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Publications of Alexander Rosenberg    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
@book{fds336419,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of social science, fifth edition},
   Pages = {1-347},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780813349732},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429494840},
   Abstract = {© 2016 by Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. Philosophy
             of Social Science provides a tightly argued yet accessible
             introduction to the philosophical foundations of the human
             sciences, including economics, anthropology, sociology,
             political science, psychology, history, and the disciplines
             emerging at the intersections of these subjects with
             biology. Philosophy is unavoidable for social scientists
             because the choices they make in answering questions in
             their disciplines force them to take sides on philosophical
             matters. Conversely, the philosophy of social science is
             equally necessary for philosophers since the social and
             behavior sciences must inform their understanding of human
             action, norms, and social institutions. The fifth edition
             retains from previous editions an illuminating
             interpretation of the enduring relations between the social
             sciences and philosophy, and reflects on developments in
             social research over the past two decades that have informed
             and renewed debate in the philosophy of social science. An
             expanded discussion of philosophical anthropology and modern
             and postmodern critical theory is new for this
             edition.},
   Doi = {10.4324/9780429494840},
   Key = {fds336419}
}

@book{fds303580,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of Social Science, 4th edition revised,
             enlarged},
   Publisher = {Westview Press},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {February},
   Key = {fds303580}
}

@book{fds303581,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosphy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Second
             Edition, portuguese translation},
   Publisher = {Edicioes Loyola},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {February},
   Key = {fds303581}
}

@book{fds219753,
   Author = {A. Rosenberg},
   Title = {Philosphy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Second
             Edition, portuguese translation},
   Publisher = {Edicioes Loyola},
   Address = {Sao Paulo, Brazil},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {Summer},
   Key = {fds219753}
}

@book{fds244754,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Atheist’s Guide to Reality},
   Publisher = {W.W. Norton},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds244754}
}

@book{fds244755,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, 3d
             Edition, revised, enlarged},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds244755}
}

@book{fds336421,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Japanese
             translation},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds336421}
}

@book{fds336422,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Arabic
             translation},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds336422}
}

@book{fds336423,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction–Portuguese
             translation},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds336423}
}

@book{fds244752,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
   Title = {Philosophy of biology: A contemporary introduction},
   Pages = {1-241},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {December},
   ISBN = {0203926994},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203926994},
   Abstract = {© 2008 Alex Rosenberg and Daniel W. McShea. All rights
             reserved. Is life a purely physical process? What is human
             nature? Which of our traits is essential to us? In this
             volume, Daniel McShea and Alex Rosenberg - a biologist and a
             philosopher, respectively - join forces to create a new
             gateway to the philosophy of biology; making the major
             issues accessible and relevant to biologists and
             philosophers alike. Exploring concepts such as
             supervenience; the controversies about genocentrism and
             genetic determinism; and the debate about major transitions
             central to contemporary thinking about macroevolution; the
             authors lay out the broad terms in which we should assess
             the impact of biology on human capacities, social
             institutions and ethical values.},
   Doi = {10.4324/9780203926994},
   Key = {fds244752}
}

@book{fds52014,
   Author = {Alex Rosenberg and Daniel McShea},
   Title = {The Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary
             Introduction},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds52014}
}

@book{fds244751,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Darwinian Reductionism or How to Stop Worrying and Love
             Molecular Biology},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {August},
   Key = {fds244751}
}

@book{fds244750,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction
             (Portuegese translation)},
   Year = {2006},
   Key = {fds244750}
}

@book{fds336425,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, First
             Edition, Chinese Translation},
   Series = {Philosopher's Stone Series},
   Publisher = {Shanghai Scientific and Technological Education Publishing
             House},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {February},
   Key = {fds336425}
}

@book{fds244747,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Darwinism in Philosophy, Social Science and
             Policy},
   Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2000},
   Key = {fds244747}
}

@book{fds244745,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Instrumental Biology or the Disunity of Science},
   Publisher = {Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {1994},
   Key = {fds244745}
}

@book{fds244744,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing
             Returns?},
   Publisher = {Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {1992},
   Key = {fds244744}
}

@book{fds244743,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of Social Science},
   Publisher = {Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Oxford: Oxford University
             Press},
   Year = {1988},
   Key = {fds244743}
}

@book{fds244742,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Structure of Biological Science},
   Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {1985},
   Key = {fds244742}
}

@book{fds244741,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Beauchamp, TL},
   Title = {Hume and the Problem of Causation},
   Publisher = {New York: Oxford University Press},
   Year = {1981},
   Key = {fds244741}
}

@book{fds244740,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social
             Science},
   Publisher = {Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press},
   Year = {1980},
   Key = {fds244740}
}

@book{fds244739,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Microeconomic Laws: A Philosophical Analysis},
   Publisher = {Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
             Press},
   Year = {1976},
   Key = {fds244739}
}


%% Papers Published   
@article{fds336418,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Can we make sense of subjective experience in metabolically
             situated cognitive processes?},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {1-2},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-018-9624-4},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-018-9624-4},
   Key = {fds336418}
}

@article{fds332348,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Making mechanism interesting},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Volume = {195},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {11-33},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0713-5},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0713-5},
   Key = {fds332348}
}

@article{fds327007,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Why Social Science is Biological Science},
   Journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {48},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {341-369},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9365-0},
   Abstract = {© 2017 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht The social
             sciences need to take seriously their status as divisions of
             biology. As such they need to recognize the central role of
             Darwinian processes in all the phenomena they seek to
             explain. An argument for this claim is formulated in terms
             of a small number of relatively precise premises that focus
             on the nature of the kinds and taxonomies of all the social
             sciences. The analytical taxonomies of all the social
             sciences are shown to require a Darwinian approach to human
             affairs, though not a nativist or genetically driven theory
             by any means. Non-genetic Darwinian processes have the
             fundamental role on all human affairs. I expound a general
             account of how Darwinian processes operate in human affairs
             by selecting for strategies and sets of strategies
             individuals and groups employ. I conclude by showing how a
             great deal of social science can be organized in accordance
             with Tinbergen’s approach to biological inquiry, an
             approach required by the fact that the social sciences are
             all divisions of biology, and in particular the studies of
             one particular biological species.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10838-017-9365-0},
   Key = {fds327007}
}

@article{fds323663,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {ON THE VERY IDEA OF IDEAL THEORY IN POLITICAL
             PHILOSOPHY},
   Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {1-2},
   Pages = {55-75},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2016},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052516000376},
   Abstract = {<jats:title>Abstract:</jats:title> <jats:p>The essay agues
             that there is little scope for ideal theory in political
             philosophy, even under Rawls’s conception of its aims. It
             begins by identifying features of a standard example of
             ideal theory in physics — the ideal gas law, PV=NRT and
             draws attention to the lack of these features in Rawls’s
             derivation of the principles of justice from the original
             position. A. John Simmons’s defense of ideal theory
             against criticisms of Amartya Sen is examined, as are
             further criticisms of both by David Schmidtz. The essay goes
             on to develop a conception of the domain of social relations
             to be characterized by justice that suggests that as a
             moving target it makes ideal theory otiose. Examination of
             Rawls’s later views substantiate the conclusion that ideal
             theory as propounded in A Theory of Justice is a mistaken
             starting point in the enterprise of political philosophy.
             Differences between the domains of ideal theory in
             mathematics, physics, and economics on the one hand, and
             political philosophy on the other, reinforce this
             conclusion.</jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0265052516000376},
   Key = {fds323663}
}

@article{fds320318,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Genealogy of Content or the Future of an
             Illusion},
   Journal = {Philosophia},
   Volume = {43},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {537-547},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9624-4},
   Abstract = {© 2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
             Eliminativism about intentional content argues for its
             conclusion from the partial correctness of all three of the
             theses Hutto and Satne seek to combine: neo-Cartesianism is
             correct to this extent: if there is intentional content it
             must originally be mental. Neo-Behaviorism is correct to
             this extent: attribution of intentional content is basically
             a heuristic device for predicting the behavior of higher
             vertebrates. Neo-Pragmatism is right to this extent: the
             illusion of intentionality in language is the source of the
             illusion of intentionality in thought. Eliminativists employ
             the insights of all three “neo”-theses to explain why
             there is no such thing and why the systematic illusion that
             there is intentional content runs so deep.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11406-015-9624-4},
   Key = {fds320318}
}

@article{fds244764,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {How Jerry Fodor slid down the slippery slope to
             Anti-Darwinism, and how we can avoid the same
             fate},
   Journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-17},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1879-4912},
   url = {http://http://link.springer.com/search?query=rosenberg&search-within=Journal&facet-journal-id=%2213194%22},
   Doi = {10.1007/s13194-012-0055-9},
   Key = {fds244764}
}

@article{fds244737,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Free markets and the myth of earned inequalities},
   Journal = {3AM Magazine},
   Year = {2013},
   url = {http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/free-markets-and-the-myth-of-earned-inequalities/},
   Key = {fds244737}
}

@article{fds244738,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Curtain, T},
   Title = {What is economics good for?},
   Publisher = {The New York Times},
   Year = {2013},
   url = {http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/what-is-economics-good-for/?_r=1},
   Key = {fds244738}
}

@article{fds331102,
   Author = {Braddock, M and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reconstruction in moral philosophy?},
   Journal = {Analyse Und Kritik},
   Volume = {2012},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {63-80},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {August},
   Abstract = {We raise three issues for Kitcher's Ethical Project: First,
             we argue that the genealogy of morals starts well before the
             advent of altruism-failures and the need to remedy them,
             which Kitcher dates at about 50K years ago. Second, we
             challenge the likelihood of long term moral progress of the
             sort Kitcher requires to establish objectivity while
             circumventing Hume's challenge to avoid trying to derive
             normative conclusions from positive ones-'ought' from 'is'.
             Third, we sketch ways in which Kitcher's metaethical
             opponents could respond to his arguments against them. ©
             Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart.},
   Key = {fds331102}
}

@article{fds244759,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Why do Spatiotemporally Restricted Regularities Explain in
             the Social Sciences?},
   Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {63},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-26},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {March},
   ISSN = {0007-0882},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000300327100001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axr014},
   Key = {fds244759}
}

