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| Publications of Alexander Rosenberg :recent first alphabetical combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds244739,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Microeconomic Laws: A Philosophical Analysis},
Publisher = {Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
Press},
Year = {1976},
Key = {fds244739}
}
@book{fds244740,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social
Science},
Publisher = {Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds244740}
}
@book{fds244741,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Beauchamp, TL},
Title = {Hume and the Problem of Causation},
Publisher = {New York: Oxford University Press},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds244741}
}
@book{fds244742,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Structure of Biological Science},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244742}
}
@book{fds244743,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Social Science},
Publisher = {Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Oxford: Oxford University
Press},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244743}
}
@book{fds244744,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing
Returns?},
Publisher = {Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244744}
}
@book{fds244745,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Instrumental Biology or the Disunity of Science},
Publisher = {Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244745}
}
@book{fds244747,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinism in Philosophy, Social Science and
Policy},
Publisher = {Cambridge, Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244747}
}
@book{fds336425,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, First
Edition, Chinese Translation},
Series = {Philosopher's Stone Series},
Publisher = {Shanghai Scientific and Technological Education Publishing
House},
Year = {2004},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds336425}
}
@book{fds244750,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction
(Portuegese translation)},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244750}
}
@book{fds244751,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinian Reductionism or How to Stop Worrying and Love
Molecular Biology},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2006},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds244751}
}
@book{fds244752,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and McShea, DW},
Title = {Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary Introduction},
Pages = {1-241},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415315920},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203926994},
Abstract = {Is life a purely physical process? What is human nature?
Which of our traits is essential to us? In this volume,
Daniel McShea and Alex Rosenberg - a biologist and a
philosopher, respectively - join forces to create a new
gateway to the philosophy of biology; making the major
issues accessible and relevant to biologists and
philosophers alike. Exploring concepts such as
supervenience; the controversies about genocentrism and
genetic determinism; and the debate about major transitions
central to contemporary thinking about macroevolution; the
authors lay out the broad terms in which we should assess
the impact of biology on human capacities, social
institutions and ethical values.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203926994},
Key = {fds244752}
}
@book{fds52014,
Author = {Alex Rosenberg and Daniel McShea},
Title = {The Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary
Introduction},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds52014}
}
@book{fds336423,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction–Portuguese
translation},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds336423}
}
@book{fds244754,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Atheist’s Guide to Reality},
Publisher = {W.W. Norton},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244754}
}
@book{fds244755,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, 3d
Edition, revised, enlarged},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244755}
}
@book{fds336421,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Japanese
translation},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds336421}
}
@book{fds336422,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Arabic
translation},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds336422}
}
@book{fds219753,
Author = {A. Rosenberg},
Title = {Philosphy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Second
Edition, portuguese translation},
Publisher = {Edicioes Loyola},
Address = {Sao Paulo, Brazil},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds219753}
}
@book{fds303580,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Social Science, 4th edition revised,
enlarged},
Publisher = {Westview press},
Year = {2014},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds303580}
}
@book{fds303581,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosphy of Science: A Contemporary Approach, Second
Edition, portuguese translation},
Publisher = {Edicioes Loyola},
Year = {2014},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds303581}
}
@book{fds336419,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of social science, fifth edition},
Pages = {1-347},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780813349732},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429494840},
Abstract = {Philosophy of Social Science provides a tightly argued yet
accessible introduction to the philosophical foundations of
the human sciences, including economics, anthropology,
sociology, political science, psychology, history, and the
disciplines emerging at the intersections of these subjects
with biology. Philosophy is unavoidable for social
scientists because the choices they make in answering
questions in their disciplines force them to take sides on
philosophical matters. Conversely, the philosophy of social
science is equally necessary for philosophers since the
social and behavior sciences must inform their understanding
of human action, norms, and social institutions. The fifth
edition retains from previous editions an illuminating
interpretation of the enduring relations between the social
sciences and philosophy, and reflects on developments in
social research over the past two decades that have informed
and renewed debate in the philosophy of social science. An
expanded discussion of philosophical anthropology and modern
and postmodern critical theory is new for this
edition.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780429494840},
Key = {fds336419}
}
@book{fds350322,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reduction and Mechanism},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2020},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9781108605113},
Abstract = {This Element expounds the debate about reductionism in
biology, from the work of the post-positivists to the end of
the century debates about supervenience, multiple
realizability, and explanatory exclusion.},
Key = {fds350322}
}
%% Papers Published
@article{fds244634,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Braybrooke, D},
Title = {Getting the War News Straight: The Actual Situation in the
Philosophy of Science},
Journal = {American Political Science Review, 66, 1972:
818-826},
Volume = {66},
Pages = {818-826},
Year = {1972},
Key = {fds244634}
}
@article{fds244633,
Author = {Braybrooke, D and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {IV—Anti-Behaviourism in the Hour of its
Disintegration},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {355-363},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1972},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317200200127},
Doi = {10.1177/004839317200200127},
Key = {fds244633}
}
@article{fds244635,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Friedman's ‘Methodology’ for Economics: A Critical
Examination},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {15-29},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1972},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317200200102},
Doi = {10.1177/004839317200200102},
Key = {fds244635}
}
@article{fds331104,
Author = {Braybrooke, D and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Comment: Getting the war news straight: The actual situation
in the philosophy of science},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {66},
Number = {3},
Pages = {818-826},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1972},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1957480},
Doi = {10.2307/1957480},
Key = {fds331104}
}
@article{fds244636,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Campbell, R},
Title = {Action, Purpose and Consciousness Among the
Computers},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {40},
Pages = {547-557},
Year = {1973},
Key = {fds244636}
}
@article{fds244637,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Mill and Some Contemporary Critics on ‘Cause’},
Journal = {Personalist},
Volume = {54},
Pages = {123-129},
Year = {1973},
Key = {fds244637}
}
@article{fds244638,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On Fodor’s Distinction Between Strong and Weak Equivalence
in Machine Simulation},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {40},
Pages = {118-120},
Year = {1973},
Key = {fds244638}
}
@article{fds244639,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation and recipes: The mixture as before?},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {24},
Number = {6},
Pages = {378-385},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1973},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00376106},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00376106},
Key = {fds244639}
}
@article{fds244640,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and MacIntosh, NJ},
Title = {Strong, Weak, and Functional Equivalence in Machine
Simulation},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {41},
Pages = {412-414},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244640}
}
@article{fds244641,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On Kim’s Account of Events and Event Identity},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {71},
Pages = {327-336},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244641}
}
@article{fds244642,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Beauchamp, TL},
Title = {Singular Causal Statements: a Reconsideration},
Journal = {Philosophical Forum, 5, 1974: 611-618},
Volume = {5},
Pages = {611-618},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244642}
}
@article{fds244645,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Proper Hoc, Ergo Post Hoc},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {12},
Pages = {245-254},
Year = {1975},
Key = {fds244645}
}
@article{fds244643,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Terms of experience and theory: A rejoinder to
Körner},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {309-311},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1975},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300043420},
Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300043420},
Key = {fds244643}
}
@article{fds244644,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The virtues of vagueness in the languages of
science},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Volume = {14},
Number = {2},
Pages = {281-305},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1975},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300043407},
Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300043407},
Key = {fds244644}
}
@article{fds244646,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The nomological character of microeconomics},
Journal = {Theory and Decision},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-26},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1975},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00139817},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00139817},
