Economics
Arts & Sciences
Duke University
| |
Faculty Database Economics Arts & Sciences Duke University |
|
| HOME > Arts & Sciences > Economics > Faculty | Search Help Login |
|
| Publications of Lori S. Bennear :chronological alphabetical combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds328284,
Author = {Wiener, J},
Title = {Policy Shock: Recalibrating Risk and Regulation after Oil
Spills, Nuclear Accidents, and Financial
Crises},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Balleisen, EJ and Wiener, J and Krawiec, K and Bennear,
L},
Year = {2017},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {978-1107140219},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316492635},
Doi = {10.1017/9781316492635},
Key = {fds328284}
}
%% Papers Published
@article{fds371155,
Author = {Baker, J and Bennear, L and Olmstead, S},
Title = {Does Information Disclosure Reduce Drinking Water Violations
in the United States?},
Journal = {Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists},
Volume = {10},
Number = {3},
Pages = {787-818},
Year = {2023},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/722619},
Abstract = {The 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments required
community water systems to disclose violations of drinking
water standards to their customers in annual water quality
reports. We explore the impact of three methods of
disclosure on health-based drinking water quality violations
using a matching and differences-in-differences framework
with a national data set of drinking water quality
violations from 1990 to 2001. We find that this information
disclosure requirement reduced drinking water violations
significantly and that the primary effect of disclosure on
violations persists for at least four years after policy
implementation. We find no evidence, however, that water
systems trade these potentially more salient violation
reductions for potentially less salient reductions in
violations of other standards, nor do we find any evidence
that water systems responded differentially to disclosure
based on the demo-graphic or political characteristics of
their customers.},
Doi = {10.1086/722619},
Key = {fds371155}
}
@article{fds367815,
Author = {Bennear, LS},
Title = {Energy Justice, Decarbonization, and the Clean Energy
Transformation},
Journal = {Annual Review of Resource Economics},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {647-668},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-111920-022328},
Abstract = {Addressing climate change will require significant
reductions in carbon emissions. Decarbonization will likely
lead to increases in energy prices, which are regressive.
Poorer households spend a higher percentage of income on
energy and also have less access to energy efficient options
in housing, transportation (including electric vehicles),
and household durables. This review summarizes the state of
knowledge on the energy justice implications of the clean
energy transformation along four dimensions¤mdash¤production
of energy, energy insecurity/energy poverty, access to clean
energy technologies, and impacts of policy instrument
choices for achieving decarbonization. Along each dimension
there is evidence of greater negative impacts on
lower-income households and on Black, Indigenous, and people
of color (BIPOC) households, even controlling for income.
But there is also evidence that these impacts can be
mitigated through policy choices. Together these findings
highlight that centering justice concerns in policy debates
is critical for a just and clean energy transformation.},
Doi = {10.1146/annurev-resource-111920-022328},
Key = {fds367815}
}
@article{fds360663,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Wiener, JB},
Title = {Institutional Roles and Goals for Retrospective Regulatory
Analysis},
Journal = {Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {466-493},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bca.2021.10},
Abstract = {Despite repeated calls for retrospective regulatory review
by every President since the 1970s, progress on implementing
such reviews has been slow. We argue that part of the
explanation for the slow progress to date stems from
misalignment between the goals of regulatory review and the
institutional framework used for the review. We define three
distinct goals of regulatory review - the rule relevance
goal, the rule improvement goal, and the regulatory learning
goal. We then examine the text of the Presidential Executive
Orders and major Congressional legislation addressing
retrospective review, and document which goals were targeted
and which institutions were used to conduct the reviews. We
find that the U.S. federal government has almost always
sought review of one rule at a time, conducted by the agency
that issued or promulgated the rule and that these reviews
tend to focus on rule relevance and costs. This
institutional framework for retrospective review - one rule,
assessed by the promulgating agency, focused on relevance
and cost - is only well-suited to a narrow interpretation of
the rule improvement goal. We then review alternative
institutional structures that could better meet the rule
improvement goal and the broader regulatory learning goal
across multiple rules and agencies, and we offer
recommendations for developing new guidance and institutions
to promote multiagency regulatory learning.},
Doi = {10.1017/bca.2021.10},
Key = {fds360663}
}
@article{fds324102,
Author = {Smith, MD and Oglend, A and Kirkpatrick, AJ and Asche, F and Bennear,
LS and Craig, JK and Nance, JM},
Title = {Seafood prices reveal impacts of a major ecological
disturbance.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {114},
Number = {7},
Pages = {1512-1517},
Year = {2017},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1617948114},
Abstract = {Coastal hypoxia (dissolved oxygen ≤ 2 mg/L) is a growing
problem worldwide that threatens marine ecosystem services,
but little is known about economic effects on fisheries.
Here, we provide evidence that hypoxia causes economic
impacts on a major fishery. Ecological studies of hypoxia
and marine fauna suggest multiple mechanisms through which
hypoxia can skew a population's size distribution toward
smaller individuals. These mechanisms produce sharp
predictions about changes in seafood markets. Hypoxia is
hypothesized to decrease the quantity of large shrimp
relative to small shrimp and increase the price of large
shrimp relative to small shrimp. We test these hypotheses
using time series of size-based prices. Naive quantity-based
models using treatment/control comparisons in hypoxic and
nonhypoxic areas produce null results, but we find strong
evidence of the hypothesized effects in the relative prices:
Hypoxia increases the relative price of large shrimp
compared with small shrimp. The effects of fuel prices
provide supporting evidence. Empirical models of fishing
effort and bioeconomic simulations explain why quantifying
effects of hypoxia on fisheries using quantity data has been
inconclusive. Specifically, spatial-dynamic feedbacks across
the natural system (the fish stock) and human system (the
mobile fishing fleet) confound "treated" and "control"
areas. Consequently, analyses of price data, which rely on a
market counterfactual, are able to reveal effects of the
ecological disturbance that are obscured in quantity data.
