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Publications of Vincent Conitzer    :chronological  combined  bibtex listing:

Journal articles or Book chapters PUBLISHED

  1. Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M; Maruono, K; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 697-702  [abs]
  2. Conitzer, V, A devastating example for the Halfer Rule, Philosophical Studies, vol. 172 no. 8 (September, 2015), pp. 1985-1992, Springer Nature, ISSN 0031-8116 [doi]  [abs]
  3. Jain, M; Korzhyk, D; Vaněk, O; Conitzer, V; Pěchouček, M; Tambe, M, A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs, 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011, vol. 1 (January, 2011), pp. 305-312  [abs]
  4. Conitzer, V, A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists, Synthese, vol. 192 no. 9 (October, 2015), pp. 2887-2899, Springer Nature, ISSN 0039-7857 [doi]  [abs]
  5. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, A generalized strategy eliminability criterion and computational methods for applying it, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (December, 2005), pp. 483-488  [abs]
  6. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, A multiagent turing test based on a prediction market, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 2 (January, 2009), pp. 1435-1436, ISSN 1548-8403
  7. Yokoo, M; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A, A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 4012 LNAI (January, 2006), pp. 53-64, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  8. Conitzer, V, A Puzzle about Further Facts, Erkenntnis, vol. 84 no. 3 (June, 2019), pp. 727-739, Springer Nature [doi]  [abs]
  9. Harrenstein, BP; De Weerdt, MM; Conitzer, V, A qualitative Vickrey auction, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2009), pp. 197-206, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  10. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Procaccia, AD, A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (July, 2010), pp. 275-284, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  11. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2008), pp. 99-108, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  12. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a nash equilibrium, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents, vol. 2006 (December, 2006), pp. 537-544, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  13. Anand, SS; Bunescu, R; Carvcdho, V; Chomicki, J; Conitzer, V; Cox, MT; Dignum, V; Dodds, Z; Dredze, M; Furcy, D; Gabrilovich, E; Göker, MH; Guesgen, H; Hirsh, H; Jannach, D; Junker, U; Ketter, W; Kobsa, A; Koenig, S; Lau, T; Lewis, L; Matson, E; Metzler, T; Mihalcea, R; Mobasher, B; Pineau, J; Poupart, P; Raja, A; Ruml, W; Sadeh, N; Shani, G; Shapiro, D; Smith, T; Taylor, ME; Wagstaff, K; Walsh, W; Zhou, R, AAAI 2008 workshop reports, AI Magazine, vol. 30 no. 1 (January, 2009), pp. 108-118, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), ISSN 0738-4602 [doi]  [abs]
  14. Chomicki, J; Conitzer, V; Junkar, U; Pern, P, AAAI Workshop - Technical Report: Preface, AAAI Workshop - Technical Report, vol. WS-08-09 (December, 2008), pp. vii
  15. Freedman, R; Borg, JS; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Dickerson, JP; Conitzer, V, Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 283 (June, 2020) [doi]  [abs]
  16. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, Aggregating value ranges: Preference elicitation and truthfulness, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol. 22 no. 1 (January, 2011), pp. 127-150, Springer Nature, ISSN 1387-2532 [doi]  [abs]
  17. Conitzer, V, AI and Economic Theory, IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, vol. 26 no. 1 (January, 2011), pp. 7-7, IEEE COMPUTER SOC
  18. Skorburg, JA; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Conitzer, V, AI Methods in Bioethics., AJOB empirical bioethics, vol. 11 no. 1 (January, 2020), pp. 37-39 [doi]
  19. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V; Jain, K, An "ethical" game-theoretic solution concept for two-player perfect-information games, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5385 LNCS (December, 2008), pp. 696-707, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  20. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004, vol. 1 (September, 2004), pp. 128-135  [abs]
  21. Zuckerman, M; Faliszewski, P; Conitzer, V; Rosenschein, JS, An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS (January, 2011), pp. 363-374, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  22. Conitzer, V, An undergraduate course in the intersection of computer science and economics, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 3 (November, 2012), pp. 2357-2362  [abs]
  23. Ohta, N; Sato, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M; Conitzer, V, Anonymity-proof shapley value: Compact and computationally efficient solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environment, Computer Software, vol. 26 no. 4 (December, 2009), pp. 181-196, ISSN 0289-6540  [abs]
  24. Ohta, N; Conitzer, V; Satoh, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M, Anonymity-proof Shapley value: Extending Shapley value for coalitional games in open environments, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 909-916, ISSN 1548-8403  [abs]
  25. Conitzer, V, Anonymity-proof voting rules, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5385 LNCS (December, 2008), pp. 295-306, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  26. Conitzer, V, Approximation guarantees for fictitious play, 2009 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2009 (December, 2009), pp. 636-643, IEEE [doi]  [abs]
  27. Chan, L; Doyle, K; McElfresh, DC; Conitzer, V; Dickerson, JP; Borg, JS; Sinnott-Armstrong, W, Artificial artificial intelligence: Measuring influence of AI 'Assessments' on moral decision-making, AIES 2020 - Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (February, 2020), pp. 214-220 [doi]  [abs]
  28. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (January, 2003), pp. 232-233 [doi]  [abs]
  29. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Automated mechanism design: Complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting, ACM International Conference Proceeding Series, vol. 50 (December, 2003), pp. 17-24 [doi]  [abs]
  30. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (December, 2003), pp. 17-24, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  31. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents, Machine Learning, vol. 67 no. 1-2 (May, 2007), pp. 23-43, Springer Nature, ISSN 0885-6125 [doi]  [abs]
  32. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents, edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning, vol. 1 (December, 2003), pp. 83-90, AAAI Press, ISBN 1-57735-189-4  [abs]
  33. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 216 (January, 2014), pp. 287-308, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0004-3702 [doi]  [abs]
  34. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2008), pp. 210-219, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  35. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games, edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, Proceedings, Twentieth International Conference on Machine Learning, vol. 1 (December, 2003), pp. 91-98, AAAI Press, ISBN 1-57735-189-4  [abs]
  36. Guo, M; Naroditskiy, V; Conitzer, V; Greenwald, A; Jennings, NR, Budget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: Public goods and beyond, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS (January, 2011), pp. 158-169, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  37. Conitzer, V, Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs?, Synthese, vol. 192 no. 12 (December, 2015), pp. 4107-4119, Springer Nature, ISSN 0039-7857 [doi]  [abs]
  38. Li, Y; Conitzer, V; Korzhyk, D, Catcher-evader games, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2016-January (January, 2016), pp. 329-337  [abs]
  39. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 41 no. 1 (February, 2012), pp. 91-129, Springer Nature, ISSN 0020-7276 [doi]  [abs]
  40. Ueda, S; Iwasaki, A; Conitzer, V; Ohta, N; Sakurai, Y; Yokoo, M, Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol. 32 no. 4 (July, 2018), pp. 503-533, Springer Nature [doi]  [abs]
