Publications of Robert N. Brandon    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
@book{fds244326,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Samson, R},
   Title = {Integrating Development and Evolution},
   Publisher = {The MIT Press},
   Editor = {Samson, R and Brandon, R},
   Year = {2007},
   Key = {fds244326}
}


%% Papers Published   
@article{fds320303,
   Author = {Fleming, L and Brandon, R},
   Title = {Why flying dogs are rare: A general theory of luck in
             evolutionary transitions.},
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies
             in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
             Sciences},
   Volume = {49},
   Pages = {24-31},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006},
   Abstract = {There is a worry that the 'major transitions in evolution'
             represent an arbitrary group of events. This worry is
             warranted, and we show why. We argue that the transition to
             a new level of hierarchy necessarily involves a
             nonselectionist chance process. Thus any unified theory of
             evolutionary transitions must be more like a general theory
             of fortuitous luck, rather than a rigid formulation of
             expected events. We provide a systematic account of
             evolutionary transitions based on a second-order regularity
             of chance events, as stipulated by the ZFEL (Zero Force
             Evolutionary Law). And in doing so, we make evolutionary
             transitions explainable and predictable, and so not entirely
             contingent after all.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006},
   Key = {fds320303}
}

@article{fds320304,
   Author = {Brandon, R and Fleming, L},
   Title = {Drift sometimes dominates selection, and vice versa: a reply
             to Clatterbuck, Sober and Lewontin},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {29},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {577-585},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z},
   Key = {fds320304}
}

@article{fds244327,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and McShea, DW},
   Title = {Four solutions for four puzzles},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {27},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {737-744},
   Publisher = {Springer},
   Editor = {K. Sterelny},
   Year = {2012},
   ISSN = {0169-3867},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6},
   Keywords = {Zero-force law },
   Abstract = {Barrett et al. (Biol Philos, 2012) present four puzzles for
             the ZFEL-view of evolution that we present in our 2010 book,
             Biology's First Law: The Tendency for Diversity and
             Complexity to Increase in Evolutionary Systems. Our intent
             in writing this book was to present a radically different
             way to think about evolution. To the extent that it really
             is radical, it will be easy to misunderstand. We think
             Barrett et al. have misunderstood several crucial points and
             so we welcome the opportunity to clarify. © 2012 Springer
             Science+Business Media B.V.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6},
   Key = {fds244327}
}

@article{fds244322,
   Author = {Ramsey, G and Brandon, R},
   Title = {Why reciprocal altruism is not a kind of group
             selection},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {26},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {385-400},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {May},
   ISSN = {0169-3867},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7},
   Key = {fds244322}
}

@article{fds201669,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon},
   Title = {“Why Reciprocal Altruism is Not a Kind of Group
             Selection” (with Grant Ramsey) in Biology and Philosophy,
             (2011) Vol. 26, 3: 385-400.},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds201669}
}

@article{fds201670,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon},
   Title = {“The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary Theory,”
             in The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol.
             9 (ed. By M. O’Rouke and M. Slater)},
   Publisher = {MIT Press},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds201670}
}

@article{fds201671,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon},
   Title = {“A General Case for Functional Pluralism,” in Function:
             Selection and Mechanisms (ed. by P. Huneman)},
   Publisher = {Springer},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds201671}
}

@article{fds320305,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {A Non-Newtonian Newtonian Model of Evolution: The ZFEL
             View},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {77},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {702-715},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/656901},
   Doi = {10.1086/656901},
   Key = {fds320305}
}

@article{fds244328,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {The Principle of Drift: Biology's First Law},
   Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {CII},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {319-335},
   Publisher = {The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds244328}
}

@article{fds320307,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {The difference between selection and drift: A reply to
             Millstein},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {153-170},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9},
   Key = {fds320307}
}

@article{fds320308,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {The units of selection revisited: The modules of
             selection},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {14},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {167-180},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006682200831},
   Doi = {10.1023/A:1006682200831},
   Key = {fds320308}
}

@article{fds320309,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Does biology have laws? The experimental
             evidence},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {4 SUPPL. 1},
   Year = {1997},
   Month = {December},
   Abstract = {In this paper I argue that we can best make sense of the
             practice of experimental evolutionary biology if we see it
             as investigating contingent, rather than lawlike,
             regularities. This understanding is contrasted with the
             experimental practice of certain areas of physics. However,
             this presents a problem for those who accept the Logical
             Positivist conception of law and its essential role in
             scientific explanation. I address this problem by arguing
             that the contingent regularities of evolutionary biology
             have a limited range of nomic necessity and a limited range
             of explanatory power even though they lack the unlimited
             projectibility that has been seen by some as a hallmark of
             scientific laws. Copyright 1997 by the Philosophy of Science
             Association. All rigts reserved.},
   Key = {fds320309}
}

