Politics, Philosophy & Economics Certificate : Publications since January 2023

%% Munger, Michael C.   
@article{fds371869,
   Author = {Munger, M and Tilley, C},
   Title = {Race, risk, and greed: Harold Black's contributions to the
             institutional economics of finance},
   Journal = {Public Choice},
   Volume = {197},
   Number = {3-4},
   Pages = {335-346},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01073-w},
   Abstract = {Dr. Harold Black has made a career of investigating the
             effects of different rules and institutional arrangements on
             the extent to which market participants in finance can
             exercise a taste for discrimination. This paper considers
             the nature of Black's contributions, and reviews some
             particulars of his voluminous published research, focusing
             especially on his work on the number of "overages" charged
             by banks, and the differences in the effects of the race of
             bank owners, as explained by the race of customers. The
             paper concludes by connecting Dr. Black’s work to his
             “origin story,” which helps explain his consistent focus
             on careful empirical distinctions rather than preconceptions
             and biases.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11127-023-01073-w},
   Key = {fds371869}
}

@article{fds355327,
   Author = {Munger, M and Vanberg, G},
   Title = {Contractarianism, constitutionalism, and the status
             quo},
   Journal = {Public Choice},
   Volume = {195},
   Number = {3-4},
   Pages = {323-339},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00878-x},
   Abstract = {The constitutional political economy (CPE) approach as
             developed by James Buchanan places emphasis on supermajority
             rules—in particular, a unanimity requirement for
             constitutional change. Critics argue that this approach
             “privileges the status quo” in two problematic ways: (1)
             alternatives are treated unequally, because the status quo
             requires a smaller coalition to be “chosen” than any
             other institutional arrangement selected to replace it; and
             (2) individuals are treated unequally, because those who
             happen to support the status quo have excessive power to
             impose their will on the larger group, implying that a
             minority illegitimately is privileged to block change. This
             is a serious and important challenge. At the same time, we
             argue that critics have conflated two analytically distinct
             issues in arguing that the CPE paradigm (and
             constitutionalism more generally) “privilege the status
             quo”. Moreover, we aim to show that in rejecting the
             “privileged position of the status quo”, critics must
             confront an equally challenging task: Providing a
             “measuring stick” by which the legitimacy of the status
             quo, and changes to it, can be judged. It is precisely
             skepticism regarding the possibility of providing a
             criterion of legitimacy that is independent of agreement
             that leads to the peculiar position of the status quo in
             Buchanan’s thought.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11127-021-00878-x},
   Key = {fds355327}
}

@article{fds374313,
   Author = {Munger, MC},
   Title = {Christopher Kam and Adlai Newson, The Economic Origins of
             Political Parties},
   Journal = {OEconomia},
   Number = {13-1},
   Pages = {115-118},
   Publisher = {OpenEdition},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/oeconomia.13996},
   Doi = {10.4000/oeconomia.13996},
   Key = {fds374313}
}

@article{fds374354,
   Author = {Munger, M},
   Title = {“Apparently, You Don’t”: Economist Jokes as an
             Educational Tool},
   Journal = {Journal of Private Enterprise},
   Volume = {38},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {61-82},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {This paper addresses the growing literature on the
             comparative statics of rhetorical equilibrium, using humor
             as the animating device that corrodes existing norms for
             understanding the commercial system. Three motivations for
             economics jokes are advanced: to be funny, to illustrate,
             and to mock. A simple model of humor is advanced, with three
             independent variables—whether the joke is funny,
             insightful, or accurately mocking—that are argued to
             generate different levels of amusement, the dependent
             variable. One conclusion is that jokes economists tell each
             other, jokes economists tell outsiders, and jokes outsiders
             tell themselves about economists have different mixes of the
             essential arguments of the amusement function.},
   Key = {fds374354}
}

@article{fds376034,
   Author = {Riess, H and Munger, M and Zavlanos, MM},
   Title = {Max-Plus Synchronization in Decentralized Trading
             Systems},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and
             Control},
   Pages = {221-227},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9798350301243},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC49753.2023.10383918},
   Abstract = {We introduce a decentralized mechanism for pricing and
             exchanging alternatives constrained by transaction costs. We
             characterize the time-invariant solutions of a heat equation
             involving a (weighted) Tarski Laplacian operator, defined
             for max-plus matrix-weighted graphs, as approximate
             equilibria of the trading system. We study algebraic
             properties of the solution sets as well as convergence
             behavior of the dynamical system. We apply these tools to
             the 'economic problem' of allocating scarce resources among
             competing uses. Our theory suggests differences in
             competitive equilibrium, bargaining, or cost-benefit
             analysis, depending on the context, are largely due to
             differences in the way that transaction costs are
             incorporated into the decision-making process. We present
             numerical simulations of the synchronization algorithm
             (RRAggU), demonstrating our theoretical findings.},
   Doi = {10.1109/CDC49753.2023.10383918},
   Key = {fds376034}
}

@article{fds374317,
   Author = {Munger, MC},
   Title = {Karl Mittermaier Economic Theory vs. Reality},
   Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
   Volume = {28},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {281-289},
   Year = {2023},
   Key = {fds374317}
}

@article{fds374318,
   Author = {Munger, MC},
   Title = {The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies: A
             Computational Social Science Approach},
   Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW},
   Volume = {28},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {334-339},
   Year = {2023},
   Key = {fds374318}
}