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Publications of David McAdams    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Game-Changer: Game Theory and the Art of Transforming
             Strategic Situations},
   Publisher = {W.W. Norton},
   Year = {2014},
   ISBN = {0393239675},
   Key = {fds313854}

%% Journal Articles   
   Author = {Årdal, C and Balasegaram, M and Laxminarayan, R and McAdams, D and Outterson, K and Rex, JH and Sumpradit, N},
   Title = {Antibiotic development - economic, regulatory and societal
   Journal = {Nature Reviews. Microbiology},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {267-274},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {May},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1038/s41579-019-0293-3},
   Key = {fds347209}

   Author = {McAdams, D and Wollein Waldetoft and K and Tedijanto, C and Lipsitch, M and Brown, SP},
   Title = {Resistance diagnostics as a public health tool to combat
             antibiotic resistance: A model-based evaluation.},
   Journal = {Plos Biology},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {e3000250},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {May},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Rapid point-of-care resistance diagnostics (POC-RD) are a
             key tool in the fight against antibiotic resistance. By
             tailoring drug choice to infection genotype, doctors can
             improve treatment efficacy while limiting costs of
             inappropriate antibiotic prescription. Here, we combine
             epidemiological theory and data to assess the potential of
             resistance diagnostics (RD) innovations in a public health
             context, as a means to limit or even reverse selection for
             antibiotic resistance. POC-RD can be used to impose a
             nonbiological fitness cost on resistant strains by enabling
             diagnostic-informed treatment and targeted interventions
             that reduce resistant strains' opportunities for
             transmission. We assess this diagnostic-imposed fitness cost
             in the context of a spectrum of bacterial population
             biologies and find that POC-RD have a greater potential
             against obligate pathogens than opportunistic pathogens
             already subject to selection under "bystander" antibiotic
             exposure during asymptomatic carriage (e.g., the
             pneumococcus). We close by generalizing the notion of
             RD-informed strategies to incorporate carriage surveillance
             information and illustrate that coupling
             transmission-control interventions to the discovery of
             resistant strains in carriage can potentially select against
             resistance in a broad range of opportunistic
   Doi = {10.1371/journal.pbio.3000250},
   Key = {fds343756}

   Author = {Hortaçsu, A and McAdams, D},
   Title = {Empirical work on auctions of multiple objects},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
   Volume = {56},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {157-184},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {March},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {© 2018 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.
             Abundant data has led to new opportunities for empirical
             auctions research in recent years, with much of the newest
             work on auctions of multiple objects, including: (1)
             auctions of ranked objects (such as sponsored search ads),
             (2) auctions of identical objects (such as Treasury bonds),
             and (3) auctions of dissimilar objects (such as FCC spectrum
             licenses). This paper surveys recent developments in the
             empirical analysis of such auctions.},
   Doi = {10.1257/jel.20160961},
   Key = {fds333814}

   Author = {Galik, CS and McAdams, D},
   Title = {Supply, Demand, and Uncertainty: Implications for Prelisting
             Conservation Policy},
   Journal = {Ecological Economics},
   Volume = {137},
   Pages = {91-98},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {July},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {© 2017 Elsevier B.V. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) faces
             a shortage of incentives to motivate the scale of
             conservation activities necessary to address and reverse the
             decline of at-risk species. A recent policy proposal
             attempts to change this by allowing landowners to generate
             credits for voluntary prelisting conservation activities. We
             explore the proposed policy from the perspective of
             potential participants. We find that uncertainty present in
             species listing processes complicates the decision to
             undertake conservation activities, leading to less
             conservation being supplied than when a listing decision is
             certain, while also delaying implementation until late in
             the listing determination process. Incentives created by the
             prelisting policy may likewise push species status closer to
             a listing threshold and thus exacerbate uncertainty in the
             listing process. To counter this tendency and encourage a
             more efficient allocation of conservation activity,
             early-actor bonuses, weighted credits, or limited windows of
             eligibility could be used to target or place increased
             premiums on early conservation activity. Though these
             findings are most directly applicable to the specific
             prelisting policy considered here, they are nonetheless
             relevant to a wider array of conservation policies that seek
             to encourage voluntary early action in advance of a
             regulatory alternative.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.03.009},
   Key = {fds325506}

