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Philosophy : Publications since January 2018

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%% Buchanan, Allen E.   
@misc{fds337609,
   Author = {Buchanan, A and Sreenivasan, G},
   Title = {Taking international legality seriously: A methodology for
             human rights},
   Pages = {211-229},
   Booktitle = {Human Rights: Moral or Political?},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {April},
   ISBN = {9780198713258},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198713258.003.0013},
   Abstract = {© the several contributors 2018. All rights reserved. The
             chapter aims to draw philosophical attention to the
             neglected enterprise of figuring out whether the existence
             of international legal human rights is morally justified.
             Philosophers usually focus on whether moral human rights
             exist, which is often rather controversial. As is argued
             here, however, the existence of a moral right not to be
             imprisoned for debt (say) is neither necessary nor
             sufficient for an international legal human right not to be
             imprisoned for debt to be morally justified. The chapter
             proceeds to indicate how rich and complex the issues
             involved in morally justifying an international legal human
             right really are; and to show how much philosophical
             distance there is between such a justification and the
             existence of a relevant moral right. Finally, the chapter
             draws some lessons from its analysis for the methodological
             debate over political approaches to human
             rights.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198713258.003.0013},
   Key = {fds337609}
}

@misc{fds335555,
   Author = {Buchanan, A},
   Title = {Institutional legitimacy},
   Volume = {4},
   Pages = {53-78},
   Booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780198813972},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198813972.003.0003},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198813972.003.0003},
   Key = {fds335555}
}

@book{fds337052,
   Author = {Buchanan, A and Powell, R},
   Title = {The evolution of moral progress: A biocultural
             theory},
   Pages = {1-424},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190868413},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190868413.001.0001},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. All rights reserved. The
             idea of moral progress played a central role in liberal
             political thought from the Enlightenment through the
             nineteenth century but is rarely encountered in moral and
             political philosophical discourse today. One reason for this
             is that traditional liberal theorists of moral progress,
             like their conservative detractors, tended to rely on
             underevidenced assumptions about human psychology and
             society. For the first time in history, we are developing
             robust scientific knowledge about human nature, especially
             through empirical psychological theories of morality and
             culture that are informed by evolutionary theory. In
             addition, the social sciences now provide better information
             about which social arrangements are feasible and sustainable
             and about how social norms arise, change, and come to shape
             moral thought and behavior. Accordingly, it is time to
             revisit the question of moral progress. On the surface,
             evolutionary accounts of morality paint a pessimistic
             picture, suggesting that certain types of moral progress are
             unrealistic or inappropriate for beings like us. In brief,
             humans are said to be “hard-wired” for rather limited
             moral capacities. However, such a view overlooks the great
             plasticity of human morality as evidenced by our history of
             social and political moral achievements. To account for
             these changes while giving evolved moral psychology its due,
             we develop a dynamic, biocultural theory of moral progress
             that highlights the interaction between adaptive components
             of moral psychology and the cultural construction of moral
             norms and beliefs; and we explore how this interaction can
             advance, impede, and reverse moral progress.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190868413.001.0001},
   Key = {fds337052}
}

@book{fds337336,
   Author = {Buchanan, A},
   Title = {Institutionalizing the just war},
   Pages = {1-324},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190878436},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190878436.001.0001},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. All rights reserved. This
             book challenges traditional and contemporary just war
             theorizing, by taking seriously the role of social practices
             and institutions in decisions to go to war. It argues that
             which substantive moral principles regarding the initiation
             of war are valid can depend upon the institutional processes
             within which the decisions are made. Traditional and
             mainstream contemporary just war theorists proceed as if
             institutions don’t exist or as if existing institutional
             resources for influencing decision-making are so negligible
             that they may be disregarded. They fail to consider the
             possibility that institutional innovations could improve
             recourse to war decisions and that the fact that this is so
             has important implications for the morality of war-making.
             The first six chapters of the book lay out the case for
             institutionalizing the just war-for rethinking just war
             theory with due regard for the fact that institutional
             realities and possibilities shape the morality of war. The
             last two chapters advance concrete, feasible proposals for
             much-needed institutional innovation.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190878436.001.0001},
   Key = {fds337336}
}


%% Conitzer, Vincent   
@article{fds341328,
   Author = {Kramer, MF and Schaich Borg and J and Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong,
             W},
   Title = {When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?},
   Journal = {Aies 2018 Proceedings of the 2018 Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai,
             Ethics, and Society},
   Pages = {204-209},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {December},
   ISBN = {9781450360128},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278752},
   Abstract = {© 2018 ACM. AI systems are now or will soon be
             sophisticated enough to make consequential decisions.
             Although this technology has flourished, we also need public
             appraisals of AI systems playing these more important roles.
             This article reports surveys of preferences for and against
             AI systems making decisions in various domains as well as
             experiments that intervene on these preferences. We find
             that these preferences are contingent on subjects' previous
             exposure to computer systems making these kinds of
             decisions, and some interventions designed to mimic previous
             exposure successfully encourage subjects to be more
             hospitable to computer systems making these weighty
             decisions.},
   Doi = {10.1145/3278721.3278752},
   Key = {fds341328}
}

@article{fds335334,
   Author = {Ueda, S and Iwasaki, A and Conitzer, V and Ohta, N and Sakurai, Y and Yokoo, M},
   Title = {Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with
             compact representations},
   Journal = {Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems},
   Volume = {32},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {503-533},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-018-9386-z},
   Abstract = {© 2018, The Author(s). This paper presents a new way of
             formalizing the coalition structure generation problem (CSG)
             so that we can apply constraint optimization techniques to
             it. Forming effective coalitions is a major research
             challenge in AI and multi-agent systems. CSG involves
             partitioning a set of agents into coalitions to maximize
             social surplus. Traditionally, the input of the CSG problem
             is a black-box function called a characteristic function,
             which takes a coalition as input and returns the value of
             the coalition. As a result, applying constraint optimization
             techniques to this problem has been infeasible. However,
             characteristic functions that appear in practice often can
             be represented concisely by a set of rules, rather than
             treating the function as a black box. Then we can solve the
             CSG problem more efficiently by directly applying constraint
             optimization techniques to this compact representation. We
             present new formalizations of the CSG problem by utilizing
             recently developed compact representation schemes for
             characteristic functions. We first characterize the
             complexity of CSG under these representation schemes. In
             this context, the complexity is driven more by the number of
             rules than by the number of agents. As an initial step
             toward developing efficient constraint optimization
             algorithms for solving the CSG problem, we also develop
             mixed integer programming formulations and show that an
             off-the-shelf optimization package can perform reasonably
             well.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10458-018-9386-z},
   Key = {fds335334}
}

@article{fds337141,
   Author = {Freeman, R and Conitzer, V and Zahedi, SM and Lee,
             BC},
   Title = {Dynamic proportional sharing: A game-theoretic
             approach},
   Journal = {Sigmetrics 2018 Abstracts of the 2018 Acm International
             Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer
             Systems},
   Pages = {33-35},
   Publisher = {ACM Press},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {June},
   ISBN = {9781450358460},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3219617.3219631},
   Abstract = {© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Sharing
             computational resources amortizes cost and improves
             utilization and efficiency. When agents pool their
             resources, each becomes entitled to a portion of the shared
             pool. Static allocations in each round can guarantee
             entitlements and are strategy-proof, but efficiency suffers
             because allocations do not reflect variations in agents’
             demands for resources across rounds. Dynamic allocation
             mechanisms assign resources to agents across multiple rounds
             while guaranteeing agents their entitlements. Designing
             dynamic mechanisms is challenging, however, when agents are
             strategic and can benefit by misreporting their demands for
             resources. In this paper, we show that dynamic allocation
             mechanisms based on max-min fail to guarantee entitlements,
             strategy-proofness or both. We propose the flexible lending
             (FL) mechanism and show that it satisfies strategy-proofness
             and guarantees at least half of the utility from static
             allocations while providing an asymptotic efficiency
             guarantee. Our simulations with real and synthetic data show
             that the performance of the flexible lending mechanism is
             comparable to that of state-of-the-art mechanisms, providing
             agents with at least 0.98x, and on average 15x, of their
             utility from static allocations. Finally, we propose the
             T-period mechanism and prove that it satisfies
             strategy-proofness and guarantees entitlements for T =
             2.},
   Doi = {10.1145/3219617.3219631},
   Key = {fds337141}
}