Our results are an important step toward quantifying the
economic value of reduced upstream nutrient loading in the
Mississippi Basin and are broadly applicable to other
coupled human-natural systems.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1617948114},
Key = {fds324102}
}
@article{fds329046,
Author = {Golden, JS and Virdin, J and Nowacek, D and Halpin, P and Bennear, L and Patil, PG},
Title = {Making sure the blue economy is green.},
Journal = {Nature ecology & evolution},
Volume = {1},
Number = {2},
Pages = {17},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41559-016-0017},
Doi = {10.1038/s41559-016-0017},
Key = {fds329046}
}
@article{fds328661,
Author = {Purcell, KM and Craig, JK and Nance, JM and Smith, MD and Bennear,
LS},
Title = {Fleet behavior is responsive to a large-scale environmental
disturbance: Hypoxia effects on the spatial dynamics of the
northern Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {12},
Number = {8},
Pages = {e0183032},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183032},
Abstract = {The northwestern Gulf of Mexico shelf experiences one of the
largest seasonal hypoxic zones in the western hemisphere.
Hypoxia (dissolved oxygen, DO ≤ 2.0 mg·L-1) is most
severe from May to August during the height of the Gulf
shrimp fishery, but its effects on the fishery are not well
known. Prior studies indicate that hypoxia alters the
spatial dynamics of shrimp and other species through habitat
loss and aggregation in nearby oxygenated refuge habitats.
We hypothesized that hypoxia-induced changes in the
distribution of shrimp also alter the spatial dynamics of
the Gulf shrimp fleet. We integrated data on the geographic
distribution of shrimp tows and bottom DO to evaluate the
effects of hypoxia on spatial patterns in shrimping effort.
Our analyses indicate that shrimping effort declines in low
DO waters on both the Texas and Louisiana shelf, but that
considerable effort still occurs in low DO waters off
Louisiana, likely because riverine nutrients fuel both
benthic production and low bottom DO in the same general
regions. The response of the shrimp fleet to hypoxia on the
Louisiana shelf was complex with shifts in effort inshore,
offshore, westward, and eastward of the hypoxic zone, as
well as to an oxygenated area between two hypoxia regimes
associated with the Mississippi and the Atchafalaya River
outflows. In contrast, effort on the Texas shelf mostly
shifted offshore in response to low DO but also shifted
inshore in some years. Spatial patterns in total shrimping
effort were driven primarily by the number of shrimp tows,
consistent with aggregation of the fleet outside of hypoxic
waters, though tow duration also declined in low DO waters.
Overall, our results demonstrate that hypoxia alters the
spatial dynamics of the Gulf shrimp fishery with potential
consequences for harvest interactions and the economic
condition of the fishery.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0183032},
Key = {fds328661}
}
@article{fds322571,
Author = {Cunningham, S and Bennear, LS and Smith, MD},
Title = {Spillovers in regional fisheries management: Do catch shares
cause leakage?},
Journal = {Land Economics},
Volume = {92},
Number = {2},
Pages = {344-362},
Publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3368/le.92.2.344},
Abstract = {Regional councils manage U.S. fisheries. Fishermen can
participate in fisheries managed by multiple councils, and
effort controls in one region could lead to effort leakage
into another. Theoretical modeling demonstrates that
positive, negative, and no leakage are possible. Using
difference-in-differences, we test for leakage across
regional boundaries for a catch share program in New England
and find evidence that the New England groundfish sector
program caused spillover into adjacent Mid-Atlantic
fisheries. Aggregate Mid-Atlantic harvest volume increased
among sector members after the policy change. We find
leakage in individual fisheries with similar gear and high
market substitutability with sector species.},
Doi = {10.3368/le.92.2.344},
Key = {fds322571}
}
@article{fds266085,
Author = {Bennear, LS},
Title = {Offshore oil and gas drilling: A review of regulatory
regimes in the United States, United Kingdom, and
Norway},
Journal = {Review of Environmental Economics and Policy},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {2-22},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1750-6816},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/reep/reu013},
Doi = {10.1093/reep/reu013},
Key = {fds266085}
}
@article{fds266088,
Author = {Balasubramanya, S and Pfaff, A and Bennear, L and Tarozzi, A and Ahmed,
KM and Schoenfeld, A and van Geen, A},
Title = {Evolution of households' responses to the groundwater
arsenic crisis in Bangladesh: information on environmental
health risks can have increasing behavioral impact over
time.},
Journal = {Environment and development economics},
Volume = {19},
Number = {5},
Pages = {631-647},
Year = {2014},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {1355-770X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x13000612},
Abstract = {A national campaign of well testing through 2003 enabled
households in rural Bangladesh to switch, at least for
drinking, from high-arsenic wells to neighboring
lower-arsenic wells. We study the well-switching dynamics
over time by re-interviewing, in 2008, a randomly selected
subset of households in the Araihazar region who had been
interviewed in 2005. Contrary to concerns that the impact of
arsenic information on switching behavior would erode over
time, we find that not only was 2003-2005 switching highly
persistent but also new switching by 2008 doubled the share
of households at unsafe wells who had switched. The passage
of time also had a cost: 22% of households did not recall
test results by 2008. The loss of arsenic knowledge led to
staying at unsafe wells and switching from safe wells. Our
results support ongoing well testing for arsenic to
reinforce this beneficial information.},
Doi = {10.1017/s1355770x13000612},
Key = {fds266088}
}
@article{fds266086,
Author = {Kirkpatrick, AJ and Bennear, LS},
Title = {Promoting clean energy investment: An empirical analysis of
property assessed clean energy},
Journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
Volume = {68},
Number = {2},
Pages = {357-375},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2014},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0095-0696},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2014.05.001},
Abstract = {From 2008 to 2010 a handful of Property-Assessed Clean
Energy (PACE) programs offered property-secured loans to
homeowners for residential clean energy investments. This
analysis uses difference-in-differences models and synthetic
counterfactual models to estimate the effect of three
California PACE programs on residential photovoltaic
installations. While PACE programs do not offer superior
terms to other solar financing options, we find that PACE
financing increases solar installations by approximately
3.8. watts per owner-occupied household per quarter, a 108%
increase over the mean watts per owner-occupied
household.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2014.05.001},
Key = {fds266086}
}
@article{fds266087,
Author = {Smith, MD and Asche, F and Bennear, LS and Oglend,
A},
Title = {Spatial-dynamics of hypoxia and fisheries: The case of Gulf
of Mexico brown shrimp},
Journal = {Marine Resource Economics},
Volume = {29},
Number = {2},
Pages = {111-131},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2014},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0738-1360},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/676826},
Abstract = {We analyze the Gulf of Mexico brown shrimp fishery and the
potential impacts of a large seasonal area of hypoxia (low
dissolved oxygen) that coincides with the peak shrimp
season. A spatial-dynamic bioeconomic simulation embeds
three biological impacts on shrimp: mortality, growth, and
aggregation on hypoxic edges. Hypoxia creates feedbacks in
the bioeconomic system, altering catch and effort patterns.
