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| Publications of Owen Flanagan :chronological combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds287535,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Almas Que Suenan},
Publisher = {Oceano},
Year = {2003},
Month = {Fall},
Abstract = {Spanish translation of DREAMING SOULS.},
Key = {fds287535}
}
@book{fds287530,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Consciousness Reconsidered},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds287530}
}
@book{fds287532,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Dreaming Souls},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {1999},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds287532}
}
@book{fds341012,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Foreword: Cross-cultural philosophy and the moral
project},
Pages = {xi-xvii},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190499778},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190499778.001.0001},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190499778.001.0001},
Key = {fds341012}
}
@book{fds306212,
Title = {Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral
Psychology},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Flanagan, O and Rorty, AO},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds306212}
}
@book{fds222040,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {MORAL SPROUTS AND NATURAL TELEOLOGIES 21st CENTURY MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY MEETS CLASSICAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY},
Publisher = {Marquette University Press},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds222040}
}
@book{fds287538,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral Sprouts and Natural Teleology: 21st century Moral
Psychology Meets Classical Chinese Philosophy},
Publisher = {Marquette University Press},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {The 78th Aquinas Lecture},
Key = {fds287538}
}
@book{fds306210,
Author = {Fireman, GD and McVay, TE and Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the
Brain},
Pages = {1-264},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9780195140057},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.001.0001},
Abstract = {The evocation of narrative as a way to understand the
content of consciousness, including memory, autobiography,
self, and imagination, has sparked truly interdisciplinary
work among psychologists, philosophers, and literary
critics. Even neuroscientists have taken an interest in the
stories people create to understand themselves, their past,
and the world around them. The research presented in this
volume should appeal to researchers enmeshed in these
problems, as well as the general reader with an interest in
the philosophical problem of what consciousness is and how
it functions in the everyday world.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.001.0001},
Key = {fds306210}
}
@book{fds18414,
Title = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the
Brain. Eds. Gary Fireman, Ted McVay, and Owen
Flanagan},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Gary Fireman and Ted McVay and Owen Flanagan},
Year = {2003},
Abstract = {Interdisciplinary book (edited collection) on
role/construction of self-narratives in cog. sci,
neuroscience, psychology and literature. A contribution to
topic of personal identity and role of narrative in
self-construction.},
Key = {fds18414}
}
@book{fds222041,
Author = {Abrol Fairweather and O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {Naturalized Virtue Epistemology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Fairweather and Flanagan},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds222041}
}
@book{fds318366,
Author = {Fairweather, A},
Title = {Naturalizing epistemic virtue},
Pages = {1-272},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107028579},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236348},
Abstract = {An epistemic virtue is a personal quality conducive to the
discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other
intellectually valuable goal. Current work in epistemology
is increasingly value-driven, but this volume presents the
first collection of essays to explore whether virtue
epistemology can also be naturalistic, in the philosophical
definition meaning 'methodologically continuous with
science'. The essays examine the empirical research in
psychology on cognitive abilities and personal dispositions,
meta-epistemic semantic accounts of virtue theoretic norms,
the role of emotion in knowledge, 'ought-implies can'
constraints, empirically and metaphysically grounded
accounts of 'proper functioning', and even applied virtue
epistemology in relation to education. Naturalizing
Epistemic Virtue addresses many core issues in contemporary
epistemology, presents new opportunities for work on
epistemic abilities, epistemic virtues and cognitive
character, and will be of great interest to those studying
virtue ethics and epistemology.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781139236348},
Key = {fds318366}
}
@book{fds335566,
Author = {Caruso, G and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, morals, and purpose in the age
of neuroscience},
Pages = {1-374},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190460723},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.001.0001},
Abstract = {Existentialism is a concern about the foundation of meaning,
morals, and purpose. Existentialisms arise when some
foundation for these elements of being is under assault. In
the past, first-wave existentialism concerned the
increasingly apparent inability of religion and religious
tradition to provide such a foundation, as typified in the
writings of Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche.
Second-wave existentialism, personified philosophically by
Sartre, Camus, and de Beauvoir, developed in response to the
inability of an overly optimistic Enlightenment vision of
reason and the common good to provide such a foundation.
There is a third-wave existentialism, a new existentialism,
developing in response to advances in the neurosciences that
threaten the last vestiges of an immaterial soul or self.
With the increasing explanatory and therapeutic power of
neuroscience, the mind no longer stands apart from the world
to serve as a foundation of meaning. This produces
foundational anxiety. This collection of new essays explores
the anxiety caused by this third-wave existentialism and
some responses to it. It brings together some of the
world℉s leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive
scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our
neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind
sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion,
autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral
responsibility, law, the nature of criminal punishment,
meaning in life, and purpose.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.001.0001},
Key = {fds335566}
}
@book{fds287531,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Self Expressions: Mind, Morals and the Meaning of
Life},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds287531}
}
@book{fds183894,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (paper
2013)},
Publisher = {MIT PRESS},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds183894}
}
@book{fds287537,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {2011},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds287537}
}
@book{fds306211,
Title = {The Nature of Consciousness},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Block, N and Guzeldere, G and Flanagan, O},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds306211}
}
@book{fds287533,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to
Reconcile Them},
Publisher = {Basic Books},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds287533}
}
@book{fds141485,
Author = {O. Flanagan},
Title = {The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material
World},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Year = {2007},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds141485}
}
@book{fds287536,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material
World},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {2007},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds287536}
}
@book{fds287528,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Science of the Mind},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds287528}
}
@book{fds287529,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological
Realism},
Publisher = {Harvard University Press},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds287529}
}
@book{fds306209,
Title = {Virtue Epistemology Naturalized},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Fairweather, A and Flanagan, O},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds306209}
}
%% Book Reviews
@article{fds212062,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {Kristján Kristjánsson The Self and Its Emotions Kristján
Kristjánsson, The Self and Its Emotions, Cambridge
University Press, 2010, 288pp., ISBN 9780521114783.},
Journal = {NOTRE DAME PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWS},
Year = {2012},
url = {http://http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35356-the-self-and-its-emotions/},
Key = {fds212062}
}
@article{fds201209,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {SISSELA BOK Exploring Happiness: From Aristotle to Brain
Science},
Journal = {Notre Dame Review of Books},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds201209}
}
@article{fds167613,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {The Ego Tunnel http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20127001.600-review-the-ego-tunnel-by-thomas-metzinger.html},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds167613}
}
@article{fds167617,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {“The Left Brain Conspiracy,” New Scientist, December 9,
2009 http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20427381.600},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds167617}
}
@article{fds167618,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {“The Literate Ape,” New Scientist November 23, 2009
http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/culturelab/2009/11/how-our-brains-learned-to-read.php},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds167618}
}
%% Articles and Chapters
@article{fds156818,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {"Consciousness"},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Ted Honderich},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds156818}
}
@article{fds318378,
Author = {Jr, OF},
Title = {"Stream of Consciousness"},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds318378}
}
@article{fds287477,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
Title = {"What is the Nature of Morality? A Response to Casebeer,
Railton, and Ruse"},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {45-52},
Booktitle = {*Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality*},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds287477}
}
@article{fds287493,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {*It Takes a Metaphysics, Raising Virtuous
Buddhists*},
Booktitle = {*Cultivating Virtue*},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Snow, N},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {Abstract: Buddhism is an extremely demanding ethic, possibly
as demanding as act-utilitarianism. It endorses virtuous
dispositions, compassion and loving-kindness, to alleviate
the suffering of all sentient beings and to bring well-being
in its stead. How does Buddhism inculcate these virtues, if
it does? Besides the usual direct instruction, cajoling,
carrots and sticks familiar across ethical traditions,
