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| Publications of Robert N. Brandon :chronological alphabetical combined listing:%% Books @book{fds244326, Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Samson, R}, Title = {Integrating Development and Evolution}, Publisher = {The MIT Press}, Editor = {Samson, R and Brandon, R}, Year = {2007}, Key = {fds244326} } %% Papers Published @article{fds343339, Author = {McShea, DW and Wang, SC and Brandon, RN}, Title = {A quantitative formulation of biology's first law.}, Journal = {Evolution; International Journal of Organic Evolution}, Volume = {73}, Number = {6}, Pages = {1101-1115}, Year = {2019}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/evo.13735}, Abstract = {The zero-force evolutionary law (ZFEL) states that in evolutionary systems, in the absence of forces or constraints, diversity and complexity tend to increase. The reason is that diversity and complexity are both variance measures, and variances tend to increase spontaneously as random events accumulate. Here, we use random-walk models to quantify the ZFEL expectation, producing equations that give the probabilities of diversity or complexity increasing as a function of time, and that give the expected magnitude of the increase. We produce two sets of equations, one for the case in which variation occurs in discrete steps, the other for the case in which variation is continuous. The equations provide a way to decompose actual trajectories of diversity or complexity into two components, the portion due to the ZFEL and a remainder due to selection and constraint. Application of the equations is demonstrated using real and hypothetical data.}, Doi = {10.1111/evo.13735}, Key = {fds343339} } @article{fds320303, Author = {Fleming, L and Brandon, R}, Title = {Why flying dogs are rare: A general theory of luck in evolutionary transitions.}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, Volume = {49}, Pages = {24-31}, Year = {2015}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006}, Abstract = {There is a worry that the 'major transitions in evolution' represent an arbitrary group of events. This worry is warranted, and we show why. We argue that the transition to a new level of hierarchy necessarily involves a nonselectionist chance process. Thus any unified theory of evolutionary transitions must be more like a general theory of fortuitous luck, rather than a rigid formulation of expected events. We provide a systematic account of evolutionary transitions based on a second-order regularity of chance events, as stipulated by the ZFEL (Zero Force Evolutionary Law). And in doing so, we make evolutionary transitions explainable and predictable, and so not entirely contingent after all.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006}, Key = {fds320303} } @article{fds320304, Author = {Brandon, R and Fleming, L}, Title = {Drift sometimes dominates selection, and vice versa: A reply to Clatterbuck, Sober and Lewontin}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {29}, Number = {4}, Pages = {577-585}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z}, Abstract = {Clatterbuck et al. (Biol Philos 28: 577-592, 2013) argue that there is no fact of the matter whether selection dominates drift or vice versa in any particular case of evolution. Their reasons are not empirically based; rather, they are purely conceptual. We show that their conceptual presuppositions are unmotivated, unnecessary and overly complex. We also show that their conclusion runs contrary to current biological practice. The solution is to recognize that evolution involves a probabilistic sampling process, and that drift is a deviation from probabilistic expectation. We conclude that conceptually, there are no problems with distinguishing drift from selection, and empirically-as modern science illustrates-when drift does occur, there is a quantifiable fact of the matter to be discovered. © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z}, Key = {fds320304} } @article{fds244327, Author = {Brandon, RN and McShea, DW}, Title = {Four solutions for four puzzles}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {27}, Number = {5}, Pages = {737-744}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Editor = {K. Sterelny}, Year = {2012}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0169-3867}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6}, Keywords = {Zero-force law }, Abstract = {Barrett et al. (Biol Philos, 2012) present four puzzles for the ZFEL-view of evolution that we present in our 2010 book, Biology's First Law: The Tendency for Diversity and Complexity to Increase in Evolutionary Systems. Our intent in writing this book was to present a radically different way to think about evolution. To the extent that it really is radical, it will be easy to misunderstand. We think Barrett et al. have misunderstood several crucial points and so we welcome the opportunity to clarify. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6}, Key = {fds244327} } @article{fds244322, Author = {Ramsey, G and Brandon, R}, Title = {Why reciprocal altruism is not a kind of group selection}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {26}, Number = {3}, Pages = {385-400}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2011}, Month = {May}, ISSN = {0169-3867}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7}, Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was originally formulated in terms of individual selection and most theorists continue to view it in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998). They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other forms of altruism) evolves by the process of group selection. In this paper, we argue that the original interpretation of reciprocal altruism is the correct one. We accomplish this by arguing that if fitness attaches to (at minimum) entire life cycles, then the kind of fitness exchanges needed to form the group-level in such situations is not available. Reciprocal altruism is thus a result of individual selection and when it evolves, it does so because it is individually advantageous. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7}, Key = {fds244322} } @article{fds201669, Author = {R.N. Brandon}, Title = {“Why Reciprocal Altruism is Not a Kind of Group Selection” (with Grant Ramsey) in Biology and Philosophy, (2011) Vol. 26, 3: 385-400.}, Year = {2011}, Key = {fds201669} } @article{fds201670, Author = {R.N. Brandon}, Title = {“The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary Theory,” in The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 9 (ed. By M. O’Rouke and M. Slater)}, Publisher = {MIT Press}, Year = {2011}, Key = {fds201670} } @article{fds201671, Author = {R.N. Brandon}, Title = {“A General Case for Functional Pluralism,” in Function: Selection and Mechanisms (ed. by P. Huneman)}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2011}, Key = {fds201671} } @article{fds320305, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {A non-newtonian newtonian model of evolution: The ZFEL view}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Volume = {77}, Number = {5}, Pages = {702-715}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/656901}, Abstract = {Recently philosophers of biology have argued over whether or not Newtonian mechanics provides a useful analogy for thinking about evolutionary theory. For philosophers, the canonical presentation of this analogy is Sober's. Matthen and Ariew and Walsh, Lewins, and Ariew argue that this analogy is deeply wrong-headed. Here I argue that the analogy is indeed useful, however, not in the way it is usually interpreted. The Newtonian analogy depends on having the proper analogue of Newton's First Law. That analogue is what McShea and Brandon call the Zero Force Evolutionary Law (ZFEL). According to the ZFEL, change, not stasis, is the default state of evolutionary systems. Copyright 2010 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1086/656901}, Key = {fds320305} } @article{fds244328, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {The Principle of Drift: Biology's First Law}, Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, Volume = {CII}, Number = {7}, Pages = {319-335}, Publisher = {The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, Year = {2006}, Month = {July}, Key = {fds244328} } @article{fds320307, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {The difference between selection and drift: A reply to Millstein}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {20}, Number = {1}, Pages = {153-170}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2005}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9}, Abstract = {Millstein [Bio. Philos. 17 (2002) 33] correctly identies a serious problem with the view that natural selection and random drift are not conceptually distinct. She offers a solution to this problem purely in terms of differences between the processes of selection and drift. I show that this solution does not work, that it leaves the vast majority of real biological cases uncategorized. However, I do think there is a solution to the problem she raises, and I offer it here. My solution depends on solving the biological analogue of the reference class problem in probability theory and on the reality of individual fitnesses. © Springer 2005.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9}, Key = {fds320307} } @article{fds320308, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {The Units of Selection Revisited: The Modules of Selection}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {14}, Number = {2}, Pages = {167-180}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {1999}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006682200831}, Abstract = {Richard Lewontin's (1970) early work on the "units" of selection initiated the conceptual and theoretical investigations that have led to the hierarchical perspective on selection that has reached near consensus status today. This paper explores other aspects of his work, work on what he termed "continuity" and "quasi-independence", that connect to contemporary explorations of modularity in development and evolution. I characterize such modules and argue that they are the true units of selection in that they are what evolution by natural selection individuates, selects among, and transforms.}, Doi = {10.1023/A:1006682200831}, Key = {fds320308} } @article{fds320309, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {Does biology have laws? The experimental evidence}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Volume = {64}, Number = {4 SUPPL. 1}, Year = {1997}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392621}, Abstract = {In this paper I argue that we can best make sense of the practice of experimental evolutionary biology if we see it as investigating contingent, rather than lawlike, regularities. This understanding is contrasted with the experimental practice of certain areas of physics. However, this presents a problem for those who accept the Logical Positivist conception of law and its essential role in scientific explanation. I address this problem by arguing that the contingent regularities of evolutionary biology have a limited range of nomic necessity and a limited range of explanatory power even though they lack the unlimited projectibility that has been seen by some as a hallmark of scientific laws. Copyright 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rigts reserved.