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| Publications of Thomas J. Nechyba :chronological alphabetical combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds18275,
Author = {T. Nechyba},
Title = {Microeconomics (working title)},
Publisher = {Southwest/Thompson},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds18275}
}
@book{fds18276,
Author = {T. Nechyba and D. Older-Aguilar and Patrick
McEwan},
Title = {The Effect of Family and Community Resources on Education
Outcomes},
Publisher = {New Zealand Government, Ministry of Education},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds18276}
}
%% Book Reviews
@article{fds18172,
Author = {Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen},
Title = {IQ and the Wealth of Nations},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {XLII},
Pages = {220-21},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds18172}
}
@article{fds18173,
Author = {Alan Auerbach and Martin Feldstein},
Title = {Handbook of Public Economics: Vol. 3},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {XLI},
Pages = {1299-1301},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds18173}
}
@article{fds10936,
Author = {George R. Zodrow},
Title = {State Sales and Income Taxes: An Economic
Analysis},
Journal = {Journal of Regional Science},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds10936}
}
@article{fds10938,
Author = {Helen Ladd},
Title = {Local Government Tax and Land Use Policies in the United
States: Understanding the Links},
Journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics},
Volume = {29},
Pages = {547-52},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds10938}
}
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds361183,
Author = {Baldin, I and Chase, J and Crabtree, J and Nechyba, T and Christopherson, L and Stealey, M and Kneifel, C and Orlikowski, V and Carter, R and Scott, E and Sone, A and Sizemore, D},
Title = {ImPACT: A networked service architecture for safe sharing of
restricted data},
Journal = {Future Generation Computer Systems},
Volume = {129},
Pages = {269-285},
Year = {2022},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2021.11.026},
Abstract = {In this paper we describe an architecture developed and
prototyped in the course of the NSF-funded project called
ImPACT—Infrastructure for Privacy-Assured CompuTations.
This architecture addresses the common problems that arise
from the need to securely store, control access to and
process privacy-restricted data in a multi-institutional,
multi-stakeholder setting. Specifically the architecture
includes several components—a way to publicly advertise a
limited set of data attributes without exposing the
sensitive data itself; a set of mechanisms for a data owner
to specify and automatically enforce complex data-access
policies commonly expressed today as Data Use Agreements
(DUAs); a way to securely collect digital attestations from
multiple stakeholders to satisfy those policies; and a
reproducible template to deploy secure processing enclaves
in which groups of researchers can analyze the data in a way
that complies with data owner policies using the tools of
their choice. The paper describes the architecture and its
instantiation in a prototype, providing a performance
evaluation of several components.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.future.2021.11.026},
Key = {fds361183}
}
@article{fds353048,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Tiebout sorting and competition},
Pages = {471-478},
Booktitle = {The Economics of Education: A Comprehensive
Overview},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780128153918},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-815391-8.00034-3},
Abstract = {Over 60 years ago, Charles Tiebout hypothesized that
decentralized provision of public services (such as public
schools) through local governments can result in efficient
levels of such services (Tiebout, 1956). His key insight was
that residential mobility of households might provide a
sufficient disciplining force (analogous to typical market
forces) to insure efficient provision of local public
services. With sufficient local competition, there would be
no room for local governments to engage in excessive
political rent seeking, and enough variety in local tax and
service packages would emerge to satisfy different consumer
tastes. In the case of public education, however, serious
issues related to equity and equal opportunity also emerge,
suggesting a tradeoff between the promise of Tiebout
efficiency and the emergence of inequities in educational
opportunities for children of different income classes and
different races.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-12-815391-8.00034-3},
Key = {fds353048}
}
@article{fds344736,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {What should students learn in intermediate microeconomics?