Buddhists work to inculcate these virtues by teaching
children a metaphysic that involves recognition of one’s
ephemerality and one’s dependency on and
interconnectedness with all other beings.},
Key = {fds287493}
}
@article{fds167619,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr.},
Title = {1. “What does the Modularity of Ethics have to do with
Ethics? Four Moral Sprouts Plus or Minus a Few” with
Robert A. Williams, TopiCS (Topics in Cognitive
Science).},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds167619}
}
@article{fds318381,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Malaise of Modernity.Charles Taylor},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {104},
Number = {1},
Pages = {192-194},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1993},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/293596},
Doi = {10.1086/293596},
Key = {fds318381}
}
@article{fds318375,
Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O},
Title = {A decade of teleofunctionalism: Lycan's consciousness and
consciousness and experience},
Journal = {Minds and Machines},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {113-126},
Year = {2001},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1011276727406},
Abstract = {The books 'consciouness' and 'consciouness and experience,'
written by Lycan, were reviewed. According to the reviwers,
the author has given some powerful ideas about how
functionalism would work, and a whole armory of useful
tools. These two books are an indispensable part of any
study of consciousness. They are ideal for graduate
seminars, and accessible to interested readers who may
already have waded through any of various recent
philosophical works about consciousness.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1011276727406},
Key = {fds318375}
}
@article{fds287499,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {A Reply to Lawrence Kohlberg},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {92},
Number = {3},
Pages = {529-532},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1982},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380737},
Doi = {10.1086/292360},
Key = {fds287499}
}
@article{fds327006,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Addiction Doesn’t Exist, But it is Bad for
You},
Journal = {Neuroethics},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {91-98},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2017},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9298-z},
Abstract = {There is a debate about the nature of addiction, whether it
is a result of brain damage, brain dysfunction, or normal
brain changes that result from habit acquisition, and about
whether it is a disease. I argue that the debate about
whether addiction is a disease is much ado about nothing,
since all parties agree it is “unquestionably
destructive.” Furthermore, the term ‘addiction’ has
disappeared from recent DSM’s in favor of a spectrum of
‘abuse’ disorders. This may be a good thing indicating
more nuance in typing the heterogeneous phenomena we used to
call ‘addiction’.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12152-016-9298-z},
Key = {fds327006}
}
@article{fds287550,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {83},
Number = {1},
Pages = {41-60},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {1986},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026466},
Doi = {10.2307/2026466},
Key = {fds287550}
}
@article{fds352990,
Author = {Tekin, Ş and Flanagan, O and Graham, G},
Title = {Against the Drug Cure Model: Addiction, Identity, and
Pharmaceuticals},
Volume = {122},
Pages = {221-236},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Medicine},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-0979-6_13},
Abstract = {Recent advances in brain imaging methods as well as
increased sophistication in neuroscientific modeling of the
brain’s reward systems have facilitated the study of
neural mechanisms associated with addiction such as
processes associated with motivation, decision-making,
pleasure seeking, and inhibitory control. These scientific
activities have increased optimism that the neurological
underpinnings of addiction will be delineated, and that
pharmaceuticals that target and change these mechanisms will
by themselves facilitate early intervention and even full
recovery. In this paper, we argue that it is misguided to
construe addiction as just or primarily a brain chemistry
problem, which can be adequately treated by pharmaceutical
interventions alone.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-94-024-0979-6_13},
Key = {fds352990}
}
@article{fds318364,
Author = {Flanagan, B and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Anguished Art: Coming Through the Dark to the Light the Hard
Way},
Pages = {75-83},
Booktitle = {Blues-Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking Deep About Feeling
Low},
Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL},
Year = {2012},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9780470656808},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118153284.ch7},
Doi = {10.1002/9781118153284.ch7},
Key = {fds318364}
}
@article{fds287459,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Behaviorism},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287459}
}
@article{fds287526,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Buddhism and The Scientific Image},
Journal = {Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287526}
}
@article{fds318363,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Buddhism and the scientific image: Reply to
critics},
Journal = {Zygon(R)},
Volume = {49},
Number = {1},
Pages = {242-258},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/zygo.12080},
Abstract = {I provide a précis of The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism
Naturalized, and then respond to three critics, Christian
Coseru, Charles Goodman, and Bronwyn Finnigan. © 2014 by
the Joint Publication Board of Zygon.},
Doi = {10.1111/zygo.12080},
Key = {fds318363}
}
@article{fds287544,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Can do attitudes: Some positive illusions are not
misbeliefs},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {32},
Number = {6},
Pages = {519-520},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0140-525X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000274676100012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {McKay & Dennett (M&D) argue that positive illusions are a
plausible candidate for a class of evolutionarily selected
for misbeliefs. I argue (Flanagan 1991; 2007) that the class
of alleged positive illusions is a hodge-podge, and that
some of its members are best understood as positive
attitudes, hopes, and the like, not as beliefs at all. ©
2010 Cambridge University Press.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X09991439},
Key = {fds287544}
}
@article{fds366137,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Geisz, S},
Title = {Confucian Moral Sources},
Journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGE FROM CHINA},
Pages = {205-227},
Year = {2015},
Key = {fds366137}
}
@article{fds287490,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Geisz, S},
Title = {Confucian Moral Sources},
Booktitle = {The Philosophical Challenge from China},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Burya, B},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287490}
}
@article{fds318377,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Consciousness},
Pages = {176-185},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {2008},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781405164535.ch9},
Abstract = {What is consciousness? What role, if any, does consciousness
play in the explanation of cognition? Can consciousness be
studied empirically? These are the questions. Here are the
answers},
Doi = {10.1002/9781405164535.ch9},
Key = {fds318377}
}
@article{fds287463,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Consciousness},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287463}
}
@article{fds287471,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Dryden, D},
Title = {Consciousness and the Mind},
Booktitle = {Invitation to Cognitive Science},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Sternberg, S},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds287471}
}
@article{fds287552,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Consciousness and the natural method.},
Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
Volume = {33},
Number = {9},
Pages = {1103-1115},
Year = {1995},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0028-3932},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7501132},
Abstract = {'Consciousness' is a superordinate term for a heterogeneous
array of mental state types. The types share the property of
'being experienced' or 'being experiences'--'of there being
something that it is like for the subject to be in one of
these states.' I propose that we can only build a theory of
consciousness by deploying 'the natural method' of
coordinating all relevant informational resources at once,
especially phenomenology, cognitive science, neuroscience
and evolutionary biology. I'll provide two examples of the
natural method in action in mental domains where an
adaptationist evolutionary account seems plausible: (i)
visual awareness and (ii) conscious event memory. Then I
will discuss a case, (iii), dreaming, where I think no
adaptationist evolutionary account exists. Beyond whatever
interest the particular cases have, the examination will
show why I think that a theory of mind, and the role
conscious mentation plays in it, will need to be built
domain-by-domain with no a priori expectation that there
will be a unified account of the causal role or evolutionary
history of different domains and competences.},
Doi = {10.1016/0028-3932(95)00051-4},
Key = {fds287552}
}
@article{fds287470,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Consciousness as a Pragmatist Views It},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to William James},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Putnam, RA},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds287470}
}
@article{fds318385,
Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
Title = {CONSCIOUSNESS, NATURALISM, AND NAGEL},
Journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {373-390},
Publisher = {INST MIND BEHAVIOR INC},
Year = {1985},
Month = {June},
Key = {fds318385}
}
@article{fds287468,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Guzeldere, G},
Title = {Consciousness: A Philosophical Tour},
Booktitle = {Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Rolls, E},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds287468}
}
@article{fds366398,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Cross-cultural philosophy and well-being},
Pages = {227-247},
Booktitle = {Naturalism, Human Flourishing, and Asian Philosophy: Owen
Flanagan and Beyond},
Year = {2019},
Month = {October},
ISBN = {9780367350246},
Key = {fds366398}
}
@article{fds287460,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {D. C. Dennett},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287460}
}
@article{fds287543,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Deconstructing Dreams: The Spandrels of Sleep},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {92},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-27},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Hameroff, SR and Kaszniak, AW and Scott, AC},
Year = {1995},
ISBN = {0-262-08249-7},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1995PY90800001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2940806},
Key = {fds287543}
}
@article{fds318361,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Does yoga induce metaphysical hallucinations?