Key = {fds244646}
}
@article{fds244647,
Author = {Martin, RM and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Rejoinder to Puccetti},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {143-144},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1976},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1976.10716985},
Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1976.10716985},
Key = {fds244647}
}
@article{fds244648,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On the Interanimation of Micro and Macroeconomics},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {35-53},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1976},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317600600103},
Doi = {10.1177/004839317600600103},
Key = {fds244648}
}
@article{fds244649,
Author = {Martin, RM and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Materialism and Evolution: A Reconsideration},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {127-138},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1976},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1976.10716983},
Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1976.10716983},
Key = {fds244649}
}
@article{fds244650,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Beauchamp, TL},
Title = {Critical Notice of The Cement of the Universe},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {371-404},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1977},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1977.10717025},
Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1977.10717025},
Key = {fds244650}
}
@article{fds244651,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Concrete occurrences vs. explanatory facts: Mackie on the
extensionality of causal statements},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {31},
Number = {2},
Pages = {133-140},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1977},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01857183},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01857183},
Key = {fds244651}
}
@article{fds244652,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Genetics and the Theory of Natural Selection: Synthesis or
Sustenance?},
Journal = {Nature and System, 1, 1978: 3-15.},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {3-15},
Year = {1978},
Key = {fds244652}
}
@article{fds244653,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Puzzle of Economic Modeling},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {75},
Pages = {679-683},
Year = {1978},
Key = {fds244653}
}
@article{fds244654,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Supervenience of Biological Concepts},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {45},
Pages = {368-386},
Year = {1978},
Key = {fds244654}
}
@article{fds244655,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Hollis and Nell: Rationalist Economic Men},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {87-98},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1978},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317800800109},
Doi = {10.1177/004839317800800109},
Key = {fds244655}
}
@article{fds244656,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation and Counterfactuals: Lewis’ Treatment
Reconsidered},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Volume = {18},
Number = {02},
Pages = {210-219},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1979},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300048071},
Doi = {10.1017/s0012217300048071},
Key = {fds244656}
}
@article{fds244657,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can Economic Theory Explain Everything?},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {9},
Number = {4},
Pages = {509-529},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1979},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839317900900409},
Doi = {10.1177/004839317900900409},
Key = {fds244657}
}
@article{fds244658,
Author = {ROSENBERG, A and MARTIN, RM},
Title = {The Extensionality of Causal Contexts},
Journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy},
Volume = {4},
Number = {1},
Pages = {401-408},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1979},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00389.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00389.x},
Key = {fds244658}
}
@article{fds343294,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation and counteifactuals: Lewis’ treatment
reconsidered},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Volume = {18},
Number = {2},
Pages = {209-219},
Year = {1979},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300048071},
Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300048071},
Key = {fds343294}
}
@article{fds244659,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Species Notions and the Theoretical Hierarchy of
Biology},
Journal = {Nature and System},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {163-172},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds244659}
}
@article{fds244661,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Obstacles to the Nomological Connection of Reasons and
Actions},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {79-91},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1980},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318001000106},
Doi = {10.1177/004839318001000106},
Key = {fds244661}
}
@article{fds244660,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {A skeptical history of microeconomic theory},
Journal = {Theory and Decision},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {79-93},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1980},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00154660},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00154660},
Key = {fds244660}
}
@article{fds244663,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Critical Notice of Method and Appraisal in
Economics},
Journal = {Nous},
Volume = {15},
Pages = {225-230},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds244663}
}
@article{fds244662,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Typologies: Obstacles and opportunities in scientific
change},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {4},
Number = {2},
Pages = {298-299},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1981},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00009006},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00009006},
Key = {fds244662}
}
@article{fds244664,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Harden, CL},
Title = {In Defense of Convergent Realism},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {49},
Pages = {604-615},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244664}
}
@article{fds244665,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Harden, CL},
Title = {On the Propensity Definition of Fitness},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {49},
Pages = {605-615},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244665}
}
@article{fds244667,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {In Hume’s Cause: A Reply to Mackie and
Flew},
Journal = {Philosophical Books},
Volume = {23},
Pages = {140-146},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244667}
}
@article{fds244666,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Are there culturgens?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {5},
Number = {1},
Pages = {22-24},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1982},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00010281},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00010281},
Key = {fds244666}
}
@article{fds244668,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Consciousness and Content vs. the Intentional
Stance},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {6},
Pages = {375-376},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244668}
}
@article{fds244669,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Coefficients, Effects and Genic Selection},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {50},
Pages = {332-338},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244669}
}
@article{fds244671,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {If Economics Isn’t Science, What Is It?},
Journal = {Philosophical Forum},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {296-314},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244671}
}
@article{fds244672,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Human Sciences: Obstacles and Opportunities},
Journal = {Syracuse Scholar},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {63-80},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244672}
}
@article{fds244673,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Critical Notice of Genes, Mind and Culture},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {80},
Pages = {304-311},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244673}
}
@article{fds244674,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Fitness},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {80},
Pages = {457-474},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244674}
}
@article{fds244670,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Protagoras Among the Physicists},
Journal = {Dialogue},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {311-317},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300018011},
Doi = {10.1017/S0012217300018011},
Key = {fds244670}
}
@article{fds320331,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Content and consciousness versus the International
stance},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {6},
Number = {3},
Pages = {375-376},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1983},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00016629},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00016629},
Key = {fds320331}
}
@article{fds244675,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Fitness, reinforcement, underlying mechanisms},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {495-496},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1984},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0002690X},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X0002690X},
Key = {fds244675}
}
@article{fds244676,
Author = {ROSENBERG, A},
Title = {Mackie and Shoemaker on Dispositions and
Properties},
Journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy},
Volume = {9},
Number = {1},
Pages = {77-91},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1984},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00053.x},
Abstract = {In “Dispositions and Powers,” J. L. Mackie identifies
three different “ontological views about dispositions”:
The first is the one Armstrong calls phenomenalist and
ascribes to Ryle: we attribute a minimal disposition, which
is in effect to assert a conditional or set of conditionals,
themselves to be interpreted as inference tickets; but this
does not mean anything is going on in the things to which we
attribute the disposition which is not going on in similar
things from which we withhold this description. The second
is the ‘realist’ view, that dispositions have occurrent
(and concurrent) categorical bases consisting of properties
which are not in themselves peculiarly dispositional, though
they may be introduced in the dispositional style and may be
known only as the bases of these dispositions; although the
dispositional descriptions are conditional‐entailing, the
properties to which they point are only contingently related
to the displays of the dispositions. The third is what we
may call the rationalist view; dispositions (while still
being intrinsically dispositional and conditional‐entailing)
are real occurrent states of the object, different from
anything a realist would call a categorical basis (which may
or may not be there as well), but actually present both when
the disposition is being manifested and when it is not.
