Economics - Fuqua : Publications since January 2023

%% Lopomo, Giuseppe   
@article{fds371719,
   Author = {Lopomo, G and Persico, N and Villa, AT},
   Title = {Optimal Procurement with Quality Concerns},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {113},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {1505-1529},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211437},
   Abstract = {Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost
             bidders are also low-quality suppliers. We propose a
             mechanism called LoLA (lowball lottery auction) which, under
             some conditions, maximizes any combination of buyer’s and
             social surplus, subject to incentive compatibility, in the
             presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor
             price, and a reserve price. The LoLA has a dominant strategy
             equilibrium that, under mild conditions, is unique. In a
             counterfactual analysis of Italian government auctions, we
             compute the gain that the government could have made, had it
             used the optimal procurement mechanism (a LoLA), relative to
             a first-price auction (the adopted format).},
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.20211437},
   Key = {fds371719}
}


%% Marx, Leslie M.   
@article{fds376300,
   Author = {Iossa, E and Loertscher, S and Marx, LM and Rey, P},
   Title = {Coordination in the Fight against Collusion},
   Journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
   Volume = {16},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {224-261},
   Year = {2024},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220194},
   Abstract = {While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and
             thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that
             conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to
             deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of
             deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a
             procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to
             accommodate rather than deter collusion among their
             suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a
             centralized procurement authority, may optimally deter
             collusion when multiple independent buyers would not,
             consistent with the view that “large” buyers are less
             susceptible to collusion.},
   Doi = {10.1257/mic.20220194},
   Key = {fds376300}
}

@article{fds369878,
   Author = {Loertscher, S and Marx, LM},
   Title = {Bilateral Trade with Multiunit Demand and
             Supply},
   Journal = {Management Science},
   Volume = {69},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {1146-1165},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4399},
   Abstract = {We study a bilateral trade problem with multiunit demand and
             supply and one-dimensional private information. Each agent
             geometrically discounts additional units by a constant
             factor. We show that when goods are complements, the
             incentive problem-measured as the ratio of second-best to
             first-best social surplus-becomes less severe as the degree
             of complementarity increases. In contrast, if goods are
             substitutes and each agent's distribution exhibits linear
             virtual types, then this ratio is a constant. If the
             bilateral trade setup arises from prior vertical integration
             between a buyer and a supplier, with the vertically
             integrated firm being a buyer facing an independent
             supplier, then the ratio of second-best to first-best social
             surplus is, in general, not monotone in the degree of
             complementarity when products are substitutes and is
             increasing when products are complements. Extensions to
             profit maximization by a market maker and a discrete public
             good problem show that the broad insight that
             complementarity of goods mitigates the incentive problem
             generalizes to these settings.},
   Doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2022.4399},
   Key = {fds369878}
}

@article{fds367903,
   Author = {Loertscher, S and Marx, LM},
   Title = {Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market
             mechanisms},
   Journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
   Volume = {137},
   Pages = {68-90},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.013},
   Abstract = {We develop a prior-free mechanism for an asset market that
             is dominant-strategy incentive compatible, ex post
             individually rational, constrained efficient, and
             asymptotically optimal—as the number of agents grows
             large, the designer's profit from using this mechanism
             approaches the profit it would optimally make if it knew the
             agents' type distribution at the outset. The direct
             implementation first identifies the agent whose value equals
             the Walrasian price. The second step can be described
             algorithmically as consisting of ascending and descending
             clock auctions that start from the Walrasian price, estimate
             virtual types, and stop eliminating trades when the
             estimated virtual value exceeds the estimated virtual cost.
             The mechanism permits partial clock auction implementation.
             Our approach accommodates heterogeneity among groups of
             traders and discrimination among these, provided
             heterogeneity is not too accentuated.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.013},
   Key = {fds367903}
}


%% McAdams, David   
@article{fds368570,
   Author = {McAdams, D and Song, Y and Zou, D},
   Title = {Equilibrium social activity during an epidemic},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
   Volume = {207},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105591},
   Abstract = {During an infectious-disease epidemic, people make choices
             that impact transmission, trading off the risk of infection
             with the social-economic benefits of activity. We
             investigate how the qualitative features of an epidemic's
             Nash-equilibrium trajectory depend on the nature of the
             economic benefits that people get from activity. If economic
             benefits do not depend on how many others are active, as
             usually modeled, then there is a unique equilibrium
             trajectory, the epidemic eventually reaches a steady state,
             and agents born into the steady state have zero expected
             lifetime welfare. On the other hand, if the benefit of
             activity increases as others are more active (“social
             benefits”) and the disease is sufficiently severe, then
             there are always multiple equilibrium trajectories,
             including some that never settle into a steady state and
             that welfare dominate any given steady-state equilibrium.
             Within this framework, we analyze the equilibrium impact of
             a policy that modestly reduces the transmission rate. Such a
             policy has no long-run effect on society-wide welfare absent
             social benefits, but can raise long-run welfare if there are
             social benefits and the epidemic never settles into a steady
             state.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2022.105591},
   Key = {fds368570}
}