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Publications of Owen Flanagan    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
@book{fds335566,
   Author = {Caruso, G and Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, morals, and purpose in the age
             of neuroscience},
   Pages = {1-374},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190460723},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.001.0001},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. Existentialism is a concern
             about the foundation of meaning, morals, and purpose.
             Existentialisms arise when some foundation for these
             elements of being is under assault. In the past, first-wave
             existentialism concerned the increasingly apparent inability
             of religion and religious tradition to provide such a
             foundation, as typified in the writings of Kierkegaard,
             Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche. Second-wave existentialism,
             personified philosophically by Sartre, Camus, and de
             Beauvoir, developed in response to the inability of an
             overly optimistic Enlightenment vision of reason and the
             common good to provide such a foundation. There is a
             third-wave existentialism, a new existentialism, developing
             in response to advances in the neurosciences that threaten
             the last vestiges of an immaterial soul or self. With the
             increasing explanatory and therapeutic power of
             neuroscience, the mind no longer stands apart from the world
             to serve as a foundation of meaning. This produces
             foundational anxiety. This collection of new essays explores
             the anxiety caused by this third-wave existentialism and
             some responses to it. It brings together some of the
             world℉s leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive
             scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our
             neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind
             sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion,
             autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral
             responsibility, law, the nature of criminal punishment,
             meaning in life, and purpose.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.001.0001},
   Key = {fds335566}
}

@book{fds222040,
   Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
   Title = {MORAL SPROUTS AND NATURAL TELEOLOGIES 21st CENTURY MORAL
             PSYCHOLOGY MEETS CLASSICAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY},
   Publisher = {Marquette University Press},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds222040}
}

@book{fds287538,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Moral Sprouts and Natural Teleology: 21st century Moral
             Psychology Meets Classical Chinese Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Marquette University Press},
   Year = {2014},
   Abstract = {The 78th Aquinas Lecture},
   Key = {fds287538}
}

@book{fds306209,
   Title = {Virtue Epistemology Naturalized},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Fairweather, A and Flanagan, O},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds306209}
}

@book{fds222041,
   Author = {Abrol Fairweather and O. Flanagan Jr.},
   Title = {Naturalized Virtue Epistemology},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Fairweather and Flanagan},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds222041}
}

@book{fds306210,
   Author = {Fireman, GD and McVay, TE and Flanagan, OJ},
   Title = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the
             Brain},
   Pages = {1-264},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {March},
   ISBN = {9780199847402},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.001.0001},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. The
             evocation of narrative as a way to understand the content of
             consciousness, including memory, autobiography, self, and
             imagination, has sparked truly interdisciplinary work among
             psychologists, philosophers, and literary critics. Even
             neuroscientists have taken an interest in the stories people
             create to understand themselves, their past, and the world
             around them. The research presented in this volume should
             appeal to researchers enmeshed in these problems, as well as
             the general reader with an interest in the philosophical
             problem of what consciousness is and how it functions in the
             everyday world.},
   Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.001.0001},
   Key = {fds306210}
}

@book{fds318366,
   Author = {Fairweather, A},
   Title = {Naturalizing epistemic virtue},
   Pages = {1-272},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781139236348},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236348},
   Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2014. An epistemic virtue is a
             personal quality conducive to the discovery of truth, the
             avoidance of error, or some other intellectually valuable
             goal. Current work in epistemology is increasingly
             value-driven, but this volume presents the first collection
             of essays to explore whether virtue epistemology can also be
             naturalistic, in the philosophical definition meaning
             'methodologically continuous with science'. The essays
             examine the empirical research in psychology on cognitive
             abilities and personal dispositions, meta-epistemic semantic
             accounts of virtue theoretic norms, the role of emotion in
             knowledge, 'ought-implies can' constraints, empirically and
             metaphysically grounded accounts of 'proper functioning',
             and even applied virtue epistemology in relation to
             education. Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue addresses many core
             issues in contemporary epistemology, presents new
             opportunities for work on epistemic abilities, epistemic
             virtues and cognitive character, and will be of great
             interest to those studying virtue ethics and
             epistemology.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781139236348},
   Key = {fds318366}
}

@book{fds183894,
   Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
   Title = {The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (paper
             2013)},
   Publisher = {MIT PRESS},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {October},
   Key = {fds183894}
}

@book{fds287537,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds287537}
}

@book{fds141485,
   Author = {O. Flanagan},
   Title = {The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material
             World},
   Publisher = {MIT Press},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {Fall},
   Key = {fds141485}
}

@book{fds287536,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material
             World},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {September},
   Key = {fds287536}
}

@book{fds18414,
   Title = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the
             Brain. Eds. Gary Fireman, Ted McVay, and Owen
             Flanagan},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Gary Fireman and Ted McVay and Owen Flanagan},
   Year = {2003},
   Abstract = {Interdisciplinary book (edited collection) on
             role/construction of self-narratives in cog. sci,
             neuroscience, psychology and literature. A contribution to
             topic of personal identity and role of narrative in
             self-construction.},
   Key = {fds18414}
}

@book{fds287533,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to
             Reconcile Them},
   Publisher = {Basic Books},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds287533}
}

@book{fds287535,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Almas Que Suenan},
   Publisher = {Oceano},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {Fall},
   Abstract = {Spanish translation of DREAMING SOULS.},
   Key = {fds287535}
}

@book{fds287532,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Dreaming Souls},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {Fall},
   Key = {fds287532}
}

@book{fds306211,
   Title = {The Nature of Consciousness},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Editor = {Block, N and Guzeldere, G and Flanagan, O},
   Year = {1998},
   Key = {fds306211}
}

@book{fds287531,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Self Expressions: Mind, Morals and the Meaning of
             Life},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds287531}
}

@book{fds287530,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Consciousness Reconsidered},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Year = {1992},
   Key = {fds287530}
}

@book{fds287529,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological
             Realism},
   Publisher = {Harvard University Press},
   Year = {1991},
   Key = {fds287529}
}

@book{fds306212,
   Title = {Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral
             Psychology},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Editor = {Flanagan, O and Rorty, AO},
   Year = {1990},
   Key = {fds306212}
}

@book{fds287528,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Science of the Mind},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Year = {1984},
   Key = {fds287528}
}


%% Papers Published   
@article{fds287495,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J},
   Title = {Han Fei Zi’s Philosophical Psychology: Human Nature,
             Scarcity, and the Neo-Darwinian Consensus},
   Booktitle = {The State of Nature in Comparative Political Thought:
             Western and Non-Western Perspectives},
   Publisher = {Lexington Books},
   Editor = {Carlson, JD and Fox, RA},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds287495}
}