  41. Naoki, O; Vincent, C; Ryo, I; Yuko, S; Atsushi, I; Makoto, Y, Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations, Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, vol. 26 no. 3 (May, 2011), pp. 451-460, Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, ISSN 1346-0714 [doi]  [abs]
  42. Ohta, N; Conitzer, V; Ichimura, R; Sakurai, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M, Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5732 LNCS (November, 2009), pp. 623-638, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  43. Yokoot, M; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A, Coalitional games in open anonymous environments, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (December, 2005), pp. 509-514  [abs]
  44. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Santi, P, Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2005), pp. 248-254  [abs]
  45. Conitzer, V; Derryberry, J; Sandholm, T, Combinatorial auctions with structured item graphs, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2004), pp. 212-218  [abs]
  46. Conitzer, V; Korzhyk, D, Commitment to correlated strategies, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2011), pp. 632-637  [abs]
  47. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators, Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2005 (January, 2005), pp. 145-152  [abs]
  48. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games, Proceedings, Twenty-First International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2004 (December, 2004), pp. 185-192  [abs]
  49. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Communication complexity of common voting rules, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2005), pp. 78-87, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  50. Conitzer, V, Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, vol. 58 no. 3 (April, 2010), pp. 239-259, Springer Nature, ISSN 1012-2443 [doi]  [abs]
  51. Conitzer, V, Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting, 10th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2008 (December, 2008), pp. 10P  [abs]
  52. Guo, M; Conitzer, V; Reeves, DM, Competitive repeated allocation without payments, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5929 LNCS (December, 2009), pp. 244-255, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  53. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Compilation complexity of common voting rules, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (January, 2010), pp. 915-920  [abs]
  54. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of (iterated) dominance, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2005), pp. 88-97, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  55. Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Complexity of computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in security resource allocation games, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (January, 2010), pp. 805-810  [abs]
  56. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 170 no. 6-7 (May, 2006), pp. 607-619, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0004-3702 [doi]  [abs]
  57. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2003), pp. 613-618, ACM, ISBN 1-58113-679-X [html], [doi]  [abs]
  58. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates, edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2002), pp. 314-319, AAAI Press / The MIT Press  [abs]
  59. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Mechanism Design, Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-02), Edmonton, Canada, 2002 (May, 2002)  [abs]
  60. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Mechanism Design., CoRR, vol. abs/1408.1486 (2014)
  61. Xia, L; Zuckerman, M; Procaccia, AD; Conitzer, V; Rosenschein, JS, Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (January, 2009), pp. 348-353, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  62. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity results about Nash equilibria, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. cs.GT/0205074 (December, 2003), pp. 765-771 [0205074v1]  [abs]
  63. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria, CoRR, vol. cs.GT/0205074 (2002)
  64. Conitzer, V, Computational aspects of mechanism design, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 4 (December, 2005), pp. 1642-1643
  65. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computational criticisms of the revelation principle, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (January, 2004), pp. 262-263 [doi]  [abs]
  66. Awad, E; Levine, S; Anderson, M; Anderson, SL; Conitzer, V; Crockett, MJ; Everett, JAC; Evgeniou, T; Gopnik, A; Jamison, JC; Kim, TW; Liao, SM; Meyer, MN; Mikhail, J; Opoku-Agyemang, K; Borg, JS; Schroeder, J; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Slavkovik, M; Tenenbaum, JB, Computational ethics., Trends in cognitive sciences, vol. 26 no. 5 (May, 2022), pp. 388-405 [doi]  [abs]
  67. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 3 (January, 2010), pp. 1676-1679  [abs]
  68. Bhattacharya, S; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, Computing a profit-maximizing sequence of offers to agents in a social network, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7695 LNCS (December, 2012), pp. 482-488, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  69. Conitzer, V, Computing game-theoretic solutions and applications to security, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 3 (November, 2012), pp. 2106-2112  [abs]
  70. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities, Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 78 no. 1 (January, 2012), pp. 2-14, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0022-0000 [doi]  [abs]
  71. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V, Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (July, 2010), pp. 83-92, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  72. Letchford, J; MacDermed, L; Conitzer, V; Parr, R; Isbell, CL, Computing optimal strategies to commit to in stochastic games, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2012), pp. 1380-1386  [abs]
  73. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computing shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2004), pp. 219-225  [abs]
  74. Conitzer, V, Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 613-619  [abs]
  75. Letchford, J; MacDermed, L; Conitzer, V; Parr, R; Isbell, CL, Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 11 no. 2 (December, 2012), pp. 36-40, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]  [abs]
  76. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Computing the optimal strategy to commit to, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 2006 (January, 2006), pp. 82-90 [doi]  [abs]
  77. Kolb, A; Conitzer, V, Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 189 no. 16 (September, 2020) [doi]  [abs]
  78. Afnan, M; Afnan, MAM; Liu, Y; Savulescu, J; Mishra, A; Conitzer, V; Rudin, C, Data solidarity for machine learning for embryo selection: a call for the creation of an open access repository of embryo data., Reproductive biomedicine online, vol. 45 no. 1 (July, 2022), pp. 10-13 [doi]  [abs]
  79. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Definition and complexity of some basic metareasoning problems, edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2003), pp. 1099-1106, Morgan Kaufmann [0307017v1]  [abs]
  80. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders., CoRR, vol. abs/1401.3876 (2014)
  81. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 41 (May, 2011), pp. 25-67, AI Access Foundation, ISSN 1076-9757 [doi]  [abs]
  82. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2008), pp. 196-201  [abs]
  83. Conitzer, V, Discussion of "a conditional game for comparing approximations", Journal of Machine Learning Research, vol. 15 (December, 2011), pp. 72-73, ISSN 1532-4435  [abs]
  84. Conitzer, V; Walsh, T; Xia, L, Dominating manipulations in voting with partial information, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2011), pp. 638-643  [abs]
  85. Conitzer, V; Easley, D; Babaioff, M, EC'14 foreword, EC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (January, 2014), pp. iii-iv
