Politics, Philosophy & Economics Certificate Arts & Sciences Duke University |
||
HOME > Arts & Sciences > ppae | Search Help Login |
| Publications of Michael C. Munger :chronological combined listing:%% Books @book{fds250197, Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC}, Title = {Analytical Politics}, Pages = {253 pages}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {1997}, Month = {April}, ISBN = {9780521565677}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139174725}, Abstract = {<jats:p>To 'analyse' means to break into components and understand. But new readers find modern mathematical theories of politics so inaccessible that analysis is difficult. Where does one start? Analytical Politics is an introduction to analytical theories of politics, explicitly designed both for the interested professional and students in political science. We cannot evaluate how well governments perform without some baseline for comparison: what should governments be doing? This book focuses on the role of the 'center' in politics, drawing from the classical political theories of Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, and others. The main questions in Analytical Politics involve the existence and stability of the center; when does it exist? When should the center guide policy? How do alternative voting rules help in discovering the center? An understanding of the work reviewed here is essential for anyone who hopes to evaluate the performance or predict the actions of democratic governments.</jats:p>}, Doi = {10.1017/cbo9781139174725}, Key = {fds250197} } @book{fds302177, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Analyzing Policy Choices, Conflicts, and Practices}, Pages = {430 pages}, Publisher = {W. W. Norton}, Year = {2000}, ISBN = {9780393973990}, Abstract = {Introduction to the conceptual foundations of policy analysis including the basics of the welfare-economics paradigm and cost-benefit analysis.}, Key = {fds302177} } @book{fds250200, Author = {Munger, MC and Munger, KM}, Title = {Choosing in groups: Analytical politics revisited}, Pages = {1-255}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2015}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781107070035}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107707153}, Abstract = {This book is an introduction to the logic and analytics of group choice. To understand how political institutions work, it is important to isolate what citizens - as individuals and as members of society - actually want. This book develops a means of “representing” the preferences of citizens so that institutions can be studied more carefully. This is the first book to integrate the classical problem of constitutions with modern spatial theory, connecting Aristotle and Montesquieu with Arrow and Buchanan.}, Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781107707153}, Key = {fds250200} } @book{fds312801, Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC}, Title = {Empirical studies in comparative politics}, Volume = {97}, Pages = {219-227}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005057920748}, Doi = {10.1023/A:1005057920748}, Key = {fds312801} } @book{fds19836, Title = {Empirical Studies in Comparative Public Choice}, Editor = {M. Munger and Melvin J. Hinich}, Year = {1998}, Key = {fds19836} } @book{fds312800, Title = {Future of the Economy: Fifty Years}, Publisher = {Independent Institute}, Editor = {Whaples, R and Munger, MC and Coyne, C}, Year = {2015}, Abstract = {Authored essays on "Tomorrow 3.0" and "Concluding Essay."}, Key = {fds312800} } @book{fds250196, Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC}, Title = {Ideology and the theory of political choice}, Pages = {1-267}, Publisher = {University of Michigan Press}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780472084135}, Abstract = {There is no unified theory that can explain both voter choice and where choices come from. Hinich and Munger fill that gap with their model of political communication based on ideology. Rather than beginning with voters and diffuse, atomistic preferences, Hinich and Munger explore why large groups of voters share preference profiles, why they consider themselves “liberals” or “conservatives.” The reasons, they argue, lie in the twin problems of communication and commitment that politicians face. Voters, overloaded with information, ignore specific platform positions. Parties and candidates therefore communicate through simple statements of goals, analogies, and by invoking political symbols. But politicians must also commit to pursuing the actions implied by these analogies and symbols. Commitment requires that ideologies be used consistently, particularly when it is not in the party’s short-run interest. The model Hinich and Munger develop accounts for the choices of voters, the goals of politicians, and the interests of contributors. It is an important addition to political science and essential reading for all in that discipline.}, Key = {fds250196} } @book{fds350701, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Is Capitalism Sustainable?}, Publisher = {American Institute for Economic Research}, Year = {2019}, Month = {July}, ISBN = {978-1630691738}, Key = {fds350701} } @book{fds302178, Author = {Anomaly, J and Brennan, G and Brennan, POSAPTG and Munger, MC and Sayre-McCord, G}, Title = {Philosophy, Politics, and Economics An Anthology}, Pages = {672 pages}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press, USA}, Year = {2015}, Month = {June}, ISBN = {9780190207311}, Abstract = {The only book on the market to include classical and contemporary readings from key authors in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE), this unique anthology provides a comprehensive overview of the central topics in this rapidly ...}, Key = {fds302178} } @book{fds318622, Author = {Munger, MC and Hinich, M}, Title = {Political Economy}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2010}, Abstract = {Originally published in 1997. Reprinted in new Chinese language edition, and in new Korean edition.}, Key = {fds318622} } @book{fds314265, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {The Thing Itself: Essays on Academics, Economics, and Policy}, Pages = {188 pages}, Publisher = {Mungerella Publishing}, Year = {2015}, ISBN = {9780692364154}, Key = {fds314265} } @book{fds327639, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Tomorrow 3.0: The Sharing-Middleman Economy}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2018}, Key = {fds327639} } @book{fds365860, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Tomorrow 3.0: Transaction Costs and the Sharing Economy}, Pages = {1-174}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781108427081}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108602341}, Abstract = {With the growing popularity of apps such as Uber and Airbnb, there has been a keen interest in the rise of the sharing economy. Michael C. Munger brings these new trends in the economy down to earth by focusing on their relation to the fundamental economic concept of transaction costs. In doing so Munger brings a fresh perspective on the 'sharing economy' in clear and engaging writing that is accessible to both general and specialist readers. He shows how, for the first time, entrepreneurs can sell reductions in transaction costs, rather than reductions in the costs of the products themselves. He predicts that smartphones will be used to commodify excess capacity, and reaches the controversial conclusion that a basic income will be required as a consequence of this new 'transaction costs revolution'.}, Doi = {10.1017/9781108602341}, Key = {fds365860} } %% Monographs @misc{fds142637, Author = {M.C. Munger}, Title = {"They Clapped: Can Price-Gouging Laws Prohibit Scarcity?” Econlib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN,}, Year = {2007}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungergouging.html}, Key = {fds142637} } %% Chapters in Books @misc{fds250113, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {A Retrospective Assessment of Tullock’s THE VOTE MOTIVE}, Pages = {131-138}, Booktitle = {The Vote Motive}, Publisher = {Institute of Economic Affairs}, Editor = {Kurrild-Klitgaard, P}, Year = {2006}, Key = {fds250113} } @misc{fds250104, Author = {Munger, M and Enelow, J and Endersby, J}, Title = {A Revised Probabilistic Spatial Model of Elections: Theory and Evidence}, Pages = {125-140}, Booktitle = {An Economic Theory of Democracy in Contemporary Perspective}, Publisher = {University of Michigan Press}, Editor = {Grofman, B}, Year = {1993}, Key = {fds250104} } @misc{fds312942, Author = {Munger, MC and Russell, D}, Title = {Business and Virtue}, Booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of Business Ethics}, Publisher = {Routledge/Taylor and Francis}, Editor = {Heath, E and et al.}, Year = {2016}, Month = {April}, Key = {fds312942} } @misc{fds363840, Author = {Munger, MC and Russell, DC}, Title = {Can profit seekers be virtuous?}, Pages = {114-130}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Business Ethics}, Year = {2018}, Month = {February}, ISBN = {9781315764818}, Key = {fds363840} } @misc{fds366928, Author = {Munger, MC and Russell, DC}, Title = {Can profit seekers be virtuous?}, Pages = {113-130}, Booktitle = {ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO BUSINESS ETHICS}, Year = {2018}, ISBN = {978-1-138-78956-2}, Key = {fds366928} } @misc{fds303786, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Chadha v. I.N.S. and the Legislative Veto}, Pages = {93-105}, Booktitle = {Creating Constitutional Change}, Publisher = {Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press}, Editor = {Ivers, G and McGuire, K}, Year = {2014}, Month = {March}, Key = {fds303786} } @misc{fds14591, Author = {M. Munger}, Title = {Chadha v. I.N.S. and the Legislative Veto}, Pages = {93-105}, Booktitle = {Creating Constitutional Change}, Publisher = {Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press}, Editor = {Gregg Ivers and Kevin McGuire}, Year = {2004}, Month = {Spring}, Key = {fds14591} } @misc{fds313453, Author = {Munger, MC and McKay, A}, Title = {Chadha v. INS: Policy-making Outside the Constitution}, Pages = {93-105}, Booktitle = {Creating Constitutional Change}, Publisher = {University of Virginia Press}, Editor = {Ivers, G and McGuire, K}, Year = {2004}, Key = {fds313453} } @misc{fds313178, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Coase and the ‘Sharing Economy}, Pages = {187-208}, Booktitle = {Forever Contemporary: The Economics of Ronald Coase}, Publisher = {Institute for Economic Affairs}, Editor = {Veljanovski, C}, Year = {2015}, Key = {fds313178} } @misc{fds250274, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Commentary on 'The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice}, Volume = {63}, Pages = {280 pages}, Booktitle = {The Production and Diffusion of Public Choice Political Economy: Reflections on the VPI Center}, Publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, Editor = {Pitt, JC and Salehi-Isfahani, D and Eckel, DW}, Year = {2004}, ISBN = {978-1-4051-2453-9}, Key = {fds250274} } @misc{fds250111, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Committee Assignments}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {95-98}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Public Choice}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press.}, Editor = {Frey, B and Rowley, C and Schneider, F}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds250111} } @misc{fds313758, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Committee Jurisdictions and PACs}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {98-100}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Public Choice}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press}, Editor = {Frey, B and Rowley, C and Schneider, F}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds313758} } @misc{fds365859, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Corruption}, Pages = {314-324}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics}, Year = {2022}, Month = {May}, ISBN = {9780367407674}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780367808983-30}, Doi = {10.4324/9780367808983-30}, Key = {fds365859} } @misc{fds340067, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Culture, order, and virtue}, Pages = {177-195}, Booktitle = {Liberalism, Conservatism, and Hayek's Idea of Spontaneous Order}, Publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan US}, Year = {2007}, Month = {October}, ISBN = {9781403984258}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230609228}, Doi = {10.1057/9780230609228}, Key = {fds340067} } @misc{fds250114, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Culture, Order, and Virtue}, Pages = {267-291}, Booktitle = {LIBERALISM, CONSERVATISM, AND HAYEK’S IDEA OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER}, Publisher = {Palgrave}, Editor = {Hunt, L and McNamara, P}, Year = {2007}, ISBN = {9780230609228}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230609228}, Doi = {10.1057/9780230609228}, Key = {fds250114} } @misc{fds250110, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Demobilized and Demoralized: Negative Ads and Loosening Bonds}, Pages = {15-29}, Booktitle = {Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Breton, A and Galeotti, G and Salmon, P and Wintrobe, R}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds250110} } @misc{fds250233, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Editors' Introduction: Empirical Studies in Comparative Politics}, Volume = {97}, Pages = {219-227}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {1998}, ISSN = {1573-7101}, Key = {fds250233} } @misc{fds313179, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Editor’s Introduction: The Basic-Income Debate}, Volume = {19}, Number = {4}, Pages = {485-488}, Publisher = {The Independant Institute}, Year = {2015}, ISSN = {1086-1653}, url = {http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/toc.asp?issueID=81}, Key = {fds313179} } @misc{fds250119, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Euvoluntary Exchange and the Creation of Wealth}, Booktitle = {Wealth Creation: Ethical & Economic Perspectives}, Publisher = {Cognella Academic Publishing}, Editor = {Schmidtz, D}, Year = {2012}, Key = {fds250119} } @misc{fds318621, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Euvoluntary or Not, Exchange is Just}, Booktitle = {Liberalism and Capitalism}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Paul, EF and Miller, Jr., FD and Paul, J}, Year = {2011}, Key = {fds318621} } @misc{fds318619, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Everything You Know About Recycling is Wrong}, Booktitle = {The Political Economy of Recycling}, Editor = {Kuznicki, J}, Year = {2013}, Abstract = {Cato Unbound Symposium}, Key = {fds318619} } @misc{fds363841, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Government failure and market failure}, Pages = {342-357}, Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism}, Year = {2017}, Month = {August}, ISBN = {9781138832169}, Key = {fds363841} } @misc{fds250118, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Hayek’s Insight: Order Without Direction, Benefit Without Intent}, Booktitle = {Political Economy in Philosophic Perspective}, Publisher = {University Press of America}, Editor = {Butler, G}, Year = {2012}, Key = {fds250118} } @misc{fds312937, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Hayek’s Political Insights: Emergent Orders and Laid-on Laws}, Booktitle = {40 years after the Nobel: F.A. Hayek and Political Economy as a Progressive Research Program}, Editor = {Boetke, P}, Year = {2016}, Key = {fds312937} } @misc{fds250116, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {I have a real meeting at 10:30: Running for Office as a Third Party Candidate}, Pages = {203-222}, Booktitle = {Inside Political Campaigns: Chronicles—And Lessons–From the Trenches}, Publisher = {Lynne Rienner Publishers}, Editor = {Bowers, J and Daniels, S}, Year = {2010}, Key = {fds250116} } @misc{fds250108, Author = {Munger, M and Ensley, M}, Title = {Institutions, Ideology, and the Transmission of Information Across Generations}, Pages = {107-122}, Booktitle = {Constitutional Political Economy}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Mudambi, R}, Year = {2001}, Key = {fds250108} } @misc{fds313757, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Interest Groups}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {307-312}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Public Choice}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press}, Editor = {Frey, B and Rowley, C and Schneider, F}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds313757} } @misc{fds250122, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Kaldor-Hicks Coercion, Coasian Bargaining, and the State}, Pages = {117-135}, Booktitle = {Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance: Economic and Political Dimensions}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Martinez, J and Winer, S}, Year = {2014}, Abstract = {Conference volume for Evergreen Resort Coercion Conference, Oct. 1-2, 2010.}, Key = {fds250122} } @misc{fds314206, Author = {Munger, MC and Denzau, AT}, Title = {Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented}, Pages = {338-357}, Booktitle = {The Classics of Interest Group Behavior}, Publisher = {Wadsworth Higher Ed Publishing}, Editor = {Wadsworth, RM}, Year = {2006}, Key = {fds314206} } @misc{fds312939, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Market Failure and Government Failure (forthcoming)}, Booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism}, Editor = {Brennan, J}, Year = {2016}, Month = {April}, Key = {fds312939} } @misc{fds312954, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first century world}, Pages = {115-133}, Booktitle = {Policy Challenges and Political Responses: Public Choice Perspectives on the Post-9/11 World}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, Year = {2005}, Month = {December}, ISBN = {9780387280370}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/0-387-28038-3_7}, Abstract = {Voting procedures nowadays are anachronistic on two counts: the technology of recording and counting votes often is outmoded and too much is expected from the mechanisms of democratic choice. Even if votes always and everywhere were counted perfectly, election outcomes would still be arbitrary since no collective choice process can divine the "general will". The crucial line in any state is the one dividing private decisions from collective decisions. Democracy is part of the package for nations freeing themselves from totalitarianism's grip, but it may be the last, rather than the first thing that should be added to the mix. © 2005 Springer.}, Doi = {10.1007/0-387-28038-3_7}, Key = {fds312954} } @misc{fds366929, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first century world}, Volume = {124}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {115-133}, Booktitle = {POLICY CHALLENGES AND POLITICAL RESPONSES: PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON THE POST-9/11 WORLD}, Year = {2005}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-4749-9}, Abstract = {Voting procedures nowadays are anachronistic on two counts: the technology of recording and counting votes often is outmoded and too much is expected from the mechanisms of democratic choice. Even if votes always and everywhere were counted perfectly, election outcomes would still be arbitrary since no collective choice process can divine the "general will". The crucial line in any state is the one dividing private decisions from collective decisions. Democracy is part of the package for nations freeing themselves from totalitarianism's grip, but it may be the last, rather than the first thing that should be added to the mix. © Springer 2005.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-005-4749-9}, Key = {fds366929} } @misc{fds312951, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Orange blossom special: Externalities and the coase theorem}, Pages = {192-196}, Booktitle = {Readings in Applied Microeconomics: The Power of the Market}, Publisher = {Taylor & Francis}, Editor = {Newmark, C}, Year = {2009}, ISBN = {9780203878460}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2008/Mungerbees.html}, Doi = {10.4324/9780203878460}, Key = {fds312951} } @misc{fds250099, Author = {Munger, MC and Roberts, BE}, Title = {Political and Economic Control of the Federal Reserve: A Review of the Literature}, Booktitle = {The Political Economy of Monetary Policy}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Mayer, T}, Year = {1990}, Key = {fds250099} } @misc{fds250103, Author = {Munger, MC and Roberts, BE}, Title = {Political and Economic Control of the Federal Reserve: A Review of the Literature}, Booktitle = {The Political Economy of Monetary Policy}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Mayer, T}, Year = {1990}, Key = {fds250103} } @misc{fds250117, Author = {Keech, W and Munger, MC}, Title = {Political Economy}, Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of Political Science}, Publisher = {Congressional Quarterly Press}, Editor = {Garrett, L and McClain, A and Chambers}, Year = {2010}, Abstract = {Originally published in 1997. Reprinted in new Chinese language edition, and in new Korean edition.}, Key = {fds250117} } @misc{fds250105, Author = {Munger, M and Hinich, M}, Title = {Political Ideology, Communication, and Community}, Pages = {25-50}, Booktitle = {Political Economy: Institutions, Competion, and Representation}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Barnett, W and Hinich, M and Schofield, N}, Year = {1993}, Key = {fds250105} } @misc{fds250102, Author = {Munger, M and Hinich, M}, Title = {Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibrium Spatial Analysis}, Pages = {49-68}, Booktitle = {Models of Strategic Choice in Politics}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Ordeshook, P}, Year = {1989}, Key = {fds250102} } @misc{fds312958, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Political science and public choice}, Pages = {39-53}, Booktitle = {The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition}, Year = {2013}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9781849802857}, Abstract = {Political science is the study of power, cooperation, and the uses (legitimate or otherwise) of force. Public choice is the application of a general model of rational individual choice and action to a variety of problems of groups choosing in non- market settings.