@article{fds287496,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Phenomenal Authority: The Epistemic Authority of Alcoholics
             Anonymous},
   Booktitle = {The Nature of Addiction},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Levy, N},
   Year = {2014},
   Abstract = {To understand a complicated psycho-bio-social phenomenon(a)
             such as addiction to alcohol one wants ideally a
             phenomenology, a behavioral and cognitive psychology, a
             physiology, and a neurobiology – all embedded in a
             sociology. One wants to know what it is like to be alcoholic
             – if, that is, there is any commonality to the experiences
             of alcoholics (Flanagan 2011). One wants to know about such
             things as whether and if so what kind of loss of control
             alcoholics experience in relation to alcohol (as well as,
             any and all affective and cognitive deficits). One wants to
             know what the brain is doing and how it contributes to the
             production of the characteristic phenomenology(ies) and
             control (and other cognitive and affective) problems. One
             wants to know what effect heavy drinking has on vulnerable
             organ systems, e.g., the brain, the heart, and the liver.
             And, of course, all along the way, one should want to know
             how the sociomoral-cultural-political ecology normalizes,
             romanticizes, pathologizes, etc. alcoholism and its
             relations, heavy drinking, recklessness-under-the-influence,
             etc. Some scientists and philosophers worry that the program
             of A.A. biases our understanding of the phenomenology,
             psychology, physiology, and neurobiology of addiction and
             prevents a unified, or at least a consilient, account of the
             nature, causes, and treatment of alcoholism from emerging. I
             have experience in the rooms of A.A., as well as in seminar
             and conference rooms with experts on addiction. From this
             perspective, I assess this claim that A.A. is part of the
             problem, not of the solution, and suggest some ways to
             increase mutual understanding between the various modes of
             understanding alcoholism, which if abided would yield
             sensitive and sensible interaction among the practical
             program of A.A. and the sciences of addiction. One
             consequence is that A.A. would need to acknowledge that as a
             therapeutic social institution it is a repository of some
             practical knowledge about what works to help some people
             recovery and stay abstinent, but has no expertise on
             alcoholism or even on “how it works” if, that is, it
             does work.},
   Key = {fds287496}
}

@article{fds287527,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {PERFORMING ONESELF},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy of Creativity},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Samuels, E and Kaufmann, SB},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds287527}
}

@article{fds287540,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The shame of addiction.},
   Journal = {Frontiers in Psychiatry},
   Volume = {4},
   Pages = {120},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {8 OCTOBER 2013},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24115936},
   Abstract = {Addiction is a person-level phenomenon that involves twin
             normative failures. A failure of normal rational effective
             agency or self-control with respect to the substance; and
             shame at both this failure, and the failure to live up to
             the standards for a good life that the addict himself
             acknowledges and aspires to. Feeling shame for addiction is
             not a mistake. It is part of the shape of addiction, part of
             the normal phenomenology of addiction, and often a source of
             motivation for the addict to heal. Like other recent
             attempts in the addiction literature to return normative
             concepts such as "choice" and "responsibility" to their
             rightful place in understanding and treating addiction, the
             twin normative failure model is fully compatible with
             investigation of genetic and neuroscientific causes of
             addiction. Furthermore, the model does not re-moralize
             addiction. There can be shame without blame.},
   Doi = {10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00120},
   Key = {fds287540}
}


%% Papers Accepted   
@article{fds287492,
   Author = {Crome, I and Wu, L-T and Rao, RT and Crome, P},
   Title = {Introduction},
   Pages = {xxiv-xxv},
   Booktitle = {Naturalized Virtue Epistemology},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {A. Fairweather and O. Flanagan},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds287492}
}

@article{fds287493,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {*It Takes a Metaphysics, Raising Virtuous
             Buddhists*},
   Booktitle = {*Cultivating Virtue*},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Snow, N},
   Year = {2014},
   Abstract = {Abstract: Buddhism is an extremely demanding ethic, possibly
             as demanding as act-utilitarianism. It endorses virtuous
             dispositions, compassion and loving-kindness, to alleviate
             the suffering of all sentient beings and to bring well-being
             in its stead. How does Buddhism inculcate these virtues, if
             it does? Besides the usual direct instruction, cajoling,
             carrots and sticks familiar across ethical traditions,
             Buddhists work to inculcate these virtues by teaching
             children a metaphysic that involves recognition of one’s
             ephemerality and one’s dependency on and
             interconnectedness with all other beings.},
   Key = {fds287493}
}

@article{fds287490,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Geisz, S},
   Title = {Confucian Moral Sources},
   Booktitle = {The Philosophical Challenge from China},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Editor = {Burya, B},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds287490}
}

@article{fds287491,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Ancell, A and Martin, S and Steenbergen,
             G},
   Title = {Empiricism and Normative Ethics What do the biology and the
             psychology of morality have to do with ethics?},
   Booktitle = {Evolved Morality: The Biology & Philosophy of Human
             Conscience},
   Publisher = {BRILL},
   Editor = {Waal, FD and al, PSCE},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds287491}
}

@article{fds287526,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Buddhism and The Scientific Image},
   Journal = {Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds287526}
}


%% Book Reviews   
@article{fds212062,
   Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
   Title = {Kristján Kristjánsson The Self and Its Emotions Kristján
             Kristjánsson, The Self and Its Emotions, Cambridge
             University Press, 2010, 288pp., ISBN 9780521114783.},
   Journal = {NOTRE DAME PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWS},
   Year = {2012},
   url = {http://http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35356-the-self-and-its-emotions/},
   Key = {fds212062}
}

@article{fds201209,
   Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
   Title = {SISSELA BOK Exploring Happiness: From Aristotle to Brain
             Science},
   Journal = {Notre Dame Review of Books},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {April},
   Key = {fds201209}
}

@article{fds287546,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {I, hypocrite},
   Journal = {New scientist (1971)},
   Volume = {208},
   Number = {2791},
   Pages = {44-44},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {0262-4079},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=000287908900039&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(10)63116-8},
   Key = {fds287546}
}

@article{fds167613,
   Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
   Title = {The Ego Tunnel http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20127001.600-review-the-ego-tunnel-by-thomas-metzinger.html},
   Journal = {New Scientist},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {March},
   Key = {fds167613}
}

@article{fds287523,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Your mind is more than your brain},
   Journal = {New scientist (1971)},
   Volume = {201},
   Number = {2691},
   Pages = {42-43},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20126911.800-review-where-in-the-world-is-the-mind.html},
   Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(09)60167-6},
   Key = {fds287523}
}

@article{fds167618,
   Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
   Title = {“The Literate Ape,” New Scientist November 23, 2009
             http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/culturelab/2009/11/how-our-brains-learned-to-read.php},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds167618}
}