To think conceptually from the fundamentals of the
discipline},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Education},
Volume = {50},
Number = {3},
Pages = {261-264},
Year = {2019},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220485.2019.1618769},
Doi = {10.1080/00220485.2019.1618769},
Key = {fds344736}
}
@article{fds238522,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Tiebout sorting and competition},
Journal = {International Encyclopedia of Education},
Pages = {388-393},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2010},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-044894-7.01259-8},
Abstract = {Public and private schools operate in local economies in
which households choose where to live based, in part, on
access to schools and, in part, on features of local housing
markets. These residential location choices, in turn,
determine where children attend schools, the types of
resources available to different schools and the degree to
which schools are focused primarily on the educational needs
of students. The sorting of students and resources that
emerges across schools, known as Tiebout sorting, is
therefore closely linked to features of local economies as
well as institutional characteristics of school finance and
assignment policies. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-08-044894-7.01259-8},
Key = {fds238522}
}
@article{fds369393,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Tiebout Sorting and Competition},
Pages = {388-393},
Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of Education, Third
Edition},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780080448947},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-044894-7.01259-8},
Abstract = {Public and private schools operate in local economies in
which households choose where to live based, in part, on
access to schools and, in part, on features of local housing
markets. These residential location choices, in turn,
determine where children attend schools, the types of
resources available to different schools and the degree to
which schools are focused primarily on the educational needs
of students. The sorting of students and resources that
emerges across schools, known as Tiebout sorting, is
therefore closely linked to features of local economies as
well as institutional characteristics of school finance and
assignment policies.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-08-044894-7.01259-8},
Key = {fds369393}
}
@article{fds238526,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Chapter 22 Income and Peer Quality Sorting in Public and
Private Schools},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {1327-1368},
Booktitle = {Handbook of the Economics of Education},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780444528193},
ISSN = {1574-0692},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0692(06)02022-8},
Abstract = {Any system of primary and secondary schools involves
explicit or implicit mechanisms that ration not only
financial but also nonfinancial inputs into education
production. This chapter focuses primarily on such
mechanisms as they relate to the sorting of parents and
children into schools and classrooms. Three primary
mechanisms are reviewed: (1) sorting that emerges through
residential location choices within housing markets that are
linked to schools; (2) sorting that arises from parental
choices to send children to private rather than public
schools; and (3) sorting within schools that results from
explicit tracking policies. The equilibrium level of sorting
(along parental income and child peer quality dimensions)
then depends on both the specifics of how education
production works and the overall characteristics of the
general equilibrium environment within which schools
operate. We review the theoretical as well as the related
simulation-based literature in this area and suggest that
much potential exists for increasing empirical relevance of
the emerging models for policy analysis, particularly as a
related empirical literature comes to better terms with the
nature of peer effects in education production. © 2006
Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/S1574-0692(06)02022-8},
Key = {fds238526}
}
@article{fds324979,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Income and Peer Quality Sorting in Public and Private
Schools},
Volume = {2},
Series = {Elsevier/North Holland.},
Pages = {1327-1368},
Booktitle = {Handbook of the Economics of Education},
Editor = {Hanushek, E and Welch, F},
Year = {2006},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {978-0-444-52819-3},
Abstract = {Any system of primary and secondary schools involves
explicit or implicit mechanisms that ration not only
financial but also nonfinancial inputs into education
production. This chapter focuses primarily on such
mechanisms as they relate to the sorting of parents and
children into schools and classrooms. Three primary
mechanisms are reviewed: (1) sorting that emerges through
residential location choices within housing markets that are
linked to schools; (2) sorting that arises from parental
choices to send children to private rather than public
schools; and (3) sorting within schools that results from
explicit tracking policies. The equilibrium level of sorting
(along parental income and child peer quality dimensions)
then depends on both the specifics of how education
production works and the overall characteristics of the
general equilibrium environment within which schools
operate. We review the theoretical as well as the related
simulation-based literature in this area and suggest that
much potential exists for increasing empirical relevance of
the emerging models for policy analysis, particularly as a
related empirical literature comes to better terms with the
nature of peer effects in education production.},
Key = {fds324979}
}
@article{fds238527,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Alternative education finance strategies},
Number = {Mar},
Pages = {7-27},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds238527}
}
@article{fds238528,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {School Finance, School Choice and Residential
Segregation},
Journal = {CESifo Economic Studies},
Publisher = {[Keynote Lecture at 2004 CES Public Sector Economics
Conference]},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds238528}
}
@article{fds238521,
Author = {Nechyba, T},
Title = {Comment: Land taxation in New York City: A general
equilibrium analysis},
Journal = {City Taxes, City Spending: Essays in Honor of Dick
Netzer},
Pages = {95-100},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781845421632.00011},
Doi = {10.4337/9781845421632.00011},
Key = {fds238521}
}
@article{fds238530,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {School Competition and School Quality in the
U.S.},
Journal = {CESifo DICE Report - Journal of Institutional
Comparison},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {3-8},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds238530}
}
@article{fds238529,
Author = {Nechyba, T and Walsh, R},
Title = {Urban Sprawl},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
Volume = {18},
Number = {4},
Pages = {177-200},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
ISSN = {0895-3309},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0895330042632681},
Doi = {10.1257/0895330042632681},
Key = {fds238529}
}
@article{fds324980,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {IQ and the wealth of nations.},
Journal = {JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE},
Volume = {42},
Number = {1},
Pages = {220-221},
Publisher = {AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC},
Year = {2004},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds324980}
}
@article{fds238525,
Author = {Epple, D and Nechyba, T},
Title = {Chapter 55 Fiscal decentralization},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {2423-2480},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780444509673},
ISSN = {1574-0080},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0080(04)80012-9},
Abstract = {Fiscal decentralization is on the rise worldwide while
barriers to factor and population mobility are declining.
