![]() |
Faculty Database Linguistics Arts & Sciences Duke University |
|
HOME > Arts & Sciences > Linguistics > Faculty | Search Help Login ![]() ![]() |
| Publications of Robert N. Brandon :chronological alphabetical combined listing:%% Books @book{fds244326, Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Samson, R}, Title = {Integrating Development and Evolution}, Publisher = {The MIT Press}, Editor = {Samson, R and Brandon, R}, Year = {2007}, Key = {fds244326} } %% Papers Published @article{fds320303, Author = {Fleming, L and Brandon, R}, Title = {Why flying dogs are rare: A general theory of luck in evolutionary transitions.}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, Volume = {49}, Pages = {24-31}, Year = {2015}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006}, Abstract = {There is a worry that the 'major transitions in evolution' represent an arbitrary group of events. This worry is warranted, and we show why. We argue that the transition to a new level of hierarchy necessarily involves a nonselectionist chance process. Thus any unified theory of evolutionary transitions must be more like a general theory of fortuitous luck, rather than a rigid formulation of expected events. We provide a systematic account of evolutionary transitions based on a second-order regularity of chance events, as stipulated by the ZFEL (Zero Force Evolutionary Law). And in doing so, we make evolutionary transitions explainable and predictable, and so not entirely contingent after all.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006}, Key = {fds320303} } @article{fds320304, Author = {Brandon, R and Fleming, L}, Title = {Drift sometimes dominates selection, and vice versa: a reply to Clatterbuck, Sober and Lewontin}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {29}, Number = {4}, Pages = {577-585}, Year = {2014}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z}, Doi = {10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z}, Key = {fds320304} } @article{fds244327, Author = {Brandon, RN and McShea, DW}, Title = {Four solutions for four puzzles}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {27}, Number = {5}, Pages = {737-744}, Publisher = {Springer}, Editor = {K. Sterelny}, Year = {2012}, ISSN = {0169-3867}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6}, Keywords = {Zero-force law }, Abstract = {Barrett et al. (Biol Philos, 2012) present four puzzles for the ZFEL-view of evolution that we present in our 2010 book, Biology's First Law: The Tendency for Diversity and Complexity to Increase in Evolutionary Systems. Our intent in writing this book was to present a radically different way to think about evolution. To the extent that it really is radical, it will be easy to misunderstand. We think Barrett et al. have misunderstood several crucial points and so we welcome the opportunity to clarify. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6}, Key = {fds244327} } @article{fds244322, Author = {Ramsey, G and Brandon, R}, Title = {Why reciprocal altruism is not a kind of group selection}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {26}, Number = {3}, Pages = {385-400}, Year = {2011}, Month = {May}, ISSN = {0169-3867}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7}, Doi = {10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7}, Key = {fds244322} } @article{fds201669, Author = {R.N. Brandon}, Title = {“Why Reciprocal Altruism is Not a Kind of Group Selection” (with Grant Ramsey) in Biology and Philosophy, (2011) Vol. 26, 3: 385-400.}, Year = {2011}, Key = {fds201669} } @article{fds201670, Author = {R.N. Brandon}, Title = {“The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary Theory,” in The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 9 (ed. By M. O’Rouke and M. Slater)}, Publisher = {MIT Press}, Year = {2011}, Key = {fds201670} } @article{fds201671, Author = {R.N. Brandon}, Title = {“A General Case for Functional Pluralism,” in Function: Selection and Mechanisms (ed. by P. Huneman)}, Publisher = {Springer}, Year = {2011}, Key = {fds201671} } @article{fds320305, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {A Non-Newtonian Newtonian Model of Evolution: The ZFEL View}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Volume = {77}, Number = {5}, Pages = {702-715}, Year = {2010}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/656901}, Doi = {10.1086/656901}, Key = {fds320305} } @article{fds244328, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {The Principle of Drift: Biology's First Law}, Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, Volume = {CII}, Number = {7}, Pages = {319-335}, Publisher = {The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, Year = {2006}, Month = {July}, Key = {fds244328} } @article{fds320307, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {The difference between selection and drift: A reply to Millstein}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {20}, Number = {1}, Pages = {153-170}, Year = {2005}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9}, Doi = {10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9}, Key = {fds320307} } @article{fds320308, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {The units of selection revisited: The modules of selection}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {14}, Number = {2}, Pages = {167-180}, Year = {1999}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006682200831}, Doi = {10.1023/A:1006682200831}, Key = {fds320308} } @article{fds320309, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {Does biology have laws? The experimental evidence}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Volume = {64}, Number = {4 SUPPL. 1}, Year = {1997}, Month = {December}, Abstract = {In this paper I argue that we can best make sense of the practice of experimental evolutionary biology if we see it as investigating contingent, rather than lawlike, regularities. This understanding is contrasted with the experimental practice of certain areas of physics. However, this presents a problem for those who accept the Logical Positivist conception of law and its essential role in scientific explanation. I address this problem by arguing that the contingent regularities of evolutionary biology have a limited range of nomic necessity and a limited range of explanatory power even though they lack the unlimited projectibility that has been seen by some as a hallmark of scientific laws. Copyright 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rigts reserved.