@article{fds333306,
   Author = {Conitzer, V},
   Title = {A Puzzle about Further Facts},
   Journal = {Erkenntnis},
   Pages = {1-13},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9979-6},
   Abstract = {© 2018 The Author(s) In metaphysics, there are a number of
             distinct but related questions about the existence of
             “further facts”—facts that are contingent relative to
             the physical structure of the universe.These include further
             facts about qualia, personal identity, and time.In this
             article I provide a sequence of examples involving computer
             simulations, ranging from one in which the protagonist can
             clearly conclude such further facts exist to one that
             describes our own condition.This raises the question of
             where along the sequence (if at all) the protagonist stops
             being able to soundly conclude that further facts
             exist.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10670-018-9979-6},
   Key = {fds333306}
}

@article{fds332974,
   Author = {Conitzer, V},
   Title = {Technical perspective designing algorithms and the fairness
             criteria they should satisfy},
   Journal = {Communications of the Acm},
   Volume = {61},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {92},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3166066},
   Doi = {10.1145/3166066},
   Key = {fds332974}
}

@article{fds339563,
   Author = {De Weerdt and M and Albert, M and Conitzer, V and Van Der Linden,
             K},
   Title = {Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart
             grid},
   Journal = {Ijcai International Joint Conference on Artificial
             Intelligence},
   Volume = {2018-July},
   Pages = {4736-4742},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780999241127},
   Abstract = {© 2018 International Joint Conferences on Artificial
             Intelligence.All right reserved. The problem of optimally
             scheduling the charging demand of electric vehicles within
             the constraints of the electricity infrastructure is called
             the charge scheduling problem. The models of the charging
             speed, horizon, and charging demand determine the
             computational complexity of the charge scheduling problem.
             We show that for about 20 variants the problem is either in
             P or weakly NP-hard and dynamic programs exist to compute
             optimal solutions. About 10 other variants of the problem
             are strongly NP-hard, presenting a potentially significant
             obstacle to their use in practical situations of scale. An
             experimental study establishes up to what parameter values
             the dynamic programs can determine optimal solutions in a
             couple of minutes.},
   Key = {fds339563}
}

@article{fds341330,
   Author = {Deng, Y and Conitzer, V},
   Title = {Disarmament games with resources},
   Journal = {32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai
             2018},
   Pages = {981-988},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781577358008},
   Abstract = {Copyright © 2018, Association for the Advancement of
             Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
             A paper by Deng and Conitzer in AAAI'17 introduces
             disarmament games, in which players alternatingly commit not
             to play certain pure strategies. However, in practice
             disarmament usually does not consist in removing a strategy,
             but rather in removing a resource (and doing so rules out
             all the strategies in which that resource is used
             simultaneously). In this paper, we introduce a model of
             disarmament games in which resources, rather than
             strategies, are removed. We prove NP-completeness of several
             formulations of the problem of achieving desirable outcomes
             via disarmament. We then study the case where resources can
             be fractionally removed, and prove a result analogous to the
             folk theorem that all desirable outcomes can be achieved. We
             show that we can approximately achieve any desirable outcome
             in a polynomial number of rounds, though determining whether
             a given outcome can be obtained in a given number of rounds
             remains NP-complete.},
   Key = {fds341330}
}

@article{fds341329,
   Author = {Freedman, R and Dickerson, JP and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V},
   Title = {Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human
             values},
   Journal = {32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai
             2018},
   Pages = {1636-1643},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781577358008},
   Abstract = {Copyright © 2018, Association for the Advancement of
             Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
             The efficient allocation of limited resources is a classical
             problem in economics and computer science. In kidney
             exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney
             donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors
             in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc weights
             decided on by committee and then fed into an allocation
             algorithm that determines who get what-and who does not. In
             this paper, we provide an end-to-end methodology for
             estimating weights of individual participant profiles in a
             kidney exchange. We first elicit from human subjects a list
             of patient attributes they consider acceptable for the
             purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g., medical
             characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on). Then, we ask
             subjects comparison queries between patient profiles and
             estimate weights in a principled way from their responses.
             We show how to use these weights in kidney exchange market
             clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the impact of the
             weights in simulations and find that the precise numerical
             values of the weights we computed matter little, other than
             the ordering of profiles that they imply. However, compared
             to not prioritizing patients at all, there is a significant
             effect, with certain classes of patients being
             (de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value
             judgments.},
   Key = {fds341329}
}

@article{fds339285,
   Author = {De Weerdt and MM and Conitzer, V and Albert, M and Van Der Linden,
             K},
   Title = {Complexity of scheduling charging in the smart
             grid},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on
             Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
             Aamas},
   Volume = {3},
   Pages = {1924-1926},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781510868083},
   Abstract = {© 2018 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
             Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
             The problem of optimally scheduling the charging demand of
             electric vehicles within the constraints of the electricity
             infrastructure is called the charge scheduling problem. The
             models of the charging speed, horizon, and charging demand
             determine the computational complexity of the charge
             scheduling problem. For about 20 variants the problem is
             either in P or weakly NP-hard and dynamic programs exist to
             compute optimal solutions. About 10 other variants of the
             problem are strongly NP-hard, presenting a potentially
             significant obstacle to their use in practical situations of
             scale.},
   Key = {fds339285}
}


%% De Brigard, Felipe   
@article{fds332864,
   Author = {Murray, S and Murray, ED and Stewart, G and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
             Brigard, F},
   Title = {Responsibility for forgetting},
   Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
   Volume = {176},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {1177-1201},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature. In this paper, we focus on whether and to
             what extent we judge that people are responsible for the
             consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of
             behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility
             for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that
             we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their
             forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent
             is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the
             level of care that the agent exhibits toward performing the
             forgotten action does not. We argue that this result has
             important implications for a long-running debate about the
             nature of responsible agency.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
   Key = {fds332864}
}

@article{fds341881,
   Author = {Henne, P and Semler, J and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies
             ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and
             Furniture},
   Journal = {Philosophia},
   Volume = {47},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {131-139},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature. Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’
             implies ‘can’. In light of recent empirical evidence,
             however, some skeptics conclude that philosophers should
             stop assuming the principle unconditionally. Streumer,
             however, does not simply assume the principle’s truth; he
             provides arguments for it. In this article, we argue that
             his arguments fail to support the claim that ‘ought’
             implies ‘can’.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
   Key = {fds341881}
}

@article{fds341030,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Parikh, N},
   Title = {Episodic Counterfactual Thinking},
   Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
   Volume = {28},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {59-66},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721418806512},
   Abstract = {© The Author(s) 2018. Our tendency to engage in episodic
             counterfactual thinking—namely, imagining alternative ways
             in which past personal events could have occurred but did
             not—is ubiquitous. Although widely studied by cognitive
             and social psychologists, this autobiographically based
             variety of counterfactual thought has been connected only
             recently to research on the cognitive and neuroscientific
             basis of episodic memory and mental simulation. In the
             current article, we offer an empirical characterization of
             episodic counterfactual thinking by contrasting it with
             related varieties of mental simulation along three
             dimensions: temporal context, degree of episodic detail, and
             modal profile (i.e., perceived possibility or
             impossibility). In so doing, we offer a practical strategy
             to navigate the nascent literature on episodic
             counterfactual thinking within the context of other mental
             simulations, and we argue that the evidence surveyed
             strongly indicates that although connected along the
             aforementioned dimensions, episodic counterfactual thinking
             is a psychological process different from episodic memory,
             episodic future thinking, and semantic counterfactual
             thinking.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0963721418806512},
   Key = {fds341030}
}