Greater decentralized government activity is therefore
taking place in an economic environment characterized by
increased competition for mobile resources, and government
policy within this environment is increasingly cognizant of
profound implications this combination of decentralization
and mobility may have on political and economic outcomes. As
these trends have become important, the academic literature
across several disciplines in economics has paid increasing
attention to the issues that arise from these trends. This
chapter summarizes the progress that has been made in this
literature - in both theoretical and empirical dimensions -
while simultaneously pointing out some open questions for
future research. Several important themes emerge: First,
while simple versions of more general models have clarified
many analytic issues, policy trade-offs are ultimately made
in complicated settings rich with institutional detail.
Thus, the search for a greater connection between
theoretical models and data has taken on particular
importance. Complex general equilibrium models of fiscal
decentralization ultimately become most useful when
underlying parameters within such models are determined by
the data. Both calibration and structural estimation
techniques are advancing this portion of the literature.
Second, the last decade has seen an increasing emphasis on
political forces in debates over fiscal decentralization.
Not only does such decentralization carry with it potential
economic benefits and costs, but political decisions are
likely to be fundamentally different in a decentralized
environment. Important further work on political
institutions under fiscal decentralization is needed.
Finally, as decentralization has been studied in multiple
contexts, it has become increasingly clear that the
micro-foundations of local goods and services need further
theoretical and empirical investigations. Many such goods
(such as crime prevention and schooling) depend on peer and
neighborhood effects, and predictions can change
fundamentally as such effects are introduced. © 2004
Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/S1574-0080(04)80012-9},
Key = {fds238525}
}
@article{fds324982,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Handbook of public economics, volume 3.},
Journal = {JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE},
Volume = {41},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1301-1303},
Publisher = {AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds324982}
}
@article{fds238532,
Author = {Nechyba, T},
Title = {Public School Finance and Urban School Policy: General
Versus Partial Equilibrium Analysis},
Journal = {Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs},
Pages = {139-170},
Year = {2003},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds238532}
}
@article{fds238541,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Centralization, fiscal federalism, and private school
attendance},
Journal = {International Economic Review},
Volume = {44},
Number = {1},
Pages = {179-204},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2003},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00066},
Abstract = {A CGE model is used to analyze the impact of public school
financing on private school attendance. The common
perception that public school finance centralization will
necessarily lead to greater private school attendance is not
correct in such a model - even when that centralization
involves an extreme equalization as in California.
Furthermore, if centralization is less dramatic (as in most
states), declines in private school attendance are even more
pronounced. This weakens the speculation that low exit rates
to private schools in centralizing states imply that general
public school quality does not drop as a result of such
centralization.},
Doi = {10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00066},
Key = {fds238541}
}
@article{fds238543,
Author = {Nechyba, T},
Title = {School finance, spatial income segregation, and the nature
of communities},
Journal = {Journal of Urban Economics},
Volume = {54},
Number = {1},
Pages = {61-88},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0094-1190(03)00041-X},
Abstract = {In a general equilibrium model that links school and housing
markets, a purely public school system (regardless of the
degree of centralization) results in substantially more
spatial income segregation than a purely private system.
However, the combination of a public system with a private
school market yields the least residential segregation as
housing price distortions from the capitalization of the
public system generate incentives for middle and high income
private school attendees to live with lower income public
school attendees. The impact of vouchers and the sensitivity
of results to alternative school production models is also
investigated. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0094-1190(03)00041-X},
Key = {fds238543}
}
@article{fds304429,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {What can be (and what has been) learned from general
equilibrium simulation models of school finance?},
Journal = {National Tax Journal},
Volume = {56},
Number = {2},
Pages = {387-414},
Publisher = {National Tax Association},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0028-0283},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2644 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {This paper synthesizes some initial lessons from an emerging
school finance literature that employs computational
structural models to investigate different policy proposals.