}, Key = {fds312958} } @misc{fds250120, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Political Science and Public Choice}, Pages = {81-106}, Booktitle = {Elgar Companion to Public Choice II}, Publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishers}, Editor = {Reksulak, M and Razzolini, L and Shughart, W}, Year = {2012}, Key = {fds250120} } @misc{fds313173, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Public Choice Economics}, Volume = {19}, Pages = {534-539}, Booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences}, Publisher = {Elsevier}, Editor = {Wright, JD}, Year = {2015}, ISBN = {9780080970868}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.71071-3}, Abstract = {Public choice is the application of economic methods and behavioral assumptions to nonmarket collective choice institutions. There are six major questions that public choice has focused on: collective action, controlling Leviathan, delegation, democratic coherence, information problems, and rent-seeking. Public choice has important implications for institutional design, particularly under the assumption that political actors may be motivated by interests other than the public interest. Public choice has given rise to important areas of study in empirical behavioral economics, including experimental economics, and to the study of common pool resource management institutions.}, Doi = {10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.71071-3}, Key = {fds313173} } @misc{fds250115, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Regulation}, Pages = {418-420}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Libertarianism}, Publisher = {Cato Institute}, Editor = {Hanowy, R}, Year = {2008}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412965811.n257}, Doi = {10.4135/9781412965811.n257}, Key = {fds250115} } @misc{fds303785, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Regulation}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Libertarianism}, Publisher = {CATO Institute, Washington, D.C.}, Editor = {Palmer, T}, Year = {2005}, Key = {fds303785} } @misc{fds312940, Author = {Munger, MC and Larson, J}, Title = {Reimagine What You Already Know: Toward New Solutions to Longstanding Problems (forthcoming)}, Booktitle = {Digital Kenya}, Editor = {Weiss, T}, Year = {2016}, Month = {April}, Key = {fds312940} } @misc{fds313756, Author = {Munger, MC and Hinich, M}, Title = {Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson}, Volume = {II}, Pages = {284-286}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Public Choice}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press}, Editor = {Frey, B and Rowley, C and Scheider, F}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds313756} } @misc{fds361934, Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC}, Title = {Spatial theory}, Pages = {295-304}, Booktitle = {Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy}, Year = {2008}, Month = {December}, ISBN = {9780387745749}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-75870-1_18}, Abstract = {One of the fundamental building blocks in the analysis of political phenomena is the representation of preferences. Without some means of capturing the essence of goals and trade-offs for individual choices, the mechanics of the public choice method are stalled. While there are many ways of representing preferences, the single most commonly used approach is the spatial model. The idea of conceiving preference in a kind of space is actually quite ancient, as the quote from Aristotle's Politics below shows. Furthermore, there are hints of several topics of modern spatial theory, including the power of the middle, and the problem of instability in political processes. © 2008 Springer-Verlag US.}, Doi = {10.1007/978-0-387-75870-1_18}, Key = {fds361934} } @misc{fds313755, Author = {Munger, MC and Hinich, M}, Title = {Spatial Theory}, Volume = {II}, Pages = {305-312}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Public Choice}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press}, Editor = {Frey, B and Rowley, C and Schneider, F}, Year = {2003}, ISBN = {9780792386070}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_26}, Doi = {10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_26}, Key = {fds313755} } @misc{fds250101, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {The Cost of Protectionism: Estimates of the Hidden Tax of Trade Restraints}, Booktitle = {World Trade and Trade Finance}, Publisher = {Matthew Bender}, Editor = {Norton, JJ}, Year = {1985}, Key = {fds250101} } @misc{fds376561, Author = {Munger, MC and Grier, K and Roberts, B}, Title = {The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978 - 1986}, Booktitle = {Business and Government}, Publisher = {Edward Elgar Press}, Year = {1994}, Key = {fds376561} } @misc{fds250100, Author = {Munger, M and Grier, KB}, Title = {The Empirical Accuracy of Sargent’s New Classical Macro Model: Some Simulation Evidence}, Booktitle = {A Comparison of the Predictive Performance of Small Macroeconometric Models}, Publisher = {St. Louis, MO: Center for the Study of American Business}, Editor = {Meyer, L}, Year = {1983}, Key = {fds250100} } @misc{fds250123, Author = {Couyoumdjian, JP and Munger, MC}, Title = {The Entrepreneurial Virtues}, Booktitle = {Perspectives on Character}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Editor = {Fileva, I}, Year = {2016}, Key = {fds250123} } @misc{fds250106, Author = {Munger, M and Brewster, R and Oatley, T}, Title = {The European Court of Justice: An Agenda Control Analysis of the Implications of EU Enlargement}, Booktitle = {Institutional Challenges in The European Union}, Publisher = {Kluwer Academic Press}, Editor = {canDeemen, A and Hosli, M}, Year = {2000}, Key = {fds250106} } @misc{fds312952, Author = {Gerard, D and Keech, W and Munger, M}, Title = {The Political Economy of Sustainability (forthcoming)}, Booktitle = {Introduction to Sustainable Engineering}, Publisher = {Prentice-Hall}, Editor = {Davidson, C}, Year = {2014}, Month = {March}, Key = {fds312952} } @misc{fds365150, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES}, Volume = {2}, Pages = {404-416}, Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice: Volume 2}, Year = {2019}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780190469788}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.19}, Abstract = {Political parties have been conceived variously as teams of candidates, of ideological activists, or of groups of voters. Their goals range range from winning office or controlling government to implementing a shared vision of policy. But candidates, activists, and voters often have conflicting goals, and a desire to control government may conflict with a particular conception of “good” policy. This chapter considers how these conflicts play out in parties as organizations. Parties are the means by which democracies present, simplify, and differentiate competing visions of governance. They also may be the most fundamental informal institutions in democracies. Public choice conceives of individuals as pursuing goals, with plans and institutions used to the extent that individual goals are advanced; this is the “parties as effective” argument. Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, so organized interests focus their power on the policy process.}, Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.19}, Key = {fds365150} } @misc{fds250112, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Voting}, Booktitle = {Public Choice Handbook}, Publisher = {Edward Elgar Press}, Editor = {Shughart, W and Razzolini, L}, Year = {2003}, Key = {fds250112} } @misc{fds250107, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Voting}, Pages = {197-239}, Booktitle = {Elgar Companion to Public Choice}, Publisher = {Edward Elgar Press}, Editor = {Shughart, W and Razzolini, L}, Year = {2001}, Key = {fds250107} } @misc{fds250097, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Why People Don’t Trust Government}, Booktitle = {Regulation}, Editor = {Joseph S Nye and J and Zelikow, P}, Year = {1999}, Key = {fds250097} } @misc{fds250109, Author = {Brewster, R and Munger, M and Oatley, T}, Title = {Widening vs. Deepening the European Union: An Institutional Analysis}, Pages = {48-64}, Booktitle = {Institutional Challenges in the European Union}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Editor = {Hosli, M and van Deemen, A}, Year = {2002}, Key = {fds250109} } @misc{fds250124, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {“How to Write Less Badly” (Reprint 2010 article as book chapter)}, Booktitle = {Top Ten Productivity Tips for Professors, Edward Elgar Publishers}, Year = {2012}, Key = {fds250124} } %% Journal Articles @article{fds250182, Author = {Munger, KM and Munger, MC}, Title = {'Competencia Spatial en América Latina: Una visión general de algunos modelos ilustrativos' (Spatial Competition in Latin America: A Review of Some Illustrative Models)}, Journal = {Revista Mexicana de Analisis Politico y Administracion Publica}, Volume = {4}, Number = {2}, Pages = {33-40}, Year = {2013}, Key = {fds250182} } @article{fds250217, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {'Thinking About Order Without Thought' In Tullock's Contributions to Spontaneous Order Studies}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {135}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {79-88}, Year = {2010}, Abstract = {"Thinking About Order Without Thought." In Tullock's Contributions to Spontaneous Order Studies, Public Choice Special Issue, 135: 79-88.}, Key = {fds250217} } @article{fds250181, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {19th Century Voting Procedures in a 21st Century World}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {124}, Series = {Special Issue on "Public Choice Perspectives at the Dawn of the 21st Century"}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {115-133}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Editor = {Shughat, W and Tollison, R}, Year = {2005}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000231472200007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Voting procedures nowadays are anachronistic on two counts: the technology of recording and counting votes often is outmoded and too much is expected from the mechanisms of democratic choice. Even if votes always and everywhere were counted perfectly, election outcomes would still be arbitrary since no collective choice process can divine the "general will". The crucial line in any state is the one dividing private decisions from collective decisions. Democracy is part of the package for nations freeing themselves from totalitarianism's grip, but it may be the last, rather than the first thing that should be added to the mix. © Springer 2005.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-005-4749-9}, Key = {fds250181} } @article{fds332797, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {30 years after the nobel: James Buchanan’s political philosophy}, Journal = {Review of Austrian Economics}, Volume = {31}, Number = {2}, Pages = {151-167}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2018}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11138-018-0418-3}, Abstract = {There are three main foundations of Public Choice theory: methodological individualism, behavioral symmetry, and “politics as exchange.” The first two are represented in nearly all work that identifies as “Public Choice,” but politics as exchange is often forgotten or de-emphasized. This paper—adapted from a lecture given on the occasion of the 30th year after Buchanan’s Nobel Prize—fleshes out Buchanan’s theory of politics as exchange, using four notions that are uniquely central to his thought: philosophical anarchism, ethical neutrality, subjectivism, and the “relatively absolute absolutes.” A central tension in Buchanan’s work is identified, in which he seems simultaneously to argue both that nearly anything agreed to by a group could be enforced within the group as a contract, and that there are certain types of rules and arrangements, generated by decentralized processes, that serve human needs better than state action. It is argued that it is a mistake to try to reconcile this tension, and that both parts of the argument are important.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11138-018-0418-3}, Key = {fds332797} } @article{fds312967, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {From Subsistence to Exchange, and Other Essays. Peter Bauer}, Journal = {The Journal of Politics}, Volume = {63}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1273-1275}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {2001}, Month = {November}, ISSN = {0022-3816}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000172085500015&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1086/jop.63.4.2691819}, Key = {fds312967} } @article{fds250204, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Odd Markets in Japanese History: Law and Economic Growth. J. Mark Ramseyer}, Journal = {The Journal of Politics}, Volume = {60}, Number = {1}, Pages = {289-291}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {1998}, Month = {February}, ISSN = {0022-3816}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000072897400038&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.2307/2648028}, Key = {fds250204} } @article{fds366284, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {A 'Good' Industrial Policy is Impossible: With an Application to AB5 and Contractors}, Journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Policy.}, Volume = {17}, Number = {3}, Year = {2022}, Month = {June}, Key = {fds366284} } @article{fds361937, Author = {Collier, K and Munger, M}, Title = {A comparison of incumbent security in the House and Senate}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {78}, Number = {2}, Pages = {145-154}, Year = {1994}, Month = {February}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01050391}, Doi = {10.1007/BF01050391}, Key = {fds361937} } @article{fds250174, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {A Fable of the OC}, Series = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungeropportunitycost.html}, Publisher = {EconLib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN}, Year = {2006}, Month = {Summer}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungeropportunitycost.html}, Key = {fds250174} } @article{fds312970, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {A Logic of Expressive Choice. By Alexander A. Schuessler. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 177p. $49.50 cloth, $16.95 paper.}, Journal = {American Political Science Review}, Volume = {96}, Number = {1}, Pages = {218-219}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {2002}, Month = {March}, ISSN = {0003-0554}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000174946100065&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {<jats:p>An interesting aspect of life at Duke is the annual construction of our local Brigadoon. The well-ordered but ephemeral tent city is named “Krzyzewskiville,” after Duke's head basketball coach. K-ville appears once a year in the weeks before the game against UNC-Chapel Hill, our arch rival. So many students want to see this game that an elaborate nonprice rationing scheme, based on a queue, has evolved to allocate tickets. “Tenting” students may have to wait two weeks or more to get tickets. The game is in January or early February, so they sleeping outside and try to keep up with their school work despite rain, snow, and subfreezing temperatures at night. Random checks (even in the middle of the night) are conducted by student representatives; if a tent is empty too often it is taken down, and the residents lose their place in the queue.</jats:p>}, Doi = {10.1017/s0003055402394322}, Key = {fds312970} } @article{fds313213, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {A Moral Basis for Markets}, Journal = {Public Discourse}, Publisher = {Witherspoon Institute}, Year = {2014}, url = {http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/01/11845/}, Abstract = {Debate with James Stoner}, Key = {fds313213} } @article{fds250242, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {A Simple Test of the Thesis that Committee Assignments Shape the Pattern of Corporate PAC Contributions}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {62}, Number = {2}, Pages = {181-186}, Year = {1989}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00124334}, Abstract = {The results presented in the previous section tend to confirm the hypothesis that committee assignments shape the pattern of corporate PAC contributions. This note corroborates existing research on corporate PACs at a significantly lower level of aggregation than the samples on which existing research has been conducted. Further, because a nonparametric test was used (rather than the more standard regressional analysis), these results should increase our confidence that the essential institutions of government affect, and engender responses by, economic agents. © 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF00124334}, Key = {fds250242} } @article{fds342282, Author = {Guzmán, RA and Munger, MC}, Title = {A Theory of Just Market Exchange}, Journal = {Journal of Value Inquiry}, Volume = {54}, Number = {1}, Pages = {91-118}, Year = {2020}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-019-09686-5}, Doi = {10.1007/s10790-019-09686-5}, Key = {fds342282} } @article{fds250231, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Adjustment to Global Economy}, Journal = {Business and Society Review}, Volume = {55}, Pages = {8-9}, Year = {1985}, Month = {Fall}, Key = {fds250231} } @article{fds250238, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Allocation of Desirable Committee Assignments: Extended Queues vs. Committee Expansion}, Journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, Volume = {32}, Number = {2}, Pages = {317-344}, Year = {1988}, Month = {May}, Key = {fds250238} } @article{fds250243, Author = {Grier, K and Torrent, G and Munger, MC}, Title = {Allocation Patterns of PAC Monies: The U.S. Senate}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {67}, Pages = {111-128}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {1990}, ISSN = {1573-7101}, Key = {fds250243} } @article{fds361928, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Anthony Downs (1930–2021)}, Journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, Volume = {58}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1-4}, Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, Year = {2022}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01377-0}, Doi = {10.1007/s00355-021-01377-0}, Key = {fds361928} } @article{fds350866, Author = {Jenke, L and Munger, M}, Title = {Attention distribution as a measure of issue salience}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {191}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {405-416}, Year = {2022}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00711-6}, Abstract = {In spatial theory a central concept is salience, or the relative importance of issues in a voter’s mind in evaluating candidates’ platforms. Traditional, self-reported measures of salience have either been national in breadth (“which issues are most important to the nation as a whole?”) or personal (“which issues do you care most about personally?”). In the former case, the subjects are being asked to guess what issues other voters think are important; in the latter case, subjects are likely to report issues that are “socially” important to avoid seeming selfish or superficial. Unsurprisingly, such self-reported measures have not been found to explain actual candidate choices by individual voters very well. We introduce a simple process-tracing measure of salience, using mouse-tracking. Experimental participants were asked to rate three hypothetical candidates, using information accessed in a setting where the distribution of attention represents salience in the decision process. Four models were tested: standard city block distance and then the addition of each of the two measures of traditional salience—national and personal—and, finally, the attention distribution measure. Attention distribution improves model fit over the standard distance model and improves classification compared to the traditional salience measures.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-019-00711-6}, Key = {fds350866} } @article{fds250213, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Basic Income Is Not an Obligation, But It Might Be a Legitimate Choice}, Journal = {Basic Income Studies}, Volume = {6}, Number = {2}, Pages = {1-13}, Year = {2012}, Month = {January}, Abstract = {A distinction is made between libertarian destinations and libertarian directions. Basic income cannot be part of a truly libertarian state unless it could be accomplished entirely through voluntary donations. But basic income is an important step in a libertarian direction because it improves core values such as self-ownership, liberty and efficiency of transfers while reducing coercion and increasing procedural fairness. Practical approaches to achieving basic income are compared to proposals by Milton Friedman and Charles Murray.}, Key = {fds250213} } @article{fds250151, Author = {Magee, S and Brock, W and Young, L}, Title = {Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {70}, Pages = {108-110}, Year = {1991}, Key = {fds250151} } @article{fds340335, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Blogging and political information: Truth or truthiness?