@article{fds167617,
   Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
   Title = {“The Left Brain Conspiracy,” New Scientist, December 9,
             2009 http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20427381.600},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds167617}
}


%% Articles and Chapters   
@article{fds335564,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Zhao, W},
   Title = {The self and its good vary cross-culturally: A dozen
             self-variations and Chinese familial selves},
   Pages = {287-301},
   Booktitle = {Self, Culture and Consciousness: Interdisciplinary
             Convergences on Knowing and Being},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9789811057779},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_17},
   Doi = {10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_17},
   Key = {fds335564}
}

@article{fds335565,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Caruso, G},
   Title = {Neuroexistentialism: Third-wave existentialism},
   Pages = {1-22},
   Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age
             of Neuroscience},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190460723},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0001},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. Neuroexistentialism is a
             recent expression of existential anxiety over the nature of
             persons. Unlike previous existentialisms,
             neuroexistentialism is not caused by a problem with
             ecclesiastical authority, as was the existentialism
             represented by Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche, nor
             by the shock of coming face to face with the moral horror of
             nation state actors and their citizens, as in the
             mid-century existentialism of Sartre and Camus. Rather,
             neuroexistentialism is caused by the rise of the scientific
             authority of the human sciences and a resultant clash
             between the scientific and the humanistic image of persons.
             Flanagan and Caruso explain what neuroexistentialism is and
             how it is related to two earlier existentialisms and they
             spell out how neuroexistentialism makes particularly vivid
             the clash between the humanistic and the scientific image of
             persons. They conclude by providing a brief summary of the
             chapters to follow.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0001},
   Key = {fds335565}
}

@article{fds329381,
   Author = {Gyal, P and Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The role of pain in buddhism: The conquest of
             suffering},
   Pages = {288-296},
   Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {June},
   ISBN = {9781315742205},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315742205},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781315742205},
   Key = {fds329381}
}

@article{fds327006,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Addiction Doesn’t Exist, But it is Bad for
             You},
   Journal = {Neuroethics},
   Volume = {10},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {91-98},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9298-z},
   Doi = {10.1007/s12152-016-9298-z},
   Key = {fds327006}
}

@article{fds328339,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Negative dialectics in comparative philosophy: The case of
             Buddhist free will quietism},
   Pages = {59-71},
   Booktitle = {Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless
             Agency?},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {July},
   ISBN = {9781317362098},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315668765},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781315668765},
   Key = {fds328339}
}

@article{fds318360,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
   Title = {Naturalizing Ethics},
   Pages = {16-33},
   Booktitle = {The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9781118657775},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118657775.ch2},
   Abstract = {© 2016 John wiley & sons, inc. All rights reserved. In this
             chapter, we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be
             naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet
             naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two
             fallacies - Hume's and Moore's - that ethical naturalism
             allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics
             is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to
             pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics
             both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why
             nihilism about value is not especially worrisome for ethical
             naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes
             the essence of Duke naturalism.},
   Doi = {10.1002/9781118657775.ch2},
   Key = {fds318360}
}

@article{fds327181,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Wallace, H},
   Title = {William James and the problem of consciousness},
   Pages = {152-161},
   Booktitle = {Consciousness and the Great Philosophers: What would they
             have said about our Mind-Body Problem?},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781317389941},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315678023},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781315678023},
   Key = {fds327181}
}

@article{fds318361,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Does Yoga Induce Metaphysical Hallucinations?:
             Interdisciplinarity at the Edge: Comments on Evan
             Thompson’s Waking, Dreaming, Being},
   Journal = {Philosophy East and West},
   Volume = {66},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {952-958},
   Year = {2016},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pew.2016.0074},
   Doi = {10.1353/pew.2016.0074},
   Key = {fds318361}
}

@article{fds318362,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Foreword},
   Pages = {ix-xiv},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {May},
   ISBN = {9781317498407},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315713571},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781315713571},
   Key = {fds318362}
}

@article{fds318363,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {BUDDHISM AND THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGE: REPLY TO
             CRITICS},
   Journal = {Zygon},
   Volume = {49},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {242-258},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/zygo.12080},
   Doi = {10.1111/zygo.12080},
   Key = {fds318363}
}

@article{fds287488,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The View From the East Pole: Buddhist and Confucian
             Tolerance},
   Booktitle = {Religion and Tolerance},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Clarke, S and Powell, R},
   Year = {2013},
   Abstract = {In this chapter I ask the question: Why are Buddhists and
             Confucians more tolerant, less conflict prone, less
             war-like, etc. than Abrahamic peoples IF THEY ARE?1 A proper
             analysis that positioned us to adequately answer this
             question would require defining the different
             concepts—“tolerance,” “conflict-prone,”
             “war-like”—producing evidence that it is true that
             there exist significant differences between adherents of
             these different traditions, and then using something like
             Mill’s methods to rule out political, economic, or
             material culture explanations of the differences, thereby
             making the reli- gious differences the most plausible
             candidate for the difference-maker.2 Here I do something
             less than what is needed. I operate on the assump- tion that
             it is true that Buddhists and Confucians are more tolerant,
             less conflict-prone, etc. than Abrahamic people, all else
             equal.3 Then I formulate a hypothesis for why the
             difference-maker may have to do with God, or better, with
             beliefs about God’s nature and modus operandi. I say
             “may” because I am not convinced that my hypothesis is
             true. The hypothesis is not that Buddhism and Confucianism
             are more rational, less superstitious than the Abrahamic
             religions. It is that Buddhism and Confucianism have
             theologies that differ from the Abrahamic ones in ways that
             make a difference. The core idea is that the belief in the
             Abrahamic God (Yahweh, God, Allah) engenders or supports
             attitudes and actions that demand epistemic and normative
             conformity across peoples with different customs, habits,
             and beliefs. Buddhist and Confucian theologies differ from
             each other in important ways, but share the following two
             features (Flanagan 2008; Flanagan 2011):},
   Key = {fds287488}
}

@article{fds287489,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Social Epistemological Normalization of Contestable
             Narratives:* Stories of Just Deserts},
   Pages = {358-375},
   Booktitle = {What Happened In and To Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth
             Century},
   Publisher = {Notre Dame University Press},
   Editor = {Rourke, FO},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds287489}
}

@article{fds287520,
   Author = {Flanagan Jr and O and Lane, T},
   Title = {Neuroexistentialism, Eudaimonics, and Positive
             Illusions},
   Journal = {SYNTHESE Philosophy Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic,
             Methodology, and Philosophy of Science},
   Publisher = {SPRINGER},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds287520}
}