@article{fds341027,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Gessell, B and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Network modularity as a foundation for neural
             reuse},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {86},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {23-46},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/701037},
   Abstract = {© 2019 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights
             reserved. The neural reuse framework developed primarily by
             Michael Anderson proposes that brain regions are involved in
             multiple and diverse cognitive tasks and that brain regions
             flexibly and dynamically interact in different combinations
             to carry out cognitive functioning. We argue that the
             evidence cited by Anderson and others falls short of
             supporting the fundamental principles of neural reuse. We
             map out this problem and provide solutions by drawing on
             recent advances in network neuroscience, and we argue that
             methods employed in network neuroscience provide the means
             to fully engage in a research program operating under the
             principles of neural reuse.},
   Doi = {10.1086/701037},
   Key = {fds341027}
}

@article{fds341028,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Yang, BW and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and
             Polarization},
   Journal = {Political Behavior},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09526-z},
   Abstract = {© 2019, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of
             Springer Nature. People seem more divided than ever before
             over social and political issues, entrenched in their
             existing beliefs and unwilling to change them. Empirical
             research on mechanisms driving this resistance to belief
             change has focused on a limited set of well-known, charged,
             contentious issues and has not accounted for deliberation
             over reasons and arguments in belief formation prior to
             experimental sessions. With a large, heterogeneous sample
             (N = 3001), we attempt to overcome these existing
             problems, and we investigate the causes and consequences of
             resistance to belief change for five diverse and less
             contentious socio-political issues. After participants chose
             initially to support or oppose a given socio-political
             position, they were provided with reasons favoring their
             chosen position (affirming reasons), reasons favoring the
             other, unchosen position (conflicting reasons), or all
             reasons for both positions (reasons for both sides). Our
             results indicate that participants are more likely to stick
             with their initial decisions than to change them no matter
             which reasons are considered, and that this resistance to
             belief change is likely due to a motivated, biased
             evaluation of the reasons to support their initial beliefs
             (prior-belief bias). More specifically, they rated affirming
             reasons more favorably than conflicting reasons—even after
             accounting for reported prior knowledge about the issue, the
             novelty of the reasons presented, and the reported strategy
             used to make the initial decision. In many cases,
             participants who did not change their positions tended to
             become more confident in the superiority of their positions
             after considering many reasons for both sides.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11109-019-09526-z},
   Key = {fds341028}
}

@article{fds335558,
   Author = {Parikh, N and Ruzic, L and Stewart, GW and Spreng, RN and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {What if? Neural activity underlying semantic and episodic
             counterfactual thinking.},
   Journal = {Neuroimage},
   Volume = {178},
   Pages = {332-345},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.05.053},
   Abstract = {Counterfactual thinking (CFT) is the process of mentally
             simulating alternative versions of known facts. In the past
             decade, cognitive neuroscientists have begun to uncover the
             neural underpinnings of CFT, particularly episodic CFT
             (eCFT), which activates regions in the default network (DN)
             also activated by episodic memory (eM) recall. However, the
             engagement of DN regions is different for distinct kinds of
             eCFT. More plausible counterfactuals and counterfactuals
             about oneself show stronger activity in DN regions compared
             to implausible and other- or object-focused counterfactuals.
             The current study sought to identify a source for this
             difference in DN activity. Specifically, self-focused
             counterfactuals may also be more plausible, suggesting that
             DN core regions are sensitive to the plausibility of a
             simulation. On the other hand, plausible and self-focused
             counterfactuals may involve more episodic information than
             implausible and other-focused counterfactuals, which would
             imply DN sensitivity to episodic information. In the current
             study, we compared episodic and semantic counterfactuals
             generated to be plausible or implausible against episodic
             and semantic memory reactivation using fMRI. Taking
             multivariate and univariate approaches, we found that the DN
             is engaged more during episodic simulations, including eM
             and all eCFT, than during semantic simulations. Semantic
             simulations engaged more inferior temporal and lateral
             occipital regions. The only region that showed strong
             plausibility effects was the hippocampus, which was
             significantly engaged for implausible CFT but not for
             plausible CFT, suggestive of binding more disparate
             information. Consequences of these findings for the
             cognitive neuroscience of mental simulation are
             discussed.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.05.053},
   Key = {fds335558}
}

@article{fds336415,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Yang, BW and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {No evidence for unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A
             failed replication and extension.},
   Journal = {Memory & Cognition},
   Volume = {46},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {787-795},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0803-y},
   Abstract = {In a recent study, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that
             memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of
             whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we
             argue in the current study, their claim that people develop
             "unethical amnesia" confuses two distinct and dissociable
             memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology of
             remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To
             further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory
             accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical
             amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N
             = 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from
             Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory
             accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to
             replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino
             (2016), while including several additional variables meant
             to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study
             (N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the
             same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new
             vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not
             find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy
             in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon
             the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined
             unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study
             memory for moral and immoral actions are
             discussed.},
   Doi = {10.3758/s13421-018-0803-y},
   Key = {fds336415}
}

@article{fds329104,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Dougherty, AM and Yang, BW and Henne, P and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {Reasons probably won't change your mind: The role of reasons
             in revising moral decisions.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology. General},
   Volume = {147},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {962-987},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000368},
   Abstract = {Although many philosophers argue that making and revising
             moral decisions ought to be a matter of deliberating over
             reasons, the extent to which the consideration of reasons
             informs people's moral decisions and prompts them to change
             their decisions remains unclear. Here, after making an
             initial decision in 2-option moral dilemmas, participants
             examined reasons for only the option initially chosen
             (affirming reasons), reasons for only the option not
             initially chosen (opposing reasons), or reasons for both
             options. Although participants were more likely to change
             their initial decisions when presented with only opposing
             reasons compared with only affirming reasons, these effect
             sizes were consistently small. After evaluating reasons,
             participants were significantly more likely not to change
             their initial decisions than to change them, regardless of
             the set of reasons they considered. The initial decision
             accounted for most of the variance in predicting the final
             decision, whereas the reasons evaluated accounted for a
             relatively small proportion of the variance in predicting
             the final decision. This resistance to changing moral
             decisions is at least partly attributable to a biased,
             motivated evaluation of the available reasons: participants
             rated the reasons supporting their initial decisions more
             favorably than the reasons opposing their initial decisions,
             regardless of the reported strategy used to make the initial
             decision. Overall, our results suggest that the
             consideration of reasons rarely induces people to change
             their initial decisions in moral dilemmas. (PsycINFO
             Database Record},
   Doi = {10.1037/xge0000368},
   Key = {fds329104}
}

@article{fds335560,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Brady, WJ},
   Title = {Correction to: The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our
             Judgments of Responsibility (Review of Philosophy and
             Psychology, (2013), 4, 2, (259-269), 10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8)},
   Journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {447},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0389-0},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature. On pages 263, 265, and 266, incorrect
             degrees of freedom and t values were reported. The
             statistical conclusions are not affected by these reporting
             errors, but the corrected values are shown
             below.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s13164-018-0389-0},
   Key = {fds335560}
}