}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {134}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {125-138}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2008}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9205-6}, Abstract = {Does the blogosphere generate truth, or what Stephen Colbert calls 'truthiness,' facts or concepts one only wishes or believes were true? Bloggers and the mainstream media face the same difficulties if they wish to rely on the blogosphere as a generator of truth. First, both bloggers and media converge on a small number of key blogs as sources of information. But the proprietors of these elite blogs are likely to resist information that doesn't conform to their existing attitudes and beliefs, precisely because they are already highly aware of politics. Second, blogs and blog readers are likely to separate themselves into smaller networks according to their particular tastes. However, under some circumstances the blogosphere may still approximate a parallel processing statistical estimator of the truth with 'nice' properties. The key to this outcome is that judgments are independent, and that problems of polarization are mitigated. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, BV.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-007-9205-6}, Key = {fds340335} } @article{fds337962, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Blogging and Political Information: Truth or ‘Truthiness’?}, Journal = {Public Choice: The Power and Political Science of Blogs.}, Volume = {134}, Pages = {125-138}, Year = {2008}, Key = {fds337962} } @article{fds359093, Author = {Grier, KB and Munger, MC}, Title = {Breaking up is hard to do: Lessons from the strange case of New Zealand}, Journal = {Social Science Quarterly}, Volume = {102}, Number = {6}, Pages = {2565-2577}, Year = {2021}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13047}, Abstract = {Objective: To investigate historical antecedents for the likely effects of Brexit, the “breaking up” of the Commonwealth is considered. In particular, the effects on New Zealand in the period following “Brentry,” or the entry of the UK into the EU, are measured and used to forecast the pattern of impacts the UK may encounter. Methods: The technique of Synthetic Control. This quasi-experimental method takes conscious advantage of features of endogenous selection that enable the comparison of predicted growth against an explicit counterfactual, allowing for dynamic changes in each. Results: We find that NZ's loss of preferential trade status after “Brentry” in 1973 created a lost decade for NZ. Using the synthetic control model, we find that current estimates understate, perhaps substantially, the negative effect of a hard Brexit on the U.K. economy. Conclusion: NZ's famous “liberal” reforms in the 1980s did put the country back on a path parallel to its pre-1973 path. But contrary to the conventional wisdom, these reforms did not come close to restoring NZ's income to its level had Brentry not occurred. In fact, NZ is still almost 20 percent poorer even post reforms, compared to its synthetic control.}, Doi = {10.1111/ssqu.13047}, Key = {fds359093} } @article{fds250148, Author = {Eismeier, T and III, PP}, Title = {Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections}, Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management}, Volume = {9}, Pages = {577-581}, Year = {1990}, Key = {fds250148} } @article{fds250223, Author = {M.C. Munger and Ensley, MJ and Munger, MC and de Marchi, S}, Title = {Candidate Uncertainty, Mental Models, and Complexity: Some Experimental Results}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {132}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {231-246}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2007}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000247657500016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Since the work of Downs (1957), spatial models of elections have been a mainstay of research in political science and public choice. Despite the plethora of theoretical and empirical research involving spatial models, researchers have not considered in great detail the complexity of the decision task that a candidate confronts. Two facets of a candidate's decision process are investigated here, using a set of laboratory experiments where subjects face a fixed incumbent in a two-dimensional policy space. First, we analyze the effect that the complexity of the electoral landscape has on the ability of the subject to defeat the incumbent. Second, we analyze the impact that a subject's "mental model" (which we infer from a pre-experiment questionnaire) has on her performance. The experimental results suggest that the complexity of a candidate's decision task and her perception of the task may be important factors in electoral competition.}, Doi = {10.2307/27698137}, Key = {fds250223} } @article{fds374313, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Christopher Kam and Adlai Newson, The Economic Origins of Political Parties}, Journal = {OEconomia}, Number = {13-1}, Pages = {115-118}, Publisher = {OpenEdition}, Year = {2023}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/oeconomia.13996}, Doi = {10.4000/oeconomia.13996}, Key = {fds374313} } @article{fds376562, Author = {Cox, GW and Munger, MC}, Title = {Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections}, Journal = {American Political Science Review}, Volume = {83}, Number = {1}, Pages = {217-231}, Year = {1989}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1956441}, Abstract = {Students of elections have repeatedly found that the closeness of an election is modestly correlated with turnout. This may be due to a direct response of instrumentally motivated voters, but recent theoretical work casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation. Another possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with greater effort at mobilization. We explore the latter possibility by using FEC and state data on campaign expenditures in House, Senate, and gubernatorial races. Our results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the mass and elite levels. We also provide quantitative estimates of the effect of Senate and gubernatorial expenditure on House turnout. © 1989, American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.2307/1956441}, Key = {fds376562} } @article{fds250206, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Coercion, the state, and the obligations of citizenship}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {152}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {415-421}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2012}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000306791200030&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-012-9992-2}, Key = {fds250206} } @article{fds250141, Author = {Ravenhill, J}, Title = {Collective Clientelism: The Lome Conventions and North-South Relations}, Journal = {The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science}, Volume = {493}, Pages = {219-220}, Year = {1986}, Month = {September}, Key = {fds250141} } @article{fds250277, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Comment on 'Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law' by John Ferejohn}, Journal = {Law and contemporary problems: The Law of Politics}, Volume = {65}, Pages = {87-94}, Publisher = {Duke University School of Law}, Year = {2002}, Month = {Summer}, ISSN = {0023-9186}, Key = {fds250277} } @article{fds312966, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Comment on Michael C. Munger's "Political Science and Fundamental Research" - Reply to Roelofs}, Journal = {PS-POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS}, Volume = {33}, Number = {3}, Pages = {518-519}, Publisher = {AMER POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOC}, Year = {2000}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {1049-0965}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000088910500002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1017/S1049096500063162}, Key = {fds312966} } @article{fds312972, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Commentary on "The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice" by Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom}, Journal = {American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, Volume = {63}, Number = {1}, Pages = {149-160}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2004}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0002-9246}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000189098600008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {The Ostroms have created a paper that goes to the very heart of the public choice enterprise. They suggest that we should conceive of the evolution of constitutional procedures and laws in analogy with biological evolution. One of the paper's central goals is to establish the logical foundations of political order. I take this goal seriously and compare explicitly the task of explaining order in biology and politics. In the case of biology, the task of evolutionary theory has been to give an account of why there are complex arrangements of genetic material called "organisms" (including humans, giraffes, and whales) rather than just a nutrient-rich primordial ooze with no apparent structure. For the social scientist, the task is to explain why there are rules, structure, and stability in societies.}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00278.x}, Key = {fds312972} } @article{fds250246, Author = {Grier, K and Munger, MC}, Title = {Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions to House Incumbents}, Journal = {Economic Inquiry}, Volume = {29}, Pages = {24-43}, Publisher = {Wiley}, Year = {1991}, ISSN = {1465-7295}, Key = {fds250246} } @article{fds250252, Author = {Torrent, GM and Munger, MC}, Title = {Committee Power and Value in the U.S. Senate: Implications for Policy}, Journal = {Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory}, Volume = {3}, Pages = {46-65}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press}, Year = {1993}, ISSN = {1477-9803}, Key = {fds250252} } @article{fds250149, Author = {Alexander, H}, Title = {Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s}, Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management}, Volume = {9}, Pages = {577-581}, Year = {1990}, Key = {fds250149} } @article{fds361938, Author = {Grier, KB and Munger, MC}, Title = {Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and Senate Incumbents, 1980–1986}, Journal = {The Journal of Politics}, Volume = {55}, Number = {3}, Pages = {615-643}, Year = {1993}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2131991}, Abstract = {Most work on the allocation patterns of campaign contributions by interest groups focuses on the relative productivity of legislators' effort in serving each group. Short time-series and cross-sectional _ studies of PAC activity have been done for the House of Representatives and the Senate separately, but no study has used (1) longer time series data or (2) made explicit comparisons among interest group (corporations, unions, and trade associations) activities, considering (3) differences in the time series pattern of groups across the two chambers. We integrate all three perspectives here, using data covering the 1980–1986 election cycles. The results represent preliminary estimates of the dollar value to interest groups of the personal and institutional characteristics of legislators, where these characteristics are allowed for the first time to vary across chambers. © 1993, Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.2307/2131991}, Key = {fds361938} } @article{fds250256, Author = {Collier, K and Munger, MC}, Title = {Comparing Reelection Rates in the House and Senate}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {78}, Pages = {45-54}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {1994}, ISSN = {1573-7101}, Key = {fds250256} } @article{fds356921, Author = {Potthoff, RF and Munger, MC}, Title = {Condorcet Loser in 2016: Apparently Trump; Condorcet Winner: Not Clinton?}, Journal = {American Politics Research}, Volume = {49}, Number = {6}, Pages = {618-636}, Year = {2021}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211009499}, Abstract = {Using thermometer score data from the ANES, we show that while there may have been no clear-cut Condorcet winner among the 2016 US presidential candidates, there appears to have been a Condorcet loser: Donald Trump. Thus the surprise is that the electorate preferred not only Hillary Clinton, but also the two “minor” candidates, Gary Johnson and Jill Stein, to Trump. Another surprise is that Johnson may have been the Condorcet winner. A minimal normative standard for evaluating voting systems is advanced, privileging those systems that select Condorcet winners if one exists, and critiquing systems that allow the selection of Condorcet losers. A variety of voting mechanisms are evaluated using the 2016 thermometer scores: Condorcet voting, plurality, Borda, (single winner) Hare, Coombs, range voting, and approval voting. We conclude that the essential problem with the existing voting procedure—Electoral College runoff of primary winners of two major parties—is that it (demonstrably) allows the selection of a Condorcet loser.}, Doi = {10.1177/1532673X211009499}, Key = {fds356921} } @article{fds312946, Author = {Potthoff, RF and Munger, MC}, Title = {Condorcet polling can yield serendipitous clues about voter views}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {165}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {1-12}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2015}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0285-4}, Abstract = {Condorcet polling provides additional information about pairwise rankings often obscured in standard polls when there are three or more candidates. This paper analyzes an original dataset collected from Duke University students in North Carolina concerning the 2014 Senate race, wherein a Democrat, a Republican, and a Libertarian contested the election. The results illustrate that Condorcet polling is feasible in such a context, and that the information provided changes the strategic calculus of voters in ways that may have a positive impact on the way votes are cast and choices considered.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-015-0285-4}, Key = {fds312946} } @article{fds250169, Author = {Poole, K and Rosenthal, H}, Title = {Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting}, Journal = {The Independent Review}, Year = {1999}, Key = {fds250169} } @article{fds312962, Author = {Berger, MM and Munger, MC}, Title = {Congressional parties and primary election challenges.}, Journal = {LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY}, Volume = {23}, Number = {3}, Pages = {450-450}, Publisher = {COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE RES CENTER}, Year = {1998}, Month = {August}, ISSN = {0362-9805}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000075223300012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Key = {fds312962} } @article{fds355327, Author = {Munger, M and Vanberg, G}, Title = {Contractarianism, constitutionalism, and the status quo}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {195}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {323-339}, Year = {2023}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00878-x}, Abstract = {The constitutional political economy (CPE) approach as developed by James Buchanan places emphasis on supermajority rules—in particular, a unanimity requirement for constitutional change. Critics argue that this approach “privileges the status quo” in two problematic ways: (1) alternatives are treated unequally, because the status quo requires a smaller coalition to be “chosen” than any other institutional arrangement selected to replace it; and (2) individuals are treated unequally, because those who happen to support the status quo have excessive power to impose their will on the larger group, implying that a minority illegitimately is privileged to block change. This is a serious and important challenge. At the same time, we argue that critics have conflated two analytically distinct issues in arguing that the CPE paradigm (and constitutionalism more generally) “privilege the status quo”. Moreover, we aim to show that in rejecting the “privileged position of the status quo”, critics must confront an equally challenging task: Providing a “measuring stick” by which the legitimacy of the status quo, and changes to it, can be judged. It is precisely skepticism regarding the possibility of providing a criterion of legitimacy that is independent of agreement that leads to the peculiar position of the status quo in Buchanan’s thought.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-021-00878-x}, Key = {fds355327} } @article{fds250240, Author = {Cox, G and Munger, MC}, Title = {Contributions, Expenditure, Turnout: The 1982 U.S. House Elections}, Journal = {The American political science review}, Volume = {83}, Number = {1}, Pages = {217-231}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals}, Year = {1989}, ISSN = {1537-5943}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1956441}, Abstract = {Students of elections have repeatedly found that the closeness of an election is modestly correlated with turnout. This may be due to a direct response of instrumentally motivated voters, but recent theoretical work casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation. Another possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with greater effort at mobilization. We explore the latter possibility by using FEC and state data on campaign expenditures in House, Senate, and gubernatorial races. Our results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the mass and elite levels. We also provide quantitative estimates of the effect of Senate and gubernatorial expenditure on House turnout. © 1989, American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.2307/1956441}, Key = {fds250240} } @article{fds250160, Author = {Mitnick, EBB}, Title = {Corporate Political Agency: The Construction of Competition in Public Affairs}, Journal = {American Political Science Review}, Volume = {88}, Pages = {1000-1001}, Year = {1994}, Key = {fds250160} } @article{fds250255, Author = {Grier, KB and Munger, MC}, Title = {Corporate, Labor, and Trade Association Contributions to the U.S. House and Senate, 1978-1986}, Journal = {Journal of Politics}, Volume = {55}, Pages = {615-644}, Year = {1993}, Key = {fds250255} } @article{fds250166, Author = {Klein, DB and Moore, AT and Reja, B}, Title = {Curb Rights: A Foundation for Free Enterprise in Urban Transit}, Journal = {Regulation}, Year = {1997}, Month = {Summer}, Key = {fds250166} } @article{fds250241, Author = {Hart, D and Munger, MC}, Title = {Declining Electoral Competitiveness in the House of Representatives: the Differential Impact of Improved Transportation Technology}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {61}, Pages = {217-231}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {1989}, ISSN = {1573-7101}, Key = {fds250241} } @article{fds250165, Author = {Teske, P and Best, S and Mintrom, M}, Title = {Deregulation Freight Transportation: Delivering the Goods}, Journal = {Regulation}, Year = {1997}, Month = {Summer}, Key = {fds250165} } @article{fds362299, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Desert? You Can't Handle Desert!}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {26}, Number = {3}, Pages = {325-332}, Year = {2021}, Key = {fds362299} } @article{fds250230, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Destroy Trade Barriers}, Journal = {Business and Society Review}, Volume = {53}, Pages = {10-11}, Year = {1985}, Month = {Spring}, Key = {fds250230} } @article{fds250186, Author = {Grynaviski, JD and Munger, M}, Title = {Did southerners favor slavery? Inferences from an analysis of prices in New Orleans, 1805-1860}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {159}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {341-361}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0150-2}, Abstract = {During the years immediately following the American Revolution, it was common for Southern elites to express concerns about the morality or long-term viability of slavery. It is unclear, however, whether such expressions of anti-slavery sentiment were genuine, especially given the failure of so many slave owners to emancipate their slaves. In this paper, we show that there was a change in elite rhetoric about slavery, initiated by Whig politicians in the mid-1830s seeking a campaign issue in the South, in which anti-slavery rhetoric became linked to attempts by abolitionists to foment slave unrest, making anti-slavery an unsustainable position for the region's politicians. Before that development, we contend that some planters believed that slavery might some day be abolished. After it, those concerns largely went away. We argue that the change in slave owners' beliefs about the probability of abolition in the mid-1830s should have been reflected in slave prices at auction and test that claim using evidence from the New Orleans auction market. © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media New York.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0150-2}, Key = {fds250186} } @article{fds250254, Author = {Mitchell, WC and Munger, MC}, Title = {Doing well while intending good: Cases in political exploitation}, Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics}, Volume = {5}, Number = {3}, Pages = {317-348}, Publisher = {SAGE Publications (UK and US)}, Year = {1993}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {1460-3667}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692893005003002}, Abstract = {Exploitation has a deservedly bad reputation as an analytic concept in the social sciences. But this need not be so; a simple definition of exploitation is advanced that has a positive basis. Exploitation should be defined as the result of rent-seeking activity that results in social outcomes that are not Paretooptimal. Government, or the organization with a constitutional monopoly on the legitimate use of force, is ideally charged with balancing two competing kinds of exploitation. The first is the private exploitation of agents acting in unregulated markets where property rights are undefined and unenforced. The second is political exploitation using the powers of government itself. The ideal task of government is to minimize the total exploitative activity in the polity. Five case studies are offered as illustrations of political exploitation, and how difficult the task of balancing is. © 1993, Sage Publications. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1177/0951692893005003002}, Key = {fds250254} } @article{fds312965, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Donald G. Saari, Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes: Social Choice Analysis}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {140}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {539-542}, Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, Year = {2009}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000268281200014&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-009-9435-x}, Key = {fds312965} } @article{fds327642, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Douglass C. North: The answer is "transactions costs"}, Journal = {Independent Review}, Volume = {21}, Number = {1}, Pages = {143-146}, Year = {2016}, Month = {June}, Abstract = {Michael C. Munger found during conducting economic research that professor Douglass C. North emphasized on the concept of transactions costs as an answer to most of the economic problems, suggesting that transactions costs played a central role in solving most of the economic questions. The problem was that ideology cannot be both a summary, an information shortcut, which would have to be correct on average, and a substitute for facts and reason. Once one recognized that institutional arrangements were in part the product of and in part supported ex post by ideologies, the rational choice view of mass politics became much harder to sustain. This recognition led Doug on a path that took him away from traditional economics, which adopted its own ideological requirement that incentives, not tastes, must be the force that animated choices and changes in choices.}, Key = {fds327642} } @article{fds250216, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Economic Choice, Political Decision, and the Problem of Limits}, Journal = {Public Choice: Homo Economicus, Homo Politicus}, Volume = {137}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {507-522}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2008}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000260378900008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Assesses the arguments for the use of market, or political, processes for making collective choices. The border between "what is mine" and "what is ours" is contested, but it is unguarded. Where should it lie? How would we know when it should be adjusted? I uncover an old paradox: A society can never use political means to guard against incursions across the border for political ends. Some other mechanism, such as constitutional or other extra-statutory rules, are required. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-008-9353-3}, Key = {fds250216} } @article{fds250248, Author = {Mitchell, W and Munger, MC}, Title = {Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey}, Journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, Volume = {35}, Pages = {512-546}, Publisher = {Wiley}, Year = {1991}, ISSN = {1540-5907}, Key = {fds250248} } @article{fds250153, Author = {Schwartzman, D}, Title = {Economic Policy: An Agenda for the 1990s}, Journal = {The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science}, Volume = {513}, Pages = {200-202}, Year = {1991}, Key = {fds250153} } @article{fds250272, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Economists and fiscal policy advice: A deficit or a deficiency?}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {118}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {235-249}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2004}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000220250100002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1023/b:puch.0000019988.50722.13}, Key = {fds250272} } @article{fds361935, Author = {Shughart, WF and Kurrild-Klitgaard, P and Munger, M}, Title = {Editorial announcement}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {132}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {255-256}, Year = {2007}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9164-y}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-007-9164-y}, Key = {fds361935} } @article{fds318620, Author = {Munger, MC and Hinich, M}, Title = {Editors' Introduction}, Journal = {Public Choice: Empirical Studies in Comparative Politics}, Volume = {97}, Number = {2}, Pages = {3-3}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {1998}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/MCC.0b013e328352c6d6}, Doi = {10.1097/MCC.0b013e328352c6d6}, Key = {fds318620} } @article{fds327640, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Egalitarianism, properly conceived: We all are "Rawlsekians" now!}, Journal = {Independent Review}, Volume = {22}, Number = {1}, Pages = {59-70}, Year = {2017}, Month = {June}, Key = {fds327640} } @article{fds313172, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Empowering, Not Enfeebling: Beyond the ‘Market v. State’ Dichotomy}, Journal = {Conversations on Philanthropy}, Volume = {10}, Publisher = {Conversations on Philanthropy}, Year = {2015}, Key = {fds313172} } @article{fds312975, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful: Elinor Ostrom and the diversity of institutions}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {143}, Number = {3}, Pages = {263-268}, Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, Year = {2010}, Month = {June}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000277556500001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-010-9629-2}, Key = {fds312975} } @article{fds361933, Author = {Grynaviski, JD and Munger, M}, Title = {Erratum to: Did southerners favor slavery? Inferences from an analysis of prices in New Orleans, 1805-1860 (Public Choice, 10.1007/s11127-013-0150-2)}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {160}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {293}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0178-y}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-014-0178-y}, Key = {fds361933} } @article{fds312948, Author = {Guzmán, RA and Munger, MC}, Title = {Erratum to: Euvoluntariness and just market exchange: moral dilemmas from Locke’s Venditio(Public Choice, (2014), 158, 39-49, DOI 10.1007/s11127-013-0090-x)}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {164}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {189}, Year = {2015}, Month = {July}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0269-4}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-015-0269-4}, Key = {fds312948} } @article{fds312947, Author = {Keech, WR and Munger, MC}, Title = {Erratum to: The anatomy of government failure(Public Choice, (2015), DOI 10.1007/s11127-015-0262-y)}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {164}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {43-44}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2015}, Month = {July}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0268-5}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-015-0268-5}, Key = {fds312947} } @article{fds312963, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Estimating market power and strategies}, Journal = {PUBLIC CHOICE}, Volume = {134}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {495-500}, Publisher = {SPRINGER}, Year = {2008}, Month = {March}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000252801100024&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Key = {fds312963} } @article{fds312956, Author = {Guzmán, RA and Munger, MC}, Title = {Euvoluntariness and just market exchange: Moral dilemmas from Locke's Venditio}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {158}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {39-49}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0090-x}, Abstract = {It is a maxim of Public Choice that voluntary exchanges should not be interfered with by the state. But what makes a voluntary market exchange truly voluntary? We suggest, contra much of the economics literature, that voluntary exchange requires consent uncoerced by threats of harm, but that this is not sufficient. In particular, a person pressured to exchange by the dire consequences of failing to exchange-e.g., dying of thirst or hunger-is still coerced, and coerced exchange cannot be voluntary. The weaker party's desperation gives the other party unconscionable bargaining power. We argue for a distinction, based on a neologism: in the case of coercion by circumstance but not by threat, exchange is still voluntary in the conventional sense, but it is not euvoluntary (i.e., truly voluntary). We will argue that all euvoluntary exchanges are just, while non-euvoluntary exchanges may or may not be unjust; that in competitive markets all exchanges are just, even those that are not euvoluntary, while in bilateral monopolies some exchanges are neither euvoluntary nor just. We will propose a mental device, the "fictitious negotiation", to determine the just price in non-euvoluntary market exchanges. A primitive version of these ideas can be found in a little known monograph by John Locke, which we will analyze in detail. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0090-x}, Key = {fds312956} } @article{fds312957, Author = {Guzmán, RA and Munger, MC}, Title = {Euvoluntariness and just market exchange: moral dilemmas from Locke's Venditio}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Pages = {1-11}, Year = {2013}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, Key = {fds312957} } @article{fds250205, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Euvoluntary or not, exchange is just}, Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy}, Volume = {28}, Series = {Summer}, Number = {2}, Pages = {192-211}, Booktitle = {Liberalism and Capitalism}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Editor = {EF Paul and FD Miller, Jr. and J Paul}, Year = {2011}, Month = {Summer}, ISSN = {0265-0525}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000292247500008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {The arguments for redistribution of wealth, and for prohibiting certain transactions such as price-gouging, both are based in mistaken conceptions of exchange. This paper proposes a neologism, "euvoluntary" exchange, meaning both that the exchange is truly voluntary and that it benefits both parties to the transaction. The argument has two parts: First, all euvoluntary exchanges should be permitted, and there is no justification for redistribution of wealth if disparities result only from euvoluntary exchanges. Second, even exchanges that are not euvoluntary should generally be permitted, because access to market exchange may be the only means by which people in desperate circumstances can improve their position. © Copyright Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2011.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0265052510000269}, Key = {fds250205} } @article{fds42296, Author = {M.C. Munger and Irwin Morris}, Title = {First Branch, or Root? Congress, the President, and Federal Reserve}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Year = {1998}, Key = {fds42296} } @article{fds250177, Author = {Munger, MC and Morris, I}, Title = {First Branch, or Root? Congress, the President, and Federal Reserve}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {96}, Pages = {363-380}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {1998}, ISSN = {1573-7101}, Key = {fds250177} } @article{fds250269, Author = {Munger, MC and Cooper, A}, Title = {Five Questions: An Integrated Research Agenda in Public}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {103}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {1-12}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {2000}, ISSN = {1573-7101}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000086020100001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1023/A:1005048904160}, Key = {fds250269} } @article{fds361936, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Forum}, Journal = {PS: Political Science & Politics}, Volume = {28}, Number = {2}, Pages = {187}, Year = {1995}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096500057085}, Doi = {10.1017/S1049096500057085}, Key = {fds361936} } @article{fds250184, Author = {Guzman, RA and Munger, MC}, Title = {Freedom of Contract and the Morality of Exchange: Examples From Locke’s Venditio}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Year = {2013}, Abstract = {(with Ricardo Guzman). Public Choice.}, Key = {fds250184} } @article{fds367345, Author = {Theisen, A and Kiesling, L and Munger, M}, Title = {From Airbnb to solar: electricity market platforms as local sharing economies}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {193}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {141-162}, Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, Year = {2022}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00985-3}, Abstract = {Distributed energy resource (DER) technologies such as rooftop solar change the structure of production and consumption in the electricity industry. These changes will be mediated by digital platforms in ways that will sharply decrease scale economy entry barriers in generation, making local generation and self-supply not only possible but economically competitive. Digitally-enabled platform business models and local electricity markets are increasingly part of policy debates in electricity distribution and retail due to the proliferation of digital and DER technologies. Here we propose a two-stage model to represent the effects of transaction cost-reducing innovation on two aspects of such transactions: gains from trade in sharing, and the ability to express and satisfy heterogeneous, subjective preferences in a poly-centric system. Our core insight is that excess capacity varies inversely with transaction costs; digital platform technologies and business models enable asset owners to rent out this excess capacity. We analyze the equilibrium comparative statics of the model to derive observable predictions, and find that having a local electricity market platform option makes the opportunity cost of excess capacity economically relevant. As small- scale transactions in energy capacity become more feasible, our results suggest that ownership of DER capacity will be driven less by one’s expected intensity of use and more by relative price concerns and subjective preferences for energy self-sufficiency or environmental attributes.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-022-00985-3}, Key = {fds367345} } @article{fds343718, Author = {Kiesling, LL and Munger, MC and Theisen, A}, Title = {From Airbnb to Solar: Toward a Transaction Cost Model of a Retail Electricity Distribution Platform}, Year = {2019}, Month = {January}, Key = {fds343718} } @article{fds374316, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Getting Right with Reagan: The Struggle for True Conservatism, 1980-2016}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {26}, Number = {4}, Pages = {630-633}, Year = {2022}, Key = {fds374316} } @article{fds360001, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Giants among us: do we need a new antitrust paradigm?}, Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, Volume = {33}, Number = {4}, Pages = {445-460}, Year = {2022}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-021-09350-w}, Abstract = {Traditional antitrust policy was formulated to control pricing and output decisions that were not disciplined by competitive forces, either because of monopoly power or agreements in restraint of trade. Because there is no single criterion for evaluating political policy outcomes, antitrust regulators eventually settled on the “consumer welfare standard,” correctly recognizing that any other standard was incoherent. Recently “platforms” (defined here as firms or apps that solve the key transaction costs problems of triangulation, transfer, and trust) have tended toward giantism. This had led to calls for a new approach to antitrust, restoring the old multiple set of goals. But every platform by definition defines an industry, and is a monopoly within that industry. Such network economies or advantages in managing trust are the reasons platforms exist in the first place. This paper reviews the history of antitrust, defines platforms and the problems of “giantism,” and suggests some policies that certainly won't work and should be abandoned. The problem is power, not monopoly. So power is what the “new paradigm” needs to address.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10602-021-09350-w}, Key = {fds360001} } @article{fds250163, Author = {Ferguson, T}, Title = {Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems}, Journal = {The Independent Review}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {198-201}, Year = {1996}, Key = {fds250163} } @article{fds340538, Author = {Munger, M and Vanberg, G}, Title = {Gordon Tullock as a political scientist}, Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, Volume = {27}, Number = {2}, Pages = {194-213}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2016}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-016-9214-x}, Abstract = {We consider Gordon Tullock’s impact in political science, focusing on his influence as a scholar and as an academic entrepreneur. It is common to think of Tullock as a “natural economist,” but his formal training at Chicago encompassed considerable coursework related to political science. We consider three sources of information to draw conclusions about Tullock’s contributions in political science: (1) Course syllabi; (2) Citations in academic political science journals; and (3) Impact on the careers of important political scientists, and shaping the intellectual agenda. Our conclusion is that, while Tullock’s work is clearly significant for central questions in political science, and has received some attention, his primary legacy lies in the impact he had on launching and shaping the careers of prominent political scientists, and thus the development of political science scholarship.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10602-016-9214-x}, Key = {fds340538} } @article{fds312941, Author = {Munger, MC and Vanberg, G}, Title = {Gordon Tullock as a Political Scientist (forthcoming)}, Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, Year = {2016}, Month = {April}, Key = {fds312941} } @article{fds250251, Author = {Coates, DC and Munger, MC}, Title = {Guessing and Choosing: A Multicriterion Decision on a Dispoal Technology for Low Level Radioactive Waste}, Journal = {Journal of Public Policy}, Volume = {11}, Pages = {275-289}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals}, Year = {1992}, ISSN = {1469-7815}, Key = {fds250251} } @article{fds313211, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {How to Write Less Badly}, Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education}, Year = {2010}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0009-5982}, Key = {fds313211} } @article{fds312938, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Human Agency and Convergence: Gaus’s Kantian Parliamentarian (forthcoming)}, Journal = {The Review of Austrian Economics}, Volume = {30}, Number = {3}, Pages = {353-364}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {2017}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0889-3047}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11138-016-0357-9}, Abstract = {Public reason is justified to the extent that it uses (only) arguments, assumptions, or goals that are allowable as “public” reasons. But this exclusion requires some prior agreement on domains, and a process that disallows new unacceptable reasons by unanimous consent. Surprisingly, this problem of reconciliation is nearly the same, mutatis mutandis, as that faced by micro-economists working on general equilibrium, where a conceit—tâtonnement, directed by an auctioneer—was proposed by Leon Walras. Gaus’s justification of public reason requires the “as if” solution of a Kantian Parliamentarian, who rules on whether a proposal is “in order.” Previous work on public reason, by Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls, have all reduced decision-making and the process of “reasoning” to choice by a unitary actor, thereby begging the questions of disagreement, social choice, and reconciliation. Gaus, to his credit, solves that problem, but at the price of requiring that the process “knows” information that is in fact indiscernible to any of the participants. In fact, given the dispersed and radical situatedness of human aims and information, it is difficult for individuals, much less groups, to determine when norms are publicly justified or not. More work is required to fully take on Hayek’s insight that no person, much less all people, can have sufficient reasons to endorse the relevant norm, rule or law.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11138-016-0357-9}, Key = {fds312938} } @article{fds250268, Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC and De Marchi and S}, Title = {Ideology and the construction of nationality: The Canadian elections of 1993}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {97}, Number = {3}, Pages = {401-428}, Year = {1998}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000078315900008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Canada is one nation, but it is in many ways two communities, one Francophone and the other Anglophone. We employ a formal model of "ideology" and analyze how nationality is constructed in people's minds. The magnitude of the changes in expressed "preferences" in terms of ideology depends on the salience of the new issue, the extent to which it confirms with the existing ideological cleavage, and the difference between the perceived status quo on the new dimension and the voter's most preferred alternative. Using data from the 1993 Canadian National Election Study, we consider the relative importance of different policy dimensions in explaining voting decisions among educated Canadians. The issue of Quebec sovereignty, alone, is shown to have significant power for predicting vote choice. A plausible explanation, confirmed here by regression analysis, is that Quebec sovereignty "stands" for other issues in voters' conception of Canadian politics.