@article{fds287539,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Phenomenal and historical selves},
   Journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien: internationale Zeitschrift
             fuer analytische Philosophie},
   Volume = {84},
   Pages = {217-240},
   Editor = {Katja Crone and Kristina Musholt and Anna Strasser},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {0165-9227},
   Abstract = {There are two ways a person can experience or, what is dif
             erent, can think about herself: f rst, as a subject of
             experience who feels a certain characteristic way,
             the-way-it-feels-to-be-oneself; and, second, as the person
             who is the subject of a particular autobiography, as the
             actor who is the protagonist in the history of this
             organism. The f rst is the phenomenal self; the second is
             the historical self. Marking the distinction has
             implications for philosophical psychology, for views about
             what a self is, how many selves a person has, the varieties
             of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, and for normative
             views about how a self is supposed to relate to its own past
             and future.},
   Key = {fds287539}
}

@article{fds318364,
   Author = {Flanagan, B and Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Anguished Art: Coming Through the Dark to the Light the Hard
             Way},
   Pages = {75-83},
   Booktitle = {Blues-Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking Deep About Feeling
             Low},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {April},
   ISBN = {9780470656808},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118153284.ch7},
   Doi = {10.1002/9781118153284.ch7},
   Key = {fds318364}
}

@article{fds318365,
   Author = {Einstein, G and Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Sexual Identities and Narratives of Self},
   Booktitle = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the
             Brain},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {March},
   ISBN = {9780199847402},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.003.0011},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press, 2013. Certain philosophical
             ideas about identity, what makes one human, and other such
             dimensions may be associated with conceptions that concern
             how scientific knowledge about sense of self may be
             reinforced by processes that occur within the body and the
             brain. John Locke's cognitivist view asserts that among all
             other organisms, and although these organisms may possess
             organic integrity and biological continuity, only human
             beings are bestowed with a semantic and autobiographical
             memory. While Locke's view concentrates on how personal
             identity should entail cognitive memory, this chapter looks
             into alternative views wherein the self also involves
             certain conative factors. This chapter looks into the notion
             of sexual self and how the body and brain may also determine
             the self.},
   Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.003.0011},
   Key = {fds318365}
}

@article{fds318367,
   Author = {Fairweather, A},
   Title = {Introduction: Naturalized virtue epistemology},
   Pages = {1-14},
   Booktitle = {Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781139236348},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236348.001},
   Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2014. This volume aims to
             launch a powerful and largely unexplored position in
             epistemology: naturalized virtue epistemology. Most debates
             in virtue epistemology have been decidedly axiological and
             aim to clarify the goals, values, and ends constitutive of
             epistemic evaluation. Value-driven inquiry has now become
             quite complex in the large literature on the value problem
             (and the related Meno problem), which examines whether the
             value of knowledge can be reduced to the value of any proper
             subset of its parts (Zagzebski 1996; Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard
             2007). Normative epistemic inquiry has also been useful in
             meeting more traditional problems in epistemology, such as
             Gettier problems (Turri 2011) and problems of epistemic luck
             more generally, as well as the structure of knowledge (as
             etiological rather than foundational or coherentist), and
             Chisholm’s “problem of the criterion” (Riggs 2007).
             Virtue epistemology has opened many new areas of inquiry in
             contemporary epistemology including: epistemic agency (Greco
             1999; Zagzebski 2001; Sosa 2007), the role of motivations
             and emotions in epistemology (Fairweather 2001; Hookway
             2003), the nature of abilities (Millar 2008; Greco 2010;
             Pritchard 2012), skills (Greco 1993; Bloomfield 2000), and
             competences (Sosa 2007), the value of understanding (Kvanvig
             2003; Grimm 2006; Riggs 2009), wisdom (Ryan 1999; Zagzebski
             2013), curiosity (Whitcomb 2010; Inan 2012) and even
             education policy and practice (Baehr 2011). The virtue turn
             in epistemology that started with the early work of Sosa
             (1991) and Zagzebski (1996) has now produced a large and
             mature literature in normative epistemology. While the
             growth and impact of virtue epistemology has been impressive
             and important, it has come with insufficient attention to
             the empirical grounding of these normative theories, and
             thus runs the risk of endorsing free-floating epistemic
             norms cut loose from the real-world phenomenon they must
             evaluate. To this end, virtue epistemologists should heed
             the exhortation given by Anscombe in “Modern Moral
             Philosophy” (1958) to constrain normative theorizing in
             ethics with an empirically adequate moral psychology, and
             might even do so optimistically since Anscombe (and Foot,
             later Geach, and still later MacIntyre) was led to endorse
             virtue theory precisely because it appeared more
             psychologically plausible than deontology or
             consequentialism. The same cautionary (and perhaps
             optimistic) point holds for epistemic psychology and
             normative epistemology.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781139236348.001},
   Key = {fds318367}
}

@article{fds212082,
   Author = {O. Flanagan Jr. and Stephen Martin},
   Title = {Science and the Modest Image of Epistemology},
   Journal = {Human.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies
             21},
   Year = {2012},
   Abstract = {In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man (1963) Wilfrid
             Sellars raises a problem for the very possibility of
             normative epistemology. How can the scientific image, which
             celebrates the causal relation among often imperceptible
             physical states, make room for justificatory relations among
             introspectible propositional attitudes? We sketch a
             naturalistic model of reason and of epistemic decisions that
             parallels a compatibilist solution to the problem of freedom
             of action. Not only doesn’t science lead to rejection of
             our account of normative reasoning, science depends on,
             sophisticates, and explains how normative reasoning is
             possible.},
   Key = {fds212082}
}

@article{fds287519,
   Author = {Flanagan Jr and O and Ancell, A and Martin, S and Steenbergen,
             G},
   Title = {What do the Psychology and Biology of Morality have to do
             with Ethics?: Ethics as Human Ecology},
   Journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
             B},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds287519}
}

@article{fds287541,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J},
   Title = {HAN FEI ZI'S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN NATURE,
             SCARCITY, AND THE NEO-DARWINIAN CONSENSUS},
   Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
   Volume = {38},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {293-316},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {June},
   ISSN = {0301-8121},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2011.01632.x},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2011.01632.x},
   Key = {fds287541}
}

@article{fds287453,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Wittgenstein's Ethical Nonnaturalism: An Interpretation of
             Tractatus 6.41-47 and the 'Lecture on Ethics'},
   Journal = {American philosophical quarterly},
   Volume = {48},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {185-198},
   Publisher = {University of Illinois Press},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {April},
   ISSN = {0003-0481},
   Key = {fds287453}
}

@article{fds318368,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious
             Brain},
   Journal = {Nature},
   Volume = {469},
   Number = {7329},
   Pages = {160-161},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/469160a},
   Doi = {10.1038/469160a},
   Key = {fds318368}
}