System changes propagate over space to affect areas that do
not experience hypoxia. Areas that might otherwise be
considered controls in a natural experiments framework are
contaminated by the ecological disturbance through spatial
sorting. Aggregate predictions from simulations are similar
to empirical fishery data. Average shrimp size and total
landings are negatively correlated, as are hypoxic severity
and landings. Shrimp size and hypoxic severity are only
weakly negatively correlated. Growth overfishing, which
varies with recruitment success and ecological disturbances,
is a key mediating effect.},
Doi = {10.1086/676826},
Key = {fds266087}
}
@article{fds266089,
Author = {Smith, MD and Asche, F and Bennear, LS and Havice, E and Read, AJ and Squires, D},
Title = {Will a catch share for whales improve social
welfare?},
Journal = {Ecological applications : a publication of the Ecological
Society of America},
Volume = {24},
Number = {1},
Pages = {15-23},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1051-0761},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1890/13-0085.1},
Abstract = {We critique a proposal to use catch shares to manage
transboundary wildlife resources with potentially high
non-extractive values, and we focus on the case of whales.
Because whales are impure public goods, a policy that fails
to capture all nonmarket benefits (due to free riding) could
lead to a suboptimal outcome. Even if free riding were
overcome, whale shares would face four implementation
challenges. First, a whale share could legitimize the
international trade in whale meat and expand the whale meat
market. Second, a legal whale trade creates monitoring and
enforcement challenges similar to those of organizations
that manage highly migratory species such as tuna. Third, a
whale share could create a new political economy of
management that changes incentives and increases costs for
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to achieve the current
level of conservation. Fourth, a whale share program creates
new logistical challenges for quota definition and
allocation regardless of whether the market for whale
products expands or contracts. Each of these issues, if left
unaddressed, could result in lower overall welfare for
society than under the status quo.},
Doi = {10.1890/13-0085.1},
Key = {fds266089}
}
@article{fds266097,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Lee, JM and Taylor, LO},
Title = {Municipal rebate programs for environmental retrofits: An
evaluation of additionality and cost-effectiveness},
Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management},
Volume = {32},
Number = {2},
Pages = {350-372},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2013},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0276-8739},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pam.21692},
Abstract = {When policies incentivize voluntary activities that also
take place in the absence of the incentive, it is critical
to identify the additionality of the policy-that is, the
degree to which the policy results in actions that would not
have occurred otherwise. Rebate programs have become a
common conservation policy tool for local municipalities
seeking to retrofit residential properties with efficient
appliances. This research evaluates whether such rebates can
be cost-effective means for water utilities to promote water
conservation. A unique database is developed that combines
water-use data over a three-year period for all households
that participated in a utility's high-efficiency toilet
(HET) rebate program, water-use data for a matched sample of
neighbors who did not receive a rebate, and a survey of
rebate participants. Difference-in-differences models
indicate that installation of an HET reduces household water
consumption by approximately 7 percent. While installation
of an HET appears to be an effective means for achieving
household reductions in water consumption, our results also
suggest that the rebate program is a much less effective
means for achieving household reductions in water
consumption. Specifically, the rebate program is found to
provide limited additional water savings beyond what would
have occurred naturally and is responsible for only 37
percent of the total water reduction attributable to the
installation of HETs over the study period. © 2013 by the
Association for Public Policy Analysis and
Management.},
Doi = {10.1002/pam.21692},
Key = {fds266097}
}
@article{fds214784,
Author = {Asche, Frank and Lori S. Bennear and Atle Oglend and Martin D.
Smith},
Title = {U.S. Shrimp Market Integration},
Journal = {Marine Resources Economics},
Volume = {29},
Number = {2},
Pages = {181-192},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds214784}
}
@article{fds266101,
Author = {Asche, F and Bennear, LS and Oglend, A and Smith,
MD},
Title = {U.S. Shrimp Market Integration},
Journal = {Marine Resource Economics},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {181-192},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2012},
ISSN = {0738-1360},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5950/0738-1360-27.2.181},
Abstract = {Recent supply shocks in the Gulf of Mexico-including
hurricanes, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the
seasonal appearance of a large dead zone of low oxygen water
(hypoxia)-have raised concerns about the economic viability
of the U.S. shrimp fishery. The ability of U.S. shrimpers to
mediate supply shocks through increased prices hinges on the
degree of market integration, both among shrimp of different
sizes classes and between U.S. wild caught shrimp and
imported farmed shrimp. We use detailed data on shrimp
prices by size class and import prices to conduct a
co-integration analysis of market integration in the shrimp
industry. We find significant evidence of market
integration, suggesting that the law of one price holds for
this industry. Hence, in the face of a supply shocks, prices
do not rise; instead, imports of foreign farmed fish
increase.},
Doi = {10.5950/0738-1360-27.2.181},
Key = {fds266101}
}
@article{fds328354,
Author = {Bennear, L and Tarozzi, A and Pfaff, A and Balasubramanya, S and Ahmed,
KM and Geen, AV},
Title = {Impact of a randomized controlled trial in arsenic risk
communication on household water-source choices in
Bangladesh},
Journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
Volume = {65},
Number = {2},
Pages = {225-240},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2012.07.006},
Abstract = {We conducted a randomized controlled trial in rural
Bangladesh to examine how household drinking-water choices
were affected by two different messages about risk from
naturally occurring groundwater arsenic. Households in both
randomized treatment arms were informed about the arsenic
level in their well and whether that level was above or
below the Bangladesh standard for arsenic. Households in one
group of villages were encouraged to seek water from wells
below the national standard. Households in the second group
of villages received additional information explaining that
lower-arsenic well water is always safer and these
households were encouraged to seek water from wells with
lower levels of arsenic, irrespective of the national
standard. A simple model of household drinking-water choice
indicates that the effect of the emphasis message is
theoretically ambiguous. Empirically, we find that the
richer message had a negative, but insignificant, effect on
well-switching rates, but the estimates are sufficiently