@article{fds318391,
   Author = {Neander, K and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Solving the circularity problem for functions: A response to
             Nanay},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {109},
   Number = {10},
   Pages = {613-622},
   Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20121091030},
   Doi = {10.5840/jphil20121091030},
   Key = {fds318391}
}

@article{fds166628,
   Author = {A. Rosenberg and K. Neander},
   Title = {Are homolgies function free?},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {76},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {1-39},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds166628}
}

@article{fds318392,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
   Title = {Are homologies (selected effect or causal role) function
             free?},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {76},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {307-334},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/649807},
   Abstract = {This article argues that at least very many judgments of
             homology rest on prior attributions of selected-effect (SE)
             function, and that many of the "parts" of biological systems
             that are rightly classified as homologous are constituted by
             (are so classified in virtue of) their consequence
             etiologies. We claim that SE functions are often used in the
             prior identification of the parts deemed to be homologous
             and are often used to differentiate more restricted
             homologous kinds within less restricted ones. In doing so,
             we discuss recent criticism of this view that has been
             offered (especially that offered by Paul Griffiths).
             Copyright 2009 by the Philosophy of Science
             Association.},
   Doi = {10.1086/649807},
   Key = {fds318392}
}

@article{fds320322,
   Author = {Love, AC and Brigandt, I and Stotz, K and Schweitzer, D and Rosenberg,
             A},
   Title = {More worry and less love?},
   Journal = {Metascience},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {18-26},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-007-9159-9},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11016-007-9159-9},
   Key = {fds320322}
}

@article{fds244620,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {If economics is a science, what kind of a science is
             it?},
   Pages = {55-68},
   Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Kincaid, H},
   Year = {2008},
   Key = {fds244620}
}

@article{fds318393,
   Author = {Rosoff, PM and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {How Darwinian reductionism refutes genetic
             determinism.},
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies
             in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
             Sciences},
   Volume = {37},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {122-135},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.12.005},
   Abstract = {Genetic determinism labels the morally problematical claim
             that some socially significant traits, traits we care about,
             such as sexual orientation, gender roles, violence,
             alcoholism, mental illness, intelligence, are largely the
             results of the operation of genes and not much alterable by
             environment, learning or other human intervention. Genetic
             determinism does not require that genes literally fix these
             socially significant traits, but rather that they constrain
             them within narrow channels beyond human intervention. In
             this essay we analyze genetic determinism in light of what
             is now known about the inborn error of metabolism
             phenylketonuria (PKU), which has for so long been the poster
             child 'simple' argument in favor of some form of genetic
             determinism. We demonstrate that this case proves the exact
             opposite of what it has been proposed to support and
             provides a strong refutation of genetic determinism in all
             its guises.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.12.005},
   Key = {fds318393}
}

@article{fds244736,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {In defence of Genocentrism},
   Journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences. 2005
             ;27:345-59},
   Year = {2006},
   Key = {fds244736}
}

@article{fds244774,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
   Title = {Matten and Ariews Obituary for Fitness},
   Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {343-353},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {March},
   Key = {fds244774}
}

@article{fds320324,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
   Title = {Matthen and Ariew's obituary for fitness: Reports of its
             death have been greatly exaggerated},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {2-3},
   Pages = {343-353},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-2560-0},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10539-005-2560-0},
   Key = {fds320324}
}

@article{fds244775,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Kaplan, DM},
   Title = {How to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism about
             biology},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {72},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {43-68},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0031-8248},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000229131300003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {Physicalism and antireductionism are the ruling orthodoxy in
             the philosophy of biology. But these two theses are
             difficult to reconcile. Merely embracing an epistemic
             antireductionism will not suffice, as both reductionists and
             antireductionists accept that given our cognitive interests
             and limitations, non-molecular explanations may not be
             improved, corrected or grounded in molecular ones. Moreover,
             antireductionists themselves view their claim as a
             metaphysical or ontological one about the existence of facts
             molecular biology cannot identify, express or explain.
             However, this is tantamount to a rejection of physicalism
             and so causes the antireductionist discomfort. In this paper
             we argue that vindicating physicalism requires a
             physicalistic account of the principle of natural selection,
             and we provide such an account. The most important payoff to
             the account is that it provides for the very sort of
             autonomy from the physical that antireductionists need
             without threatening their commitment to physicalism.
             Copyright 2005 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All
             rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1086/428389},
   Key = {fds244775}
}

@article{fds320325,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Defending information-free genocentrism.},
   Journal = {History and philosophy of the life sciences},
   Volume = {27},
   Number = {3-4},
   Pages = {345-359},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {Genocentrism, the thesis that the genes play a special role
             in the causation of development is often rejected in favor
             of a 'causal democracy thesis' to the effect that all
             causally necessary conditions for development are equal.
             Genocentrists argue that genes play a distinct causal role
             owing to their informational content and that this content
             enables them to program the embryo. I show that the special
             causal role of the genome hinges not on its informational
             status--it has none, or at least no more than computer
             programs have independent of our interpretations of
             them--but on its power literally to program the embryo, a
             power nicely illustrated in the use of polynucleotide
             sequences to compute solutions to NP hard problems in
             mathematics.},
   Key = {fds320325}
}

@article{fds244735,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Linquist, S},
   Title = {On the original contract: evolutionary game theory and human
             evolution},
   Journal = {Analyze und Kritik},
   Volume = {27},
   Number = {1},
   Year = {2005},
   Key = {fds244735}
}

@article{fds244757,
   Author = {Bouchard, F and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Fitness, probability and the principles of natural
             selection},
   Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {55},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {693-712},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {0007-0882},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000225362200006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.1093/bjps/55.4.693},
   Key = {fds244757}
}

@article{fds336424,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {On the Priority of Intellectual Property Rights, Especially
             in Biotechnology},
   Journal = {Politics, Philosophy & Economics},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {77-95},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X04039983},
   Doi = {10.1177/1470594X04039983},
   Key = {fds336424}
}

@article{fds244771,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Political Philosophy of Intellectual Property, with
             Applications in Biotechnology},
   Journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {102-130},
   Year = {2004},
   Key = {fds244771}
}

@article{fds244772,
   Author = {Sommers, T and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Darwin's nihilistic idea: Evolution and the meaninglessness
             of life},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {653-668},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2003},
   Month = {November},
   ISSN = {0169-3867},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000186204700003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.1023/A:1026311011245},
   Key = {fds244772}
}

@article{fds244734,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The priority of intellectual property},
   Journal = {Fraser Forum, February 2003, pp. 12-15},
   Volume = {February},
   Pages = {12-15},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds244734}
}

@article{fds244761,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {On multiple realization and the special sciences},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {98},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {365-373},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {July},
   ISSN = {0022-362X},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000169968600003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.2307/2678441},
   Key = {fds244761}
}

@article{fds244762,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reductionism in a historical science},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {68},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {135-163},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {June},
   ISSN = {0031-8248},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000169074200001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.1086/392870},
   Key = {fds244762}
}

@article{fds244763,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {How is biological explanation possible?},
   Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {52},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {735-760},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2001},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0007-0882},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000172447300006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {That biology provides explanations is not open to doubt. But
             how it does so must be a vexed question for those who deny
             that biology embodies laws or other generalizations with the
             sort of explanatory force that the philosophy of science
             recognizes. The most common response to this problem has
             involved redefining law so that those grammatically general
             statements which biologists invoke in explanations can be
             counted as laws. But this terminological innovation cannot
             identify the source of biology's explanatory power. I argue
             that because biological science is historical, the problem
             of biological explanation can be assimilated to the parallel
             problem in the philosophy of history, and that the problem
             was solved by Carl Hempel. All we need to do is recognize
             that the only laws that biology - in all its compartments
             from the molecular onward - has or needs are the laws of
             natural selection.},
   Doi = {10.1093/bjps/52.4.735},
   Key = {fds244763}
}

@article{fds244733,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Indeterminacy, probability and randomness in evolutionary
             theory},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {64},
   Pages = {536-544},
   Year = {2001},
   Key = {fds244733}
}

@article{fds244731,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Privacy as a matter of taste and right},
   Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {68-90},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {June},
   Key = {fds244731}
}

@article{fds244730,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Clark, A},
   Title = {La Genetique et le holism debride},
   Journal = {Review Internationale de Philosophie},
   Volume = {4},
   Pages = {35-61},
   Year = {2000},
   Key = {fds244730}
}

@article{fds244732,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Problem of Enforcement: Is there an Alternative to
             Leviathan?},
   Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
   Volume = {7},
   Pages = {236-239},
   Year = {2000},
   Key = {fds244732}
}

@article{fds244726,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Economic theory as political philosophy},
   Journal = {The Social Science Journal},
   Volume = {36},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {575-587},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {1999},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(99)00039-7},
   Abstract = {I defend the integrity of the question of what the cognitive
             status of economic theory could amount to, and I argue that
             the theory is best understood as a compartment of formal
             political philosophy, in particular a species of
             contractarianism. This seems particularly apt as an account
             of general equilibrium theory. Given the intentional
             character of the explanatory variables of economic theory
             and the role of information in effecting choice, it is
             argued that economic theory is unlikely to secure the
             predictive power that would enable it to function as a
             factual instead of a normative theory.},
   Doi = {10.1016/S0362-3319(99)00039-7},
   Key = {fds244726}
}

@article{fds244727,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Naturalistic Epistemology for Eliminative
             Materialists},
   Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
   Volume = {59},
   Pages = {1-24},
   Year = {1999},
   Key = {fds244727}
}

@article{fds244728,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Les Limits de la Connaissance Biologique},
   Journal = {Annales d’histoire et de philosophie du
             vivant},
   Volume = {2},
   Pages = {15-35},
   Year = {1999},
   Key = {fds244728}
}

@article{fds244729,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Horan, B and Graves, L},
   Title = {Is Indeterminism the Source of the Statistical Character of
             the Theory of natural Selection},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {66},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {140-157},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {1999},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392680},
   Abstract = {We argue that Brandon and Carson's (1996) "The
             Indeterministic Character of Evolutionary Theory" fails to
             identify any indeterminism that would require evolutionary
             theory to be a statistical or probabilistic theory.
             Specifically, we argue that (1) their demonstration of a
             mechanism by which quantum indeterminism might "percolate
             up" to the biological level is irrelevant; (2) their
             argument that natural selection is indeterministic because
             it is inextricably connected with drift fails to join the
             issue with determinism; and (3) their view that experimental
             methodology in botany assumes indeterminism is both false
             and incompatible with the commitment to discoverable causal
             mechanisms underlying biological processes. We remain
             convinced that the probabilism of the theory of evolution is
             epistemically, not ontologically, motivated.},
   Doi = {10.1086/392680},
   Key = {fds244729}
}