}, Doi = {10.1023/A:1005089925291}, Key = {fds250268} } @article{fds42295, Author = {M.C. Munger and Melvin Hinich and Scott de Marchi}, Title = {Ideology and the Construction of Nationality: The Canadian Elections of 1993}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Year = {1998}, Key = {fds42295} } @article{fds357974, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Ideology and the Direction of Causation in the Acquisition and Maintenance of Shared Belief Systems}, Journal = {Kyklos}, Volume = {73}, Number = {3}, Pages = {392-409}, Year = {2020}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12243}, Abstract = {Preferences and beliefs are more widely and systematically shared than might be predicted by a subjective, idiosyncratic view arising out of neoclassical economics. Two works were published twenty five years ago on just this question, contesting conceptions of belief acquisition: Denzau and North (1994) and Hinich and Munger (1994). Denzau and North argued that beliefs are simplified representations of reality that provide conventional means of interpreting the world around us; Hinich and Munger agreed. But Denzau and North argued that beliefs were essentially self-perpetuating, and not subject to optimizing revision based on feedback, while Hinich and Munger followed the orthodox Downsian notion of a heuristic that economizes (in equilibrium) on the cost of becoming informed about politics. The big difference is that the Hume-Denzau-North conception follows the “Folk Theorem,” making no claim about the optimality of the belief systems that a society comes to share.}, Doi = {10.1111/kykl.12243}, Key = {fds357974} } @article{fds250164, Author = {Gais, T}, Title = {Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {92}, Pages = {442-446}, Year = {1997}, Key = {fds250164} } @article{fds374314, Author = {Munger, MC and Anderson, T}, Title = {In Memoriam: Richard L. Stroup (1943-2021)}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {27}, Number = {1}, Pages = {141-144}, Year = {2022}, Key = {fds374314} } @article{fds313454, Author = {Munger, MC and Merolla, J and Tofias, M}, Title = {In play: a commentary on strategies in the 2004 U.S. presidential election}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {123}, Pages = {19-37}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {2005}, ISSN = {1573-7101}, Key = {fds313454} } @article{fds312964, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Industrial organization and the digital economy}, Journal = {PUBLIC CHOICE}, Volume = {134}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {495-500}, Publisher = {SPRINGER}, Year = {2008}, Month = {March}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000252801100023&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Key = {fds312964} } @article{fds250159, Author = {Parker, G}, Title = {Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of Modern Congress}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {76}, Pages = {397-398}, Year = {1993}, Key = {fds250159} } @article{fds340539, Author = {Aldrich, J and Munger, M and Reifler, J}, Title = {Institutions, information, and faction: An experimental test of Riker's federalism thesis for political parties}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {158}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {577-588}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2014}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0040-z}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-012-0040-z}, Key = {fds340539} } @article{fds250208, Author = {Aldrich, J and Munger, MC and Reifler, J}, Title = {Institutions, Information, and Faction: An Experimental Test of Riker’s Federalism Thesis for Political Parties}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Year = {2012}, Key = {fds250208} } @article{fds250155, Author = {North, DC}, Title = {Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance}, Journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, Volume = {58}, Pages = {296-297}, Year = {1991}, Key = {fds250155} } @article{fds314436, Author = {Jenkins, JA and Munger, MC}, Title = {Investigating the incidence of killer amendments in congress}, Journal = {Journal of Politics}, Volume = {65}, Number = {2}, Pages = {498-517}, Year = {2003}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.t01-3-00012}, Abstract = {While much empirical research has been devoted to the study of "killer amendments" in recent years, few studies have explicitly examined the theoretical foundations of the phenomenon. The goal of this paper is to investigate why some killer amendment attempts are successful, when theory suggests that they should always fail. More specifically, we examine the practical political constraints on legislators' abilities to neutralize the imminent threat of killer amendments through sophisticated voting. We also present two new cases, both occurring during the Reconstruction era, in which killer amendments were used successfully. In the end, our findings support previous research on all successful killer amendments detailed in the congressional literature: race was the issue under consideration at the amendment stage.}, Doi = {10.1111/1468-2508.t01-3-00012}, Key = {fds314436} } @article{fds250183, Author = {Munger, MC and Salsman, R}, Title = {Is ‘Too Big to Fail’ Too Big?}, Volume = {11}, Pages = {433-456}, Year = {2013}, Key = {fds250183} } @article{fds250257, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Judicial Interpretation in the Face of Uncertainty: A Comment on Schwartz, Spiller, and Urbiztondo}, Journal = {Law and Contemporary Problems}, Volume = {57}, Pages = {87-90}, Year = {1994}, Key = {fds250257} } @article{fds374317, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Karl Mittermaier Economic Theory vs. Reality}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {28}, Number = {2}, Pages = {281-289}, Year = {2023}, Key = {fds374317} } @article{fds250261, Author = {Coates, D and Munger, MC}, Title = {Legislative Voting and the Economic Theory of Politics}, Journal = {Southern economic journal}, Volume = {61}, Pages = {861-873}, Publisher = {Wiley}, Year = {1995}, ISSN = {0038-4038}, Key = {fds250261} } @article{fds250235, Author = {Denzau, AT and Munger, MC}, Title = {Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented}, Journal = {The American political science review}, Volume = {80}, Pages = {89-106}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals}, Year = {1986}, ISSN = {1537-5943}, Key = {fds250235} } @article{fds312974, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Long divisions}, Journal = {NEW REPUBLIC}, Volume = {229}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {4-4}, Publisher = {NEW REPUBLIC INC}, Year = {2003}, Month = {July}, ISSN = {0028-6583}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000183855700002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Key = {fds312974} } @article{fds342604, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Making the Voluntaryist Venn Work for Us, Not against Us}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {23}, Number = {4}, Pages = {503-520}, Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST}, Year = {2019}, Month = {March}, Key = {fds342604} } @article{fds250152, Author = {Spulber, N}, Title = {Managing the American Economy from Roosevelt to Reagan}, Journal = {The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science}, Volume = {513}, Pages = {200-202}, Year = {1991}, Key = {fds250152} } @article{fds250168, Author = {Taylor, A}, Title = {Mathematics and Politics}, Journal = {Chance, Magazine of the American Statiscal Association}, Volume = {11}, Pages = {44-45}, Year = {1998}, Key = {fds250168} } @article{fds376034, Author = {Riess, H and Munger, M and Zavlanos, MM}, Title = {Max-Plus Synchronization in Decentralized Trading Systems}, Journal = {Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control}, Pages = {221-227}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9798350301243}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC49753.2023.10383918}, Abstract = {We introduce a decentralized mechanism for pricing and exchanging alternatives constrained by transaction costs. We characterize the time-invariant solutions of a heat equation involving a (weighted) Tarski Laplacian operator, defined for max-plus matrix-weighted graphs, as approximate equilibria of the trading system. We study algebraic properties of the solution sets as well as convergence behavior of the dynamical system. We apply these tools to the 'economic problem' of allocating scarce resources among competing uses. Our theory suggests differences in competitive equilibrium, bargaining, or cost-benefit analysis, depending on the context, are largely due to differences in the way that transaction costs are incorporated into the decision-making process. We present numerical simulations of the synchronization algorithm (RRAggU), demonstrating our theoretical findings.}, Doi = {10.1109/CDC49753.2023.10383918}, Key = {fds376034} } @article{fds361929, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Moral community and moral order: Buchanan’s theory of obligation}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {183}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {509-521}, Year = {2020}, Month = {June}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00791-9}, Abstract = {In 1981, James Buchanan published the text of a lecture entitled “Moral Community, Moral Order, and Moral Anarchy.” The argument in that paper deserves more attention than it has received in the literature, as it closely follows the argument made by Adam Smith in Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith believed, and rightly, that moral communities—to use Buchanan’s words—are indispensable. Smith also believed that the system could be expanded to encompass norms that foster commercial society. Buchanan allows for the same possibility in his discussion of moral community, in some ways similar to Hayek’s “great society” norms. But Buchanan points out the dark possibility that moral orders can collapse, relegating interactions outside of small moral communities to moral anarchy. Buchanan’s contribution is an important, and unrecognized, link between Smith’s conception of propriety and Hume’s conception of convention.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-020-00791-9}, Key = {fds361929} } @article{fds250273, Author = {Banerjee, SG and Munger, MC}, Title = {Move to markets? An empirical analysis of privatization in developing countries}, Journal = {Journal of International Development}, Volume = {16}, Number = {2}, Pages = {213-240}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2004}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.1072}, Abstract = {Aspects of the privatization experience are analysed for a group of 35 low or middle-income developing countries, over the period 1982 through 1999. The theory turns on net political benefits, which in our model are the primary determinant of privatization policies. The decision to privatize is captured here in three related, but distinct, dependent variables: (i) timing; (ii) pace; and (iii) intensity. Our notion of the independent variable, 'net political benefits', is not measured directly, but is instead proxied by an array of macroeconomic, political, and institutional variables. Our key finding is that, though political benefits turn out to explain the timing, pace, and intensity of privatization, the effects are very different in each case. The timing hypothesis is tested using a Cox proportional hazard model, the pace hypothesis is tested using a random effects negative binomial model and the intensity hypothesis is tested using the random effects model. We find that the factors that improve timing delay intensity-early adopters are later implementers. Furthermore, we find that a privatization policy is much more likely to be a crisis-driven, last ditch effort to turn the economy around, rather than a carefully chosen policy with explicit, long-term goals. A related, and very important, finding in our analysis has to do with the 'lock-in' of institutions. The particular form of political institutions, foreign aid regimes, and level of development of property rights systems in the nation have significant conditioning influences on the extent of lock-in. These relationships may be important for informing policy decisions, and for understanding apparent 'failures' of privatization policies. © 2004 John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.}, Doi = {10.1002/jid.1072}, Key = {fds250273} } @article{fds312968, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {New publications}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {134}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {495-500}, Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, Year = {2008}, Month = {March}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000252801100022&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-007-9225-2}, Key = {fds312968} } @article{fds250258, Author = {Coates, D and Heid, V and Munger, MC}, Title = {Not Equitable, Not Efficient: U.S. Policy on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal}, Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management}, Volume = {13}, Pages = {526-541}, Publisher = {Wiley}, Year = {1994}, ISSN = {1520-6688}, Key = {fds250258} } @article{fds361930, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Objections to Euvoluntary Exchange Do Not Have “Standing”: Extending Markets Without Limits}, Journal = {Journal of Value Inquiry}, Volume = {51}, Number = {4}, Pages = {619-627}, Year = {2017}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-017-9620-y}, Doi = {10.1007/s10790-017-9620-y}, Key = {fds361930} } @article{fds343478, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {On the contingent vice of corruption}, Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy}, Volume = {35}, Number = {2}, Pages = {158-181}, Year = {2018}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052519000153}, Abstract = {This essay develops a notion of “functional corruption,” adapted from sociology, to note that the harm of corruption appears to be contingent. In a system of dysfunctional institutions, corruption can improve the efficiency and speed of allocative mechanisms of the bureaucracy, possibly quite substantially. The problem is that this “short run” benefit locks in the long run harm of corruption by making institutions much more difficult to reform. In particular, a nation with bad institutions but without bureaucracy may be much more open to reform than a nation with similarly bad institutions but with “efficiently corrupt” bureaucrats. The idea of a “long run” is developed using the North, Wallis, and Weingast conception of open access orders. Corrupt systems are likely to be locked into closed access orders indefinitely, even though everyone knows there are better institutions available.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0265052519000153}, Key = {fds343478} } @article{fds250234, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {On the Mutuality of Interest Between Bureaus and High Demand Review Committees: The Case of Joint Production}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {43}, Number = {2}, Pages = {211-216}, Year = {1984}, Key = {fds250234} } @article{fds331467, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {On the origins and goals of public choice: Constitutional conspiracy?}, Journal = {Independent Review}, Volume = {22}, Number = {3}, Pages = {359-382}, Year = {2018}, Month = {December}, Key = {fds331467} } @article{fds250237, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {On the Political Participation of the Firm in the Electoral Process: An Update}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {56}, Number = {3}, Pages = {295-298}, Year = {1988}, Key = {fds250237} } @article{fds313180, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {One and One-Half Cheers for Basic-Income Guarantee: We Could Do Worse, and Already Have}, Journal = {Independent Review}, Volume = {19}, Number = {4}, Pages = {503-513}, Publisher = {The Independant Institute}, Year = {2015}, ISSN = {1086-1653}, url = {http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/toc.asp?issueID=81}, Key = {fds313180} } @article{fds250232, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Pangloss was right: Reforming congress is useless, expensive, or harmful}, Journal = {Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum}, Volume = {9}, Number = {1}, Pages = {133-146}, Year = {1998}, Month = {December}, ISSN = {1064-3958}, Key = {fds250232} } @article{fds312935, Author = {Munger, MC and Grynaviski, G}, Title = {Pathologies of Political Authority: Constructed Racism is 'Public Reason' Gone Wrong (forthcoming)}, Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals - No Cambridge Open}, Year = {2016}, ISSN = {1471-6437}, Key = {fds312935} } @article{fds250150, Author = {Sabato, L}, Title = {Paying for Elections}, Journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management}, Volume = {9}, Pages = {577-581}, Year = {1990}, Key = {fds250150} } @article{fds250156, Author = {Alt, J and Shepsle, K}, Title = {Perspectives on Positive Political Economy}, Journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, Volume = {58}, Pages = {1944-6}, Year = {1992}, Key = {fds250156} } @article{fds312976, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Persuasion, psychology and public choice}, Journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, Volume = {80}, Number = {2}, Pages = {290-300}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2011}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {0167-2681}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000296682100004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {There has been a division of labor in the "behavioral sciences" This is perhaps most striking in two of the largest behavioral disciplines, economics and psychology. Since 1990, a number of economists have crossed this boundary. But James Buchanan was one of the first economists to take the problem of moral intuitions and the origins of preferences seriously, and to treat them analytically. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2011.07.012}, Key = {fds312976} } @article{fds250157, Author = {Schlesinger, J}, Title = {Political Parties and the Winning of Office}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {75}, Pages = {99-101}, Year = {1993}, Key = {fds250157} } @article{fds250203, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Political science and fundamental research}, Journal = {PS - Political Science and Politics}, Volume = {33}, Series = {Special Issue: The Public Value of Political Science Research}, Number = {1}, Pages = {25-30}, Publisher = {JSTOR}, Editor = {Arthur Lupia}, Year = {2000}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {1049-0965}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000085998600006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.2307/420773}, Key = {fds250203} } @article{fds362300, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Populism, Self-Government, and Liberty}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {26}, Number = {1}, Pages = {5-13}, Year = {2021}, Key = {fds362300} } @article{fds250267, Author = {Flynn, BS and Goldstein, AO and Solomon, LJ and Bauman, KE and Gottlieb, NH and Cohen, JE and Munger, MC and Dana, GS}, Title = {Predictors of state legislators' intentions to vote for cigarette tax increases.}, Journal = {Preventive medicine}, Volume = {27}, Number = {2}, Pages = {157-165}, Year = {1998}, Month = {March}, ISSN = {0091-7435}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000073317500001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {<h4>Background</h4>This study analyzed influences on state legislators' decisions about cigarette tax increase votes using a research strategy based on political science and social-psychological models.<h4>Methods</h4>Legislators from three states representing a spectrum of tobacco interests participated in personal interviews concerned with tobacco control legislation (n = 444). Measures of potential predictors of voting intention were based on the consensus model of legislative decision-making and the theory of planned behavior. Multiple logistic regression methods were used to identify social-psychological and other predictors of intention to vote for cigarette tax increases.<h4>Results</h4>General attitudes and norms concerning cigarette tax increases predicted legislators' intention to vote for cigarette tax increases. More specific predictors included perceptions of public health impact and retail sales impact of cigarette tax increases. Constituent pressure was the strongest perceived social influence. Political party and state also were strong predictors of intention. Results were consistent with related research based on political science models.<h4>Conclusions</h4>Legislators' votes on cigarette tax increases may be influenced by their perceptions of positive and negative outcomes of a cigarette tax increase and by perceived constituent pressures. This research model provides useful insights for theory and practice and should be refined in future tobacco control research.