  86. Hough, JF, Editor's Introduction, Journal of Soviet Nationalities, vol. 1 no. 1 (March, 1990), pp. 1-13, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  87. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 9 no. 1 (June, 2010), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]  [abs]
  88. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 8 no. 2 (December, 2009), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]  [abs]
  89. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 8 no. 1 (July, 2009), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  90. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 7 no. 3 (November, 2008), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  91. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 7 no. 2 (June, 2008), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  92. Conitzer, V, Editor's puzzle, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 7 no. 1 (December, 2007), pp. 69-70, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  93. Sosa, JA; Romero, P, Editorial Introductions, Current Opinion in Oncology, vol. 21 no. 1 (January, 2009), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  94. Campbell, JY; Melino, A, Editors' introduction, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 45 no. 1-2 (January, 1990), pp. 1-5, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  95. Conitzer, V, Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 35 (January, 2009), pp. 161-191, ISSN 1076-9757 [doi]  [abs]
  96. Conitzer, V, Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (December, 2007), pp. 420-427, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  97. Conitzer, V, Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries., CoRR, vol. abs/1401.3449 (2014)
  98. Waggoner, B; Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Evaluating resistance to false-name manipulations in elections, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (November, 2012), pp. 1485-1491  [abs]
  99. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Expressive markets for donating to charities, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 175 no. 7-8 (May, 2011), pp. 1251-1271, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0004-3702 [doi]  [abs]
  100. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Expressive negotiation in settings with externalities, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2005), pp. 255-260  [abs]
  101. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Expressive negotiation over donations to charities, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (January, 2004), pp. 51-60 [doi]  [abs]
  102. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents, vol. 2006 (December, 2006), pp. 521-528, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  103. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 43 no. 3 (January, 2014), pp. 599-618, ISSN 0020-7276 [doi]  [abs]
  104. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 43 no. 3 (2014), pp. 1-20, Springer Nature, ISSN 0020-7276 [doi]
  105. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal, vol. abs/1208.6501 (August, 2012)  [abs]
  106. Conitzer, V; Mcafee, P, Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future, edited by Conitzer, V; McAfee, P, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 5 no. 2 (May, 2017), pp. 1-2, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  107. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (January, 2009), pp. 336-341, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  108. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Game-theoretic question selection for tests, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2013), pp. 254-262, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  109. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2008), pp. 109-118, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  110. Conitzer, V; Taylor, CR; Wagman, L, Hide and seek: Costly consumer privacy in a market with repeat purchases, Marketing Science, vol. 31 no. 2 (March, 2012), pp. 277-292, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), ISSN 0732-2399 [doi]  [abs]
  111. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V; Taylor, CR, Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases (October, 2011)
  112. Conitzer, V; Lang, J; Xia, L, How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (January, 2009), pp. 103-108, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  113. Conitzer, V; Davenport, A; Kalagitanam, J, Improved bounds for computing kemeny rankings, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 620-626  [abs]
  114. McElfresh, DC; Chan, L; Doyle, K; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Conitzer, V; Borg, JS; Dickerson, JP, Indecision Modeling, 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2021, vol. 7 (January, 2021), pp. 5975-5983  [abs]
  115. Afnan, MAM; Liu, Y; Conitzer, V; Rudin, C; Mishra, A; Savulescu, J; Afnan, M, Interpretable, not black-box, artificial intelligence should be used for embryo selection., Human reproduction open, vol. 2021 no. 4 (January, 2021), pp. hoab040 [doi]  [abs]
  116. Conitzer, V; Easley, D, Introduction to the special issue on EC'14, edited by Conitzer, V; Easley, D, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 4 no. 4 (August, 2016), pp. 1-1, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  117. Aziz, H; Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Elkind, E; Freeman, R; Walsh, T, Justified representation in approval-based committee voting, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48 no. 2 (February, 2017), pp. 461-485, Springer Nature [doi]  [abs]
  118. Aziz, H; Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Elkind, E; Freeman, R; Walsh, T, Justified representation in approval-based committee voting, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 784-790  [abs]
  119. Conitzer, V; Garera, N, Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online), ACM International Conference Proceeding Series, vol. 148 (December, 2006), pp. 209-216, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  120. Conitzer, V; Garera, N, Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online), ICML 2006 - Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Machine Learning, vol. 2006 (October, 2006), pp. 209-216  [abs]
  121. Conitzer, V, Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents, Communications of the ACM, vol. 53 no. 3 (March, 2010), pp. 84-94, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), ISSN 0001-0782 [doi]  [abs]
  122. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Lopomo, G; Stone, P, Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue Maximization, Operations Research, vol. 70 no. 1 (January, 2022), pp. 562-584, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) [doi]  [abs]
  123. Conitzer, V, Metareasoning as a formal computational problem, AAAI Workshop - Technical Report, vol. WS-08-07 (December, 2008), pp. 29-33  [abs]
  124. Sandholm, T; Gilpin, A; Conitzer, V, Mixed-integer programming methods for finding Nash equilibria, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (December, 2005), pp. 495-501  [abs]
  125. Halvorson, E; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Multi-step multi-sensor hider-seeker games, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (January, 2009), pp. 159-166, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  126. Conitzer, V; Kroer, C; Sodomka, E; Stier-Moses, NE, Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets, Operations Research, vol. 70 no. 2 (March, 2022), pp. 963-989 [doi]  [abs]
  127. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, New complexity results about Nash equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 63 no. 2 (July, 2008), pp. 621-641, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi]  [abs]
  128. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (November, 2006), pp. 627-634  [abs]
  129. Conitzer, V; Easley, D, Notes from the EC'14 program chairs, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 13 no. 1 (November, 2014), pp. 2-4, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]  [abs]
  130. Conitzer, V, On Stackelberg mixed strategies, Synthese, vol. 193 no. 3 (March, 2016), pp. 689-703, Springer Nature, ISSN 0039-7857 [doi]  [abs]
