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| Publications of David McAdams :chronological combined listing:%% Books @book{fds313854, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Game-Changer: Game Theory and the Art of Transforming Strategic Situations}, Publisher = {W.W. Norton}, Year = {2014}, ISBN = {9780393239676}, Key = {fds313854} } %% Journal Articles @article{fds355629, Author = {Årdal, C and McAdams, D and Wester, AL and Møgedal, S}, Title = {Adapting environmental surveillance for polio to the need to track antimicrobial resistance.}, Journal = {Bulletin of the World Health Organization}, Volume = {99}, Number = {3}, Pages = {239-240}, Year = {2021}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/blt.20.258905}, Doi = {10.2471/blt.20.258905}, Key = {fds355629} } @article{fds289594, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool}, Journal = {Economics Letters}, Volume = {95}, Number = {1}, Pages = {48-53}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2007}, Month = {April}, ISSN = {0165-1765}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.035}, Abstract = {In some uniform-price auctions, the auctioneer decides how much to sell after the bidding. Auctioneer expected profit and social welfare can each be strictly higher in all equilibria given such "adjustable supply" than in all equilibria given any fixed quantity and reserve price. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.035}, Key = {fds289594} } @article{fds327048, Author = {Turner, KM and Christensen, H and Adams, EJ and McAdams, D and Fifer, H and McDonnell, A and Woodford, N}, Title = {Analysis of the potential for point-of-care test to enable individualised treatment of infections caused by antimicrobial-resistant and susceptible strains of Neisseria gonorrhoeae: a modelling study.}, Journal = {BMJ open}, Volume = {7}, Number = {6}, Pages = {e015447}, Year = {2017}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015447}, Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>To create a mathematical model to investigate the treatment impact and economic implications of introducing an antimicrobial resistance point-of-care test (AMR POCT) for gonorrhoea as a way of extending the life of current last-line treatments.<h4>Design</h4>Modelling study.<h4>Setting</h4>England.<h4>Population</h4>Patients accessing sexual health services.<h4>Interventions</h4>Incremental impact of introducing a hypothetical AMR POCT that could detect susceptibility to previous first-line antibiotics, for example, ciprofloxacin or penicillin, so that patients are given more tailored treatment, compared with the current situation where all patients are given therapy with ceftriaxone and azithromycin. The hypothetical intervention was assessed using a mathematical model developed in Excel. The model included initial and follow-up attendances, loss to follow-up, use of standard or tailored treatment, time taken to treatment and the costs of testing and treatment.<h4>Main outcome measures</h4>Number of doses of ceftriaxone saved, mean time to most appropriate treatment, mean number of visits per (infected) patient, number of patients lost to follow-up and total cost of testing.<h4>Results</h4>In the current situation, an estimated 33 431 ceftriaxone treatments are administered annually and 792 gonococcal infections remain untreated due to loss to follow-up. The use of an AMR POCT for ciprofloxacin could reduce these ceftriaxone treatments by 66%, and for an AMR POCT for penicillin by 79%. The mean time for patients receiving an antibiotic treatment is reduced by 2 days in scenarios including POCT and no positive patients remain untreated through eliminating loss to follow-up. Such POCTs are estimated to add £34 million to testing costs, but this does not take into account reductions in costs of repeat attendances and the reuse of older, cheaper antimicrobials.<h4>Conclusions</h4>The introduction of AMR POCT could allow clinicians to discern between the majority of gonorrhoea-positive patients with strains that could be treated with older, previously abandoned first-line treatments, and those requiring our current last-line dual therapy. Such tests could extend the useful life of dual ceftriaxone and azithromycin therapy, thus pushing back the time when gonorrhoea may become untreatable.}, Doi = {10.1136/bmjopen-2016-015447}, Key = {fds327048} } @article{fds347209, Author = {Årdal, C and Balasegaram, M and Laxminarayan, R and McAdams, D and Outterson, K and Rex, JH and Sumpradit, N}, Title = {Antibiotic development - economic, regulatory and societal challenges.}, Journal = {Nature reviews. Microbiology}, Volume = {18}, Number = {5}, Pages = {267-274}, Year = {2020}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41579-019-0293-3}, Doi = {10.1038/s41579-019-0293-3}, Key = {fds347209} } @article{fds289595, Author = {Chapman, JTE and McAdams, D and Paarsch, HJ}, Title = {Bounding revenue comparisons across multi-unit auction formats under ε-best response}, Journal = {American Economic Review}, Volume = {97}, Number = {2}, Pages = {455-458}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2007}, Month = {May}, ISSN = {0002-8282}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.2.455}, Doi = {10.1257/aer.97.2.455}, Key = {fds289595} } @article{fds289604, Author = {Lopomo, G and Marx, LM and McAdams, D and Murray, B}, Title = {Carbon allowance auction design: An assessment of options for the United States}, Journal = {Review of Environmental Economics and Policy}, Volume = {5}, Number = {1}, Pages = {25-43}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)}, Year = {2011}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {1750-6816}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/reep/req024}, Abstract = {Carbon allowance auctions are a component of existing and proposed regional cap-and-trade programs in the