@article{fds335559,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Hanna, E and St Jacques and PL and Schacter,
             DL},
   Title = {How thinking about what could have been affects how we feel
             about what was},
   Journal = {Cognition and Emotion},
   Pages = {1-14},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2018.1478280},
   Abstract = {© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
             Group Episodic counterfactual thoughts (CFT) and
             autobiographical memories (AM) involve the reactivation and
             recombination of episodic memory components into mental
             simulations. Upon reactivation, memories become labile and
             prone to modification. Thus, reactivating AM in the context
             of mentally generating CFT may provide an opportunity for
             editing processes to modify the content of the original
             memory. To examine this idea, this paper reports the results
             of two studies that investigated the effect of reactivating
             negative and positive AM in the context of either imagining
             a better (i.e. upward CFT) or a worse (i.e. downward CFT)
             alternative to an experienced event, as opposed to
             attentively retrieving the memory without mental
             modification (i.e. remembering) or no reactivation. Our
             results suggest that attentive remembering was the best
             strategy to both reduce the negative affect associated with
             negative AM, and to prevent the decay of positive affect
             associated with positive AM. In addition, reactivating
             positive, but not negative, AM with or without CFT
             modification reduces the perceived arousal of the original
             memory over time. Finally, reactivating negative AM in a
             downward CFT or an attentive remembering condition increases
             the perceived detail of the original memory over
             time.},
   Doi = {10.1080/02699931.2018.1478280},
   Key = {fds335559}
}

@article{fds335561,
   Author = {De Freitas and J and Sarkissian, H and Newman, GE and Grossmann, I and De
             Brigard, F and Luco, A and Knobe, J},
   Title = {Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and
             Three Interdependent Cultures.},
   Journal = {Cognitive Science},
   Volume = {42 Suppl 1},
   Pages = {134-160},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12505},
   Abstract = {People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an
             essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the
             true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to
             believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep
             inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good
             ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with
             optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does
             it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people
             understand the self? To address this question, we tested the
             good true self theory against two potential boundary
             conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about
             the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual
             differences in misanthropy-the tendency to view humans
             negatively-predict beliefs about the good true self in an
             American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in
             a good true self, even among individuals who have an
             explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true
             self-attributions across cultural groups, by comparing
             samples from an independent country (USA) and a diverse set
             of interdependent countries (Russia, Singapore, and
             Colombia). Results indicated that the direction and
             magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we
             tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across
             groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy,
             suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the
             true self as morally good.},
   Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12505},
   Key = {fds335561}
}

@article{fds337053,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Memory and the intentional stance},
   Pages = {62-91},
   Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9780199367511},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0005},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. All rights reserved.
             Despite Dennett's vast scholarship, he seemed to only have
             directly addressed the topic of memory in a relatively
             unknown coauthored article published in a somewhat obscure
             volume. The current chapter attempts to reconstruct the
             ideas from this old article, and argues that it offers a
             viable and coherent view of episodic memory with substantial
             empirical support. Specifically, the chapter uncovers three
             empirically supported theses. A functional thesis, according
             to which our memory system not only processes information
             about past events but also uses this information to
             construct useful anticipations of possible future events. A
             computational thesis, according to which statistical
             regularities, along with individual limitations and goals,
             probabilistically constrain the search space examined during
             memory retrieval. And a metaphysical thesis, according to
             which memories do not exist as subpersonal-level brain
             structures encoding particular intentional contents but
             rather as personal-level psychological phenomena only
             accessible from the intentional stance.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0005},
   Key = {fds337053}
}

@article{fds335563,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Gessell, B},
   Title = {Why episodic memory may not be for communication.},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {41},
   Pages = {e8},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x17001303},
   Abstract = {Three serious challenges to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) proposal
             are presented. First, we argue that the epistemic attitude
             that they claim is unique to remembering also applies to
             some forms of imaginative simulations that aren't memories.
             Second, we argue that their account cannot accommodate
             critical neuropsychological evidence. Finally, we argue that
             their proposal looks unconvincing when compared to more
             parsimonious evolutionary accounts.},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x17001303},
   Key = {fds335563}
}

@article{fds341029,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Remembering moral and immoral actions in constructing the
             self},
   Journal = {Memory & Cognition},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0880-y},
   Abstract = {© 2018, The Psychonomic Society, Inc. Having positive moral
             traits is central to one’s sense of self, and people
             generally are motivated to maintain a positive view of the
             self in the present. But it remains unclear how people
             foster a positive, morally good view of the self in the
             present. We suggest that recollecting and reflecting on
             moral and immoral actions from the personal past jointly
             help to construct a morally good view of the current self in
             complementary ways. More specifically, across four studies
             we investigated the extent to which people believe they have
             changed over time after recollecting their own moral or
             immoral behaviors from the personal past. Our results
             indicate that recollecting past immoral actions is
             associated with stronger impressions of dissimilarity and
             change in the sense of self over time than recollecting past
             moral actions. These effects held for diverse domains of
             morality (i.e., honesty/dishonesty, helping/harming,
             fairness/unfairness, and loyalty/disloyalty), and they
             remained even after accounting for objective, calendar time.
             Further supporting a motivational explanation, these effects
             held when people recollected their own past actions but not
             when they recollected the actions of other
             people.},
   Doi = {10.3758/s13421-018-0880-y},
   Key = {fds341029}
}

@article{fds340469,
   Author = {Gessell, B and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {The discontinuity of levels in cognitive
             science},
   Journal = {Teorema},
   Volume = {37},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {151-165},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {© 2018; KRK Ediciones. All rights reserved. We begin by
             characterizing Dennett’s “homuncular functionalist”
             view of the mind, as described in his early work. We then
             contrast that view with the one outlined in From Bacteria to
             Bach and Back. We argue that recent changes in Dennett’s
             view have produced tension in the way he conceives of
             functional decompositions. Functional decompositions based
             on the intentional stance are supposed to reach a bottom,
             “dumb” level which can be explained mechanically;
             however, since Dennett now believes that neurons may need to
             be described intentionally, it is not clear whether our
             explanations of cognitive functions can ever align with our
             explanations of neuronal and network behaviors. We explore
             the consequences of this tension for Dennett’s view, and
             for cognitive neuroscience in general.},
   Key = {fds340469}
}

@article{fds335562,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Memory, attention, and joint reminiscing},
   Pages = {200-220},
   Booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781138065604},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591},
   Abstract = {© 2018 Taylor & Francis. When people jointly reminisce,
             they often talk about past objects, which may or may no
             longer exist. How can two or more people jointly refer to an
             object that is long gone-or at least, that is not present in
             their surrounding? In this chapter, I offer a three-part
             answer to this question. First, I suggest that our capacity
             to remember intentional objects during memory retrieval
             depends on our capacity to direct our attention inwardly
             toward the relevant component of a memorial content-a mental
             act I call mental ostension. Second, I argue that, for us to
             refer to remembered intentional objects, we must possess the
             ability to refer to them indirectly or “deferredly” by
             way of mentally ostending toward a present mental content;
             in short, we must be capable of deferred mental ostension.
             Finally, I claim that to jointly reminisce, we must have the
             capacity to guide someone else’s attention inwardly toward
             the relevant aspect of the mental content we want them to
             focus on so that they become aware of the past object we are
             deferredly ostending; that is, we need concerted deferred
             mental ostension.},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781315159591},
   Key = {fds335562}
}


%% Farahany, Nita A.   
@article{fds341805,
   Author = {Farahany, N and Chodavadia, S and Katsanis, S},
   Title = {Ethical Guidelines for DNA Testing in Migrant Family
             Reunification},
   Journal = {American Journal of Bioethics},
   Volume = {19},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {4-7},
   Year = {2019},
   Key = {fds341805}
}

@article{fds341286,
   Author = {Farahany, N and Greely, H},
   Title = {Neuroscience and the Criminal Justice System},
   Journal = {Annual Review of Criminology},
   Volume = {2},
   Pages = {451-471},
   Year = {2019},
   Key = {fds341286}
}