Copyright © 1984, Wiley Blackwell. All rights
reserved},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00053.x},
Key = {fds244676}
}
@article{fds244677,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Methodology, Theory and the Philosophy of
Science},
Journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {66},
Pages = {377-393},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244677}
}
@article{fds244679,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Place of Psychology in a Vacuum of Theories},
Journal = {Annals of Theoretical Psychology},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {95-102},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244679}
}
@article{fds244680,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Williams, MB},
Title = {Fitness in Fact and Fiction},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {82},
Pages = {738-749},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244680}
}
@article{fds244678,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Prospects for the elimination of tastes from economics and
ethics},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {2},
Number = {2},
Pages = {48-68},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1985},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500003216},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500003216},
Key = {fds244678}
}
@article{fds244682,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Intentional Psychology and Evolutionary Biology: Part II:
Crucial Disanalogy},
Journal = {Behaviorism},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {125-138},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244682}
}
@article{fds244683,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Intentional Psychology and Evolutionary Biology, Part I: The
Uneasy Analogy},
Journal = {Behaviorism},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {15-28},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244683}
}
@article{fds244684,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation and Explanation in Evolutionary
Biology},
Journal = {Behaviorism},
Volume = {14},
Pages = {77-88},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244684}
}
@article{fds244686,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On the Explanatory Role of Existence Proofs},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {97},
Pages = {177-186},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244686}
}
@article{fds244687,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {What Rosenberg’s Philosophy of Economics Is
Not},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {53},
Pages = {127-132},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244687}
}
@article{fds244688,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Williams, MB},
Title = {Fitness as Primitive and Propensity},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {53},
Pages = {412-418},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244688}
}
@article{fds244685,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Lakatosian consolations for economics},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {2},
Number = {1},
Pages = {127-139},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1986},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100000821},
Doi = {10.1017/S0266267100000821},
Key = {fds244685}
}
@article{fds244681,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Ignorance and disinformation in the philosophy of biology: A
reply to Stent},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {1},
Number = {4},
Pages = {461-471},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1986},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00140963},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00140963},
Key = {fds244681}
}
@article{fds244692,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Why Does the Nature of Species Matter},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {192-197},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds244692}
}
@article{fds244689,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is there really “juggling,” “artifice,” and
“trickery” in Genes, Mind, and Culture?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {80-82},
Year = {1987},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00056429},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00056429},
Key = {fds244689}
}
@article{fds244690,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The political philosophy of biological endowments: Some
considerations},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {5},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-31},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1987},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500001229},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500001229},
Key = {fds244690}
}
@article{fds244691,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Weintraub’s aims: A Brief Rejoinder},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {143-144},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1987},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100002807},
Doi = {10.1017/S0266267100002807},
Key = {fds244691}
}
@article{fds350323,
Author = {Brandon, RN and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Structure of Biological Science.},
Journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {84},
Number = {4},
Pages = {224-224},
Publisher = {JSTOR},
Year = {1987},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2027161},
Doi = {10.2307/2027161},
Key = {fds350323}
}
@article{fds244694,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Are Generic Predictions Enough?},
Journal = {Fundamenta Scientiae},
Volume = {9},
Pages = {329-352},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244694}
}
@article{fds244695,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Will the Real Argument for "Abstracta" Please Stand
Up?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {11},
Pages = {526-527},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244695}
}
@article{fds244696,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Grievous Faults in "Vaulting Ambition"?},
Journal = {Ethics},
Volume = {98},
Pages = {827-838},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244696}
}
@article{fds244698,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Rhetoric is Not Important Enough for Economists to Bother
About},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {173-175},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244698}
}
@article{fds244699,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Economics Is Too Important to be Left to the
Rhetoricians},
Journal = {Economics and Philosophy},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {129-149},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244699}
}
@article{fds244693,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Past Recaptured: Mongin on the Problem of Realism in
Economics},
Journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
Volume = {18},
Number = {3},
Pages = {379-381},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318801800307},
Doi = {10.1177/004839318801800307},
Key = {fds244693}
}
@article{fds244697,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is the Theory of Natural Selection a Statistical
Theory?},
Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {sup1},
Pages = {187-207},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1988.10715949},
Doi = {10.1080/00455091.1988.10715949},
Key = {fds244697}
}
@article{fds320330,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Will the argument for abstracta please stand
up?},
Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
Volume = {11},
Number = {3},
Pages = {526-527},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1988},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00058799},
Doi = {10.1017/S0140525X00058799},
Key = {fds320330}
}
@article{fds244700,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Superseding Explanation vs. Understanding: The View from
Rorty},
Journal = {Social Research},
Volume = {56},
Pages = {479-510},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244700}
}
@article{fds244701,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is Lewis’s Genuine Modal Realism Magical
Too?},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {98},
Pages = {412-421},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244701}
}
@article{fds244702,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Perceptual Presentations and Biological Functions: A Comment
on Matthen},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {86},
Pages = {38-44},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244702}
}
@article{fds244703,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Intensionality, intenSionality and Representation},
Journal = {Behaviorism},
Volume = {17},
Pages = {137-140},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244703}
}
@article{fds244705,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Russell vs. Steiner on Physics and Causality},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {56},
Pages = {341-347},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244705}
}
@article{fds244704,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Are generic predictions enough?},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Volume = {30},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {43-68},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1989},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00184815},
Abstract = {I have argued not that economics has no predictive content,
but that it is limited, or at least has so far been limited
to generic predictions. Now this is an important kind of
prediction, and almost certainly a necessary preliminary to
specific or quantitative predictions. But if the sketch of
an important episode in the twentieth century history of the
subject I have given is both correct and representative,
then economics seems pretty well stuck at the level of
generic prediction. And at least some influential economists
and philosophers of economics seem well satisfied with
stopping at the point of generic prediction. Or at least
they give no other reason than its power to produce such
predictions as a justification for the character of economic
theory. But this leads to the question that is the title of
my paper, is generic prediction enough? © 1989 Kluwer
Academic Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00184815},
Key = {fds244704}
}
@article{fds320329,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is lewis's 'genuine modal realism' magical
too?},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {98},
Number = {391},
Pages = {411-421},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1989},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCVIII.391.411},
Doi = {10.1093/mind/XCVIII.391.411},
Key = {fds320329}
}
@article{fds244707,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Normative Naturalism and the Role of Philosophy},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {57},