precise that we can rule out large positive effects. The
main policy implication of this finding is that a one-time
oral message conveying richer information on arsenic risks,
while inexpensive and easily scalable, is unlikely to be
successful in reducing exposure relative to the status-quo
policy. © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2012.07.006},
Key = {fds328354}
}
@article{fds328662,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Taylor, L and Lee, J},
Title = {Participation Incentives, Rebound Effects and the
Cost-Effectiveness of Rebates for Water-Efficient
Appliances},
Journal = {Duke Environmental Economics Working Paper},
Number = {11},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds328662}
}
@article{fds328355,
Author = {Tarozzi, A and Bennear, LS and Pfaff, A and Soumya, HB and Ahmed, KM and van Geen, A},
Title = {Bright Lines, Risk Beliefs, and Risk Avoidance: Evidence
from a Randomized Intervention in Bangladesh},
Journal = {Economic Research Initiatives at Duke Working
Paper},
Number = {77},
Year = {2011},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds328355}
}
@article{fds328356,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Tarozzi, A and Pfaff, A and Soumya, HB and Ahmed, KM and van Geen, A},
Title = {Bright Lines, Risk Beliefs, and Risk Avoidance: Evidence
from a Randomized Intervention in Bangladesh},
Year = {2010},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds328356}
}
@article{fds266103,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Olmstead, SM},
Title = {Information Disclosure and Drinking Water
Quality},
Journal = {Resources Magazine},
Pages = {88-89},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2009},
Month = {Fall},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781936331253},
Doi = {10.4324/9781936331253},
Key = {fds266103}
}
@article{fds266109,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Jessoe, KK and Olmstead, SM},
Title = {Sampling out: regulatory avoidance and the Total Coliform
Rule.},
Journal = {Environmental science & technology},
Volume = {43},
Number = {14},
Pages = {5176-5182},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0013-936X},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19708338},
Abstract = {This paper investigates strategic noncompliance with the
Total Coliform Rule (TCR) under the U.S. Safe Drinking Water
Act. The structure of the TCR provides incentives for some
piped drinking water systems to avoid violations by taking
additional water quality samples. We estimate the prevalence
of this behavior and its potential impact on violations
using monthly data for more than 500 Massachusetts water
systems, 1993-2003. We find evidence that strategic
oversampling is occurring. Water systems most likely to
avoid violations by oversampling are most likely to
oversample. A significant number of additional violations
would have occurred if systems had adhered to legal sampling
requirements, rather than oversampling. Our analysis of
potential impacts of regulatory avoidance under the current
rule suggests that alternative policies for monitoring
bacteria in drinking water should be considered.},
Doi = {10.1021/es803115k},
Key = {fds266109}
}
@article{fds168621,
Author = {L.S. Bennear and K.K. Jessoe and S.M. Olmstead},
Title = {Sampling Out: Regulatory Avoidance and the Total Coliform
Rule},
Journal = {Environ Sci & Technol},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/es803115k},
Key = {fds168621}
}
@article{fds266102,
Author = {Bennear, LS},
Title = {What do we really know? The effect of reporting thresholds
on inferences using environmental right‐to‐know
data},
Journal = {Regulation & Governance},
Volume = {2},
Number = {3},
Pages = {293-315},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2008},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {1748-5983},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000259322500002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Environmental
right‐to‐know regulations require regulated entities to
publicly disclose measures of environmental performance but
exempt entities from these disclosure requirements if they
manufacture, process, or use a chemical below some threshold
level. Environmental right‐to‐know data are widely used
to assess environmental performance by academics,
regulators, non‐profit organizations, and the public. This
paper uses data from Massachusetts to estimate the effect of
reporting thresholds in environmental right‐to‐know
programs on the validity of inferences using data from these
programs. The analysis indicates that errors in inference
introduced by reporting thresholds may be significant. Up to
40% of the observed decline in reported toxic releases in
Massachusetts may be attributed to non‐reporting due to
the reporting thresholds. In addition, quartile rankings of
facilities may be in error up to 45% of the time when
behavior around the reporting thresholds is not taken into
account.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1748-5991.2008.00042.x},
Key = {fds266102}
}
@article{fds266104,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Olmstead, SM},
Title = {The impacts of the "right to know": Information disclosure
and the violation of drinking water standards},
Journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
Volume = {56},
Number = {2},
Pages = {117-130},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0095-0696},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2008.03.002},
Abstract = {Information disclosure regulations are increasingly common,
but their effects on the behavior of regulated firms are
unclear. The 1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act
mandated that community drinking water suppliers issue to
customers annual consumer confidence reports (CCRs),
containing information on violations of drinking water
regulations and on observed contaminant levels. We examine
the impact of mandatory information provision on drinking
water violations by 517 community water systems in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts from 1990 to 2003. Results
suggest that larger utilities required to mail CCRs directly
to customers reduced total violations by between 30% and 44%
as a result of this policy, and reduced the more severe
health violations by 40-57%. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jeem.2008.03.002},
Key = {fds266104}
}
@article{fds266108,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Stavins, RN},
Title = {Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy
instruments},
Journal = {Environmental and Resource Economics},
Volume = {37},
Number = {1},
Pages = {111-129},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2007},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0924-6460},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-007-9110-y},
Abstract = {In many cases policy makers employ multiple instruments to
address a single environmental problem, but much of the
economics literature on instrument choice focuses on
comparing properties of single policy instruments. We argue
that under a fairly broad set of circumstances the use of
multiple policy instruments can be justified as optimal in a
second-best world. We examine two broad categories of
second-best policy making: cases with multiple market
failures only some of which can be corrected at any one
time; and cases with exogenous (often political) constraints
that cannot be removed. The fact that the use of multiple
policy instruments can be justified economically in these