Interdisciplinarity at the edge: Comments on Evan Thompson's
waking, dreaming, being},
Journal = {Philosophy East and West},
Volume = {66},
Number = {3},
Pages = {952-958},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pew.2016.0074},
Doi = {10.1353/pew.2016.0074},
Key = {fds318361}
}
@article{fds318376,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Dreaming is not an adaptation},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {23},
Number = {6},
Pages = {936-939},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2000},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00404024},
Abstract = {The five papers in this issue all deal with the proper
evolutionary function of sleep and dreams, these being
different. To establish that some trait of character is an
adaptation in the strict biological sense requires a story
about the fitness enhancing function it served when it
evolved and possibly a story of how the maintenance of this
function is fitness enhancing now. My aim is to evaluate the
proposals put forward in these papers. My conclusion is that
although sleep is almost certainly an adaptation, dreaming
is not.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00404024},
Key = {fds318376}
}
@article{fds287513,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Emotional Expressions},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Radick, and Hodge},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds287513}
}
@article{fds287473,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Emotional Expressions: Why Moralists Scowl, Frown, and
Smile},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Radick, G and Hodges, J},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds287473}
}
@article{fds287491,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Ancell, A and Martin, S and Steenbergen,
G},
Title = {Empiricism and Normative Ethics What do the biology and the
psychology of morality have to do with ethics?},
Booktitle = {Evolved Morality: The Biology & Philosophy of Human
Conscience},
Publisher = {Brill},
Editor = {Waal, FD and al, PSCE},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287491}
}
@article{fds318371,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Ethical expressions: Why moralists scowl, frown and
smile},
Pages = {413-434},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521884754},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521884754.018},
Abstract = {A major task for philosophy is to adjudicate conflicts
between our ordinary way of understanding persons and the
world - what Wilfrid Sellars called the 'manifest image' -
and scientific accounts of persons and the world - the
'scientific image'. Sometimes, of course, it is possible to
blend the two images so as to produce a genuinely
stereoscopic or synthetic picture. But this is not always
possible. In the case of Darwin's theory of natural
selection, we seem to have a scientific theory that cannot
be comfortably assimilated into the extant manifest image by
adding, in Sellars' phrase, a 'needle point of detail' to
that image. As traditionally understood, we humans are made
in God's image and sit beneath God and the angels and above
the animals on the 'Great Chain of Being'. There is a
tripartite ontology of Pure Spirit(s) (God and angels), pure
matter (rocks, plants and animals), and dualistic beings
who, while on earth, partake of both the immaterial realm
and the material realm (us). We humans know the material
realm through our senses and reason, and the immaterial
realm - theological and moral truths in particular - through
illumination, grace or other non-empirical and nonrational
or arational means. God sets out the moral law, and if we
obey it, thereby using our free will properly, we will gain
eternal salvation.},
Doi = {10.1017/CCOL9780521884754.018},
Key = {fds318371}
}
@article{fds318374,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Ethical expressions: Why moralists scowl, frown and
smile},
Pages = {377-398},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2003},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0521771978},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521771978.017},
Abstract = {Darwinism And The Manifest Image Of Humankind: A major task
for philosophy is to adjudicate conflicts between our
ordinary way of understanding persons and the world - what
Wilfrid Sellars called the 'manifest image' - and scientific
accounts of persons and the world - the 'scientific image'.
