even when controlling for perceived
temptation and trait self-control. Experiment 3 showed that
as people perceived commitments to have more positive moral
valence, they judged attentional focus strategies to be
significantly more effective relative to attentional
distraction strategies. Moreover, this effect was partly
mediated by perceived differences in motivation. These
results indicate that moralization informs decision-making
processes related to self-control strategy
selection.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-023-02257-7},
Key = {fds369853}
}
@article{fds374206,
Author = {Morales-Torres, R and De Brigard and F},
Title = {On the frequency and nature of the cues that elicit déjà
vu and involuntary autobiographical memories.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {46},
Pages = {e370},
Year = {2023},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x23000134},
Abstract = {Barzykowski and Moulin suggest that déjà vu and
involuntary autobiographical memories recruit similar
retrieval processes. Here, we invite the authors to clarify
three issues: (1) What mechanism prevents déjà vu to
happen more frequently? (2) What is the role of semantic
cues in involuntary autobiographical retrieval? and (3) How
déjà vu relates to non-believed memories?},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x23000134},
Key = {fds374206}
}
@article{fds373975,
Author = {Krasich, K and O'Neill, K and Murray, S and Brockmole, JR and De
Brigard, F and Nuthmann, A},
Title = {A computational modeling approach to investigating mind
wandering-related adjustments to gaze behavior during scene
viewing.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {242},
Pages = {105624},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105624},
Abstract = {Research on gaze control has long shown that increased
visual-cognitive processing demands in scene viewing are
associated with longer fixation durations. More recently,
though, longer durations have also been linked to mind
wandering, a perceptually decoupled state of attention
marked by decreased visual-cognitive processing. Toward
better understanding the relationship between fixation
durations and visual-cognitive processing, we ran
simulations using an established random-walk model for
saccade timing and programming and assessed which model
parameters best predicted modulations in fixation durations
associated with mind wandering compared to attentive
viewing. Mind wandering-related fixation durations were best
described as an increase in the variability of the
fixation-generating process, leading to more
variable-sometimes very long-durations. In contrast, past
research showed that increased processing demands increased
the mean duration of the fixation-generating process. The
findings thus illustrate that mind wandering and processing
demands modulate fixation durations through different
mechanisms in scene viewing. This suggests that processing
demands cannot be inferred from changes in fixation
durations without understanding the underlying mechanism by
which these changes were generated.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105624},
Key = {fds373975}
}
@article{fds373542,
Author = {Miceli, K and Morales-Torres, R and Khoudary, A and Faul, L and Parikh,
N and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Perceived plausibility modulates hippocampal activity in
episodic counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {Hippocampus},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {2-6},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hipo.23583},
Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thinking (ECT) consists of imagining
alternative outcomes to past personal events. Previous
research has shown that ECT shares common neural substrates
with episodic future thinking (EFT): our ability to imagine
possible future events. Both ECT and EFT have been shown to
critically depend on the hippocampus, and past research has
explored hippocampal engagement as a function of the
perceived plausibility of an imagined future event. However,
the extent to which the hippocampus is modulated by
perceived plausibility during ECT is unknown. In this study,
we combine two functional magnetic resonance imaging
datasets to investigate whether perceived plausibility
modulates hippocampal activity during ECT. Our results
indicate that plausibility parametrically modulates
hippocampal activity during ECT, and that such modulation is
confined to the left anterior portion of the hippocampus.
Moreover, our results indicate that this modulation is
positive, such that increased activity in the left anterior
hippocampus is associated with higher ratings of ECT
plausibility. We suggest that neither effort nor difficulty
alone can account for these results, and instead suggest
possible alternatives to explain the role of the hippocampus
during the construction of plausible and implausible
ECT.},
Doi = {10.1002/hipo.23583},
Key = {fds373542}
}
@article{fds376898,
Author = {Krasich, K and O'Neill, K and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Looking at Mental Images: Eye-Tracking Mental Simulation
During Retrospective Causal Judgment.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {48},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e13426},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13426},
Abstract = {How do people evaluate causal relationships? Do they just
consider what actually happened, or do they also consider
what could have counterfactually happened? Using eye
tracking and Gaussian process modeling, we investigated how
people mentally simulated past events to judge what caused
the outcomes to occur. Participants played a virtual
ball-shooting game and then-while looking at a blank
screen-mentally simulated (a) what actually happened, (b)
what counterfactually could have happened, or (c) what
caused the outcome to happen. Our findings showed that
participants moved their eyes in patterns consistent with
the actual or counterfactual events that they mentally
simulated. When simulating what caused the outcome to occur,
participants moved their eyes consistent with simulations of
counterfactual possibilities. These results favor
counterfactual theories of causal reasoning, demonstrate how
eye movements can reflect simulation during this reasoning
and provide a novel approach for investigating retrospective
causal reasoning and counterfactual thinking.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.13426},
Key = {fds376898}
}
@article{fds376061,
Author = {Niemi, L and Washington, N and Workman, C and Arcila-Valenzuela, M and De Brigard and F},
Title = {The emotional impact of baseless discrediting of knowledge:
An empirical investigation of epistemic injustice.},
Journal = {Acta psychologica},
Volume = {244},
Pages = {104157},
Year = {2024},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104157},
Abstract = {According to theoretical work on epistemic injustice,
baseless discrediting of the knowledge of people with
marginalized social identities is a central driver of
prejudice and discrimination. Discrediting of knowledge may
sometimes be subtle, but it is pernicious, inducing chronic
stress and coping strategies such as emotional avoidance. In
this research, we sought to deepen the understanding of
epistemic injustice's impact by examining emotional
responses to being discredited and assessing if marginalized
social group membership predicts these responses. We
conducted a novel series of three experiments (Total
N = 1690) in which participants (1) shared their factual
knowledge about how a game worked or their personal feelings
about the game; (2) received discrediting feedback
(invalidating remarks), validating feedback (affirming
remarks), or insulting feedback (general negative social
evaluation); and then (3) reported their affect. In all
three studies, on average, affective responses to
discrediting feedback were less negative than to insulting
feedback, and more negative than to validating feedback.
Participants who shared their knowledge reported more
negative affect after discrediting feedback than
participants who shared their feelings. There were
consistent individual differences, including a
twice-replicated finding of reduced negative affect after
receiving discrediting and insulting feedback for Black men
compared to White men and women and Black women. Black men's
race-based traumatic symptom scores predicted their
affective responses to discrediting and insulting feedback,
suggesting that experience with discrimination contributed
to the emotional processing of a key aspect of epistemic
injustice: remarks conveying baseless discrediting of
knowledge.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104157},
Key = {fds376061}
}
%% Eva, Benjamin E.
@article{fds374145,
Author = {Eva, B and Stern, R},
Title = {Comparative opinion loss},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {107},
Number = {3},
Pages = {613-637},
Year = {2023},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12921},
Abstract = {It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences
that there exist situations in which rational agents
inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions
as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's
imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often
treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to
inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a
mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion
loss is countenanced as rational by a substantially broader
class of normative theories than has been previously
recognised. Specifically, we show that dilation-like
phenomena arise even when one abandons the basic assumption
that agents have (precise or imprecise) credences of any
kind, and follows directly from bedrock norms for rational
comparative confidence judgements of the form ‘I am at
least as confident in p as I am in q’. We then use the
comparative confidence framework to develop a novel
understanding of what exactly gives rise to dilation-like
phenomena. By considering opinion loss in this more general
setting, we are able to provide a novel assessment of the
prospects for an account of inductive inference that is not
saddled with the inevitability of rational
opinion loss.},
Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12921},
Key = {fds374145}
}
%% Farahany, Nita A.
@book{fds365011,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {The Battle for Your Brain: Defending the Right to Think
Freely in the Age of Neurotechnology},
Publisher = {St. Martin's Press},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds365011}
}
@misc{fds369820,
Author = {Farahany, NA and Corbyn, Z},
Title = {We Need a New Human Right to Cognitive Liberty},
Journal = {The Guardian},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds369820}
}
@misc{fds368813,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {A Round-Up of 2022 Neurotechnology Advances},
Journal = {Volokh Conspiracy},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds368813}
}
@misc{fds369927,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {Provide a Résumé, Cover Letter and Access to Your Brain?