   Author = {Turner, KM and Christensen, H and Adams, EJ and McAdams, D and Fifer, H and McDonnell, A and Woodford, N},
   Title = {Analysis of the potential for point-of-care test to enable
             individualised treatment of infections caused by
             antimicrobial-resistant and susceptible strains of Neisseria
             gonorrhoeae: a modelling study.},
   Journal = {Bmj Open},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {e015447},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {June},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {OBJECTIVE:To create a mathematical model to investigate the
             treatment impact and economic implications of introducing an
             antimicrobial resistance point-of-care test (AMR POCT) for
             gonorrhoea as a way of extending the life of current
             last-line treatments. DESIGN:Modelling study.
             SETTING:England. POPULATION:Patients accessing sexual health
             services. INTERVENTIONS:Incremental impact of introducing a
             hypothetical AMR POCT that could detect susceptibility to
             previous first-line antibiotics, for example, ciprofloxacin
             or penicillin, so that patients are given more tailored
             treatment, compared with the current situation where all
             patients are given therapy with ceftriaxone and
             azithromycin. The hypothetical intervention was assessed
             using a mathematical model developed in Excel. The model
             included initial and follow-up attendances, loss to
             follow-up, use of standard or tailored treatment, time taken
             to treatment and the costs of testing and treatment. MAIN
             OUTCOME MEASURES:Number of doses of ceftriaxone saved, mean
             time to most appropriate treatment, mean number of visits
             per (infected) patient, number of patients lost to follow-up
             and total cost of testing. RESULTS:In the current situation,
             an estimated 33 431 ceftriaxone treatments are
             administered annually and 792 gonococcal infections remain
             untreated due to loss to follow-up. The use of an AMR POCT
             for ciprofloxacin could reduce these ceftriaxone treatments
             by 66%, and for an AMR POCT for penicillin by 79%. The mean
             time for patients receiving an antibiotic treatment is
             reduced by 2 days in scenarios including POCT and no
             positive patients remain untreated through eliminating loss
             to follow-up. Such POCTs are estimated to add £34 million
             to testing costs, but this does not take into account
             reductions in costs of repeat attendances and the reuse of
             older, cheaper antimicrobials. CONCLUSIONS:The introduction
             of AMR POCT could allow clinicians to discern between the
             majority of gonorrhoea-positive patients with strains that
             could be treated with older, previously abandoned first-line
             treatments, and those requiring our current last-line dual
             therapy. Such tests could extend the useful life of dual
             ceftriaxone and azithromycin therapy, thus pushing back the
             time when gonorrhoea may become untreatable.},
   Doi = {10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015447},
   Key = {fds327048}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Resistance diagnosis and the changing economics of
             antibiotic discovery.},
   Journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
   Volume = {1388},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {18-25},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Point-of-care diagnostics that can determine an infection's
             antibiotic sensitivity increase the profitability of new
             antibiotics that enjoy patent protection, even when such
             diagnostics reduce the quantity of antibiotics sold.
             Advances in the science and technology underpinning rapid
             resistance diagnostics can therefore be expected to spur
             efforts to discover and develop new antibiotics, especially
             those with a narrow spectrum of activity that would
             otherwise fail to find a market.},
   Doi = {10.1111/nyas.13303},
   Key = {fds323854}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Resistance diagnosis and the changing epidemiology of
             antibiotic resistance.},
   Journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
   Volume = {1388},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {5-17},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Widespread adoption of point-of-care resistance diagnostics
             (POCRD) reduces ineffective antibiotic use but could
             increase overall antibiotic use. Indeed, in the context of a
             standard susceptible-infected epidemiological model with a
             single antibiotic, POCRD accelerates the rise of resistance
             in the disease-causing bacterial population. When multiple
             antibiotics are available, however, POCRD may slow the rise
             of resistance even as more patients receive antibiotic
             treatment, belying the conventional wisdom that antibiotics
             are "exhaustible resources" whose increased use necessarily
             promotes the rise of resistance.},
   Doi = {10.1111/nyas.13300},
   Key = {fds323855}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
   Volume = {157},
   Pages = {959-972},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0022-0531},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {© 2015 Elsevier Inc. Consider a second-price auction with
             costly bidding in which bidders with i.i.d. private values
             have multiple opportunities to bid. If bids are observable,
             the resulting dynamic-bidding game generates greater
             expected total welfare than if bids were sealed, for any
             given reserve price. Making early bids observable allows
             high-value bidders to signal their strength and deter others
             from entering the auction. Nonetheless, as long as the
             seller can commit to a reserve price, expected revenue is
             higher when bids are observable than when they are
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.003},
   Key = {fds289587}