United States and are also included in recent proposed bills in the U.S. Congress that would establish a national cap-and-trade program to regulate greenhouse gases ("carbon"). We discuss and evaluate the two leading candidates for auction format: a uniform-price sealed-bid auction and an ascending-bid dynamic auction, either of which could be augmented with a "price collar" to ensure that the price of allowances is neither too high nor too low. We identify the primary trade-offs between these two formats as applied to carbon allowance auctions and suggest additional auction design features that address potential concerns about efficiency losses from collusion and other factors. We conclude that, based on currently available evidence, a uniform-price sealed-bid auction is more appropriate for the sale of carbon allowances than the other leading auction formats, in part because it offers increased robustness to collusion without significant sacrifice of price discovery. © The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1093/reep/req024}, Key = {fds289604} } @article{fds289592, Author = {McAdams, D and Schwarz, M}, Title = {Credible sales mechanisms and intermediaries}, Journal = {American Economic Review}, Volume = {97}, Number = {1}, Pages = {260-276}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2007}, Month = {March}, ISSN = {0002-8282}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1729 Duke open access}, Abstract = {We consider a seller who faces several buyers and lacks access to an institution to credibly close a sale. If buyers anticipate that the seller may negotiate further, they will prefer to wait before making their best and final offers. This in turn induces the seller to bargain at length with buyers, even if doing so is costly. When the seller's cost of soliciting another round of offers is either very large or very small, the seller credibly commits to an auction and experiences negligible bargaining costs. Otherwise, there may be several rounds of increasing offers and significant seller losses. In these situations, an intermediary with a sufficiently valuable reputation and/or weak marginal incentives regarding price can create value by credibly committing to help sell the object without delay.}, Doi = {10.1257/aer.97.1.260}, Key = {fds289592} } @article{fds333814, Author = {Hortaçsu, A and McAdams, D}, Title = {Empirical work on auctions of multiple objects}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, Volume = {56}, Number = {1}, Pages = {157-184}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2018}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20160961}, Abstract = {Abundant data has led to new opportunities for empirical auctions research in recent years, with much of the newest work on auctions of multiple objects, including: (1) auctions of ranked objects (such as sponsored search ads), (2) auctions of identical objects (such as Treasury bonds), and (3) auctions of dissimilar objects (such as FCC spectrum licenses). This paper surveys recent developments in the empirical analysis of such auctions.}, Doi = {10.1257/jel.20160961}, Key = {fds333814} } @article{fds368570, Author = {McAdams, D and Song, Y and Zou, D}, Title = {Equilibrium social activity during an epidemic}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, Volume = {207}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105591}, Abstract = {During an infectious-disease epidemic, people make choices that impact transmission, trading off the risk of infection with the social-economic benefits of activity. We investigate how the qualitative features of an epidemic's Nash-equilibrium trajectory depend on the nature of the economic benefits that people get from activity. If economic benefits do not depend on how many others are active, as usually modeled, then there is a unique equilibrium trajectory, the epidemic eventually reaches a steady state, and agents born into the steady state have zero expected lifetime welfare. On the other hand, if the benefit of activity increases as others are more active (“social benefits”) and the disease is sufficiently severe, then there are always multiple equilibrium trajectories, including some that never settle into a steady state and that welfare dominate any given steady-state equilibrium. Within this framework, we analyze the equilibrium impact of a policy that modestly reduces the transmission rate. Such a policy has no long-run effect on society-wide welfare absent social benefits, but can raise long-run welfare if there are social benefits and the epidemic never settles into a steady state.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2022.105591}, Key = {fds368570} } @article{fds289589, Author = {Hu, Y and McAdams, D and Shum, M}, Title = {Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity}, Journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, Volume = {174}, Number = {2}, Pages = {186-193}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0304-4076}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2013.02.005}, Abstract = {We propose a novel methodology for identification of first-price auctions, when bidders' private valuations are independent conditional on one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. We extend the existing literature (Li and Vuong, 1998; Krasnokutskaya, 2011) by allowing the unobserved heterogeneity to be non-separable from bidders' valuations. Our central identifying assumption is that the distribution of bidder values is increasing in the state. When the state-space is finite, such monotonicity implies the full-rank condition needed for identification. Further, we extend our approach to the conditionally independent private values model of Li et al. (2000), as well as to unobserved heterogeneity settings in which the implicit reserve price or the cost of bidding varies across auctions. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2013.02.005}, Key = {fds289589} } @article{fds354246, Author = {McAdams, D and McDade, KK and Ogbuoji, O and Johnson, M and Dixit, S and Yamey, G}, Title = {Incentivising wealthy nations to participate in the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility (COVAX): a game theory perspective.}, Journal = {BMJ global health}, Volume = {5}, Number = {11}, Pages = {e003627}, Year = {2020}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003627}, Doi = {10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003627}, Key = {fds354246} } @article{fds289590, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Isotone equilibrium in games of incomplete information}, Journal = {Econometrica}, Volume = {71}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1191-1214}, Publisher = {The Econometric Society}, Year = {2003}, Month = {January}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1874 Duke open access}, Abstract = {An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which each player's action set is infinite sublattice of multidimensional Euclidean space, types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected payoff function satisfies two "nonprimitive conditions" whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies: (i) single-crossing in own action and type and (ii) quasi-supermodularity in own action. Conditions (i), (ii) are satisfied in supermodular and log-supermodular games given affiliated types, and in games with independent types in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies supermodularity in own action and nondecreasing differences in own action and type. This result is applied to provide the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand, nonprivate values, and independent types.}, Doi = {10.1111/1468-0262.00443}, Key = {fds289590} } @article{fds365835, Author = {Jackson, MO and Malladi, S and McAdams, D}, Title = {Learning through the grapevine and the impact of the breadth and depth of social networks.}, Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America}, Volume = {119}, Number = {34}, Pages = {e2205549119}, Year = {2022}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2205549119}, Abstract = {We study how communication platforms can improve social learning without censoring or fact-checking messages, when they have members who deliberately and/or inadvertently distort information. Message fidelity depends on social network depth (how many times information can be relayed) and breadth (the number of others with whom a typical user shares information). We characterize how the expected number of true minus false messages depends on breadth and depth of the network and the noise structure. Message fidelity can be improved by capping depth or, if that is not possible, limiting breadth, e.g., by capping the number of people to whom someone can forward a given message. Although caps reduce total communication, they increase the fraction of received messages that have traveled shorter distances and have had less opportunity to be altered, thereby increasing the signal-to-noise ratio.}, Doi = {10.1073/pnas.2205549119}, Key = {fds365835} } @article{fds289601, Author = {Hortaçsu, A and McAdams, D}, Title = {Mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions: An empirical analysis of the turkish treasury auction market}, Journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, Volume = {118}, Number = {5}, Pages = {833-865}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {2010}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {0022-3808}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/657948}, Abstract = {We propose an estimation method to bound bidders' marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal values, we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or Vickrey auction. We conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or Vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue. Moreover, such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0.02 percent. © 2010 by The University of Chicago.}, Doi = {10.1086/657948}, Key = {fds289601} } @article{fds289591, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Monotone equilibrium in multi-unit auctions}, Journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, Volume = {73}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1039-1056}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)}, Year = {2006}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {0034-6527}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00407.x}, Abstract = {In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed-strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected surplus/ revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies. © 2006 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00407.x}, Key = {fds289591} } @article{fds289593, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation}, Journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, Volume = {35}, Number = {3}, Pages = {427-453}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2007}, Month = {February}, ISSN = {0020-7276}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0038-1}, Abstract = {I study monotonicity of equilibrium strategies in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, risk aversion, affiliated types, and interdependent values. Every mixed-strategy equilibrium is shown to be outcome-equivalent to a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium under the "priority rule" for breaking ties. This provides a missing link to establish uniqueness in the "general symmetric model" of Milgrom and Weber (Econometrica 50:1089-1122, 1982). Non-monotone equilibria can exist under the "coin-flip rule" but they are distinguishable: all non-monotone equilibria have positive probability of ties whereas all monotone equilibria have zero probability of ties. This provides a justification for the standard empirical practice of restricting attention to monotone strategies. © Springer Verlag 2007.