The advantage of such models lies in their ability to fully
trace out the general equilibrium effects of policies within
an internally consistent and empirically relevant economic
framework. Results in this literature suggest that a full
general equilibrium analysis may lead to outcomes that
differ substantially from those predicted by partial
equilibrium models. At the same time, there is considerable
room for further research that can both inform and be
informed by more standard empirical research.},
Doi = {10.17310/ntj.2003.2.06},
Key = {fds304429}
}
@article{fds304428,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Social approval, values, and AFDC: A reexamination of the
illegitimacy debate},
Journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
Volume = {109},
Number = {3},
Pages = {637-672},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1986 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {This paper models the fertility decision of individuals who
differ in their wage rate and their intensity of preferences
for rearing children, and whose utility of having a child
out of wedlock depends on the level of "social approval"
associated with doing so. This social approval in turn is a
function of the fraction of individuals in previous
generations that chose to have children out of wedlock. The
model is a straightforward extension of the typical rational
choice model that motivates much of the empirical
literature-a literature that has cast doubt on a strong link
between AFDC and illegitimacy. However, the model introduces
elements from epidemic models that many have in mind when
arguing for such a link. As a result, the predictions of
this extended model are consistent with empirical findings
while at the same time linking the rise in illegitimacy
solely to government welfare programs. Specifically, a
program similar to AFDC is introduced into an economy with
low illegitimacy rates, and a transition path to a new
steady state is calculated. Along the transition path,
observed cases of illegitimacy are rising among both the
poor and nonpoor despite the fact that AFDC payments are
held constant or even falling. The simultaneous trends of
declining real welfare benefits and rising illegitimacy over
the past two and a half decades are therefore not
inconsistent with the view that illegitimacy might be caused
primarily by government welfare policies. Although this
paper certainly does not claim to prove such a link, it does
suggest that current empirical approaches have been focused
too much on an artificially narrow model and have thus given
rise to results that can be differently interpreted in the
context of a more natural model. At the same time, the model
also suggests that welfare reform aimed at reducing the
incentives for poor women to have out-of-wedlock births may
not be as effective as policy makers who believe in a causal
link between AFDC and illegitimacy might
suspect.},
Doi = {10.1086/321020},
Key = {fds304428}
}
@article{fds324987,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Social welfare and individual responsibility},
Journal = {ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY},
Volume = {16},
Number = {2},
Pages = {361-368},
Publisher = {CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS},
Year = {2000},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds324987}
}
@article{fds238531,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Mobility, targeting, and private-school vouchers},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {90},
Number = {1},
Pages = {130-146},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2085 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {This paper uses general-equilibrium simulations to explore
the role of residential mobility in shaping the impact of
different private-school voucher policies. The simulations
are derived from a three-district model of low-, middle-,
and high-income school districts (calibrated to New York
data) with housing stocks that vary within and across
districts. In this model, it is demonstrated that
school-district targeted vouchers are similar in their
impact to nontargeted vouchers but vastly different from
vouchers targeted to low-income households. Furthermore,
strong migration effects are shown to significantly improve
the likely equity consequences of voucher
programs.},
Doi = {10.1257/aer.90.1.130},
Key = {fds238531}
}
@article{fds238539,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {School finance induced migration and stratification
patterns: The impact of private school vouchers},
Journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-50},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1999},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00002},
Abstract = {This paper introduces a general equilibrium model of public
school finance that includes: (i) multiple school districts
that finance local public schools via property taxes set by
majority vote; (ii) multiple neighborhoods within school
districts where each neighborhood is characterized by a
quality level of housing; (iii) local public schools that
are obligated to admit all interested students who reside
within the school district; (iv) private schools that
function as clubs of parents who share the cost of the
private school equally and who can choose to exclude others;
(v) an educational production process that depends on both
per pupil spending and average peer quality within the
school; and (vi) individual peer quality levels that are
correlated with the socioeconomic status of households.
Since it allows for various degrees of imperfect
stratification of residents across communities, the model is
well suited for investigating empirically relevant migration
forces induced by school finance reform proposals. The
abstract model itself, however, is too complex to yield many
analytic results. A computational counterpart to the model
is therefore developed, calibrated to data, and utilized for
policy experiments. In particular, the impact of vouchers in
the context of different types of prevoucher educational
finance systems is investigated, and it is found that
migration patterns in general would cause vouchers to
benefit public schools in poor communities while hurting
public schools in wealthy communities. © 1999 Blackwell
Publishers, Inc.},
Doi = {10.1111/1097-3923.00002},
Key = {fds238539}
}
@article{fds324988,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {A Model of Multiple Districts and Private Schools: the Role
of Mobility, Targeting, and Private School
Vouchers},
Publisher = {NBER working paper #7239},
Year = {1999},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds324988}
}
@article{fds238538,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ and Strauss, RP},
Title = {Community choice and local public services: A discrete
choice approach},
Journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics},
Volume = {28},
Number = {1},
Pages = {51-73},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0166-0462(97)00013-6},
Abstract = {This paper uses a discrete choice approach to estimate the
impact of local fiscal and other variables on individual
community choices. It employs a combination of a unique
micro data set composed of 90% of all homeowners in six
school districts in Camden County, New Jersey and
information on local community characteristics including
local crime rates, commercial activity and distance from a
metropolitan area. The empirical model implies that all
these variables as well as the local per pupil spending on
public education and 'community entry prices' play a major
part in explaining the location of individual households. ©
1998 Elsevier Science B.V.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0166-0462(97)00013-6},