}, Key = {fds320309} } @article{fds320310, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {Discussion: Reply to Hitchcock}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {12}, Number = {4}, Pages = {531-538}, Year = {1997}, Month = {December}, Abstract = {Christopher Hitchcock's discussion of my use of screening-off in analyzing the causal process of natural selection raises some interesting issues to which I am pleased to reply. The bulk of his article is devoted to some fairly general points in the theory of explanation. In particular, he questions whether or not my point that phenotype screens off genotype from reproductive success (in cases of organismic selection) supports my claim that the explanation of differential reproductive success should be in terms of phenotypic differences, not genotypic differences. I will respond to this and show why the two supposed counter-examples to my position fail.}, Key = {fds320310} } @article{fds320311, Author = {Brandon, RN and Carson, S}, Title = {The indeterministic character of evolutionary theory: No ''no hidden variables proof'' but no room for determinism either}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Volume = {63}, Number = {3}, Pages = {315-337}, Year = {1996}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289915}, Doi = {10.1086/289915}, Key = {fds320311} } @article{fds318355, Author = {Brandon, RN and Rausher, MD}, Title = {Testing adaptationism: A comment on Orzack and Sober}, Journal = {American Naturalist}, Volume = {148}, Number = {1}, Pages = {189-201}, Year = {1996}, Key = {fds318355} } @article{fds320312, Author = {BRANDON, RN}, Title = {THEORY AND EXPERIMENT IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY}, Journal = {Synthese}, Volume = {99}, Number = {1}, Pages = {59-73}, Year = {1994}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01064530}, Doi = {10.1007/BF01064530}, Key = {fds320312} } @article{fds320313, Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN}, Title = {Sex and the individuality of species: A response to Ghiselin}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {4}, Number = {1}, Pages = {77-79}, Year = {1989}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00144042}, Doi = {10.1007/BF00144042}, Key = {fds320313} } @article{fds320314, Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN}, Title = {Individuality, pluralism, and the phylogenetic species concept}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {2}, Number = {4}, Pages = {397-414}, Year = {1987}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00127698}, Abstract = {The concept of individuality as applied to species, an important advance in the philosophy of evolutionary biology, is nevertheless in need of refinement. Four important subparts of this concept must be recognized: spatial boundaries, temporal boundaries, integration, and cohesion. Not all species necessarily meet all of these. Two very different types of "pluralism" have been advocated with respect to species, only one of which is satisfactory. An often unrecognized distinction between "grouping" and "ranking" components of any species concept is necessary. A phylogenetic species concept is advocated that uses a (monistic) grouping criterion of monophyly in a cladistic sense, and a (pluralistic) ranking criterion based on those causal processes that are most important in producing and maintaining lineages in a particular case. Such causal processes can include actual interbreeding, selective constraints, and developmental canalization. The widespread use of the "biological species concept" is flawed for two reasons: because of a failure to distinguish grouping from ranking criteria and because of an unwarranted emphasis on the importance of interbreeding as a universal causal factor controlling evolutionary diversification. The potential to interbreed is not in itself a process; it is instead a result of a diversity of processes which result in shared selective environments and common developmental programs. These types of processes act in both sexual and asexual organisms, thus the phylogenetic species concept can reflect an underlying unity that the biological species concept can not. © 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF00127698}, Key = {fds320314} } @article{fds320315, Author = {Brandon, RN and Hornstein, N}, Title = {From icons to symbols: Some speculations on the origins of language}, Journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, Volume = {1}, Number = {2}, Pages = {169-189}, Year = {1986}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00142900}, Abstract = {This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section we offer a retooling of some traditional concepts, namely icons and symbols, which allows us to describe an evolutionary continuum of communication systems. The second section consists of an argument from theoretical biology. In it we explore the advantages and disadvantages of phenotypic plasticity. We argue that a range of the conditions that selectively favor phenotypic plasticity also favor a nongenetic transmission system that would allow for the inheritance of acquired characters. The first two sections are independent, the third depends on both of them. In it we offer an argument that human natural languages have just the features required of an ideal transmission mechanism under the conditions described in section 2. © 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF00142900}, Key = {fds320315} } @article{fds320316, Author = {BRANDON, RN}, Title = {BIOLOGICAL TELEOLOGY - QUESTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, Volume = {12}, Number = {2}, Pages = {91-105}, Year = {1981}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7}, Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7}, Key = {fds320316} } @article{fds320317, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {Adaptation and evolutionary theory}, Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, Volume = {9}, Number = {3}, Pages = {181-206}, Year = {1978}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5}, Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5}, Key = {fds320317} } %% Papers Accepted @article{fds244324, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {A general case for functional pluralism}, Pages = {97-104}, Booktitle = {Functions: Selection and Mechanisms}, Publisher = {Springer}, Editor = {Huneman, P}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9789400753044}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6}, Abstract = {© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013. Using examples from functional morphology and evolution, Amundson and Lauder (Biol Philos 9: 443-469, 1994) argued for functional pluralism in biology. More specifically, they argued that both causal role (CR) analyses of function and selected effects (SE) analyses played necessary parts in evolutionary biology, broadly construed, and that neither sort of analysis was reducible to the other. Rather than thinking of these two accounts of function as rivals, they argued that they were instead complimentary. Frdaric Bouchard (Chap. 5, this volume) attempts to make that case stronger using an interesting example-the evolution of ecosystems. This case is interesting in that it involves the sudden appearance of things with functions, which also evolve, but which do not, at least initially, have a selected effect etiology. I am in complete agreement with the above-mentioned positions. Here, I take a different tack in arguing for functional pluralism. I abstract away not only from the details of biological practice but even from the details of the CR and SE accounts to argue for a more general pluralism of historical and ahistorical concepts.}, Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6}, Key = {fds244324} } @article{fds244325, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary Theory}, Volume = {9}, Pages = {19-35}, Booktitle = {The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy}, Publisher = {MIT Press}, Editor = {O'rourke, M and Slater, M}, Year = {2011}, ISBN = {9780262017404}, Key = {fds244325} } @article{fds320306, Author = {Brandon, RN}, Title = {Teleology in self-organizing systems}, Pages = {267-281}, Booktitle = {Self-Organization and Emergence in Life Sciences}, Year = {2006}, Month = {December}, ISBN = {1402039166}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16}, Abstract = {Teleological language, talk of function and purpose, has long been associated with the appearance of order in the biological world. Indeed, the pre-Darwinian tradition of natural theology (e.g., Paley 1836) gave a clear underpinning for such teleology. The order of nature was a product of Gods design and reflected his purposes. In this post-Darwinian era neural selection has taken the place of Gods purposes in supporting teleological ascriptions -the ultimate purpose or function of some biological trait, say a wing, is just that effect acted on by natural selection to produce, by evolution, the order of the trait in question. But the recent recognition that order can emerge just from the dynamics of complex systems -no natural selection is needed -leads us to the question of this paper; namely, in what ways, and to what extent, does teleological language properly apply to the selfgenerated order of complex dynamical systems in biology?© 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.}, Doi = {10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16}, Key = {fds320306} } @article{fds244323, Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Ramsey, G}, Title = {What’s Wrong with the Emergentist Statistical Interpretation of Natural Selection and Random Drift}, Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy of Biology}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Ruse, M and Hull, D}, Year = {2006}, Abstract = {Population-level theories of evolution—the stock and trade of population genetics—are statistical theories par excellence. But what accounts for the statistical character of population-level phenomena? One view is that the population-level statistics are a product of, are generated by, probabilities that attach to the individuals in the population. On this conception, population-level phenomena are explained by individual-level probabilities and their population-level combinations. Another view, which arguably goes back to Fisher (1930) but has been defended recently , is that the population-level statistics are sui generis, that they somehow emerge from the underlying deterministic behavior of the individuals composing the population. Walsh et al. (2002) label this the statistical interpretation. We are not willing to give them that term, since everyone will admit that the population-level theories of evolution are statistical, so we will call this the emergentist statistical interpretation (ESI). Our goals are to show that: (1) This interpretation is based on gross factual errors concerning the practice of evolutionary biology, concerning both what is done and what can be done; (2) its adoption would entail giving up on most of the explanatory and predictive (i.e., scientific) projects of evolutionary biology; and finally (3) a rival interpretation, which we will label the propensity statistical interpretation (PSI) succeeds exactly where the emergentist interpretation fails.}, Key = {fds244323} } %% Papers Submitted @article{fds52684, Author = {R.N. Brandon and Grant Ramsey}, Title = {Toward a Pluralistic Account of Altruism: Why Reciprical Alturism is Not a Kind of Group Selection}, Journal = {Philosophy of Science}, Publisher = {Philosophy of Science Association}, Year = {2006}, Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was origianlly formulated in terms of individual selection and most theorists continue to view it in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998). They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other forms of alturism) evolves by the process of group selection. their view is thus monistic--all alturism evolves via the sole mechanism of group selection. In this paper we defend the view that reciprocal altruism involves individual selection. By arguing that reciprocal altruism is individually advantageous, while maintaining that other forms of altruism evolve by group selection, we are arguing for a pluralistic account of alturism.}, Key = {fds52684} } | |
Duke University * Arts & Sciences * Linguistics * Faculty * Librarian * Staff * Reload * Login |