}, Doi = {10.1007/s00182-006-0038-1}, Key = {fds289593} } @article{fds355285, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Nash SIR: An Economic-Epidemiological Model of Strategic Behavior During a Viral Epidemic}, Year = {2020}, Month = {May}, Key = {fds355285} } @article{fds289587, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, Volume = {157}, Pages = {959-972}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2015}, Month = {May}, ISSN = {0022-0531}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.003}, Abstract = {Consider a second-price auction with costly bidding in which bidders with i.i.d. private values have multiple opportunities to bid. If bids are observable, the resulting dynamic-bidding game generates greater expected total welfare than if bids were sealed, for any given reserve price. Making early bids observable allows high-value bidders to signal their strength and deter others from entering the auction. Nonetheless, as long as the seller can commit to a reserve price, expected revenue is higher when bids are observable than when they are sealed.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.003}, Key = {fds289587} } @article{fds289598, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, Volume = {137}, Number = {1}, Pages = {729-732}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2007}, Month = {November}, ISSN = {0022-0531}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1944 Duke open access}, Abstract = {Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002}, Key = {fds289598} } @article{fds289600, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions}, Journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, Volume = {146}, Number = {1}, Pages = {74-85}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2008}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0304-4076}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1901 Duke open access}, Abstract = {Bidders' values in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions are not necessarily point-identified under the assumptions of equilibrium bidding and independent private values, but meaningful policy analysis can proceed from bounds on bidder values. This paper provides upper and lower bounds on the set of values that can rationalize a given distribution of bids, under the additional (and standard) assumption of non-increasing marginal values. Novel testable implications of the best response hypothesis are also provided, again under the assumption of non-increasing marginal values. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2008.07.003}, Key = {fds289600} } @article{fds289602, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Performance and turnover in a stochastic partnership}, Journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics}, Volume = {3}, Number = {4}, Pages = {107-142}, Publisher = {American Economic Association}, Year = {2011}, Month = {November}, ISSN = {1945-7669}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.4.107}, Abstract = {Suppose that players in a stochastic partnership have the option to quit and rematch anonymously. If stage-game payoffs are subject to a persistent initial shock, the (unique) social welfare-maximizing equilibrium induces a "dating" process in which all partners enjoy the full potential equilibrium gains from each match. By contrast, maximizing social welfare in non-stochastic repeated games with rematching requires that players burn money or otherwise fail to realize all potential equilibrium gains. Comparative statics on welfare and turnover are also provided, consistent with documented patterns of "survivorship bias" and "honeymoon".}, Doi = {10.1257/mic.3.4.107}, Key = {fds289602} } @article{fds289597, Author = {McAdams, D and Schwarz, M}, Title = {Perverse incentives in the Medicare prescription drug benefit.}, Journal = {Inquiry : a journal of medical care organization, provision and financing}, Volume = {44}, Number = {2}, Pages = {157-166}, Year = {2007}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0046-9580}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5034/inquiryjrnl_44.2.157}, Abstract = {This paper analyzes some of the perverse incentives that may arise under the current Medicare prescription drug benefit design. In particular, risk adjustment for a stand-alone prescription drug benefit creates perverse incentives for prescription drug plans when making coverage decisions and/or for pharmaceutical companies when setting prices. This problem is new in that it does not arise with risk adjustment for other types of health care coverage. For this and other reasons, Medicare's drug benefit requires especially close regulatory oversight, now and in the future. We also consider a relatively minor change in financing the benefit that could lead to significant changes in how the benefit functions. In particular, if all plans were required to charge the same premium, there would be less diversity in quality, but also less need to regulate formulary composition, less budgetary uncertainty, and less upward pressure on drug prices.}, Doi = {10.5034/inquiryjrnl_44.2.157}, Key = {fds289597} } @article{fds323854, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Resistance diagnosis and the changing economics of antibiotic discovery.}, Journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences}, Volume = {1388}, Number = {1}, Pages = {18-25}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nyas.13303}, Abstract = {Point-of-care diagnostics that can determine an infection's antibiotic sensitivity increase the profitability of new antibiotics that enjoy patent protection, even when such diagnostics reduce the quantity of antibiotics sold. Advances in the science and technology underpinning rapid resistance diagnostics can therefore be expected to spur efforts to discover and develop new antibiotics, especially those with a narrow spectrum of activity that would otherwise fail to find a market.