Sometimes, of course, it is possible to blend the two images
so as to produce a genuinely stereoscopic or synthetic
picture. But this is not always possible. In the case of
Darwin's theory of natural selection, we seem to have a
scientific theory that cannot be comfortably assimilated
into the extant manifest image by adding, in Sellars'
phrase, a 'needle point of detail' to that image. As
traditionally understood, we humans are made in God’s
image and sit beneath God and the angels and above the
animals on the ‘Great Chain of Being’. There is a
tripartite ontology of Pure Spirit(s) (God and angels), pure
matter (rocks, plants and animals), and dualistic beings
who, while on earth, partake of both the immaterial realm
and the material realm (us). We humans know the material
realm through our senses and reason, and the immaterial
realm – theological and moral truths in particular –
through illumination, grace or other non-empirical and
nonrational or arational means. God sets out the moral law,
and if we obey it, thereby using our free will properly, we
will gain eternal salvation. Nothing in this metaphysics,
epistemology and ethics seems to square with the theory of
natural selection. On this theory, no divine, intelligent
designer is needed to explain the existence of humans or any
other type of organic life. Moreover, as animals, descended
from other animals, we humans possess no mysterious
epistemic powers to detect what is true or what is good. The
idea that morality has a divine origin and justification
loses its force. The prospects for personal immortality seem
nil. The manifest image of humankind thus takes a major hit
at the hands of Darwin2019s theory, and it is not clear how
to maintain sensibly the central components of that
image.},
Doi = {10.1017/CCOL0521771978.017},
Key = {fds318374}
}
@article{fds287464,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Ethics Naturalized: Ethics and Human Ecology},
Booktitle = {Mind and Morals},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {May, and Clark, and Friedman},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds287464}
}
@article{fds287514,
Author = {Greene, M and Schill, K and Takahashi, S and Bateman-House, A and Beauchamp, T and Bok, H and Cheney, D and Coyle, J and Deacon, T and Dennett, D and Donovan, P and Flanagan, O and Goldman, S and Greely, H and Martin, L and Miller, E and Mueller, D and Siegel, A and Solter, D and Gearhart, J and McKhann, G and Faden, R},
Title = {Ethics: Moral issues of human-non-human primate neural
grafting.},
Journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
Volume = {309},
Number = {5733},
Pages = {385-386},
Year = {2005},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1112207},
Doi = {10.1126/science.1112207},
Key = {fds287514}
}
@article{fds287481,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Five Questions},
Booktitle = {Mind & Consciousness},
Publisher = {VIP Press},
Editor = {Grim, P},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds287481}
}
@article{fds318362,
Author = {Patton, LL and Griffiths, PJ},
Title = {Foreward},
Pages = {ix-xi},
Booktitle = {David Peter Lawrence - Rediscovering God with Transcendental
Argument: A Contemporary Interpretation of Monistic Kashmiri
Éaiva Philosophy},
Publisher = {Albany: State University of New York Press},
Year = {1999},
ISBN = {9781138888272},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315713571},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315713571},
Key = {fds318362}
}
@article{fds287541,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J},
Title = {HAN FEI ZI'S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN NATURE,
SCARCITY, AND THE NEO-DARWINIAN CONSENSUS},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {38},
Number = {2},
Pages = {293-316},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2011},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0301-8121},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2011.01632.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2011.01632.x},
Key = {fds287541}
}
@article{fds355606,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J},
Title = {Han fei zi’s philosophical psychology: Human nature,
scarcity, and the Neo-Darwinian consensus},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {38},
Number = {2},
Pages = {293-316},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03802010},
Doi = {10.1163/15406253-03802010},
Key = {fds355606}
}
@article{fds287495,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Hu, J},
Title = {Han Fei Zi’s Philosophical Psychology: Human Nature,
Scarcity, and the Neo-Darwinian Consensus},
Booktitle = {The State of Nature in Comparative Political Thought:
Western and Non-Western Perspectives},
Publisher = {Lexington Books},
Editor = {Carlson, JD and Fox, RA},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287495}
}
@article{fds287462,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {History of the Philosophy of Mind},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287462}
}
@article{fds287469,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {How to Study Consciousness Empirically: The Case of
Dreams},
Booktitle = {Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Rolls, E},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds287469}
}
@article{fds287546,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {I, hypocrite},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Volume = {208},
Number = {2791},
Pages = {44-44},
Year = {2010},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0262-4079},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=000287908900039&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(10)63116-8},
Key = {fds287546}
}
@article{fds363772,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Identity and addiction},
Pages = {77-89},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of
Addiction},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9781138909281},
Key = {fds363772}
}
@article{fds303568,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation},
Pages = {37-65},
Booktitle = {Identity, Character, and Morality},
Editor = {Flanagan, O and Rorty, AO},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds303568}
}
@article{fds287507,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Identity, Gender, and Strong Evaluation},
Journal = {Nous},
Volume = {25},
Number = {2},
Pages = {198-198},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1991},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0029-4624},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215579},
Doi = {10.2307/2215579},
Key = {fds287507}
}
@article{fds287502,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Adler, J},
Title = {Impartiality and Particularity},
Journal = {Social Research},
Volume = {50},
Number = {3},
Pages = {576-596},
Year = {1983},
ISSN = {0037-783X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970910},
Doi = {10.2307/40970910},
Key = {fds287502}
}
@article{fds287492,
Author = {Crome, I and Wu, L-T and Rao, RT and Crome, P},
Title = {Introduction},
Pages = {xxiv-xxv},
Booktitle = {Naturalized Virtue Epistemology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {A. Fairweather and O. Flanagan},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287492}
}
@article{fds318367,
Author = {Fairweather, A},
Title = {Introduction: Naturalized virtue epistemology},
Pages = {1-14},
Booktitle = {Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107028579},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236348.001},
Abstract = {This volume aims to launch a powerful and largely unexplored
position in epistemology: naturalized virtue epistemology.
Most debates in virtue epistemology have been decidedly
axiological and aim to clarify the goals, values, and ends
constitutive of epistemic evaluation. Value-driven inquiry
has now become quite complex in the large literature on the
value problem (and the related Meno problem), which examines
whether the value of knowledge can be reduced to the value
of any proper subset of its parts (Zagzebski 1996; Kvanvig
2003; Pritchard 2007). Normative epistemic inquiry has also
been useful in meeting more traditional problems in
epistemology, such as Gettier problems (Turri 2011) and
problems of epistemic luck more generally, as well as the
structure of knowledge (as etiological rather than
foundational or coherentist), and Chisholm’s “problem of
the criterion” (Riggs 2007). Virtue epistemology has
opened many new areas of inquiry in contemporary
epistemology including: epistemic agency (Greco 1999;
Zagzebski 2001; Sosa 2007), the role of motivations and
emotions in epistemology (Fairweather 2001; Hookway 2003),
the nature of abilities (Millar 2008; Greco 2010; Pritchard
2012), skills (Greco 1993; Bloomfield 2000), and competences
(Sosa 2007), the value of understanding (Kvanvig 2003; Grimm
2006; Riggs 2009), wisdom (Ryan 1999; Zagzebski 2013),
curiosity (Whitcomb 2010; Inan 2012) and even education
policy and practice (Baehr 2011). The virtue turn in
epistemology that started with the early work of Sosa (1991)
and Zagzebski (1996) has now produced a large and mature
literature in normative epistemology. While the growth and
impact of virtue epistemology has been impressive and
important, it has come with insufficient attention to the
empirical grounding of these normative theories, and thus
runs the risk of endorsing free-floating epistemic norms cut
loose from the real-world phenomenon they must evaluate. To
this end, virtue epistemologists should heed the exhortation
given by Anscombe in “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) to
constrain normative theorizing in ethics with an empirically
adequate moral psychology, and might even do so
optimistically since Anscombe (and Foot, later Geach, and
still later MacIntyre) was led to endorse virtue theory
precisely because it appeared more psychologically plausible
than deontology or consequentialism. The same cautionary
(and perhaps optimistic) point holds for epistemic
psychology and normative epistemology.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781139236348.001},
Key = {fds318367}
}
@article{fds303570,
Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Is Consciousness an Adaptation?},