@article{fds340883,
   Author = {Greely, HT and Grady, C and Ramos, KM and Chiong, W and Eberwine, J and Farahany, NA and Johnson, LSM and Hyman, BT and Hyman, SE and Rommelfanger, KS and Serrano, EE},
   Title = {Neuroethics Guiding Principles for the NIH BRAIN
             Initiative.},
   Journal = {The Journal of Neuroscience : the Official Journal of the
             Society for Neuroscience},
   Volume = {38},
   Number = {50},
   Pages = {10586-10588},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2077-18.2018},
   Doi = {10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2077-18.2018},
   Key = {fds340883}
}

@article{fds340884,
   Author = {Farahany, NA and Greely, HT and Hyman, S and Koch, C and Grady, C and Pașca, SP and Sestan, N and Arlotta, P and Bernat, JL and Ting, J and Lunshof, JE and Iyer, EPR and Hyun, I and Capestany, BH and Church, GM and Huang, H and Song, H},
   Title = {The ethics of experimenting with human brain
             tissue.},
   Journal = {Nature},
   Volume = {556},
   Number = {7702},
   Pages = {429-432},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-04813-x},
   Doi = {10.1038/d41586-018-04813-x},
   Key = {fds340884}
}


%% Fjeld, Jon   
@article{fds336006,
   Author = {Fjeld, J},
   Title = {How to Test Your Assumptions},
   Journal = {Mit Sloan Management Review},
   Volume = {59},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {89-90},
   Publisher = {SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW ASSOC, MIT SLOAN SCHOOL
             MANAGEMENT},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds336006}
}


%% Flanagan, Owen   
@article{fds335564,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Zhao, W},
   Title = {The self and its good vary cross-culturally: A dozen
             self-variations and Chinese familial selves},
   Pages = {287-301},
   Booktitle = {Self, Culture and Consciousness: Interdisciplinary
             Convergences on Knowing and Being},
   Publisher = {Springer Singapore},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9789811057762},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_17},
   Doi = {10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_17},
   Key = {fds335564}
}

@book{fds335566,
   Author = {Caruso, G and Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, morals, and purpose in the age
             of neuroscience},
   Pages = {1-374},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190460723},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.001.0001},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. Existentialism is a concern
             about the foundation of meaning, morals, and purpose.
             Existentialisms arise when some foundation for these
             elements of being is under assault. In the past, first-wave
             existentialism concerned the increasingly apparent inability
             of religion and religious tradition to provide such a
             foundation, as typified in the writings of Kierkegaard,
             Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche. Second-wave existentialism,
             personified philosophically by Sartre, Camus, and de
             Beauvoir, developed in response to the inability of an
             overly optimistic Enlightenment vision of reason and the
             common good to provide such a foundation. There is a
             third-wave existentialism, a new existentialism, developing
             in response to advances in the neurosciences that threaten
             the last vestiges of an immaterial soul or self. With the
             increasing explanatory and therapeutic power of
             neuroscience, the mind no longer stands apart from the world
             to serve as a foundation of meaning. This produces
             foundational anxiety. This collection of new essays explores
             the anxiety caused by this third-wave existentialism and
             some responses to it. It brings together some of the
             world℉s leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive
             scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our
             neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind
             sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion,
             autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral
             responsibility, law, the nature of criminal punishment,
             meaning in life, and purpose.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.001.0001},
   Key = {fds335566}
}

@article{fds335565,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Caruso, G},
   Title = {Neuroexistentialism: Third-wave existentialism},
   Pages = {1-22},
   Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age
             of Neuroscience},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190460723},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0001},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. Neuroexistentialism is a
             recent expression of existential anxiety over the nature of
             persons. Unlike previous existentialisms,
             neuroexistentialism is not caused by a problem with
             ecclesiastical authority, as was the existentialism
             represented by Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche, nor
             by the shock of coming face to face with the moral horror of
             nation state actors and their citizens, as in the
             mid-century existentialism of Sartre and Camus. Rather,
             neuroexistentialism is caused by the rise of the scientific
             authority of the human sciences and a resultant clash
             between the scientific and the humanistic image of persons.
             Flanagan and Caruso explain what neuroexistentialism is and
             how it is related to two earlier existentialisms and they
             spell out how neuroexistentialism makes particularly vivid
             the clash between the humanistic and the scientific image of
             persons. They conclude by providing a brief summary of the
             chapters to follow.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0001},
   Key = {fds335565}
}

@article{fds339638,
   Author = {Tononi, G and Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness},
   Journal = {Frontiers of Philosophy in China},
   Volume = {13},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {332-348},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3868/s030-007-018-0026-1},
   Abstract = {© 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
             This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist
             about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is
             consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If
             so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like
             in order to provide us with a satisfying explanation of its
             explanandum? And what types of entities might such a theory
             acknowledge as being conscious? Philosopher Owen Flanagan
             and scientist Giulio Tononi weigh in on these issues during
             an exchange about the nature and scientific explanation of
             consciousness.},
   Doi = {10.3868/s030-007-018-0026-1},
   Key = {fds339638}
}


%% Gillespie, Michael A.   
@article{fds336482,
   Author = {Allen Gillespie and M},
   Title = {On Debt and Redemption: Friedrich Nietzsche's Doctrine of
             Eternal Recurrence},
   Journal = {Journal of Religious Ethics},
   Volume = {46},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {267-287},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jore.12218},
   Doi = {10.1111/jore.12218},
   Key = {fds336482}
}

@article{fds336483,
   Author = {Gillespie, MA},
   Title = {On Nietzsche's final teaching: A response to my
             critics},
   Journal = {Interpretation (United States)},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {439-446},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {March},
   Key = {fds336483}
}


%% Grant, Ruth W.   
@article{fds341049,
   Author = {Grant, RW},
   Title = {Incentives and praise compared: the ethics of
             motivation},
   Journal = {International Review of Economics},
   Volume = {66},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {17-28},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12232-018-0293-z},
   Doi = {10.1007/s12232-018-0293-z},
   Key = {fds341049}
}


%% Hawkins, Jennifer   
@article{fds332347,
   Author = {Hawkins, J},
   Title = {The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability},
   Journal = {Ethics},
   Volume = {128},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {462-467},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/694278},
   Doi = {10.1086/694278},
   Key = {fds332347}
}

@article{fds335567,
   Author = {Hawkins, J},
   Title = {Artistic creativity and suffering},
   Pages = {152-169},
   Booktitle = {Creativity and Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781138827677},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351199797},
   Abstract = {© 2018 selection and editorial matter, Berys Gaut and
             Matthew Kieran; individual chapters, the contributors. Can
             negative psychological experiences be good for a person? If
             so, what could possibly be good about them? And when and
             under what circumstances might they be good? In what
             follows, my aim is to begin a philosophical exploration of
             these issues by focusing on a particular case-the
             relationship between negative affective experience and
             artistic creativity.},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781351199797},
   Key = {fds335567}
}