Key = {fds238538}
}
@article{fds324991,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and
public finance - Breton,A},
Journal = {JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE},
Volume = {35},
Number = {4},
Pages = {2062-2064},
Publisher = {AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC},
Year = {1997},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds324991}
}
@article{fds238536,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Local property and state income taxes: The role of
interjurisdictional competition and collusion},
Journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
Volume = {105},
Number = {2},
Pages = {351-384},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-3808},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2064 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {This paper addresses two long-standing positive questions in
public finance: (i) Why is the property tax, despite
widespread popular complaints against its fairness, the
almost exclusive tax instrument used by local governments,
and (ii) why do we consistently observe higher levels of
governments (states) undermining local property tax systems
through income tax-funded grants and state-imposed caps on
local property tax rates? A new intuitive argument to
explain question i is presented and tested in simulations
using a computable general equilibrium model with parameters
set to be consistent with New Jersey data. Both the
intuitive argument and the simulation results indicate that
setting local income tax rates to zero is a dominant
strategy for community planners. When faced with popular
sentiment against the property tax, community planners can
collude and introduce local income taxes simultaneously to
prevent adverse general equilibrium migration and price
changes. Since zero income tax rates are dominant
strategies, however, such an agreement is enforceable only
if an outsider such as the state government steps in. The
institution of state grants funded through a state income
tax can play such an enforcement role.},
Doi = {10.1086/262076},
Key = {fds238536}
}
@article{fds238537,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and
hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and
voting},
Journal = {Economic Theory},
Volume = {10},
Number = {2},
Pages = {277-304},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050158},
Abstract = {This paper present the first fully closed general
equilibrium model of hierarchical and local public goods
economies with the following features: (i) multiple agent
types who are endowed with both some amount of private good
(income) and a house, who are mobile between houses and
jurisdictions, and who vote in local and national elections;
(ii) multiple communities that finance a local public good
through property taxes which are set in accordance with
absolute majority rule; and (iii) a national government that
produces a national public good financed through an income
tax whose level is determined through majority rule voting.
In contrast to previous models, no overly restrictive
assumptions on preferences and technologies are required to
prove the existence of an equilibrium in the presence of
property taxation and voting. Thus, the existence of an
equilibrium is proved without any of the major restrictions
used in the past, and sufficient conditons for
stratification of agents into communities based on their
public good preferences and their wealth levels are found.
This model lays the groundwork for a positive applied
analysis of local public finance and intergovernmental
relations. It furthermore builds the foundation for the
first parameterized computable general equilibrium model of
local public goods and fiscal federalism.},
Doi = {10.1007/s001990050158},
Key = {fds238537}
}
@article{fds324992,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Public School Finance in a General Equilibrium Tiebout
World: Equalization Programs, Peer Effects and Private
School Vouchers},
Publisher = {NBER working paper #5642},
Year = {1996},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds324992}
}
@article{fds238534,
Author = {Nechyba, T},
Title = {Fiscal Federalism and Local Public Finance: A Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) Framework},
Journal = {International Tax and Public Finance},
Volume = {3},
Number = {2},
Pages = {215-231},
Publisher = {Springer Nature America, Inc},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00399911},
Abstract = {This paper attempts to make an argument for the feasibility
and usefulness of a computable general equilibrium approach
to studying fiscal federalism and local public finance. It
begins by presenting a general model of fiscal federalism
that has at its base a local public goods model with (1)
multiple types of mobile agents who are endowed with
preferences, private good endowments, and land endowments,
(2) local governments that produce local public goods funded
by a property tax, and (3) a land market that capitalizes
local policies to equilibrate supply and demand. To this, a
state (or national) government producing a state public good
is added, and all levels of government abide by majority
rule voting. A computable general equilibrium framework is
derived from this theoretical model and calibrated to New
Jersey micro tax data. It has been applied elsewhere to
study the dominance of property in local tax bases as well
as the general equilibrium effects of state or national
intergovernmental programs such as redistributive grants in
aid, district power equalization, and the deducibility of
local taxes. Results in these areas are summarized and
potential future applications discussed.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00399911},
Key = {fds238534}
}
@article{fds238535,
Author = {Nechyba, T},
Title = {A computable general equilibrium model of intergovernmental
aid},
Journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
Volume = {62},
Number = {3},
Pages = {363-397},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01565-5},
Abstract = {This paper introduces a theoretical and a calibrated
computable general equilibrium model of intergovernmental
relations in which heterogeneous agents (i) are endowed with
income and houses, (ii) are fully mobile between multiple
jurisdictions, and (iii) vote in both local and state
elections to determine local property and state income tax
rates. Three different types of intergovernmental programs
are analyzed: (i) redistributive revenue sharing, (ii)
district power equalization and (iii) deductibility of local
taxes. The approach facilitates a heretofore difficult
comparative analysis in that it provides for an integrated
investigation of these programs in a single general
equilibrium model.},
Doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(95)01565-5},
Key = {fds238535}
}
@article{fds23543,
Author = {T. Nechyba},
Title = {Fiscal Federalims and Local Public Finance: A General
Equilibrium Approach with Voting},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 86th Annual Conference of the National
Tax Association},
Pages = {136-141},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds23543}
}
@article{fds238533,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {The Southern wage gap, human capital and the quality of
education},
Journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
Volume = {57},
Number = {2},
Pages = {308-322},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1990},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1060612},
Abstract = {Much of the literature on the racial wage gap in the US has
focused on the importance of differences in human capital.