Booktitle = {Evolving Consciousness},
Publisher = {Johns Benjamin, Amsterdam},
Editor = {Mulhauser, G},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds303570}
}
@article{fds346700,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Is Oneness an Over-belief?},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {99},
Number = {2},
Pages = {508-513},
Year = {2019},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12631},
Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12631},
Key = {fds346700}
}
@article{fds361192,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Jackson, K},
Title = {Justice, care, and gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan debate
revisited},
Pages = {69-84},
Booktitle = {An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary
Perspectives},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781134712465},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203760192-13},
Abstract = {In 1958, G. E. M. Anscombe wrote, “It is not profitable
for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be
laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy
of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking”
(186). Anscombe hinted (and she and many others pursued the
hint) that the Aristotelian tradition was the best place to
look for a richer and less shadowy conception of moral
agency than either utilitarianism or Kantianism had
provided.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203760192-13},
Key = {fds361192}
}
@article{fds287548,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Jackson, K},
Title = {Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate
Revisited},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {97},
Number = {3},
Pages = {622-637},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1987},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292870},
Doi = {10.1086/292870},
Key = {fds287548}
}
@article{fds318387,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ and McCreadie-Albright, T},
Title = {Malcolm and the fallacy of behaviorism},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {26},
Number = {5-6},
Pages = {425-430},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1974},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00368508},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00368508},
Key = {fds318387}
}
@article{fds318383,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Materialism and immaterialism: A reply to
Robinson},
Journal = {Contemporary Psychology: a Journal of Reviews},
Volume = {31},
Number = {9},
Pages = {722-722},
Publisher = {Portico},
Year = {1986},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/025101},
Doi = {10.1037/025101},
Key = {fds318383}
}
@article{fds287467,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral Confidence: Three Cheers for Naturalistic
Ethics},
Booktitle = {In The Face of Facts: Moral Inquiry in American
Scholarship},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Westbrook, and Bethe-Elstain, and Fox},
Year = {1997},
Key = {fds287467}
}
@article{fds318372,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral contagion and logical persuasion in the
Mozi},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {35},
Number = {3},
Pages = {473-491},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2008},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2008.00492.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6253.2008.00492.x},
Key = {fds318372}
}
@article{fds287515,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral contagion and logical persuasion in the Mozi
1},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {35},
Number = {3},
Pages = {473-491},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03503008},
Doi = {10.1163/15406253-03503008},
Key = {fds287515}
}
@article{fds287465,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral Network},
Booktitle = {The Churchlands and Their Critics},
Publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
Editor = {McCauley, R},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds287465}
}
@article{fds287479,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Moral Science? Still Metaphysical After All These
Years},
Pages = {52-78},
Booktitle = {Moral Personality, Identity and Character: Explorations in
Moral Psychology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Narvaez, D and Lapsley, DK},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://www.duke.edu/},
Key = {fds287479}
}
@article{fds287500,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Moral Structures?},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {12},
Number = {3},
Pages = {255-270},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1982},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318201200302},
Doi = {10.1177/004839318201200302},
Key = {fds287500}
}
@article{fds287458,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Multiple Identity, Character Transformation, and
Self-Reclamation},
Pages = {135-162},
Booktitle = {Philosophical Psychopathology},
Publisher = {MIT},
Editor = {Graham, G and Stephens, L},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287458}
}
@article{fds287547,
Author = {Hardcastle, VG and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Multiplex vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative
Disorders},
Journal = {The Monist},
Volume = {82},
Number = {4},
Pages = {645-657},
Year = {1999},
ISSN = {0026-9662},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000084733100006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/27903660},
Key = {fds287547}
}
@article{fds287486,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {My Non-Narrative, Non-Forensic Dasein: The First and Second
Self},
Pages = {214-240},
Booktitle = {Self and Consciousness},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Liu, JL and Perry, J},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds287486}
}
@article{fds287472,
Author = {Polger, T and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Natural Questions to Natural Answers},
Volume = {5},
Booktitle = {Biology Meets Psychology: Constraints, Connections,
Conjectures},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds287472}
}
@article{fds318360,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
Title = {Naturalizing Ethics},
Pages = {16-33},
Booktitle = {The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism},
Publisher = {JOHN WILEY & SONS INC},
Year = {2016},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9781118657607},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118657775.ch2},
Abstract = {In this chapter, we provide (1) an argument for why ethics
should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet
naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two
fallacies - Hume's and Moore's - that ethical naturalism
allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics
is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to
pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics
both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why
nihilism about value is not especially worrisome for ethical
naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes
the essence of Duke naturalism.},
Doi = {10.1002/9781118657775.ch2},
Key = {fds318360}
}
@article{fds287478,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Sarkissian, H and Wong, D},
Title = {Naturalizing Ethics},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {1-26},
Booktitle = {*Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality*},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds287478}
}
@article{fds328339,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Negative dialectics in comparative philosophy: The case of
Buddhist free will quietism},
Pages = {59-71},
Booktitle = {Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless
Agency?},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
ISBN = {9781138950344},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315668765},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315668765},
Key = {fds328339}
}
@article{fds287483,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Neuro-Eudaimonics, or Buddhists Lead Neuroscientists to the
Seat of Happiness},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook on Philosophy and Neuroscience},
Editor = {Bickle, J},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://www.duke.edu/},
Key = {fds287483}
}
@article{fds366917,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Caruso, GD},
Title = {Neuroexistentialism},
Journal = {The Philosophers' Magazine},
Number = {83},
Pages = {68-72},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2018},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm201883105},
Doi = {10.5840/tpm201883105},
Key = {fds366917}
}
@article{fds287520,
Author = {Flanagan Jr and O and Lane, T},
Title = {Neuroexistentialism, Eudaimonics, and Positive
Illusions},
Journal = {SYNTHESE Philosophy Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic,
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {SPRINGER},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287520}
}
@article{fds287518,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Neuroexistentialism, with David Barack},
Journal = {EURAMERICA},
Volume = {40},
Number = {3},
Year = {2010},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {EURAMERICA vol. 40, no. 3},
Key = {fds287518}
}
@article{fds335565,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Caruso, G},
Title = {Neuroexistentialism: Third-wave existentialism},
Pages = {1-22},
Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age
of Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780190460723},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0001},
Abstract = {Neuroexistentialism is a recent expression of existential
anxiety over the nature of persons. Unlike previous
existentialisms, neuroexistentialism is not caused by a
problem with ecclesiastical authority, as was the
existentialism represented by Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and
Nietzsche, nor by the shock of coming face to face with the
moral horror of nation state actors and their citizens, as
in the mid-century existentialism of Sartre and Camus.
