Economics - Fuqua : Publications since January 2024

%% Coleman, Wilbur J.   
@article{fds379329,
   Author = {Coleman, WJ},
   Title = {Corruption and supply-side economics},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control},
   Volume = {168},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104942},
   Abstract = {This paper develops a model of the effects of tax rates
             chosen optimally to promote growth and public welfare in the
             face of corruption. For a given level of corruption, public
             spending can promote growth but high tax rates in pursuit of
             various social goals have potentially significant
             supply-side economics effects that reduce income.
             Governments faced with rampant corruption optimally choose
             low tax rates, thus associating poor countries with low tax
             rates, and confounding the observed relation between tax
             rates and income. The model is estimated using cross-country
             data on income, tax rates, and corruption and is shown to
             match key features of the data. The chief contribution of
             this paper is to stress the importance of jointly
             considering the effects of corruption and taxation in
             documenting evidence in support of supply-side
             economics.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104942},
   Key = {fds379329}
}


%% Marx, Leslie M.   
@article{fds376300,
   Author = {Iossa, E and Loertscher, S and Marx, LM and Rey, P},
   Title = {Coordination in the Fight against Collusion},
   Journal = {American Economic Journal Microeconomics},
   Volume = {16},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {224-261},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220194},
   Abstract = {While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and
             thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that
             conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to
             deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of
             deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a
             procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to
             accommodate rather than deter collusion among their
             suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a
             centralized procurement authority, may optimally deter
             collusion when multiple independent buyers would not,
             consistent with the view that “large” buyers are less
             susceptible to collusion.},
   Doi = {10.1257/mic.20220194},
   Key = {fds376300}
}


%% McAdams, David   
@book{fds383467,
   Author = {Dixit, AK and Skeath, S and McAdams, D},
   Title = {Games of Strategy},
   Year = {2025},
   Month = {June},
   ISBN = {9781324087137},
   Abstract = {Invites all students to understand game theory},
   Key = {fds383467}
}

@article{fds383584,
   Author = {Fawole, A and Boyer, B and Shahid, M and Bharali, I and McAdams, D and Yamey, G},
   Title = {What are the key features of an equitable global vaccine
             strategy for the next pandemic? A qualitative study of
             pandemic control experts.},
   Journal = {Vaccine},
   Volume = {61},
   Pages = {127377},
   Year = {2025},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2025.127377},
   Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>The COVID-19 pandemic exposed significant
             weaknesses in global health multilateralism, particularly in
             its failure to achieve fair and equitable global
             distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. Soon after vaccines were
             available, huge inequities in vaccination rates between
             populations in the global north and the global south became
             apparent. This study explores why multilateralism fell so
             short during the pandemic and identifies the steps that must
             be taken now to ensure global vaccine equity in the next
             pandemic.<h4>Methods</h4>We conducted in-depth interviews
             with 20 expert key informants (KIs) worldwide from May 2023
             to January 2024, comprising 16 individual interviews and two
             group interviews (each group interview had two KIs). The
             experts included representatives of academia, multilateral
             health and development agencies, civil society
             organizations, non-governmental organizations, think tanks,
             and the pharmaceutical industry. We used a qualitative study
             design to explore the perspectives, experiences, and
             insights of global health experts. We used purposive
             sampling to select participants based on their experience
             and knowledge of pandemic vaccines and pandemic
             preparedness. We continued conducting interviews until we
             had reached theoretical saturation.<h4>Findings</h4>Five key
             themes emerged on why multilateralism fell short when it
             came to global COVID-19 vaccine distribution. Prioritization
             of national interests-so-called "vaccine nationalism"-was a
             barrier to sharing doses. COVAX, the global vaccine sharing
             mechanism, lacked incentives for high-income and
             upper-middle-income nations to participate or compulsory
             mechanisms to make them do so, undercutting its ability to
             serve as an equitable distribution platform. COVAX also left
             out important constituents from the decision-making process.
             Rich countries benefitted from having stronger market power
             in the global economy due to their established, long-term
             relationships with the pharmaceutical companies. Inadequate
             vaccine supply fed into inequitable distribution. Five key
             themes emerged on ways to avert global vaccine inequity in
             the next pandemic. Promoting regional self-sufficiency in
             research and development and vaccine manufacturing is
             crucial. Building manufacturing capacity cannot be deferred
             until the next pandemic-it must begin now. International
             collective action will still be important, especially
             technology transfer agreements between large companies in
             the global north and partners in the global south as well as
             south-south partnerships. Public funding for pandemic
             vaccine development should include conditionalities that
             support global access. Finally, new kinds of intellectual
             property agreements are essential in preparing for the next
             pandemic.<h4>Interpretation</h4>Vaccine nationalism-combined
             with vaccine supply constraints, the dominance of
             manufacturing by countries in the global north, and the
             greater purchasing power of wealthy nations-created a
             "perfect storm" for rich nations to buy up the supply and to
             leave COVAX and many low- and middle-income countries at the
             back of the queue. To prevent such inequity in the next
             pandemic, regions should build capacity not just in
             manufacturing vaccines but also in regulatory approval and
             the financing and procurement of vaccines at scale. Such
             capacity needs to be built now-it cannot be deferred until
             the next crisis.<h4>Funding</h4>This study was funded by a
             research grant to Duke University from the Carnegie
             Corporation of New York (https://www.carnegie.org/grants/grants-database/?q=duke&per_page=25#!/grants/grants-database/grant/937399121.0/).},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.vaccine.2025.127377},
   Key = {fds383584}
}

