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| Publications of Rachel Kranton :chronological alphabetical combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds238421,
Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
Title = {Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work,
Wages, and Well-Being},
Pages = {1-185},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780691152554},
Abstract = {Identity Economics provides an important and compelling new
way to understand human behavior, revealing how our
identities--and not just economic incentives--influence our
decisions. In 1995, economist Rachel Kranton wrote future
Nobel Prize-winner George Akerlof a letter insisting that
his most recent paper was wrong. Identity, she argued, was
the missing element that would help to explain why
people--facing the same economic circumstances--would make
different choices. This was the beginning of a fourteen-year
collaboration--and of Identity Economics. The authors
explain how our conception of who we are and who we want to
be may shape our economic lives more than any other factor,
affecting how hard we work, and how we learn, spend, and
save. Identity economics is a new way to understand people's
decisions--at work, at school, and at home. With it, we can
better appreciate why incentives like stock options work or
don't; why some schools succeed and others don't; why some
cities and towns don't invest in their futures--and much,
much more. Identity Economics bridges a critical gap in the
social sciences. It brings identity and norms to economics.
People's notions of what is proper, and what is forbidden,
and for whom, are fundamental to how hard they work, and how
they learn, spend, and save. Thus people's identity--their
conception of who they are, and of who they choose to
be--may be the most important factor affecting their
economic lives. And the limits placed by society on people's
identity can also be crucial determinants of their economic
well-being.},
Key = {fds238421}
}
%% Papers Submitted
@article{fds337046,
Author = {Bloch, F and Demange, G and Kranton, R},
Title = {RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS},
Pages = {421-448},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12275},
Abstract = {This article studies the transmission of rumors in social
networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased
agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision
and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent
learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors,
who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We
characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game,
show that the social network can act as a filter, and that
biased agents may have an incentive to limit their
number.},
Doi = {10.1111/iere.12275},
Key = {fds337046}
}
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds358746,
Author = {Lee, VK and Kranton, RE and Conzo, P and Huettel,
SA},
Title = {The hidden cost of humanization: Individuating information
reduces prosocial behavior toward in-group
members},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology},
Volume = {86},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2021.102424},
Abstract = {This paper reports robust experimental evidence that
humanization—in the form of individuating information
about another's personal preferences—leads to decreased
prosocial behavior toward in-group members. Previous
research shows that individuating information increases
prosocial behavior toward dehumanized out-group members. Its
consequences for in-group members, however, are less well
understood. Using methods from social psychology and
behavioral economics, four experiments show that
individuating information decreases pro-social behavior
toward in-group members in a variety of settings (charitable
giving, altruistic punishment, and trust games). Moreover,
this effect results from decreased reliance on group
membership labels, and not from other potential explanations
like the induction of new group identities. Understanding
these effects sheds light on the motives behind intergroup
conflict, which may not result from a difference in social
perception (i.e., humanized in-groups and dehumanized
out-groups), but rather from biases associated with group
membership (i.e., in-group favoritism and out-group
discrimination) that are eliminated by individuating
information. Together, these results indicate that
humanization carries a hidden cost for in-group members by
disrupting group identities that would otherwise make them
targets of altruistic actions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2021.102424},
Key = {fds358746}
}
@article{fds356402,
Author = {Khaw, MW and Kranton, R and Huettel, S},
Title = {Oversampling of minority categories drives misperceptions of
group compositions.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {214},
Pages = {104756},
Year = {2021},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104756},
Abstract = {The ability to estimate proportions informs our immediate
impressions of social environments (e.g., of the diversity
of races or genders within a crowded room). This study
examines how the distribution of attention during brief
glances shapes estimates of group gender proportions.