two cases does not imply, however, that all multiple
instruments employed in actual practice are economically
justified. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media,
Inc.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10640-007-9110-y},
Key = {fds266108}
}
@article{fds266100,
Author = {Bennear, LS},
Title = {Are Management-Based Regulations Effective?},
Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management},
Volume = {26},
Number = {2},
Pages = {327-348},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2007},
ISSN = {0276-8739},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pam.20250},
Abstract = {This paper evaluates a recent innovation in regulating risk
called management-based regulation. Traditionally, risk
regulation has either specified a particular means of
achieving a risk-reduction goal or specified the goal and
left the means of achieving that goal up to the regulated
entity. In contrast, management-based regulation neither
explicitly imposes the means, nor the ends. Rather, what is
required is that each regulated entity review its production
processes and develop a set of goals and procedures that
will reduce risk. I evaluate the effectiveness of
management-based regulation by taking advantage of policy
variation that occurred when 14 states adopted such
regulations for toxic chemical control in the 1990s. Using
panel data for just over 31,000 manufacturing plants in the
United States, I investigate whether facilities subject to
management-based regulations had larger changes in total
quantities of toxic chemical releases, engaged in more
pollution prevention activities, or reported fewer toxic
chemicals to the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). The results
indicate that management-based regulation has had a
measurable positive effect on the environmental performance
of manufacturing plants. In particular, plants subject to
management-based regulation experienced larger decreases in
total pounds of toxic chemicals released and were more
likely to engage in source reduction activities. © 2007 by
the Association for Public Policy Analysis and
Management.},
Doi = {10.1002/pam.20250},
Key = {fds266100}
}
@article{fds266099,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Stavins, RN and Wagner, AF},
Title = {Using revealed preferences to infer environmental benefits:
Evidence from recreational fishing licenses},
Journal = {Journal of Regulatory Economics},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {157-179},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2005},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-005-3107-7},
Abstract = {We develop and apply a new method for estimating the
economic benefits of an environmental amenity. The method is
based upon the notion of estimating the derived demand for a
privately traded option to utilize an open access good. In
particular, the demand for state fishing licenses is used to
infer the benefits of recreational fishing. Using panel data
on state fishing license sales and prices for the
continental United States over a 15-year period, combined
with data on substitute prices and demographic variables, a
license demand function is estimated with instrumental
variable procedures to allow for the potential endogeneity
of administered prices. The econometric results lead to
estimates of the benefits of a fishing license, and
subsequently to the expected benefits of a recreational
fishing day. In contrast with previous studies, which have
utilized travel cost or hypothetical market methods, our
approach provides estimates that are directly comparable
across geographic areas. Our findings show substantial
variation in the value of a recreational fishing day across
geographic areas in the United States. This suggests that
current practice of using benefits estimates from one part
of the country in national or regional analyses may lead to
substantial bias in benefits estimates. © 2005 Springer
Science+Business Media, Inc.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11149-005-3107-7},
Key = {fds266099}
}
@article{fds328663,
Author = {Bennear, LS},
Title = {Strategic Response to Regulatory Thresholds: Evidence from
the Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act},
Year = {2005},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds328663}
}
@article{fds266105,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Coglianese, C},
Title = {Measuring progress: Program evaluaton of environmental
policies},
Journal = {Environment},
Volume = {47},
Number = {2},
Pages = {22-39},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2005},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0013-9157},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/ENVT.47.2.22-39},
Doi = {10.3200/ENVT.47.2.22-39},
Key = {fds266105}
}
@article{fds328664,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Stavins, RN and Wagner, A},
Title = {Private Options to Use Public Goods: Using Revealed
Preferences to Estimate Environmental Benefits},
Journal = {Journal of Regulatory Economics},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {157-180},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds328664}
}
@article{fds266107,
Author = {Snyder, LD and Miller, NH and Stavins, RN},
Title = {The effects of environmental regulation on technology
diffusion: The case of chlorine manufacturing},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {93},
Number = {2},
Pages = {431-435},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2003},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282803321947470},
Doi = {10.1257/000282803321947470},
Key = {fds266107}
}
@article{fds266106,
Author = {Sadd, JL and Pastor, M and Boer, JT and Snyder, LD},
Title = {"Every breath you take ... ": The demographics of toxic air
releases in Southern California},
Journal = {Economic Development Quarterly},
Volume = {13},
Number = {2},
Pages = {107-123},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/089124249901300201},
Abstract = {In this article, the authors investigate the relationship
between ethnicity and potential environmental hazards in the
metropolitan Los Angeles area. Using a variety of
techniques, including geographic information systems (GIS)
mapping, univariate comparisons, and logit, ordered logit,
and tobit regression analysis, the authors find that, even
controlling for other factors such as income and the extent
of manufacturing employment and land use, minority residents
tend to be disproportionately located in neighborhoods
surrounding toxic air emissions. The results generally
support the propositions of the proponents of "environmental
justice "; in the conclusion, they consider what this might
mean for urban land use and environmental
policy.},
Doi = {10.1177/089124249901300201},
Key = {fds266106}
}
@article{fds266098,
Author = {Boer, JT and Pastor, M and Sadd, JL and Snyder, LD},
Title = {Is there environmental racism? The demographics of hazardous
waste in Los Angeles County},
Journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
Volume = {78},
Number = {4},
Pages = {X-810},
Year = {1997},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {Objective. The "environmental justice" movement has
suggested that demographic inequities characterize the
location of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal
facilities (TSDFs). While some researchers have found
evidence that TSDFs are disproportionately located in
minority areas, others attribute TSDF location to nonracial
factors such as income and industrial employment. Methods.