@article{fds318369,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Neuroscience: Knowing and feeling},
   Journal = {Nature},
   Volume = {469},
   Number = {7329},
   Pages = {160-161},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/469160a},
   Doi = {10.1038/469160a},
   Key = {fds318369}
}

@article{fds287485,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Performing Oneself},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy and Creativity},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Paul, E and Kaufmann, SB},
   Year = {2011},
   Abstract = {Abstract: I explore the ancient idea that life is some kind
             of dramatic or artistic performance. How seriously and
             literally ought we to take this idea that life is like a
             dramatic performance, even that it is one? There are
             metaphysical and logical questions about whether and how
             self-creation and self-constitution are possible; and there
             are normative questions about which norms sensibly govern
             self-constituting performances. Here I discuss the normative
             questions associated with the ideas that life is a
             performance and that the self is something that both emerges
             in and is constituted by the performance. Three contemporary
             psychopoetic conceptions of persons – “day-by-day
             persons,” “ironic persons,” and “strong poetic
             persons” are examined in order to discuss whether there
             are legitimate normative constraints on “performing
             oneself,” and, if so, what these might
             be.},
   Key = {fds287485}
}

@article{fds287486,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {My Non-Narrative, Non-Forensic Dasein: The First and Second
             Self},
   Pages = {214-240},
   Booktitle = {Self and Consciousness},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Liu, JL and Perry, J},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds287486}
}

@article{fds318370,
   Author = {Paulson, S and Flanagan, O and Bloom, P and Baumeister,
             R},
   Title = {Quid pro quo: the ecology of the self},
   Journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
   Volume = {1234},
   Pages = {29-43},
   Year = {2011},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06182.x},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06182.x},
   Key = {fds318370}
}

@article{fds287518,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Neuroexistentialism, with David Barack},
   Journal = {EURAMERICA},
   Volume = {40},
   Number = {3},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {EURAMERICA vol. 40, no. 3},
   Key = {fds287518}
}

@article{fds167619,
   Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
   Title = {1. “What does the Modularity of Ethics have to do with
             Ethics? Four Moral Sprouts Plus or Minus a Few” with
             Robert A. Williams, TopiCS (Topics in Cognitive
             Science).},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds167619}
}

@article{fds287549,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Williams, RA},
   Title = {What does the modularity of morals have to do with ethics?
             Four moral sprouts plus or minus a few.},
   Journal = {Topics in Cognitive Science},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {430-453},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {July},
   ISSN = {1756-8757},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000283869500012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to
             suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was
             worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a
             serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence
             is best explained in terms of moral modules-evolutionarily
             ancient, fast-acting, automatic reactions to particular
             sociomoral experiences (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MMH fleshes
             out an idea nascent in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We
             discuss the evidence for MMH, specifically an ancient
             version, "Mencian Moral Modularity," which claims four
             innate modules, and "Social Intuitionist Modularity," which
             claims five innate modules. We compare these two moral
             modularity models, discuss whether the postulated modules
             are best conceived as perceptual/Fodorian or
             emotional/Darwinian, and consider whether assuming MMH true
             has any normative ethical consequences whatsoever. The
             discussion of MMH reconnects cognitive science with
             normative ethics in a way that involves the reassertion of
             the "is-ought" problem. We explain in a new way what this
             problem is and why it would not yield. The reason does not
             involve the logic of "ought," but rather the plasticity of
             human nature and the realistic options to "grow" and "do"
             human nature in multifarious legitimate ways.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01076.x},
   Key = {fds287549}
}

@article{fds287484,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {What is it Like to be an Addict?},
   Booktitle = {Addiction and Responsibility},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Editor = {Graham, G and Poland, G},
   Year = {2010},
   Key = {fds287484}
}

@article{fds287544,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {“Can do” attitudes: Some positive illusions are not
             misbeliefs},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {32},
   Number = {06},
   Pages = {519-519},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {0140-525X},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000274676100012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {Comment on McKay & Dennett},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X09991439},
   Key = {fds287544}
}

@article{fds287522,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Literate Ape},
   Journal = {New Scientist},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/culturelab/2009/11/how-our-brains-learned-to-read.php},
   Key = {fds287522}
}

@article{fds287524,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Ego Tunnel},
   Journal = {New Scientist},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20127001.600-review-the-ego-tunnel-by-thomas-metzinger.html},
   Key = {fds287524}
}

@article{fds287542,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {One Enchanted Being: Neuroexistentialism &
             Meaning},
   Journal = {Zygon},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {41-49},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {March},
   ISSN = {1467-9744},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2009.00984.x},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9744.2009.00984.x},
   Key = {fds287542}
}

@article{fds318371,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Ethical expressions: Why moralists scowl, frown and
             smile},
   Pages = {413-434},
   Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781139002370},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521884754.018},
   Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2009. A major task for
             philosophy is to adjudicate conflicts between our ordinary
             way of understanding persons and the world - what Wilfrid
             Sellars called the 'manifest image' - and scientific
             accounts of persons and the world - the 'scientific image'.
             Sometimes, of course, it is possible to blend the two images
             so as to produce a genuinely stereoscopic or synthetic
             picture. But this is not always possible. In the case of
             Darwin's theory of natural selection, we seem to have a
             scientific theory that cannot be comfortably assimilated
             into the extant manifest image by adding, in Sellars'
             phrase, a 'needle point of detail' to that image. As
             traditionally understood, we humans are made in God's image
             and sit beneath God and the angels and above the animals on
             the 'Great Chain of Being'. There is a tripartite ontology
             of Pure Spirit(s) (God and angels), pure matter (rocks,
             plants and animals), and dualistic beings who, while on
             earth, partake of both the immaterial realm and the material
             realm (us). We humans know the material realm through our
             senses and reason, and the immaterial realm - theological
             and moral truths in particular - through illumination, grace
             or other non-empirical and nonrational or arational means.
             God sets out the moral law, and if we obey it, thereby using
             our free will properly, we will gain eternal
             salvation.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CCOL9780521884754.018},
   Key = {fds318371}
}

@article{fds287479,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Moral Science? Still Metaphysical After All These
             Years},
   Pages = {52-78},
   Booktitle = {Moral Personality, Identity and Character: Explorations in
             Moral Psychology},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Narvaez, D and Lapsley, DK},
   Year = {2009},
   url = {http://www.duke.edu/},
   Key = {fds287479}
}

@article{fds287480,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {“Buddhist Persons & Eudaimonia Buddha”},
   Booktitle = {Routledge Companion to Philosophical Psychology},
   Editor = {Symons, J},
   Year = {2009},
   url = {http://www.duke.edu/},
   Key = {fds287480}
}

