Linguistics Faculty Database
Linguistics
Arts & Sciences
Duke University

 HOME > Arts & Sciences > Linguistics > Faculty    Search Help Login pdf version printable version 

Publications of Robert N. Brandon    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
@book{fds244326,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Samson, R},
   Title = {Integrating Development and Evolution},
   Publisher = {The MIT Press},
   Editor = {Samson, R and Brandon, R},
   Year = {2007},
   Key = {fds244326}
}


%% Papers Published   
@article{fds343339,
   Author = {McShea, DW and Wang, SC and Brandon, RN},
   Title = {A quantitative formulation of biology's first
             law.},
   Journal = {Evolution; International Journal of Organic
             Evolution},
   Volume = {73},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {1101-1115},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/evo.13735},
   Abstract = {The zero-force evolutionary law (ZFEL) states that in
             evolutionary systems, in the absence of forces or
             constraints, diversity and complexity tend to increase. The
             reason is that diversity and complexity are both variance
             measures, and variances tend to increase spontaneously as
             random events accumulate. Here, we use random-walk models to
             quantify the ZFEL expectation, producing equations that give
             the probabilities of diversity or complexity increasing as a
             function of time, and that give the expected magnitude of
             the increase. We produce two sets of equations, one for the
             case in which variation occurs in discrete steps, the other
             for the case in which variation is continuous. The equations
             provide a way to decompose actual trajectories of diversity
             or complexity into two components, the portion due to the
             ZFEL and a remainder due to selection and constraint.
             Application of the equations is demonstrated using real and
             hypothetical data.},
   Doi = {10.1111/evo.13735},
   Key = {fds343339}
}

@article{fds320303,
   Author = {Fleming, L and Brandon, R},
   Title = {Why flying dogs are rare: A general theory of luck in
             evolutionary transitions.},
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies
             in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
             Sciences},
   Volume = {49},
   Pages = {24-31},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006},
   Abstract = {There is a worry that the 'major transitions in evolution'
             represent an arbitrary group of events. This worry is
             warranted, and we show why. We argue that the transition to
             a new level of hierarchy necessarily involves a
             nonselectionist chance process. Thus any unified theory of
             evolutionary transitions must be more like a general theory
             of fortuitous luck, rather than a rigid formulation of
             expected events. We provide a systematic account of
             evolutionary transitions based on a second-order regularity
             of chance events, as stipulated by the ZFEL (Zero Force
             Evolutionary Law). And in doing so, we make evolutionary
             transitions explainable and predictable, and so not entirely
             contingent after all.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.10.006},
   Key = {fds320303}
}

@article{fds320304,
   Author = {Brandon, R and Fleming, L},
   Title = {Drift sometimes dominates selection, and vice versa: A reply
             to Clatterbuck, Sober and Lewontin},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {29},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {577-585},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z},
   Abstract = {Clatterbuck et al. (Biol Philos 28: 577-592, 2013) argue
             that there is no fact of the matter whether selection
             dominates drift or vice versa in any particular case of
             evolution. Their reasons are not empirically based; rather,
             they are purely conceptual. We show that their conceptual
             presuppositions are unmotivated, unnecessary and overly
             complex. We also show that their conclusion runs contrary to
             current biological practice. The solution is to recognize
             that evolution involves a probabilistic sampling process,
             and that drift is a deviation from probabilistic
             expectation. We conclude that conceptually, there are no
             problems with distinguishing drift from selection, and
             empirically-as modern science illustrates-when drift does
             occur, there is a quantifiable fact of the matter to be
             discovered. © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media
             Dordrecht.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-014-9437-z},
   Key = {fds320304}
}

@article{fds244327,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and McShea, DW},
   Title = {Four solutions for four puzzles},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {27},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {737-744},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Editor = {K. Sterelny},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {0169-3867},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6},
   Keywords = {Zero-force law },
   Abstract = {Barrett et al. (Biol Philos, 2012) present four puzzles for
             the ZFEL-view of evolution that we present in our 2010 book,
             Biology's First Law: The Tendency for Diversity and
             Complexity to Increase in Evolutionary Systems. Our intent
             in writing this book was to present a radically different
             way to think about evolution. To the extent that it really
             is radical, it will be easy to misunderstand. We think
             Barrett et al. have misunderstood several crucial points and
             so we welcome the opportunity to clarify. © 2012 Springer
             Science+Business Media B.V.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-012-9330-6},
   Key = {fds244327}
}