We used both univariate and multivariate techniques to
analyze the location of TSDFs in Los Angeles County,
California; the focus on one county allowed us to overcome
the problem of "false" addresses for TSDF sites and to
introduce specific land use/zoning variables that are not
used in the other studies. Results. In our univariate
results and the multivariate model, we find that (1)
industrial land use and manufacturing employment do matter,
as suggested by critics of environmental justice; (2) income
has first a positive, then a negative effect on TSDF
location, a pattern that likely reflects the fact that the
poorest communities have little economic activity while
wealthier communities have the economic and political power
to resist negative environmental externalities; and (3) race
and ethnicity are still significantly associated with TSDF
location, even when percentage African American and
percentage Latino are evaluated as separate groupings. Taken
together, the results suggest that communities most affected
by TSDFs in the Los Angeles area are working-class
communities of color located near industrial
areas.},
Key = {fds266098}
}
@article{fds328665,
Author = {Boer, LSBWT and Sadd, J and Pastor, M},
Title = {Is There Environmental Racism: An Empirical Analysis of the
Geographical Distribution of Hazardous Waste Facilities in
Los Angeles County},
Journal = {Social Science Quarterly},
Year = {1997},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds328665}
}
%% Papers Accepted
@article{fds214785,
Author = {Bennear, Lori S. and Alessandro Tarozzi and Alexander Pfaff and Soumya H. Balasubramanya and Kazi Matin Ahmed and Alexander
van Geen},
Title = {Impacts of a Randomized Controlled Trial in Arsenic Risk
Communication on Household Water-Source Choices in
Bangladesh},
Journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds214785}
}
@article{fds214786,
Author = {Bennear, Lori S. and Jonathan M. Lee and Laura O.
Taylor},
Title = {Municipal Rebate Programs for Environmental Retrofits: An
Evaluation of Additionality and Cost-Effectiveness},
Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds214786}
}
%% Book Chapters
@misc{fds335822,
Author = {Balleisen, EJ and Bennear, LS and Krawiec, KD and Wiener,
JB},
Title = {Recalibrating risk: Crises, learning, and regulatory
change},
Pages = {540-561},
Booktitle = {Policy Shock: Recalibrating Risk and Regulation after Oil
Spills, Nuclear Accidents and Financial Crises},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107140219},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316492635.018},
Abstract = {It is often observed that crisis events spur new regulation.
An extensive literature focuses on the role of disasters,
tragedies, scandals, shocks, and other untoward events in
stimulating regulatory responses (Baumgartner and Jones
1993; Percival 1998; Kuran and Sunstein 1999; Birkland 2006;
Repetto 2006; Wiener and Richman 2010; Wuthnow 2010). We
have highlighted numerous examples of arguably crisis-driven
regulation in the introductory chapter (Balleisen et al.,
this volume) and in the several case study chapters in this
book. The notion that crises spur regulation has become a
“commonplace assertion,” and yet one that is “so
widely held … that it remains virtually unexamined in
empirical and historical analyses” (Carpenter and Sin
2007, 149). Observing this relationship does not itself
explain what causal mechanisms may be driving it (Carpenter
and Sin 2007, 154). And the relationship does not always
hold (Kahn 2007). We do not claim that all crises spur
regulatory change, nor that all regulatory changes arise
from crises. Some crisis events do not produce significant
regulatory change – perhaps including mass shootings in
the United States, and Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. Some
regulatory changes occur without preceding crisis events –
such as the Acid Rain Program of the 1990 Clean Air Act.
This volume has sought to enrich the empirical understanding
of how the process of crisis stimulus and regulatory
response unfolds. Our main question has been not whether,
but rather how, regulatory systems change in response to
crises. Going beyond the generic assertion that crises spur
regulation, we have explored diverse ways in which
regulatory change may play out: how different types of
regulatory responses may follow from different kinds of
crises. In this volume, we have studied a set of cases in
which some regulatory change typically did follow a crisis
event, in order to understand how that process led to
different types of regulatory changes in different contexts.
The case studies in this volume – focusing on oil spills,
nuclear power accidents, and financial crashes, with
regulatory responses in the United States, Europe, and Japan
– illustrate a wide array of crises, institutions, actors,
countries, time periods, and policy changes.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781316492635.018},
Key = {fds335822}
}
@misc{fds335823,
Author = {Balleisen, EJ and Bennear, LS and Krawiec, KD and Wiener,
JB},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {1-40},
Booktitle = {Policy Shock: Recalibrating Risk and Regulation after Oil
Spills, Nuclear Accidents and Financial Crises},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107140219},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316492635.001},
Abstract = {Crises punctuate our world. Their causes and consequences
are woven through complex, interconnected social and
technological systems. Consider these three recent events,
each of which dramatically upended expectations about risk:
• In the fall of 2008, the global financial system
experienced a full-blown panic. Credit flows seized up,
ushering in the worst global recession since the 1930s and
leading newspapers to convey the resulting “shocks” to
financial markets. • In April 2010, a blowout at the
British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon drilling platform killed
eleven workers and triggered a three-month-long oil spill,
sending nearly five million barrels of crude into the
Northern Gulf of Mexico, which fouled beaches, estuaries,
and fishing grounds. • In March 2011, an earthquake and a
resulting tsunami killed 20,000 people in Japan. The natural
disaster also caused reactor meltdowns at the Fukushima
nuclear power plant, forcing the evacuation of tens of
thousands of people, unleashing a long-term leak of
radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean and creating a
daunting set of challenges as officials sought to stabilize
pools of spent fuel rods and protect local populations from
radioactive fallout. Each of these three recent events
attracted extraordinary attention from the media and the
global public, raising concerns about dangers that may lurk
within the complex technological and social systems on which
we depend to sustain our economy and way of life. They also
generated criticisms of the regulatory systems that were
supposed to prevent such failures, as well as demands for
new regulatory actions to reduce the risks that the crises
had brought into sharp relief. In the aftermath, policy
elites and the broader public ponder the meaning of such
events and look for appropriate responses. Once a consensus
emerges that they indeed constitute crises (and sometimes
even before), government agencies, legislative committees,
think tanks, citizens’ groups, scholars, and often
official commissions begin to investigate their causes,
consider whether better policy might have prevented them,
and debate what regulatory adjustments governments should
adopt, if any.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781316492635.001},
Key = {fds335823}
}
@misc{fds335824,
Author = {Bennear, LS},
Title = {Economic analysis, risk regulation, and the dynamics of
policy regret},
Pages = {43-57},
Booktitle = {Policy Shock: Recalibrating Risk and Regulation after Oil
Spills, Nuclear Accidents and Financial Crises},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107140219},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316492635.002},
Abstract = {In the wake of a crisis, a common refrain is “Why didn't
we do more to prevent this terrible disaster?” All too
frequently, ex-post analysis suggests that policy did not
sufficiently account for extreme events, or that the level
of regulation imposed or enforced was insufficient. For
example, after Hurricane Katrina a bipartisan commission
found that the levee system had been designed for
“standard” hurricanes and not for the most severe storms
(US House of Representatives 2006). The bipartisan
commission investigating the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
found that inspections and regulations were insufficient to
prevent an oil spill of that significant magnitude (National
Commission 2011). Similarly, the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission found that “widespread failures in financial
regulation and supervision proved devastating to the
stability of the nation's financial markets” (Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011). For the sake of simplicity,
I will refer to this phenomenon as “policy regret.”