@article{fds320310,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Discussion: Reply to Hitchcock},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {531-538},
   Year = {1997},
   Month = {December},
   Abstract = {Christopher Hitchcock's discussion of my use of
             screening-off in analyzing the causal process of natural
             selection raises some interesting issues to which I am
             pleased to reply. The bulk of his article is devoted to some
             fairly general points in the theory of explanation. In
             particular, he questions whether or not my point that
             phenotype screens off genotype from reproductive success (in
             cases of organismic selection) supports my claim that the
             explanation of differential reproductive success should be
             in terms of phenotypic differences, not genotypic
             differences. I will respond to this and show why the two
             supposed counter-examples to my position
             fail.},
   Key = {fds320310}
}

@article{fds320311,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and Carson, S},
   Title = {The indeterministic character of evolutionary theory: No
             ''no hidden variables proof'' but no room for determinism
             either},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {63},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {315-337},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289915},
   Doi = {10.1086/289915},
   Key = {fds320311}
}

@article{fds318355,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and Rausher, MD},
   Title = {Testing adaptationism: A comment on Orzack and
             Sober},
   Journal = {American Naturalist},
   Volume = {148},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {189-201},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds318355}
}

@article{fds320312,
   Author = {BRANDON, RN},
   Title = {THEORY AND EXPERIMENT IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Volume = {99},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {59-73},
   Year = {1994},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01064530},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF01064530},
   Key = {fds320312}
}

@article{fds320313,
   Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Sex and the individuality of species: A response to
             Ghiselin},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {4},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {77-79},
   Year = {1989},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00144042},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00144042},
   Key = {fds320313}
}

@article{fds320314,
   Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Individuality, pluralism, and the phylogenetic species
             concept},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {397-414},
   Year = {1987},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00127698},
   Abstract = {The concept of individuality as applied to species, an
             important advance in the philosophy of evolutionary biology,
             is nevertheless in need of refinement. Four important
             subparts of this concept must be recognized: spatial
             boundaries, temporal boundaries, integration, and cohesion.
             Not all species necessarily meet all of these. Two very
             different types of "pluralism" have been advocated with
             respect to species, only one of which is satisfactory. An
             often unrecognized distinction between "grouping" and
             "ranking" components of any species concept is necessary. A
             phylogenetic species concept is advocated that uses a
             (monistic) grouping criterion of monophyly in a cladistic
             sense, and a (pluralistic) ranking criterion based on those
             causal processes that are most important in producing and
             maintaining lineages in a particular case. Such causal
             processes can include actual interbreeding, selective
             constraints, and developmental canalization. The widespread
             use of the "biological species concept" is flawed for two
             reasons: because of a failure to distinguish grouping from
             ranking criteria and because of an unwarranted emphasis on
             the importance of interbreeding as a universal causal factor
             controlling evolutionary diversification. The potential to
             interbreed is not in itself a process; it is instead a
             result of a diversity of processes which result in shared
             selective environments and common developmental programs.
             These types of processes act in both sexual and asexual
             organisms, thus the phylogenetic species concept can reflect
             an underlying unity that the biological species concept can
             not. © 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company.},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00127698},
   Key = {fds320314}
}

@article{fds320315,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and Hornstein, N},
   Title = {From icons to symbols: Some speculations on the origins of
             language},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {1},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {169-189},
   Year = {1986},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00142900},
   Abstract = {This paper is divided into three sections. In the first
             section we offer a retooling of some traditional concepts,
             namely icons and symbols, which allows us to describe an
             evolutionary continuum of communication systems. The second
             section consists of an argument from theoretical biology. In
             it we explore the advantages and disadvantages of phenotypic
             plasticity. We argue that a range of the conditions that
             selectively favor phenotypic plasticity also favor a
             nongenetic transmission system that would allow for the
             inheritance of acquired characters. The first two sections
             are independent, the third depends on both of them. In it we
             offer an argument that human natural languages have just the
             features required of an ideal transmission mechanism under
             the conditions described in section 2. © 1986 D. Reidel
             Publishing Company.},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00142900},
   Key = {fds320315}
}

@article{fds320316,
   Author = {BRANDON, RN},
   Title = {BIOLOGICAL TELEOLOGY - QUESTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS},
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
             A},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {91-105},
   Year = {1981},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7},
   Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7},
   Key = {fds320316}
}

@article{fds320317,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Adaptation and evolutionary theory},
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
             A},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {181-206},
   Year = {1978},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5},
   Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5},
   Key = {fds320317}
}