Rather, neuroexistentialism is caused by the rise of the
scientific authority of the human sciences and a resultant
clash between the scientific and the humanistic image of
persons. Flanagan and Caruso explain what
neuroexistentialism is and how it is related to two earlier
existentialisms and they spell out how neuroexistentialism
makes particularly vivid the clash between the humanistic
and the scientific image of persons. They conclude by
providing a brief summary of the chapters to
follow.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0001},
Key = {fds335565}
}
@article{fds318369,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Neuroscience: Knowing and feeling},
Journal = {Nature},
Volume = {469},
Number = {7329},
Pages = {160-161},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2011},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/469160a},
Doi = {10.1038/469160a},
Key = {fds318369}
}
@article{fds287542,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {One Enchanted Being: Neuroexistentialism &
Meaning},
Journal = {Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science},
Volume = {44},
Number = {1},
Pages = {41-49},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1467-9744},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2009.00984.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9744.2009.00984.x},
Key = {fds287542}
}
@article{fds287456,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Other Minds, Obligation, and Honesty},
Booktitle = {Social and Cognitive Factors in Preschoolers’
Deception},
Publisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum},
Editor = {Ceci, S and DeSimone, M and Putnick, ME},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds287456}
}
@article{fds287527,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {PERFORMING ONESELF},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Creativity},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Samuels, E and Kaufmann, SB},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287527}
}
@article{fds287485,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Performing Oneself},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Creativity},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Paul, E and Kaufmann, SB},
Year = {2011},
Abstract = {Abstract: I explore the ancient idea that life is some kind
of dramatic or artistic performance. How seriously and
literally ought we to take this idea that life is like a
dramatic performance, even that it is one? There are
metaphysical and logical questions about whether and how
self-creation and self-constitution are possible; and there
are normative questions about which norms sensibly govern
self-constituting performances. Here I discuss the normative
questions associated with the ideas that life is a
performance and that the self is something that both emerges
in and is constituted by the performance. Three contemporary
psychopoetic conceptions of persons – “day-by-day
persons,” “ironic persons,” and “strong poetic
persons” are examined in order to discuss whether there
are legitimate normative constraints on “performing
oneself,” and, if so, what these might
be.},
Key = {fds287485}
}
@article{fds287539,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Phenomenal and historical selves},
Journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
Volume = {84},
Pages = {217-240},
Editor = {Katja Crone and Kristina Musholt and Anna Strasser},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0165-9227},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789401207904_011},
Abstract = {There are two ways a person can experience or, what is dif
erent, can think about herself: f rst, as a subject of
experience who feels a certain characteristic way,
the-way-it-feels-to-be-oneself; and, second, as the person
who is the subject of a particular autobiography, as the
actor who is the protagonist in the history of this
organism. The f rst is the phenomenal self; the second is
the historical self. Marking the distinction has
implications for philosophical psychology, for views about
what a self is, how many selves a person has, the varieties
of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, and for normative
views about how a self is supposed to relate to its own past
and future.},
Doi = {10.1163/9789401207904_011},
Key = {fds287539}
}
@article{fds287496,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Phenomenal Authority: The Epistemic Authority of Alcoholics
Anonymous},
Booktitle = {The Nature of Addiction},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Levy, N},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {To understand a complicated psycho-bio-social phenomenon(a)
such as addiction to alcohol one wants ideally a
phenomenology, a behavioral and cognitive psychology, a
physiology, and a neurobiology – all embedded in a
sociology. One wants to know what it is like to be alcoholic
– if, that is, there is any commonality to the experiences
of alcoholics (Flanagan 2011). One wants to know about such
things as whether and if so what kind of loss of control
alcoholics experience in relation to alcohol (as well as,
any and all affective and cognitive deficits). One wants to
know what the brain is doing and how it contributes to the
production of the characteristic phenomenology(ies) and
control (and other cognitive and affective) problems. One
wants to know what effect heavy drinking has on vulnerable
organ systems, e.g., the brain, the heart, and the liver.
And, of course, all along the way, one should want to know
how the sociomoral-cultural-political ecology normalizes,
romanticizes, pathologizes, etc. alcoholism and its
relations, heavy drinking, recklessness-under-the-influence,
etc. Some scientists and philosophers worry that the program
of A.A. biases our understanding of the phenomenology,
psychology, physiology, and neurobiology of addiction and
prevents a unified, or at least a consilient, account of the
nature, causes, and treatment of alcoholism from emerging. I
have experience in the rooms of A.A., as well as in seminar
and conference rooms with experts on addiction. From this
perspective, I assess this claim that A.A. is part of the
problem, not of the solution, and suggest some ways to
increase mutual understanding between the various modes of
understanding alcoholism, which if abided would yield
sensitive and sensible interaction among the practical
program of A.A. and the sciences of addiction. One
consequence is that A.A. would need to acknowledge that as a
therapeutic social institution it is a repository of some
practical knowledge about what works to help some people
recovery and stay abstinent, but has no expertise on
alcoholism or even on “how it works” if, that is, it
does work.},
Key = {fds287496}
}
@article{fds339638,
Author = {Tononi, G and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Consciousness},
Journal = {Frontiers of Philosophy in China},
Volume = {13},
Number = {3},
Pages = {332-348},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3868/s030-007-018-0026-1},
Abstract = {This is a dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist
about the scientific explanation of consciousness. What is
consciousness? Does it admit of scientific explanation? If
so, what must a scientific theory of consciousness be like
in order to provide us with a satisfying explanation of its
explanandum? And what types of entities might such a theory
acknowledge as being conscious? Philosopher Owen Flanagan
and scientist Giulio Tononi weigh in on these issues during
an exchange about the nature and scientific explanation of
consciousness.},
Doi = {10.3868/s030-007-018-0026-1},
Key = {fds339638}
}
@article{fds366918,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Philosophy of Multicultures},
Journal = {The Philosophers' Magazine},
Number = {82},
Pages = {99-104},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2018},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20188283},
Doi = {10.5840/tpm20188283},
Key = {fds366918}
}
@article{fds287504,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Pragmatism, Ethics, and Correspondence Truth: Response to
Gibson and Quine},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {98},
Number = {3},
Pages = {541-549},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1988},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380967},
Doi = {10.1086/292971},
Key = {fds287504}
}
@article{fds303569,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Prospects For A Unified Theory of Consciousness or, What
Dreams are Made Of},
Booktitle = {Scientific Approaches to the Question of Consciousness: 25th
Carnegie Symposium on Cognition},
Publisher = {Erlbaum},
Editor = {Cohen, J and Schooler, J},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds303569}
}
@article{fds287503,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Psychoanalysis and Social Practice: A Comment on
Grünbaum},
Journal = {The Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Number = {Fall},
Year = {1986},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds287503}
}
@article{fds318384,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Psychoanalysis as a social activity},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {9},
Number = {2},
Pages = {238-239},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00022391},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00022391},
Key = {fds318384}
}
@article{fds318386,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Psychology, progress and the problem of reflexivity: a study
in the epistemological foundations of psychology.},
Journal = {Journal of the History of the Behavioral
Sciences},
Volume = {17},
Pages = {375-386},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/1520-6696(198107)17:3<375::aid-jhbs2300170308>3.0.co},
Doi = {10.1002/1520-6696(198107)17:3<375::aid-jhbs2300170308>3.0.co},
Key = {fds318386}
}
@article{fds318370,
Author = {Paulson, S and Flanagan, O and Bloom, P and Baumeister,