Performance-wise, subjects exhibit a canonical pattern of
judgment errors: small proportions are overestimated while
large values are underestimated. Subjects' eye movements at
sub-second timescales reveal that these biases follow from a
tendency to visually oversample members of the gender
minority. Rates of oversampling dovetail with average levels
of error magnitudes, response variability, and response
times. Visual biases are thus associated with the inherent
difficulty in estimating particular proportions. All results
are replicated at a within-subjects level with non-human
ensembles using natural scene stimuli; the observed
attentional patterns and judgment biases are thus not
exclusively guided by face-specific visual properties. Our
results reveal the biased distribution of attention
underlying typical judgment errors of group
proportions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104756},
Key = {fds356402}
}
@article{fds363908,
Author = {Thomas, D and Lawton, R and Brown, T and Kranton,
R},
Title = {Prevalence, severity and distribution of depression and
anxiety symptoms using observational data collected before
and nine months into the COVID-19 pandemic.},
Journal = {Lancet regional health. Americas},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {100009},
Year = {2021},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lana.2021.100009},
Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>The COVID-19 pandemic has been
accompanied by substantial increases in adverse mental
health, particularly among the young. However, it remains
unclear to what extent increases in population scores on
mental health assessments are due to changes in prevalence,
rather than severity of symptoms. Further, it is not obvious
that widely used assessments of aggregate symptoms retain
their typical interpretation during an event that directly
disrupts behavior.<h4>Methods</h4>Pre-pandemic data on
workers age 18-69y in the 2019 National Health Interview
Survey are reweighted to match distributions of demographic
characteristics of Duke University employees surveyed nine
months into the pandemic. The latter population was at low
risk of infection or economic insecurity. Prevalence,
severity, and scores for each of nine symptoms are compared
overall and by age group.<h4>Outcomes</h4>Elevated
psychological distress is primarily driven by increases in
prevalence of particular symptoms. Prevalence of trouble
concentrating increased six-fold from 9.6% to 72.5%. Other
symptoms increased by over one-third; feeling anxious,
having little interest, feeling depressed, sleep problems
and being irritable, while some symptoms rose only 10% or
less. Severity also increased but magnitudes are small
relative to prevalence changes. Escalation in prevalence and
severity are greatest for the youngest.<h4>Interpretation</h4>Some
of the least prevalent symptoms pre-pandemic became the most
prevalent during the pandemic, affecting interpretation of
indices validated pre-pandemic. Clinical and policy
interventions should focus on specific symptoms that
increased including trouble concentrating and
anxiety.<h4>Funding</h4>Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
and Social Science Research Institute at Duke
University.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.lana.2021.100009},
Key = {fds363908}
}
@article{fds351432,
Author = {Kranton, R and Pease, M and Sanders, S and Huettel,
S},
Title = {Deconstructing bias in social preferences reveals groupy and
not-groupy behavior.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {117},
Number = {35},
Pages = {21185-21193},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918952117},
Abstract = {Group divisions are a continual feature of human history,
with biases toward people's own groups shown in both
experimental and natural settings. Using a within-subject
design, this paper deconstructs group biases to find
significant and robust individual differences; some
individuals consistently respond to group divisions, while
others do not. We examined individual behavior in two
treatments in which subjects make pairwise decisions that
determine own and others' incomes. In a political treatment,
which divided subjects into groups based on their political
leanings, political party members showed more in-group bias
than Independents who professed the same political opinions.
However, this greater bias was also present in a minimal
group treatment, showing that stronger group identification
was not the driver of higher favoritism in the political
setting. Analyzing individual choices across the experiment,
we categorize participants as "groupy" or "not groupy," such
that groupy participants have social preferences that change
for in-group and out-group recipients, while not-groupy
participants' preferences do not change across group
context. Demonstrating further that the group identity of
the recipient mattered less to their choices, strongly
not-groupy subjects made allocation decisions faster. We
conclude that observed in-group biases build on a foundation
of heterogeneity in individual groupiness.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1918952117},
Key = {fds351432}
}
@article{fds341870,
Author = {Amasino, DR and Sullivan, NJ and Kranton, RE and Huettel,
SA},
Title = {Amount and time exert independent influences on