Pages = {34-43},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds244707}
}
@article{fds244706,
Author = {ROSENBERG, A},
Title = {Moral Realism and Social Science},
Journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {150-166},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1990},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1990.tb00211.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1990.tb00211.x},
Key = {fds244706}
}
@article{fds244709,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The biological justification of ethics: A best-case
scenario},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {8},
Number = {1},
Pages = {86-101},
Booktitle = {Ethics, Politics and Human Nature},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Editor = {Paul, Miller and Rowe},
Year = {1990},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500003757},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500003757},
Key = {fds244709}
}
@article{fds244708,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Adequacy criteria for a theory of fitness},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {6},
Number = {1},
Pages = {38-41},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1991},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02426822},
Doi = {10.1007/BF02426822},
Key = {fds244708}
}
@article{fds244711,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation, Probability and the Monarchy},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {29},
Pages = {305-318},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244711}
}
@article{fds244710,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Contractarianism and the "trolley" problem.},
Journal = {Journal of social philosophy},
Volume = {23},
Number = {3},
Pages = {88-104},
Year = {1992},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1992.tb00134.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9833.1992.tb00134.x},
Key = {fds244710}
}
@article{fds244712,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Selection and Science: Critical notice of David Hull's
Science as a Process},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {7},
Number = {2},
Pages = {217-228},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1992},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00129886},
Abstract = {An examination of Hull's claims about the nature of
interactors, replicators and selection, with special
attention to how the genetic material realizes the first two
types, and a critique of Hull's attempt to apply the theory
of natural selection to the explanation of scientific
change, and in particular the succession of theories. I
conclude that difficulties attending the molecular
instantiation of Hull's theory are vastly increased when it
comes to be applied to "memes." © 1992 Kluwer Academic
Publishers.},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00129886},
Key = {fds244712}
}
@article{fds244713,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {"Hausman, Inexact and Separate Science of Economics,”
Critical Notice},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {90},
Pages = {533-537},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244713}
}
@article{fds244714,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Scientific Innovation and the Limits of Social Scientific
Prediction},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {97},
Number = {2},
Pages = {1-21},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1993},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01064113},
Doi = {10.1007/BF01064113},
Key = {fds244714}
}
@article{fds244715,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Genic Selection and Biological Instrumentalism},
Journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
Volume = {XVIII},
Pages = {343-362},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244715}
}
@article{fds244716,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Powers and Limits of Agricultural Economics},
Journal = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics},
Volume = {75},
Pages = {15-24},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244716}
}
@article{fds320328,
Author = {ROSENBERG, A},
Title = {Genie Selection, Molecular Biology and Biological
Instrumentalism},
Journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {1},
Pages = {343-362},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1993},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00272.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1475-4975.1993.tb00272.x},
Key = {fds320328}
}
@article{fds244717,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Hoefer, C},
Title = {Empirical Equivalence, Underdetermination and Systems of the
World},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {61},
Pages = {592-607},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244717}
}
@article{fds244719,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Metaphysical Foundations of Microeconomics},
Journal = {Monist},
Volume = {78},
Pages = {353-367},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244719}
}
@article{fds244718,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Equality, Sufficiency, and Opportunity in the Just
Society},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {2},
Pages = {54-71},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {1995},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500004672},
Abstract = {<jats:p>It seems to be almost a given of contemporary
Anglo-American political philosophy that the just society is
obligated to establish and ensure the equality of its
members. Debate begins when we come to delineate the forms
and limits of the equality society is obligated to
underwrite. In this essay I offer the subversive suggestion
that equality is not something the just society should aim
for. Instead I offer another objective, one which is to be
preferred both because it is more attainable and because it
is morally more defensible than equality, either as an ideal
or as an operative principle. The demand for equality of
treatment, of opportunity, or of outcome, is a distraction
from morally more significant aims.</jats:p>},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052500004672},
Key = {fds244718}
}
@article{fds244627,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Biology},
Volume = {Supplementary},
Pages = {407-411},
Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {New York, NY: Simon-Schuster McMillan},
Editor = {Borchert, D},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244627}
}
@article{fds244721,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Sober’s "Philosophy of Biology" and His Philosophy of
Biology},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {63},
Pages = {452-465},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244721}
}
@article{fds244723,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Research Tactics and Economic Strategies: Case of the Human
Genome Project},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {1-18},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244723}
}
@article{fds244720,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {47},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-29},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/47.1.1},
Abstract = {This review of recent work in the philosophy of science
motivated by a commitment to 'naturalism' begins by
identifying three key axioms and one theorem shared by
philosophers thus self-styled. Owing much to Quine and
Ernest Nagel, these philosophers of science share a common
agenda with naturalists elsewhere in philosophy. But they
have disagreed among themselves about how the axioms and the
theorems they share settle long-standing disputes in the
philosophy of science. After expounding these disagreements
in the work of Boyd, Giere, Laudan, and Kitcher, I argue
that naturalism needs to look for more than mere consistency
in its foundations.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/47.1.1},
Key = {fds244720}
}
@article{fds244722,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Laws, damn laws, and ceteris paribus clauses},
Journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {34},
Number = {S1},
Pages = {183-204},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00820.x},
Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00820.x},
Key = {fds244722}
}
@article{fds320327,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Critical review: Sober's philosophy of biology and his
philosophy of biology},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {63},
Number = {3},
Pages = {452-464},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289921},
Abstract = {An examination of the foundations of Elliot Sober's
philosophy of biology as reflected in his introductory
textbook of that title reveals substantial and controversial
philosophical commitments. Among these are the claim that
all understanding is historical, the assertion that there
are biological laws but they are necessary truths, the view
that the fundamental theory in biology is a narrative, and
the suggestion that biology adverts to ungrounded
probabilistic propensities of the sort to be met with
elsewhere only in quantum mechanics.},
Doi = {10.1086/289921},
Key = {fds320327}
}
@article{fds244724,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism Redux: Computing the Embryo},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {445-470},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006574719901},
Abstract = {This paper argues that the consensus physicalist
antireductionism in the philosophy of biology cannot
accommodate the research strategy or indeed the recent
findings of molecular developmental biology. After
describing Wolpert's programmatic claims on its behalf, and
recent work by Gehring and others to identify the molecular
determinants of development, the paper attempts to identify
the relationship between evolutionary and developmental
biology by reconciling two apparently conflicting accounts
of bio-function - Wright's and Nagel's (as elaborated by
Cummins). Finally, the paper seeks a way of defending the
two central theses of physicalist antireductionism in the
light of the research program of molecular developmental
biology, by sharply reducing their metaphysical
force.},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1006574719901},
Key = {fds244724}
}
@article{fds320326,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can physicalist antireductionism compute the
embryo?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {64},
Number = {4 SUPPL. 1},
Pages = {S359-S371},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392614},
Abstract = {It is widely held that (1) there are autonomous levels of
organization above that of the macromolecule and that (2) at
least sometimes macromolecular processes are best explained
in terms of such autonomous kinds. I argue that molecular
developmental biology honors neither of these claims, and I
show that the only way they can be rendered consistent with
a minimal physicalism is through the adoption of
controversial claims about causation and explanation which
undercut the force of these two antireductionism claims.