}, Doi = {10.1006/pmed.1998.0308}, Key = {fds250267} } @article{fds350702, Author = {Story, M and Larson, N}, Title = {Preface}, Journal = {Adolescent Medicine: State of the Art Reviews}, Volume = {23}, Number = {3}, Year = {2012}, Month = {December}, Key = {fds350702} } @article{fds250225, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Preference modification vs. incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment: The role of culture}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {128}, Pages = {131-146}, Year = {2006}, Key = {fds250225} } @article{fds312959, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Preferences and situations: Points of intersection between historical and rational choice institutionalism}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {11}, Number = {4}, Pages = {623-626}, Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE}, Year = {2007}, Month = {March}, ISSN = {1086-1653}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000245521900015&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Key = {fds312959} } @article{fds250180, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Presidential Address: Give Questions for the Public Choice Society}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Year = {1999}, Key = {fds250180} } @article{fds250227, Author = {Weidenbaum, ML and Munger, MC}, Title = {Protection At Any Price?}, Journal = {Regulation}, Number = {July/August}, Pages = {54-61}, Year = {1983}, url = {http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1983/7/v7n4-3.pdf}, Key = {fds250227} } @article{fds250245, Author = {Dow, J and Munger, MC}, Title = {Public Choice in Political Science}, Journal = {PS: Political Science and Politics}, Volume = {23}, Pages = {604-610}, Year = {1990}, Key = {fds250245} } @article{fds361932, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Public choice's homeric hero: Gordon Tullock (1922-2014)}, Journal = {Independent Review}, Volume = {19}, Number = {4}, Pages = {599-604}, Year = {2015}, Month = {March}, Abstract = {Gordon Tullock, who was born in 1922 in Rockford, Illinois gave the world public choice theory, the concept of rent seeking, and bioeconomics. In early 1943, he enrolled in his first economics class, taught by Henry Calvert Simons. But later in 1943, before formally finishing the class, he was drafted into the army and was assigned as a rifleman to the Ninth Infantry Division. He returned to Chicago early in 1946 and finished the requirements for the J.D. Fortunately for academic economics and public-choice theory, Gordon learned to read and write a little Chinese, took the Foreign Service Exam, and passed it on the first try. He was assigned to Tientsin, China, in 1947. The Foreign Service assigned him to do advanced study in Chinese back in the United States, after which he returned to China and later worked also in Korea and for the intelligence service in Washington. He resigned from the Foreign Service in 1956 and then knocked around, working several jobs. He has more than fourteen thousand citations in many fields in Google Scholar. He created a concept now called the 'Tullock Contest' as a way of understanding efficient rent seeking.}, Key = {fds361932} } @article{fds250224, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Public Policy Informatics: Does Better Information Produce Better Public Policy?}, Journal = {International Journal of Public Policy}, Volume = {1}, Pages = {343-354}, Year = {2006}, Month = {September}, Key = {fds250224} } @article{fds371869, Author = {Munger, M and Tilley, C}, Title = {Race, risk, and greed: Harold Black's contributions to the institutional economics of finance}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {197}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {335-346}, Year = {2023}, Month = {December}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01073-w}, Abstract = {Dr. Harold Black has made a career of investigating the effects of different rules and institutional arrangements on the extent to which market participants in finance can exercise a taste for discrimination. This paper considers the nature of Black's contributions, and reviews some particulars of his voluminous published research, focusing especially on his work on the number of "overages" charged by banks, and the differences in the effects of the race of bank owners, as explained by the race of customers. The paper concludes by connecting Dr. Black’s work to his “origin story,” which helps explain his consistent focus on careful empirical distinctions rather than preconceptions and biases.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-023-01073-w}, Key = {fds371869} } @article{fds327641, Author = {Grynaviski, JD and Munger, MC}, Title = {RECONSTRUCTING RACISM: TRANSFORMING RACIAL HIERARCHY from "nECESSARY EVIL" into "pOSITIVE GOOD"}, Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy}, Volume = {34}, Number = {1}, Pages = {144-163}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {2017}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052517000073}, Abstract = {Our theoretical claim is that racism was consciously (though perhaps not intentionally) devised, and later evolved, to serve two conflicting purposes. First, racism served a legal-economic purpose, legitimating ownership and savage treatment of slaves by southern whites, preserving the value of property rights in labor. Second, racism allowed slave owners to justify, to themselves and to outsiders, how a morally "good" person could own slaves. Racism portrayed African slaves as being less than human (and therefore requiring care, as a positive duty of the slave owner, as a man cares for his children, who cannot care for themselves), or else as being other than human (and therefore being spiritually no different from cattle or horses, and therefore requiring only the same considerations for maintenance and husbandry). The interest of the historical narrative presented here is the emergence of racial chattel slavery as a coherent and fiercely defended ideal, rather than the "necessary evil" that had been the perspective of the Founders. The reason that this is important is that the ideology of racism persisted far beyond the destruction of the institution of slavery, through Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and in some ways persisting even today. This work is an example of the problems of assuming that there is a "feedback" mechanism by which moral intuitions are updated and perfected; to the contrary, as suggested by Douglass North, even socially inferior ideologies can prove extremely persistent.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0265052517000073}, Key = {fds327641} } @article{fds250172, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Regulation}, Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Libertarianism}, Publisher = {CATO Institute, Washington, D.C.}, Editor = {Palmer, T}, Year = {2005}, Key = {fds250172} } @article{fds250145, Author = {Meier, K}, Title = {Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics and The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of Insurance}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {62}, Pages = {192-195}, Year = {1989}, Key = {fds250145} } @article{fds250173, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Rent Seek and You Will Find}, Journal = {EconLib}, Series = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungerrentseeking.html}, Publisher = {EconLib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN}, Year = {2006}, Month = {Spring}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungerrentseeking.html}, Key = {fds250173} } @article{fds335630, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Reply to Roelofs}, Journal = {PS - Political Science and Politics}, Volume = {33}, Number = {3}, Pages = {518-519}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {2000}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096500063162}, Doi = {10.1017/S1049096500063162}, Key = {fds335630} } @article{fds361931, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Robert D. Tollison: A remembrance}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {171}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {63-65}, Year = {2017}, Month = {April}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0430-3}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-017-0430-3}, Key = {fds361931} } @article{fds250170, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Saari’s "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes"}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {140}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {539-543}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag}, Year = {2009}, Key = {fds250170} } @article{fds250147, Author = {Taagepera, R and Shugart, M}, Title = {Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems}, Journal = {American Political Science Review}, Volume = {84}, Pages = {676-677}, Year = {1990}, Key = {fds250147} } @article{fds312971, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Self-interest and public interest: The motivations of political actors}, Journal = {Critical Review}, Volume = {23}, Number = {3}, Pages = {339-357}, Publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, Year = {2011}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0891-3811}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000300165700005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics showed that the public, politicians, and bureaucrats are often public spirited. But this does not invalidate public-choice theory. Public-choice theory is an ideal type, not a claim that self-interest explains all political behavior. Instead, public-choice theory is useful in creating rules and institutions that guard against the worst case, which would be universal self-interestedness in politics. In contrast, the public-interest hypothesis is neither a comprehensive explanation of political behavior nor a sound basis for institutional design. © 2011 Copyright Critical Review Foundation.}, Doi = {10.1080/08913811.2011.635871}, Key = {fds312971} } @article{fds250244, Author = {Richardson, LE and Munger, MC}, Title = {Shirking, representation, and Congressional behavior: Voting on the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {67}, Number = {1}, Pages = {11-33}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {1990}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1990DY91500002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Our central goals at the outset of the paper were three: (1) to report on the relative significance of a sophisticated measure of constituent economic interest and a commonly used variable, ADA score, that purports to measure the personal ideology of the candidate; (2) demonstrate that the constituent economic interest variable should be adjusted to account for the fact that voters, not citizens, are the only effective principals in influencing a legislator's voting activities; and (3) call into question, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, the claim that legislators shirk their responsibilities to voters by voting their own ideological preferences.[Figure not available: see fulltext.] In order to evaluate our efforts, consider Table 5. For a large majority (15) of the 18 relevant runs, the ideological variable is significant. Our measure of constituent economic interests does not eliminate the explanatory power of the ideological voting variable, but this does not indicate shirking. As opposed to shirking, we may observe ideological voting because (1) it provides brand name capital, (2) it represents the ideological preferences of the constituents, or (3) it acts as a measure of median voter economic preferences. Further, ADA scores do not allow us to differentiate between these competing explanations. Table 5. Comparison of House and Senate resultsEconomic variableIdeological variableHouseSenateTotalSignificantNot significantSignificantNot significantKalt-Zupan Insignificant--4-4Kalt-Zupan Significant332-8Peltzman Insignificant--3-3Peltzman Significan--3-3Total3312018 For 11 of the 18 models one of the economic variables accounts for a significant portion of the variance in the dependent variables. The results derived from our measure of constituent economic interests contradict most findings of the LASI school and raise questions about the validity of the empirical characterization of constituent interests in that research. A breakdown of the results by chamber indicates that significant differences in the degree of ideological voting between the House and Senate may exist. This is important in that most research has focused only on the Senate where ideological voting is more prevalent. For the House, Table 5 reveals the constituent economic interest variable is always significant, and in fully one-half of the relevant regressions it is the only significant variable, knocking ADA out of the race. As noted earlier, the insignificance of ADA is some indication of the absence of ideological shirking though its significance may indicate only measurement error, voter ideology, or reputational capital. In the Senate, the results are more evenly split, though it is clear that the adjusted (for reelection constituency) economic interest variable is an improvement. ADA is significant in all 12 Senate regressions, and the respective economic variables are significant in 5, or just under half. This side-by-side comparison is provocative, though it remains to be tested in detail. But our preliminary conclusions can be stated as follows. First, as Peltzman (1984) suggested, a better specification of economic interest and constituency representation reduces, though it does not eliminate, the role of the ADA variable in the Senate. Second, we find evidence that ideological shirking, if it exists, is much smaller in the House. In fact, from an institutional perspective, it can be argued that economic interests are dominant, since House districts are smaller and more homogeneous. Further, the shorter terms for House members may make them more directly accountable to voters, and smaller groups of voters may force a lesser reliance on pure ideological campaigning and require a more personal presentation of self. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF01890154}, Key = {fds250244} } @article{fds250144, Author = {Kelly, JS}, Title = {Social Choice Theory: An Introduction}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {62}, Pages = {97-98}, Year = {1989}, Key = {fds250144} } @article{fds312953, Author = {Aldrich, J and Reifler, J and Munger, MC}, Title = {Sophisticated and myopic? Citizen preferences for Electoral College reform}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {158}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {541-558}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2014}, Month = {March}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0056-z}, Abstract = {Different institutions can produce more (or less) preferred outcomes, in terms of citizens' preferences. Consequently, citizen preferences over institutions may "inherit"-to use William Riker's term-the features of preferences over outcomes. But the level of information and understanding required for this effect to be observable seems quite high. In this paper, we investigate whether Riker's intuition about citizens acting on institutional preferences is borne out by an original empirical dataset collected for this purpose. These data, a survey commissioned specifically for this project, were collected as part of a larger nationally representative sample conducted right before the 2004 election. The results show that support for a reform to split a state's Electoral College votes proportionally is explained by (1) which candidate one supports, (2) which candidate one thinks is likely to win the election under the existing system of apportionment, (3) preferences for abolishing the Electoral College in favor of the popular vote winner, and (4) statistical interactions between these variables. In baldly political terms, Kerry voters tend to support splitting their state's Electoral College votes if they felt George W. Bush was likely to win in that state. But Kerry voters who expect Kerry to win their state favor winner-take-all Electoral College rules for their state. In both cases, mutatis mutandis, the reverse is true for Bush voters. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-013-0056-z}, Key = {fds312953} } @article{fds250143, Author = {Minsky, HP}, Title = {Stabilizing and Unstable Economy}, Journal = {The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science}, Volume = {494}, Pages = {205-206}, Year = {1987}, Month = {November}, Key = {fds250143} } @article{fds250265, Author = {Munger, M and Goldstein, A and Cohen, J and Flynn, B and Gottlieb, N and Solomon, L and Dana, G and Baumann, K}, Title = {State Legislators' Attitudes and Voting Intentions about Tobacco Control Legislation}, Journal = {American Journal of Public Health}, Volume = {87}, Pages = {11-7-2000}, Year = {1997}, Month = {July}, Key = {fds250265} } @article{fds250276, Author = {Gottlieb, NH and Goldstein, AO and Flynn, BS and Cohen, EJE and Bauman, KE and Solomon, LJ and Munger, MC and Dana, GS and McMorris, LE}, Title = {State legislators' beliefs about legislation that restricts youth access to tobacco products.}, Journal = {Health education & behavior : the official publication of the Society for Public Health Education}, Volume = {30}, Number = {2}, Pages = {209-224}, Year = {2003}, Month = {April}, ISSN = {1090-1981}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000181791100006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Better understanding of the cognitive framework for decision making among legislators is important for advocacy of health-promoting legislation. In 1994, the authors surveyed state legislators from North Carolina, Texas, and Vermont concerning their beliefs and intentions related to voting for a hypothetical measure to enforce legislation preventing the sale of tobacco to minors, using scales based on the theory of planned behavior. Attitude (importance), subjective norm (whether most people important to you would say you should or should not vote for the law), perceived behavioral control (ability to cast one's vote for the law), and home state were independently and significantly related to intention to vote for the law's enforcement. The results, including descriptive data concerning individual beliefs, suggest specific public health strategies to increase legislative support for passing legislation to restrict youth tobacco sales and, more generally, a framework for studying policy making and advocacy.}, Doi = {10.1177/1090198102251033}, Key = {fds250276} } @article{fds250264, Author = {Munger, M and Flynn, B and Dana, G and Goldstein, A and Cohen, J and Gottlieb, N and Solomon, L and Baumann, K}, Title = {State Legislators' Intentions to Vote and Subsequent Votes on Tobacco Control Legislation}, Journal = {Health Psychology}, Volume = {16}, Pages = {401-404}, Year = {1997}, Key = {fds250264} } @article{fds313753, Author = {Cohen, JE and Goldstein, AO and Flynn, BS and Munger, MC and Gottlieb, NH and Solomon, LJ and Dana, GS}, Title = {State legislators' perceptions of lobbyists and lobbying on tobacco control issues.}, Journal = {Tobacco control}, Volume = {6}, Number = {4}, Pages = {332-336}, Publisher = {BMJ}, Year = {1997}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0964-4563}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/tc.6.4.332}, Abstract = {<h4>Objective</h4>To determine state legislators' perceptions about health and tobacco lobbyists, their frequency of contact with these lobbyists, and the amount of campaign contributions from health professional organisations and the tobacco industry.<h4>Design</h4>Cross-sectional study.<h4>Subjects</h4>State legislators from North Carolina, Texas, and Vermont (USA), serving in 1994.<h4>Main outcome measures</h4>Perceptions about lobbyists representing the tobacco industry, non-profit health organisations, and state medical societies with respect to their credibility, importance as sources of information, and persuasiveness; extent of lobbying activities; campaign contributions from health professional organisations and the tobacco industry.<h4>Results</h4>Almost all legislators reported that medical society and non-profit health organisation lobbyists are credible on tobacco issues and just over half believed that these lobbyists are important sources of information. More legislators said they could be persuaded by medical and health lobbyists than by tobacco lobbyists. Although health professional Political Action Committees (PACs) gave campaign contributions to more state legislators, and gave higher amounts on average, than tobacco PACs, legislators reported less contact with medical society lobbyists than tobacco lobbyists about tobacco issues.<h4>Conclusions</h4>State legislators have positive attitudes toward lobbyists for non-profit health organisations and state medical societies regarding tobacco issues. These groups may be an underused resource for educating legislators about tobacco control measures.