R},
Title = {Quid pro quo: the ecology of the self.},
Journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
Volume = {1234},
Pages = {29-43},
Year = {2011},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06182.x},
Abstract = {Moderated by Steve Paulson, producer and interviewer for
public radio's To the Best of Our Knowledge, philosopher and
neurobiologist Owen Flanagan (Duke University), and
psychologists Paul Bloom (Yale University) and Roy
Baumeister (Florida State University) examine current
biological, psychological, and anthropological research on
the complex interaction between the self and others, and
consider the roots of empathy and morality. The following is
an edited transcript of the discussion that occurred
February 23, 2011, 7:00-8:15 PM, at the New York Academy of
Sciences in New York City.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06182.x},
Key = {fds318370}
}
@article{fds287501,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Quinean Ethics},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {93},
Number = {1},
Pages = {56-74},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1982},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380762},
Doi = {10.1086/292405},
Key = {fds287501}
}
@article{fds322469,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Review: The Political Mind by George Lakoff},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Volume = {198},
Number = {2658},
Pages = {48-49},
Year = {2008},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(08)61371-8},
Abstract = {If winning elections is a matter of manipulating brains,
that must make George Bush and his team experts in
neuroscience - but Owen Flanagan isn't convinced. © 2008
Reed Business Information Ltd, England.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(08)61371-8},
Key = {fds322469}
}
@article{fds212082,
Author = {O. Flanagan Jr. and Stephen Martin},
Title = {Science and the Modest Image of Epistemology},
Journal = {Human.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies
21},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man (1963) Wilfrid
Sellars raises a problem for the very possibility of
normative epistemology. How can the scientific image, which
celebrates the causal relation among often imperceptible
physical states, make room for justificatory relations among
introspectible propositional attitudes? We sketch a
naturalistic model of reason and of epistemic decisions that
parallels a compatibilist solution to the problem of freedom
of action. Not only doesn’t science lead to rejection of
our account of normative reasoning, science depends on,
sophisticates, and explains how normative reasoning is
possible.},
Key = {fds212082}
}
@article{fds318365,
Author = {Einstein, G and Flanagan, O},
Title = {Sexual Identities and Narratives of Self},
Pages = {209-231},
Booktitle = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the
Brain},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
ISBN = {9780195140057},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.003.0011},
Abstract = {Certain philosophical ideas about identity, what makes one
human, and other such dimensions may be associated with
conceptions that concern how scientific knowledge about
sense of self may be reinforced by processes that occur
within the body and the brain. John Locke's cognitivist view
asserts that among all other organisms, and although these
organisms may possess organic integrity and biological
continuity, only human beings are bestowed with a semantic
and autobiographical memory. While Locke's view concentrates
on how personal identity should entail cognitive memory,
this chapter looks into alternative views wherein the self
also involves certain conative factors. This chapter looks
into the notion of sexual self and how the body and brain
may also determine the self.},
Doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.003.0011},
Key = {fds318365}
}
@article{fds287457,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Situations and Dispositions},
Pages = {681-695},
Booktitle = {Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science},
Publisher = {Cambridge: MIT Press},
Editor = {Goldman, AI},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds287457}
}
@article{fds287454,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Skinnerian Metaphysics and the Problem of
Operationism},
Journal = {Behaviorism},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-13},
Year = {1980},
ISSN = {0090-4155},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27758948},
Doi = {10.2307/27758948},
Key = {fds287454}
}
@article{fds287461,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Stream of Consciousness},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Honderich, T},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287461}
}
@article{fds287476,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Neuroscience and
Happiness},
Booktitle = {The Buddha’s Way: The Confluence of Buddhist Thought and
Applied Psychological Research in the Post-Modern
Age},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Nauriyal, DK and Drummond, YB},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds287476}
}
@article{fds366919,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Wallace, H},
Title = {The Character of Consciousness},
Pages = {17-30},
Booktitle = {UNDERSTANDING JAMES, UNDERSTANDING MODERNISM},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-5013-0274-9},
Key = {fds366919}
}
@article{fds318373,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The colour of happiness},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Volume = {178},
Number = {2396},
Pages = {44},
Year = {2003},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds318373}
}
@article{fds357871,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The disunity of addictive cravings},
Journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology},
Volume = {27},
Number = {3},
Pages = {243-246},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2020.0030},
Doi = {10.1353/ppp.2020.0030},
Key = {fds357871}
}
@article{fds287524,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Ego Tunnel},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20127001.600-review-the-ego-tunnel-by-thomas-metzinger.html},
Key = {fds287524}
}
@article{fds287522,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Literate Ape},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Year = {2009},
Month = {November},
url = {http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/culturelab/2009/11/how-our-brains-learned-to-read.php},
Key = {fds287522}
}
@article{fds318382,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The modularity of consciousness},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {14},
Number = {3},
Pages = {446-447},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00070692},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00070692},
Key = {fds318382}
}
@article{fds318379,
Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
Title = {THE MOMENT OF TRUTH ON DUBLIN BRIDGE, A RESPONSE TO
PICKERING,ANDREW},
Journal = {South Atlantic Quarterly},
Volume = {94},
Number = {2},
Pages = {467-474},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds318379}
}
@article{fds287508,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Moment of Truth on the Dublin Bridge},
Journal = {South Atlantic Quarterly},
Volume = {94},
Number = {2},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds287508}
}
@article{fds287516,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Neural Pathway to the White House},
Journal = {The New Scientist},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19826586.300-review-ithe-political-mindi-by-george-lakoff.html?full=true},
Key = {fds287516}
}
@article{fds287474,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Neurobiology of Sexual Self-Consciousness: Mind and the
Interplay of Brain and Body},
Booktitle = {Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the
Brain.},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Fireman, G and McVay, T and Flanagan, O},
Year = {2003},
Month = {Spring},
Abstract = {Chapter on Narrative Self-Construction by individuals
w/non-standard sexual identities.},
Key = {fds287474}
}
@article{fds329381,
Author = {Gyal, P and Flanagan, O},
Title = {The role of pain in buddhism: The conquest of
suffering},
Pages = {288-296},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781138823181},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315742205},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315742205},
Key = {fds329381}
}
@article{fds335564,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Zhao, W},
Title = {The self and its good vary cross-culturally: A dozen
self-variations and Chinese familial selves},
Pages = {287-301},
Booktitle = {Self, Culture and Consciousness: Interdisciplinary
Convergences on Knowing and Being},
Publisher = {Springer Singapore},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9789811057762},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_17},
Doi = {10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_17},
Key = {fds335564}
}
@article{fds287540,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The shame of addiction.},
Journal = {Frontiers in Psychiatry},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {120},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {8 OCTOBER 2013},
url = {http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24115936},
Abstract = {Addiction is a person-level phenomenon that involves twin
normative failures. A failure of normal rational effective
agency or self-control with respect to the substance; and
shame at both this failure, and the failure to live up to
the standards for a good life that the addict himself
acknowledges and aspires to. Feeling shame for addiction is
not a mistake. It is part of the shape of addiction, part of
the normal phenomenology of addiction, and often a source of