}, Doi = {10.1086/392621}, Key = {fds320309} } @article{fds320310, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {Discussion: Reply to Hitchcock}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {12}, Number = {4}, Pages = {531-538}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {1997}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006576129655}, Abstract = {Christopher Hitchcock's discussion of my use of screening-off in analyzing the causal process of natural selection raises some interesting issues to which I am pleased to reply. The bulk of his article is devoted to some fairly general points in the theory of explanation. In particular, he questions whether or not my point that phenotype screens off genotype from reproductive success (in cases of organismic selection) supports my claim that the explanation of differential reproductive success should be in terms of phenotypic differences, not genotypic differences. I will respond to this and show why the two supposed counter-examples to my position fail.}, Doi = {10.1023/A:1006576129655}, Key = {fds320310} } @article{fds318355, Author = {Brandon, RN and Rausher, MD}, Title = {Testing adaptationism: A comment on Orzack and Sober}, Journal = {The American Naturalist}, Volume = {148}, Number = {1}, Pages = {189-201}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1996}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/285918}, Doi = {10.1086/285918}, Key = {fds318355} } @article{fds320311, Author = {Brandon, RN and Carson, S}, Title = {The indeterministic character of evolutionary theory: No "No hidden variables proof" but no room for determinism either}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Volume = {63}, Number = {3}, Pages = {315-337}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1996}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289915}, Abstract = {In this paper we first briefly review Bell's (1964, 1966) Theorem to see how it invalidates any deterministic "hidden variable" account of the apparent indeterminacy of quantum mechanics (QM). Then we show that quantum uncertainty, at the level of DNA mutations, can "percolate" up to have major populational effects. Interesting as this point may be it does not show any autonomous indeterminism of the evolutionary process. In the next two sections we investigate drift and natural selection as the locus of autonomous biological indeterminacy. Here we conclude that the population-level indeterminacy of natural selection and drift are ultimately based on the assumption of a fundamental indeterminacy at the level of the lives and deaths of individual organisms. The following section examines this assumption and defends it from the determinists' attack. Then we show that, even if one rejects the assumption, there is still an important reason why one might think evolutionary theory (ET) is autonomously indeterministic. In the concluding section we contrast the arguments we have mounted against a deterministic hidden variable account of ET with the proof of the impossibility of such an account of QM.}, Doi = {10.1086/289915}, Key = {fds320311} } @article{fds320312, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {Theory and experiment in evolutionary biology}, Journal = {Synthese}, Volume = {99}, Number = {1}, Pages = {59-73}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {1994}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01064530}, Doi = {10.1007/BF01064530}, Key = {fds320312} } @article{fds320313, Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN}, Title = {Sex and the individuality of species: A response to Ghiselin}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {4}, Number = {1}, Pages = {77-79}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {1989}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00144042}, Doi = {10.1007/BF00144042}, Key = {fds320313} } @article{fds320314, Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN}, Title = {Individuality, pluralism, and the phylogenetic species concept}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {2}, Number = {4}, Pages = {397-414}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {1987}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00127698}, Abstract = {The concept of individuality as applied to species, an important advance in the philosophy of evolutionary biology, is nevertheless in need of refinement. Four important subparts of this concept must be recognized: spatial boundaries, temporal boundaries, integration, and cohesion. Not all species necessarily meet all of these. Two very different types of "pluralism" have been advocated with respect to species, only one of which is satisfactory. An often unrecognized distinction between "grouping" and "ranking" components of any species concept is necessary. A phylogenetic species concept is advocated that uses a (monistic) grouping criterion of monophyly in a cladistic sense, and a (pluralistic) ranking criterion based on those causal processes that are most important in producing and maintaining lineages in a particular case. Such causal processes can include actual interbreeding, selective constraints, and developmental canalization. The widespread use of the "biological species concept" is flawed for two reasons: because of a failure to distinguish grouping from ranking criteria and because of an unwarranted emphasis on the importance of interbreeding as a universal causal factor controlling evolutionary diversification. The potential to interbreed is not in itself a process; it is instead a result of a diversity of processes which result in shared selective environments and common developmental programs. These types of processes act in both sexual and asexual organisms, thus the phylogenetic species concept can reflect an underlying unity that the biological species concept can not. © 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF00127698}, Key = {fds320314} } @article{fds320315, Author = {Brandon, RN and Hornstein, N}, Title = {From icons to symbols: Some speculations on the origins of language}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {1}, Number = {2}, Pages = {169-189}, Year = {1986}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00142900}, Abstract = {This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section we offer a retooling of some traditional concepts, namely icons and symbols, which allows us to describe an evolutionary continuum of communication systems. The second section consists of an argument from theoretical biology. In it we explore the advantages and disadvantages of phenotypic plasticity. We argue that a range of the conditions that selectively favor phenotypic plasticity also favor a nongenetic transmission system that would allow for the inheritance of acquired characters. The first two sections are independent, the third depends on both of them. In it we offer an argument that human natural languages have just the features required of an ideal transmission mechanism under the conditions described in section 2. © 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF00142900}, Key = {fds320315} } @article{fds320316, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {Biological teleology: Questions and explanations}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, Volume = {12}, Number = {2}, Pages = {91-105}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {1981}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7}, Abstract = {This paper gives an account of evolutionary explanations in biology. Briefly, the explanations I am primarily concerned with are explanations of adaptations. ('Adaptation' is a technical term and defining it requires a fairly lengthy digression.) These explanations are contrasted with other nonteleological evolutionary explanations. The distinction is made by distinguishing the different kinds of questions these different explanations serve to answer. The sense in which explanations of adaptations are teleological is spelled out. © 1981.}, Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7}, Key = {fds320316} } @article{fds320317, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {Adaptation and evolutionary theory}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, Volume = {9}, Number = {3}, Pages = {181-206}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {1978}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5}, Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5}, Key = {fds320317} } %% Papers Accepted @article{fds363728, Author = {Brandon, RN and Nijhout, HF}, Title = {The Empirical Nonequivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models of Selection: A (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism}, Pages = {383-404}, Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume I}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780754627531}, Abstract = {Genic selectionists (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976) defend the view that genes are the (unique) units of selection and that all evolutionary events can be adequately represented at the genic level. Pluralistic genic selectionists (Dawkins 1982; Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991) defend 278 ROBERT N. BRANDON AND H. FREDERIK NIJHOUT the weaker view that in many cases there are multiple, equally adequate accounts of evolutionary events but that always among the set of equally adequate representations will be one at the genic level. There have been many arguments against these views (e.g., Wimsatt 1980; Brandon 1982; Sober and Lewontin 1982; Lloyd 1988), but the debate continues to animate contemporary philosophy of biology (e.g., Lloyd 2005; Waters 2005). A (perhaps the) reason for this is that the refutations have primarily relied on philosophically contentious views on scientific explanation and causation-views their opponents have not been willing to accept. What both sides in this debate have accepted is that the genic and higher-level accounts are empirically equivalent (but see Brandon and Burian [1984, introduction to part II] and Godfrey-Smith and Lewontin [1993]). This paper will show that that is not the case, that the two accounts give dramatically different, incompatible, predictions in a broad class of cases. The predictions are factually different and the genic models consistently get it wrong. Given that virtually all philosophers and scientists accept the position that scientific theories should agree with known facts, we will refute genic selectionism without resort to anything that is philosophically controversial. 1 1. The Cases. Let us start with the case that has been most discussed in this literature, a case of heterozygote superiority. Let us suppose that there is a single genetic locus with two alleles, A and a. Thus there are three genotypes, AA, Aa, and aa.. By definition the heterozygote Aa is superior in fitness to the two homozygotes. In general the fitness of the two homozygotes need not be equal, but for simplicity we will assume that they are since nothing hinges on that assumption. The standard genotypic model normalizes the fitness of Aa at 1 and assigns the fitness of 1 - s to the two homozygotes (where 1 ~ s > 0). Although the value of s = 1 GENIC AND GENOTYPIC MODELS OF SELECTION 279 is a mathematical, and biological, possibility, for our purposes we cannot focus on that value since it is what Brandon (2005) has termed a value of maximal fitness difference. Fitness values are at the point of maximal fitness difference when some fitness values equal 1 and some equal 0 and there are no intermediary fitness values. Drift is impossible at a maximal fitness differential point. Since we are going to be interested in the interplay of drift and selection, we will need to give s some intermediary value. For now let us assume s = 0.5. This model predicts a stable equilibrium that will be reached in a number of generations (depending on the initial starting point and population size). At this equilibrium the frequencies of the two alleles are both 50'%.