@article{fds244725,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {La teoria economica como filosofia politica},
   Journal = {Teoria},
   Volume = {13},
   Pages = {279-299},
   Year = {1998},
   Key = {fds244725}
}

@article{fds244724,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reductionism Redux: Computing the Embryo},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {445-470},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1997},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006574719901},
   Abstract = {This paper argues that the consensus physicalist
             antireductionism in the philosophy of biology cannot
             accommodate the research strategy or indeed the recent
             findings of molecular developmental biology. After
             describing Wolpert's programmatic claims on its behalf, and
             recent work by Gehring and others to identify the molecular
             determinants of development, the paper attempts to identify
             the relationship between evolutionary and developmental
             biology by reconciling two apparently conflicting accounts
             of bio-function - Wright's and Nagel's (as elaborated by
             Cummins). Finally, the paper seeks a way of defending the
             two central theses of physicalist antireductionism in the
             light of the research program of molecular developmental
             biology, by sharply reducing their metaphysical
             force.},
   Doi = {10.1023/A:1006574719901},
   Key = {fds244724}
}

@article{fds320326,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Can physicalist antireductionism compute the
             embryo?},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {64},
   Number = {4 SUPPL. 1},
   Pages = {S359-S371},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {1997},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392614},
   Abstract = {It is widely held that (1) there are autonomous levels of
             organization above that of the macromolecule and that (2) at
             least sometimes macromolecular processes are best explained
             in terms of such autonomous kinds. I argue that molecular
             developmental biology honors neither of these claims, and I
             show that the only way they can be rendered consistent with
             a minimal physicalism is through the adoption of
             controversial claims about causation and explanation which
             undercut the force of these two antireductionism claims.
             Copyright 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All
             rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1086/392614},
   Key = {fds320326}
}

@article{fds320327,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Critical review: Sober's philosophy of biology and his
             philosophy of biology},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {63},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {452-464},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {December},
   Abstract = {An examination of the foundations of Elliot Sober's
             philosophy of biology as reflected in his introductory
             textbook of that title reveals substantial and controversial
             philosophical commitments. Among these are the claim that
             all understanding is historical, the assertion that there
             are biological laws but they are necessary truths, the view
             that the fundamental theory in biology is a narrative, and
             the suggestion that biology adverts to ungrounded
             probabilistic propensities of the sort to be met with
             elsewhere only in quantum mechanics.},
   Key = {fds320327}
}

@article{fds244720,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism},
   Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {47},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-29},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/47.1.1},
   Doi = {10.1093/bjps/47.1.1},
   Key = {fds244720}
}

@article{fds244722,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Laws, damn laws, and ceteris paribus clauses},
   Journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {34},
   Number = {S1},
   Pages = {183-204},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {1996},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00820.x},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00820.x},
   Key = {fds244722}
}

@article{fds244721,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Sober’s "Philosophy of Biology" and His Philosophy of
             Biology},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {63},
   Pages = {452-465},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds244721}
}

@article{fds244723,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Research Tactics and Economic Strategies: Case of the Human
             Genome Project},
   Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
   Volume = {13},
   Pages = {1-18},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds244723}
}

@article{fds244718,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Equality, Sufficiency, and Opportunity in the Just
             Society},
   Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {54-71},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1995},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500004672},
   Abstract = {<jats:p>It seems to be almost a given of contemporary
             Anglo-American political philosophy that the just society is
             obligated to establish and ensure the equality of its
             members. Debate begins when we come to delineate the forms
             and limits of the equality society is obligated to
             underwrite. In this essay I offer the subversive suggestion
             that equality is not something the just society should aim
             for. Instead I offer another objective, one which is to be
             preferred both because it is more attainable and because it
             is morally more defensible than equality, either as an ideal
             or as an operative principle. The demand for equality of
             treatment, of opportunity, or of outcome, is a distraction
             from morally more significant aims.</jats:p>},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500004672},
   Key = {fds244718}
}

@article{fds244719,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Metaphysical Foundations of Microeconomics},
   Journal = {Monist},
   Volume = {78},
   Pages = {353-367},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds244719}
}

@article{fds244717,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Hoefer, C},
   Title = {Empirical Equivalence, Underdetermination and Systems of the
             World},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {61},
   Pages = {592-607},
   Year = {1994},
   Key = {fds244717}
}

@article{fds320328,
   Author = {ROSENBERG, A},
   Title = {Genie Selection, Molecular Biology and Biological
             Instrumentalism},
   Journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {343-362},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {1993},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00272.x},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00272.x},
   Key = {fds320328}
}

@article{fds244713,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {"Hausman, Inexact and Separate Science of Economics,”
             Critical Notice},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {90},
   Pages = {533-537},
   Year = {1993},
   Key = {fds244713}
}

@article{fds244714,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Scientific Innovation and the Limits of Social Scientific
             Prediction},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Volume = {97},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {1-21},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1993},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01064113},
   Doi = {10.1007/bf01064113},
   Key = {fds244714}
}

@article{fds244715,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Genic Selection and Biological Instrumentalism},
   Journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
   Volume = {XVIII},
   Pages = {343-362},
   Year = {1993},
   Key = {fds244715}
}

@article{fds244716,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Powers and Limits of Agricultural Economics},
   Journal = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics},
   Volume = {75},
   Pages = {15-24},
   Year = {1993},
   Key = {fds244716}
}

@article{fds244712,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Selection and Science: Critical notice of David Hull's
             Science as a Process},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {217-228},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1992},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00129886},
   Abstract = {An examination of Hull's claims about the nature of
             interactors, replicators and selection, with special
             attention to how the genetic material realizes the first two
             types, and a critique of Hull's attempt to apply the theory
             of natural selection to the explanation of scientific
             change, and in particular the succession of theories. I
             conclude that difficulties attending the molecular
             instantiation of Hull's theory are vastly increased when it
             comes to be applied to "memes." © 1992 Kluwer Academic
             Publishers.},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00129886},
   Key = {fds244712}
}

@article{fds244710,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Contractarianism and the Trolley},
   Journal = {Journal of Social Philosophy, 23, 1992: 88-104},
   Volume = {23},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {88-104},
   Year = {1992},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1992.tb00134.x},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9833.1992.tb00134.x},
   Key = {fds244710}
}

@article{fds244711,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Causation, Probability and the Monarchy},
   Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
   Volume = {29},
   Pages = {305-318},
   Year = {1992},
   Key = {fds244711}
}

@article{fds244708,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Adequacy criteria for a theory of fitness},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {38-41},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1991},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02426822},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF02426822},
   Key = {fds244708}
}

@article{fds244706,
   Author = {ROSENBERG, ALEXANDER},
   Title = {Moral Realism and Social Science*},
   Journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
   Volume = {15},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {150-166},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {1990},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1990.tb00211.x},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1990.tb00211.x},
   Key = {fds244706}
}

@article{fds244707,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Normative Naturalism and the Role of Philosophy},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {57},
   Pages = {34-43},
   Year = {1990},
   Key = {fds244707}
}

@article{fds320329,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Is lewis's 'genuine modal realism' magical
             too?},
   Journal = {Mind},
   Volume = {98},
   Number = {391},
   Pages = {411-421},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {1989},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCVIII.391.411},
   Doi = {10.1093/mind/XCVIII.391.411},
   Key = {fds320329}
}

@article{fds244704,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Are generic predictions enough?},
   Journal = {Erkenntnis},
   Volume = {30},
   Number = {1-2},
   Pages = {43-68},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1989},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00184815},
   Abstract = {I have argued not that economics has no predictive content,
             but that it is limited, or at least has so far been limited
             to generic predictions. Now this is an important kind of
             prediction, and almost certainly a necessary preliminary to
             specific or quantitative predictions. But if the sketch of
             an important episode in the twentieth century history of the
             subject I have given is both correct and representative,
             then economics seems pretty well stuck at the level of
             generic prediction. And at least some influential economists
             and philosophers of economics seem well satisfied with
             stopping at the point of generic prediction. Or at least
             they give no other reason than its power to produce such
             predictions as a justification for the character of economic
             theory. But this leads to the question that is the title of
             my paper, is generic prediction enough? © 1989 Kluwer
             Academic Publishers.},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00184815},
   Key = {fds244704}
}

@article{fds244700,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Superseding Explanation vs. Understanding: The View from
             Rorty},
   Journal = {Social Research},
   Volume = {56},
   Pages = {479-510},
   Year = {1989},
   Key = {fds244700}
}

@article{fds244701,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Is Lewis’s Genuine Modal Realism Magical
             Too?},
   Journal = {Mind},
   Volume = {98},
   Pages = {412-421},
   Year = {1989},
   Key = {fds244701}
}

@article{fds244702,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Perceptual Presentations and Biological Functions: A Comment
             on Matthen},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {86},
   Pages = {38-44},
   Year = {1989},
   Key = {fds244702}
}

@article{fds244703,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Intensionality, intenSionality and Representation},
   Journal = {Behaviorism},
   Volume = {17},
   Pages = {137-140},
   Year = {1989},
   Key = {fds244703}
}

@article{fds244705,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Russell vs. Steiner on Physics and Causality},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {56},
   Pages = {341-347},
   Year = {1989},
   Key = {fds244705}
}

@article{fds244693,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Past Recaptured: Mongin on the Problem of Realism in
             Economics},
   Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {379-381},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1988},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318801800307},
   Doi = {10.1177/004839318801800307},
   Key = {fds244693}
}

@article{fds244697,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Is the Theory of Natural Selection a Statistical
             Theory?},
   Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {sup1},
   Pages = {187-207},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {1988},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1988.10715949},
   Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1988.10715949},
   Key = {fds244697}
}

@article{fds320330,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Will the argument for abstracta please stand
             up?},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {11},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {526-527},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1988},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00058799},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00058799},
   Key = {fds320330}
}