@article{fds244322,
   Author = {Ramsey, G and Brandon, R},
   Title = {Why reciprocal altruism is not a kind of group
             selection},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {26},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {385-400},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {May},
   ISSN = {0169-3867},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7},
   Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was originally formulated in terms of
             individual selection and most theorists continue to view it
             in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal
             altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998).
             They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other
             forms of altruism) evolves by the process of group
             selection. In this paper, we argue that the original
             interpretation of reciprocal altruism is the correct one. We
             accomplish this by arguing that if fitness attaches to (at
             minimum) entire life cycles, then the kind of fitness
             exchanges needed to form the group-level in such situations
             is not available. Reciprocal altruism is thus a result of
             individual selection and when it evolves, it does so because
             it is individually advantageous. © 2011 Springer
             Science+Business Media B.V.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-011-9261-7},
   Key = {fds244322}
}

@article{fds201669,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon},
   Title = {“Why Reciprocal Altruism is Not a Kind of Group
             Selection” (with Grant Ramsey) in Biology and Philosophy,
             (2011) Vol. 26, 3: 385-400.},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds201669}
}

@article{fds201670,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon},
   Title = {“The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary Theory,”
             in The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol.
             9 (ed. By M. O’Rouke and M. Slater)},
   Publisher = {MIT Press},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds201670}
}

@article{fds201671,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon},
   Title = {“A General Case for Functional Pluralism,” in Function:
             Selection and Mechanisms (ed. by P. Huneman)},
   Publisher = {Springer},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds201671}
}

@article{fds320305,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {A non-newtonian newtonian model of evolution: The ZFEL
             view},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {77},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {702-715},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/656901},
   Abstract = {Recently philosophers of biology have argued over whether or
             not Newtonian mechanics provides a useful analogy for
             thinking about evolutionary theory. For philosophers, the
             canonical presentation of this analogy is Sober's. Matthen
             and Ariew and Walsh, Lewins, and Ariew argue that this
             analogy is deeply wrong-headed. Here I argue that the
             analogy is indeed useful, however, not in the way it is
             usually interpreted. The Newtonian analogy depends on having
             the proper analogue of Newton's First Law. That analogue is
             what McShea and Brandon call the Zero Force Evolutionary Law
             (ZFEL). According to the ZFEL, change, not stasis, is the
             default state of evolutionary systems. Copyright 2010 by the
             Philosophy of Science Association. All rights
             reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1086/656901},
   Key = {fds320305}
}

@article{fds244328,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {The Principle of Drift: Biology's First Law},
   Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {CII},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {319-335},
   Publisher = {The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds244328}
}

@article{fds320307,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {The difference between selection and drift: A reply to
             Millstein},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {153-170},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9},
   Abstract = {Millstein [Bio. Philos. 17 (2002) 33] correctly identies a
             serious problem with the view that natural selection and
             random drift are not conceptually distinct. She offers a
             solution to this problem purely in terms of differences
             between the processes of selection and drift. I show that
             this solution does not work, that it leaves the vast
             majority of real biological cases uncategorized. However, I
             do think there is a solution to the problem she raises, and
             I offer it here. My solution depends on solving the
             biological analogue of the reference class problem in
             probability theory and on the reality of individual
             fitnesses. © Springer 2005.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-004-1070-9},
   Key = {fds320307}
}