The Creepy Race to Read Workers’ Minds},
Journal = {Los Angeles Times},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds369927}
}
@misc{fds370153,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {TikTok Is Part of China’s Cognitive Warfare
Campaign},
Journal = {Guardian},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds370153}
}
@misc{fds370151,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {This Is the Battle for Your Brain at Work},
Journal = {Fast Company},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds370151}
}
@misc{fds371554,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {'Cognitive Liberty' Is the Human Right We Need to Talk
About},
Journal = {Time},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds371554}
}
@misc{fds373700,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {Human Values in a Digital Age},
Journal = {Science},
Volume = {382},
Number = {6670},
Pages = {523},
Year = {2023},
Key = {fds373700}
}
@misc{fds376318,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {Congress Is Right to Want to Curtail Tiktok’s Power and
Influence},
Journal = {The Guardian},
Year = {2024},
Key = {fds376318}
}
@article{fds375515,
Author = {Farahany, NA},
Title = {Neurotech at Work},
Booktitle = {The Year in Tech, 2024: The Insights You Need From Harvard
Business Review},
Publisher = {Harvard Business Review Press},
Year = {2024},
Key = {fds375515}
}
%% Grant, Ruth W.
@article{fds372670,
Author = {Grant, RW and Katzenstein, S and Kennedy, C},
Title = {How Could They Let This Happen? Cover Ups, Complicity, and
the Problem of Accountability},
Journal = {Res Publica},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09628-w},
Abstract = {Sexual abuse by clergymen, poisoned water, police
brutality—these cases each involve two wrongs: the abuse
itself and the attempt to avoid responsibility for it. Our
focus is this second wrong—the cover up. Cover ups are
accountability failures, and they share common strategies
for thwarting accountability whatever the abuse and whatever
the institution. We find that cover ups often succeed even
when accountability mechanisms are in place. Hence, improved
institutions will not be sufficient to prevent
accountability failures. Accountability mechanisms are tools
that people must be willing to use in good faith. They fail
when people are complicit. What explains complicity? We
identify certain human proclivities and features of modern
organizations that lead people to become complicit in the
wrongdoing of others. If we focus exclusively on the design
of institutions, we will fail to constrain the perpetrators
of wrongdoing. Understanding complicity is key to
understanding accountability failures.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11158-023-09628-w},
Key = {fds372670}
}
%% Hawkins, Jennifer
@article{fds371502,
Author = {Hawkins, J},
Title = {Affect, Values and Problems Assessing Decision-Making
Capacity.},
Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB},
Pages = {1-12},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2023.2224273},
Abstract = {The dominant approach to assessing decision-making capacity
in medicine focuses on determining the extent to which
individuals possess certain core cognitive abilities.
Critics have argued that this model delivers the wrong
verdict in certain cases where patient values that are the
product of mental disorder or disordered affective states
undermine decision-making without undermining cognition. I
argue for a re-conceptualization of what it is to possess
the capacity to make medical treatment decisions. It is, I
argue, <i>the ability to track one's own personal interests
at least as well as most people can</i>. Using this idea, I
demonstrate that it is possible to craft a solution for the
problem cases-one that neither alters existing criteria in
dangerous ways (e.g. does not open the door to various kinds
of abuse) nor violates the spirit of widely accepted ethical
constraints on decision-making assessment.},
Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2023.2224273},
Key = {fds371502}
}
%% Hazelwood, Caleb
@article{fds369252,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {Reciprocal causation and biological practice},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {38},
Number = {1},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2023},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-023-09895-0},
Abstract = {Arguments for an extended evolutionary synthesis often
center on the concept of “reciprocal causation.”
Proponents argue that reciprocal causation is superior to
standard models of evolutionary causation for at least two
reasons. First, it leads to better scientific models with
more predictive power. Second, it more accurately represents
the causal structure of the biological world. Simply put,
proponents of an extended evolutionary synthesis argue that
reciprocal causation is empirically and explanatorily apt
relative to competing causal frameworks. In this paper, I
present quantitative survey data from faculty members in
biology departments at universities across the United States
to evaluate this claim. The survey data indicate that a
majority of the participants do not agree (i.e., most either
disagree or neither agree nor disagree) that the concept of
reciprocal causation confers a larger advantage on research
practices. However, a majority of the participants agree
that the causal framework of the extended evolutionary
synthesis more accurately represents the structure of the
biological world. These results demonstrate that the
explanatory merits of a conceptual framework and its
practical utility can come apart in interesting and
informative ways.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-023-09895-0},
Key = {fds369252}
}
@article{fds370035,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {Review of Charles H. Pence’sThe Causal Structure of
Natural Selection- Charles H. Pence, The Causal
Structure of Natural Selection. Elements in the Philosophy
of Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2021), 75
pp. $22.00 (paperback).},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {90},
Number = {3},
Pages = {750-753},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.53},
Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.53},
Key = {fds370035}
}
@article{fds372667,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {Newton's “law-first” epistemology and “matter-first”
metaphysics},
Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {101},
Pages = {40-47},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.08.005},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.08.005},
Key = {fds372667}
}
@article{fds373380,
Author = {Hazelwood, C},
Title = {An Emerging Dilemma for Reciprocal Causation},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Pages = {1-43},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.124},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Among advocates
and critics of the “extended evolutionary synthesis”
(EES), “reciprocal causation” refers to the view that
adaptive evolution is a bidirectional phenomenon, whereby
organisms and environments impinge on each other through
processes of niche construction and natural selection. I
argue that reciprocal causation is incompatible with the
view that natural selection is a metaphysically emergent
causal process. The emergent character of selection places
reciprocal causation on the horns of dilemma, and neither
horn can rescue it. I conclude that proponents of the EES
must abandon the claim that the process of natural selection
features in cycles of reciprocal causation.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.124},
Key = {fds373380}
}
%% Hoover, Kevin D.
@article{fds360551,
Author = {Hoover, KD},
Title = {The struggle for the soul of macroeconomics},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {30},
Number = {2},
Pages = {80-89},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281},
Abstract = {Critics argued that the 2007–09 financial crisis was
failure of macroeconomics, locating its source in the
dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium model and calling
for fundamental re-orientation of the field. Critics
exaggerated the role of DSGE models in actual policymaking,
and DSGE modelers addressed some criticisms within the DSGE
framework. But DSGE modelers oversold their success and even
claimed that their approach is the sine qua non of competent
macroeconomics. The DSGE modelers and their critics renew an
old debate over the relative priority of a priori theory and
empirical data, classically exemplified in the Measurement
without Theory Debate of the 1940s between the Cowles
Commission and the National Bureau of Economic Research. The
earlier debate is reviewed for its implications for the
recent controversy. In adopting the Cowles-Commission
position, some DSGE modelers would essentially
straight-jacket macroeconomics and undermine economic
science and the pursuit of knowledge in an open-minded, yet
critical framework.},
Doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2021.2010281},
Key = {fds360551}
}
@article{fds373365,
Author = {Hoover, KD and Svorenčík, A},
Title = {Who Runs the AEA?},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {61},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1127-1171},
Year = {2023},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221667},
Abstract = {The leadership structure of the American Economic
Association is documented using a biographical database
covering every officer and losing candidate for AEA offices
from 1950 to 2019. The analysis focuses on institutional
affiliations by education and employment. The structure is
strongly hierarchical. A few institutions dominate the
leadership, and their dominance has become markedly stronger
over time. Broadly two types of explanations are explored:
that institutional dominance is based on academic merit or
that it is based on self-perpetuating privilege. Network
effects that might explain the dynamic of increasing
concentration are also investigated.},
Doi = {10.1257/jel.20221667},
Key = {fds373365}
}
%% Janiak, Andrew
@article{fds374560,
Author = {Janiak, A},
Title = {A Tale of Two Forces: Metaphysics and its Avoidance in
Newton’s Principia},
Volume = {343},
Pages = {223-242},
Booktitle = {Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of
Science},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41041-3_11},
Abstract = {Isaac Newton did more than any other early modern figure to
revolutionize natural philosophy, but he was often wary of
other aspects of philosophy. He had an especially vexed
relationship with metaphysics. As recent scholarship has
highlighted, he often denounced metaphysical discussions,
especially those in the Scholastic tradition (Levitin 2016).
He insisted that he himself was not engaging with the aspect
of philosophy that played such a prominent role in the work
of his predecessors, especially Descartes, and his critics,
especially Leibniz. However, in the Principia and the
Opticks, along with correspondence and unpublished
manuscripts, Newton expressed views about the gravity of
bodies and the power of substances that place his thought
squarely within the metaphysical tradition he sought to
avoid. Alas, his famous reluctance to engage in disputes
left even Newton’s supporters confused about his
metaphysical ideas.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-41041-3_11},
Key = {fds374560}
}
@article{fds371295,
Author = {Gessell, B and Janiak, A},
Title = {Physics and optics: Agnesi, Bassi, Du Châtelet},
Pages = {174-186},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Women and Early Modern European
Philosophy},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781138212756},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315450001-17},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315450001-17},
Key = {fds371295}
}
%% Kushnir, Tamar
@article{fds363275,
Author = {Zhao, X and Kushnir, T},
Title = {When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental
changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral
praiseworthiness.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {e13257},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13257},
Abstract = {Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral
praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults
recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving
an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires.
Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing
in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in
contrast with other work showing that children incorporate
notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning.
Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016)
vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly
moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving
inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children,
range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we
contrasted a character who paid a personal cost
(psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a
moral action with another who acted morally without paying a
cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and
9-year-old children and adults recognized the
praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically
or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only
recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are
physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically
costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that
paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire
or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both
adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct
motivational force on actions. They further suggest that
costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in
judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.13257},
Key = {fds363275}
}
@article{fds372714,
Author = {Carpenter, E and Siegel, A and Urquiola, S and Liu, J and Kushnir,
T},
Title = {Being me in times of change: Young children's reflections on
their lives during the COVID-19 pandemic},
Journal = {Children and Society},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/chso.12790},
Abstract = {Research from the perspective of parents, educators and
mental health professionals has documented the negative
impacts of pandemic isolation on children, but few studies
have sought children's own perspectives on this difficult
year. The current study aims to provide a first-person
perspective on children's psychological health by asking
children directly about their experiences of isolating at
home. We interviewed 28 seven- to eleven-year-olds in early
days of lockdowns with follow-ups 6 months later. Children
answered questions about family, school, friendships and
feelings about the changes in their lives during lockdown.
Children's reflections showed resilience, adaptability,
positive appraisals and an ability to maintain meaningful
social connections. This data underscores the value of
including children's narratives to better understand the
pandemic's lasting effects on their lives.},
Doi = {10.1111/chso.12790},
Key = {fds372714}
}
@article{fds369077,
Author = {Partington, S and Nichols, S and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Rational learners and parochial norms.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {233},
Pages = {105366},
Year = {2023},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105366},
Abstract = {Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they
apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm
acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early
age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are
prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However,
another possibility is rational learning: given the
available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms
in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we
introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm
acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In
one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with
children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants
viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two
unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of
social scope - whether the rule applied only to the sampled
group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) -
were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of
their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2)
we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used
statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or
inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive
regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis
shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children
inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a
naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work
highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not
necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial
norms.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105366},
Key = {fds369077}
}
@article{fds370243,
Author = {Flanagan, T and Wong, G and Kushnir, T},
Title = {The minds of machines: Children's beliefs about the
experiences, thoughts, and morals of familiar interactive
technologies.},
Journal = {Developmental psychology},
Volume = {59},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1017-1031},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0001524},
Abstract = {Children are developing alongside interactive technologies
that can move, talk, and act like agents, but it is unclear
if children's beliefs about the agency of these household
technologies are similar to their beliefs about advanced,
humanoid robots used in lab research. This study
investigated 4-11-year-old children's (<i>N</i> = 127,
<i>M</i><sub>age</sub> = 7.50, <i>SD</i><sub>age</sub> =
2.27, 53% females, 75% White; from the Northeastern United
States) beliefs about the mental, physical, emotional, and
moral features of two familiar technologies (Amazon Alexa
and Roomba) in comparison to their beliefs about a humanoid
robot (Nao). Children's beliefs about the agency of these
technologies were organized into three distinct
clusters-having experiences, having minds, and deserving
moral treatment. Children endorsed some agent-like features
for each technology type, but the extent to which they did
so declined with age. Furthermore, children's judgment of
the technologies' freedom to "act otherwise" in moral
scenarios changed with age, suggesting a development shift
in children's understanding of technologies' limitations.
Importantly, there were systematic differences between
Alexa, Roomba, and Nao, that correspond to the unique
characteristics of each. Together these findings suggest
that children's intuitive theories of agency are informed by
an increasingly technological world. (PsycInfo Database
Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/dev0001524},
Key = {fds370243}
}
@article{fds369144,
Author = {Heck, IA and Kushnir, T and Kinzler, KD},
Title = {Building representations of the social world: Children
extract patterns from social choices to reason about
multi-group hierarchies.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {26},
Number = {4},
Pages = {e13366},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13366},
Abstract = {How do children learn about the structure of the social
world? We tested whether children would extract patterns
from an agent's social choices to make inferences about
multiple groups' relative social standing. In Experiment 1,
4- to 6-year-old children (N = 36; tested in Central New
York) saw an agent and three groups (Group-A, Group-B, and
Group-C) and observed the agent choose between pairs of
individuals from different groups. Across pairwise
selections, a pattern emerged: The agent chose individuals
from Group-A > Group-B > Group-C. Children tracked the
agent's choices to predict that Group-A was "most-preferred"
and the "leader" and that Group-C was "least-preferred" and
the "helper." In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined children's
reasoning about a more complex pattern involving four groups
and tested a wider age range. In Experiment 2, 5- to
10-year-old children (N = 98; tested in Central New York)
used the agent's pattern of pairwise choices to infer that
the agent liked Group-A > Group-B > Group-C > Group-D
and to make predictions about which groups were likely to be
"leaders" and "helpers." In Experiment 3, we found evidence
for social specificity in children's reasoning: 5- to
10-year-old children (N = 96; from 26 US States) made
inferences about groups' relative social but not physical
power from the agent's pattern of affiliative choices across
the four groups. These findings showcase a mechanism through
which children may learn about societal-level hierarchies
through the patterns they observe over time in people's
group-based social choices. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Children in
our sample extracted patterns from an agent's positive
social choices between multiple groups to reason about
groups' relative social standing. Children used the pattern
of an agent's positive social choices to guide their
reasoning about which groups were likely to be "leaders" and
"helpers" in a fictional town. The pattern that emerged in
an agent's choices of friends shaped children's thinking
about groups' relative social but not physical power.
Children tracked social choices to reason about group-based
hierarchies at the individual level (which groups an agent
prefers) and societal level (which groups are
privileged).},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.13366},
Key = {fds369144}
}
@article{fds372600,
Author = {Kushnir, T and Katz, T and Stegall, J},
Title = {A Review of “Becoming Human”},
Journal = {Journal of Cognition and Development},
Volume = {24},
Number = {4},
Pages = {620-622},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2023},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2023.2226207},
Doi = {10.1080/15248372.2023.2226207},
Key = {fds372600}
}
@article{fds372785,
Author = {Katz, T and Kushnir, T and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children are eager to take credit for prosocial acts, and
cost affects this tendency.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {237},
Pages = {105764},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
Abstract = {We report two experiments on children's tendency to enhance
their reputations through communicative acts. In the
experiments, 4-year-olds (N = 120) had the opportunity to
inform a social partner that they had helped him in his
absence. In a first experiment, we pitted a prosocial act
("Let's help clean up for Doggie!") against an instrumental
act ("Let's move these out of our way"). Children in the
prosocial condition were quicker to inform their partner of
the act and more likely to protest when another individual
was given credit for it. In a second experiment, we
replicated the prosocial condition but with a new
manipulation: high-cost versus low-cost helping. We
manipulated both the language surrounding cost (i.e., "This
will be pretty tough to clean up" vs. "It will be really
easy to clean this up") and how difficult the task itself
was. As predicted, children in the high-cost condition were
quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely
to take back credit for it. These results suggest that even
4-year-old children make active attempts to elicit positive
reputational judgments for their prosocial acts, with cost
as a moderating factor.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
Key = {fds372785}
}
@article{fds376647,
Author = {Weisman, K and Ghossainy, ME and Williams, AJ and Payir, A and Lesage,
KA and Reyes-Jaquez, B and Amin, TG and Anggoro, FK and Burdett, ERR and Chen, EE and Coetzee, L and Coley, JD and Dahl, A and Dautel, JB and Davis,
HE and Davis, EL and Diesendruck, G and Evans, D and Feeney, A and Gurven,
M and Jee, BD and Kramer, HJ and Kushnir, T and Kyriakopoulou, N and McAuliffe, K and McLaughlin, A and Nichols, S and Nicolopoulou, A and Rockers, PC and Shneidman, L and Skopeliti, I and Srinivasan, M and Tarullo, AR and Taylor, LK and Yu, Y and Yucel, M and Zhao, X and Corriveau, KH and Richert, RA and Developing Belief
Network},
Title = {The development and diversity of religious cognition and
behavior: Protocol for Wave 1 data collection with children
and parents by the Developing Belief Network.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {19},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e0292755},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0292755},
Abstract = {The Developing Belief Network is a consortium of researchers
studying human development in diverse social-cultural
settings, with a focus on the interplay between general
cognitive development and culturally specific processes of
socialization and cultural transmission in early and middle
childhood. The current manuscript describes the study
protocol for the network's first wave of data collection,
which aims to explore the development and diversity of
religious cognition and behavior. This work is guided by
three key research questions: (1) How do children represent
and reason about religious and supernatural agents? (2) How
do children represent and reason about religion as an aspect
of social identity? (3) How are religious and supernatural
beliefs transmitted within and between generations? The
protocol is designed to address these questions via a set of
nine tasks for children between the ages of 4 and 10 years,
a comprehensive survey completed by their
parents/caregivers, and a task designed to elicit
conversations between children and caregivers. This study is
being conducted in 39 distinct cultural-religious groups (to
date), spanning 17 countries and 13 languages. In this
manuscript, we provide detailed descriptions of all elements
of this study protocol, give a brief overview of the ways in
which this protocol has been adapted for use in diverse
religious communities, and present the final,
English-language study materials for 6 of the 39
cultural-religious groups who are currently being recruited
for this study: Protestant Americans, Catholic Americans,
American members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, Jewish Americans, Muslim Americans, and religiously
unaffiliated Americans.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0292755},
Key = {fds376647}
}
@article{fds375236,
Author = {Finiasz, Z and Gelman, SA and Kushnir, T},
Title = {Testimony and observation of statistical evidence interact
in adults' and children's category-based
induction.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {244},
Pages = {105707},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105707},
Abstract = {Hearing generic or other kind-relevant claims can influence
the use of information from direct observations in category
learning. In the current study, we ask how both adults and
children integrate their observations with testimony when
learning about the causal property of a novel category.