}, Doi = {10.1136/tc.6.4.332}, Key = {fds313753} } @article{fds250260, Author = {Coates, D and Munger, MC}, Title = {Strategizing in small group decision-making: Host state identification for radioactive waste disposal among eight southern states}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {82}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {1-15}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {1995}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {1573-7101}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01047726}, Abstract = {Experimental work in economics has long focussed attention on strategic interaction amongst individuals. A robust result is that a large fraction of participants in public goods experiments act cooperatively. This paper tests for the extent of strategic behavior in a non-laboratory setting. These data were generated when representatives from eight southeastern states voted to identify one state as host for a regional disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste. We find that no state plays its dominant (free-riding) strategy, but none plays in a completely cooperative fashion either. This result is similar to that found in laboratory public goods experiments. © 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF01047726}, Key = {fds250260} } @article{fds312955, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Strength in Numbers: The Political Power of Weak Interests}, Journal = {Political Science Quarterly}, Volume = {128}, Number = {4}, Pages = {785-786}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)}, Year = {2013}, Month = {December}, ISSN = {0032-3195}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000328494200029&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1002/polq.12124}, Key = {fds312955} } @article{fds250270, Author = {Cooper, A and Munger, MC}, Title = {The (un)predictability of primaries with many candidates: Simulation evidence}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {103}, Number = {3-4}, Pages = {337-355}, Year = {2000}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000086965800008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {It is common to describe the dynamic processes that generate outcomes in U.S. primaries as "unstable" or "unpredictable". In fact, the way we choose candidates may amount to a lottery. This paper uses a simulation approach, assuming 10,000 voters who vote according to a naive, deterministic proximity rule, but who choose party affiliation probabilistically. The voters of each party then must choose between two sets of ten randomly chosen candidates, in "closed" primaries. Finally, the winners of the two nominations compete in the general election, in which independent voters also participate. The key result of the simulations reported here is the complete unpredictability of the outcomes of a sequence of primaries: the winner of the primary, or the party's nominee, varied as much as two standard deviations from the median partisan voter. The reason is that the median, or any other measure of the center of the distribution of voters, is of little value in predicting the outcome of multicandidate elections. These results suggest that who runs may have more to do with who wins than any other consideration.}, Doi = {10.1023/a:1005150101110}, Key = {fds250270} } @article{fds312950, Author = {Keech, WR and Munger, MC}, Title = {The anatomy of government failure}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {164}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {1-42}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2015}, Month = {July}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0262-y}, Abstract = {Government failure is a much bigger problem than its contemporary treatment implies. Setting aside natural disasters, most of the great catastrophes of human history have been government failures of one sort or another. We argue that many so-called market failures are government failures because government defines the institutions in which markets succeed or fail. The concept of government failure has been trapped in the cocoon of the theory of perfect markets. Narrowly defined deviations from market perfection have been designated market failures, for which government corrections may or may not really be a solution. Government failure in the contemporary context means failing to resolve a classic market failure. We propose an alternative approach for evaluating whether government fails: the Pareto standard. If an available Pareto improvement is not chosen, or is not implemented, that is a government failure. We organize government failure into two types: substantive and procedural. Substantive failures include the inability or unwillingness to maintain order, to maintain sound fiscal and monetary policies, and to reduce risks of transaction costs, which we classify as corruption, agency and rent-seeking. Procedural failures are inadequacies of available social choice mechanisms, causing collective decisions to be arbitrary, capricious, or manipuated. We conclude with some reflections on human rationality and the implications of behavioral economics.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-015-0262-y}, Key = {fds312950} } @article{fds250259, Author = {Grier, K and Roberts, B and Munger, MC}, Title = {The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986}, Journal = {The American political science review}, Volume = {88}, Pages = {911-932}, Booktitle = {Business and Government}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals}, Editor = {Coen, D and Grant, W}, Year = {1994}, ISSN = {1537-5943}, Key = {fds250259} } @article{fds250271, Author = {Munger, M and Berger, M and Potthoff, R}, Title = {The Downsian Model Predicts Divergence}, Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics}, Volume = {12}, Number = {2}, Pages = {78-90}, Year = {2000}, ISSN = {0951-6298}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000086986700005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1177/0951692800012002005}, Key = {fds250271} } @article{fds250218, Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC}, Title = {The dynamics of issue introduction: A model based on the politics of ideology}, Journal = {Mathematical and Computer Modelling}, Volume = {48}, Number = {9-10}, Pages = {1510-1518}, Publisher = {Elsevier BV}, Year = {2008}, Month = {November}, ISSN = {0895-7177}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000259637500019&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Many topics might be discussed in the course of any election, but problems that are in fact discussed, and which affect the electorate's choice, are located in the issue space of a relatively small dimension. Two factors contribute to this phenomenon: (a) party platforms are usually presented to the electorate as packages of issues, and (b) candidates tend to emphasize only a few particular issues in the campaign. We model a dynamic process of changing the issue space by candidates as a matter of their campaign strategy and study factors causing changes in the dimensionality or/and in the structure of the set of issues shaping the political conflict in the election. We show how particular features of an added new issue can change voter perceptions of the candidates or the structure of the political conflict in the election when the new issue is such that (1) voters care about it, (2) a majority of voters are interested changing the status quo of anything associated with this issue, and (3) the existing ideological differences among the candidates have clear reflections in voters' minds. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.}, Doi = {10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.022}, Key = {fds250218} } @article{fds250161, Author = {Holcombe, R}, Title = {The Economic Foundations of Government}, Journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, Volume = {61}, Pages = {892-894}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds250161} } @article{fds250140, Author = {Hughes, JJ and Perlman, R}, Title = {The Economics of Unemployment: A Comparative Analysis of Britain and the United States}, Journal = {Journal of Labor Research}, Volume = {7}, Pages = {381-382}, Year = {1986}, Key = {fds250140} } @article{fds250253, Author = {Enelow, J and Munger, MC}, Title = {The Elements of Candidate Reputation: The Effect of Record and Credibility on Optimal Spatial Location}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {77}, Pages = {757-772}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {1993}, ISSN = {1573-7101}, Key = {fds250253} } @article{fds250146, Author = {Coase, RH}, Title = {The Firm, The Market, and the Law}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {65}, Pages = {295-296}, Year = {1990}, Key = {fds250146} } @article{fds374318, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies: A Computational Social Science Approach}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {28}, Number = {2}, Pages = {334-339}, Year = {2023}, Key = {fds374318} } @article{fds250229, Author = {Rehbein, MMWKA}, Title = {The High Cost of Protectionism}, Journal = {Europe}, Volume = {243}, Pages = {10-11}, Year = {1984}, Key = {fds250229} } @article{fds250236, Author = {Grier, KB and Munger, MC}, Title = {The Impact of Legislative Attributes on Interest Group Contributions}, Journal = {Journal of Labor Research}, Volume = {7}, Pages = {349-361}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {1986}, Month = {Fall}, ISSN = {1936-4768}, Key = {fds250236} } @article{fds250249, Author = {Endersby, J and Munger, MC}, Title = {The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Union PAC Contributions}, Journal = {Journal of Labor Research}, Volume = {12}, Number = {4}, Pages = {79-97}, Year = {1992}, ISSN = {1936-4768}, Key = {fds250249} } @article{fds250247, Author = {Grier, K and Roberts, B and Munger, MC}, Title = {The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Activity}, Journal = {Southern Economics Journal}, Volume = {57}, Pages = {727-738}, Year = {1991}, Key = {fds250247} } @article{fds374315, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {The Journey Beyond Fear: Leverage the Three Pillars of Positivity to Build Your Success}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {27}, Number = {2}, Pages = {317-318}, Year = {2022}, Key = {fds374315} } @article{fds312945, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {The Leadership Crisis and the Free Market Cure: Why the Future of Business Depends on the Return to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {20}, Number = {3}, Pages = {466-469}, Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST}, Year = {2016}, Month = {December}, ISSN = {1086-1653}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000367025200021&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Key = {fds312945} } @article{fds250167, Author = {Dixit, AK}, Title = {The Making of Economic Policy: A Transactions-Cost Politics Perspective}, Journal = {Regulation}, Volume = {21}, Pages = {73-76}, Year = {1998}, Key = {fds250167} } @article{fds250142, Author = {Dumas, LJ}, Title = {The Over-Burdened Economy}, Journal = {The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science}, Volume = {494}, Pages = {205-206}, Year = {1987}, Month = {November}, Key = {fds250142} } @article{fds250202, Author = {Munger, MC and Wintrobe, R}, Title = {The Political Economy of Dictatorship}, Journal = {The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique}, Volume = {31}, Number = {4}, Pages = {992-992}, Publisher = {JSTOR}, Year = {1998}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {0008-4085}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000077736800018&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.2307/136507}, Key = {fds250202} } @article{fds250219, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {The principal difficulty: Besley’s neo-Rousseavian aspirations}, Journal = {The Review of Austrian Economics}, Volume = {22}, Number = {2}, Pages = {169-175}, Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, Year = {2009}, Month = {June}, ISSN = {0889-3047}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11138-009-0075-7}, Abstract = {The use of the "principal-agent" model makes an implicit assumption about the existence of an underlying global optimum or "general will." This assumption is debatable, and Besley does not defend it sufficiently or even seem to realize how strong an assumption it is. Still, it is standard in the literature, and Besley's book is a very strong contribution to that literature. Its two greatest strengths are its solid microfoundations, and its use of the classical "comparative statics" approach to analyze dynamics. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11138-009-0075-7}, Key = {fds250219} } @article{fds250263, Author = {Schaller, MMWT}, Title = {The Prohibition and Repeal Amendments: A Natural Experiment in Interest Group Influence}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {90}, Number = {1-4}, Pages = {139-163}, Year = {1997}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_6}, Abstract = {The pattern of state support for Prohibition (18th Amendment, 1919) and Repeal (21st Amendment, 1933) is analyzed and compared. This comparison is important because Prohibition is the only amendment ever to be repealed. The main thesis is that there was no wholesale change in preferences of citizens. Instead, producer interests failed to mobilize effectively in 1919, and the coupling of moral and economic arguments that worked in 1919 broke apart in 1933. Regression analysis is conducted on state legislatures (for Prohibition) and state referenda on convention delegates (for Repeal), so states are observations in the cross-sectional regression analysis. The results broadly support the main thesis.}, Doi = {10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_6}, Key = {fds250263} } @article{fds250239, Author = {Dougan, WR and Munger, MC}, Title = {The Rationality of Ideology}, Journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, Volume = {32}, Pages = {213-239}, Year = {1989}, Key = {fds250239} } @article{fds341734, Author = {Munger, MC and Vilarreal-Diaz, M}, Title = {The Road to Crony Capitalism}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {23}, Number = {3}, Pages = {331-344}, Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST}, Year = {2019}, Month = {December}, Key = {fds341734} } @article{fds250210, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {The Social Science of Democracy}, Journal = {Perspectives on Politics}, Volume = {9}, Number = {2}, Pages = {374-376}, Year = {2011}, Abstract = {Symposium on Jon Elster’s Tocqueville: The First Social Scientist}, Key = {fds250210} } @article{fds250185, Author = {Brennan, G and Munger, M}, Title = {The soul of James Buchanan?}, Journal = {Independent Review}, Volume = {18}, Number = {3}, Pages = {331-342}, Publisher = {The Independant Institute}, Year = {2014}, Month = {Winter}, ISSN = {1086-1653}, Abstract = {The article reflects on the views and life of James M. Buchanan. The Buchanan family had a political past: Buchanan's grandfather had briefly been governor of Tennessee in the early 1890s as a member of the populist People's Party. This party was a coalition of agrarian interests mainly poor cotton and wheat farmers from the South and the West. Throughout his professional career, Buchanan called himself a classical liberal. As indicated, this was something he learned from Frank Knight and that he held accordingly as a matter of intellectual conviction rather than personal inclination, which he always acknowledged was closer to 'libertarian socialist.'. He viewed politics as arising from agreements. But the agreements were founded in a notion of exchange rather than in some fixed notion of consensus on a single policy or choice. As a consequence, his conception of politics was encompassing and multidimensional, allowing agreement to be achieved through accommodations or compromises such as logrolls.}, Key = {fds250185} } @article{fds250250, Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC}, Title = {The Spatial Theory of Ideology}, Journal = {Journal of Theoretical Politics}, Volume = {4}, Pages = {5-27}, Publisher = {SAGE Publications (UK and US)}, Year = {1992}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {1460-3667}, Key = {fds250250} } @article{fds346773, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {The State of the First Amendment: 2018}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {24}, Number = {2}, Pages = {295-305}, Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST}, Year = {2019}, Month = {September}, Key = {fds346773} } @article{fds250158, Author = {Mizruchi, M}, Title = {The Structure of Corporate Political Action: Interfirm Relations and Their Consequences}, Journal = {American Political Science Review}, Volume = {87}, Pages = {219-221}, Year = {1993}, Key = {fds250158} } @article{fds250154, Author = {Sullivan, EBNO}, Title = {The Structure of Modern Ideology: Critical Perspectives on Social and Political Theory}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {72}, Pages = {95-96}, Year = {1991}, Key = {fds250154} } @article{fds313456, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Thinking About Order Without Thought}, Journal = {Public Choice: Tullock's Contributions to Spontaneous Order Studies}, Volume = {135}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {79-88}, Year = {2008}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9283-0}, Abstract = {Philosophers tend to think of them as "conventions." Economists and some biologists conceive of them as "spontaneous orders," a concept discussed at some length in other papers in this issue. Perhaps the most general conception is "systems" theory, with roots in many disciplines. Many scholars in the sciences have tried to advance their research agendas by bringing systems theory to the study of human civilization. Gordon Tullock, a scholar who in the future will be recognized as someone well ahead of his own time, traveled the reverse path, in many cases being the first to suggest that the path even exists. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-008-9283-0}, Key = {fds313456} } @article{fds312944, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Tomorrow 3.0 the sharing economy}, Journal = {Independent Review}, Volume = {20}, Number = {3}, Pages = {391-395}, Year = {2016}, Month = {December}, ISSN = {1086-1653}, Abstract = {A third great economic revolution will come about as the sharing economy slashes transaction costs and turns almost every product into an asset with the potential to earn rental income for its owner. Although the demand for manufactured goods will fall, costing many people their jobs, the quality-adjusted price level will also fall and pressures on the environment will lessen. All of us will rent more and own less. Some of us may specialize in being sellers in these new rental markets for things we do own. But, overall, each of us will have actual possession of far, far less stuff at any given time. But the bad news is that an economy in which entrepreneurs have always been focused on making new products or on making more old products more inexpensively will be shaken to its foundations.}, Key = {fds312944} } @article{fds357975, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Tomorrow 3.0: Transaction Costs and the Sharing Economy (an excerpt)}, Journal = {Ekonomicheskaya Sotsiologiya}, Volume = {20}, Number = {5}, Pages = {74-97}, Year = {2019}, Month = {November}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/1726-3247-2019-5-74-97}, Abstract = {According to Michael Munger, there is some evidence of the Third Great Economic Revolution, which can be traced within two dimensions: the sharing economy and the brokerage economy. Although in many industries, these two dimensions are far from each other, in some spheres where they interact, their intersection results in extending the new economy. In his book, Prof. Munger describes the features of the sharing economy; entrepreneurship is oriented toward cuts of transactional expenses rather than production expenses, use of new basic program tools, a business running with the help of mobile intellectual equipment, and an internet connection. In turn, the emergence of a brokerage economy results from skills used to sell cuts of transactional costs, opening new opportunities for mutually gained exchanges that have not yet been perceived as commercial. The Journal of Economic Sociology publishes the first chapter, "The World of Tomorrow 3.0," where the author describes key features of the new economy resulting from the Third Great Economic Revolution. It means that innovations with the usage of digital technologies come to the fore, allowing more intensive usage of durable goods and reducing the total number of circulated goods. As a result, the human experience turns out to be more important than the obtained things, thus changing the idea of private property dramatically.}, Doi = {10.17323/1726-3247-2019-5-74-97}, Key = {fds357975} } @article{fds250162, Author = {Bianco, W}, Title = {Trust: Representatives and Constituencies}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {85}, Pages = {395-397}, Year = {1995}, Key = {fds250162} } @article{fds339419, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption: there is a “political Coase Theorem”}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {181}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {83-100}, Publisher = {Springer Nature America, Inc}, Year = {2019}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0610-9}, Abstract = {Gordon Tullock developed an approach to understanding dynamic processes of political change and policy outcomes. The key insight is the notion that political insiders have a comparative advantage—because they face lower transaction costs—in manipulating rules. The result is that political actors can collect revenues from threatening to restrict, or offering to loosen, access to valuable permissions, permits, or services. To the extent that the ability to pay for such favorable treatment is a consequence of private activities that produce greater social value, there is a “political Coase theorem”: corruption makes bad systems more efficient. But the dynamic consequences are extremely negative, because of the inability to institute reforms resulting from application of Tullock’s “transitional gains trap.”.