The racial difference in school quality has been large but
has diminished over time. Research indicates that in the
years from 1920 to 1940, an average of 28% of the racial
literacy gap can be explained by race differences in school
inputs. The desegregation of schools, begun in 1954,
accelerated the gradual convergence in the quality of white
and black education. I examine 15 Southern states which had
data on the segregated white and black school systems. I
have attempted to link the demonstrated lower quality of
education during segregation in the South to the persistent
Southern wage gap. In addition I have tried to establish a
role for educational quality in the rapid increase in the
Southern black to white income ratios over the last few
decades. While the quality of education is my main concern
in this study, I have also controlled for other important
Southern economic trends that have been demonstrated to have
had a clear impact on Southern wages. The findings of this
study are two-fold: episodic trends in the Southern wage gap
are partially explained by periods of market disequilibria,
while new evidence is found that the inferior quality of
black schools during segregation has significantly hampered
a full black/white income parity. -from Author},
Doi = {10.2307/1060612},
Key = {fds238533}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds324977,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Mobilizing the Private Sector in the United States: A
Theoretical Overview},
Journal = {SCHOOL CHOICE INTERNATIONAL: EXPLORING PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS},
Pages = {47-69},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Chakrabarti, R and Peterson, PE},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {978-0-262-03376-3},
Key = {fds324977}
}
@misc{fds143158,
Author = {T.J. Nechyba},
Title = {Tiebout Sorting and School Choice},
Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of Education},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Editor = {Brewer, Dominic and Patrick McEwan},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds143158}
}
@misc{fds143159,
Author = {T.J. Nechyba},
Title = {The Social Context of Vouchers},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Research on School Choice},
Publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum Associates},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds143159}
}
@misc{fds143160,
Author = {T.J. Nechyba},
Title = {Public and Private School Competition Under U.S. Fiscal
Federalism},
Booktitle = {Land Policy in Fiscal Decentralization},
Editor = {Ingram, Greg and Yu-Hung Hong},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds143160}
}
@misc{fds42400,
Author = {T.J. Nechyba},
Title = {Mobilizing the Private Sector for Public Education: A
Theoretical Overview},
Booktitle = {School Choice International},
Editor = {P. Peterson and H. Patrinos},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds42400}
}
@misc{fds324978,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {The efficiency and equity of Tiebout in the United States:
Taxes, services, and property values},
Journal = {LAND POLICIES AND THEIR OUTCOMES},
Pages = {68-89},
Booktitle = {Land Policies and their Outcomes},
Publisher = {LINCOLN INST LAND POLICY},
Editor = {Ingram, GK and Hong, YH},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {978-1-55844-172-9},
Key = {fds324978}
}
@misc{fds29696,
Author = {J.L. Vigdor and T.J. Nechyba},
Title = {Peer Effects in North Carolina Public Schools},
Pages = {73-102},
Booktitle = {Schools and the Equal Opportunity Problem},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Editor = {P. Peterson and L. Woessmann},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds29696}
}
@misc{fds23548,
Author = {T.J. Nechyba},
Title = {Mobility, Targeting and Private School Vouchers},
Series = {The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics
(Mark Blaug, ed.)},
Booktitle = {The Economics of Schooling and School Quality},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd},
Editor = {Eric Hanushek},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds23548}
}
@inbook{fds21261,
Author = {D. Epple and T. Nechyba},
Title = {Fiscal Decentralization},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics: Volume
4},
Publisher = {North Holland},
Editor = {V. Henderson and J. Thisse},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds21261}
}
@inbook{fds324981,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Prospects for Achieving Equity or Adequacy in Education: The
Limits of State Aid in General Equilibrium},
Journal = {HELPING CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: STATE AID AND THE PURSUIT OF
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY},
Pages = {111-143},
Booktitle = {Helping Children Left Behind},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Yinger, J},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
ISBN = {978-0-262-25404-5},
Key = {fds324981}
}
@misc{fds29695,
Author = {T.J. Nechyba and J.L. Vigdor},
Title = {Peer Effects in North Carolina Public Schools},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds29695}
}
@misc{fds21271,
Author = {T. Nechyba},
Title = {The Benefit View and the New View: Where do we stand 25
years into the debate?},
Pages = {113-21},
Booktitle = {Property Taxation and Local Public Finance},
Publisher = {Lincoln Institute Press: Cambridge, MA},
Editor = {Wallace Oates},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds21271}