  131. Letchford, J; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, On the value of commitment, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol. 28 no. 6 (January, 2014), pp. 986-1016, ISSN 1387-2532 [doi]  [abs]
  132. Letchford, J; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, On the value of commitment, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol. 28 no. 6 (2013), pp. 1-31, Springer Nature, ISSN 1387-2532 [doi]
  133. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2008), pp. 190-195  [abs]
  134. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 174 no. 5-6 (April, 2010), pp. 363-381, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0004-3702 [doi]  [abs]
  135. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 1029-1036, ISSN 1548-8403  [abs]
  136. Conitzer, V; Kroer, C; Panigrahi, D; Schrijvers, O; Stier-Moses, NE; Sodomka, E; Wilkens, CA, Pacing Equilibrium in First Price Auction Markets, Management Science, vol. 68 no. 12 (December, 2022), pp. 8515-8535 [doi]  [abs]
  137. Conitzer, V, Philosophy in the Face of Artificial Intelligence, vol. abs/1605.06048 (May, 2016)  [abs]
  138. Conitzer, V, Prediction markets, mechanism design, and cooperative game theory, edited by Bilmes, JA; Ng, AY, Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2009 (January, 2009), pp. 101-108, AUAI Press  [abs]
  139. Shi, P; Conitzer, V; Guo, M, Prediction mechanisms that do not incentivize undesirable actions, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5929 LNCS (December, 2009), pp. 89-100, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  140. Conitzer, V; Rognlie, M; Xia, L, Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (January, 2009), pp. 109-115, ISSN 1045-0823  [abs]
  141. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3435 LNAI (December, 2005), pp. 1-14, ISSN 0302-9743  [abs]
  142. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (January, 2004), pp. 266-267 [doi]  [abs]
  143. Oesterheld, C; Conitzer, V, Safe Pareto improvements for delegated game playing, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol. 36 no. 2 (October, 2022) [doi]  [abs]
  144. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5 (January, 2004), pp. 132-141 [doi]  [abs]
  145. Conitzer, V, Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 64 no. 1 (July, 2012), pp. 100-102, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0165-4896 [doi]  [abs]
  146. Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Solving stackelberg games with uncertain observability, 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011, vol. 2 (January, 2011), pp. 953-960  [abs]
  147. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Stackelberg voting games: Computational aspects and paradoxes, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (January, 2010), pp. 921-926  [abs]
  148. Korzhyk, D; Yin, Z; Kiekintveld, C; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Stackelberg vs. nash in security games: An extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 41 (May, 2011), pp. 297-327, ISSN 1076-9757 [doi]  [abs]
  149. Korzhyk, D; Yin, Z; Kiekintveld, C; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness., CoRR, vol. abs/1401.3888 (2014)
  150. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Lang, J, Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (January, 2011), pp. 179-188, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  151. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Strategie betting for competitive agents, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 829-836, ISSN 1548-8403  [abs]
  152. De Weerdt, MM; Harrenstein, P; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 86 (January, 2014), pp. 405-420, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi]  [abs]
  153. de Weerdt, MM; Harrenstein, P; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 86 (2013), pp. 405-420, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi]  [abs]
  154. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 6484 LNCS (December, 2010), pp. 402-414, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  155. Apaydin, MS; Conitzer, V; Donald, BR, Structure-based protein NMR assignments using native structural ensembles., Journal of biomolecular NMR, vol. 40 no. 4 (April, 2008), pp. 263-276, ISSN 0925-2738 [18365752], [doi]  [abs]
  156. Conitzer, V, Technical perspective designing algorithms and the fairness criteria they should satisfy, Communications of the ACM, vol. 61 no. 2 (February, 2018), pp. 92 [doi]
  157. Conitzer, V; Mcafee, RP, The ACM transactions on economics and computation: An introduction, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 1 no. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 1-3, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [doi]
  158. Conitzer, V, The exact computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 44 no. 3 (January, 2019), pp. 783-792 [doi]  [abs]
  159. Conitzer, V, The exact computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 8289 LNCS (December, 2013), pp. 96-108, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  160. Conitzer, V, The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks, 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 (January, 2013), pp. 1482-1487, IEEE [doi]  [abs]
  161. Kephart, A; Conitzer, V, The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 9 no. 1 (March, 2021) [doi]  [abs]
  162. Jakobsen, SK; Sørensen, TB; Conitzer, V, Timeability of extensive-form games, ITCS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (January, 2016), pp. 191-199, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  163. Santi, P; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Towards a characterization of polynomial preference elicitation with value queries in combinatorial auctions, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science), vol. 3120 (January, 2004), pp. 1-16, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743 [doi]  [abs]
  164. Guo, M; Markakis, E; Apt, KR; Conitzer, V, Undominated groves mechanisms, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 46 (January, 2013), pp. 129-163, AI Access Foundation [1203.1809v2], [doi]  [abs]
  165. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 2 (January, 2008), pp. 1021-1028, ISSN 1548-8403  [abs]
  166. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard, edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2003), pp. 781-788, Morgan Kaufmann [0307018v1]  [abs]
  167. Conitzer, V, Using a memory test to limit a user to one account, Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol. 44 LNBIP (January, 2010), pp. 60-72, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 1865-1348 [doi]  [abs]
  168. Conitzer, V; Yokoo, M, Using mechanism design to prevent false-name manipulations, AI Magazine, vol. 31 no. 4 (January, 2010), pp. 65-77, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), ISSN 0738-4602 [doi]  [abs]
  169. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Vote elicitation: Complexity and strategy-proofness, edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2002), pp. 392-397, AAAI Press / The MIT Press  [abs]
  170. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Lang, J, Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (December, 2008), pp. 202-207  [abs]
  171. Apt, K; Conitzer, V; Guo, M; Markakis, E, Welfare undominated groves mechanisms, edited by Papadimitriou, CH; Zhang, S, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5385 LNCS (December, 2008), pp. 426-437, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743, ISBN 978-3-540-92184-4 [doi]  [abs]
  172. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Lang, J, When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate, Journal of the ACM, vol. 54 no. 3 (June, 2007), pp. 14-es, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), ISSN 0004-5411 [doi]  [abs]
  173. Chan, L; Schaich Borg, J; Conitzer, V; Wilkinson, D; Savulescu, J; Zohny, H; Sinnott-Armstrong, W, Which features of patients are morally relevant in ventilator triage? A survey of the UK public., BMC medical ethics, vol. 23 no. 1 (March, 2022), pp. 33 [doi]  [abs]
  174. Conitzer, V; Taylor, CR; Wagman, L, Who Benefits from Online Privacy? (August, 2009)