Participants were randomly assigned to hear one of four
types of testimony: generic, quantified "all", specific, or
only labels. In Study 1, adults (N = 1249) then observed
that some proportion of objects (10%-100%) possessed a
causal property. In Study 2, children (N = 123,
M<sub>age</sub> = 5.06 years, SD = 0.61 years, range
4.01-5.99 years) observed a sample where 30% of the objects
had the causal property. Generic and quantified "all" claims
led both adults and children to generalize the causal
property beyond what was observed. Adults and children
diverged, however, in their overall trust in testimony that
could be verified by observations: adults were more
skeptical of inaccurate quantified claims, whereas children
were more accepting. Additional memory probes suggest that
children's trust in unverified claims may have been due to
misremembering what they saw in favor of what they heard.
The current findings demonstrate that both child and adult
learners integrate information from both sources, offering
insights into the mechanisms by which language frames
first-hand experience.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105707},
Key = {fds375236}
}
%% McShea, Daniel W.
@article{fds370659,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Evolutionary Success: Standards of Value},
Pages = {17-39},
Booktitle = {Human Success: Evolutionary Origins and Ethical
Implications},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190096168},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0002},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190096168.003.0002},
Key = {fds370659}
}
@article{fds370848,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Evolutionary trends and goal directedness.},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {201},
Number = {5},
Pages = {178},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04164-9},
Abstract = {The conventional wisdom declares that evolution is not goal
directed, that teleological considerations play no part in
our understanding of evolutionary trends. Here I argue that,
to the contrary, under a current view of teleology, field
theory, most evolutionary trends would have to be considered
goal directed to some degree. Further, this view is
consistent with a modern scientific outlook, and more
particularly with evolutionary theory today. Field theory
argues that goal directedness is produced by higher-level
fields that direct entities contained within them to behave
persistently and plastically, that is, returning them to a
goal-directed trajectory following perturbations
(persistence) and directing them to a goal-directed
trajectory from a large range of alternative starting points
(plasticity). The behavior of a bacterium climbing a
chemical food gradient is persistent and plastic, with
guidance provided by the external "food field," the chemical
gradient. Likewise, an evolutionary trend that is produced
by natural selection is a lineage behaving persistently and
plastically under the direction of its local ecology, an
"ecological field." Trends directed by selection-generated
boundaries, thermodynamic gradients, and certain internal
constraints, would also count as goal directed. In other
words, most of the causes of evolutionary trends that have
been proposed imply goal directedness. However, under field
theory, not all trends are goal directed. Examples are
discussed. Importantly, nothing in this view suggests that
evolution is guided by intentionality, at least none at the
level of animal intentionality. Finally, possible
implications for our thinking about evolutionary
directionality in the history of life are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-023-04164-9},
Key = {fds370848}
}
@article{fds368096,
Author = {Keenan, JP and McShea, DW},
Title = {Synergies Among Behaviors Drive the Discovery of Productive
Interactions},
Journal = {Biological Theory},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {43-62},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13752-022-00420-2},
Abstract = {When behaviors assemble into combinations, then synergies
have a central role in the discovery of productive patterns
of behavior. In our view—what we call the Synergy
Emergence Principle (SEP)—synergies are dynamic
attractors, drawing interactions toward greater returns as
they happen, in the moment. This Principle offers an
alternative to the two conventionally acknowledged routes to
discovery: directed problem solving, involving forethought
and planning; and the complete randomness of trial and
error. Natural selection has a role in the process, in
humans favoring the maintenance and improvement of certain
key underlying capabilities, such as prosocial helping and
episodic foresight, but selection is not required for
discovery by synergy (which occurs too rapidly for selection
anyway). Here we discuss the consequences of the SEP for
the evolution in humans of key synergies such as tool
usage and interactions that reward cooperation, show how
discovery by synergy and the selection of synergy-supporting
abilities formed a positive feedback loop, and show how
synergies can combine, forming clusters and packages that
are the core of institutions and cultures. Finally, clusters
and packages represent an intermediate level of organization
above the individual and below whole society, with
consequences for our understanding of the major transitions
in evolution.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13752-022-00420-2},
Key = {fds368096}
}
@article{fds369050,
Author = {McShea, DW},
Title = {Four reasons for scepticism about a human major transition
in social individuality.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {378},
Number = {1872},
Pages = {20210403},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0403},
Abstract = {The 'major transitions in evolution' are mainly about the
rise of hierarchy, new individuals arising at ever higher
levels of nestedness, in particular the eukaryotic cell
arising from prokaryotes, multicellular individuals from
solitary protists and individuated societies from
multicellular individuals. Some lists include human
societies as a major transition, but based on a comparison
with the non-human transitions, there are reasons for
scepticism. (i) The foundation of the major transitions is
hierarchy, but the cross-cutting interactions in human
societies undermine hierarchical structure. (ii) Natural
selection operates in three modes-stability, growth and
reproductive success-and only the third produces the complex
adaptations seen in fully individuated higher levels. But
human societies probably evolve mainly in the stability and
growth modes. (iii) Highly individuated entities are marked
by division of labour and commitment to morphological
differentiation, but in humans differentiation is mostly
behavioural and mostly reversible. (iv) As higher-level
individuals arise, selection drains complexity, drains
parts, from lower-level individuals. But there is little
evidence of a drain in humans. In sum, a comparison with the
other transitions gives reasons to doubt that human social
individuation has proceeded very far, or if it has, to doubt
that it is a transition of the same sort. This article is
part of the theme issue 'Human socio-cultural evolution in
light of evolutionary transitions'.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2021.0403},
Key = {fds369050}
}
@article{fds366835,
Author = {Babcock, G and McShea, DW},
Title = {Resolving teleology's false dilemma},
Journal = {Biological Journal of the Linnean Society},
Volume = {139},
Number = {4},
Pages = {415-432},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2023},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/biolinnean/blac058},
Abstract = {This paper argues that the account of teleology previously
proposed by the authors is consistent with the physical
determinism that is implicit across many of the sciences. We
suggest that much of the current aversion to teleological
thinking found in the sciences is rooted in debates that can
be traced back to ancient natural science, which pitted
mechanistic and deterministic theories against teleological
ones. These debates saw a deterministic world as one where
freedom and agency is impossible. And, because teleological
entities seem to be free to either reach their ends or not,
it was assumed that they could not be deterministic. Mayr's
modern account of teleonomy adheres to this basic
assumption. Yet, the seeming tension between teleology and
determinism is illusory because freedom and agency do not,
in fact, conflict with a deterministic world. To show this,
we present a taxonomy of different types of freedom that we
see as inherent in teleological systems. Then we show that
our taxonomy of freedom, which is crucial to understanding
teleology, shares many of the features of a philosophical
position regarding free will that is known in the
contemporary literature as 'compatibilism'. This position
maintains that an agent is free when the sources of its
actions are internal, when the agent itself is the
deterministic cause of those actions. Our view shows that
freedom is not only indispensable to teleology, but also
that, contrary to common intuitions, there is no conflict
between teleology and causal determinism.},
Doi = {10.1093/biolinnean/blac058},
Key = {fds366835}
}
@article{fds374935,
Author = {Babcock, G and McShea, DW},
Title = {Goal Directedness and the Field Concept},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Pages = {1-10},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.121},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>A long-standing
problem in understanding goal-directed systems has been the
insufficiency of mechanistic explanations to make sense of
them. This article offers a solution to this problem. It
begins by observing the limitations of mechanistic
decompositions when it comes to understanding physical
fields. We argue that introducing the field concept, as it
has been developed in <jats:italic>field
theory</jats:italic>, alongside mechanisms is able to
provide an account of goal directedness in the
sciences.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/psa.2023.121},
Key = {fds374935}
}
%% Moi, Toril
@article{fds371699,
Author = {Moi, T},
Title = {Acknowledging Hanna Pitkin: A Belated Discovery of a Kindred
Spirit},
Journal = {Polity},
Volume = {55},
Number = {3},
Pages = {479-487},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/725254},
Doi = {10.1086/725254},
Key = {fds371699}
}
%% Neander, Karen
@article{fds219963,
Author = {K.L. Neander},
Title = {"Toward an Informational Teleosemantics"},
Booktitle = {Millikan and Her Critics},
Editor = {Justine Kingsbury},
Keywords = {Teleolosemantics, functions, information, representation,
content, distal content, Millikan, Papineau.},