intertemporal choice.},
Journal = {Nature human behaviour},
Volume = {3},
Number = {4},
Pages = {383-392},
Year = {2019},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0537-2},
Abstract = {Intertemporal choices involve trade-offs between the value
of rewards and the delay before those rewards are
experienced. Canonical intertemporal choice models such as
hyperbolic discounting assume that reward amount and time
until delivery are integrated within each option prior to
comparison<sup>1,2</sup>. An alternative view posits that
intertemporal choice reflects attribute-wise processes in
which amount and time attributes are compared
separately<sup>3-6</sup>. Here, we use multi-attribute drift
diffusion modelling (DDM) to show that attribute-wise
comparison represents the choice process better than
option-wise comparison for intertemporal choice in a young
adult population. We find that, while accumulation rates for
amount and time information are uncorrelated, the difference
between those rates predicts individual differences in
patience. Moreover, patient individuals incorporate amount
earlier than time into the decision process. Using eye
tracking, we link these modelling results to attention,
showing that patience results from a rapid, attribute-wise
process that prioritizes amount over time information. Thus,
we find converging evidence that distinct evaluation
processes for amount and time determine intertemporal
financial choices. Because intertemporal decisions in the
lab have been linked to failures of patience ranging from
insufficient saving to addiction<sup>7-13</sup>,
understanding individual differences in the choice process
is important for developing more effective
interventions.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41562-019-0537-2},
Key = {fds341870}
}
@article{fds343586,
Author = {Kranton, R},
Title = {The devil is in the details: Implications of Samuel
bowles’s the moral economy for economics and policy
research},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {57},
Number = {1},
Pages = {147-160},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20171463},
Abstract = {All economists should buy and read The Moral Economy by
Samuel Bowles. The book challenges basic premises of
economic theory and questions policies based on monetary
incentives. Incentives not only crowd out intrinsic
motivations, they Erode the ethical and moral codes
necessary for the workings of markets. Bowles boldly
suggests that successful policies must combine incentives
and moral messages, exploiting complementarities between the
two. This essay argues that to achieve this objective,
economists must study the local institutions and social
context and engage untraditional data to uncover the
interplay of incentives and identity.},
Doi = {10.1257/jel.20171463},
Key = {fds343586}
}
@article{fds325259,
Author = {Immorlica, N and Kranton, R and Manea, M and Stoddard,
G},
Title = {Social status in networks},
Journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-30},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160082},
Abstract = {We study social comparisons and status seeking in an
interconnected society. Individuals take costly actions that
have direct benefits and also confer social status. A new
measure of interconnectedness- cohesion-captures the
intensity of incentives for seeking status. Equilibria
stratify players into social classes, with each class's
action pinned down by cohesion. A network decomposition
algorithm characterizes the highest (and most inefficient)
equilibrium. Members of the largest maximally cohesive set
form the highest class. Alternatively, players not belonging
to sets more cohesive than the set of all nodes constitute
the lowest class. Intermediate classes are identified by
iterating a cohesion operator. We also characterize networks
that accommodate multiple- class equilibria. (JEL D11, D85,
Z13).},
Doi = {10.1257/mic.20160082},
Key = {fds325259}
}
@article{fds238420,
Author = {Harris, L and Lee, VK and Thompson, EH and Kranton,
R},
Title = {Exploring the Generalization Process from Past Behavior to
Predicting Future Behavior},
Journal = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making},
Volume = {29},
Number = {4},
Pages = {419-436},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2016},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0894-3257},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1889},
Abstract = {Substantial evidence in social psychology documents that
traits predict behavior. Research in behavioral economics
establishes prior behavioral information—the actual
behavior of another person in the past—influences future
decision making, suggestive of the role of traits in guiding
future behavior, but agnostic to the specific psychological
mechanism. Yet the entire generalization process from past
behavior to predicting future behavior has not been fully
explored. Additionally, previous paradigms do not adequately
dissociate prediction from explanation, and provide
participants with trait information, or rely on participants
to generate the appropriate trait. Here, we combine
literature and experimental approaches in social psychology
and behavioral economics to explore the generalization
process from prior behavior that guides future decisions.