  175. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments, EC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce (December, 2007), pp. 30-39, ACM Press [doi]  [abs]
  176. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 67 no. 1 (September, 2009), pp. 69-98, Elsevier BV, ISSN 0899-8256 [doi]  [abs]

Conference articles PUBLISHED

  1. Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, 10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of Social Choice., edited by Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, Computational Foundations of Social Choice, vol. 10101 (2010), Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany
  2. Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, 10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of Social Choice., edited by Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, Computational Foundations of Social Choice, vol. 10101 (2010), Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany
  3. Zhang, H; Cheng, Y; Conitzer, V, A better algorithm for societal tradeoffs, 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 (January, 2019), pp. 2229-2236, ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ISBN 9781577358091  [abs]
  4. Jecmen, S; Yoon, M; Conitzer, V; Shah, NB; Fang, F, A Dataset on Malicious Paper Bidding in Peer Review, ACM Web Conference 2023 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2023 (April, 2023), pp. 3816-3826, ISBN 9781450394161 [doi]  [abs]
  5. Jain, M; Korzhyk, D; Vanek, O; Conitzer, V; Pechoucek, M; Tambe, M, A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs., edited by Sonenberg, L; Stone, P; Tumer, K; Yolum, P, AAMAS (2011), pp. 327-334, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9826571-5-7
  6. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, A hybrid of a Turing test and a prediction market, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 14 LNICST (December, 2009), pp. 61-73, ISSN 1867-8211, ISBN 9783642038204 [doi]  [abs]
  7. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, A maximum likelihood approach towards aggregating partial orders, edited by Walsh, T, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2011), pp. 446-451, IJCAI/AAAI, ISBN 9781577355120 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  8. Farfel, J; Conitzer, V, A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market., edited by Sierra, C; Castelfranchi, C; Decker, KS; Sichman, JS, AAMAS (2) (2009), pp. 1407-1408, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9817381-7-8 [doi]
  9. Zhang, H; Conitzer, V, A PAC framework for aggregating agents' judgments, 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 (January, 2019), pp. 2237-2244, ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ISBN 9781577358091  [abs]
  10. Oesterheld, C; Demski, A; Conitzer, V, A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS, vol. 379 (July, 2023), pp. 421-440 [doi]  [abs]
  11. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '14, Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014, edited by Babaioff, M; Conitzer, V; Easley, DA, EC (2014), ACM, ISBN 978-1-4503-2565-3
  12. Freedman, R; Schaich Borg, J; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Dickerson, JP; Conitzer, V, Adapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human Values, Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (December, 2018), ACM, ISBN 9781450360128 [doi]
  13. Freedman, R; Dickerson, JP; Borg, JS; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Conitzer, V, Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values, 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018 (January, 2018), pp. 1636-1643, ISBN 9781577358008  [abs]
  14. Xia, L; Conitzer, V; Lang, J, Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 1 (January, 2010), pp. 399-406, IFAAMAS, ISBN 9781617387715 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  15. Conitzer, V; Hadfield, G; Vallor, S, AIES 2019 program chairs' welcome, AIES 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (January, 2019), pp. III-IV, ISBN 9781450363242
  16. Ohta, N; Conitzer, V; Satoh, Y; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M, Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, AAMAS (2) (2008), pp. 927-934, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9817381-1-6 [doi]
  17. Conitzer, V, Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules, edited by Cramton, P; Müller, R; Tardos, É; Tennenholtz, M, Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, vol. 7271 (January, 2007), Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany  [abs]
  18. Conitzer, V; Xia, L, Approximating common voting rules by sequential voting in multi-issue domains, International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2012 (December, 2012) [AcceptedPapers]  [abs]
  19. Bhattacharya, S; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K, Approximation algorithm for security games with costly resources, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7090 LNCS (January, 2011), pp. 13-24, ISSN 0302-9743, ISBN 9783642255090 [doi]  [abs]
  20. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Lopomo, G, Assessing the robustness of Cremer-McLean with automated mechanism design, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 763-769, ISBN 9781577357001  [abs]
  21. Andersen, G; Conitzer, V, ATUCAPTS: Automated tests that a user cannot pass twice simultaneously, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2016-January (January, 2016), pp. 3662-3669  [abs]
  22. Sandholm, T; Conitzer, V; Boutilier, C, Automated design of multistage mechanisms, edited by Veloso, MM, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2007), pp. 1500-1506 [html]  [abs]
  23. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Stone, P, Automated design of robust mechanisms, 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017 (January, 2017), pp. 298-304  [abs]
  24. Zhang, H; Conitzer, V, Automated Dynamic Mechanism Design, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, vol. 33 (January, 2021), pp. 27785-27797, ISBN 9781713845393  [abs]
  25. Zhang, H; Cheng, Y; Conitzer, V, Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification, 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2021, vol. 6B (January, 2021), pp. 5789-5796, ISBN 9781713835974  [abs]
  26. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents., edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, ICML (2003), pp. 83-90, AAAI Press, ISBN 1-57735-189-4
  27. Conitzer, V; Deng, Y; Dughmi, S, Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 12495 LNCS (January, 2020), pp. 444-458, ISBN 9783030649456 [doi]  [abs]
  28. Sørensen, TB; Dalis, M; Letchford, J; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V, Beat the cheater: Computing game-theoretic strategies for when to kick a gambler out of a casino, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 798-804, ISBN 9781577356776  [abs]
  29. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games., edited by Fawcett, T; Mishra, N, ICML (2003), pp. 91-98, AAAI Press, ISBN 1-57735-189-4
  30. Zhang, H; Cheng, Y; Conitzer, V, Classification with Few Tests through Self-Selection, 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2021, vol. 6B (January, 2021), pp. 5805-5812, ISBN 9781713835974  [abs]
  31. Krishnaswamy, AK; Li, H; Rein, D; Zhang, H; Conitzer, V, Classification with Strategically Withheld Data∗, 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2021, vol. 6B (January, 2021), pp. 5514-5522, ISBN 9781713835974  [abs]
  32. Yokoo, M; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A, Coalitional games in open anonymous environments, edited by Kaelbling, LP; Saffiotti, A, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2005), pp. 1668-1669, Professional Book Center, ISBN 0938075934 [html]
  33. Zhang, H; Conitzer, V, Combinatorial Ski Rental and Online Bipartite Matching, EC 2020 - Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (July, 2020), pp. 879-910, ISBN 9781450379755 [doi]  [abs]
  34. Conitzer, V; Korzhyk, D, Commitment to Correlated Strategies, Proceedings of the 25th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2011 (August, 2011), pp. 632-637, ISBN 9781577355083  [abs]
  35. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules, Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2010 (July, 2010), pp. 915-920, ISBN 9781577354642  [abs]