@article{fds320308,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {The Units of Selection Revisited: The Modules of
             Selection},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {14},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {167-180},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006682200831},
   Abstract = {Richard Lewontin's (1970) early work on the "units" of
             selection initiated the conceptual and theoretical
             investigations that have led to the hierarchical perspective
             on selection that has reached near consensus status today.
             This paper explores other aspects of his work, work on what
             he termed "continuity" and "quasi-independence", that
             connect to contemporary explorations of modularity in
             development and evolution. I characterize such modules and
             argue that they are the true units of selection in that they
             are what evolution by natural selection individuates,
             selects among, and transforms.},
   Doi = {10.1023/A:1006682200831},
   Key = {fds320308}
}

@article{fds320309,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Does biology have laws? The experimental
             evidence},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {4 SUPPL. 1},
   Year = {1997},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392621},
   Abstract = {In this paper I argue that we can best make sense of the
             practice of experimental evolutionary biology if we see it
             as investigating contingent, rather than lawlike,
             regularities. This understanding is contrasted with the
             experimental practice of certain areas of physics. However,
             this presents a problem for those who accept the Logical
             Positivist conception of law and its essential role in
             scientific explanation. I address this problem by arguing
             that the contingent regularities of evolutionary biology
             have a limited range of nomic necessity and a limited range
             of explanatory power even though they lack the unlimited
             projectibility that has been seen by some as a hallmark of
             scientific laws. Copyright 1997 by the Philosophy of Science
             Association. All rigts reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1086/392621},
   Key = {fds320309}
}

@article{fds320310,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Discussion: Reply to Hitchcock},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {531-538},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1997},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006576129655},
   Abstract = {Christopher Hitchcock's discussion of my use of
             screening-off in analyzing the causal process of natural
             selection raises some interesting issues to which I am
             pleased to reply. The bulk of his article is devoted to some
             fairly general points in the theory of explanation. In
             particular, he questions whether or not my point that
             phenotype screens off genotype from reproductive success (in
             cases of organismic selection) supports my claim that the
             explanation of differential reproductive success should be
             in terms of phenotypic differences, not genotypic
             differences. I will respond to this and show why the two
             supposed counter-examples to my position
             fail.},
   Doi = {10.1023/A:1006576129655},
   Key = {fds320310}
}

@article{fds318355,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and Rausher, MD},
   Title = {Testing adaptationism: A comment on Orzack and
             Sober},
   Journal = {The American Naturalist},
   Volume = {148},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {189-201},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/285918},
   Doi = {10.1086/285918},
   Key = {fds318355}
}

@article{fds320311,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and Carson, S},
   Title = {The indeterministic character of evolutionary theory: No "No
             hidden variables proof" but no room for determinism
             either},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {63},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {315-337},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289915},
   Abstract = {In this paper we first briefly review Bell's (1964, 1966)
             Theorem to see how it invalidates any deterministic "hidden
             variable" account of the apparent indeterminacy of quantum
             mechanics (QM). Then we show that quantum uncertainty, at
             the level of DNA mutations, can "percolate" up to have major
             populational effects. Interesting as this point may be it
             does not show any autonomous indeterminism of the
             evolutionary process. In the next two sections we
             investigate drift and natural selection as the locus of
             autonomous biological indeterminacy. Here we conclude that
             the population-level indeterminacy of natural selection and
             drift are ultimately based on the assumption of a
             fundamental indeterminacy at the level of the lives and
             deaths of individual organisms. The following section
             examines this assumption and defends it from the
             determinists' attack. Then we show that, even if one rejects
             the assumption, there is still an important reason why one
             might think evolutionary theory (ET) is autonomously
             indeterministic. In the concluding section we contrast the
             arguments we have mounted against a deterministic hidden
             variable account of ET with the proof of the impossibility
             of such an account of QM.},
   Doi = {10.1086/289915},
   Key = {fds320311}
}

@article{fds320312,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Theory and experiment in evolutionary biology},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Volume = {99},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {59-73},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1994},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01064530},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF01064530},
   Key = {fds320312}
}

@article{fds320313,
   Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Sex and the individuality of species: A response to
             Ghiselin},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {4},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {77-79},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1989},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00144042},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00144042},
   Key = {fds320313}
}