}
@misc{fds324985,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {The benefit view and the new view - Where do we stand,
twenty-five years into the debate?},
Journal = {PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE},
Pages = {113-121},
Publisher = {LINCOLN INST LAND POLICY},
Editor = {Oates, WE},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {1-55844-144-1},
Key = {fds324985}
}
@misc{fds21270,
Author = {T. Nechyba and Thomas MaCurdy},
Title = {How Does a Community's Demographic Composition Alter Its
Fiscal Burdens?},
Pages = {101-148},
Booktitle = {Demographic Change and Fiscal Policy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {A. Auerbach and R. Lee},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds21270}
}
@misc{fds21273,
Author = {M. Heise and T. Nechyba},
Title = {School Finance Reform: Introducing the Choice
Factor},
Booktitle = {City Schools: Lessons from New York},
Publisher = {John Hopkins University Press},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds21273}
}
@misc{fds324989,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Replacing capital taxes with land taxes: Efficiency and
distributional implications with an application to the
United States economy},
Journal = {LAND VALUE TAXATION},
Pages = {183-204},
Publisher = {LINCOLN INST LAND POLICY},
Editor = {Netzer, D},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {1-55844-133-6},
Key = {fds324989}
}
@misc{fds324990,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Public school finance and vouchers in a general equilibrium
Tiebout world},
Journal = {90TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION, PROCEEDINGS},
Pages = {119-125},
Publisher = {NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION},
Year = {1998},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds324990}
}
@misc{fds21275,
Author = {T. MaCurdy and T. Nechyba and J. Battacharaya},
Title = {An Economic Framework for Assessing the Fiscal Impact of
Immigration},
Booktitle = {The Immigration Debate: Studies on the Economic, Demographic
and Fiscal Effects of Immigration},
Publisher = {National Academy Press},
Editor = {J. Smith and B. Edmonston},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds21275}
}
@misc{fds21277,
Author = {T. Nechyba},
Title = {Replacing Capital Taxes with Land Taxes: Efficiency and
Distributional Implications with an Application to the
US},
Booktitle = {Land Value Taxation: Can It and Will It Work
Today},
Publisher = {Lincoln Institute Press},
Editor = {D. Netzer},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds21277}
}
@misc{fds21278,
Author = {T. Nechyba},
Title = {Computable General Equilibrium in Local Public Finance and
Fiscal Federalism: Applications to Local Taxation,
Intergovernmental Aid and Educational Vouchers},
Booktitle = {Fiscal Aspects of Evolving Federations},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {D. Wildasin},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds21278}
}
@misc{fds21281,
Author = {R. McKinnon and T. Nechyba},
Title = {Tax Competition in Federal Systems: Political Accountability
and Financial Constraints},
Booktitle = {The New Federalism: Can the States be Trusted},
Publisher = {Hoover Institution Press},
Editor = {J. Ferejohn and B. Weingast},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds21281}
}
@misc{fds324995,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Fiscal federalism and local public finance: A general
equilibrium approach with voting},
Journal = {1994 PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
TAXATION},
Pages = {136-141},
Publisher = {NATL TAX ASSOC-TAX INST AMER},
Editor = {Stocker, FD},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds324995}
}
%% Other
@misc{fds42399,
Author = {T. Nechyba},
Title = {"Comment" on "Non-Fiscal Residential Zoning"},
Booktitle = {The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in
Honor of Wallace Oates},
Publisher = {Lincoln Institute Press: Cambridge, MA},
Editor = {W. Fischel},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds42399}
}
@misc{fds23547,
Author = {T. Nechyba},
Title = {"Comment" on "Land Taxation in New York City: A General
Equilibrium Analysis"},
Pages = {95-100},
Booktitle = {Urban Issues and Public Finance: Essays in Honor of Dick
Netzer},
Publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd},
Editor = {A. Schwartz},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds23547}
}
@misc{fds23541,
Author = {T. Nechyba},
Title = {"Comment" on "Immigrant Children and New York City Schools:
Segregation and Its Consequences"},
Journal = {Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs},
Pages = {208-211},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds23541}
}
@misc{fds324984,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax
Reforms},
Publisher = {Lincoln Institute Working Paper},
Year = {2002},
Abstract = {This paper develops a general equilibrium model of an
economy that produces output using capital, labor and land
as inputs. It further develops an approach that allows
specific parameters in the model to be matched to data in
such a way as to ensure that the model can replicate
important economic realities in different settings and under
different initial tax systems. This model is then applied to
the U.S. states. Each state's, as well as an "average"
state's, economic conditions and tax system are thus formed
into a separate model, and policy simulations are performed