   Author = {Hu, Y and McAdams, D and Shum, M},
   Title = {Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable
             unobserved heterogeneity},
   Journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
   Volume = {174},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {186-193},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0304-4076},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {We propose a novel methodology for identification of
             first-price auctions, when bidders' private valuations are
             independent conditional on one-dimensional unobserved
             heterogeneity. We extend the existing literature (Li and
             Vuong, 1998; Krasnokutskaya, 2011) by allowing the
             unobserved heterogeneity to be non-separable from bidders'
             valuations. Our central identifying assumption is that the
             distribution of bidder values is increasing in the state.
             When the state-space is finite, such monotonicity implies
             the full-rank condition needed for identification. Further,
             we extend our approach to the conditionally independent
             private values model of Li et al. (2000), as well as to
             unobserved heterogeneity settings in which the implicit
             reserve price or the cost of bidding varies across auctions.
             © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2013.02.005},
   Key = {fds289589}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction},
   Journal = {Economics Letters},
   Volume = {114},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {83-85},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0165-1765},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Suppose that bidders may publicly choose not to learn their
             values prior to a second-price auction with costly bidding.
             All equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder
             ignorance when the number of bidders is sufficiently small.
             Ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve
             price. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.036},
   Key = {fds289603}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Performance and turnover in a stochastic
   Journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {107-142},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {November},
   ISSN = {1945-7669},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Suppose that players in a stochastic partnership have the
             option to quit and rematch anonymously. If stage-game
             payoffs are subject to a persistent initial shock, the
             (unique) social welfare-maximizing equilibrium induces a
             "dating" process in which all partners enjoy the full
             potential equilibrium gains from each match. By contrast,
             maximizing social welfare in non-stochastic repeated games
             with rematching requires that players burn money or
             otherwise fail to realize all potential equilibrium gains.
             Comparative statics on welfare and turnover are also
             provided, consistent with documented patterns of
             "survivorship bias" and "honeymoon".},
   Doi = {10.1257/mic.3.4.107},
   Key = {fds289602}

   Author = {Lopomo, G and Marx, LM and McAdams, D and Murray,
   Title = {Carbon allowance auction design: An assessment of options
             for the United States},
   Journal = {Review of Environmental Economics and Policy},
   Volume = {5},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {25-43},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {July},
   ISSN = {1750-6816},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Carbon allowance auctions are a component of existing and
             proposed regional cap-and-trade programs in the United
             States and are also included in recent proposed bills in the
             U.S. Congress that would establish a national cap-and-trade
             program to regulate greenhouse gases ("carbon"). We discuss
             and evaluate the two leading candidates for auction format:
             a uniform-price sealed-bid auction and an ascending-bid
             dynamic auction, either of which could be augmented with a
             "price collar" to ensure that the price of allowances is
             neither too high nor too low. We identify the primary
             trade-offs between these two formats as applied to carbon
             allowance auctions and suggest additional auction design
             features that address potential concerns about efficiency
             losses from collusion and other factors. We conclude that,
             based on currently available evidence, a uniform-price
             sealed-bid auction is more appropriate for the sale of
             carbon allowances than the other leading auction formats, in
             part because it offers increased robustness to collusion
             without significant sacrifice of price discovery. © The
             Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf
             of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
             All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1093/reep/req024},
   Key = {fds289604}