@article{fds244694,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Are Generic Predictions Enough?},
   Journal = {Fundamenta Scientiae},
   Volume = {9},
   Pages = {329-352},
   Year = {1988},
   Key = {fds244694}
}

@article{fds244695,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Will the Real Argument for "Abstracta" Please Stand
             Up?},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {11},
   Pages = {526-527},
   Year = {1988},
   Key = {fds244695}
}

@article{fds244696,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Grievous Faults in "Vaulting Ambition"?},
   Journal = {Ethics},
   Volume = {98},
   Pages = {827-838},
   Year = {1988},
   Key = {fds244696}
}

@article{fds244698,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Rhetoric is Not Important Enough for Economists to Bother
             About},
   Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
   Volume = {4},
   Pages = {173-175},
   Year = {1988},
   Key = {fds244698}
}

@article{fds244699,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Economics Is Too Important to be Left to the
             Rhetoricians},
   Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
   Volume = {4},
   Pages = {129-149},
   Year = {1988},
   Key = {fds244699}
}

@article{fds244689,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Is there really “juggling,” “artifice,” and
             “trickery” in Genes, Mind, and Culture?},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {10},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {80-82},
   Year = {1987},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00056429},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00056429},
   Key = {fds244689}
}

@article{fds244690,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The political philosophy of biological endowments: Some
             considerations},
   Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
   Volume = {5},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-31},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1987},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500001229},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500001229},
   Key = {fds244690}
}

@article{fds244691,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Weintraub’s aims: A Brief Rejoinder},
   Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {143-144},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1987},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100002807},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0266267100002807},
   Key = {fds244691}
}

@article{fds244692,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Why Does the Nature of Species Matter},
   Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
   Volume = {2},
   Pages = {192-197},
   Year = {1987},
   Key = {fds244692}
}

@article{fds244681,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Ignorance and disinformation in the philosophy of biology: A
             reply to Stent},
   Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
   Volume = {1},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {461-471},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1986},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00140963},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00140963},
   Key = {fds244681}
}

@article{fds244685,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Lakatosian consolations for economics},
   Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {127-139},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1986},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100000821},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0266267100000821},
   Key = {fds244685}
}

@article{fds244682,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Intentional Psychology and Evolutionary Biology: Part II:
             Crucial Disanalogy},
   Journal = {Behaviorism},
   Volume = {14},
   Pages = {125-138},
   Year = {1986},
   Key = {fds244682}
}

@article{fds244683,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Intentional Psychology and Evolutionary Biology, Part I: The
             Uneasy Analogy},
   Journal = {Behaviorism},
   Volume = {14},
   Pages = {15-28},
   Year = {1986},
   Key = {fds244683}
}

@article{fds244684,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Causation and Explanation in Evolutionary
             Biology},
   Journal = {Behaviorism},
   Volume = {14},
   Pages = {77-88},
   Year = {1986},
   Key = {fds244684}
}

@article{fds244686,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {On the Explanatory Role of Existence Proofs},
   Journal = {Ethics},
   Volume = {97},
   Pages = {177-186},
   Year = {1986},
   Key = {fds244686}
}

@article{fds244687,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {What Rosenberg’s Philosophy of Economics Is
             Not},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {53},
   Pages = {127-132},
   Year = {1986},
   Key = {fds244687}
}

@article{fds244688,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Williams, MB},
   Title = {Fitness as Primitive and Propensity},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {53},
   Pages = {412-418},
   Year = {1986},
   Key = {fds244688}
}

@article{fds244678,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Prospects for the Elimination of Tastes from Economics and
             Ethics},
   Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {02},
   Pages = {48-48},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1985},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003216},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0265052500003216},
   Key = {fds244678}
}

@article{fds244677,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Methodology, Theory and the Philosophy of
             Science},
   Journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
   Volume = {66},
   Pages = {377-393},
   Year = {1985},
   Key = {fds244677}
}

@article{fds244679,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Place of Psychology in a Vacuum of Theories},
   Journal = {Annals of Theoretical Psychology},
   Volume = {3},
   Pages = {95-102},
   Year = {1985},
   Key = {fds244679}
}

@article{fds244680,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Williams, MB},
   Title = {Fitness in Fact and Fiction},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {82},
   Pages = {738-749},
   Year = {1985},
   Key = {fds244680}
}

@article{fds244675,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Fitness, reinforcement, underlying mechanisms},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {04},
   Pages = {495-495},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1984},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x0002690x},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x0002690x},
   Key = {fds244675}
}

@article{fds244676,
   Author = {ROSENBERG, A},
   Title = {Mackie and Shoemaker on Dispositions and
             Properties},
   Journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {77-91},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {1984},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00053.x},
   Abstract = {In “Dispositions and Powers,” J. L. Mackie identifies
             three different “ontological views about dispositions”:
             The first is the one Armstrong calls phenomenalist and
             ascribes to Ryle: we attribute a minimal disposition, which
             is in effect to assert a conditional or set of conditionals,
             themselves to be interpreted as inference tickets; but this
             does not mean anything is going on in the things to which we
             attribute the disposition which is not going on in similar
             things from which we withhold this description. The second
             is the ‘realist’ view, that dispositions have occurrent
             (and concurrent) categorical bases consisting of properties
             which are not in themselves peculiarly dispositional, though
             they may be introduced in the dispositional style and may be
             known only as the bases of these dispositions; although the
             dispositional descriptions are conditional‐entailing, the
             properties to which they point are only contingently related
             to the displays of the dispositions. The third is what we
             may call the rationalist view; dispositions (while still
             being intrinsically dispositional and conditional‐entailing)
             are real occurrent states of the object, different from
             anything a realist would call a categorical basis (which may
             or may not be there as well), but actually present both when
             the disposition is being manifested and when it is not.
             Copyright © 1984, Wiley Blackwell. All rights
             reserved},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00053.x},
   Key = {fds244676}
}

@article{fds244670,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Protagoras Among the Physicists},
   Journal = {Dialogue},
   Volume = {22},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {311-317},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1983},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300018011},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300018011},
   Key = {fds244670}
}

@article{fds320331,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Content and consciousness versus the International
             stance},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {375-376},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1983},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00016629},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00016629},
   Key = {fds320331}
}

@article{fds244668,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Consciousness and Content vs. the Intentional
             Stance},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {6},
   Pages = {375-376},
   Year = {1983},
   Key = {fds244668}
}

@article{fds244669,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Coefficients, Effects and Genic Selection},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {50},
   Pages = {332-338},
   Year = {1983},
   Key = {fds244669}
}

@article{fds244671,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {If Economics Isn’t Science, What Is It?},
   Journal = {Philosophical Forum},
   Volume = {14},
   Pages = {296-314},
   Year = {1983},
   Key = {fds244671}
}

@article{fds244672,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Human Sciences: Obstacles and Opportunities},
   Journal = {Syracuse Scholar},
   Volume = {4},
   Pages = {63-80},
   Year = {1983},
   Key = {fds244672}
}

@article{fds244673,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Critical Notice of Genes, Mind and Culture},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {80},
   Pages = {304-311},
   Year = {1983},
   Key = {fds244673}
}

@article{fds244674,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Fitness},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {80},
   Pages = {457-474},
   Year = {1983},
   Key = {fds244674}
}

@article{fds244666,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Are there culturgens?},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {5},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {22-24},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1982},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00010281},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00010281},
   Key = {fds244666}
}

@article{fds244664,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Harden, CL},
   Title = {In Defense of Convergent Realism},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {49},
   Pages = {604-615},
   Year = {1982},
   Key = {fds244664}
}

@article{fds244665,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Harden, CL},
   Title = {On the Propensity Definition of Fitness},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {49},
   Pages = {605-615},
   Year = {1982},
   Key = {fds244665}
}

@article{fds244667,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {In Hume’s Cause: A Reply to Mackie and
             Flew},
   Journal = {Philosophical Books},
   Volume = {23},
   Pages = {140-146},
   Year = {1982},
   Key = {fds244667}
}

@article{fds244662,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Typologies: Obstacles and opportunities in scientific
             change},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {4},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {298-299},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1981},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00009006},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00009006},
   Key = {fds244662}
}

@article{fds244663,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Critical Notice of Method and Appraisal in
             Economics},
   Journal = {Nous},
   Volume = {15},
   Pages = {225-230},
   Year = {1981},
   Key = {fds244663}
}

@article{fds244660,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {A skeptical history of microeconomic theory},
   Journal = {Theory and Decision},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {79-93},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1980},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00154660},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00154660},
   Key = {fds244660}
}

@article{fds244661,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Obstacles to the Nomological Connection of Reasons and
             Actions},
   Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
   Volume = {10},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {79-91},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1980},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318001000106},
   Doi = {10.1177/004839318001000106},
   Key = {fds244661}
}

@article{fds244659,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Species Notions and the Theoretical Hierarchy of
             Biology},
   Journal = {Nature and System},
   Volume = {2},
   Pages = {163-172},
   Year = {1980},
   Key = {fds244659}
}

@article{fds244658,
   Author = {ROSENBERG, ALEXANDER and MARTIN, ROBERTM},
   Title = {The Extensionality of Causal Contexts},
   Journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
   Volume = {4},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {401-408},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {1979},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00389.x},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00389.x},
   Key = {fds244658}
}

@article{fds244657,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Can Economic Theory Explain Everything?},
   Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {509-529},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1979},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317900900409},
   Doi = {10.1177/004839317900900409},
   Key = {fds244657}
}

@article{fds244656,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Causation and Counterfactuals: Lewis’ Treatment
             Reconsidered},
   Journal = {Dialogue},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {02},
   Pages = {210-219},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1979},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300048071},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0012217300048071},
   Key = {fds244656}
}

@article{fds244655,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Hollis and Nell: Rationalist Economic Men},
   Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
   Volume = {8},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {87-98},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1978},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317800800109},
   Doi = {10.1177/004839317800800109},
   Key = {fds244655}
}

@article{fds244652,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Genetics and the Theory of Natural Selection: Synthesis or
             Sustenance?},
   Journal = {Nature and System, 1, 1978: 3-15.},
   Volume = {1},
   Pages = {3-15},
   Year = {1978},
   Key = {fds244652}
}

@article{fds244653,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Puzzle of Economic Modeling},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {75},
   Pages = {679-683},
   Year = {1978},
   Key = {fds244653}
}