Copyright 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/392614},
Key = {fds320326}
}
@article{fds244725,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {La teoria economica como filosofia politica},
Journal = {Teoria},
Volume = {13},
Pages = {279-299},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244725}
}
@article{fds244727,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Naturalistic Epistemology for Eliminative
Materialists},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {59},
Pages = {1-24},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244727}
}
@article{fds244728,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Les Limits de la Connaissance Biologique},
Journal = {Annales d’histoire et de philosophie du
vivant},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {15-35},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244728}
}
@article{fds244726,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Economic theory as political philosophy},
Journal = {Social Science Journal},
Volume = {36},
Number = {4},
Pages = {575-587},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(99)00039-7},
Abstract = {I defend the integrity of the question of what the cognitive
status of economic theory could amount to, and I argue that
the theory is best understood as a compartment of formal
political philosophy, in particular a species of
contractarianism. This seems particularly apt as an account
of general equilibrium theory. Given the intentional
character of the explanatory variables of economic theory
and the role of information in effecting choice, it is
argued that economic theory is unlikely to secure the
predictive power that would enable it to function as a
factual instead of a normative theory.},
Doi = {10.1016/S0362-3319(99)00039-7},
Key = {fds244726}
}
@article{fds244729,
Author = {Graves, L and Horan, BL and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is indeterminism the source of the statistical character of
evolutionary theory?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {66},
Number = {1},
Pages = {140-157},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1999},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392680},
Abstract = {We argue that Brandon and Carson's (1996) "The
Indeterministic Character of Evolutionary Theory" fails to
identify any indeterminism that would require evolutionary
theory to be a statistical or probabilistic theory.
Specifically, we argue that (1) their demonstration of a
mechanism by which quantum indeterminism might "percolate
up" to the biological level is irrelevant; (2) their
argument that natural selection is indeterministic because
it is inextricably connected with drift fails to join the
issue with determinism; and (3) their view that experimental
methodology in botany assumes indeterminism is both false
and incompatible with the commitment to discoverable causal
mechanisms underlying biological processes. We remain
convinced that the probabilism of the theory of evolution is
epistemically, not ontologically, motivated.},
Doi = {10.1086/392680},
Key = {fds244729}
}
@article{fds244730,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Clark, A},
Title = {La Genetique et le holism debride},
Journal = {Review Internationale de Philosophie},
Volume = {4},
Pages = {35-61},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244730}
}
@article{fds244732,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Problem of Enforcement: Is there an Alternative to
Leviathan?},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {7},
Pages = {236-239},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244732}
}
@article{fds244731,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Privacy as a matter of taste and right},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2},
Pages = {68-90},
Year = {2000},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500002119},
Doi = {10.1017/s0265052500002119},
Key = {fds244731}
}
@article{fds244733,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Indeterminacy, probability and randomness in evolutionary
theory},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {64},
Pages = {536-544},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244733}
}
@article{fds244761,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On multiple realization and the special sciences},
Journal = {JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY},
Volume = {98},
Number = {7},
Pages = {365-373},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2001},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000169968600003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.2307/2678441},
Key = {fds244761}
}
@article{fds244762,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism in a historical science},
Journal = {PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE},
Volume = {68},
Number = {2},
Pages = {135-163},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2001},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000169074200001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/392870},
Key = {fds244762}
}
@article{fds244763,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {How is biological explanation possible?},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {52},
Number = {4},
Pages = {735-760},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2001},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0007-0882},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000172447300006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {That biology provides explanations is not open to doubt. But
how it does so must be a vexed question for those who deny
that biology embodies laws or other generalizations with the
sort of explanatory force that the philosophy of science
recognizes. The most common response to this problem has
involved redefining law so that those grammatically general
statements which biologists invoke in explanations can be
counted as laws. But this terminological innovation cannot
identify the source of biology's explanatory power. I argue
that because biological science is historical, the problem
of biological explanation can be assimilated to the parallel
problem in the philosophy of history, and that the problem
was solved by Carl Hempel. All we need to do is recognize
that the only laws that biology - in all its compartments
from the molecular onward - has or needs are the laws of
natural selection.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/52.4.735},
Key = {fds244763}
}
@article{fds244734,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The priority of intellectual property},
Journal = {Fraser Forum, February 2003, pp. 12-15},
Volume = {February},
Pages = {12-15},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244734}
}
@article{fds244772,
Author = {Sommers, T and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwin's nihilistic idea: Evolution and the meaninglessness
of life},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {18},
Number = {5},
Pages = {653-668},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2003},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000186204700003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1026311011245},
Key = {fds244772}
}
@article{fds244757,
Author = {Bouchard, F and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Fitness, probability and the principles of natural
selection},
Journal = {BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE},
Volume = {55},
Number = {4},
Pages = {693-712},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2004},
ISSN = {0007-0882},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000225362200006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/55.4.693},
Key = {fds244757}
}
@article{fds244771,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Political Philosophy of Intellectual Property, with
Applications in Biotechnology},
Journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {102-130},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds244771}
}
@article{fds336424,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {On the Priority of Intellectual Property Rights, Especially
in Biotechnology},
Journal = {Politics, Philosophy & Economics},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {77-95},
Year = {2004},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X04039983},
Abstract = {This article argues that considerations about the role and
predictability of intellectual innovation make the
protection of intellectual property morally obligatory even
when it greatly reduces short-term welfare. Since the
provision of good new ideas is the only productive input not
subject to decreasing marginal productivity, welfarist
considerations require that no impediment to its maximal
provision be erected and the potentially substantial welfare
losses imposed by a patent system be mitigated by taxation
of other sources of wealth and income. © 2004, SAGE
Publications. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1177/1470594X04039983},
Key = {fds336424}
}
@article{fds244631,
Author = {Brav, A and Heaton, JB and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The rational-behavioral debate in financial
economics},
Journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {11},
Number = {4},
Pages = {393-409},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {1350-178X},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178042000177978},
Abstract = {The contest between rational and behavioral finance is
poorly understood as a contest overtestability' and
'predictive success.' In fact, neither rational nor
behavioral finance offer much in the way of testable
predictions of improving precision. Researchers in the
rational paradigm seem to have abandoned testability and
prediction in favor of a scheme of ex post
'rationalizations' of observed price behavior. These
rationalizations, however, have an unemphasized relevance
for behavioral finance. While behavioral finance advocates
may justly criticize rationalizations as unlikely to lead to
a science of financial economics with improving predictive
power, rational finance's explanatory power plays a key role
supporting the limits of arbitrage arguments that make
behavioral finance possible.},
Doi = {10.1080/1350178042000177978},
Key = {fds244631}
}
@article{fds244775,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Kaplan, DM},
Title = {How to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism about
biology},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {72},
Number = {1},
Pages = {43-68},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000229131300003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Physicalism and antireductionism are the ruling orthodoxy in
the philosophy of biology. But these two theses are
difficult to reconcile. Merely embracing an epistemic
antireductionism will not suffice, as both reductionists and
antireductionists accept that given our cognitive interests
and limitations, non-molecular explanations may not be
improved, corrected or grounded in molecular ones. Moreover,
antireductionists themselves view their claim as a
metaphysical or ontological one about the existence of facts
molecular biology cannot identify, express or explain.
However, this is tantamount to a rejection of physicalism
and so causes the antireductionist discomfort. In this paper
we argue that vindicating physicalism requires a
physicalistic account of the principle of natural selection,
and we provide such an account. The most important payoff to
the account is that it provides for the very sort of
autonomy from the physical that antireductionists need
without threatening their commitment to physicalism.
Copyright 2005 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All
rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1086/428389},
Key = {fds244775}
}
@article{fds320325,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Defending information-free genocentrism.},
Journal = {History and philosophy of the life sciences},
Volume = {27},
Number = {3-4},
Pages = {345-359},
Year = {2005},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {Genocentrism, the thesis that the genes play a special role
in the causation of development is often rejected in favor
of a 'causal democracy thesis' to the effect that all
causally necessary conditions for development are equal.
Genocentrists argue that genes play a distinct causal role
owing to their informational content and that this content
enables them to program the embryo. I show that the special
causal role of the genome hinges not on its informational
status--it has none, or at least no more than computer
programs have independent of our interpretations of
them--but on its power literally to program the embryo, a
power nicely illustrated in the use of polynucleotide
sequences to compute solutions to NP hard problems in
mathematics.},
Key = {fds320325}
}
@article{fds244774,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
Title = {Matten and Ariews Obituary for Fitness},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {20},
Number = {2},
Pages = {343-353},
Year = {2005},
Month = {March},
Key = {fds244774}
}
@article{fds320324,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
Title = {Matthen and Ariew's obituary for fitness: Reports of its
death have been greatly exaggerated},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {20},
Number = {2-3},
Pages = {343-353},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2005},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-2560-0},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-005-2560-0},
Key = {fds320324}
}
@article{fds244735,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Linquist, S},
Title = {On the Original Contract: Evolutionary Game Theory and Human
Evolution},
Journal = {Analyse und Kritik},
Volume = {27},
Number = {1},
Pages = {136-157},
Year = {2005},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2005-0108},
Abstract = {This paper considers whether the available evidence from
archeology, biological anthropology, primatology, and
comparative gene-sequencing, can test evolutionary game
theory models of cooperation as historical hypotheses about
the actual course of human prehistory. The examination
proceeds on the assumption that cooperation is the product
of cultural selection and is not a genetically encoded
trait. Nevertheless, we conclude that gene sequence data may
yet shed significant light on the evolution of
cooperation.},
Doi = {10.1515/auk-2005-0108},
Key = {fds244735}
}
@article{fds244770,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Rosoff, P},
Title = {How reductionism refutes genetic determinism},
Journal = {Studies in the History and Philosophy of the Biological and
Biomedical Sciences},
Year = {2005},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds244770}
}
@article{fds244736,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {In defence of Genocentrism},
Journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences. 2005
;27:345-59},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244736}
}
@article{fds318393,
Author = {Rosoff, PM and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {How Darwinian reductionism refutes genetic
determinism.},
Journal = {Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci},
Volume = {37},
Number = {1},
Pages = {122-135},
Year = {2006},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.12.005},
Abstract = {Genetic determinism labels the morally problematical claim
that some socially significant traits, traits we care about,
such as sexual orientation, gender roles, violence,
alcoholism, mental illness, intelligence, are largely the
results of the operation of genes and not much alterable by
environment, learning or other human intervention. Genetic
determinism does not require that genes literally fix these
socially significant traits, but rather that they constrain
them within narrow channels beyond human intervention. In
this essay we analyze genetic determinism in light of what
is now known about the inborn error of metabolism
phenylketonuria (PKU), which has for so long been the poster
child 'simple' argument in favor of some form of genetic
determinism. We demonstrate that this case proves the exact
opposite of what it has been proposed to support and
provides a strong refutation of genetic determinism in all
its guises.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.12.005},
Key = {fds318393}
}
@article{fds244769,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is epigeneis a counterexample to the central
dogma},
Journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences},
Volume = {28},
Pages = {509-526},
Year = {2007},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds244769}
}
@article{fds244768,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinian Reductionism: How stupid of me to have thought of
it},
Journal = {Metascience},
Year = {2007},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds244768}
}
@article{fds320322,
Author = {Love, AC and Brigandt, I and Stotz, K and Schweitzer, D and Rosenberg,
A},
Title = {More worry and less love?},
Journal = {Metascience},
Volume = {17},
Number = {1},
Pages = {18-26},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-007-9159-9},
Doi = {10.1007/s11016-007-9159-9},
Key = {fds320322}
}
@article{fds244767,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Are homologies function free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Pages = {approximately 35 pages},
Year = {2008},
Month = {Fall},
Key = {fds244767}
}
@article{fds318392,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Are homologies (selected effect or causal role) function
free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {307-334},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/649807},
Abstract = {This article argues that at least very many judgments of
homology rest on prior attributions of selected-effect (SE)
function, and that many of the "parts" of biological systems
that are rightly classified as homologous are constituted by
(are so classified in virtue of) their consequence
etiologies. We claim that SE functions are often used in the
prior identification of the parts deemed to be homologous
and are often used to differentiate more restricted
homologous kinds within less restricted ones. In doing so,
we discuss recent criticism of this view that has been
offered (especially that offered by Paul Griffiths).