%% Henne, Paul M.   
@article{fds337722,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Dougherty, AM and Yang, BW and Henne, P and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {Reasons probably won't change your mind: The role of reasons
             in revising moral decisions.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology. General},
   Volume = {147},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {962-987},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000368},
   Abstract = {Although many philosophers argue that making and revising
             moral decisions ought to be a matter of deliberating over
             reasons, the extent to which the consideration of reasons
             informs people's moral decisions and prompts them to change
             their decisions remains unclear. Here, after making an
             initial decision in 2-option moral dilemmas, participants
             examined reasons for only the option initially chosen
             (affirming reasons), reasons for only the option not
             initially chosen (opposing reasons), or reasons for both
             options. Although participants were more likely to change
             their initial decisions when presented with only opposing
             reasons compared with only affirming reasons, these effect
             sizes were consistently small. After evaluating reasons,
             participants were significantly more likely not to change
             their initial decisions than to change them, regardless of
             the set of reasons they considered. The initial decision
             accounted for most of the variance in predicting the final
             decision, whereas the reasons evaluated accounted for a
             relatively small proportion of the variance in predicting
             the final decision. This resistance to changing moral
             decisions is at least partly attributable to a biased,
             motivated evaluation of the available reasons: participants
             rated the reasons supporting their initial decisions more
             favorably than the reasons opposing their initial decisions,
             regardless of the reported strategy used to make the initial
             decision. Overall, our results suggest that the
             consideration of reasons rarely induces people to change
             their initial decisions in moral dilemmas. (PsycINFO
             Database Record},
   Doi = {10.1037/xge0000368},
   Key = {fds337722}
}

@misc{fds337721,
   Author = {Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {Does neuroscience undermine morality?},
   Pages = {54-67},
   Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age
             of Neuroscience},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190460723},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. In Chapter 4, the authors
             explore whether neuroscience undermines morality. The
             authors distinguish, analyze, and assess the main arguments
             for neuroscientific skepticism about morality and argue that
             neuroscience does not undermine all of our moral judgments,
             focusing the majority of their attention on one argument in
             particular-the idea that neuroscience and psychology might
             undermine moral knowledge by showing that our moral beliefs
             result from unreliable processes. They argue that the
             background arguments needed to bolster the main premise fail
             to adequately support it. They conclude that the overall
             issue of neuroscience undermining morality is unsettled,
             but, they contend, we can reach some tentative and qualified
             conclusions. Neuroscience is, then, not a general
             underminer, but can play a constructive role in moral
             theory, although not by itself. In order to make progress,
             neuroscience and normative moral theory must work
             together.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
   Key = {fds337721}
}


%% Hoover, Kevin D.   
@article{fds333200,
   Author = {Hoover, K},
   Title = {Scots are more studious},
   Journal = {Economist},
   Volume = {414},
   Number = {9074},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   Key = {fds333200}
}

@article{fds339820,
   Author = {Hoover, KD},
   Title = {First principles, fallibilism, and economics},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature America, Inc},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02021-8},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Nature B.V. In the eyes of its
             practitioners, economics is both a deductive science and an
             empirical science. The starting point of its deductions
             might be thought of as first principles. But what is the
             status of such principles? The tension between
             foundationalism, the idea that there are necessary and
             secure first principles for economic inquiry, and
             fallibilism, the idea that no belief can be certified as
             true beyond the possibility of doubt, is explored. Empirical
             disciplines require some sort of falsifiability. Yet,
             empirical inquiries also require a starting place—if not a
             necessarily true one, at least an indubitable one, that is,
             one that is not actually doubted. Indubitability appears to
             have necessary consequences, undercutting fallibilism, while
             fallibilism threatens confidence in the de facto first
             principles that begin inquiry. This tension is examined in
             three well-known attempts to define economics and its
             method: John Stuart Mill’s economics as the science of
             wealth, Lionel Robbins’s economics as constrained
             optimization; and George Stigler and Becker’s attempt to
             reformulate neoclassical economics to square empiricism with
             Robbins’ deductivism.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-02021-8},
   Key = {fds339820}
}


%% Kingston, Ewan D.   
@article{fds335568,
   Author = {Kingston, E and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling?},
   Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {169-186},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature. Our thesis is that there is no moral
             requirement to refrain from emitting reasonable amounts of
             greenhouse gases (GHGs) solely in order to enjoy oneself.
             Joyriding in a gas guzzler (joyguzzling) provides our
             paradigm example. We first distinguish this claim that there
             is no moral requirement to refrain from joyguzzling from
             other more radical claims. We then review several different
             proposed objections to our view. These include: the claim
             that joyguzzling exemplifies a vice, causes or contributes
             to harm, has negative expected value, exceeds our fair share
             of global emissions, and undermines political duties. We
             show why none of these objections succeeds and conclude that
             no good reason has yet been proposed that shows why
             joyguzzling violates a moral requirement.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1},
   Key = {fds335568}
}


%% Neander, Karen   
@article{fds219963,
   Author = {K.L. Neander},
   Title = {"Toward an Informational Teleosemantics"},
   Booktitle = {Millikan and Her Critics},
   Editor = {Justine Kingsbury},
   Keywords = {Teleolosemantics, functions, information, representation,
             content, distal content, Millikan, Papineau.},
   Abstract = {This paper argues that there are response functions. Systems
             can have the function to produce one thing in response to
             another. This has consequences for the kind of
             teleosemantics that can be offered. Contrary to claims made
             by Millikan and Papineau, sensory representations can have
             contents that are determined by the functions of sensory
             systems to respond to stimuli in certain ways. This paper
             further explores these implications and offers a
             teleosemantic and yet informational theory for sensory
             representations. It further offers a solution to the problem
             of distal content.},
   Key = {fds219963}
}


%% Pavese, Carlotta   
@article{fds340900,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {Know-how, action, and luck},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Pages = {1-23},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1823-7},
   Abstract = {© 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature A good surgeon knows how to perform a
             surgery; a good architect knows how to design a house. We
             value their know-how. We ordinarily look for it. What makes
             it so valuable? A natural response is that know-how is
             valuable because it explains success. A surgeon’s know-how
             explains their success at performing a surgery. And an
             architect’s know-how explains their success at designing
             houses that stand up. We value know-how because of its
             special explanatory link to success. But in virtue of what
             is know-how explanatorily linked to success? This essay
             provides a novel argument for the thesis that know-how’s
             special link to success is to be explained at least in part
             in terms of its being, or involving, a doxastic attitude
             that is epistemically alike propositional knowledge. It is
             argued that the role played by know-how in explaining
             intentional success shows that the epistemic differences
             between know-how and knowledge, if any, are less than
             usually thought; and that “revisionary intellectualism”,
             the view that know-how is true belief that might well fall
             short of knowledge, is not really a stable position. If its
             explanatory link to success is what makes know-how valuable,
             an upshot of my argument is that the value of know-how is
             due, to a considerable extent, to its being, or involving, a
             kind of propositional knowledge.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-1823-7},
   Key = {fds340900}
}

@article{fds340901,
   Author = {Beddor, B and Pavese, C},
   Title = {Modal Virtue Epistemology},
   Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12562},
   Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12562},
   Key = {fds340901}
}


%% Purves, Dale   
@article{fds336007,
   Author = {Bowling, DL and Purves, D and Gill, KZ},
   Title = {Reply to Goffinet: In consonance, old ideas die
             hard.},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
             United States of America},
   Volume = {115},
   Number = {22},
   Pages = {E4958-E4959},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1805570115},
   Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1805570115},
   Key = {fds336007}
}

@article{fds331493,
   Author = {Bowling, DL and Purves, D and Gill, KZ},
   Title = {Vocal similarity predicts the relative attraction of musical
             chords.},
   Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
             United States of America},
   Volume = {115},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {216-221},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1713206115},
   Abstract = {Musical chords are combinations of two or more tones played
             together. While many different chords are used in music,
             some are heard as more attractive (consonant) than others.
             We have previously suggested that, for reasons of biological
             advantage, human tonal preferences can be understood in
             terms of the spectral similarity of tone combinations to
             harmonic human vocalizations. Using the chromatic scale, we
             tested this theory further by assessing the perceived
             consonance of all possible dyads, triads, and tetrads within
             a single octave. Our results show that the consonance of
             chords is predicted by their relative similarity to voiced
             speech sounds. These observations support the hypothesis
             that the relative attraction of musical tone combinations is
             due, at least in part, to the biological advantages that
             accrue from recognizing and responding to conspecific vocal
             stimuli.},
   Doi = {10.1073/pnas.1713206115},
   Key = {fds331493}
}