Across three studies utilizing consequential economic game
paradigms and online questionnaires, an initial group of
participants (employees) played a time estimation game and a
charity donations game before a second group of participants
(employers) viewed the behavior of the first group, then
decided whether to invest in employees in a trust game and
rock guessing game. Although participants infer trait warmth
and competence from the behavioral information in the first
two games, estimates of normative behavior predicted
investment decisions on the warmth-relevant games better
than trait inferences. These results dissociate
generalizations guided by warmth and competence behavioral
information, and question the extent to which traits always
serve as heuristics to predict behavior. Copyright © 2015
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1002/bdm.1889},
Key = {fds238420}
}
@article{fds325260,
Author = {Bramoull, Y and Kranton, R and D'Amours, M},
Title = {Strategic Interaction and Networks},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {104},
Number = {3},
Pages = {898-930},
Year = {2014},
Month = {March},
Abstract = {Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In
industries, schools, and markets, the entire network
determines outcomes. This paper analyzes a large class of
games and obtains a striking result. Equilibria depend on a
single network measure: the lowest eigenvalue. This paper is
the first to uncover the importance of the lowest eigenvalue
to economic and social outcomes. It captures how much the
network amplifies agents' actions. The paper combines new
tools?potential games, optimization, and spectral graph
theory?to solve for all Nash and stable equilibria and
applies the results to R&D, crime, and the econometrics of
peer effects.},
Key = {fds325260}
}
@article{fds238431,
Author = {Immorlica, N and Kranton, R and Stoddard, G},
Title = {Striving for social status},
Journal = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
Pages = {672},
Publisher = {ACM Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229063},
Abstract = {Social comparisons can influence individual decisions.
People compare their income and their belongings to those of
people around them. Prominent scholars, such as Frank
[1985], argue that increasing inequality has led to
excessive spending, as people try to emulate and compete
with the rich. This process accelerates as more people are
exposed to the lives of the rich and what they consume. We
study social comparisons and striving for status in a
network context, focusing on how the status considerations
and network structure influences individual outcomes and
aggregate consumption of goods. We study this phenomenon in
a model where agents choose a level of consumption for a
good with status implications, like cars or designer
clothing. Agents have a linear value for the good and a
convex cost of consumption. Additionally, adopting the model
of Stark andWang [2005], we assume agents suffer a status
loss as they compare to themselves to those with higher
consumption in their peer group. Letting e i represent the
consumption level of agent i, then i suffers a loss equal to
β x max{e j - e i, 0}/|N i| + 1 for each agent j in N i,
i's neighborhood in the network. β parameterizes an agent's
concern for status. Our primary objective is to solve for
and analyze the Nash equilibria. We find that the
best-response function is isotone in the lattice structure
induced by consumption profiles, and so the equilibria of
our game form a non-empty complete lattice. Furthermore,
sequential best-response dynamics from either the min or max
consumption profiles converges in polynomial time to either
the min-consuming or max-consuming equilibrium. We then
study how the consumption and welfare of equilibria change
with respect to status considerations. We find that
consumption at both the minimum-consuming and
maximum-consuming equilibria increases with status
considerations whereas welfare decreases, indicating that
external organizations like luxury good retailers have
incentives to perpetuate the perception of their goods as
status symbols. Welfare, on the other hand, decreases with
status concerns. Starting from any equilibrium and
increasing status concerns causes agents to converge to a
new equilibrium (via best-response dynamics) in which every
agent has (weakly) lower welfare. This supports the
intuition that attempts to "keep up with the Joneses" cause
agents to over-spend. This happens for all agents, even
those that don't know the Joneses, demonstrating the
spillover effects of the network. We conclude with a study
of the network effect on consumption and welfare. We
characterize the set of equilibria by a notion of network
connectivity, called cohesion. Using this, we show that
adding connections can increase or decrease production (and
welfare) as it alters cohesion. © 2012 Authors.},
Doi = {10.1145/2229012.2229063},
Key = {fds238431}
}
@article{fds238433,
Author = {Huettel, SA and Kranton, RE},
Title = {Identity economics and the brain: uncovering the mechanisms
of social conflict.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {367},
Number = {1589},
Pages = {680-691},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22271784},
Abstract = {Social contexts can have dramatic effects on decisions. When
individuals recognize each other as coming from the same
social group, they can coordinate their actions towards a
common goal. Conversely, information about group differences
can lead to conflicts both economic and physical.
Understanding how social information shapes decision
processes is now a core goal both of behavioural economics
and neuroeconomics. Here, we describe the foundations for
research that combines the theoretical framework from
identity economics with the experimental methods of
neuroscience. Research at this intersection would fill
important gaps in the literature not addressed by current
approaches in either of these disciplines, nor within social
neuroscience, psychology or other fields. We set forth a
simple taxonomy of social contexts based on the information
content they provide. And, we highlight the key questions
that would be addressed by a new 'identity neuroeconomics'.