Copyright 2009 by the Philosophy of Science
Association.},
Doi = {10.1086/649807},
Key = {fds318392}
}
@article{fds166628,
Author = {A. Rosenberg and K. Neander},
Title = {Are homolgies function free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-39},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds166628}
}
@article{fds244765,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Solving the circularity problem for functions},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Year = {2011},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds244765}
}
@article{fds244628,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Why I am a Naturalist},
Journal = {New York Times},
Year = {2011},
Month = {September},
url = {http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/why-i-am-a-naturalist/},
Key = {fds244628}
}
@article{fds244629,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can nuerophilosophy save the humanities},
Journal = {New York Times},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
url = {http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/?s=can+neurophilosophy},
Key = {fds244629}
}
@article{fds244766,
Author = {Lange, M and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can There beA PrioriCausal Models of Natural
Selection?},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {89},
Number = {4},
Pages = {591-599},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048402.2011.598175},
Doi = {10.1080/00048402.2011.598175},
Key = {fds244766}
}
@article{fds318391,
Author = {Neander, K and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Solving the circularity problem for functions: A response to
Nanay},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {109},
Number = {10},
Pages = {613-622},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20121091030},
Doi = {10.5840/jphil20121091030},
Key = {fds318391}
}
@article{fds331102,
Author = {Braddock, M and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reconstruction in moral philosophy?},
Journal = {Analyse und Kritik},
Volume = {2012},
Number = {1},
Pages = {63-80},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2012-0105},
Abstract = {We raise three issues for Kitcher's Ethical Project: First,
we argue that the genealogy of morals starts well before the
advent of altruism-failures and the need to remedy them,
which Kitcher dates at about 50K years ago. Second, we
challenge the likelihood of long term moral progress of the
sort Kitcher requires to establish objectivity while
circumventing Hume's challenge to avoid trying to derive
normative conclusions from positive ones-'ought' from 'is'.
Third, we sketch ways in which Kitcher's metaethical
opponents could respond to his arguments against them. ©
Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart.},
Doi = {10.1515/auk-2012-0105},
Key = {fds331102}
}
@article{fds244759,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Why do spatiotemporally restricted regularities explain in
the social sciences?},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {63},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-26},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2012},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0007-0882},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000300327100001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Employing a well-known local regularity from macroeconomics,
the Phillips curve, I examine Woodward's ([2000], [2003])
account of the explanatory power of such historically
restricted generalizations and the mathematical models with
which they are sometimes associated. The article seeks to
show that, pace Woodward, to be explanatory such
generalizations need to be underwritten by more fundamental
ones, and that rational choice theory would not avail in
this case to provide the required underwriting. Examining
how such explanatory restricted regularities are
underwritten in biology - by unrestricted Darwinian
regularities - provides the basis for an argument that
Darwinian regularities serve the same function in human
affairs. The general argument for this claim requires, inter
alia, that we accept some version or other of a theory of
memes. The article concludes by clearing the field of some
prominent objections to the existence of memes, and
extracting some policy implications from the persistence and
acceleration of arms races in human affairs. © The Author
2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of
British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axr014},
Key = {fds244759}
}
@article{fds244630,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {From rational choice to reflexivity},
Journal = {Economic Thought (on-line)},
Pages = {32-32},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://etdiscussion.worldeconomicsassociation.org/?post=from-rational-choice-to-reflexivity-learning-from-sen-keynes-hayek-soros-and-most-of-all-from-darwin},
Key = {fds244630}
}
@article{fds244632,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reflexivity, Uncertainty and the Unity of
Science},
Journal = {Review of Economic Methodology},
Volume = {20},
Number = {4},
Pages = {14-14},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Winter},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2013.859413},
Abstract = {The paper argues that substantial support for Soros' claims
about uncertainty and reflexivity in economics and human
affairs generally are provided by the operation of both
factors in the biological domain to produce substantially
the same processes which have been recognized by ecologists
and evolutionary biologists. In particular predator prey
relations have their sources in uncertainty - i.e. the
random character of variations, and frequency dependent
co-evolution - reflexivity. The paper argues that despite
Soros' claims, intentionality is not required to produce
these phenomena, and that where it does so, in the human
case, it provides no basis to deny a reasonable thesis of
the methodological or causal unity of science. The argument
for this conclusion is developed by starting with a
biological predator/prey relation and successively
introducing intentional components without affecting the
nature of the process. Accepting the conclusion of this
argument provides substantial additional inductive support
for Soros' theory in its economic application. © 2014 ©
2014 Taylor & Francis.},
Doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2013.859413},
Key = {fds244632}
}
@article{fds244737,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Free markets and the myth of earned inequalities},
Journal = {3AM Magazine},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/free-markets-and-the-myth-of-earned-inequalities/},
Key = {fds244737}
}
@article{fds244738,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Curtain, T},
Title = {What is economics good for?},
Publisher = {The New York Times},
Year = {2013},
url = {http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/what-is-economics-good-for/?_r=1},
Key = {fds244738}
}
@article{fds244764,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {How Jerry Fodor slid down the slippery slope to
Anti-Darwinism, and how we can avoid the same
fate},
Journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {3},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-17},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1879-4912},
url = {http://http://link.springer.com/search?query=rosenberg&search-within=Journal&facet-journal-id=%2213194%22},
Abstract = {There is only one physically possible process that builds
and operates purposive systems in nature: natural selection.