@article{fds244654,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Supervenience of Biological Concepts},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {45},
   Pages = {368-386},
   Year = {1978},
   Key = {fds244654}
}

@article{fds244651,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Concrete occurrences vs. explanatory facts: Mackie on the
             extensionality of causal statements},
   Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
   Volume = {31},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {133-140},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1977},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01857183},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF01857183},
   Key = {fds244651}
}

@article{fds244650,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Beauchamp, TL},
   Title = {Critical Notice of The Cement of the Universe},
   Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {371-404},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {1977},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1977.10717025},
   Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1977.10717025},
   Key = {fds244650}
}

@article{fds244647,
   Author = {Martin, RM and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Rejoinder to Puccetti},
   Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {143-144},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {1976},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1976.10716985},
   Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1976.10716985},
   Key = {fds244647}
}

@article{fds244648,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {On the Interanimation of Micro and Macroeconomics},
   Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {35-53},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1976},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317600600103},
   Doi = {10.1177/004839317600600103},
   Key = {fds244648}
}

@article{fds244649,
   Author = {Martin, RM and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Materialism and Evolution: A Reconsideration},
   Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {127-138},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {1976},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1976.10716983},
   Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1976.10716983},
   Key = {fds244649}
}

@article{fds244646,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The nomological character of microeconomics},
   Journal = {Theory and Decision},
   Volume = {6},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-26},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1975},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00139817},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00139817},
   Key = {fds244646}
}

@article{fds244643,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Terms of experience and theory: A rejoinder to
             Körner},
   Journal = {Dialogue},
   Volume = {14},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {309-311},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1975},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300043420},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300043420},
   Key = {fds244643}
}

@article{fds244644,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The virtues of vagueness in the languages of
             science},
   Journal = {Dialogue},
   Volume = {14},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {281-305},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1975},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300043407},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300043407},
   Key = {fds244644}
}

@article{fds244645,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Proper Hoc, Ergo Post Hoc},
   Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
   Volume = {12},
   Pages = {245-254},
   Year = {1975},
   Key = {fds244645}
}

@article{fds244640,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and MacIntosh, NJ},
   Title = {Strong, Weak, and Functional Equivalence in Machine
             Simulation},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {41},
   Pages = {412-414},
   Year = {1974},
   Key = {fds244640}
}

@article{fds244641,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {On Kim’s Account of Events and Event Identity},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {71},
   Pages = {327-336},
   Year = {1974},
   Key = {fds244641}
}

@article{fds244642,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Beauchamp, TL},
   Title = {Singular Causal Statements: a Reconsideration},
   Journal = {Philosophical Forum, 5, 1974: 611-618},
   Volume = {5},
   Pages = {611-618},
   Year = {1974},
   Key = {fds244642}
}

@article{fds244639,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Causation and recipes: The mixture as before?},
   Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
   Volume = {24},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {378-385},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {1973},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00376106},
   Doi = {10.1007/BF00376106},
   Key = {fds244639}
}

@article{fds244636,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Campbell, R},
   Title = {Action, Purpose and Consciousness Among the
             Computers},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {40},
   Pages = {547-557},
   Year = {1973},
   Key = {fds244636}
}

@article{fds244637,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Mill and Some Contemporary Critics on ‘Cause’},
   Journal = {Personalist},
   Volume = {54},
   Pages = {123-129},
   Year = {1973},
   Key = {fds244637}
}

@article{fds244638,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {On Fodor’s Distinction Between Strong and Weak Equivalence
             in Machine Simulation},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {40},
   Pages = {118-120},
   Year = {1973},
   Key = {fds244638}
}

@article{fds244635,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Friedman's 'Methodology' for Economics: A Critical
             Examination},
   Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {15-29},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1972},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317200200102},
   Doi = {10.1177/004839317200200102},
   Key = {fds244635}
}

@article{fds331104,
   Author = {Braybrooke, D and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Comment: Getting the war news straight: The actual situation
             in the philosophy of science},
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Volume = {66},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {818-826},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {1972},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1957480},
   Doi = {10.2307/1957480},
   Key = {fds331104}
}

@article{fds244633,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Braybrooke, D},
   Title = {Anti-behaviourism in the Hour of its Disintegration},
   Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
   Volume = {2},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {355-363},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {1972},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317200200127},
   Doi = {10.1177/004839317200200127},
   Key = {fds244633}
}

@article{fds244634,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Braybrooke, D},
   Title = {Getting the War News Straight: The Actual Situation in the
             Philosophy of Science},
   Journal = {American Political Science Review, 66, 1972:
             818-826},
   Volume = {66},
   Pages = {818-826},
   Year = {1972},
   Key = {fds244634}
}


%% Papers Accepted   
@article{fds244632,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reflexivity, Uncertainty and the Unity of
             Science},
   Journal = {Review of Economic Methodology},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {14-14},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {Winter},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178x.2013.859413},
   Doi = {10.1080/1350178x.2013.859413},
   Key = {fds244632}
}

@article{fds244766,
   Author = {Lange, M and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Can There beA PrioriCausal Models of Natural
             Selection?},
   Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {89},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {591-599},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {0004-8402},
   url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048402.2011.598175},
   Doi = {10.1080/00048402.2011.598175},
   Key = {fds244766}
}

@article{fds244765,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
   Title = {Solving the circularity problem for functions},
   Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {Summer},
   Key = {fds244765}
}

@article{fds244767,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
   Title = {Are homologies function free?},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Pages = {approximately 35 pages},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {Fall},
   Key = {fds244767}
}

@article{fds244768,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Darwinian Reductionism: How stupid of me to have thought of
             it},
   Journal = {Metascience},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {Fall},
   Key = {fds244768}
}

@article{fds244769,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Is epigeneis a counterexample to the central
             dogma},
   Journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences},
   Volume = {28},
   Pages = {509-526},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {September},
   Key = {fds244769}
}

@article{fds244770,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Rosoff, P},
   Title = {How reductionism refutes genetic determinism},
   Journal = {Studies in the History and Philosophy of the Biological and
             Biomedical Sciences},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {July},
   Key = {fds244770}
}

@article{fds244631,
   Author = {Brav, A and Heaton, JB and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The rational-behavioral debate in financial
             economics},
   Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
   Volume = {11},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {393-409},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {December},
   ISSN = {1350-178X},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178042000177978},
   Abstract = {The contest between rational and behavioral finance is
             poorly understood as a contest overtestability' and
             'predictive success.' In fact, neither rational nor
             behavioral finance offer much in the way of testable
             predictions of improving precision. Researchers in the
             rational paradigm seem to have abandoned testability and
             prediction in favor of a scheme of ex post
             'rationalizations' of observed price behavior. These
             rationalizations, however, have an unemphasized relevance
             for behavioral finance. While behavioral finance advocates
             may justly criticize rationalizations as unlikely to lead to
             a science of financial economics with improving predictive
             power, rational finance's explanatory power plays a key role
             supporting the limits of arbitrage arguments that make
             behavioral finance possible.},
   Doi = {10.1080/1350178042000177978},
   Key = {fds244631}
}


%% Papers Submitted   
@article{fds244630,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {From rational choice to reflexivity},
   Journal = {Economic Thought (on-line)},
   Pages = {32-32},
   Year = {2013},
   url = {http://etdiscussion.worldeconomicsassociation.org/?post=from-rational-choice-to-reflexivity-learning-from-sen-keynes-hayek-soros-and-most-of-all-from-darwin},
   Key = {fds244630}
}


%% Articles and Chapters   
@article{fds340757,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophical Challenges for Scientism (and How to Meet
             Them?)},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0004},
   Abstract = {<p>Scientism is expounded. Then its two major challenges are
             stated and responses to them sketched. The first challenge
             is to its epistemology of mathematics-how we know the
             necessary truths of mathematics. The second challenge is to
             the very coherence of its eliminativist account of
             cognition. The first of these problems is likely to be taken
             more seriously by philosophers than by other advocates of
             scientism. It is a problem that has absorbed philosophers
             since Plato and on which little progress has been made. The
             second is often unnoticed, even among those who endorse
             scientism, since they don’t recognize their own commitment
             to eliminativism and so do not appreciate the threat of
             incoherence it poses. It is important for scientism to
             acknowledge these challenges.</p>},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0004},
   Key = {fds340757}
}

@article{fds336420,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Darwinism as philosophy can the universal acid be
             contained?},
   Pages = {23-50},
   Booktitle = {How Biology Shapes Philosophy: New Foundations for
             Naturalism},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781107055834},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781107295490.003},
   Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2017. The history of science
             has a broad pattern. Each science, including mathematics,
             began its life as a subdiscipline of philosophy, or at least
             as among the concerns of philosophers. Mathematics - at
             first mainly the science of space - separated itself from
             philosophy in the time of Plato and Euclid, physics in the
             period from Galileo to Newton, chemistry in a process that
             mainly took place during the lifetimes of figures from Boyle
             to Lavoisier, and biology from 1859, when the “Newton of
             the blade of grass” was compelled to publish On the Origin
             of Species. As each of these disciplines separated itself
             from philosophy, it left questions to philosophy that it
             didn’t need to answer or was unable to answer, questions
             that looked like they should be addressed by the science
             that relegated them to “mere” philosophy. Two obvious
             examples: mathematicians never seemed to need to answer the
             question, “What is a number?" Physicists have for the most
             part steered clear of addressing the question, “What is
             time?" The agenda of philosophy is replete with questions
             the sciences (and mathematics) can’t answer yet, may never
             be able to answer, and don’t need to answer. In addition
             to this first set of questions the sciences cannot (yet or
             perhaps ever) answer or don’t need to answer, there are
             the second-order questions about why the sciences can’t
             (yet) or don’t need to answer the first set of questions.
             This pattern in the history of science was finally broken by
             Darwin. Instead of leaving questions to philosophy, his
             breakthrough enabled the sciences, in particular, biology,
             to begin to take on questions that from Aristotle’s time
             onward had been the exclusive preserve of philosophy. It
             took more than a century of repeated forays by biologists
             and philosophers inspired by Darwin to convince the
             disciplines - biology and philosophy - that the former could
             deal with the questions of the latter and then to shape the
             answers biology provides to a host of perennial questions in
             philosophy. The prominence of “naturalism” in
             metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, the
             philosophy of language, and moral philosophy is evidence of
             this achievement. Nowadays, philosophical “naturalism”
             pretty much means philosophy driven by mainly insights from
             Darwin.},
   Doi = {10.1017/9781107295490.003},
   Key = {fds336420}
}