Policy regret is characterized by a post-crisis sentiment
that decision-makers had not sufficiently identified the
probability or seriousness of risks before the onset of
crisis and so had insufficiently acted to prevent it. This
sentiment tends to be strongly correlated with an impulse to
engage in significant post-crisis policy reforms. One of the
key features of policy regret seems to be the belief,
ex-post, that the problems with the current regulations
should have been known and corrected in advance. This
characteristic implies systematic failures in the regulatory
process that hinder implementation of programs and policies
that would actually have been welfare enhancing. The focus
of this chapter is on the role of economic analysis in the
regulatory process and what role, if any, these analyses
play in reducing or fostering policy regret. Economic
analyses of risk regulations of some form have been required
since the Nixon administration (Copeland 2011). However,
most people associate requirements for economic analysis,
and particularly benefit-cost analysis, with Executive Order
12291 issued in 1981 by President Ronald Reagan. This
executive order required benefit-cost analysis for all
regulations with an annual cost of $100 million or more
(Copeland 2011). More specifically, it required agencies to
monetize all benefits and costs and to choose both
regulatory objectives and regulatory alternatives (levels)
that maximized net benefits to society. This executive order
was maintained by President George H.W. Bush and was
replaced by a similar executive order (EO 12866) by
President Bill Clinton.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781316492635.002},
Key = {fds335824}
}
@misc{fds341094,
Author = {Balleisen, EJ and Bennear, L and Cheang, D and Free, J and Hayes, M and Pechar, E and Preston, AC},
Title = {Institutional Mechanisms for Investigating the Regulatory
Implications of a Major Crisis: The Commission of Inquiry
and the Safety Board},
Pages = {485-539},
Booktitle = {Policy Shock: Regulatory Responses to Nuclear Accidents,
Offshore Oil Spill, and Financial Crises},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107140219},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316492635.017},
Abstract = {As we have seen, events like the 2008 financial crash, the
BP- Deepwater Horizon Gulf oil spill, or the Fukushima
nuclear accident trigger massive public attention and often
significant regulatory reactions. Once media coverage and
the crystallization of public opinion anoint such events as
crises that require priority consideration, policy-makers
have to discern a way forward. This process typically
involves some effort to investigate the recent events and
identify their causes. The bodies responsible for such
retrospective analysis usually look ahead as well as back.
They make judgments about whether policy-makers should
revise their risk assessments in light of events,
recalibrate their views of trade-offs among competing policy
goals, and reconstruct strategies of risk management. There
are many ways to structure investigation into the causes and
policy implications of crisis events. In some cases,
governments rely on the standard institutions of
policy-making. Investigatory bodies at every level of
government pride themselves in their ability to perform
probing, incisive studies that reveal pivotal evidence and
offer relevant analysis for the formulation of policy
recommendations. The applicable legislative committees ask
staff to undertake extensive background studies and hold a
series of hearings in the usual course of business. They
then publish extensive reports to guide and justify
legislature reforms, or legislative inaction. Executive
agencies responsible for mitigating or preventing relevant
risks may pursue similar inquiries, whether based on staff
research or the work of outside experts, and either alone or
through the auspices of cross-agency task forces. The
“normal” channels of policy assessment, however, have
limitations. They sometimes lack expertise with regard to
the issues at hand, and inevitably take place in a context
of partisan politics. They also place the responsibility for
policy analysis in the hands of the very institutions whose
prior choices failed to prevent the crisis event. Officials
within those institutions have strong incentives to shape
explanatory narratives so as to deflect blame for the events
that have brought such significant social and economic
costs. These shortcomings have frequently led governments to
shy away from the typical institutional channels of
democratic governance as the most appropriate policy
coroners to undertake a crisis event “autopsy.” On many
occasions, governments have instead turned to ostensibly
more independent mechanisms of investigation and policy
analysis.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781316492635.017},
Key = {fds341094}
}
@misc{fds266095,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Coglianese, C},
Title = {Flexible Environmental Regulation},
Pages = {582-604},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Environmental
Policy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Kamieniecki, S and Kraft, M},
Year = {2012},
Month = {November},
ISBN = {9780199744671},
Abstract = {“Flexible regulation” might sound like an oxymoron but
it has become a widely accepted catch phrase for pragmatic
regulation that promises the achievement of important public
policy objectives at low cost. Given the growing interest in
flexible regulation in recent decades, we consider in this
paper what can be learned from the U.S. experience with
flexible environmental regulation. We consider four types of
flexible regulation: (1) flexible commands, such as
performance standards, information disclosure rules, and
management-based regulations; (2) flexible targets, such as
offsets, bubbles, and trading; (3) flexible consequences,
such as voluntary programs and agreements; and (4) flexible
regulators, such as systems of self-regulation and
self-policing. Researchers have demonstrated that many
flexible approaches can sometimes work, to some degree, but
just as flexible policies can vary in form, we find that
they also vary in results. What remains, we argue, is to
determine whether the marginal, and at times only potential,
gains from flexible forms of regulation are enough to
justify their increased use.},
Key = {fds266095}
}
@misc{fds266094,
Author = {Bennear, LS},
Title = {Beyond Belts and Suspenders: Promoting Private Risk
Management in Offshore Drilling},
Volume = {9780812207491},
Pages = {49-67},
Booktitle = {Regulatory Breakdown? The Crisis of Confidence in U.S.