Abstract = {This paper argues that there are response functions. Systems
can have the function to produce one thing in response to
another. This has consequences for the kind of
teleosemantics that can be offered. Contrary to claims made
by Millikan and Papineau, sensory representations can have
contents that are determined by the functions of sensory
systems to respond to stimuli in certain ways. This paper
further explores these implications and offers a
teleosemantic and yet informational theory for sensory
representations. It further offers a solution to the problem
of distal content.},
Key = {fds219963}
}
%% Pickford, Henry
@article{fds371498,
Author = {Pickford, H},
Title = {Life, Logic, Style: On Late Wittgenstein},
Pages = {168-193},
Booktitle = {Wittgenstein and Literary Studies},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2023},
ISBN = {9781108978163},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108973687},
Abstract = {In addition to explaining what "literary
Wittgensteinianism" is, it provides a point of entry
into the chapters of this volume by explaining the basic
difference between the "early" and
"late" Wittgenstein and how each has opened up
novel ...},
Doi = {10.1017/9781108973687},
Key = {fds371498}
}
@article{fds369172,
Author = {Pickford, HW},
Title = {Adorno and the categories of resistance},
Journal = {Constellations},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12652},
Doi = {10.1111/1467-8675.12652},
Key = {fds369172}
}
%% Richardson, Kevin A
@article{fds370868,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Derivative Indeterminacy},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00692-5},
Abstract = {Indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) if it has its
source in the way the world is (rather than how it is
represented or known). There are two questions we could ask
about indeterminacy. First: does it exist? Second: is
indeterminacy derivative? I focus on the second question.
Specifically, I argue that (at least some) metaphysical
indeterminacy can be derivative, where this roughly means
that facts about indeterminacy are metaphysically grounded
in facts about what is determinate.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10670-023-00692-5},
Key = {fds370868}
}
@article{fds370224,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Exclusion and Erasure: Two Types of Ontological
Opression},
Journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {9},
Publisher = {University of Michigan Library},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2279},
Doi = {10.3998/ergo.2279},
Key = {fds370224}
}
@article{fds371117,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Critical social ontology},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {201},
Number = {6},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04197-0},
Abstract = {Critical social ontology is any study of social ontology
that is done in order to critique ideology or end social
injustice. The goal of this paper is to outline what I call
the fundamentality approach to critical social ontology. On
the fundamentality approach, social ontologists are in the
business of distinguishing between appearances and
(fundamental) reality. Social reality is often obscured by
the acceptance of ideology, where an ideology is a distorted
system of beliefs that leads people to promote or accept
widespread social injustices. Social reality is also
obscured in cases where ordinary thought and language simply
is not perspicuous enough to represent the social objects,
kinds, and structures that are central to understanding
social injustice. In both cases, I argue that the critical
social ontologist will benefit from using the tools and
concepts of fundamental metaphysics.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-023-04197-0},
Key = {fds371117}
}
@article{fds367526,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively)
substantial},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {107},
Number = {1},
Pages = {192-207},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2023},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12916},
Abstract = {According to Sider, a question is metaphysically substantive
just in case it has a single most natural answer. Recently,
Barnes and Mikkola have argued that, given this notion of
substantivity, many of the central questions in the
metaphysics of gender are nonsubstantive. Specifically, it
is plausible that gender pluralism—the view that there are
multiple, equally natural gender kinds—is true, but this
view seems incompatible with the substantivity of gender.
The goal of this paper is to argue that the notion of
substantivity can be understood in a way that accommodates
gender pluralism. First, I claim that gender terms (at least
as used in the ontology room) are referentially
indeterminate, where referential indeterminacy holds in
virtue of the way the world is. Second, I propose a
degree-theoretic (or scalar) account of metaphysical
substantivity; genders are substantial to the degree that
they are determinate. I conclude that gender is relatively,
although not absolutely, substantial.},
Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12916},
Key = {fds367526}
}
@article{fds369854,
Author = {Richardson, K},
Title = {Social construction and indeterminacy},
Journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
Volume = {65},
Number = {1},
Pages = {37-52},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12299},
Abstract = {An increasing number of philosophers argue that
indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) in the sense that
indeterminacy has its source in the world itself (rather
than how the world is represented or known). The standard
arguments for metaphysical indeterminacy are centered around
the sorites paradox. In this essay, I present a novel
argument for metaphysical indeterminacy. I argue that
metaphysical indeterminacy follows from the existence of
constitutive social construction; there is indeterminacy in
the social world because there is indeterminacy in how the
social world is constructed.},
Doi = {10.1111/phib.12299},
Key = {fds369854}
}
%% Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter
@article{fds370405,
Author = {Simmons, C and Helming, K and Musholt, K and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Where is the golden mean of intellectual humility? Comments
on Ballantyne},
Journal = {Journal of Positive Psychology},
Volume = {18},
Number = {2},
Pages = {240-243},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2022.2155227},
Abstract = {In his admirable review, Ballantyne characterizes
intellectual humility (IH) as a personal way ‘to manage
evidence … in seeking truth.’ However, not every way of
managing truth is virtuous. Since IH is supposed to be an
intellectual virtue, we propose that IH should be understood
as a ‘golden mean’ or ‘middle path’ between extremes
of intellectual arrogance and lack of self-confidence (or
between dogmatism and gullibility). The golden mean should
not be characterized descriptively by the statistical mean
of a population but instead either epistemically by accuracy
in intellectual assessments of oneself and others or
pragmatically by the kinds of such assessments that enable
or lead to successful inquiry. This comment explains and
considers advantages and disadvantages of these two ways of
locating the golden mean.},
Doi = {10.1080/17439760.2022.2155227},
Key = {fds370405}
}
@article{fds372817,
Author = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Dahl’s Definition of Morality},
Journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
Volume = {34},
Number = {2},
Pages = {106-109},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2248853},
Doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2023.2248853},
Key = {fds372817}
}
@article{fds374251,
Author = {Boggio, PS and Rêgo, GG and Everett, JAC and Vieira, GB and Graves, R and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Who did it? Moral wrongness for us and them in the UK, US,
and Brazil},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637},
Abstract = {Morality has traditionally been described in terms of an
impartial and objective “moral law”, and moral
psychological research has largely followed in this vein,
focusing on abstract moral judgments. But might our moral
judgments be shaped not just by what the action is, but who
is doing it? We looked at ratings of moral wrongness,
manipulating whether the person doing the action was a
friend, a refugee, or a stranger. We looked at these ratings
across various moral foundations, and conducted the study in
Brazil, US, and UK samples. Our most robust and consistent
findings are that purity violations were judged more harshly
when committed by ingroup members and less harshly when
committed by the refugees in comparison to the unspecified
agents, the difference between refugee and unspecified
agents decays from liberals to conservatives, i.e.,
conservatives judge them more harshly than liberals do, and
Brazilians participants are harsher than the US and UK
participants. Our results suggest that purity violations are
judged differently according to who committed them and
according to the political ideology of the judges. We
discuss the findings in light of various theories of groups
dynamics, such as moral hypocrisy, moral disengagement, and
the black sheep effect.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637},
Key = {fds374251}
}
@article{fds376731,
Author = {Nadelhoffer, T and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Experimental Ethics},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {206-221},
Booktitle = {The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics: 2Nd Edition},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781350217881},
Key = {fds376731}
}
@article{fds372776,
Author = {Hopp, FR and Amir, O and Fisher, JT and Grafton, S and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Weber, R},
Title = {Moral foundations elicit shared and dissociable cortical
activation modulated by political ideology.},
Journal = {Nature human behaviour},
Volume = {7},
Number = {12},
Pages = {2182-2198},
Year = {2023},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8},
Abstract = {Moral foundations theory (MFT) holds that moral judgements
are driven by modular and ideologically variable moral
foundations but where and how these foundations are
represented in the brain and shaped by political beliefs
remains an open question. Using a moral vignette judgement
task (n = 64), we probed the neural (dis)unity of moral
foundations. Univariate analyses revealed that moral
judgement of moral foundations, versus conventional norms,
reliably recruits core areas implicated in theory of mind.