@article{fds320319,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The biological character of social theory},
   Pages = {31-58},
   Booktitle = {Handbook on Evolution and Society: Toward an Evolutionary
             Social Science},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781612058146},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315634203},
   Abstract = {© 2015, Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. This chapter
             argues that all social sciences need to take seriously their
             status as divisions of biology, and that, as such, they need
             to recognize the central role of Darwinian processes in all
             the phenomena they seek to explain. The argument is
             formulated in terms of a small number of relatively precise
             premises that focus on the nature of the kinds and
             taxonomies of all the social sciences. The analytical
             taxonomy of the social sciences is shown to require a
             Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a nativist
             or genetically driven framework. Hie fundamental role of
             Darwinian processes in human cultural evolution establishes
             limitations on the explanatory aspirations of alternative
             theories in the social sciences, including especially
             rational choice theory, the currently most fashionable
             explanatory approach in several social and behavioral
             sciences. An apparently widespread objection to a biological
             approach to human affairs proceeds from the denial that
             there are "replicators," and in particular "menies," in
             human affairs. This objection is shown to be misdirected.
             The chapter goes on to expound a general account of how
             Darwinian processes operate in human affairs by selecting
             for strategies and sets of strategies humans employ. The
             last section shows how a great deal of social science can be
             organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s approach to
             biological inquiry, an approach required by the fact that
             the social sciences are all divisions of biology, and in
             particular the studies of one particular biological
             species.},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781315634203},
   Key = {fds320319}
}

@article{fds331101,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Replies to critics very brief, very selective, rather
             snarky},
   Pages = {166-170},
   Booktitle = {Is Faith in God Reasonable?: Debates in Philosophy, Science,
             and Rhetoric},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780415709408},
   Key = {fds331101}
}

@article{fds244619,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Craig, WL},
   Title = {The debate: Is faith in God reasonable?},
   Series = {Routledge Studies inthe Philosophy of Religion},
   Booktitle = {Is Faith in God Reasonable? Debates in Philosophy, Science
             and Rhetoric},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Editor = {Miller, C and Gould, P},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds244619}
}

@article{fds244614,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Disenchanted Naturalism},
   Pages = {17-36},
   Booktitle = {Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its
             Implications},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Address = {London},
   Editor = {Bashour, B and Muller, H},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds244614}
}

@article{fds244615,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Can naturalism save the humanities?},
   Pages = {39-42},
   Booktitle = {The Armchair or the Laboratory},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Editor = {Haug, M},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds244615}
}

@article{fds244616,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reply to critics},
   Series = {Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion},
   Booktitle = {Is Faith in God Reasonable? Debates in Philosophy, Science
             and Rhetoric},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Editor = {Miller, C and Gould, P},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds244616}
}

@article{fds244617,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Why I am a naturalist},
   Pages = {32-35},
   Booktitle = {The Armchair or the Laboratory},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Editor = {Haug, M},
   Year = {2013},
   ISBN = {978-0-415-53131-3},
   Key = {fds244617}
}

@article{fds244618,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Theism and Allism},
   Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Peter Van Inwagen},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Keller, JCA},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds244618}
}

@article{fds183673,
   Author = {A. Rosenberg},
   Title = {"Why do spatiotemporally restricted regularities explain in
             the social sciences?"},
   Journal = {British Journal for Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {63},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-26},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/63/1/1.full},
   Abstract = {Br J Philos Sci (2012) 63 (1): 1-26.},
   Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axr014},
   Key = {fds183673}
}

@article{fds320320,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Designing a successor to the patent as second best solution
             to the problem of optimum provision of good
             ideas},
   Pages = {88-109},
   Booktitle = {New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual
             Property},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781107009318},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511920837.004},
   Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2012. This chapter reviews
             welfarist arguments for government intervention to optimize
             the provision of good ideas that arise from their nature. It
             shows that, paradoxically, these same considerations provide
             reasons to think that, as a solution to the good
             idea-optimization problem, the patent will increasingly fail
             to be effective. This ineffectiveness is accelerated by
             technological developments as well. The problem that
             welfarism thus faces is to provide a new institution or
             regime that encourages the optimum provision and utilization
             of good ideas that will avoid the difficulties which the
             patent must inevitably impose and which technological
             developments are hastening. An examination of the reward
             system of pure science, however, suggests such a solution,
             and the chapter goes on to sketch ways in which this
             solution pure science uses can be implemented more broadly.
             The near-public goods character of good ideas and argument
             for intellectual property rights The welfarist argument for
             intellectual property rights is based on the near-public
             goods properties of good ideas. In a competitive market
             among economically rational agents that lacks property
             rights in good ideas, there must inevitably be an
             undersupply of good ideas: discovering and testing good
             ideas is costly and risky. Consider the obvious example of
             crop rotation. Establishing its enhancement of agricultural
             yields takes several growing seasons, during which some
             fields are removed from production altogether. No one has an
             incentive to undertake the experiment, but everyone has an
             incentive to watch others undertake it and copy the early
             adopters should the innovation work. But if no one has the
             appropriate incentive, there are no early adopters and crop
             rotation is unlikely ever to be invented. Ergo, the absence
             of property rights in good ideas leads to underinvestment in
             and undersupply of them.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511920837.004},
   Key = {fds320320}
}

@article{fds244613,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Designing an alternative to the patent as a second best
             solution to the problem of intellectual property},
   Booktitle = {New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual
             Property},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Lever, A},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {Summer},
   Key = {fds244613}
}

@article{fds200378,
   Author = {A. Rosenberg},
   Title = {"How physcis fakes design"},
   Booktitle = {Evolutionary Biology: Coneptual, Ethical Religion
             Issues},
   Publisher = {Cambridge U.P.},
   Editor = {Thompson and Walsh},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {Winter},
   Key = {fds200378}
}

@article{fds244629,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Can nuerophilosophy save the humanities},
   Journal = {New York Times},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/?s=can+neurophilosophy},
   Key = {fds244629}
}

@article{fds244628,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Why I am a Naturalist},
   Journal = {New York Times},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/why-i-am-a-naturalist/},
   Key = {fds244628}
}

@article{fds244612,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {How physics fakes design},
   Booktitle = {Evolutionary Biology: Coneptual, Ethical Religion
             Issues},
   Publisher = {Cambridge UP},
   Editor = {Thompson, and Walsh},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds244612}
}

@article{fds320321,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Lessons for Cognitive Science from Neurogenomics},
   Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {September},
   ISBN = {9780195304787},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0007},
   Abstract = {© 2009 by Oxford University Press, Inc. All rights
             reserved. This article discusses the lessons from
             neurogenomics that are applicable to cognitive science. It
             argues that the work of some leading cognitive scientists
             who employed the resources of neurogenomics has already
             provided strong grounds to be pessimistic about the
             representations to which a computational theory of mind is
             committed, and to be optimistic about the syntactic
             character of processes of thinking and reasoning in the
             brain. It also discusses research findings concerning how
             the brain recalls memories and the storage of explicit
             memories.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0007},
   Key = {fds320321}
}

@article{fds244610,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Darwinism in moral philosophy and social
             theory},
   Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin, 2d Edition},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Raddick, G and Hodge, J},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds244610}
}

@article{fds244611,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Lessons from neurogenomics for cognitive
             science},
   Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Bickle, J},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds244611}
}

@article{fds303579,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reductionism in Biology},
   Pages = {550-567},
   Booktitle = {A Companion to the Philosophy of Biology},
   Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING LTD},
   Editor = {Plutinsky, A and Sarkar, S},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {April},
   ISBN = {9781405125727},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470696590.ch29},
   Doi = {10.1002/9780470696590.ch29},
   Key = {fds303579}
}

@article{fds244756,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reductionism in biology},
   Pages = {349-368},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
   Publisher = {Elsevier},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {December},
   ISBN = {9780444515438},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50018-6},
   Abstract = {Reductionism is a thesis about formal logical relations
             among theories that were undermined by the philosophers of
             science with the powers of mathematical logic to illuminate
             interesting and important methodological matters such as
             explanation and theory testing. A major problem of
             reductionism in both molecular biology, and in functional
             biology is the absence of laws, either at the level of the
             reducing theory or the reduced theory, or between them. The
             real dispute is not about the derivability or undesirability
             of laws in functional biology from laws in molecular
             biology, but since there is only one general theory in
             biology, Darwinism. Reductionism claims that the most
             complete, correct, and adequate explanations of historical
             facts uncovered in functional biology is by appealing to
             other historical facts uncovered in molecular biology, plus
             some laws that operate at the level of molecular biology.
             Reductionism in biology turns out to be the radical thesis
             that ultimate explanations must give way to proximate ones
             and that these latter will be molecular explanations. ©
             2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50018-6},
   Key = {fds244756}
}

@article{fds331103,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reductionism (and antireductionism) in biology},
   Pages = {120-138},
   Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of
             Biology},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780521851282},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521851282.007},
   Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2007 and 2008. Accelerating
             developments in molecular biology since 1953 have strongly
             encouraged the advocacy of reductionism by a number of
             important biologists, including Crick, Monod, and E. O.
             Wilson, and strong opposition by equally prominent
             biologists, especially Lewontin, along with most
             philosophers of biology. Reductionism is a metaphysical
             thesis, a claim about explanations, and a research program.
             The metaphysical thesis that reductionists advance (and
             antireductionists accept) is physicalism, the thesis that
             all facts, including the biological facts, are fixed by the
             physical and chemical facts; there are no nonphysical
             events, states, or processes, and so biological events,
             states, and processes are “nothing but” physical ones.
             This metaphysical thesis is one reductionists share with
             antireductionists. The reductionist argues that the
             metaphysical thesis has consequences for biological
             explanations: they need to be completed, corrected, made
             more precise, or otherwise deepened by more fundamental
             explanations in molecular biology. The antireductionist
             denies this inference, arguing that nonmolecular biological
             explanations are adequate and need no macromolecular
             correction, completion, or grounding. The research program
             that reductionists claim follows from the conclusion about
             explanations can be framed as the methodological moral that
             biologists should seek such macromolecular
             explanations.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CCOL9780521851282.007},
   Key = {fds331103}
}