@article{fds287481,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Five Questions},
   Booktitle = {Mind & Consciousness},
   Publisher = {VIP Press},
   Editor = {Grim, P},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds287481}
}

@article{fds287483,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Neuro-Eudaimonics, or Buddhists Lead Neuroscientists to the
             Seat of Happiness},
   Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook on Philosophy and Neuroscience},
   Editor = {Bickle, J},
   Year = {2009},
   url = {http://www.duke.edu/},
   Key = {fds287483}
}

@article{fds287517,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Structures of Meaningful Life Stories},
   Journal = {Argentinian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds287517}
}

@article{fds318372,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Moral contagion and logical persuasion in the 'Mozi'
             (sic)},
   Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
   Volume = {35},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {473-491},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2008.00492.x},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2008.00492.x},
   Key = {fds318372}
}

@article{fds287516,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Neural Pathway to the White House},
   Journal = {The New Scientist},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19826586.300-review-ithe-political-mindi-by-george-lakoff.html?full=true},
   Key = {fds287516}
}

@article{fds322469,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Review: The Political Mind by George Lakoff},
   Journal = {New scientist (1971)},
   Volume = {198},
   Number = {2658},
   Pages = {48-49},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(08)61371-8},
   Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(08)61371-8},
   Key = {fds322469}
}

@article{fds287452,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Where is the Happiness},
   Booktitle = {Oxford Companion to Philosophy and Neuroscience},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2008},
   Key = {fds287452}
}

@article{fds287515,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Moral Contagion and Logical Persuasion in the
             Mozi},
   Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
   Pages = {473-491},
   Year = {2008},
   Key = {fds287515}
}

@article{fds287477,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
   Title = {"What is the Nature of Morality? A Response to Casebeer,
             Railton, and Ruse"},
   Volume = {1},
   Pages = {45-52},
   Booktitle = {*Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality*},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Year = {2007},
   Key = {fds287477}
}

@article{fds287478,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
   Title = {Naturalizing Ethics},
   Volume = {1},
   Pages = {1-26},
   Booktitle = {*Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality*},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Year = {2007},
   Key = {fds287478}
}

@article{fds45628,
   Author = {O. Flanagan},
   Title = {“The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Neuroscience and Happiness”
             in},
   Booktitle = {The Buddha’s Way: The Confluence of Buddhist Thought and
             Applied Psychological Research in the Post-Modern Age:
             Routledge: Cruzon, London, In Press: Editors, D. K.
             Nauriyal, Michael Drummond, Y. B. Lal: Forward: His
             Holiness, XIV Dalai Lama},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {Winter},
   Key = {fds45628}
}

@article{fds287475,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Varieties of Naturalism},
   Booktitle = {Oxford Companion to Religion and Science},
   Publisher = {OUP},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {Winter},
   Key = {fds287475}
}

@article{fds287476,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Neuroscience and
             Happiness},
   Booktitle = {The Buddha’s Way: The Confluence of Buddhist Thought and
             Applied Psychological Research in the Post-Modern
             Age},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Editor = {Nauriyal, DK and Drummond, YB},
   Year = {2006},
   Key = {fds287476}
}

@article{fds287514,
   Author = {Greene, M and Schill, K and Takahashi, S and Bateman-House, A and Beauchamp, T and Bok, H and Cheney, D and Coyle, J and Deacon, T and Dennett, D and Donovan, P and Flanagan, O and Goldman, S and Greely, H and Martin, L and Miller, E and Mueller, D and Siegel, A and Solter, D and Gearhart, J and McKhann, G and Faden, R},
   Title = {Ethics: Moral issues of human-non-human primate neural
             grafting.},
   Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
   Volume = {309},
   Number = {5733},
   Pages = {385-386},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1112207},
   Doi = {10.1126/science.1112207},
   Key = {fds287514}
}

@article{fds318373,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The colour of happiness},
   Journal = {New scientist (1971)},
   Volume = {178},
   Number = {2396},
   Pages = {44},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds318373}
}

@article{fds318374,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Ethical expressions: Why moralists scowl, frown and
             smile},
   Pages = {377-398},
   Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780511998690},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521771978.017},
   Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2003. Darwinism And The
             Manifest Image Of Humankind: A major task for philosophy is
             to adjudicate conflicts between our ordinary way of
             understanding persons and the world - what Wilfrid Sellars
             called the 'manifest image' - and scientific accounts of
             persons and the world - the 'scientific image'. Sometimes,
             of course, it is possible to blend the two images so as to
             produce a genuinely stereoscopic or synthetic picture. But
             this is not always possible. In the case of Darwin's theory
             of natural selection, we seem to have a scientific theory
             that cannot be comfortably assimilated into the extant
             manifest image by adding, in Sellars' phrase, a 'needle
             point of detail' to that image. As traditionally understood,
             we humans are made in God’s image and sit beneath God and
             the angels and above the animals on the ‘Great Chain of
             Being’. There is a tripartite ontology of Pure Spirit(s)
             (God and angels), pure matter (rocks, plants and animals),
             and dualistic beings who, while on earth, partake of both
             the immaterial realm and the material realm (us). We humans
             know the material realm through our senses and reason, and
             the immaterial realm – theological and moral truths in
             particular – through illumination, grace or other
             non-empirical and nonrational or arational means. God sets
             out the moral law, and if we obey it, thereby using our free
             will properly, we will gain eternal salvation. Nothing in
             this metaphysics, epistemology and ethics seems to square
             with the theory of natural selection. On this theory, no
             divine, intelligent designer is needed to explain the
             existence of humans or any other type of organic life.
             Moreover, as animals, descended from other animals, we
             humans possess no mysterious epistemic powers to detect what
             is true or what is good. The idea that morality has a divine
             origin and justification loses its force. The prospects for
             personal immortality seem nil. The manifest image of
             humankind thus takes a major hit at the hands of Darwin2019s
             theory, and it is not clear how to maintain sensibly the
             central components of that image.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CCOL0521771978.017},
   Key = {fds318374}
}

@article{fds287473,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Emotional Expressions: Why Moralists Scowl, Frown, and
             Smile},
   Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Radick, G and Hodges, J},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds287473}
}

@article{fds287474,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Neurobiology of Sexual Self-Consciousness: Mind and the
             Interplay of Brain and Body},
   Booktitle = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the
             Brain.},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Fireman, G and McVay, T and Flanagan, O},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {Spring},
   Abstract = {Chapter on Narrative Self-Construction by individuals
             w/non-standard sexual identities.},
   Key = {fds287474}
}