@article{fds320314,
   Author = {Mishler, BD and Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Individuality, pluralism, and the phylogenetic species
             concept},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {397-414},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1987},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00127698},
   Abstract = {The concept of individuality as applied to species, an
             important advance in the philosophy of evolutionary biology,
             is nevertheless in need of refinement. Four important
             subparts of this concept must be recognized: spatial
             boundaries, temporal boundaries, integration, and cohesion.
             Not all species necessarily meet all of these. Two very
             different types of "pluralism" have been advocated with
             respect to species, only one of which is satisfactory. An
             often unrecognized distinction between "grouping" and
             "ranking" components of any species concept is necessary. A
             phylogenetic species concept is advocated that uses a
             (monistic) grouping criterion of monophyly in a cladistic
             sense, and a (pluralistic) ranking criterion based on those
             causal processes that are most important in producing and
             maintaining lineages in a particular case. Such causal
             processes can include actual interbreeding, selective
             constraints, and developmental canalization. The widespread
             use of the "biological species concept" is flawed for two
             reasons: because of a failure to distinguish grouping from
             ranking criteria and because of an unwarranted emphasis on
             the importance of interbreeding as a universal causal factor
             controlling evolutionary diversification. The potential to
             interbreed is not in itself a process; it is instead a
             result of a diversity of processes which result in shared
             selective environments and common developmental programs.
             These types of processes act in both sexual and asexual
             organisms, thus the phylogenetic species concept can reflect
             an underlying unity that the biological species concept can
             not. © 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company.},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00127698},
   Key = {fds320314}
}

@article{fds320315,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and Hornstein, N},
   Title = {From icons to symbols: Some speculations on the origins of
             language},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {1},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {169-189},
   Year = {1986},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00142900},
   Abstract = {This paper is divided into three sections. In the first
             section we offer a retooling of some traditional concepts,
             namely icons and symbols, which allows us to describe an
             evolutionary continuum of communication systems. The second
             section consists of an argument from theoretical biology. In
             it we explore the advantages and disadvantages of phenotypic
             plasticity. We argue that a range of the conditions that
             selectively favor phenotypic plasticity also favor a
             nongenetic transmission system that would allow for the
             inheritance of acquired characters. The first two sections
             are independent, the third depends on both of them. In it we
             offer an argument that human natural languages have just the
             features required of an ideal transmission mechanism under
             the conditions described in section 2. © 1986 D. Reidel
             Publishing Company.},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00142900},
   Key = {fds320315}
}

@article{fds320316,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Biological teleology: Questions and explanations},
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
             A},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {91-105},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1981},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7},
   Abstract = {This paper gives an account of evolutionary explanations in
             biology. Briefly, the explanations I am primarily concerned
             with are explanations of adaptations. ('Adaptation' is a
             technical term and defining it requires a fairly lengthy
             digression.) These explanations are contrasted with other
             nonteleological evolutionary explanations. The distinction
             is made by distinguishing the different kinds of questions
             these different explanations serve to answer. The sense in
             which explanations of adaptations are teleological is
             spelled out. © 1981.},
   Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(81)90015-7},
   Key = {fds320316}
}

@article{fds320317,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Adaptation and evolutionary theory},
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
             A},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {181-206},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1978},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5},
   Doi = {10.1016/0039-3681(78)90005-5},
   Key = {fds320317}
}


