Publications of Robert N Brandon    :chronological  combined listing:

%% Books   
@book{fds52700,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and Roger Samson},
   Title = {Integrating Development and Evolution},
   Publisher = {The MIT Press},
   Editor = {Roger Samson and Robert Brandon},
   Year = {2007},
   Key = {fds52700}
}


%% Papers Published   
@article{fds213626,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and D. McShea},
   Title = {Four Solutions for Four Puzzles},
   Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
   Volume = {2012},
   Number = {27},
   Pages = {737-744},
   Publisher = {Springer},
   Editor = {K. Sterelny},
   Year = {2012},
   Keywords = {Zero-force law },
   Abstract = {Barrett et al. (Biol Philos, 2012) present four puzzles for
             the ZFEL-view of evolution that we present in our 2010 book,
             Biology’s First Law: The Tendency for Diversity and
             Complexity to Increase in Evolutionary Systems. Our intent
             in writing this book was to present a radically different
             way to think about evolution. To the extent that it really
             is radical, it will be easy to misunderstand. We think
             Barrett et al. have misunderstood several crucial points and
             so we welcome the opportunity to clarify.},
   Key = {fds213626}
}

@article{fds201669,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon},
   Title = {“Why Reciprocal Altruism is Not a Kind of Group
             Selection” (with Grant Ramsey) in Biology and Philosophy,
             (2011) Vol. 26, 3: 385-400.},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds201669}
}

@article{fds201670,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon},
   Title = {“The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary Theory,”
             in The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol.
             9 (ed. By M. O’Rouke and M. Slater)},
   Publisher = {MIT Press},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds201670}
}

@article{fds201671,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon},
   Title = {“A General Case for Functional Pluralism,” in Function:
             Selection and Mechanisms (ed. by P. Huneman)},
   Publisher = {Springer},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds201671}
}

@article{fds52681,
   Title = {The Principle of Drift: Biology's First Law},
   Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {CII},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {319-335},
   Publisher = {The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds52681}
}


%% Papers Accepted   
@article{fds52682,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and H. Frederick Nijhout},
   Title = {The Empirical Non-equivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models
             of Selection: a (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism
             and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Publisher = {Philosophy of Science Association},
   Year = {2006},
   Abstract = {Abstract. Genic selectionists (Williams 1966 and Dawkins
             1976) defend the view that genes are the (unique) units of
             selection and that all evolutionary events can be adequately
             represented at the genic level. Pluralistic genic
             selectionists (Sterelny and Kitcher 1988, Waters 1991,
             Dawkins 1982) defend the weaker view that in many cases
             there are multiple equally adequate accounts of evolutionary
             events, but that always among the set of equally adequate
             representations will be one at the genic level. We describe
             a range of cases all involving stable equilibria actively
             maintained by selection. In these cases genotypic models
             correctly show that selection is active at the equilibrium
             point. In contrast the genic models have selection
             disappearing at equilibrium. For deterministic models this
             difference makes no difference. However, once drift is added
             in, the two sets of models diverge in their predicted
             evolutionary trajectories. Thus, contrary to received wisdom
             on this matter, the two sets of models are not empirically
             equivalent. Moreover, the genic models get the facts
             wrong.},
   Key = {fds52682}
}

@article{fds52683,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and Grant Ramsey},
   Title = {What's Wrong with the Emergentist Statistical Interpretation
             of Natural Selection and Random Drift},
   Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy of
             Biology},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Michael Ruse and David Hull},
   Year = {2006},
   Abstract = {Population-level theories of evolution—the stock and trade
             of population genetics—are statistical theories par
             excellence. But what accounts for the statistical character
             of population-level phenomena? One view is that the
             population-level statistics are a product of, are generated
             by, probabilities that attach to the individuals in the
             population. On this conception, population-level phenomena
             are explained by individual-level probabilities and their
             population-level combinations. Another view, which arguably
             goes back to Fisher (1930) but has been defended recently ,
             is that the population-level statistics are sui generis,
             that they somehow emerge from the underlying deterministic
             behavior of the individuals composing the population. Walsh
             et al. (2002) label this the statistical interpretation. We
             are not willing to give them that term, since everyone will
             admit that the population-level theories of evolution are
             statistical, so we will call this the emergentist
             statistical interpretation (ESI). Our goals are to show
             that: (1) This interpretation is based on gross factual
             errors concerning the practice of evolutionary biology,
             concerning both what is done and what can be done; (2) its
             adoption would entail giving up on most of the explanatory
             and predictive (i.e., scientific) projects of evolutionary
             biology; and finally (3) a rival interpretation, which we
             will label the propensity statistical interpretation (PSI)
             succeeds exactly where the emergentist interpretation
             fails.},
   Key = {fds52683}
}


%% Papers Submitted   
@article{fds52684,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and Grant Ramsey},
   Title = {Toward a Pluralistic Account of Altruism: Why Reciprical
             Alturism is Not a Kind of Group Selection},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Publisher = {Philosophy of Science Association},
   Year = {2006},
   Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was origianlly formulated in terms of
             individual selection and most theorists continue to view it
             in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal
             altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998).
             They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other
             forms of alturism) evolves by the process of group
             selection. their view is thus monistic--all alturism evolves
             via the sole mechanism of group selection. In this paper we
             defend the view that reciprocal altruism involves individual
             selection. By arguing that reciprocal altruism is
             individually advantageous, while maintaining that other
             forms of altruism evolve by group selection, we are arguing
             for a pluralistic account of alturism.},
   Key = {fds52684}
}