Yet, multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that each
moral foundation elicits dissociable neural representations
distributed throughout the cortex. As predicted by MFT,
individuals' liberal or conservative orientation modulated
neural responses to moral foundations. Our results confirm
that each moral foundation recruits domain-general
mechanisms of social cognition but also has a dissociable
neural signature malleable by sociomoral experience. We
discuss these findings in view of unified versus dissociable
accounts of morality and their neurological support for
MFT.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41562-023-01693-8},
Key = {fds372776}
}
@article{fds372262,
Author = {McKee, P and Kim, H-E and Tang, H and Everett, JAC and Chituc, V and Gibea,
T and Marques, LM and Boggio, P and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {Does it matter who harmed whom? A cross-cultural study of
moral judgments about harm by and to insiders and
outsiders.},
Journal = {Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)},
Volume = {43},
Number = {9},
Pages = {7997-8007},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3},
Abstract = {This cross-cultural study compared judgments of moral
wrongness for physical and emotional harm with varying
combinations of in-group vs. out-group agents and victims
across six countries: the United States of America
(N = 937), the United Kingdom (N = 995), Romania
(N = 782), Brazil (N = 856), South Korea
(N = 1776), and China (N = 1008). Consistent with
our hypothesis we found evidence of an insider agent effect,
where moral violations committed by outsider agents are
generally considered more morally wrong than the same
violations done by insider agents. We also found support for
an insider victim effect where moral violations that were
committed against an insider victim generally were seen as
more morally wrong than when the same violations were
committed against an outsider, and this effect held across
all countries. These findings provide evidence that the
insider versus outsider status of agents and victims does
affect moral judgments. However, the interactions of these
identities with collectivism, psychological closeness, and
type of harm (emotional or physical) are more complex than
what is suggested by previous literature.<h4>Supplementary
information</h4>The online version contains supplementary
material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12144-023-04986-3},
Key = {fds372262}
}
@article{fds375504,
Author = {Earp, BD and Porsdam Mann and S and Allen, J and Salloch, S and Suren, V and Jongsma, K and Braun, M and Wilkinson, D and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Rid, A and Wendler, D and Savulescu, J},
Title = {A Personalized Patient Preference Predictor for Substituted
Judgments in Healthcare: Technically Feasible and Ethically
Desirable.},
Journal = {The American journal of bioethics : AJOB},
Pages = {1-14},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2023.2296402},
Abstract = {When making substituted judgments for incapacitated
patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the
patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also
agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such
a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient
Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use
an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of
individual patients from population-level data about the
known preferences of people with similar demographic
characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even
if such a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human
surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed
algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient's
(former) autonomy since it draws on the 'wrong' kind of
data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual
patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual
values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do.
Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new
approach: the <i>Personalized</i> Patient Preference
Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in
machine learning, which allow technologies including large
language models to be more cheaply and efficiently
'fine-tuned' on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the
PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient's
preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions)
that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in
addition to being potentially more accurate at the
individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the
predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each
patient's own reasons and values. In this article, we review
recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that
suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it
is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage
some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the
original PPP. We then consider various objections to our
proposal and offer some tentative replies.},
Doi = {10.1080/15265161.2023.2296402},
Key = {fds375504}
}
%% Sreenivasan, Gopal
@article{fds375846,
Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
Title = {Courage, Consistency, and Other Conundra},
Journal = {Criminal Law and Philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {281-296},
Year = {2024},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09716-1},
Abstract = {I am very grateful to Rachel Barney and Christian Miller for
their helpful and challenging comments on my book, Emotion
and Virtue (Princeton, 2020). My response aims first to
clarify and then to fortify my position on some of the many
excellent points they raise in this symposium.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11572-023-09716-1},
Key = {fds375846}
}
%% Stern, Reuben E
@article{fds371706,
Author = {Stern, R and Eva, B},
Title = {Anti-reductionist Interventionism},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {74},
Number = {1},
Pages = {241-267},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/714792},
Abstract = {Kim’s causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate
that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental
properties (and macro-level properties in general) as
causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist
Kim’s conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of
Woodward’s interventionist conception of causation. The
viability of these responses has been challenged by
Gebharter, who argues that the causal exclusion argument is
vindicated by the theory of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs).
Since the interventionist conception of causation relies
crucially on CBNs for its foundations, Gebharter’s
argument appears to cast significant doubt on
interventionism’s anti-reductionist credentials. In the
present article, we both (1) demonstrate that Gebharter’s
CBN-theoretic formulation of the exclusion argument relies
on some unmotivated and philosophically significant
assumptions (especially regarding the relationship between
CBNs and the metaphysics of causal relevance), and (2) use
Bayesian networks to develop a general theory of causal
inference for multi-level systems that can serve as the
foundation for an anti-reductionist interventionist account
of causation.1},
Doi = {10.1086/714792},
Key = {fds371706}
}
@article{fds367761,
Author = {Eva, B and Stern, R},
Title = {Comparative opinion loss},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {107},
Number = {3},
Pages = {613-637},
Year = {2023},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12921},
Abstract = {It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences
that there exist situations in which rational agents
inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions
as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's
imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often
treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to
inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a
mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion
loss is countenanced as rational by a substantially broader
class of normative theories than has been previously
recognised. Specifically, we show that dilation-like
phenomena arise even when one abandons the basic assumption
that agents have (precise or imprecise) credences of any
kind, and follows directly from bedrock norms for rational
comparative confidence judgements of the form ‘I am at
least as confident in p as I am in q’. We then use the
comparative confidence framework to develop a novel
understanding of what exactly gives rise to dilation-like
phenomena. By considering opinion loss in this more general
setting, we are able to provide a novel assessment of the
prospects for an account of inductive inference that is not
saddled with the inevitability of rational
opinion loss.},
Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12921},
Key = {fds367761}
}
%% Summers, Jesse S
@article{fds373672,
Author = {Dasgupta, J and Lockwood Estrin and G and Summers, J and Singh,
I},
Title = {Cognitive Enhancement and Social Mobility: Skepticism from
India},
Journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
Volume = {14},
Number = {4},
Pages = {341-351},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2022.2048723},
Doi = {10.1080/21507740.2022.2048723},
Key = {fds373672}
}
%% Tomasello, Michael
@article{fds362755,
Author = {Hepach, R and Engelmann, JM and Herrmann, E and Gerdemann, SC and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Evidence for a developmental shift in the motivation
underlying helping in early childhood.},
Journal = {Developmental science},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {e13253},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.13253},
Abstract = {We investigated children's positive emotions as an indicator
of their underlying prosocial motivation. In Study 1, 2-,
and 5-year-old children (N = 64) could either help an
individual or watch as another person provided help.