%% Papers Accepted   
@article{fds363728,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and Nijhout, HF},
   Title = {The Empirical Nonequivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models
             of Selection: A (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism
             and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism},
   Pages = {383-404},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
             I},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780754627531},
   Abstract = {Genic selectionists (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976) defend the
             view that genes are the (unique) units of selection and that
             all evolutionary events can be adequately represented at the
             genic level. Pluralistic genic selectionists (Dawkins 1982;
             Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991) defend 278 ROBERT N.
             BRANDON AND H. FREDERIK NIJHOUT the weaker view that in many
             cases there are multiple, equally adequate accounts of
             evolutionary events but that always among the set of equally
             adequate representations will be one at the genic level.
             There have been many arguments against these views (e.g.,
             Wimsatt 1980; Brandon 1982; Sober and Lewontin 1982; Lloyd
             1988), but the debate continues to animate contemporary
             philosophy of biology (e.g., Lloyd 2005; Waters 2005). A
             (perhaps the) reason for this is that the refutations have
             primarily relied on philosophically contentious views on
             scientific explanation and causation-views their opponents
             have not been willing to accept. What both sides in this
             debate have accepted is that the genic and higher-level
             accounts are empirically equivalent (but see Brandon and
             Burian [1984, introduction to part II] and Godfrey-Smith and
             Lewontin [1993]). This paper will show that that is not the
             case, that the two accounts give dramatically different,
             incompatible, predictions in a broad class of cases. The
             predictions are factually different and the genic models
             consistently get it wrong. Given that virtually all
             philosophers and scientists accept the position that
             scientific theories should agree with known facts, we will
             refute genic selectionism without resort to anything that is
             philosophically controversial. 1 1. The Cases. Let us start
             with the case that has been most discussed in this
             literature, a case of heterozygote superiority. Let us
             suppose that there is a single genetic locus with two
             alleles, A and a. Thus there are three genotypes, AA, Aa,
             and aa.. By definition the heterozygote Aa is superior in
             fitness to the two homozygotes. In general the fitness of
             the two homozygotes need not be equal, but for simplicity we
             will assume that they are since nothing hinges on that
             assumption. The standard genotypic model normalizes the
             fitness of Aa at 1 and assigns the fitness of 1 - s to the
             two homozygotes (where 1 ~ s > 0). Although the value of s =
             1 GENIC AND GENOTYPIC MODELS OF SELECTION 279 is a
             mathematical, and biological, possibility, for our purposes
             we cannot focus on that value since it is what Brandon
             (2005) has termed a value of maximal fitness difference.
             Fitness values are at the point of maximal fitness
             difference when some fitness values equal 1 and some equal 0
             and there are no intermediary fitness values. Drift is
             impossible at a maximal fitness differential point. Since we
             are going to be interested in the interplay of drift and
             selection, we will need to give s some intermediary value.
             For now let us assume s = 0.5. This model predicts a stable
             equilibrium that will be reached in a number of generations
             (depending on the initial starting point and population
             size). At this equilibrium the frequencies of the two
             alleles are both 50'%.},
   Key = {fds363728}
}

@article{fds363776,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and Rausher, MD},
   Title = {TESTING ADAPTATIONISM: A COMMENT ON ORZACK AND
             SOBER},
   Pages = {133-146},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
             I},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780754627531},
   Abstract = {One of the most heated areas of controversy within
             contemporary evolutionary biology concerns adaptationism and
             the importance of natural selection relative to other
             evolutionary factors. Because these debates sometimes seem
             to be more ideological than scientific, Orzack and Sober's
             (1994) recent suggestion about how to test adaptationism is
             likely to be well received. However, as we will show, both
             their statement of the hypothesis of adaptationism and their
             method of testing it are seriously flawed. We will try to
             refine the relevant hypotheses and consider the extent to
             which, and the methods by which, they can be tested. In this
             way we do take Orzack and Sober's project seriously. But, we
             wish to state at the outset that the status of the
             "adaptationist program" does not stand or fall on the
             outcome of their project or our revision of it here. That
             is, even if the hypothesis of adaptationism cannot be stated
             in a precise enough manner to be testable, or if it is so
             statable but proves to be false, the value of an
             adaptational approach to evolutionary biology is not
             necessarily diminished (see Mayr 1983 and Williams 1992 for
             further discussion). Nonetheless, we think it
             uncontroversial that in science a well-posed thesis is
             preferable, everything else being equal, to an ill-posed or
             untestable one, and our purpose here is to demonstrate that
             Orzack and Sober's thesis of what constitutes adaptationism
             is ill posed.},
   Key = {fds363776}
}