  36. Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games, Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2010 (July, 2010), pp. 805-810, ISBN 9781577354642  [abs]
  37. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (January, 2003), pp. 230-231 [doi]  [abs]
  38. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core, edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2003), pp. 613-618, Morgan Kaufmann, ISBN 1-58113-679-X [html], [doi]  [abs]
  39. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates., edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, AAAI/IAAI (2002), pp. 314-319, AAAI Press / The MIT Press
  40. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Complexity of Mechanism Design, edited by Darwiche, A; Friedman, N, vol. cs.GT/0205075 (August, 2014), pp. 103-110, Morgan Kaufmann, ISBN 1-55860-897-4  [abs]
  41. Kephart, A; Conitzer, V, Complexity of mechanism design with signaling costs, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 1 (January, 2015), pp. 357-365, ISSN 1548-8403, ISBN 9781450337694  [abs]
  42. De Weerdt, M; Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Van Der Linden, K, Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart grid, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2018-July (January, 2018), pp. 4736-4742, ISBN 9780999241127 [doi]  [abs]
  43. De Weerdt, MM; Conitzer, V; Albert, M; Van Der Linden, K, Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart grid, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 3 (January, 2018), pp. 1924-1926, ISBN 9781510868083  [abs]
  44. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Complexity of stability-based solution concepts in multi-issue and MC-net cooperative games, 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 581-588, ISBN 9781634391313  [abs]
  45. Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, JF; Zwicker, WS, Computational Foundations of Social Choice - Dagstuhl Seminar -, Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, vol. 10101 (January, 2010)  [abs]
  46. Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010, edited by Brandt, F; Conitzer, V; Hemaspaandra, LA; Laslier, J-F; Zwicker, WS, Computational Foundations of Social Choice, vol. 10101 (2010), Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany
  47. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies, Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2010 (July, 2010), pp. 1676-1679, ISBN 9781577354642  [abs]
  48. Conitzer, V, Computing equilibria with partial commitment, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 10123 LNCS (January, 2016), pp. 1-14, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISBN 9783662541098 [doi]  [abs]
  49. Conitzer, V, Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions and Applications to Security, Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2012 (January, 2012), pp. 2106-2112  [abs]
  50. Letchford, J; MacDermed, L; Conitzer, V; Parr, R; Isbell, CL, Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic Games, Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2012 (January, 2012), pp. 1380-1386  [abs]
  51. Brill, M; Freeman, R; Conitzer, V, Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan set winners), edited by Schuurmans, D; Wellman, MP, International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2016 (January, 2016), pp. 369-375, AAAI Press, ISBN 978-1-57735-760-5  [abs]
  52. Brill, M; Freeman, R; Conitzer, V, Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan set winners), International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2016 (January, 2016)  [abs]
  53. Brill, M; Freeman, R; Conitzer, V, Computing possible and necessary equilibrium actions (and bipartisan setwinners), 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016 (January, 2016), pp. 418-424, ISBN 9781577357605  [abs]
  54. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Cooperative game solution concepts that maximize stability under noise, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 979-985, ISBN 9781577357001  [abs]
  55. Conitzer, V; Brill, M; Freeman, R, Crowdsourcing societal tradeoffs, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 2 (January, 2015), pp. 1213-1217, ISSN 1548-8403, ISBN 9781450337700  [abs]
  56. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems., edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, IJCAI (2003), pp. 1099-1106, Morgan Kaufmann
  57. Conitzer, V, Designing preferences, beliefs, and identities for artificial intelligence, 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 (January, 2019), pp. 9755-9759, ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ISBN 9781577358091  [abs]
  58. Deng, Y; Conitzer, V, Disarmament games, 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017 (January, 2017), pp. 473-479  [abs]
  59. Deng, Y; Conitzer, V, Disarmament games with resources, 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018 (January, 2018), pp. 981-988, ISBN 9781577358008  [abs]
  60. Zhang, H; Cheng, Y; Conitzer, V, Distinguishing distributions when samples are strategically transformed, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, vol. 32 (January, 2019)  [abs]
  61. Conitzer, V; Walsh, T; Xia, L, Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information, Proceedings of the 25th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2011 (August, 2011), pp. 638-643, ISBN 9781577355083  [abs]
  62. Freeman, R; Zahedi, SM; Conitzer, V; Lee, BC, Dynamic Proportional Sharing, Performance Evaluation Review, vol. 46 no. 1 (June, 2018), pp. 33-35, ACM Press, ISBN 9781450358460 [doi]  [abs]
  63. Bergemann, D; Chen, Y; Conitzer, V, EC 2016 foreword, EC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (July, 2016), pp. iii-iv, ISBN 9781450339360
  64. Zhang, H; Cheng, Y; Conitzer, V, Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints, EC 2022 - Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (July, 2022), pp. 1121-1140, ISBN 9781450391504 [doi]  [abs]
  65. Zhang, H; Cheng, Y; Conitzer, V, Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation, EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (July, 2023), pp. 1161-1186, ISBN 9798400701047 [doi]  [abs]
  66. Afnan, MAM; Rudin, C; Conitzer, V; Savulescu, J; Mishra, A; Liu, Y; Afnan, M, Ethical Implementation of Artificial Intelligence to Select Embryos in in Vitro Fertilization, AIES 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (July, 2021), pp. 316-326, ISBN 9781450384735 [doi]  [abs]
  67. Waggoner, B; Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections, Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2012 (January, 2012), pp. 1485-1491  [abs]
  68. Oesterheld, C; Conitzer, V, Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 71 no. 4 (October, 2021), pp. 701-716 [doi]  [abs]
  69. Freeman, R; Zahedi, SM; Conitzer, V, Fair and efficient social choice in dynamic settings, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (January, 2017), pp. 4580-4587, ISBN 9780999241103 [doi]  [abs]
  70. Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Shah, N, Fair public decision making, EC 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (June, 2017), pp. 629-646, ACM Press, ISBN 9781450345279 [doi]  [abs]
  71. Todo, T; Conitzer, V, False-name-proof matching, edited by Gini, ML; Shehory, O; Ito, T; Jonker, CM, 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013, vol. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 311-318, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-1-4503-1993-5 [citation.cfm]  [abs]
  72. Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Shah, N, False-name-proof recommendations in social networks, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS (January, 2016), pp. 332-340, ISBN 9781450342391  [abs]
  73. Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Shah, N, False-name-proof recommendations in social networks, International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2016 (January, 2016)  [abs]
  74. Brill, M; Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Shah, N, False-name-proof recommendations in social networks, International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2016 (January, 2016)  [abs]