Such research could serve as an important and novel link
between the social and natural sciences.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2011.0264},
Key = {fds238433}
}
@article{fds238432,
Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, R},
Title = {Identity economics},
Journal = {Economists' Voice},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Publisher = {WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1553-3832},
url = {http://econ.duke.edu/people/kranton/identity_economics},
Abstract = {Why have the relative rates of women smoking grown so much
in the last 100 years? How can the U.S. military do so well
with a relatively flat pay scale? Standard economics hasn't
a clue, but according to Berkeley economist George Akerlof
and Duke economist Rachel Kranton, the answers lie in a new
field called identity economics. © Berkeley Electronic
Press / Project Syndicate.},
Doi = {10.2202/1553-3832.1762},
Key = {fds238432}
}
@article{fds238435,
Author = {Kranton, R and Swamy, AV},
Title = {Contracts, hold-up, and exports: Textiles and opium in
colonial India},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {98},
Number = {3},
Pages = {967-989},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2008},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1736 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {Trade and export, it is argued, spur economic growth. This
paper studies the microeconomics of exporting. We build a
heuristic model of transactions between exporters and
producers and relate it to East India Company (EIC)
operations in colonial Bengal. Our model and the historical
record stress two difficulties: The exporter and its agents
might not uphold payment agreements, and producers might not
honor sales contracts. The model shows when procurement
succeeds or fails, highlighting the tension between these
two hold-up problems. We analyze several cases, including
the EIC's cotton textile venture, the famous Opium Monopoly,
and present-day contract farming.},
Doi = {10.1257/aer.98.3.967},
Key = {fds238435}
}
@article{fds238430,
Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
Title = {Identity, supervision, and work groups},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {98},
Number = {2},
Pages = {212-217},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2008},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.212},
Doi = {10.1257/aer.98.2.212},
Key = {fds238430}
}
@article{fds238446,
Author = {R. Kranton and Bramoullé, Y and Kranton, R},
Title = {Risk-sharing networks},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
Volume = {64},
Number = {3-4 SPEC. ISS.},
Pages = {275-294},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2007},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0167-2681},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000251181200002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {This paper considers the formation of risk-sharing networks.
Following empirical findings, we build a model where pairs
form links, but a population cannot coordinate links. As a
benchmark, individuals commit to share monetary holdings
equally with linked partners. We find efficient networks can
(indirectly) connect all individuals and involve full
insurance. But equilibrium networks connect fewer
individuals. When breaking links, individuals do not
consider negative externalities on others in the network.
Thus identical individuals can end up in different positions
in a network and have different outcomes. These results may
help to explain empirical findings that risk-sharing is
often asymmetric. © 2007.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2006.10.004},
Key = {fds238446}
}
@article{fds238434,
Author = {Bramoullé, Y and Kranton, R},
Title = {Public goods in networks},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
Volume = {135},
Number = {1},
Pages = {478-494},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2007},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0022-0531},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1943 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are
non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find,
first, that networks can lead to specialization in public
good provision. In every social network there is an
equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others
free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only
outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a
whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked,
collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases
access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to
contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there
are holes in a network. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.006},
Key = {fds238434}
}
@article{fds238428,
Author = {Bramoullé, Y and Kranton, R},
Title = {Risk sharing across communities},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {97},
Number = {2},
Pages = {70-74},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2007},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0002-8282},
url = {http://econ.duke.edu/%7Erek8/bramoullekrantonrisksharingcrosscommjan0207.pdf},
Doi = {10.1257/aer.97.2.70},
Key = {fds238428}
}
@article{fds238445,
Author = {R. Kranton and Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
Title = {Identity and the economics of organizations},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
Volume = {19},
Number = {1},
Pages = {9-32},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2005},
Month = {Fall},
ISSN = {0895-3309},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0895330053147930},
Doi = {10.1257/0895330053147930},
Key = {fds238445}
}
@article{fds238438,
Author = {Kranton, RE},
Title = {Competition and the incentive to produce high
quality},
Journal = {Economica},
Volume = {70},
Number = {279},
Pages = {385-404},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2003},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.t01-1-00289},
Abstract = {Previous literature indicates that, when quality is a choice
variable, firms have an incentive to produce high quality to
maintain their reputations with consumers. The strategic
interaction among firms and competition for market share is
not considered. This paper finds that, when firms compete
for market share, perfect equilibria in which firms produce
high-quality goods need not exist. Competition for customers
can eliminate the price premium needed to induce firms to
maintain a reputation for high-quality production. In this
case, economists and policy analysts should pay greater
attention to the interaction among firms and the
institutions, such as professional associations, that
structure interfirm relations when considering whether firms
have an incentive to produce high-quality
goods.},
Doi = {10.1111/1468-0335.t01-1-00289},
Key = {fds238438}
}
@article{fds238444,
Author = {R. Kranton and Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
Title = {Identity and schooling: Some lessons for the economics of
education},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
Volume = {40},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1167-1201},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2002},
Month = {January},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1926 Duke open
access},
Doi = {10.1257/.40.4.1167},
Key = {fds238444}
}
@article{fds238443,
Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Minehart, DF},
Title = {A theory of buyer-seller networks},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {91},
Number = {3},
Pages = {485-508},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1735 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {This paper introduces a new model of exchange: networks,
rather than markets, of buyers and sellers. It begins with
the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller
must have a relationship, a "link," to exchange goods.