Following the helping event and using depth sensor imaging,
we measured children's positive emotions through changes in
postural elevation. For 2-year-olds, helping the individual
and watching another person help was equally rewarding;
5-year-olds showed greater postural elevation after actively
helping. In Study 2, 5-year-olds' (N = 59) positive
emotions following helping were greater when an audience was
watching. Together, these results suggest that 2-year-old
children have an intrinsic concern that individuals be
helped whereas 5-year-old children have an additional,
strategic motivation to improve their reputation by
helping.},
Doi = {10.1111/desc.13253},
Key = {fds362755}
}
@article{fds365125,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Social cognition and metacognition in great apes: a
theory.},
Journal = {Animal cognition},
Volume = {26},
Number = {1},
Pages = {25-35},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-022-01662-0},
Abstract = {Twenty-five years ago, at the founding of this journal,
there existed only a few conflicting findings about great
apes' social-cognitive skills (theory of mind). In the 2 ½
decades since, we have discovered that great apes understand
the goals, intentions, perceptions, and knowledge of others,
and they use this knowledge to their advantage in
competitive interactions. Twenty-five years ago there
existed basically no studies on great apes' metacognitive
skills. In the 2 ½ decades since, we have discovered that
great apes monitor their uncertainty and base their
decisions on that, or else decide to gather more information
to make better decisions. The current paper reviews the past
25 years of research on great ape social cognition and
metacognition and proposes a theory about how the two are
evolutionarily related.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10071-022-01662-0},
Key = {fds365125}
}
@article{fds371813,
Author = {Wolf, W and Thielhelm, J and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Five-year-old children show cooperative preferences for
faces with white sclera.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {225},
Pages = {105532},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532},
Abstract = {The cooperative eye hypothesis posits that human eye
morphology evolved to facilitate cooperation. Although it is
known that young children prefer stimuli with eyes that
contain white sclera, it is unknown whether white sclera
influences children's perception of a partner's
cooperativeness specifically. In the current studies, we
used an online methodology to present 5-year-old children
with moving three-dimensional face models in which facial
morphology was manipulated. Children found "alien" faces
with human eyes more cooperative than faces with dark sclera
(Study 2) but not faces with enlarged irises (Study 1). For
more human-like faces (Study 3), children found human eyes
more cooperative than either enlarged irises or dark sclera
and found faces with enlarged irises cuter (but not more
cooperative) than eyes with dark sclera. Together, these
results provide strong support for the cooperative eye
hypothesis.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105532},
Key = {fds371813}
}
@misc{fds371506,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Having Intentions, Understanding Intentions, and
Understanding Communicative Intentions},
Pages = {63-75},
Booktitle = {Developing Theories of Intention: Social Understanding and
Self-Control},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780805831412},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003417927-5},
Abstract = {This chapter looks at a major cause and a major consequence
of the 9-month social-cognitive revolution; and both of
these also concern infant intentionality. It argues that
young children’s understanding of other persons as
intentional agents results in large part from newly emerging
forms of intentionality in their own sensory-motor actions.
The chapter explores young children’s understanding of a
special type of intention that emerges directly on the heels
of the 9-month revolution, namely, communicative intentions.
Intentional agents have goals and make active choices among
behavioral means for attaining those goals. Important,
intentional agents also make active choices about what they
pay attention to in pursuing those goals. ntentional agents
have goals and make active choices among behavioral means
for attaining those goals. Important, intentional agents
also make active choices about what they pay attention to in
pursuing those goals.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781003417927-5},
Key = {fds371506}
}
@article{fds367773,
Author = {Colle, L and Grosse, G and Behne, T and Tomasello,
M},
Title = {Just teasing! - Infants' and toddlers' understanding of
teasing interactions and its effect on social
bonding.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {231},
Pages = {105314},
Year = {2023},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105314},
Abstract = {The current study investigates infants' and toddlers'
understanding of teasing interactions and its effect on
subsequent social interactions. Teasing is a special kind of
social interaction due to its dual nature: It consists of a
slightly provocative contingent action accompanied by
positive ostensive emotional cues. Teasing thus presents an
especially interesting test case to inform us about young
children's abilities to deal with complex social intentions.
In a first experiment, we looked at 9-, 12-, and
18-month-old infants' ability to understand and
differentiate a teasing intention from a trying intention
and a refuse intention. We found that by 12 months of age,
infants react differently (gaze, reach) and by 18 months
they smile more in reaction to the Tease condition. In the
second experiment, we tested 13-, 20- and 30-month-old
children in closely matched purely playful and teasing
situations. We also investigated potential social effects of
teasing interactions on a subsequent affiliation sequence.
Twenty- and 30-month-old children smile more in the Teasing
than in the Play condition. For the 30-month-old toddlers,
additionally, number of laughs is much higher in the Tease
than in the Play condition. No effect on affiliation could
be found. Thus, from very early in development, infants and
toddlers are able to differentiate teasing from
superficially similar but serious behavior and from around
18 months of age they enjoy it more. Infants and toddlers
are able to process a complex social intention like teasing.
Findings are discussed regarding infant and toddler
intention understanding abilities.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105314},
Key = {fds367773}
}
@article{fds368903,
Author = {Schäfer, M and B M Haun and D and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children's consideration of collaboration and merit when
making sharing decisions in private.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {228},
Pages = {105609},
Year = {2023},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105609},
Abstract = {Young children share equally when they acquire resources
through collaboration with a partner, yet it is unclear
whether they do so because in such contexts resources are
encountered as common and distributed in front of the
recipient or because collaboration promotes a sense of
work-based fairness. In the current studies, 5- and
8-year-old children from Germany (N = 193) acquired
resources either by working individually alongside or by
collaborating with a peer. After finding out that the
partner's container was empty, they decided in private
whether they wanted to donate some resources to the peer.
When both partners had worked with equal efforts (Study 1),
children shared more after collaboration than after
individual work. When one partner had worked with much more
effort than the other (Study 2), children shared more with a
harder-working partner than with a less-working partner
independently of whether they had collaborated or worked
individually. Younger children were more generous than older
children, in particular after collaboration. These findings
support the view that collaboration promotes a genuine sense
of fairness in young children, but they also indicate that
merit-based notions of fairness in the context of work may
develop independently of collaboration, at least by the
beginning of middle childhood and in Western
societies.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105609},
Key = {fds368903}
}
@article{fds370629,
Author = {Benozio, A and House, BR and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Apes reciprocate food positively and negatively.},
Journal = {Proceedings. Biological sciences},
Volume = {290},
Number = {1998},
Pages = {20222541},
Year = {2023},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2022.2541},
Abstract = {Reciprocal food exchange is widespread in human societies
but not among great apes, who may view food mainly as a
target for competition. Understanding the similarities and
differences between great apes' and humans' willingness to
exchange food is important for our models regarding the
origins of uniquely human forms of cooperation. Here, we
demonstrate in-kind food exchanges in experimental settings
with great apes for the first time. The initial sample
consisted of 13 chimpanzees and 5 bonobos in the control
phases, and the test phases included 10 chimpanzees and 2
bonobos, compared with a sample of 48 human children aged 4
years. First, we replicated prior findings showing no
spontaneous food exchanges in great apes. Second, we
discovered that when apes believe that conspecifics have
'intentionally' transferred food to them, positive
reciprocal food exchanges (food-for-food) are not only
possible but reach the same levels as in young children
(approx. 75-80%). Third, we found that great apes engage in
negative reciprocal food exchanges (no-food for no-food) but
to a lower extent than children. This provides evidence for
reciprocal food exchange in great apes in experimental
settings and suggests that while a potential mechanism of
<i>fostering</i> cooperation (via positive reciprocal
exchanges) may be shared across species, a stabilizing
mechanism (via negative reciprocity) is not.},
Doi = {10.1098/rspb.2022.2541},
Key = {fds370629}
}
@article{fds373982,
Author = {Wolf, W and Tomasello, M},
Title = {A Shared Intentionality Account of Uniquely Human Social
Bonding.},
Journal = {Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the
Association for Psychological Science},
Pages = {17456916231201795},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17456916231201795},
Abstract = {Many mechanisms of social bonding are common to all
primates, but humans seemingly have developed some that are
unique to the species. These involve various kinds of
interactive experiences-from taking a walk together to
having a conversation-whose common feature is the triadic
sharing of experience. Current theories of social bonding
have no explanation for why humans should have these unique
bonding mechanisms. Here we propose a shared intentionality
account of uniquely human social bonding. Humans evolved to
participate with others in unique forms of cooperative and
communicative activities that both depend on and create
shared experience. Sharing experience in these activities
causes partners to feel closer because it allows them to
assess their partner's cooperative competence and motivation
toward them and because the shared representations created
during such interactions make subsequent cooperative
interactions easier and more effective.},
Doi = {10.1177/17456916231201795},
Key = {fds373982}
}
@article{fds370890,
Author = {Vasil, J and Moore, C and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Thought and language: association of groupmindedness with
young English-speaking children’s production of
pronouns},
Journal = {First Language},
Volume = {43},
Number = {5},
Pages = {516-538},
Year = {2023},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/01427237231169398},
Abstract = {Shared intentionality theory posits that at age 3, children
expand their conception of plural agency to include 3- or
more-person groups. We sought to determine whether this
conceptual shift is detectable in children’s pronoun use.