@article{fds287513,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Emotional Expressions},
   Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Radick, and Hodge},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds287513}
}

@article{fds318375,
   Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O},
   Title = {A decade of teleofunctionalism: Lycan's consciousness and
             consciousness and experience},
   Journal = {Minds and Machines},
   Volume = {11},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {113-126},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1011276727406},
   Abstract = {The books 'consciouness' and 'consciouness and experience,'
             written by Lycan, were reviewed. According to the reviwers,
             the author has given some powerful ideas about how
             functionalism would work, and a whole armory of useful
             tools. These two books are an indispensable part of any
             study of consciousness. They are ideal for graduate
             seminars, and accessible to interested readers who may
             already have waded through any of various recent
             philosophical works about consciousness.},
   Doi = {10.1023/A:1011276727406},
   Key = {fds318375}
}

@article{fds287472,
   Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Natural Questions to Natural Answers},
   Volume = {5},
   Booktitle = {Biology Meets Psychology: Constraints, Connections,
             Conjectures},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Year = {2001},
   Key = {fds287472}
}

@article{fds303570,
   Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Is Consciousness an Adaptation?},
   Booktitle = {Evolving Consciousness},
   Publisher = {Johns Benjamin, Amsterdam},
   Editor = {Mulhauser, G},
   Year = {2001},
   Key = {fds303570}
}

@article{fds318376,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Dreaming is not an adaptation},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {23},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {936-+},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00404024},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00404024},
   Key = {fds318376}
}

@article{fds287547,
   Author = {Hardcastle, VG and Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Multiplex vs. multiples selves: Distinguishing dissociative
             disorders},
   Journal = {The Monist},
   Volume = {82},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {645-657},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0026-9662},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000084733100006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.5840/monist199982431},
   Key = {fds287547}
}

@article{fds287467,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Moral Confidence: Three Cheers for Naturalistic
             Ethics},
   Booktitle = {In The Face of Facts: Moral Inquiry in American
             Scholarship},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Westbrook, and Bethe-Elstain, and Fox},
   Year = {1997},
   Key = {fds287467}
}

@article{fds287468,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Guzeldere, G},
   Title = {Consciousness: A Philosophical Tour},
   Booktitle = {Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Rolls, E},
   Year = {1997},
   Key = {fds287468}
}

@article{fds287469,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {How to Study Consciousness Empirically: The Case of
             Dreams},
   Booktitle = {Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Rolls, E},
   Year = {1997},
   Key = {fds287469}
}

@article{fds287470,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Consciousness as a Pragmatist Views It},
   Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to William James},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Putnam, RA},
   Year = {1997},
   Key = {fds287470}
}

@article{fds287471,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Dryden, D},
   Title = {Consciousness and the Mind},
   Booktitle = {Invitation to Cognitive Science},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Editor = {Sternberg, S},
   Year = {1997},
   Key = {fds287471}
}

@article{fds287464,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Ethics Naturalized: Ethics and Human Ecology},
   Booktitle = {Mind and Morals},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Editor = {May, and Clark, and Friedman},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds287464}
}

@article{fds287465,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Moral Network},
   Booktitle = {The Churchlands and Their Critics},
   Publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
   Editor = {McCauley, R},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds287465}
}

@article{fds287509,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Polger, T},
   Title = {Zombies and the Function of Consciousness},
   Journal = {The Journal of Consciousness Studies},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {4},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds287509}
}

@article{fds303569,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Prospects For A Unified Theory of Consciousness or, What
             Dreams are Made Of},
   Booktitle = {Scientific Approaches to the Question of Consciousness: 25th
             Carnegie Symposium on Cognition},
   Publisher = {Erlbaum},
   Editor = {Cohen, J and Schooler, J},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds303569}
}

@article{fds287552,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Consciousness and the natural method.},
   Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {9},
   Pages = {1103-1115},
   Year = {1995},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {0028-3932},
   url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7501132},
   Abstract = {'Consciousness' is a superordinate term for a heterogeneous
             array of mental state types. The types share the property of
             'being experienced' or 'being experiences'--'of there being
             something that it is like for the subject to be in one of
             these states.' I propose that we can only build a theory of
             consciousness by deploying 'the natural method' of
             coordinating all relevant informational resources at once,
             especially phenomenology, cognitive science, neuroscience
             and evolutionary biology. I'll provide two examples of the
             natural method in action in mental domains where an
             adaptationist evolutionary account seems plausible: (i)
             visual awareness and (ii) conscious event memory. Then I
             will discuss a case, (iii), dreaming, where I think no
             adaptationist evolutionary account exists. Beyond whatever
             interest the particular cases have, the examination will
             show why I think that a theory of mind, and the role
             conscious mentation plays in it, will need to be built
             domain-by-domain with no a priori expectation that there
             will be a unified account of the causal role or evolutionary
             history of different domains and competences.},
   Key = {fds287552}
}

@article{fds287543,
   Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
   Title = {DECONSTRUCTING DREAMS - THE SPANDRELS OF
             SLEEP},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {92},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {5-27},
   Year = {1995},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {0-262-08249-7},
   ISSN = {0022-362X},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1995PY90800001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.2307/2940806},
   Key = {fds287543}
}

@article{fds156818,
   Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
   Title = {"Consciousness"},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Ted Honderich},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds156818}
}

@article{fds287458,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Multiple Identity, Character Transformation, and
             Self-Reclamation},
   Pages = {135-162},
   Booktitle = {Philosophical Psychopathology},
   Publisher = {MIT},
   Editor = {Graham, G and Stephens, L},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds287458}
}

@article{fds287459,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Behaviorism},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Honderich, T},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds287459}
}

@article{fds287460,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {D. C. Dennett},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Honderich, T},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds287460}
}

@article{fds287461,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Stream of Consciousness},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Honderich, T},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds287461}
}

@article{fds287462,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {History of the Philosophy of Mind},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Honderich, T},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds287462}
}

@article{fds287463,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Consciousness},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Honderich, T},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds287463}
}

@article{fds287508,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The Moment of Truth on the Dublin Bridge},
   Journal = {South Atlantic Quarterly},
   Volume = {94},
   Number = {2},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds287508}
}

@article{fds318377,
   Author = {Jr, OF},
   Title = {"Consciousness"},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Honderich, T},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds318377}
}

@article{fds318379,
   Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
   Title = {THE MOMENT OF TRUTH ON DUBLIN BRIDGE, A RESPONSE TO
             PICKERING,ANDREW},
   Journal = {South Atlantic Quarterly},
   Volume = {94},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {467-474},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds318379}
}

@article{fds318378,
   Author = {Jr, OF},
   Title = {"Stream of Consciousness"},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Honderich, T},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds318378}
}