Networks - buyers, sellers, and the pattern of links
connecting them - are common exchange environments. This
paper develops a methodology to study network structures and
explains why agents may form networks. In a model that
captures characteristics of a variety of industries, the
paper shows that buyers and sellers, acting strategically in
their own self-interests, can form the network structures
that maximize overall welfare.},
Doi = {10.1257/aer.91.3.485},
Key = {fds238443}
}
@article{fds238427,
Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
Title = {Economics and identity},
Journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
Volume = {115},
Number = {3},
Pages = {715-753},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0033-5533},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1993 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {This paper considers how identity, a person's sense of self,
affects economic outcomes. We incorporate the psychology and
sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior. In
the utility function we propose, identity is associated with
different social categories and how people in these
categories should behave. We then construct a simple
game-theoretic model showing how identity can affect
individual interactions. The paper adapts these models to
gender discrimination in the workplace, the economics of
poverty and social exclusion, and the household division of
labor. In each case, the inclusion of identity substantively
changes conclusions of previous economic
analysis.},
Doi = {10.1162/003355300554881},
Key = {fds238427}
}
@article{fds238440,
Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Minehart, DF},
Title = {Networks versus vertical integration},
Journal = {RAND Journal of Economics},
Volume = {31},
Number = {3},
Pages = {570-601},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2000},
Month = {Fall},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2628 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {We construct a theory to compare vertically integrated firms
to networks of manufacturers and suppliers. Vertically
integrated firms make their own specialized inputs. In
networks, manufacturers procure specialized inputs from
suppliers that, in turn, sell to several manufacturers. The
analysis shows that networks can yield greater social
welfare when manufacturers experience large idiosyncratic
demand shocks. Individual firms may also have the incentive
to form networks, despite the lack of long-term contracts.
The analysis is supported by existing evidence and provides
predictions as to the shape of different
industries.},
Doi = {10.2307/2601001},
Key = {fds238440}
}
@article{fds238442,
Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Minehart, DF},
Title = {Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks},
Journal = {Review of Economic Design},
Volume = {5},
Number = {3},
Pages = {301-331},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1434-4742},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/PL00013691},
Abstract = {This paper studies competition in a network and how a
network structure determines agents' individual payoffs. It
constructs a general model of competition that can serve as
a reduced form for specific models. The paper shows how
agents' outside options, and hence their shares of surplus,
derive from "opportunity paths" connecting them to direct
and indirect alternative exchanges. Analyzing these paths,
results show how third parties' links affect different
agents' bargaining power. Even distant links may have large
effects on agents' earnings. These payoff results, and the
identification of the paths themselves, should prove useful
to further analysis of network structure. © Springer-Verlag
2000.},
Doi = {10.1007/PL00013691},
Key = {fds238442}
}
@article{fds238439,
Author = {R. Kranton and Kranton, RE and Swamy, AV},
Title = {The hazards of piecemeal reform: British civil courts and
the credit market in colonial India},
Journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
Volume = {58},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-24},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1999},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00100-X},
Abstract = {The colonial experience of developing countries provides
valuable evidence regarding the impact of legal and
institutional innovations on economic growth. However, there
has been little effort by economists to study colonial
policies to gain theoretical insights into the process of
institutional reform. This paper considers the introduction
of civil courts in colonial India and its impact on
agricultural credit markets in the Bombay Deccan. Drawing on
historical records and a formal analysis of the credit
market, the paper finds that the reform led to increased
competition among lenders. Ex ante, we expect that this
would have raised farmers' welfare. But increased
competition also reduced lenders' incentives to subsidize
farmers' investments in times of crisis, leaving them more
vulnerable in bad times. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00100-X},
Key = {fds238439}
}
@article{fds238437,
Author = {Kranton, RE},
Title = {Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {86},
Number = {4},
Pages = {830-851},
Year = {1996},
Month = {September},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1732 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {Reciprocal exchange, or gift exchange, remains a widespread
means of obtaining goods and services. This paper examines
the persistence of reciprocal exchange by formalizing the
interaction between self-enforcing exchange agreements and
monetary market exchange. When more people engage in
reciprocal exchange, market search costs increase,
reciprocity is easier to enforce and yields higher utility.