@article{fds320323,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Is epigenetic inheritance a counterexample to the central
             dogma?},
   Journal = {History and philosophy of the life sciences},
   Volume = {28},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {549-565},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {This paper argues that nothing that has been discovered in
             the increasingly complex delails of gene regulation has
             provided any grounds to retract or qualify Crick's version
             of the central dogma. In particular it defends the role of
             the genes as the sole bearers of information, and argues
             that the mechanism of epigenetic modification of the DNA is
             but another vindication of Crick's version of the central
             dogma. The paper shows that arguments of C.K. Waters for the
             distinctive causual role of the genes are equivalent in
             important respects to the present ones and concludes with a
             defense of the informational role of the genes against an
             argument from trans-acting genetic regulation due to
             Stotz.},
   Key = {fds320323}
}

@article{fds244606,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reductionism in molecular biology},
   Booktitle = {Oxford handbook in Philosophy of Biology},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Hull, D and Ruse, M},
   Year = {2006},
   Key = {fds244606}
}

@article{fds244607,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reductionism},
   Booktitle = {Handbook for the Philosophy of Science, v.3 Philosophy of
             Biology},
   Publisher = {Elsevier},
   Year = {2006},
   Key = {fds244607}
}

@article{fds244609,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Biology, Philosophy of},
   Booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of
             Science},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Editor = {Curd, M and Psillos, S},
   Year = {2006},
   Key = {fds244609}
}

@article{fds244603,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Genomics and cultural evolution},
   Booktitle = {Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology,},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Boniolo, G and Anna, GD},
   Year = {2005},
   Key = {fds244603}
}

@article{fds244604,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Will genomics do more for metaphysics than
             Locke},
   Pages = {186-206},
   Booktitle = {Scientific Evidence},
   Publisher = {Johns Hopkins Unversity},
   Editor = {Achinstein, P},
   Year = {2005},
   ISBN = {0521856299},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498428.012},
   Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2006 and 2009. Origin of man
             now solved. He who understands baboon would do more for
             metaphysics than Locke. Darwin, Notebooks. THE EVOLUTION OF
             HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND “JUST-SO STORIES”. Darwin's claim is
             probably guilty of pardonable exaggeration. After all he did
             not prove the origin of man, and Locke's greatest
             contributions were to political philosophy, not metaphysics.
             But it may turn out that Darwin's twentieth-century
             grandchild, genomics, vindicates this claim with respect to
             both metaphysics and political philosophy. Here I focus on
             the latter claim alone, however. From the year that William
             Hamilton first introduced the concept of inclusive fitness
             and the mechanism of kin selection, biologists,
             psychologists, game theorists, philosophers, and others have
             been adding details to answer the question of how altruism
             is possible as a biological disposition. We now have a
             fairly well-articulated story of how wecould havegotten from
             there, nature red in tooth and claw, to here, an almost
             universal commitment to morality. That is, there is now a
             scenario showing how a lineage of organisms selected for
             maximizing genetic representation in subsequent generations
             could come eventually to be composed of cooperating
             creatures. Establishing this bare possibility was an
             important turning point for biological anthropology, for
             human sociobiology, and for evolutionary psychology. Prior
             to Hamilton's breakthrough it was intellectually permissible
             to write off Darwinism as irrelevant to distinctively human
             behavior and human institutions.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511498428.012},
   Key = {fds244604}
}

@article{fds244605,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Good Ideas and Human Welfare: Big Pharma versus the
             Developing Nations},
   Booktitle = {Developmental Dilemmas},
   Publisher = {London: Routledge},
   Editor = {Ayogu, M and Ross, D},
   Year = {2005},
   Key = {fds244605}
}

@article{fds303578,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
   Title = {Drift, fitness, and the foundations of probability},
   Booktitle = {Indeterminism in Physics and Biology},
   Publisher = {Paderborn: Mentis},
   Editor = {Hutterman, A},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds303578}
}

@article{fds244600,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Brandon, R},
   Title = {Problems of the Philosophy of Biology},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy of Science Today},
   Publisher = {Oxford: Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Clark, P and Hawley, K},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds244600}
}

@article{fds244602,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Darwinism in Moral Philosophy and Social
             Theory},
   Booktitle = {Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Hodge, and Radick},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds244602}
}

@article{fds244758,
   Author = {Bouchard, F and Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Drift, fitness and the foundations of probability},
   Journal = {Determinism in Physics and Biology},
   Pages = {108-135},
   Booktitle = {Indeterminism in Physics and Biology},
   Publisher = {Paderborn: Mentis},
   Editor = {Adreas Hutterman},
   Year = {2003},
   ISBN = {3-89785-371-X},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000230579000008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Key = {fds244758}
}

@article{fds244599,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Reductionism in a historical science},
   Pages = {125-155},
   Booktitle = {Promises and Limits of Reductionism in the Biomedical
             Sciences},
   Publisher = {John Wiley},
   Editor = {Hull, D and Regenmortel, MV},
   Year = {2002},
   Month = {February},
   Key = {fds244599}
}

@article{fds244597,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
   Title = {Fitness},
   Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
   Year = {2002},
   Key = {fds244597}
}

@article{fds244598,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Good ideas and human welfare},
   Booktitle = {Proceedings of International Conference on Economics,
             Development and Ethics, University of Cape
             Woen},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Ross, D},
   Year = {2002},
   Key = {fds244598}
}

@article{fds244596,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of molecular biology},
   Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Life Sciences},
   Publisher = {London: McMillan},
   Year = {2001},
   Key = {fds244596}
}

@article{fds244591,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Character Concept in Taxonomy, Evolution, and
             Development},
   Pages = {199-214},
   Booktitle = {The Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology},
   Publisher = {New Haven, CT: Yale University Press},
   Editor = {Wagner, G},
   Year = {2000},
   Key = {fds244591}
}

@article{fds244593,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Limits to Biology},
   Pages = {247-265},
   Booktitle = {Science at Century’s End},
   Publisher = {Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
             Press},
   Editor = {Carrier, M and Ruetsche, L and Massey, G},
   Year = {2000},
   Key = {fds244593}
}

@article{fds244594,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Laws, History and the Nature of Scientific
             Understanding},
   Volume = {32},
   Pages = {51-71},
   Booktitle = {Evolutionary Biology},
   Publisher = {New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers},
   Editor = {Hecht, M and Clegg},
   Year = {2000},
   Key = {fds244594}
}

@article{fds244595,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of Social Science},
   Pages = {451-460},
   Booktitle = {A Companion to the Philosophy of Science},
   Publisher = {London: Blackwell},
   Editor = {Newton-Smith, W},
   Year = {2000},
   Key = {fds244595}
}

@article{fds287553,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The problem of enforcement: Is there an alternative to
             Leviathan},
   Pages = {236-239},
   Booktitle = {Evolutionary Origins of Morality},
   Publisher = {Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic},
   Editor = {Katz, L},
   Year = {2000},
   Key = {fds287553}
}

@article{fds303577,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Privacy as a Matter of Taste and Right (Reprint)},
   Pages = {68-91},
   Booktitle = {The Right to Privacy},
   Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Paul, M and Paul},
   Year = {2000},
   Key = {fds303577}
}

@article{fds244585,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Sociobiology},
   Booktitle = {Blackwell’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwells},
   Editor = {Craig, E},
   Year = {1998},
   Key = {fds244585}
}

@article{fds244586,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Problems of the Philosophy of Social Science},
   Booktitle = {Blackwell’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwells},
   Editor = {Craig, E},
   Year = {1998},
   Key = {fds244586}
}

@article{fds244587,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Altruism: theoretical Considerations (Reprint)},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
   Publisher = {Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Hull, and Ruse},
   Year = {1998},
   Key = {fds244587}
}

@article{fds244588,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Human Genome Project: Research Tactics and Economic
             Strategies (Reprint)},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
   Publisher = {Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Hull, and Ruse},
   Year = {1998},
   Key = {fds244588}
}

@article{fds244589,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Folk Psychology},
   Booktitle = {Handbook of Economic Methodology},
   Publisher = {Aldershot, UK: Elgar},
   Editor = {Davis, JB},
   Year = {1998},
   Key = {fds244589}
}

@article{fds244582,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Human Genome Project: Research Tactics and Economic
             Strategies (Reprint)},
   Pages = {1-26},
   Booktitle = {Scientific Innovation, Philosophy and Public
             Policy},
   Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Paul, E and Miller, F and Paul, J},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds244582}
}

@article{fds244583,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of Economics},
   Pages = {582-583},
   Booktitle = {Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Audi, R},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds244583}
}

@article{fds244584,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Is There an Evolutionary Biology of Play?
             (Reprint)},
   Pages = {217-228},
   Booktitle = {Readings in Animal Cognition},
   Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: MIT Press},
   Editor = {Bekoff, M and Jameson, D},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds244584}
}

@article{fds244627,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of Biology},
   Volume = {Supplementary},
   Pages = {407-411},
   Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
   Publisher = {New York, NY: Simon-Schuster McMillan},
   Editor = {Borchert, D},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds244627}
}

@article{fds303576,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of Biology},
   Volume = {Supplementary},
   Pages = {407-411},
   Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
   Publisher = {New York, NY: Simon-Schuster McMillan},
   Editor = {Borchert, D},
   Year = {1996},
   Key = {fds303576}
}

@article{fds244580,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario
             (Reprint)},
   Booktitle = {Ethics and Biology},
   Publisher = {SUNY Press},
   Editor = {Thompson, P},
   Year = {1995},
   Key = {fds244580}
}

@article{fds244576,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Subversive Reflections on the Human Genome
             Project},
   Volume = {2},
   Pages = {329-338},
   Booktitle = {PSA},
   Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
   Year = {1994},
   Key = {fds244576}
}

@article{fds244577,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {If Economics Isn’t a Science, What Is It?
             (Reprint)},
   Pages = {661-674},
   Booktitle = {Readings in the philosophy of Social Science},
   Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: MIT Press},
   Editor = {Martin, M and McIntyre, L},
   Year = {1994},
   Key = {fds244577}
}