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-018-0610-9}, Key = {fds339419} } @article{fds250176, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Two Steves and One Soichiro: Why Politicians Can’t Judge Innovation}, Journal = {EconLib}, Series = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungercollectivism.html}, Publisher = {EconLib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN}, Year = {2006}, Month = {Winter}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungercollectivism.html}, Key = {fds250176} } @article{fds250175, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Unintended Consequences 1, Good Intentions 0}, Journal = {EconLib}, Series = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungergood intentions.html}, Publisher = {EconLib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN}, Year = {2006}, Month = {Fall}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungergoodintentions.html}, Key = {fds250175} } @article{fds250275, Author = {Potthoff, RF and Munger, MC}, Title = {Use of integer programming to optimize the scheduling of panels at annual meetings of the Public Choice Society}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {117}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {163-175}, Year = {2003}, Month = {October}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000185858600007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Preparation for the annual meetings of an organization such as the Public Choice Society involves scheduling various panels (sessions) in the available time slots. No person can be scheduled for more than one panel in the same time slot. Each panel belongs to a specific subject area; one tries to spread the panels in each area among the time slots as evenly as possible. We develop an integer-programming model to produce a schedule that maximizes the evenness subject to the constraints. We successfully applied the model retrospectively, as a test case, to schedule the 2001 annual meetings of the society.}, Doi = {10.1023/A:1026101608593}, Key = {fds250275} } @article{fds250226, Author = {Potthoff, R and Munger, M}, Title = {Voter Uncertainty Can Produce Non-Single-Peaked But Not Cyclic Preferences: A Clue to the Fate of Ross Perot?}, Journal = {Journal of Politics}, Volume = {67}, Number = {2}, Pages = {429-453}, Year = {2005}, Month = {May}, Key = {fds250226} } @article{fds250209, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {152}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {61-72}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2012}, Month = {July}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000304170600004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Abstract = {Gordon Tullock made fundamental conceptual contributions to the understanding of collective choices. Tullock balanced an optimism about the capacity of political choices to facilitate gains from exchange with a pessimism about the negative externalities attending having majorities control power and dictate choices for all. Tullock's work on both sides of this divide is surveyed, examining both the problems of voting procedures, and the promise of the demand-revealing process he helped invent, in guiding the choice of political institutions. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-011-9856-1}, Key = {fds250209} } @article{fds312960, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Voting with dollars: A new paradigm for campaign finance.}, Journal = {JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE}, Volume = {41}, Number = {3}, Pages = {904-906}, Publisher = {AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC}, Year = {2003}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0022-0515}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000185575200009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Key = {fds312960} } @article{fds250171, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {War, the American State, and Politics since 1898}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {17}, Number = {2}, Pages = {301-304}, Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST}, Year = {2012}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {1086-1653}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000309028100015&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Key = {fds250171} } @article{fds350700, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Was Karl Marx a Public-Choice Theorist?}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {24}, Number = {4}, Pages = {509-520}, Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST}, Year = {2020}, Month = {March}, Key = {fds350700} } @article{fds338183, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {What Is "Actually Existing Socialism"?}, Journal = {INDEPENDENT REVIEW}, Volume = {23}, Number = {2}, Pages = {297-299}, Publisher = {INDEPENDENT INST}, Year = {2018}, Month = {September}, Key = {fds338183} } @article{fds356989, Author = {Bram, C and Munger, M}, Title = {Where you stand depends on where you live: county voting on the Texas secession referendum}, Journal = {Constitutional Political Economy}, Volume = {33}, Number = {1}, Pages = {67-79}, Year = {2022}, Month = {March}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-021-09334-w}, Abstract = {During the first half of the 19th century, Western Texas was a “trap baited with grass” that attracted migrants hoping to farm. When settlers on the wrong side of an unknown, invisible line could not build successful farms, residents in those counties voted to remain in the Union at far higher rates than residents in neighboring counties who could farm. The connection between the vote and economic interest was obvious, as those without suitable land could not make use of enslaved labor, which was too expensive given the implicit marginal product of labor. Because the location of settlement was plausibly random, these results highlight the importance of economic interest as a determinant of even fundamental moral beliefs that affect vote choice.}, Doi = {10.1007/s10602-021-09334-w}, Key = {fds356989} } @article{fds250262, Author = {Coates, D and Munger, M}, Title = {Win, Lose, or Withdraw: A Categorical Analysis of Career Patterns in the House of Representatives, 1948-1978}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {83}, Number = {1-2}, Pages = {91-115}, Publisher = {Springer Verlag (Germany)}, Year = {1995}, ISSN = {1573-7101}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01047686}, Abstract = {Winner of the "Duncan Black Award" for best paper published in Public Choice for 1995.}, Doi = {10.1007/BF01047686}, Key = {fds250262} } @article{fds312943, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {‘Euvoluntary’ Exchange and the ‘Difference Principle’}, Year = {2011}, Month = {August}, Abstract = {Takes up the problem of “truly voluntary” (euvoluntary) exchange argued in Munger (Social Philosophy and Policy, Summer 2011) and extends it to apply to the problem of inequality of income. In particular, it is argued that there exists a link between Rawls’ difference principle and Hayek’s conception of a safety net within an otherwise pure free market.}, Key = {fds312943} } @article{fds250221, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {’Basic Income’ is Not an Obligation, But It Might Be a Legitimate Choice}, Journal = {Basic Income Studies}, Volume = {5}, Number = {2}, Year = {2010}, Month = {Winter}, Key = {fds250221} } @article{fds374354, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {“Apparently, You Don’t”: Economist Jokes as an Educational Tool}, Journal = {Journal of Private Enterprise}, Volume = {38}, Number = {3}, Pages = {61-82}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, Abstract = {This paper addresses the growing literature on the comparative statics of rhetorical equilibrium, using humor as the animating device that corrodes existing norms for understanding the commercial system. Three motivations for economics jokes are advanced: to be funny, to illustrate, and to mock. A simple model of humor is advanced, with three independent variables—whether the joke is funny, insightful, or accurately mocking—that are argued to generate different levels of amusement, the dependent variable. One conclusion is that jokes economists tell each other, jokes economists tell outsiders, and jokes outsiders tell themselves about economists have different mixes of the essential arguments of the amusement function.}, Key = {fds374354} } %% Other @misc{fds314267, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {'A' Hire vs. 'the' Hire}, Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education}, Year = {2008}, Month = {August}, ISSN = {0009-5982}, url = {http://chronicle.com/article/A-Hire-vs-the-Hire/45775}, Key = {fds314267} } @misc{fds314201, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {10 Suggestions for a New Department Chair}, Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education}, Year = {2010}, Month = {April}, ISSN = {0009-5982}, url = {http://chronicle.com/article/10-Suggestions-for-a-New/64963}, Key = {fds314201} } @misc{fds314203, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {10 Tips on How to Write Less Badly}, Journal = {The Chronicle of Higher Educaiton}, Year = {2010}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0030-2201}, url = {http://chronicle.com/article/10-Tips-on-How-to-Write-Less/124268}, Key = {fds314203} } @misc{fds250129, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {A Time-series Investigation into Factors Influencing U.S. Auto Assembly Employment}, Booktitle = {Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission}, Publisher = {Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission}, Year = {1985}, Month = {February}, Key = {fds250129} } @misc{fds318628, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {A Time-series Investigation into Factors Influencing U.S. Auto Assembly Employment}, Booktitle = {Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission}, Year = {1985}, Month = {February}, Key = {fds318628} } @misc{fds250125, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {America’s Costly Trade Barriers}, Pages = {F29-F29}, Publisher = {The New York Times}, Year = {1983}, Key = {fds250125} } @misc{fds314343, Author = {Hayward, A and Dimino, M and Jones, CA and La Raja and RJ and Milyo, J and Munger, MC and New, NJ and Primo, DM and Samples, J}, Title = {Brief Amicus Campaign Finance Scholars in Support of Appellant, Citizens United}, Publisher = {Wilson - Epes Printing Co., Inc}, Year = {2002}, url = {http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/CU-SuppABrief-Aplt17.pdf}, Abstract = {Supreme Court of the United States: Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission}, Key = {fds314343} } @misc{fds250137, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Democracy is a Means, Not an End}, Journal = {Econ Lib.}, Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN}, Year = {2005}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2005/Mungerdemocracy.html}, Key = {fds250137} } @misc{fds250139, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Everybody Loves Mikey}, Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN}, Year = {2005}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2005/Mungerinvisiblehand.html}, Key = {fds250139} } @misc{fds250195, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Everything You Know About Recycling is Wrong}, Journal = {Cato Unbound (On-line journal, not refereed)}, Series = {Symposium, The Political Economy of Recycling, edited by Jason Kuznicki.}, Booktitle = {The Political Economy of Recycling}, Editor = {J Kuznicki}, Year = {2013}, url = {http://www.cato-unbound.org/issues/june-2013/political-economy-recycling}, Abstract = {Cato Unbound Symposium}, Key = {fds250195} } @misc{fds250134, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Forum: The Dead Cats of November}, Journal = {PS: Political Science and Politics}, Year = {1995}, Month = {September}, Key = {fds250134} } @misc{fds314341, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Idaho Republican Party v Ysursa}, Publisher = {Idaho Gov}, Year = {2011}, url = {http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/ClosedPrimaryOrder.pdf}, Key = {fds314341} } @misc{fds250215, Author = {Hinich, MJ and Munger, MC}, Title = {In Memoriam: Otto "Toby" Davis}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {128}, Number = {3}, Pages = {357-359}, Year = {2006}, Key = {fds250215} } @misc{fds250211, Author = {Ordeshook, P and Munger, M and Lin, TM and Jones, B}, Title = {In memoriam: Melvin J. Hinich, 1939-2010}, Journal = {Public Choice}, Volume = {146}, Number = {1}, Pages = {1-8}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2011}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0048-5829}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000285103500001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1007/s11127-010-9743-1}, Key = {fds250211} } @misc{fds250189, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {I’ll Stick With These: Some Sharp Observations on the Division of Labor}, Publisher = {Econlib, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN,."}, Year = {2007}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungerpins.html}, Key = {fds250189} } @misc{fds314204, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {L'Affaire LaCour: What it can teach us about academic integrity and 'truthiness'}, Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education}, Year = {2015}, Month = {June}, ISSN = {0009-5982}, Key = {fds314204} } @misc{fds314202, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Lean on Your Staff}, Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education}, Year = {2010}, Month = {May}, url = {http://chronicle.com/article/Lean-on-Your-Staff/65699}, Key = {fds314202} } @misc{fds314342, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Libertarian Party, et al v. State, et al}, Publisher = {Southern Coalition for Social Justice}, Year = {2009}, url = {https://www.southerncoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/LPNCamicusbrief.pdf}, Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Supreme Court of North Carolina}, Key = {fds314342} } @misc{fds250194, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Locking Up Political Speech: How Electioneering Communications Laws Stifle Free Speech and Civic Engagement}, Publisher = {Institute for Justice}, Address = {Arlington, VA}, Year = {2009}, Month = {June}, url = {http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/locking_up_political_speech.pdf}, Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Broward County v. Browning (Florida)}, Key = {fds250194} } @misc{fds314393, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Locking Up Political Speech: How Electioneering Communications Laws Stifle Free Speech and Civic Engagement}, Year = {2009}, Month = {June}, url = {http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/locking_up_political_speech.pdf}, Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Broward County v. Browning (Florida)}, Key = {fds314393} } @misc{fds250193, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Market Makers or Parasites?}, Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Inc.}, Address = {Indianapolis, IN}, Year = {2009}, Month = {February}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2009/Mungermiddlemen.html}, Key = {fds250193} } @misc{fds314339, Author = {Mellor, WH and Berliner, D and Sherman, PM and et. al., and Munger, MC}, Title = {NC Dental Examiners v FTC, "Scholars of Public Choice Economics in Support of FTC"}, Year = {2014}, url = {http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/nc-teeth-whitening-amicus.pdf}, Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Supreme Court of the United States}, Key = {fds314339} } @misc{fds314268, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {No Turtles: Faculty-Media Relations}, Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education}, Year = {2009}, Month = {June}, ISSN = {0009-5982}, url = {http://chronicle.com/article/No-Turtles-Faculty-Media/44489}, Key = {fds314268} } @misc{fds250130, Author = {Munger, M and Coates, D}, Title = {Nuclear Waste and the Bug Letter}, Pages = {7J-7J}, Publisher = {Raleigh News and Observer}, Year = {1991}, Key = {fds250130} } @misc{fds250192, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Planning Order, Causing Chaos: Transantiago}, Publisher = {EconLib, OLL, Liberty Fund}, Year = {2009}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2008/Mungerbus.html}, Key = {fds250192} } @misc{fds313754, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Political Parties and Campaign Finance}, Year = {2000}, Month = {April}, url = {http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2000/04500hrg.htm}, Key = {fds313754} } @misc{fds250135, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Political Parties and Campaign Finance, Written Testimony}, Publisher = {Rules and Administration Committee, U.S. Senate}, Year = {2000}, Key = {fds250135} } @misc{fds250127, Author = {Munger, M and Weidenbaum, ML}, Title = {Protectionism: Who Gets Protected?}, Pages = {16-19}, Publisher = {Consumer’s Research Magazine}, Year = {1983}, Month = {October}, Key = {fds250127} } @misc{fds376786, Title = {Regulation}, Publisher = {Sage Publications, Inc.}, Year = {2008}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412965811.n257}, Doi = {10.4135/9781412965811.n257}, Key = {fds376786} } @misc{fds314338, Author = {Prins, AD and Tamayo, AP and et. al., and Munger, MC}, Title = {Sensational Smiles, LLC, dba Smile Bright v. Mullen, No. 15-507, “Brief of Public Choice Economics Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner”}, Year = {2015}, url = {http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ct-teeth-whitening-brief-of-public-choice-economics-scholars-as-amici-curiae-in-support-of-petitioner-11-18-2015.pdf}, Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Supreme Court of the United States}, Key = {fds314338} } @misc{fds313830, Author = {Munger, MC and Bluestein, F}, Title = {Single Prime and Multi-Prime Contracting in North Carolina Public Construction}, Pages = {43 pages}, Year = {1994}, Month = {September}, Key = {fds313830} } @misc{fds250132, Author = {Munger, M and Bluestein, F}, Title = {Single Prime and Multi-Prime Contracting in North Carolina Public Construction: A Report Submitted Under Contract to the N.C. State Building Commission}, Pages = {43-43}, Publisher = {Raleigh, NC: State Building Commission}, Year = {1994}, Month = {September}, Key = {fds250132} } @misc{fds314199, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Sorry I'm Late}, Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education}, Year = {2009}, Month = {November}, ISSN = {0009-5982}, url = {http://chronicle.com/article/Sorry-Im-Late/49148}, Key = {fds314199} } @misc{fds250128, Author = {Munger, M}, Title = {Tax Implications of Reagan’s Trade Policy}, Journal = {Policy Report}, Publisher = {Cato Institute}, Year = {1984}, Month = {February}, Key = {fds250128} } @misc{fds314266, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {The Beauty of the Virtual Discussion Section}, Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education}, Year = {2016}, Month = {April}, ISSN = {0009-5982}, url = {http://chronicle.com/article/The-Beauty-of-the-Virtual/236065}, Key = {fds314266} } @misc{fds250131, Author = {Munger, M and Coates, D and Heid, V}, Title = {The Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste in America: Gridlock in the States}, Publisher = {St. Louis, MO: Center for the Study of American Business, Occasional Paper No. 119}, Year = {1992}, Month = {December}, Key = {fds250131} } @misc{fds318627, Author = {Munger, MC and Coates, D and Heid, V}, Title = {The Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste in America: Gridlock in the States}, Year = {1992}, Key = {fds318627} } @misc{fds250133, Author = {Munger, M and Stockard, W}, Title = {The Environmental Protection Agency in the Triangle}, Publisher = {Center for Urban and Regional Studies, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill}, Year = {1995}, Month = {January}, Key = {fds250133} } @misc{fds250188, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {The Five Sorry Rules of Lateness}, Publisher = {Econlib, Liberty Fund}, Year = {2007}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungerlateness.html}, Key = {fds250188} } @misc{fds314200, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {The Right Kind of Nothing}, Journal = {Chronicle of Higher Education}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, ISSN = {0009-5982}, url = {http://chronicle.com/article/The-Right-Kind-of-Nothing/63344}, Key = {fds314200} } @misc{fds250138, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {The Thing Itself}, Journal = {Econ Lib.}, Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN}, Year = {2005}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2005/Mungerthing.html}, Key = {fds250138} } @misc{fds250190, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {They Clapped: Can Price-Gouging Laws Prohibit Scarcity?}, Publisher = {Econlab}, Year = {2007}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungergouging.html}, Key = {fds250190} } @misc{fds250191, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Think Globally, Act Irrationally: Recycling}, Publisher = {Econlib, Liberty Fund}, Year = {2007}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungerrecycling.html}, Key = {fds250191} } @misc{fds250126, Author = {Munger, M and Weidenbaum, ML and Penoyer, RJ}, Title = {Toward a More Open Trade Policy}, Booktitle = {Formal Publication No. 53}, Publisher = {St. Louis, MO: Center for the Study of American Business, Formal Publication No. 53}, Year = {1983}, Month = {January}, Key = {fds250126} } @misc{fds318629, Author = {Munger, MC and Weidenbaum, ML and Penoyer, RJ}, Title = {Toward A More Open Trade Policy}, Booktitle = {Formal Publication No. 53}, Year = {1983}, Key = {fds318629} } @misc{fds314205, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Trade Barriers and Deficits: The Hidden Tax of Protectionism}, Booktitle = {Policy Report}, Year = {1984}, Month = {February}, url = {http://www.cato.org/policy-report/february-1984}, Key = {fds314205} } @misc{fds250136, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {Tragedy of the Malecon: Is Cuba ’Domestic Politics?}, Journal = {Econ Lib.}, Publisher = {Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN}, Year = {2004}, url = {http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2004/MungerCuba.html}, Key = {fds250136} } @misc{fds314340, Author = {Munger, MC}, Title = {“Many Cultures, One Message,” et al. v. Clements, et al.}, Year = {2012}, Abstract = {Amicus Brief: Washington Western District Court}, Key = {fds314340} } | |
Duke University * Arts & Sciences * Reload * Login |