%% Rosenberg, Alexander   
@article{fds340757,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophical Challenges for Scientism (and How to Meet
             Them?)},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0004},
   Abstract = {<p>Scientism is expounded. Then its two major challenges are
             stated and responses to them sketched. The first challenge
             is to its epistemology of mathematics-how we know the
             necessary truths of mathematics. The second challenge is to
             the very coherence of its eliminativist account of
             cognition. The first of these problems is likely to be taken
             more seriously by philosophers than by other advocates of
             scientism. It is a problem that has absorbed philosophers
             since Plato and on which little progress has been made. The
             second is often unnoticed, even among those who endorse
             scientism, since they don’t recognize their own commitment
             to eliminativism and so do not appreciate the threat of
             incoherence it poses. It is important for scientism to
             acknowledge these challenges.</p>},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0004},
   Key = {fds340757}
}

@article{fds336418,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Can we make sense of subjective experience in metabolically
             situated cognitive processes?},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {1-2},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-018-9624-4},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-018-9624-4},
   Key = {fds336418}
}

@book{fds336419,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of social science, fifth edition},
   Pages = {1-347},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780813349732},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429494840},
   Abstract = {© 2016 by Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. Philosophy
             of Social Science provides a tightly argued yet accessible
             introduction to the philosophical foundations of the human
             sciences, including economics, anthropology, sociology,
             political science, psychology, history, and the disciplines
             emerging at the intersections of these subjects with
             biology. Philosophy is unavoidable for social scientists
             because the choices they make in answering questions in
             their disciplines force them to take sides on philosophical
             matters. Conversely, the philosophy of social science is
             equally necessary for philosophers since the social and
             behavior sciences must inform their understanding of human
             action, norms, and social institutions. The fifth edition
             retains from previous editions an illuminating
             interpretation of the enduring relations between the social
             sciences and philosophy, and reflects on developments in
             social research over the past two decades that have informed
             and renewed debate in the philosophy of social science. An
             expanded discussion of philosophical anthropology and modern
             and postmodern critical theory is new for this
             edition.},
   Doi = {10.4324/9780429494840},
   Key = {fds336419}
}

@article{fds332348,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Making mechanism interesting},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Volume = {195},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {11-33},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0713-5},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0713-5},
   Key = {fds332348}
}


%% Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter   
@article{fds332865,
   Author = {Murray, S and Murray, ED and Stewart, G and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
             Brigard, F},
   Title = {Responsibility for forgetting},
   Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
   Volume = {176},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {1177-1201},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature. In this paper, we focus on whether and to
             what extent we judge that people are responsible for the
             consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of
             behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility
             for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that
             we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their
             forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent
             is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the
             level of care that the agent exhibits toward performing the
             forgotten action does not. We argue that this result has
             important implications for a long-running debate about the
             nature of responsible agency.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
   Key = {fds332865}
}

@article{fds341882,
   Author = {Henne, P and Semler, J and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies
             ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and
             Furniture},
   Journal = {Philosophia},
   Volume = {47},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {131-139},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature. Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’
             implies ‘can’. In light of recent empirical evidence,
             however, some skeptics conclude that philosophers should
             stop assuming the principle unconditionally. Streumer,
             however, does not simply assume the principle’s truth; he
             provides arguments for it. In this article, we argue that
             his arguments fail to support the claim that ‘ought’
             implies ‘can’.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
   Key = {fds341882}
}

@article{fds342279,
   Author = {Ancell, AJ and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {The need for feasible compromises on conscientious
             objection: response to Card.},
   Journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2019-105425},
   Abstract = {Robert Card criticises our proposal for managing some
             conscientious objections in medicine. Unfortunately, he
             severely mischaracterises the nature of our proposal, its
             scope and its implications. He also overlooks the fact that
             our proposal is a compromise designed for a particular
             political context. We correct Card's mischaracterisations,
             explain why we believe compromise is necessary and explain
             how we think proposed compromises should be
             evaluated.},
   Doi = {10.1136/medethics-2019-105425},
   Key = {fds342279}
}

@article{fds342280,
   Author = {Harris, AA and Romer, AL and Hanna, EK and Keeling, LA and LaBar, KS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Strauman, TJ and Wagner, HR and Marcus, MD and Zucker, NL},
   Title = {The central role of disgust in disorders of food
             avoidance.},
   Journal = {The International Journal of Eating Disorders},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/eat.23047},
   Abstract = {BACKGROUND:Individuals with extreme food avoidance such as
             Avoidant Restrictive Food Intake Disorder (ARFID) experience
             impairing physical and mental health consequences from
             nutrition of insufficient variety or/and quantity.
             Identifying mechanisms contributing to food avoidance is
             essential to develop effective interventions. Anxiety
             figures prominently in theoretical models of food avoidance;
             however, there is limited evidence that repeated exposures
             to foods increases approach behavior in ARFID. Studying
             disgust, and relationships between disgust and anxiety, may
             offer novel insights, as disgust is functionally associated
             with avoidance of contamination from pathogens (as may occur
             via ingestion) and is largely resistant to extinction.
             METHOD:This exploratory, cross-sectional study included data
             from 1,644 adults who completed an online questionnaire.
             Participant responses were used to measure ARFID
             classification, picky eating, sensory sensitivity, disgust,
             and anxiety. Structural equation modeling tested a
             measurement model of latent disgust and anxiety factors as
             measured by self-reported frequency of disgust and anxiety
             reactions. Mediational models were used to explore causal
             ordering. RESULTS:A latent disgust factor was more strongly
             related to severity of picky eating (B ≈ 0.4) and
             ARFID classification (B ≈ 0.6) than the latent anxiety
             factor (B ≈ 0.1). Disgust partially mediated the
             association between anxiety and picky eating and fully
             mediated the association between anxiety and ARFID. Models
             testing the reverse causal ordering demonstrated poorer fit.
             Findings suggest anxiety may be associated with food
             avoidance in part due to increased disgust.
             CONCLUSIONS:Disgust may play a prominent role in food
             avoidance. Findings may inform novel approaches to
             treatment.},
   Doi = {10.1002/eat.23047},
   Key = {fds342280}
}

@article{fds341335,
   Author = {Kramer, MF and Schaich Borg and J and Conitzer, V and Sinnott-Armstrong,
             W},
   Title = {When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?},
   Journal = {Aies 2018 Proceedings of the 2018 Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai,
             Ethics, and Society},
   Pages = {204-209},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {December},
   ISBN = {9781450360128},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278752},
   Abstract = {© 2018 ACM. AI systems are now or will soon be
             sophisticated enough to make consequential decisions.
             Although this technology has flourished, we also need public
             appraisals of AI systems playing these more important roles.
             This article reports surveys of preferences for and against
             AI systems making decisions in various domains as well as
             experiments that intervene on these preferences. We find
             that these preferences are contingent on subjects' previous
             exposure to computer systems making these kinds of
             decisions, and some interventions designed to mimic previous
             exposure successfully encourage subjects to be more
             hospitable to computer systems making these weighty
             decisions.},
   Doi = {10.1145/3278721.3278752},
   Key = {fds341335}
}

@article{fds331598,
   Author = {Cameron, CD and Payne, BK and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Scheffer, JA and Inzlicht, M},
   Title = {Corrigendum to "Implicit moral evaluations: A multinomial
             modeling approach" [Cognition 158 (2017)
             224-241].},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {173},
   Pages = {138},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.12.012},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2017.12.012},
   Key = {fds331598}
}