   Author = {Hortaçsu, A and McAdams, D},
   Title = {Mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good
             auctions: An empirical analysis of the turkish treasury
             auction market},
   Journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
   Volume = {118},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {833-865},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0022-3808},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {We propose an estimation method to bound bidders' marginal
             valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual
             bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish
             Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal
             values, we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of
             realized allocations as well as bounds on how much
             additional revenue could have been realized in a
             counterfactual uniform price or Vickrey auction. We conclude
             that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform
             price or Vickrey auction would not significantly increase
             revenue. Moreover, such a switch would increase bidder
             expected surplus by at most 0.02 percent. © 2010 by The
             University of Chicago.},
   Doi = {10.1086/657948},
   Key = {fds289601}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Partial identification and testable restrictions in
             multi-unit auctions},
   Journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
   Volume = {146},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {74-85},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {0304-4076},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {Bidders' values in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions
             are not necessarily point-identified under the assumptions
             of equilibrium bidding and independent private values, but
             meaningful policy analysis can proceed from bounds on bidder
             values. This paper provides upper and lower bounds on the
             set of values that can rationalize a given distribution of
             bids, under the additional (and standard) assumption of
             non-increasing marginal values. Novel testable implications
             of the best response hypothesis are also provided, again
             under the assumption of non-increasing marginal values. ©
             2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2008.07.003},
   Key = {fds289600}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
   Volume = {137},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {729-732},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {November},
   ISSN = {0022-0531},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have
             single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with
             independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price
             auctions with private values need not possess familiar
             monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly
             undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid
             strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher
             values for every unit. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002},
   Key = {fds289598}

   Author = {McAdams, D and Schwarz, M},
   Title = {Who pays when auction rules are bent?},
   Journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
   Volume = {25},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {1144-1157},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0167-7187},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the
             seller and/or buyers may break them at some cost. When
             buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such
             opportunistic behavior (whether by the buyers or the seller)
             is borne entirely by the seller in equilibrium, in the form
             of lower revenues. Consequently, the seller is willing to
             pay an auctioneer to credibly commit to a mechanism in which
             no one has the ability or the incentive to break the rules.
             Examples of "costly rule bending" considered here include
             hiring shill bidders and trying to learn others' bids before
             making one's own. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights
   Doi = {10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004},
   Key = {fds289599}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
   Volume = {136},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {144-166},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {0022-0531},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy
             equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders
             having affiliated types and interdependent values. © 2006
             Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002},
   Key = {fds289596}

   Author = {Chapman, JTE and McAdams, D and Paarsch, HJ},
   Title = {Bounding revenue comparisons across multi-unit auction
             formats under ε-best response},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {97},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {455-458},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {May},
   ISSN = {0002-8282},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.97.2.455},
   Key = {fds289595}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment
             as a strategic tool},
   Journal = {Economics Letters},
   Volume = {95},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {48-53},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {April},
   ISSN = {0165-1765},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {In some uniform-price auctions, the auctioneer decides how
             much to sell after the bidding. Auctioneer expected profit
             and social welfare can each be strictly higher in all
             equilibria given such "adjustable supply" than in all
             equilibria given any fixed quantity and reserve price. ©
             2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.035},
   Key = {fds289594}

   Author = {McAdams, D and Schwarz, M},
   Title = {Credible sales mechanisms and intermediaries},
   Journal = {American Economic Review},
   Volume = {97},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {260-276},
   Publisher = {American Economic Association},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {March},
   ISSN = {0002-8282},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {We consider a seller who faces several buyers and lacks
             access to an institution to credibly close a sale. If buyers
             anticipate that the seller may negotiate further, they will
             prefer to wait before making their best and final offers.
             This in turn induces the seller to bargain at length with
             buyers, even if doing so is costly. When the seller's cost
             of soliciting another round of offers is either very large
             or very small, the seller credibly commits to an auction and
             experiences negligible bargaining costs. Otherwise, there
             may be several rounds of increasing offers and significant
             seller losses. In these situations, an intermediary with a
             sufficiently valuable reputation and/or weak marginal
             incentives regarding price can create value by credibly
             committing to help sell the object without
   Doi = {10.1257/aer.97.1.260},
   Key = {fds289592}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with
   Journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
   Volume = {35},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {427-453},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {February},
   ISSN = {0020-7276},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {I study monotonicity of equilibrium strategies in
             first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, risk aversion,
             affiliated types, and interdependent values. Every
             mixed-strategy equilibrium is shown to be outcome-equivalent
             to a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium under the "priority
             rule" for breaking ties. This provides a missing link to
             establish uniqueness in the "general symmetric model" of
             Milgrom and Weber (Econometrica 50:1089-1122, 1982).
             Non-monotone equilibria can exist under the "coin-flip rule"
             but they are distinguishable: all non-monotone equilibria
             have positive probability of ties whereas all monotone
             equilibria have zero probability of ties. This provides a
             justification for the standard empirical practice of
             restricting attention to monotone strategies. © Springer
             Verlag 2007.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s00182-006-0038-1},
   Key = {fds289593}