Thus, personalized exchange can persist even when it is
inefficient. Conversely, large markets can destroy
reciprocity when reciprocal exchange is efficient. The
results characterize the use of personal "connections" as a
system of reciprocal exchange and explain the disappearance
of reciprocity when tribes encounter markets.},
Key = {fds238437}
}
@article{fds238436,
Author = {Kranton, RE},
Title = {The formation of cooperative relationships},
Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {214-233},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023358},
Abstract = {This article investigates how individuals forge and maintain
cooperative relationships when there is always the
possibility of starting again with a new partner. The
analysis shows that an ever-present opportunity to form new
relationships need not destroy cooperation. Simple
strategies achieve the (constrained) optimal level of
cooperation. These strategies involve a "bond" in the form
of reduced utility at the beginning of a relationship. Two
newly matched agents may have an incentive to forgo paying
this bond, given that everyone else in the population
requires payment of a bond to start a new relationship. This
incentive disappears, however, if there is enough initial
uncertainty about a new partner's valuation of future
utility. Accounts from the sociological and anthropological
literature indicate that individuals may indeed pay bonds to
form cooperative relationships.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023358},
Key = {fds238436}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds326598,
Author = {Kranton, RE and Sanders, SG},
Title = {Groupy versus non-groupy social preferences: Personality,
region, and political party},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {107},
Number = {5},
Pages = {65-69},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171096},
Doi = {10.1257/aer.p20171096},
Key = {fds326598}
}
@misc{fds321817,
Author = {Kranton, RE},
Title = {Identity economics 2016: Where do social distinctions and
norms come from?},
Journal = {American Economic Review},
Volume = {106},
Number = {5},
Pages = {405-409},
Publisher = {American Economic Association},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161038},
Doi = {10.1257/aer.p20161038},
Key = {fds321817}
}
@misc{fds238423,
Author = {Akerlof, GA and Kranton, RE},
Title = {Social divisions within schools: How school policies can
affect students' identities and educational
choices},
Pages = {180-203},
Booktitle = {The Social Economics of Poverty: On Identities, Communities,
Groups, and Networks},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2005},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780203799659},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203799659},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203799659},
Key = {fds238423}
}
@misc{fds142925,
Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof},
Title = {Social Divisions within Schools: How school policies can
affect students' identities and educational
choices},
Booktitle = {The Social Economics of Poverty: On Identities, Groups,
Communities and Networks},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Address = {London},
Editor = {C. Barret},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds142925}
}
@misc{fds142926,
Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof},
Title = {A Model of Poverty and Oppositional Culture},
Booktitle = {Markets and Governments},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {K. Basu and P. Nayak and R. Ray},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds142926}
}
%% Working Papers
@article{fds142918,
Author = {D. Minehart},
Title = {Vertical Merger and Specific Investments: A Tale of the
Second Best},
Year = {2004},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds142918}
}
@article{fds142919,
Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof},
Title = {Identity and the Economics of Organizations},
Year = {2003},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds142919}
}
%% Other
@misc{fds142937,
Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof},
Title = {Identity and Schooling},
Year = {2002},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds142937}
}
@misc{fds142936,
Author = {R. Kranton and G. Akerlof},
Title = {Economics and Identity},
Year = {2000},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds142936}
}
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