  75. Conitzer, V; Immorlica, N; Letchford, J; Munagala, K; Wagman, L, False-name-proofness in social networks, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 6484 LNCS (December, 2010), pp. 209-221, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743, ISBN 9783642175718 [doi]  [abs]
  76. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal., edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, AAMAS (2010), pp. 1475-1476, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9826571-1-9 [doi]
  77. Andersen, G; Conitzer, V, Fast equilibrium computation for infinitely repeated games, edited by desJardins, M; Littman, ML, Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013 (December, 2013), pp. 53-59, AAAI Press, ISBN 9781577356158 [php]  [abs]
  78. Emmons, S; Oesterheld, C; Critch, A; Conitzer, V; Russell, S, For Learning in Symmetric Teams, Local Optima are Global Nash Equilibria, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, vol. 162 (January, 2022), pp. 5924-5943  [abs]
  79. Conitzer, V; Oesterheld, C, Foundations of Cooperative AI, Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023, vol. 37 (June, 2023), pp. 15359-15367, ISBN 9781577358800  [abs]
  80. Kovařík, V; Oesterheld, C; Conitzer, V, Game Theory with Simulation of Other Players, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2023-August (January, 2023), pp. 2800-2807, ISBN 9781956792034  [abs]
  81. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Game-theoretic question selection for tests, edited by Rossi, F, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 59 (May, 2017), pp. 437-462, AI Access Foundation, ISBN 978-1-57735-633-2 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  82. Freeman, R; Brill, M; Conitzer, V, General tiebreaking schemes for computational social choice, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 3 (January, 2015), pp. 1401-1409, ISSN 1548-8403, ISBN 9781450337717  [abs]
  83. Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Shah, N; Vaughan, JW, Group fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods, 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 (January, 2019), pp. 1853-1860, ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ISBN 9781577358091  [abs]
  84. Conitzer, V; Lang, J; Sandholm, T, How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?, edited by Halpern, JY; Tennenholtz, M, TARK (2003), pp. 201-214, ACM, ISBN 1-58113-731-1 [doi]  [abs]
  85. Conitzer, V; Lang, J; Xia, L, Hypercubewise preference aggregation in multi-issue domains, edited by Walsh, T, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2011), pp. 158-163, IJCAI/AAAI, ISBN 9781577355120 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  86. Bhattacharya, S; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K; Xia, L, Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions, Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (January, 2010), pp. 554-572, ISBN 9780898717013 [doi]  [abs]
  87. Bhattacharya, S; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K; Xia, L, Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions., edited by Charikar, M, SODA (2010), pp. 554-572, SIAM, ISBN 978-0-89871-701-3 [doi]
  88. Zhang, H; Conitzer, V, Incentive-Aware PAC Learning, 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2021, vol. 6B (January, 2021), pp. 5797-5804, ISBN 9781713835974  [abs]
  89. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Incremental mechanism design, edited by Veloso, MM, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2007), pp. 1251-1256 [html]  [abs]
  90. Conitzer, V, Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award., edited by Durfee, EH; Yokoo, M; Huhns, MN; Shehory, O, AAMAS (2007), pp. 253-253, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-81-904262-7-5 [doi]
  91. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V; Munagala, K, Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5814 LNCS (December, 2009), pp. 250-262, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, ISSN 0302-9743, ISBN 9783642046445 [doi]  [abs]
  92. Conitzer, V; Panigrahi, D; Zhang, H, Learning Influence Adoption in Heterogeneous Networks, Proceedings of the 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2022, vol. 36 (June, 2022), pp. 6411-6419, ISBN 9781577358763  [abs]
  93. Conitzer, V; Panigrahi, D; Zhang, H, Learning opinions in social networks, 37th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2020, vol. PartF168147-3 (January, 2020), pp. 2100-2110, ISBN 9781713821120  [abs]
  94. Zhang, H; Conitzer, V, Learning the valuations of a k-demand agent, 37th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2020, vol. PartF168147-15 (January, 2020), pp. 11000-11009, ISBN 9781713821120  [abs]
  95. Conitzer, V, Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness, edited by Cramton, P; Müller, R; Tardos, É; Tennenholtz, M, Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2007, vol. 07271 (December, 2007), pp. 102-111, ACM Press [html], [doi]  [abs]
  96. Conitzer, V, Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness, edited by Cramton, P; Müller, R; Tardos, É; Tennenholtz, M, Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, vol. 7271 (January, 2007), Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany  [abs]
  97. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Maximal cooperation in repeated games on social networks, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2015-January (January, 2015), pp. 216-223, ISSN 1045-0823, ISBN 9781577357384  [abs]
  98. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Lopomo, G, Maximizing revenue with limited correlation: The cost of ex-post incentive compatibility, 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016 (January, 2016), pp. 376-382, ISBN 9781577357605  [abs]
  99. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Lopomo, G, Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility., edited by Schuurmans, D; Wellman, MP, AAAI (2016), pp. 383-389, AAAI Press, ISBN 978-1-57735-760-5
  100. Conitzer, V; Vidali, A, Mechanism design for scheduling with uncertain execution time, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 623-629, ISBN 9781577356776  [abs]
  101. Albert, M; Conitzer, V; Stone, P, Mechanism design with unknown correlated distributions: Can we learn optimal mechanisms?, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 1 (January, 2017), pp. 69-77, ISBN 9781510855076  [abs]
  102. Oesterheld, C; Conitzer, V, Minimum-Regret Contracts for Principal-Expert Problems, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 12495 LNCS (January, 2020), pp. 430-443, ISBN 9783030649456 [doi]  [abs]
  103. Jecmen, S; Zhang, H; Liu, R; Shah, NB; Conitzer, V; Fang, F, Mitigating manipulation in peer review via randomized reviewer assignments, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, vol. 2020-December (January, 2020)  [abs]
  104. Conitzer, V; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Borg, JS; Deng, Y; Kramer, M, Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence, International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2018 (January, 2018)  [abs]
  105. Conitzer, V; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Schaich Borg, J; Deng, Y; Kramer, M, Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence (January, 2017), pp. 4831-4835  [abs]
  106. Conitzer, V; Sinnott-Armstrong, W; Borg, JS; Deng, Y; Kramer, M, Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence, AAAI Workshop - Technical Report, vol. WS-17-01 - WS-17-15 (January, 2017), pp. 105-109, ISBN 9781577357865  [abs]
  107. Jecmen, S; Zhang, H; Liu, R; Fang, F; Conitzer, V; Shah, NB, Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing and Conference Experiment Design, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 3 (January, 2022), pp. 1642-1644, ISBN 9781713854333 [doi]  [abs]
  108. Jecmen, S; Zhang, H; Liu, R; Fang, F; Conitzer, V; Shah, NB, Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing and Conference Experiment Design, Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, vol. 10 (January, 2022), pp. 102-113, ISBN 9781577358787 [doi]  [abs]
  109. Xu, YE; Zhang, H; Conitzer, V, Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups, Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 38 no. 9 (March, 2024), pp. 9952-9959 [doi]  [abs]