   Author = {McAdams, D and Schwarz, M},
   Title = {Perverse incentives in the Medicare prescription drug
   Journal = {Inquiry: a Journal of Medical Care Organization, Provision
             and Financing},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {157-166},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0046-9580},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {This paper analyzes some of the perverse incentives that may
             arise under the current Medicare prescription drug benefit
             design. In particular, risk adjustment for a stand-alone
             prescription drug benefit creates perverse incentives for
             prescription drug plans when making coverage decisions
             and/or for pharmaceutical companies when setting prices.
             This problem is new in that it does not arise with risk
             adjustment for other types of health care coverage. For this
             and other reasons, Medicare's drug benefit requires
             especially close regulatory oversight, now and in the
             future. We also consider a relatively minor change in
             financing the benefit that could lead to significant changes
             in how the benefit functions. In particular, if all plans
             were required to charge the same premium, there would be
             less diversity in quality, but also less need to regulate
             formulary composition, less budgetary uncertainty, and less
             upward pressure on drug prices.},
   Doi = {10.5034/inquiryjrnl_44.2.157},
   Key = {fds289597}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Monotone equilibrium in multi-unit auctions},
   Journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
   Volume = {73},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1039-1056},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0034-6527},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment
             rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions,
             a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when
             bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional
             types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed-strategy
             equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected
             payment equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected
             surplus/ revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting
             attention to monotone strategies. © 2006 The Review of
             Economic Studies Limited.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00407.x},
   Key = {fds289591}

   Author = {McAdams, D},
   Title = {Isotone equilibrium in games of incomplete
   Journal = {Econometrica},
   Volume = {71},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1191-1214},
   Publisher = {The Econometric Society},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {January},
   url = { Duke open
   Abstract = {An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of
             incomplete information in which each player's action set is
             infinite sublattice of multidimensional Euclidean space,
             types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's
             interim expected payoff function satisfies two "nonprimitive
             conditions" whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies:
             (i) single-crossing in own action and type and (ii)
             quasi-supermodularity in own action. Conditions (i), (ii)
             are satisfied in supermodular and log-supermodular games
             given affiliated types, and in games with independent types
             in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies
             supermodularity in own action and nondecreasing differences
             in own action and type. This result is applied to provide
             the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in
             the uniform price auction when bidders have multi-unit
             demand, nonprivate values, and independent
   Doi = {10.1111/1468-0262.00443},
   Key = {fds289590}

   Author = {Fujishima, Y and McAdams, D and Shoham, Y},
   Title = {Speeding up ascending-bid auctions},
   Journal = {Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial
   Volume = {1},
   Pages = {554-559},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {1045-0823},
   Abstract = {In recent years auctions have grown in inter-est within the
             AI community as innovative mechanisms for resource
             allocation. The primary contribution of this paper is to
             identify a family of hybrid auctions, called survival
             auctions, which combine the benefits of both sealed-bid
             auctions (namely, quick and predictable termination time)
             and ascending-bid auctions (namely, more information
             revelation often leading, among other things, to better
             allocations and greater expected revenue). Survival auctions
             are multi-round sealed-bid auctions with an
             information-revelation component, in which some bidders are
             eliminated from the auction from one round to the next.
             These auctions are intuitive, easy to implement, and most
             importantly provably optimal. More precisely, we show that
             (a) the survival auction in which all but the lowest bidder
             make it into the next round (the*auction lasts for (n - 1)
             rounds when there are n bidders) is strategically equivalent
             to the Japanese ascending-bid auction, which itself has been
             proven to be optimal in many settings, and that (b) under
             certain symmetry conditions, even a survival auction in
             which only the two highest bidders make it into the next
             round (the auction la.sts only two rounds) is Nash outcome
             equivalent to the Japanese auction.},
   Key = {fds289586}

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