@article{fds363777,
   Author = {Brandon, RN and Carson, S},
   Title = {THE INDETERMINISTIC CHARACTER OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY: NO "NO
             HIDDEN VARIABLES PROOF" BUT NO ROOM FOR DETERMINISM
             EITHER},
   Pages = {213-236},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
             I},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780754627531},
   Abstract = {ET is also apparently indeterministic; certainly the best
             and most influential treatments of the probabilistic nature
             of ET have drawn this conclusion (Beatty 1984, Sober 1984,
             Richardson and Burian 1992). Moreover, the propensity
             interpretation of fitness (Brandon 1978, 1990; Brandon and
             Beatty 1984; Burian 1983; Mills and Beatty 1979; Richardson
             and Burian 1992), which has been accepted by most
             philosophers of biology and many working evolutionary
             biologists, presupposes that natural selection is
             fundamentally probabilistic. Recently, however, two
             philosophers, Rosenberg (1988, 1994) and Horan (1994), have
             questioned this conclusion. They have argued that the
             statistical character of evolutionary theory is best viewed
             instrumentally, i.e., that the probabilities involved in
             evolutionary theory are epistemic-they reflect our
             ignorance-and that if we were smarter and/or if we had
             different aims, evolutionary theory could be recast as a
             purely deterministic theory. In other words they argue that
             the process of evolution is deterministic while, for various
             reasons, our best theory of evolution is indeterministic.
             This is exactly the sort of position that has been ruled out
             in QM by Bell's Theorem (Bell 1964, 1966). We want to show
             that it is also ruled out in ET, though in a less decisive
             way.},
   Key = {fds363777}
}

@article{fds244324,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {A general case for functional pluralism},
   Pages = {97-104},
   Booktitle = {Functions: Selection and Mechanisms},
   Publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
   Editor = {Huneman, P},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9789400753037},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
   Abstract = {Using examples from functional morphology and evolution,
             Amundson and Lauder (Biol Philos 9: 443-469, 1994) argued
             for functional pluralism in biology. More specifically, they
             argued that both causal role (CR) analyses of function and
             selected effects (SE) analyses played necessary parts in
             evolutionary biology, broadly construed, and that neither
             sort of analysis was reducible to the other. Rather than
             thinking of these two accounts of function as rivals, they
             argued that they were instead complimentary. Frdaric
             Bouchard (Chap. 5, this volume) attempts to make that case
             stronger using an interesting example-the evolution of
             ecosystems. This case is interesting in that it involves the
             sudden appearance of things with functions, which also
             evolve, but which do not, at least initially, have a
             selected effect etiology. I am in complete agreement with
             the above-mentioned positions. Here, I take a different tack
             in arguing for functional pluralism. I abstract away not
             only from the details of biological practice but even from
             the details of the CR and SE accounts to argue for a more
             general pluralism of historical and ahistorical
             concepts.},
   Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
   Key = {fds244324}
}

@article{fds359570,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {A General Case for Functional Pluralism},
   Volume = {363},
   Pages = {97-104},
   Booktitle = {Synthese Library},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
   Abstract = {Using examples from functional morphology and evolution,
             Amundson and Lauder (Biol Philos 9: 443–469, 1994) argued
             for functional pluralism in biology. More specifically, they
             argued that both causal role (CR) analyses of function and
             selected effects (SE) analyses played necessary parts in
             evolutionary biology, broadly construed, and that neither
             sort of analysis was reducible to the other. Rather than
             thinking of these two accounts of function as rivals, they
             argued that they were instead complimentary. Frédéric
             Bouchard (Chap. 5, this volume) attempts to make that case
             stronger using an interesting example—the evolution of
             ecosystems. This case is interesting in that it involves the
             sudden appearance of things with functions, which also
             evolve, but which do not, at least initially, have a
             selected effect etiology. I am in complete agreement with
             the above-mentioned positions. Here, I take a different tack
             in arguing for functional pluralism. I abstract away not
             only from the details of biological practice but even from
             the details of the CR and SE accounts to argue for a more
             general pluralism of historical and ahistorical
             concepts.},
   Doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-5304-4_6},
   Key = {fds359570}
}