@article{fds318380,
   Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
   Title = {VALIDATION IN THE CLINICAL THEORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS - A
             STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS -
             GRUNBAUM,A},
   Journal = {Tls the Times Literary Supplement},
   Number = {4726},
   Pages = {3-4},
   Year = {1993},
   Month = {October},
   Key = {fds318380}
}

@article{fds318381,
   Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
   Title = {THE MALAISE OF MODERNITY - TAYLOR,C},
   Journal = {Ethics},
   Volume = {104},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {192-194},
   Year = {1993},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/293596},
   Doi = {10.1086/293596},
   Key = {fds318381}
}

@article{fds287457,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Situations and Dispositions},
   Pages = {681-695},
   Booktitle = {Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science},
   Publisher = {Cambridge: MIT Press},
   Editor = {Goldman, AI},
   Year = {1993},
   Key = {fds287457}
}

@article{fds287456,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Other Minds, Obligation, and Honesty},
   Booktitle = {Social and Cognitive Factors in Preschoolers’
             Deception},
   Publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum},
   Editor = {Ceci, S and DeSimone, M and Putnick, ME},
   Year = {1992},
   Key = {fds287456}
}

@article{fds318382,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {The modularity of consciousness},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {14},
   Number = {03},
   Pages = {446-447},
   Year = {1991},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00070692},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00070692},
   Key = {fds318382}
}

@article{fds287507,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Identity, Gender, and Strong Evaluation},
   Journal = {Nous},
   Volume = {25},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {198-198},
   Year = {1991},
   Month = {April},
   ISSN = {0029-4624},
   url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215579},
   Doi = {10.2307/2215579},
   Key = {fds287507}
}

@article{fds287506,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Virtue and Ignorance},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {87},
   Number = {8},
   Pages = {420-420},
   Year = {1990},
   Month = {August},
   ISSN = {0022-362X},
   url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026736},
   Doi = {10.2307/2026736},
   Key = {fds287506}
}

@article{fds303568,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation},
   Pages = {37-65},
   Booktitle = {Identity, Character, and Morality},
   Editor = {Flanagan, O and Rorty, AO},
   Year = {1990},
   Key = {fds303568}
}

@article{fds287504,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Pragmatism, Ethics, and Correspondence Truth: Response to
             Gibson and Quine},
   Journal = {Ethics},
   Volume = {98},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {541-549},
   Year = {1988},
   Month = {April},
   ISSN = {0014-1704},
   url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380967},
   Doi = {10.1086/292971},
   Key = {fds287504}
}

@article{fds287548,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Jackson, K},
   Title = {Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate
             Revisited},
   Journal = {Ethics},
   Volume = {97},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {622-637},
   Year = {1987},
   Month = {April},
   ISSN = {0014-1704},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292870},
   Doi = {10.1086/292870},
   Key = {fds287548}
}

@article{fds318383,
   Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
   Title = {MATERIALISM AND IMMATERIALISM - A REPLY TO
             ROBINSON},
   Journal = {Contemporary Psychology: a Journal of Reviews},
   Volume = {31},
   Number = {9},
   Pages = {722-722},
   Year = {1986},
   Month = {September},
   Key = {fds318383}
}

@article{fds318384,
   Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
   Title = {Psychoanalysis as a social activity},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {02},
   Pages = {238-238},
   Year = {1986},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00022391},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00022391},
   Key = {fds318384}
}

@article{fds287503,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Psychoanalysis and Social Practice: A Comment on
             Grünbaum},
   Journal = {The Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Number = {Fall},
   Year = {1986},
   Month = {Fall},
   Key = {fds287503}
}

@article{fds287550,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {83},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {41-60},
   Year = {1986},
   ISSN = {0022-362X},
   url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026466},
   Doi = {10.2307/2026466},
   Key = {fds287550}
}

@article{fds318385,
   Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
   Title = {CONSCIOUSNESS, NATURALISM, AND NAGEL},
   Journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {373-390},
   Year = {1985},
   Key = {fds318385}
}

@article{fds287502,
   Author = {Flanagan, O and Adler, J},
   Title = {Impartiality and Particularity},
   Journal = {Social Research},
   Volume = {50},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {576-596},
   Year = {1983},
   ISSN = {0037-783X},
   url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970910},
   Doi = {10.2307/40970910},
   Key = {fds287502}
}

@article{fds287501,
   Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
   Title = {Quinean Ethics},
   Journal = {Ethics},
   Volume = {93},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {56-74},
   Year = {1982},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0014-1704},
   url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380762},
   Doi = {10.1086/292405},
   Key = {fds287501}
}

@article{fds287500,
   Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
   Title = {Moral Structures?},
   Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {255-270},
   Year = {1982},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318201200302},
   Doi = {10.1177/004839318201200302},
   Key = {fds287500}
}

@article{fds287498,
   Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
   Title = {Virtue, Sex, and Gender: Some Philosophical Reflections on
             the Moral Psychology Debate},
   Journal = {Ethics},
   Volume = {92},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {499-512},
   Year = {1982},
   Month = {April},
   ISSN = {0014-1704},
   url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380735},
   Doi = {10.1086/292358},
   Key = {fds287498}
}

@article{fds287499,
   Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
   Title = {A Reply to Lawrence Kohlberg},
   Journal = {Ethics},
   Volume = {92},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {529-532},
   Year = {1982},
   Month = {April},
   ISSN = {0014-1704},
   url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380737},
   Doi = {10.1086/292360},
   Key = {fds287499}
}

@article{fds318386,
   Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
   Title = {Psychology, progress and the problem of reflexivity: a study
             in the epistemological foundations of psychology.},
   Journal = {Journal of the History of the Behavioral
             Sciences},
   Volume = {17},
   Pages = {375-386},
   Year = {1981},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/1520-6696(198107)17:3<375::aid-jhbs2300170308>3.0.co},
   Doi = {10.1002/1520-6696(198107)17:3<375::aid-jhbs2300170308>3.0.co},
   Key = {fds318386}
}

@article{fds287454,
   Author = {Flanagan, O},
   Title = {Skinnerian Metaphysics and the Problem of
             Operationism},
   Journal = {Behaviorism},
   Volume = {8},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-13},
   Year = {1980},
   ISSN = {0090-4155},
   url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27758948},
   Doi = {10.2307/27758948},
   Key = {fds287454}
}

@article{fds318387,
   Author = {Flanagan, OJ and McCreadie-Albright, T},
   Title = {Malcolm and the fallacy of behaviorism},
   Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
   Volume = {26},
   Number = {5-6},
   Pages = {425-430},
   Year = {1974},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00368508},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00368508},
   Key = {fds318387}
}


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