for each of these models in order to identify different
conditions under which reforms of different types are likely
to succeed economically and politically. Each reform that is
simulated involves an increase in taxes on unimproved land
rents sufficient to cover the shortfall in tax revenues from
a decrease in some distortionary tax on capital and/or
labor. Under plausible yet conservative assumptions, large
tax reforms that eliminate entire classes of distortionary
taxes are found to be economically feasible in virtually all
states, although prospects for such reforms are clearly
better in some states than in others. Generally, reforms are
most likely to succeed in states with high per capital
taxes, low per capita incomes and in which reforms emphasize
decreasing state and local taxes on capital rather than on
labor: taxes such as corporate income or property taxes. In
addition, the paper considers the political feasibility of
such reforms by focusing on the likely impact on land values
and thus land owners. Under plausible assumptions, reforms
that lower taxation of capital result in either INCREASES in
land values or only modest declines, while reforms that
lower taxes on labor lead to more substantial drops in land
values. Finally, reforms of this kind are shown to hold more
modest promise when states are assumed to conduct them
simultaneously rather than in isolation.},
Key = {fds324984}
}
@misc{fds324983,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {Introducing School Choice into Multi-District Public School
Systems},
Booktitle = {The Economics of School Choice},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Caroline Hoxby},
Year = {2002},
Abstract = {Predicting the impact of school finance and school choice
policies is complicated in large part because of the
multitude of household choices that are simultaneously
influenced within a general equilibrium setting. Parents
choose which neighborhoods in which school districts to
reside in, which schools - public or private - to send their
children to, and how to participate in political process
that affects education policies. As a result of these
choices, property values and therefore budget sets change as
different policies are introduced, and the nature of schools
changes as inputs - including different mixes of children
and parents - change. Furthermore, school administrators in
both private and public schools may change their behavior
under different institutional arrangements. The purpose of
this paper is therefore to shed light on how school choice
policies change opportunities faced by different types of
households and their children as the general equilibrium
forces unfold. The analysis employs general equilibrium
simulations to accomplish this. These simulations are
derived from a three-district model of low, middle and
high-income school districts (calibrated to New York data)
with housing stocks that vary within and across districts.
The advantage of this approach is that, rather than starting
from an abstract and idealized public school system, it
allows the analysis to proceed from a base model that
replicates the actual stylized facts that emerge from the
data - including public school systems with wide
inter-district variations of school quality, communities
with housing stocks similar to those observed in the data,
etc. Furthermore, the data are used to infer specific
parameters in behavioral equations, parameters that are
consistent with the present state of the world. Policies
then unfold in the model under the assumptions that
household responses will be consistent with these
parameters. Previous analysis conducted with this model has
yielded a variety of insights regarding the impact of
various public school finance systems, the potential role of
peer effects, and the likely role of different types of
voucher policies. This analysis with respect to school
choice is extended in this paper by considering potential
school responses to increased competition as well as
deriving testable implications regarding families that
differ in income and in the number of children in the
household.},
Key = {fds324983}
}
@misc{fds339516,
Author = {Nechyba, TJ},
Title = {The Economics of Education: Vouchers and Peer Group
Effects},
Year = {1998},
Abstract = {Lessons from the history of US school reforms and empirical
analysis have painted a picture of schools as complex
institutions producing a product that is influenced by the
various choices made by parents and school bureaucracies who
respond to institutional incentives. School vouchers change
the incentives faced by these agents. This paper finds that
when parents can choose schooling independent of housing,
greater residential integration results, which brings with
it much better equity properties than a more simple analysis
would imply. While the fears by some that schools will
become increasingly differentiated under voucher policies
are well founded, this greater differentiation does not have
to imply greater inequities in educational opportunities. In
fact, under some plausible scenarios, the greater
differentiation of schools leads to greater equity and
greater efficiency in both public and private
schooling.},
Key = {fds339516}
}
@misc{fds23549,
Author = {T.J. Nechyba},
Title = {"Block Grants, Matching Grants and the 'Flypaper Effect':
The Role of Local and State/National Tax
Bases"},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds23549}
}
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