}, Doi = {10.1111/nyas.13303}, Key = {fds323854} } @article{fds323855, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Resistance diagnosis and the changing epidemiology of antibiotic resistance.}, Journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences}, Volume = {1388}, Number = {1}, Pages = {5-17}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nyas.13300}, Abstract = {Widespread adoption of point-of-care resistance diagnostics (POCRD) reduces ineffective antibiotic use but could increase overall antibiotic use. Indeed, in the context of a standard susceptible-infected epidemiological model with a single antibiotic, POCRD accelerates the rise of resistance in the disease-causing bacterial population. When multiple antibiotics are available, however, POCRD may slow the rise of resistance even as more patients receive antibiotic treatment, belying the conventional wisdom that antibiotics are "exhaustible resources" whose increased use necessarily promotes the rise of resistance.}, Doi = {10.1111/nyas.13300}, Key = {fds323855} } @article{fds343756, Author = {McAdams, D and Wollein Waldetoft and K and Tedijanto, C and Lipsitch, M and Brown, SP}, Title = {Resistance diagnostics as a public health tool to combat antibiotic resistance: A model-based evaluation.}, Journal = {PLoS biology}, Volume = {17}, Number = {5}, Pages = {e3000250}, Year = {2019}, Month = {May}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3000250}, Abstract = {Rapid point-of-care resistance diagnostics (POC-RD) are a key tool in the fight against antibiotic resistance. By tailoring drug choice to infection genotype, doctors can improve treatment efficacy while limiting costs of inappropriate antibiotic prescription. Here, we combine epidemiological theory and data to assess the potential of resistance diagnostics (RD) innovations in a public health context, as a means to limit or even reverse selection for antibiotic resistance. POC-RD can be used to impose a nonbiological fitness cost on resistant strains by enabling diagnostic-informed treatment and targeted interventions that reduce resistant strains' opportunities for transmission. We assess this diagnostic-imposed fitness cost in the context of a spectrum of bacterial population biologies and find that POC-RD have a greater potential against obligate pathogens than opportunistic pathogens already subject to selection under "bystander" antibiotic exposure during asymptomatic carriage (e.g., the pneumococcus). We close by generalizing the notion of RD-informed strategies to incorporate carriage surveillance information and illustrate that coupling transmission-control interventions to the discovery of resistant strains in carriage can potentially select against resistance in a broad range of opportunistic pathogens.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pbio.3000250}, Key = {fds343756} } @article{fds289586, Author = {Fujishima, Y and McAdams, D and Shoham, Y}, Title = {Speeding up ascending-bid auctions}, Journal = {IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {554-559}, Year = {1999}, Month = {December}, ISSN = {1045-0823}, Abstract = {In recent years auctions have grown in inter-est within the AI community as innovative mechanisms for resource allocation. The primary contribution of this paper is to identify a family of hybrid auctions, called survival auctions, which combine the benefits of both sealed-bid auctions (namely, quick and predictable termination time) and ascending-bid auctions (namely, more information revelation often leading, among other things, to better allocations and greater expected revenue). Survival auctions are multi-round sealed-bid auctions with an information-revelation component, in which some bidders are eliminated from the auction from one round to the next. These auctions are intuitive, easy to implement, and most importantly provably optimal. More precisely, we show that (a) the survival auction in which all but the lowest bidder make it into the next round (the*auction lasts for (n - 1) rounds when there are n bidders) is strategically equivalent to the Japanese ascending-bid auction, which itself has been proven to be optimal in many settings, and that (b) under certain symmetry conditions, even a survival auction in which only the two highest bidders make it into the next round (the auction la.sts only two rounds) is Nash outcome equivalent to the Japanese auction.}, Key = {fds289586} } @article{fds289603, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction}, Journal = {Economics Letters}, Volume = {114}, Number = {1}, Pages = {83-85}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0165-1765}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.036}, Abstract = {Suppose that bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second-price auction with costly bidding. All equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when the number of bidders is sufficiently small. Ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve price. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.036}, Key = {fds289603} } @article{fds325506, Author = {Galik, CS and McAdams, D}, Title = {Supply, Demand, and Uncertainty: Implications for Prelisting Conservation Policy}, Journal = {Ecological Economics}, Volume = {137}, Pages = {91-98}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2017}, Month = {July}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.03.009}, Abstract = {The Endangered Species Act (ESA) faces a shortage of incentives to motivate the scale of conservation activities necessary to address and reverse the decline of at-risk species. A recent policy proposal attempts to change this by allowing landowners to generate credits for voluntary prelisting conservation activities. We explore the proposed policy from the perspective of potential participants. We find that uncertainty present in species listing processes complicates the decision to undertake conservation activities, leading to less conservation being supplied than when a listing decision is certain, while also delaying implementation until late in the listing determination process. Incentives created by the prelisting policy may likewise push species status closer to a listing threshold and thus exacerbate uncertainty in the listing process. To counter this tendency and encourage a more efficient allocation of conservation activity, early-actor bonuses, weighted credits, or limited windows of eligibility could be used to target or place increased premiums on early conservation activity. Though these findings are most directly applicable to the specific prelisting policy considered here, they are nonetheless relevant to a wider array of conservation policies that seek to encourage voluntary early action in advance of a regulatory alternative.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.03.009}, Key = {fds325506} } @article{fds358781, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {The Blossoming of Economic Epidemiology}, Journal = {Annual Review of Economics}, Volume = {13}, Pages = {539-570}, Year = {2021}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082120-122900}, Abstract = {Infectious diseases, ideas, new products, and other infectants spread in epidemic fashion through social contact. The COVID-19 pandemic, the proliferation of fake news, and the rise of antimicrobial resistance have thrust economic epidemiology into the forefront of public policy debate and reinvigorated the field. Focusing for concreteness on disease-causing pathogens, this review provides a taxonomy of economic-epidemic models, emphasizing both the biology/immunology of the disease and the economics of the social context. An economic epidemic is one whose diffusion through the agent population is generated by agents' endogenous behavior. I highlight properties of the equilibrium epidemic trajectory and discuss ways in which public health authorities can change the game for the better by (a) imposing restrictions on agent activity to reduce the harm done during a viral outbreak and (b) enabling diagnostic-informed interventions to slow or even reverse the rise of antibiotic resistance.}, Doi = {10.1146/annurev-economics-082120-122900}, Key = {fds358781} } @article{fds360036, Author = {Day, T and Kennedy, DA and Read, AF and McAdams, D}, Title = {The economics of managing evolution.}, Journal = {PLoS biology}, Volume = {19}, Number = {11}, Pages = {e3001409}, Year = {2021}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3001409}, Abstract = {Humans are altering biological systems at unprecedented rates, and these alterations often have longer-term evolutionary impacts. Most obvious is the spread of resistance to pesticides and antibiotics. There are a wide variety of management strategies available to slow this evolution, and there are many reasons for using them. In this paper, we focus on the economic aspects of evolution management and ask: When is it economically beneficial for an individual decision-maker to invest in evolution management? We derive a simple dimensionless inequality showing that it is cost-effective to manage evolution when the percentage increase in the effective life span of the biological resource that management generates is larger than the percentage increase in annual profit that could be obtained by not managing evolution. We show how this inequality can be used to determine optimal investment choices for single decision-makers, to determine Nash equilibrium investment choices for multiple interacting decision-makers, and to examine how these equilibrium choices respond to regulatory interventions aimed at stimulating investment in evolution management. Our results are illustrated with examples involving Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) crops and antibiotic use in fish farming.}, Doi = {10.1371/journal.pbio.3001409}, Key = {fds360036} } @article{fds289596, Author = {McAdams, D}, Title = {Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, Volume = {136}, Number = {1}, Pages = {144-166}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2007}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0022-0531}, url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1941 Duke open access}, Abstract = {The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002}, Key = {fds289596} } @article{fds289599, Author = {McAdams, D and Schwarz, M}, Title = {Who pays when auction rules are bent?}, Journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization}, Volume = {25}, Number = {5}, Pages = {1144-1157}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2007}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {0167-7187}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004}, Abstract = {In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the seller and/or buyers may break them at some cost. When buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such opportunistic behavior (whether by the buyers or the seller) is borne entirely by the seller in equilibrium, in the form of lower revenues. Consequently, the seller is willing to pay an auctioneer to credibly commit to a mechanism in which no one has the ability or the incentive to break the rules. Examples of "costly rule bending" considered here include hiring shill bidders and trying to learn others' bids before making one's own. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004}, Key = {fds289599} } | |
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