@article{fds332751,
   Author = {Kingston, E and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {What’s Wrong with Joyguzzling?},
   Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {169-186},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature. Our thesis is that there is no moral
             requirement to refrain from emitting reasonable amounts of
             greenhouse gases (GHGs) solely in order to enjoy oneself.
             Joyriding in a gas guzzler (joyguzzling) provides our
             paradigm example. We first distinguish this claim that there
             is no moral requirement to refrain from joyguzzling from
             other more radical claims. We then review several different
             proposed objections to our view. These include: the claim
             that joyguzzling exemplifies a vice, causes or contributes
             to harm, has negative expected value, exceeds our fair share
             of global emissions, and undermines political duties. We
             show why none of these objections succeeds and conclude that
             no good reason has yet been proposed that shows why
             joyguzzling violates a moral requirement.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10677-017-9859-1},
   Key = {fds332751}
}

@article{fds326605,
   Author = {Wright, JC and Nadelhoffer, T and Thomson Ross and L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {Be it ever so humble: Proposing a dual-dimension account and
             measurement of humility},
   Journal = {Self and Identity},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {92-125},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2017.1327454},
   Abstract = {© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
             Group. What does it mean to be humble? We argue that
             humility is an epistemically and ethically aligned state of
             awareness–the experience of ourselves as a small part of a
             larger universe and as one among a host of other morally
             relevant beings. So conceived, humility can be
             operationalized and measured along the dual dimensions of
             low self-focus and high other-focus and is distinct from
             other related constructs (e.g., modesty and
             open-mindedness). We discuss our newly developed scale
             (Study 1 and 2), and provide preliminary validation using
             self-report (Study 3) and behavioral measures (Study 4),
             showing that humility is related to people’s general
             ethical orientation (e.g., empathy, universalism/benevolence,
             and civic responsibility), their well-being (e.g., sense of
             autonomy, life-purpose, and secure attachment), mature
             religious beliefs/practices, and reactions to
             disagreement–specifically, people high in humility sat
             closer and less angled away from their conversation partner
             with whom they disagreed. Together, this provides support
             for our new Dual-Dimension Humility Scale.},
   Doi = {10.1080/15298868.2017.1327454},
   Key = {fds326605}
}

@article{fds339913,
   Author = {Tang, H and Wang, S and Liang, Z and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Su, S and Liu, C},
   Title = {Are Proselfs More Deceptive and Hypocritical? Social Image
             Concerns in Appearing Fair.},
   Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {NOV},
   Pages = {2268},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02268},
   Abstract = {Deception varies across individuals and social contexts. The
             present research explored how individual difference measured
             by social value orientations, and situations, affect
             deception in moral hypocrisy. In two experiments,
             participants made allocations between themselves and
             recipients with an opportunity to deceive recipients where
             recipients cannot reject their allocations. Experiment 1
             demonstrated that proselfs were more deceptive and
             hypocritical than prosocials by lying to be apparently fair,
             especially when deception was unrevealed. Experiment 2
             showed that proselfs were more concerned about social image
             in deception in moral hypocrisy than prosocials were. They
             decreased apparent fairness when deception was revealed and
             evaluated by a third-party reviewer and increased it when
             deception was evaluated but unrevealed. These results show
             that prosocials and proselfs differed in pursuing deception
             and moral hypocrisy social goals and provide implications
             for decreasing deception and moral hypocrisy.},
   Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02268},
   Key = {fds339913}
}

@article{fds336427,
   Author = {Freedman, R and Dickerson, JP and Borg, JS and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Conitzer, V},
   Title = {Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human
             values},
   Journal = {32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai
             2018},
   Pages = {1636-1643},
   Publisher = {AAAI Press},
   Editor = {McIlraith, SA and Weinberger, KQ},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781577358008},
   Abstract = {Copyright © 2018, Association for the Advancement of
             Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
             The efficient allocation of limited resources is a classical
             problem in economics and computer science. In kidney
             exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney
             donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors
             in kidney exchanges are prioritized using ad-hoc weights
             decided on by committee and then fed into an allocation
             algorithm that determines who get what-and who does not. In
             this paper, we provide an end-to-end methodology for
             estimating weights of individual participant profiles in a
             kidney exchange. We first elicit from human subjects a list
             of patient attributes they consider acceptable for the
             purpose of prioritizing patients (e.g., medical
             characteristics, lifestyle choices, and so on). Then, we ask
             subjects comparison queries between patient profiles and
             estimate weights in a principled way from their responses.
             We show how to use these weights in kidney exchange market
             clearing algorithms. We then evaluate the impact of the
             weights in simulations and find that the precise numerical
             values of the weights we computed matter little, other than
             the ordering of profiles that they imply. However, compared
             to not prioritizing patients at all, there is a significant
             effect, with certain classes of patients being
             (de)prioritized based on the human-elicited value
             judgments.},
   Key = {fds336427}
}

@article{fds336426,
   Author = {Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {Does neuroscience undermine morality?},
   Pages = {54-67},
   Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age
             of Neuroscience},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190460723},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. In Chapter 4, the authors
             explore whether neuroscience undermines morality. The
             authors distinguish, analyze, and assess the main arguments
             for neuroscientific skepticism about morality and argue that
             neuroscience does not undermine all of our moral judgments,
             focusing the majority of their attention on one argument in
             particular-the idea that neuroscience and psychology might
             undermine moral knowledge by showing that our moral beliefs
             result from unreliable processes. They argue that the
             background arguments needed to bolster the main premise fail
             to adequately support it. They conclude that the overall
             issue of neuroscience undermining morality is unsettled,
             but, they contend, we can reach some tentative and qualified
             conclusions. Neuroscience is, then, not a general
             underminer, but can play a constructive role in moral
             theory, although not by itself. In order to make progress,
             neuroscience and normative moral theory must work
             together.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
   Key = {fds336426}
}


%% Sreenivasan, Gopal   
@article{fds339292,
   Author = {Sreenivasan, G},
   Title = {Emotions, Reasons, and Epistemology},
   Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
   Volume = {97},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {500-506},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12539},
   Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12539},
   Key = {fds339292}
}

@article{fds244984,
   Author = {Buchanan, A and Sreenivasan, G},
   Title = {Taking international legality seriously: A methodology for
             human rights},
   Pages = {211-229},
   Booktitle = {Human Rights: Moral or Political?},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Etinson, A},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {April},
   ISBN = {9780198713258},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198713258.003.0013},
   Abstract = {© the several contributors 2018. All rights reserved. The
             chapter aims to draw philosophical attention to the
             neglected enterprise of figuring out whether the existence
             of international legal human rights is morally justified.
             Philosophers usually focus on whether moral human rights
             exist, which is often rather controversial. As is argued
             here, however, the existence of a moral right not to be
             imprisoned for debt (say) is neither necessary nor
             sufficient for an international legal human right not to be
             imprisoned for debt to be morally justified. The chapter
             proceeds to indicate how rich and complex the issues
             involved in morally justifying an international legal human
             right really are; and to show how much philosophical
             distance there is between such a justification and the
             existence of a relevant moral right. Finally, the chapter
             draws some lessons from its analysis for the methodological
             debate over political approaches to human
             rights.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198713258.003.0013},
   Key = {fds244984}
}


%% Wong, David B.   
@article{fds336431,
   Author = {Wong, DB},
   Title = {Dialogue in the Work of Michael Krausz},
   Pages = {67-74},
   Booktitle = {Interpretation, Relativism, and Identity: Essays on the
             Philosophy of Michael Krausz},
   Publisher = {Lexington Books},
   Editor = {Koggel, CM and Ritivoi, AD},
   Year = {2018},
   Key = {fds336431}
}

@article{fds338219,
   Author = {Wong, DB},
   Title = {Chinese Ethics (substantive revision)},
   Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
   Editor = {Zalta, E},
   Year = {2018},
   Key = {fds338219}
}


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