motivation for the addict to heal. Like other recent
attempts in the addiction literature to return normative
concepts such as "choice" and "responsibility" to their
rightful place in understanding and treating addiction, the
twin normative failure model is fully compatible with
investigation of genetic and neuroscientific causes of
addiction. Furthermore, the model does not re-moralize
addiction. There can be shame without blame.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00120},
Key = {fds287540}
}
@article{fds287489,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Social Epistemological Normalization of Contestable
Narratives:* Stories of Just Deserts},
Pages = {358-375},
Booktitle = {What Happened In and To Moral Philosophy in the Twentieth
Century},
Publisher = {notre dame university press},
Editor = {Rourke, FO},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287489}
}
@article{fds287517,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The Structures of Meaningful Life Stories},
Journal = {Argentinian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds287517}
}
@article{fds287488,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {The View From the East Pole: Buddhist and Confucian
Tolerance},
Booktitle = {Religion and Tolerance},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Clarke, S and Powell, R},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {In this chapter I ask the question: Why are Buddhists and
Confucians more tolerant, less conflict prone, less
war-like, etc. than Abrahamic peoples IF THEY ARE?1 A proper
analysis that positioned us to adequately answer this
question would require defining the different
concepts—“tolerance,” “conflict-prone,”
“war-like”—producing evidence that it is true that
there exist significant differences between adherents of
these different traditions, and then using something like
Mill’s methods to rule out political, economic, or
material culture explanations of the differences, thereby
making the reli- gious differences the most plausible
candidate for the difference-maker.2 Here I do something
less than what is needed. I operate on the assump- tion that
it is true that Buddhists and Confucians are more tolerant,
less conflict-prone, etc. than Abrahamic people, all else
equal.3 Then I formulate a hypothesis for why the
difference-maker may have to do with God, or better, with
beliefs about God’s nature and modus operandi. I say
“may” because I am not convinced that my hypothesis is
true. The hypothesis is not that Buddhism and Confucianism
are more rational, less superstitious than the Abrahamic
religions. It is that Buddhism and Confucianism have
theologies that differ from the Abrahamic ones in ways that
make a difference. The core idea is that the belief in the
Abrahamic God (Yahweh, God, Allah) engenders or supports
attitudes and actions that demand epistemic and normative
conformity across peoples with different customs, habits,
and beliefs. Buddhist and Confucian theologies differ from
each other in important ways, but share the following two
features (Flanagan 2008; Flanagan 2011):},
Key = {fds287488}
}
@article{fds366920,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Graham, G},
Title = {Truth and Sanity: Positive Illusions, Spiritual Delusions,
and Metaphysical Hallucinations},
Pages = {293-313},
Booktitle = {EXTRAORDINARY SCIENCE AND PSYCHIATRY: RESPONSES TO THE
CRISIS IN MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH},
Year = {2017},
Key = {fds366920}
}
@article{fds318380,
Author = {FLANAGAN, O},
Title = {VALIDATION IN THE CLINICAL THEORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS - A
STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS -
GRUNBAUM,A},
Journal = {Tls the Times Literary Supplement},
Number = {4726},
Pages = {3-4},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds318380}
}
@article{fds287475,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Varieties of Naturalism},
Booktitle = {Oxford Companion to Religion and Science},
Publisher = {OUP},
Year = {2006},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds287475}
}
@article{fds287506,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Virtue and Ignorance},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {87},
Number = {8},
Pages = {420-420},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {1990},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026736},
Doi = {10.2307/2026736},
Key = {fds287506}
}
@article{fds287498,
Author = {Flanagan, OJ},
Title = {Virtue, Sex, and Gender: Some Philosophical Reflections on
the Moral Psychology Debate},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {92},
Number = {3},
Pages = {499-512},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1982},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0014-1704},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380735},
Doi = {10.1086/292358},
Key = {fds287498}
}
@article{fds287519,
Author = {Flanagan Jr and O and Ancell, A and Martin, S and Steenbergen,
G},
Title = {What do the Psychology and Biology of Morality have to do
with Ethics?: Ethics as Human Ecology},
Journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
B},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds287519}
}
@article{fds287549,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Williams, RA},
Title = {What does the modularity of morals have to do with ethics?
Four moral sprouts plus or minus a few.},
Journal = {Topics in Cognitive Science},
Volume = {2},
Number = {3},
Pages = {430-453},
Year = {2010},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1756-8757},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000283869500012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to
suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was
worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a
serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence
is best explained in terms of moral modules-evolutionarily
ancient, fast-acting, automatic reactions to particular
sociomoral experiences (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MMH fleshes
out an idea nascent in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We
discuss the evidence for MMH, specifically an ancient
version, "Mencian Moral Modularity," which claims four
innate modules, and "Social Intuitionist Modularity," which
claims five innate modules. We compare these two moral
modularity models, discuss whether the postulated modules
are best conceived as perceptual/Fodorian or
emotional/Darwinian, and consider whether assuming MMH true
has any normative ethical consequences whatsoever. The
discussion of MMH reconnects cognitive science with
normative ethics in a way that involves the reassertion of
the "is-ought" problem. We explain in a new way what this
problem is and why it would not yield. The reason does not
involve the logic of "ought," but rather the plasticity of
human nature and the realistic options to "grow" and "do"
human nature in multifarious legitimate ways.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01076.x},
Key = {fds287549}
}
@article{fds287484,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {What is it Like to be an Addict?},
Booktitle = {Addiction and Responsibility},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Editor = {Graham, G and Poland, G},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds287484}
}
@article{fds287452,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Where is the Happiness},
Booktitle = {Oxford Companion to Philosophy and Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds287452}
}
@article{fds327181,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Wallace, H},
Title = {William James and the problem of consciousness},
Pages = {152-161},
Booktitle = {Consciousness and the Great Philosophers: What would they
have said about our Mind-Body Problem?},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138934412},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315678023},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315678023},
Key = {fds327181}
}
@article{fds287453,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Wittgenstein's Ethical Nonnaturalism: An Interpretation of
Tractatus 6.41-47 and the 'Lecture on Ethics'},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {48},
Number = {2},
Pages = {185-198},
Publisher = {University of Illinois Press},
Year = {2011},
Month = {April},
ISSN = {0003-0481},
Key = {fds287453}
}
@article{fds287523,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {Your mind is more than your brain},
Journal = {New Scientist},
Volume = {201},
Number = {2691},
Pages = {42-43},
Year = {2009},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20126911.800-review-where-in-the-world-is-the-mind.html},
Abstract = {Two new books argue that the mind extends beyond the brain
into the world around us. © 2009 Reed Business Information
Ltd, England.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0262-4079(09)60167-6},
Key = {fds287523}
}
@article{fds287509,
Author = {Flanagan, O and Polger, T},
Title = {Zombies and the Function of Consciousness},
Journal = {The Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {2},
Number = {4},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds287509}
}
@article{fds287480,
Author = {Flanagan, O},
Title = {“Buddhist Persons & Eudaimonia Buddha”},
Booktitle = {Routledge Companion to Philosophical Psychology},
Editor = {Symons, J},
Year = {2009},
url = {http://www.duke.edu/},
Key = {fds287480}
}
@article{fds45628,
Author = {O. Flanagan},
Title = {“The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Neuroscience and Happiness”
in},
Booktitle = {The Buddha’s Way: The Confluence of Buddhist Thought and
Applied Psychological Research in the Post-Modern Age:
Routledge: Cruzon, London, In Press: Editors, D. K.
Nauriyal, Michael Drummond, Y. B. Lal: Forward: His
Holiness, XIV Dalai Lama},
Year = {2006},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds45628}
}
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