Regulation},
Publisher = {University of Pennsylvania Press},
Editor = {Coglianese, C},
Year = {2012},
ISBN = {978-0-8122-4460-1},
Abstract = {On April 20, 2010, eleven workers were killed in an
explosion on the Deepwater Horizon rig in the pro cess of
drilling the Macondo well off the Gulf of Mexico. The
blowout resulted in between four and five million barrels of
oil leaking into the Gulf of Mexico. Early estimates of the
damages from the oil spill are in the range of $20 billion
with an additional $17 billion in fines (Economist 2010).
There are many entities at blame for the significant human
and environmental disaster in the Gulf, and regulators have
not escaped unscathed. Regulators at the Minerals Management
Ser vice (MMS), the federal agency charged with issuing
permits and overseeing safety of offshore oil drilling,
appeared compromised by conflicts of interest and
unqualified to ensure safety in operations (CNN 2010;
Leonnig 2010; U.S. Department of the Interior 2010). The
magnitude of the damages from the Gulf oil spill, combined
with perceptions of regulatory capture at MMS, has brought
into question the sufficiency of current regulatory
approaches to offshore oil drilling. Prior to the Gulf oil
spill, the primary form of regulation that applied to
offshore oil drilling was a set of highly prescriptive
command-andcontrol regulations requiring significant
redundancy in safety systems, an approach I call "belts and
suspenders." The belts-and-suspenders regulations were
coupled with a strict liability regime where the operating
company-BP in this case-was strictly liable for damages up
to $75 million, with additional damages covered by a
government pool of funds generated through taxes on oil
(Hargreaves 2010). Arguably, this coupling of regulatory
systems should have created the correct incentives for
companies to manage risks. The required safety technologies
should have been in place and, given the financial liability
for damages, BP and its contractors should have had the
incentives to ensure that all these systems were working
properly. Nonetheless, a disaster occurred. To advance the
search for better ways to prevent such disasters in the
future, I analyze in this chapter three ways of regulating
offshore drilling in the United States. The first approach
is the belts-and-suspenders approach used both prior to and
in response to the Gulf oil spill. I argue that the
belts-and-suspenders approach is flawed because it fails to
account for the inherent risk derived from drilling
technologies' dependence on human control. The
belts-and-suspenders approach may even encourage greater
risk taking by human operators because it creates the
impression that multiple safety systems will catch any
errors before a significant accident occurs. The second
approach is management-based regulation, which requires
drilling operators to develop detailed safety and risk
management plans. This approach has been used to regulate
offshore drilling in other countries and has been adopted by
the United States as a supplemental response to the Gulf oil
spill. I consider the suitability and likely effectiveness
of management-based regulation for regulating offshore
drilling, concluding that such an approach by itself does
little to ensure that risk management plans are fully
implemented. The third approach would be to apply a
deposit-discount-refund system, which would require an
up-front establishment of a project-level "safety deposit."
Operators can earn "discounts" on the size of their safety
deposit by earning high grades on in de pen dent third-party
assessments of their safety management plans. And upon
successful completion of the project, the safety deposit is
refunded to the company. In this way, the
deposit-discount-refund system provides an incentive for
companies to carry out effective risk management
practices.},
Key = {fds266094}
}
@misc{fds266091,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Olmstead, SM},
Title = {Information Disclosure and Drinking Water
Quality},
Pages = {122-123},
Booktitle = {Issues of the Day: 100 Commentaries on Climate, Energy, the
Environment, Transportation, and Public Health
Policy},
Publisher = {Resources for the Future Press},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds266091}
}
@misc{fds266093,
Author = {Bennear, LS},
Title = {Evaluating Management-Based Regulation: A Valuable Tool in
the Regulatory Tool Box?},
Pages = {51-86},
Booktitle = {Leveraging the Private Sector: Management-Based Strategies
for Improving Environmental Performance},
Publisher = {Resources for the Future Press},
Editor = {Coglianese, C and Nash, J},
Year = {2006},
ISBN = {9781936331444},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781936331444},
Doi = {10.4324/9781936331444},
Key = {fds266093}
}
@misc{fds266092,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Coglianese, C},
Title = {Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies: Toward
Evidence-Based Decision Making},
Booktitle = {Decision Making for the Environment: Social and Behavioral
Science Research Priorities},
Publisher = {National Academies Press},
Address = {Washington, DC},
Editor = {Brewer, GD and Stern, PC},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds266092}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds266090,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Dickenson, KL},
Title = {Incorporating Evaluation in the Regulatory
Process”},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds266090}
}
@misc{fds343268,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Coglianese, C},
Title = {Evaluating Environmental Policies},
Pages = {22-22},
Year = {2004},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds343268}
}
%% Op-eds
@misc{fds304038,
Author = {Bennear, LS and Smith, MD},
Title = {Success or Selection: An Economic Perspective on Fisheries
Co-Management},
Journal = {Working Papers on the Web},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds304038}
}
%% Working Papers
@article{fds154118,
Author = {L.S. Bennear and M. Baker-Goering and M. Lenox},
Title = {The Effectiveness of Information Disclosure: An Examination
of the TRI},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds154118}
}
@article{fds154069,
Author = {M.B. Sullivan and L.S. Bennear and W.E. Painter,
Jr.},
Title = {A Quasi-experimental Examination of Family Centered
Treatment®: Outcomes for a Juvenile Delinquent
Population},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds154069}
}
@article{fds146419,
Author = {L.S. Bennear and K.L. Dickinson},
Title = {The Role of Program Evaluation in Environmental Policy: A
Critical Evaluation of the Incentives Created by GPRA and
PART.},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://www.duke.edu/~lds5/Papers/Bennear_Dickinson_GPRA_PART.pdf},
Key = {fds146419}
}
| |
Duke University * Arts & Sciences * Economics * Faculty * Research * Staff * Master's * Ph.D. * Reload * Login | ||