  110. Freeman, R; Brill, M; Conitzer, V, On the axiomatic characterization of runoff voting rules, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1 (January, 2014), pp. 675-681, ISBN 9781577356776  [abs]
  111. Li, Y; Conitzer, V, Optimal Internet auctions with costly communication, edited by Gini, ML; Shehory, O; Ito, T; Jonker, CM, 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013, vol. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 683-690, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-1-4503-1993-5 [citation.cfm]  [abs]
  112. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, AAMAS (2) (2008), pp. 1047-1054, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9817381-1-6 [doi]
  113. Conitzer, V; Kroer, C; Panigrahi, D; Schrijvers, O; Sodomka, E; Stier-Moses, NE; Wilkens, C, Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets, Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (June, 2019), ACM, ISBN 9781450367929 [doi]
  114. Conitzer, V; Xia, L, Paradoxes of multiple elections: An approximation approach, edited by Brewka, G; Eiter, T; McIlraith, SA, Proceedings of the International Conference on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (January, 2012), pp. 179-187, AAAI Press, ISBN 9781577355601 [html]  [abs]
  115. Zhang, H; Cheng, Y; Conitzer, V, Planning with Participation Constraints, Proceedings of the 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2022, vol. 36 (June, 2022), pp. 5260-5267, ISBN 9781577358763  [abs]
  116. Conitzer, V, Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory., edited by Bilmes, JA; Ng, AY, UAI (2009), pp. 101-108, AUAI Press
  117. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS (January, 2016), pp. 1413-1414, ISBN 9781450342391  [abs]
  118. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Role assignment for game-theoretic cooperation, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2016-January (January, 2016), pp. 416-423  [abs]
  119. Moon, C; Conitzer, V, Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation: (Extended Abstract)., edited by Jonker, CM; Marsella, S; Thangarajah, J; Tuyls, K, AAMAS (2016), pp. 1413-1414, ACM, ISBN 978-1-4503-4239-1
  120. Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Brill, M; Li, Y, Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs, 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016 (January, 2016), pp. 460-467, ISBN 9781577357605  [abs]
  121. Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Brill, M; Li, Y, Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs, International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2016 (January, 2016)  [abs]
  122. Conitzer, V; Freeman, R; Brill, M; Li, Y, Rules for choosing societal tradeoffs, International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2016 (January, 2016)  [abs]
  123. Oesterheld, C; Conitzer, V, Safe pareto improvements for delegated game playing, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 2 (January, 2021), pp. 971-979, ISBN 9781713832621  [abs]
  124. Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V; Parr, R, Security games with multiple attacker resources, edited by Walsh, T, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (December, 2011), pp. 273-279, IJCAI/AAAI, ISBN 9781577355120 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  125. Jain, M; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Security scheduling for real-world networks, edited by Gini, ML; Shehory, O; Ito, T; Jonker, CM, 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013, vol. 1 (January, 2013), pp. 215-222, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-1-4503-1993-5 [citation.cfm]  [abs]
  126. Xu, H; Freeman, R; Conitzer, V; Dughmi, S; Tambe, M, Signaling in Bayesian stackelberg games, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS (January, 2016), pp. 150-158, ISBN 9781450342391  [abs]
  127. Letchford, J; Conitzer, V, Solving security games on graphs via marginal probabilities, edited by desJardins, M; Littman, ML, Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013 (December, 2013), pp. 591-597, AAAI Press, ISBN 9781577356158 [php]  [abs]
  128. Xu, H; Fang, F; Jiang, AX; Conitzer, V; Dughmi, S; Tambe, M, Solving zero-sum security games in discretized spatio-temporal domains, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (January, 2014), pp. 1500-1506, ISBN 9781577356783  [abs]
  129. Xia, L; Conitzer, V, Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes, Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2010 (July, 2010), pp. 921-926, ISBN 9781577354642  [abs]
  130. Yin, Z; Korzhyk, D; Kiekintveld, C; Conitzer, V; Tambe, M, Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: Interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 2 (January, 2010), pp. 1139-1146, IFAAMAS, ISBN 9781617387715 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  131. Wagman, L; Conitzer, V, Strategic betting for competitive agents., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, AAMAS (2) (2008), pp. 847-854, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9817381-1-6 [doi]
  132. Brill, M; Conitzer, V, Strategic voting and strategic candidacy, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2 (June, 2015), pp. 819-826, ISBN 9781577357001  [abs]
  133. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 2 (January, 2010), pp. 881-888, IFAAMAS, ISBN 9781617387715 [html], [doi]  [abs]
  134. Conitzer, V, The Complexity of Computing Robust Mediated Equilibria in Ordinal Games, Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 38 no. 9 (March, 2024), pp. 9607-9615 [doi]  [abs]
  135. Tewolde, E; Oesterheld, C; Conitzer, V; Goldberg, PW, The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games, IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2023-August (January, 2023), pp. 2878-2887, ISBN 9781956792034  [abs]
  136. Conitzer, V, The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks, International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2014 (January, 2014), pp. 1482-1487, IEEE [doi]  [abs]
  137. Kephart, A; Conitzer, V, The revelation principle for mechanism design with reporting costs, EC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (July, 2016), pp. 85-102, ACM Press, ISBN 9781450339360 [doi]  [abs]
  138. Jakobsen, SK; Sørensen, TB; Conitzer, V, Timeability of Extensive-Form Games., edited by Sudan, M, ITCS (2016), pp. 191-199, ACM, ISBN 978-1-4503-4057-1 [doi]
  139. Guo, M; Conitzer, V, Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms., edited by Padgham, L; Parkes, DC; Müller, JP; Parsons, S, AAMAS (2) (2008), pp. 1039-1046, IFAAMAS, ISBN 978-0-9817381-1-6 [doi]
  140. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard., edited by Gottlob, G; Walsh, T, IJCAI (2003), pp. 781-788, Morgan Kaufmann
  141. Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T, Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness., edited by Dechter, R; Kearns, MJ; Sutton, RS, AAAI/IAAI (2002), pp. 392-397, AAAI Press / The MIT Press
  142. Apt, KR; Conitzer, V; Guo, M; Markakis, E, Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms., edited by Papadimitriou, CH; Zhang, S, WINE, vol. 5385 (2008), pp. 426-437, Springer, ISBN 978-3-540-92184-4
  143. Conitzer, V; Feng, Z; Parkes, DC; Sodomka, E, Welfare-Preserving ε -BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 13112 LNCS (January, 2022), pp. 76-94, ISBN 9783030946753 [doi]  [abs]
  144. Kramer, MF; Schaich Borg, J; Conitzer, V; Sinnott-Armstrong, W, When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?, AIES 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (December, 2018), pp. 204-209, ISBN 9781450360128 [doi]  [abs]
  145. Zhang, H; Cheng, Y; Conitzer, V, When samples are strategically selected, 36th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2019, vol. 2019-June (January, 2019), pp. 12733-12743, ISBN 9781510886988  [abs]
  146. Conitzer, V, Why should we ever automate moral decision making?, CEUR Workshop Proceedings, vol. 3547 (January, 2022)  [abs]
  147. Iwasaki, A; Conitzer, V; Omori, Y; Sakurai, Y; Todo, T; Guo, M; Yokoo, M, Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms, edited by Hoek, WVD; Kaminka, GA; Lespérance, Y; Luck, M; Sen, S, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 2 (January, 2010), pp. 633-640, IFAAMAS, ISBN 9781617387715 [html], [doi]  [abs]
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