We report the results of a series of Bayesian hierarchical
generative models fitted to 479 English-speaking
children’s first-person plural, first-person singular,
second-person, third-person plural, and third-person
singular pronouns. As a proportion of pronouns, children
used more first-person plural pronouns, only, after 3;0
compared to before. Additionally, children used more 1pp.
pronouns when their mothers used more 1pp. pronouns. As a
proportion of total utterances, all pronoun classes were
used more often as children aged. These findings suggest
that a shift in children’s social conceptualizations at
age 3 is reflected in their use of 1pp. pronouns.},
Doi = {10.1177/01427237231169398},
Key = {fds370890}
}
@article{fds374236,
Author = {Tomasello, M},
Title = {Differences in the Social Motivations and Emotions of Humans
and Other Great Apes.},
Journal = {Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.)},
Volume = {34},
Number = {4},
Pages = {588-604},
Year = {2023},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-023-09464-0},
Abstract = {Humans share with other mammals and primates many social
motivations and emotions, but they are also much more
cooperative than even their closest primate relatives. Here
I review recent comparative experiments and analyses that
illustrate humans' species-typical social motivations and
emotions for cooperation in comparison with those of other
great apes. These may be classified most generally as (i)
'you > me' (e.g., prosocial sympathy, informative and
pedagogical motives in communication); (ii) 'you = me'
(e.g., feelings of mutual respect, fairness, resentment);
(iii) 'we > me' (e.g., feelings of obligation and guilt);
and (iv) 'WE (in the group) > me' (e.g., in-group
loyalty and conformity to norms, shame, and many in-group
biases). The existence of these species-typical and
species-universal motivations and emotions provides
compelling evidence for the importance of cooperative
activities in the human species.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12110-023-09464-0},
Key = {fds374236}
}
@article{fds374400,
Author = {Vasil, J and Price, D and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Thought and language: Effects of group-mindedness on young
children's interpretation of exclusive we.},
Journal = {Child development},
Year = {2023},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.14049},
Abstract = {The current study investigated whether age-related changes
in the conceptualization of social groups influences
interpretation of the pronoun we. Sixty-four 2- and
4-year-olds (N = 29 female, 50 White-identifying) viewed
scenarios in which it was ambiguous how many puppets
performed an activity together. When asked who performed the
activity, a speaker puppet responded, "We did!" In one
condition, the speaker was near one and distant from another
puppet, implying a dyadic interpretation of we. In another
condition, the speaker was distant from both, thus pulling
for a group interpretation. In the former condition, 2- and
4-year-olds favored the dyadic interpretation. In the latter
condition, only 4-year-olds favored the group
interpretation. Age-related conceptual development "expands"
the set of conceivable plural person referents.},
Doi = {10.1111/cdev.14049},
Key = {fds374400}
}
@article{fds374171,
Author = {Katz, T and Kushnir, T and Tomasello, M},
Title = {Children are eager to take credit for prosocial acts, and
cost affects this tendency.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {237},
Pages = {105764},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
Abstract = {We report two experiments on children's tendency to enhance
their reputations through communicative acts. In the
experiments, 4-year-olds (N = 120) had the opportunity to
inform a social partner that they had helped him in his
absence. In a first experiment, we pitted a prosocial act
("Let's help clean up for Doggie!") against an instrumental
act ("Let's move these out of our way"). Children in the
prosocial condition were quicker to inform their partner of
the act and more likely to protest when another individual
was given credit for it. In a second experiment, we
replicated the prosocial condition but with a new
manipulation: high-cost versus low-cost helping. We
manipulated both the language surrounding cost (i.e., "This
will be pretty tough to clean up" vs. "It will be really
easy to clean this up") and how difficult the task itself
was. As predicted, children in the high-cost condition were
quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely
to take back credit for it. These results suggest that even
4-year-old children make active attempts to elicit positive
reputational judgments for their prosocial acts, with cost
as a moderating factor.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105764},
Key = {fds374171}
}
@article{fds374401,
Author = {Winter Née Grocke and P and Tomasello, M},
Title = {From what I want to do to what we decided to do:
5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, honor their agreements
with peers.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental child psychology},
Volume = {239},
Pages = {105811},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105811},
Abstract = {Sometimes we have a personal preference but we agree with
others to follow a different course of action. In this
study, 3- and 5-year-old children (N = 160) expressed a
preference for playing a game one way and were then
confronted with peers who expressed a different preference.
The experimenter then either got the participants to agree
with the peers explicitly or just shrugged her shoulders and
moved on. The children were then left alone to play the game
unobserved. Only the older children stuck to their agreement
to play the game as the peers wished. These results suggest
that by 5 years of age children's sense of commitment to
agreements is strong enough to override their personal
preferences.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jecp.2023.105811},
Key = {fds374401}
}
%% Wong, David B.
@book{fds371902,
Author = {Wong, D},
Title = {Metaphors and Analogies in Classical Chinese Thought: The
Governance of the Individual, the State, and
Society},
Publisher = {Research Center for Chinese Subjectivity in Taiwan and
Chengchi University Press,},
Editor = {Marchal, K and Wang, H},
Year = {2023},
Abstract = {Chinese edition of a series of five lectures delivered at
the National Chengchi University},
Key = {fds371902}
}
@article{fds371903,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Mind (Heart-Mind) in Chinese Philosophy},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {The Metaphysics Research Lab},
Editor = {Zalta, EN and Nodelman, U},
Year = {2023},
Abstract = {The role of the concept of mind (heart-mind) in classical
Chinese philosophy},
Key = {fds371903}
}
@article{fds373974,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {RESPONSIBILITY IN CONFUCIAN THOUGHT},
Pages = {125-136},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781032252391},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003282242-15},
Abstract = {This chapter will use responsibility as a “bridge”
concept between the Confucian and Western moral and
political traditions. A key feature of the concept lies in
its root meaning “to respond.” Confucian thought focuses
on how the responder is entrusted and relied upon to
respond, to answer to, the needs and to the vulnerability of
the one to whom response is due. Confucian thought focuses
on how to cultivate the qualities enabling such
responsiveness. Another overlapping meaning of
responsibility with Chinese concepts is that of “being
held to answer for what one has done or is required to
do.” One might be faulted or blamed, or credited and
praised, for responding appropriately or not to the needs
and vulnerabilities of others. An important strand of
Confucian thought distributes responsibility in the sense of
“being held to answer for” not only to the direct agent
of the act in question but to others who have the most
control over the conditions that shape the choices of the
direct agent. Finally, another strand of Confucian thought
implies that responsibility can outrun whatever is under the
individual’s control.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781003282242-15},
Key = {fds373974}
}
@article{fds370613,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Feeling, Reflection, and Reasoning in the
Mencius},
Volume = {18},
Pages = {517-538},
Booktitle = {Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_26},
Abstract = {One of the most intriguing features of the Mencius lies in
its claims about the path to goodness: they are eloquently
defended but also articulated in ambiguous ways. It is clear
that a major role for feeling or emotion is envisaged, but
is the relevant sort of feeling to be contrasted with
reflection and reasoning? Or are these things intertwined
and implicated in one another? I support the second answer
and disagree both with those who take as primary the role of
a kind of feeling that is largely untouched by reflection
and reasoning and with those on the other extreme who hold
that reasoning has an independent and in some ways a primary
role in realizing goodness. Though my position has in broad
outlines remained constant, it has evolved over time in
important specifics. I will set out what I am thinking
now.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_26},
Key = {fds370613}
}
@book{fds371901,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Moral Relativism and Pluralism},
Pages = {143 pages},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781009044301},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781009043496},
Abstract = {<jats:p>The argument for metaethical relativism, the view
that there is no single true or most justified morality, is
that it is part of the best explanation of the most
difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view
features a comparison between traditions that highly value
relationship and community and traditions that highly value
personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held
that moralities are best understood as emerging from human
culture in response to the need to promote and regulate
interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational
coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the
conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and
most justified moralities that accomplish these functions.
The normative implications of this form of metaethical
relativism are explored, with specific focus on female
genital cutting and abortion.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/9781009043496},
Key = {fds371901}
}
@article{fds371900,
Author = {Wong, DB},
Title = {Feeling, Reflection, and Reasoning in the
Mencius},
Booktitle = {Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Editor = {Yang, X and Chong, K-C},
Year = {2023},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9783031276200},
Abstract = {This book is about the philosophical, historical, and
interpretative aspects of Mencius.},
Key = {fds371900}
}