%% Papers Accepted   
@article{fds244324,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {A general case for functional pluralism},
   Pages = {97-104},
   Booktitle = {Functions: Selection and Mechanisms},
   Publisher = {Springer},
   Editor = {Huneman, P},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9789400753044},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
   Abstract = {© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013. Using
             examples from functional morphology and evolution, Amundson
             and Lauder (Biol Philos 9: 443-469, 1994) argued for
             functional pluralism in biology. More specifically, they
             argued that both causal role (CR) analyses of function and
             selected effects (SE) analyses played necessary parts in
             evolutionary biology, broadly construed, and that neither
             sort of analysis was reducible to the other. Rather than
             thinking of these two accounts of function as rivals, they
             argued that they were instead complimentary. Frdaric
             Bouchard (Chap. 5, this volume) attempts to make that case
             stronger using an interesting example-the evolution of
             ecosystems. This case is interesting in that it involves the
             sudden appearance of things with functions, which also
             evolve, but which do not, at least initially, have a
             selected effect etiology. I am in complete agreement with
             the above-mentioned positions. Here, I take a different tack
             in arguing for functional pluralism. I abstract away not
             only from the details of biological practice but even from
             the details of the CR and SE accounts to argue for a more
             general pluralism of historical and ahistorical
             concepts.},
   Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
   Key = {fds244324}
}

@article{fds244325,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary
             Theory},
   Volume = {9},
   Pages = {19-35},
   Booktitle = {The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy},
   Publisher = {MIT Press},
   Editor = {O'rourke, M and Slater, M},
   Year = {2011},
   ISBN = {9780262017404},
   Key = {fds244325}
}

@article{fds320306,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Teleology in self-organizing systems},
   Pages = {267-281},
   Booktitle = {Self-Organization and Emergence in Life Sciences},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {December},
   ISBN = {1402039166},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16},
   Abstract = {Teleological language, talk of function and purpose, has
             long been associated with the appearance of order in the
             biological world. Indeed, the pre-Darwinian tradition of
             natural theology (e.g., Paley 1836) gave a clear
             underpinning for such teleology. The order of nature was a
             product of Gods design and reflected his purposes. In this
             post-Darwinian era neural selection has taken the place of
             Gods purposes in supporting teleological ascriptions -the
             ultimate purpose or function of some biological trait, say a
             wing, is just that effect acted on by natural selection to
             produce, by evolution, the order of the trait in question.
             But the recent recognition that order can emerge just from
             the dynamics of complex systems -no natural selection is
             needed -leads us to the question of this paper; namely, in
             what ways, and to what extent, does teleological language
             properly apply to the selfgenerated order of complex
             dynamical systems in biology?© 2006 Springer. Printed in
             the Netherlands.},
   Doi = {10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16},
   Key = {fds320306}
}

@article{fds244323,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Ramsey, G},
   Title = {What’s Wrong with the Emergentist Statistical
             Interpretation of Natural Selection and Random
             Drift},
   Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy of
             Biology},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Ruse, M and Hull, D},
   Year = {2006},
   Abstract = {Population-level theories of evolution—the stock and trade
             of population genetics—are statistical theories par
             excellence. But what accounts for the statistical character
             of population-level phenomena? One view is that the
             population-level statistics are a product of, are generated
             by, probabilities that attach to the individuals in the
             population. On this conception, population-level phenomena
             are explained by individual-level probabilities and their
             population-level combinations. Another view, which arguably
             goes back to Fisher (1930) but has been defended recently ,
             is that the population-level statistics are sui generis,
             that they somehow emerge from the underlying deterministic
             behavior of the individuals composing the population. Walsh
             et al. (2002) label this the statistical interpretation. We
             are not willing to give them that term, since everyone will
             admit that the population-level theories of evolution are
             statistical, so we will call this the emergentist
             statistical interpretation (ESI). Our goals are to show
             that: (1) This interpretation is based on gross factual
             errors concerning the practice of evolutionary biology,
             concerning both what is done and what can be done; (2) its
             adoption would entail giving up on most of the explanatory
             and predictive (i.e., scientific) projects of evolutionary
             biology; and finally (3) a rival interpretation, which we
             will label the propensity statistical interpretation (PSI)
             succeeds exactly where the emergentist interpretation
             fails.},
   Key = {fds244323}
}


%% Papers Submitted   
@article{fds52684,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and Grant Ramsey},
   Title = {Toward a Pluralistic Account of Altruism: Why Reciprical
             Alturism is Not a Kind of Group Selection},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Publisher = {Philosophy of Science Association},
   Year = {2006},
   Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was origianlly formulated in terms of
             individual selection and most theorists continue to view it
             in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal
             altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998).
             They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other
             forms of alturism) evolves by the process of group
             selection. their view is thus monistic--all alturism evolves
             via the sole mechanism of group selection. In this paper we
             defend the view that reciprocal altruism involves individual
             selection. By arguing that reciprocal altruism is
             individually advantageous, while maintaining that other
             forms of altruism evolve by group selection, we are arguing
             for a pluralistic account of alturism.},
   Key = {fds52684}
}