@article{fds383469,
   Author = {McAdams, D and Song, Y},
   Title = {Adoption epidemics and viral marketing},
   Journal = {Theoretical Economics},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {453-480},
   Publisher = {The Econometric Society},
   Year = {2025},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE5886},
   Abstract = {An innovation (e.g., new product or idea) spreads like a
             virus, transmitted by those who have previously adopted it.
             Agents update their beliefs about innovation quality based
             on private signals and when they hear about the innovation.
             We characterize equilibrium adoption dynamics and the
             resulting lifecycle of virally-spread innovations. Herding
             on adoption can occur but only early in the innovation
             lifecycle, and adoption eventually ceases for all
             virally-spread innovations. A producer capable of
             advertising directly to consumers finds it optimal to wait
             and allow awareness to grow virally initially after
             launch.},
   Doi = {10.3982/TE5886},
   Key = {fds383469}
}

@article{fds379307,
   Author = {McAdams, D and Day, T},
   Title = {The political economy of epidemic management},
   Journal = {Review of Economic Design},
   Volume = {29},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {115-148},
   Year = {2025},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00357-x},
   Abstract = {During an infectious-disease epidemic, a political leader
             imposes “stay-at-home orders” (limiting activity) or
             “go-out orders” (mandating activity) whenever preferred
             by the majority of the citizenry over the no-intervention
             status quo. We characterize the resulting equilibrium
             epidemic trajectory in an economic-epidemiological model
             that allows for asymptomatic infection and social-economic
             complementarities of activity, assuming that citizens are
             myopic optimizers. We find that the qualitative features of
             equilibrium policy dynamics hinge critically on whether the
             pathogen is transmitted before or after infected people have
             developed symptoms. If transmission only occurs
             symptomatically, then the leader never imposes stay-at-home
             orders on the healthy but may impose go-out orders during
             some phases of the epidemic. However, if transmission occurs
             asymptomatically, the leader never imposes go-out orders on
             the healthy.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10058-024-00357-x},
   Key = {fds379307}
}

@article{fds383010,
   Author = {Avery, CN and McAdams, D},
   Title = {The economics of epidemics: introduction to the special
             issue, part two},
   Journal = {Review of Economic Design},
   Volume = {29},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-7},
   Year = {2025},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-025-00378-0},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10058-025-00378-0},
   Key = {fds383010}
}

@article{fds381075,
   Author = {Avery, CN and McAdams, D},
   Title = {The economics of epidemics: introduction to the special
             issue: The economics of epidemics: introduction to the
             special issue: C. N. Avery, D. Mcadams},
   Journal = {Review of Economic Design},
   Volume = {28},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {631-637},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00370-0},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10058-024-00370-0},
   Key = {fds381075}
}

@article{fds383468,
   Author = {Avery, C and Chen, F and McAdams, D},
   Title = {Steady-State Social Distancing and Vaccination},
   Journal = {American Economic Review: Insights},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-19},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220699},
   Abstract = {<jats:p> This paper analyzes an economic-epidemiological
             model of infectious disease where it is possible to become
             infected more than once and individual agents make
             endogenous choices of social distancing and vaccine
             adoption. Protective actions adopted by any one person
             reduce future risks to other people. The positive
             externalities associated with these behaviors provide
             motivation for vaccine and social-distancing subsidies, but
             subsidizing one protective action reduces incentives for
             other protective actions. A vaccine subsidy increases
             vaccine adoption and reduces steady-state infection
             prevalence; a social distancing subsidy can either increase
             or reduce steady-state infection prevalence. (JEL D62, D91,
             I12, I18) </jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1257/aeri.20220699},
   Key = {fds383468}
}