}, Key = {fds363728} } @article{fds363776, Author = {Brandon, RN and Rausher, MD}, Title = {TESTING ADAPTATIONISM: A COMMENT ON ORZACK AND SOBER}, Pages = {133-146}, Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume I}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780754627531}, Abstract = {One of the most heated areas of controversy within contemporary evolutionary biology concerns adaptationism and the importance of natural selection relative to other evolutionary factors. Because these debates sometimes seem to be more ideological than scientific, Orzack and Sober's (1994) recent suggestion about how to test adaptationism is likely to be well received. However, as we will show, both their statement of the hypothesis of adaptationism and their method of testing it are seriously flawed. We will try to refine the relevant hypotheses and consider the extent to which, and the methods by which, they can be tested. In this way we do take Orzack and Sober's project seriously. But, we wish to state at the outset that the status of the "adaptationist program" does not stand or fall on the outcome of their project or our revision of it here. That is, even if the hypothesis of adaptationism cannot be stated in a precise enough manner to be testable, or if it is so statable but proves to be false, the value of an adaptational approach to evolutionary biology is not necessarily diminished (see Mayr 1983 and Williams 1992 for further discussion). Nonetheless, we think it uncontroversial that in science a well-posed thesis is preferable, everything else being equal, to an ill-posed or untestable one, and our purpose here is to demonstrate that Orzack and Sober's thesis of what constitutes adaptationism is ill posed.}, Key = {fds363776} } @article{fds363777, Author = {Brandon, RN and Carson, S}, Title = {THE INDETERMINISTIC CHARACTER OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY: NO "NO HIDDEN VARIABLES PROOF" BUT NO ROOM FOR DETERMINISM EITHER}, Pages = {213-236}, Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume I}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780754627531}, Abstract = {ET is also apparently indeterministic; certainly the best and most influential treatments of the probabilistic nature of ET have drawn this conclusion (Beatty 1984, Sober 1984, Richardson and Burian 1992). Moreover, the propensity interpretation of fitness (Brandon 1978, 1990; Brandon and Beatty 1984; Burian 1983; Mills and Beatty 1979; Richardson and Burian 1992), which has been accepted by most philosophers of biology and many working evolutionary biologists, presupposes that natural selection is fundamentally probabilistic. Recently, however, two philosophers, Rosenberg (1988, 1994) and Horan (1994), have questioned this conclusion. They have argued that the statistical character of evolutionary theory is best viewed instrumentally, i.e., that the probabilities involved in evolutionary theory are epistemic-they reflect our ignorance-and that if we were smarter and/or if we had different aims, evolutionary theory could be recast as a purely deterministic theory. In other words they argue that the process of evolution is deterministic while, for various reasons, our best theory of evolution is indeterministic. This is exactly the sort of position that has been ruled out in QM by Bell's Theorem (Bell 1964, 1966). We want to show that it is also ruled out in ET, though in a less decisive way.}, Key = {fds363777} } @article{fds244324, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {A general case for functional pluralism}, Pages = {97-104}, Booktitle = {Functions: Selection and Mechanisms}, Publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, Editor = {Huneman, P}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9789400753037}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6}, Abstract = {Using examples from functional morphology and evolution, Amundson and Lauder (Biol Philos 9: 443-469, 1994) argued for functional pluralism in biology. More specifically, they argued that both causal role (CR) analyses of function and selected effects (SE) analyses played necessary parts in evolutionary biology, broadly construed, and that neither sort of analysis was reducible to the other. Rather than thinking of these two accounts of function as rivals, they argued that they were instead complimentary. Frdaric Bouchard (Chap. 5, this volume) attempts to make that case stronger using an interesting example-the evolution of ecosystems. This case is interesting in that it involves the sudden appearance of things with functions, which also evolve, but which do not, at least initially, have a selected effect etiology. I am in complete agreement with the above-mentioned positions. Here, I take a different tack in arguing for functional pluralism. I abstract away not only from the details of biological practice but even from the details of the CR and SE accounts to argue for a more general pluralism of historical and ahistorical concepts.}, Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6}, Key = {fds244324} } @article{fds359570, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {A General Case for Functional Pluralism}, Volume = {363}, Pages = {97-104}, Booktitle = {Synthese Library}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6}, Abstract = {Using examples from functional morphology and evolution, Amundson and Lauder (Biol Philos 9: 443–469, 1994) argued for functional pluralism in biology. More specifically, they argued that both causal role (CR) analyses of function and selected effects (SE) analyses played necessary parts in evolutionary biology, broadly construed, and that neither sort of analysis was reducible to the other. Rather than thinking of these two accounts of function as rivals, they argued that they were instead complimentary. Frédéric Bouchard (Chap. 5, this volume) attempts to make that case stronger using an interesting example—the evolution of ecosystems. This case is interesting in that it involves the sudden appearance of things with functions, which also evolve, but which do not, at least initially, have a selected effect etiology. I am in complete agreement with the above-mentioned positions. Here, I take a different tack in arguing for functional pluralism. I abstract away not only from the details of biological practice but even from the details of the CR and SE accounts to argue for a more general pluralism of historical and ahistorical concepts.}, Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6}, Key = {fds359570} } @article{fds244325, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary Theory}, Volume = {9}, Pages = {19-35}, Booktitle = {The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy}, Publisher = {M I T PRESS}, Editor = {O'rourke, M and Slater, M}, Year = {2011}, ISBN = {9780262017404}, Key = {fds244325} } @article{fds320306, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {Teleology in self-organizing systems}, Pages = {267-281}, Booktitle = {Self-Organization and Emergence in Life Sciences}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, Year = {2006}, Month = {December}, ISBN = {1402039166}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16}, Abstract = {Teleological language, talk of function and purpose, has long been associated with the appearance of order in the biological world. Indeed, the pre-Darwinian tradition of natural theology (e.g., Paley 1836) gave a clear underpinning for such teleology. The order of nature was a product of Gods design and reflected his purposes. In this post-Darwinian era neural selection has taken the place of Gods purposes in supporting teleological ascriptions -the ultimate purpose or function of some biological trait, say a wing, is just that effect acted on by natural selection to produce, by evolution, the order of the trait in question. But the recent recognition that order can emerge just from the dynamics of complex systems -no natural selection is needed -leads us to the question of this paper; namely, in what ways, and to what extent, does teleological language properly apply to the selfgenerated order of complex dynamical systems in biology?© 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.}, Doi = {10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16}, Key = {fds320306} } @article{fds244323, Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Ramsey, G}, Title = {What’s Wrong with the Emergentist Statistical Interpretation of Natural Selection and Random Drift}, Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy of Biology}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Ruse, M and Hull, D}, Year = {2006}, Abstract = {Population-level theories of evolution—the stock and trade of population genetics—are statistical theories par excellence. But what accounts for the statistical character of population-level phenomena? One view is that the population-level statistics are a product of, are generated by, probabilities that attach to the individuals in the population. On this conception, population-level phenomena are explained by individual-level probabilities and their population-level combinations. Another view, which arguably goes back to Fisher (1930) but has been defended recently , is that the population-level statistics are sui generis, that they somehow emerge from the underlying deterministic behavior of the individuals composing the population. Walsh et al. (2002) label this the statistical interpretation. We are not willing to give them that term, since everyone will admit that the population-level theories of evolution are statistical, so we will call this the emergentist statistical interpretation (ESI). Our goals are to show that: (1) This interpretation is based on gross factual errors concerning the practice of evolutionary biology, concerning both what is done and what can be done; (2) its adoption would entail giving up on most of the explanatory and predictive (i.e., scientific) projects of evolutionary biology; and finally (3) a rival interpretation, which we will label the propensity statistical interpretation (PSI) succeeds exactly where the emergentist interpretation fails.}, Key = {fds244323} } %% Papers Submitted @article{fds52684, Author = {R.N. Brandon and Grant Ramsey}, Title = {Toward a Pluralistic Account of Altruism: Why Reciprical Alturism is Not a Kind of Group Selection}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Publisher = {Philosophy of Science Association}, Year = {2006}, Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was origianlly formulated in terms of individual selection and most theorists continue to view it in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998). They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other forms of alturism) evolves by the process of group selection. their view is thus monistic--all alturism evolves via the sole mechanism of group selection. In this paper we defend the view that reciprocal altruism involves individual selection. By arguing that reciprocal altruism is individually advantageous, while maintaining that other forms of altruism evolve by group selection, we are arguing for a pluralistic account of alturism.}, Key = {fds52684} } | |
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