@article{fds244578,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Does Evolutionary Theory Give Aid or Comfort to
             Economics},
   Pages = {384-407},
   Booktitle = {Natural Images in Economic Thought},
   Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Mirowski, P},
   Year = {1994},
   Key = {fds244578}
}

@article{fds244579,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Cognitive Status of Economic theory},
   Pages = {216-235},
   Booktitle = {Nature of Economic Method},
   Publisher = {London: Routledge},
   Editor = {Backhouse},
   Year = {1994},
   Key = {fds244579}
}

@article{fds244574,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {If Economics Isn’t a Science, What Is It?
             (Reprint)},
   Pages = {426-442},
   Booktitle = {The Philosophy and Methodology of Economics},
   Publisher = {Aldershot, UK: Elgar},
   Editor = {Caldwell, B},
   Year = {1993},
   Key = {fds244574}
}

@article{fds244575,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {How is Eliminative Materialism Possible?},
   Booktitle = {Mind and Common Sense},
   Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Bogdan, R},
   Year = {1993},
   Key = {fds244575}
}

@article{fds244570,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Hume and the Philosophy of Science},
   Pages = {64-89},
   Booktitle = {Cambridge Companion to Hume},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Norton},
   Year = {1992},
   Key = {fds244570}
}

@article{fds244571,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Evolutionary Biology and Neoclassical Economics: Strange
             Bedfellows},
   Volume = {1},
   Pages = {174-183},
   Booktitle = {PSA},
   Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
   Year = {1992},
   Key = {fds244571}
}

@article{fds244572,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Altruism: Theoretical Context},
   Pages = {20-28},
   Booktitle = {Keywords in Evolutionary Biology},
   Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press},
   Editor = {Fox-Keller, E and Lloyd, L},
   Year = {1992},
   Key = {fds244572}
}

@article{fds244573,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Common Knowledge, Equilibrium and Other Idealizations:
             Commentary Bicchieri},
   Pages = {189-194},
   Booktitle = {Postpopperian Methodology of Economics},
   Publisher = {Boston: Dordrecht},
   Editor = {DeMarchi, N},
   Year = {1992},
   Key = {fds244573}
}

@article{fds244567,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Teleology},
   Pages = {391-393},
   Booktitle = {Handbook of Metaphysics},
   Publisher = {Munich, Germany: Philosophia Verlag},
   Editor = {Burkhardt, EA},
   Year = {1991},
   Key = {fds244567}
}

@article{fds244568,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {What’s So Special About General Equilibrium?},
   Pages = {10-133},
   Booktitle = {Economics, Culture, Education},
   Publisher = {London: Elgar},
   Year = {1991},
   Key = {fds244568}
}

@article{fds303575,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario
             (Reprint)},
   Pages = {86-101},
   Booktitle = {Ethics, Politics and Human Nature},
   Editor = {Paul, M and Rowe},
   Year = {1991},
   Key = {fds303575}
}

@article{fds244709,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The biological justification of ethics: A best-case
             scenario},
   Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
   Volume = {8},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {86-101},
   Booktitle = {Ethics, Politics and Human Nature},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Editor = {Paul, Miller and Rowe},
   Year = {1990},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500003757},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500003757},
   Key = {fds244709}
}

@article{fds244564,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {A quoi bon la theorie de l’equilibre general?”},
   Pages = {170-187},
   Booktitle = {La Methodologie de L’economie Theorique et Applique
             Aujourd’hui},
   Publisher = {Paris Nathan},
   Editor = {Wolff, J and al, E},
   Year = {1990},
   Key = {fds244564}
}

@article{fds244565,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Fitness, Reinforcement and Underlying Mechanisms
             (reprint)},
   Pages = {57-59},
   Booktitle = {The Selection of Behavior},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Editor = {Catania, C and Harnad, S},
   Year = {1990},
   Key = {fds244565}
}

@article{fds244566,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Is There an Evolutionary Biology of Play?},
   Pages = {180-196},
   Booktitle = {Interpretation and Explanation in the Study of Annual
             Behavior},
   Publisher = {Boulder, CO: Westview Press},
   Editor = {Bekoff, M and Jameson},
   Year = {1990},
   Key = {fds244566}
}

@article{fds244563,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {From Reductionism to Instrumentalism},
   Pages = {245-262},
   Booktitle = {What Philosophy of Biology is},
   Publisher = {Dordrecht: Kluwer},
   Year = {1989},
   Key = {fds244563}
}

@article{fds303574,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Are Generic Predictions Enough (reprint)},
   Pages = {43-68},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy and Economics II},
   Publisher = {Dordrecht: Kluwer},
   Editor = {Hamminga, B},
   Year = {1989},
   Key = {fds303574}
}

@article{fds244560,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Autonomy and Provincialism (Reprint)},
   Pages = {10-21},
   Booktitle = {Holisme en Reductionisme en de Empirishe
             Wetenschappen},
   Publisher = {Groningen, Studium Generale},
   Editor = {Geinert, G},
   Year = {1987},
   Key = {fds244560}
}

@article{fds303573,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Political Philosophy of Biological Endowments: Some
             Considerations (Reprint)},
   Pages = {1-31},
   Booktitle = {Equal Opportunity},
   Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
   Editor = {Paul, M and Ahrens},
   Year = {1987},
   Key = {fds303573}
}

@article{fds244555,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Prospects for the Elimination of Tastes in Economics and
             Ethics (Reprint)},
   Pages = {48-69},
   Booktitle = {Ethics and Economics},
   Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
   Editor = {Paul, EF and Paul, J and Miller, FD},
   Year = {1985},
   Key = {fds244555}
}

@article{fds244556,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Davidson’s Unintended Attack on Psychology},
   Pages = {399-407},
   Booktitle = {Actions and Events},
   Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
   Editor = {LePore, E},
   Year = {1985},
   Key = {fds244556}
}

@article{fds244557,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Adaptionalist Imperatives and Panglossian
             Paradigms},
   Pages = {161-179},
   Booktitle = {Sociobiology and Epistemology},
   Publisher = {Dordrecht: Reidel},
   Editor = {Fetzer, JM},
   Year = {1985},
   Key = {fds244557}
}

@article{fds244558,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Philosophy of Science and the Potential for Knowledge in
             Social Sciences},
   Pages = {339-346},
   Booktitle = {Pluralisms and Subjectivities in Social Science},
   Publisher = {Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press},
   Editor = {Fiske, D and Schweder, R},
   Year = {1985},
   Key = {fds244558}
}

@article{fds244559,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Darwinism Today–Tomorrow, But Not Yesterday},
   Volume = {2},
   Pages = {157-173},
   Booktitle = {PSA 1984},
   Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
   Editor = {Kitcher, P and Asquith, P},
   Year = {1985},
   Key = {fds244559}
}

@article{fds244551,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Straussman, JD},
   Title = {Maximization, Markets and the Measurement of Productivity in
             the Public Sector},
   Pages = {280-287},
   Booktitle = {New Directions in Public Administration},
   Publisher = {Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole},
   Editor = {Bozeman, and Straussman},
   Year = {1984},
   Key = {fds244551}
}

@article{fds244552,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Public Sector Monopolies},
   Pages = {219-233},
   Booktitle = {Productivity and Public Policy},
   Publisher = {Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications},
   Editor = {Holzer, and Nagle},
   Year = {1984},
   Key = {fds244552}
}

@article{fds244553,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Interanimation of Micro and Macroeconomics
             (Reprint)},
   Series = {1st},
   Pages = {324-343},
   Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Economics},
   Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Hausman, D},
   Year = {1984},
   Key = {fds244553}
}

@article{fds244554,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Supervenience of Biological Concepts
             (Reprint)},
   Pages = {99-116},
   Booktitle = {Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology},
   Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press},
   Editor = {Sober, E},
   Year = {1984},
   Key = {fds244554}
}

@article{fds244550,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Human Science and Biological Science},
   Pages = {37-52},
   Booktitle = {Scientific Explanation and Understanding},
   Publisher = {Lanham, MD: University Presses of America},
   Editor = {Rescher, N},
   Year = {1983},
   Key = {fds244550}
}

@article{fds244549,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Causation and Teleology in Contemporary Philosophy of
             Science},
   Volume = {2},
   Pages = {51-86},
   Booktitle = {Contemporary Philosophy, A New Survey},
   Publisher = {The Hague: Nijhoff},
   Year = {1982},
   Key = {fds244549}
}

@article{fds244547,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {A Skeptical History of Microeconomic Theory
             (Reprint)},
   Pages = {47-62},
   Booktitle = {Philosophy in Economics},
   Publisher = {Dordrecht: Reidel},
   Editor = {Pitt, J},
   Year = {1981},
   Key = {fds244547}
}

@article{fds244548,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {The Interaction of Evolutionary and Genetic
             Theory},
   Pages = {207-219},
   Booktitle = {Pragmatism and Purpose},
   Publisher = {Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press},
   Editor = {Summer, S and Wilson},
   Year = {1981},
   Key = {fds244548}
}

@article{fds244546,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Ruse’s Treatment of the Evidence for Evolution: A
             Reconsideration},
   Pages = {83-93},
   Booktitle = {PSA},
   Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
   Editor = {Giere, and Asquith},
   Year = {1980},
   Key = {fds244546}
}

@article{fds244545,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Towards the Assimilation of Rules to Generalizations},
   Pages = {156-172},
   Booktitle = {Basic Issues in Philosophy of Science},
   Publisher = {New York: Science History Publications},
   Editor = {Shea, W},
   Year = {1976},
   Key = {fds244545}
}

@article{fds244543,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A},
   Title = {Partial Interpretation and Microeconomics},
   Pages = {93-109},
   Booktitle = {Developments in the Methodology of Social Science: Theory
             and Decision Library},
   Publisher = {Dordrecht: Reidel},
   Editor = {Leinfellner, W and Kohler, W},
   Year = {1974},
   Key = {fds244543}
}

@article{fds244544,
   Author = {Rosenberg, A and Braybrooke, D},
   Title = {Vincula Revindicata},
   Pages = {217-222},
   Booktitle = {Philosophical Problems of Causation},
   Publisher = {Encino, CA: Dickenson},
   Editor = {Beauchamp, TL},
   Year = {1974},
   Key = {fds244544}
}


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