@article{fds244325,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {The Concept of the Environment in Evolutionary
             Theory},
   Volume = {9},
   Pages = {19-35},
   Booktitle = {The Environment: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Editor = {O'rourke, M and Slater, M},
   Year = {2011},
   ISBN = {9780262017404},
   Key = {fds244325}
}

@article{fds320306,
   Author = {Brandon, RN},
   Title = {Teleology in self-organizing systems},
   Pages = {267-281},
   Booktitle = {Self-Organization and Emergence in Life Sciences},
   Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {December},
   ISBN = {1402039166},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16},
   Abstract = {Teleological language, talk of function and purpose, has
             long been associated with the appearance of order in the
             biological world. Indeed, the pre-Darwinian tradition of
             natural theology (e.g., Paley 1836) gave a clear
             underpinning for such teleology. The order of nature was a
             product of Gods design and reflected his purposes. In this
             post-Darwinian era neural selection has taken the place of
             Gods purposes in supporting teleological ascriptions -the
             ultimate purpose or function of some biological trait, say a
             wing, is just that effect acted on by natural selection to
             produce, by evolution, the order of the trait in question.
             But the recent recognition that order can emerge just from
             the dynamics of complex systems -no natural selection is
             needed -leads us to the question of this paper; namely, in
             what ways, and to what extent, does teleological language
             properly apply to the selfgenerated order of complex
             dynamical systems in biology?© 2006 Springer. Printed in
             the Netherlands.},
   Doi = {10.1007/1-4020-3917-4_16},
   Key = {fds320306}
}

@article{fds244323,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and Brandon, RN and Ramsey, G},
   Title = {What’s Wrong with the Emergentist Statistical
             Interpretation of Natural Selection and Random
             Drift},
   Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Philosophy of
             Biology},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Ruse, M and Hull, D},
   Year = {2006},
   Abstract = {Population-level theories of evolution—the stock and trade
             of population genetics—are statistical theories par
             excellence. But what accounts for the statistical character
             of population-level phenomena? One view is that the
             population-level statistics are a product of, are generated
             by, probabilities that attach to the individuals in the
             population. On this conception, population-level phenomena
             are explained by individual-level probabilities and their
             population-level combinations. Another view, which arguably
             goes back to Fisher (1930) but has been defended recently ,
             is that the population-level statistics are sui generis,
             that they somehow emerge from the underlying deterministic
             behavior of the individuals composing the population. Walsh
             et al. (2002) label this the statistical interpretation. We
             are not willing to give them that term, since everyone will
             admit that the population-level theories of evolution are
             statistical, so we will call this the emergentist
             statistical interpretation (ESI). Our goals are to show
             that: (1) This interpretation is based on gross factual
             errors concerning the practice of evolutionary biology,
             concerning both what is done and what can be done; (2) its
             adoption would entail giving up on most of the explanatory
             and predictive (i.e., scientific) projects of evolutionary
             biology; and finally (3) a rival interpretation, which we
             will label the propensity statistical interpretation (PSI)
             succeeds exactly where the emergentist interpretation
             fails.},
   Key = {fds244323}
}


%% Papers Submitted   
@article{fds52684,
   Author = {R.N. Brandon and Grant Ramsey},
   Title = {Toward a Pluralistic Account of Altruism: Why Reciprical
             Alturism is Not a Kind of Group Selection},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Publisher = {Philosophy of Science Association},
   Year = {2006},
   Abstract = {Reciprocal altruism was origianlly formulated in terms of
             individual selection and most theorists continue to view it
             in this way. However, this interpretation of reciprocal
             altruism has been challenged by Sober and Wilson (1998).
             They argue that reciprocal altruism (as well as all other
             forms of alturism) evolves by the process of group
             selection. their view is thus monistic--all alturism evolves
             via the sole mechanism of group selection. In this paper we
             defend the view that reciprocal altruism involves individual
             selection. By arguing that reciprocal altruism is
             individually advantageous, while maintaining that other
             forms of altruism evolve by group selection, we are arguing
             for a pluralistic account of alturism.},
   Key = {fds52684}
}


Duke University * Arts & Sciences * Linguistics * Faculty * Librarian * Staff * Reload * Login