What it does is build and operate systems that look to us
purposive, goal directed, teleological. There really are not
any purposes in nature and no purposive processes ether. It
is just one vast network of linked causal chains. Darwinian
natural selection is the only process that could produce the
appearance of purpose. That is why natural selection must
have built and must continually shape the intentional causes
of purposive behavior. Fodor's argument against Darwinian
theory involves a biologist's modus tollens which is a
cognitive scientist's modus ponens. Assuming his argument is
valid, the right conclusion is not that Darwin's theory is
mistaken but that Fodor's and any other non-Darwinian
approaches to the mind are wrong. It shows how getting
things wrong in the philosophy of biology leads to mistaken
conclusions with the potential to damage the acceptance of a
theory with harmful consequences for human well-being. Fodor
has shown that the real consequence of rejecting a Darwinian
approach to the mind is to reject a Darwinian theory of
phylogenetic evolution. This forces us to take seriously a
notion that otherwise would not have much of a chance: that
when it comes to the nature of mental states, indeterminacy
rules. This is an insight that should have the most
beneficial impact on freeing cognitive neuroscience from
demands on the adequacy of its theories that it could never
meet. © 2012 Springer Science + Business Media
B.V.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13194-012-0055-9},
Key = {fds244764}
}
@article{fds320318,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Genealogy of Content or the Future of an
Illusion},
Journal = {Philosophia (United States)},
Volume = {43},
Number = {3},
Pages = {537-547},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9624-4},
Abstract = {Eliminativism about intentional content argues for its
conclusion from the partial correctness of all three of the
theses Hutto and Satne seek to combine: neo-Cartesianism is
correct to this extent: if there is intentional content it
must originally be mental. Neo-Behaviorism is correct to
this extent: attribution of intentional content is basically
a heuristic device for predicting the behavior of higher
vertebrates. Neo-Pragmatism is right to this extent: the
illusion of intentionality in language is the source of the
illusion of intentionality in thought. Eliminativists employ
the insights of all three “neo”-theses to explain why
there is no such thing and why the systematic illusion that
there is intentional content runs so deep.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11406-015-9624-4},
Key = {fds320318}
}
@article{fds323663,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {ON the VERY IDEA of IDEAL THEORY in POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {55-75},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000376},
Abstract = {The essay agues that there is little scope for ideal theory
in political philosophy, even under Rawls's conception of
its aims. It begins by identifying features of a standard
example of ideal theory in physics - the ideal gas law,
PV=NRT and draws attention to the lack of these features in
Rawls's derivation of the principles of justice from the
original position. A. John Simmons's defense of ideal theory
against criticisms of Amartya Sen is examined, as are
further criticisms of both by David Schmidtz. The essay goes
on to develop a conception of the domain of social relations
to be characterized by justice that suggests that as a
moving target it makes ideal theory otiose. Examination of
Rawls's later views substantiate the conclusion that ideal
theory as propounded in A Theory of Justice is a mistaken
starting point in the enterprise of political philosophy.
Differences between the domains of ideal theory in
mathematics, physics, and economics on the one hand, and
political philosophy on the other, reinforce this
conclusion.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0265052516000376},
Key = {fds323663}
}
@article{fds327007,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Why Social Science is Biological Science},
Journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {48},
Number = {3},
Pages = {341-369},
Year = {2017},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9365-0},
Abstract = {The social sciences need to take seriously their status as
divisions of biology. As such they need to recognize the
central role of Darwinian processes in all the phenomena
they seek to explain. An argument for this claim is
formulated in terms of a small number of relatively precise
premises that focus on the nature of the kinds and
taxonomies of all the social sciences. The analytical
taxonomies of all the social sciences are shown to require a
Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a nativist
or genetically driven theory by any means. Non-genetic
Darwinian processes have the fundamental role on all human
affairs. I expound a general account of how Darwinian
processes operate in human affairs by selecting for
strategies and sets of strategies individuals and groups
employ. I conclude by showing how a great deal of social
science can be organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s
approach to biological inquiry, an approach required by the
fact that the social sciences are all divisions of biology,
and in particular the studies of one particular biological
species.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10838-017-9365-0},
Key = {fds327007}
}
@article{fds332348,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Making mechanism interesting},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {195},
Number = {1},
Pages = {11-33},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0713-5},
Abstract = {I note the multitude of ways in which, beginning with the
classic paper by Machamer et al. (Philos Sci 67:1–25,
2000), the mechanists have qualify their methodological
dicta, and limit the vulnerability of their claims by
strategic vagueness regarding their application. I go on to
generalize a version of the mechanist requirement on
explanations due to Craver and Kaplan (Philos Sci
78(4):601–627, 2011) in cognitive and systems neuroscience
so that it applies broadly across the life sciences in
accordance with the view elaborated by Craver and Darden in
In Search of Mechanisms (2013). I then go on to explore what
ramifications their mechanist requirement on explanations
may have for explanatory “dependencies” reported in
biology and the special sciences. What this exploration
suggests is that mechanism threatens to eliminate instead of
underwrite a large number of such “dependencies”
reported in higher-levels of biology and the special
sciences. I diagnose the source of this threat in
mechanism’s demand that explanations identify nested
causal differences makers in mechanisms, their components,
the components further components, and so forth. Finally, I
identify the “love–hate” relationship mechanism must
have with functional explanation, and show how it makes
mechanism an extremely interesting thesis
indeed.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0713-5},
Key = {fds332348}
}
@article{fds336418,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can we make sense of subjective experience in metabolically
situated cognitive processes?},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1-2},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-018-9624-4},
Abstract = {In “Mind, matter and metabolism,” Godfrey-Smith’s
objective is to “develop a picture” in which, first, the
basis of living activity in physical processes “makes
sense,” second, the basis of proto-cognitive activity in
living activity “makes sense” and third, “the basis of
subjective experience in metabolically situated cognitive
processes also makes sense.” show that he fails to attain
all three of these objectives, largely owing to the nature
and modularization of metabolism.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-018-9624-4},
Key = {fds336418}
}
@article{fds371630,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {THE INEVITABILITY OF A GENERALIZED DARWINIAN THEORY OF
BEHAVIOR, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE},
Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
Volume = {58},
Number = {1},
Pages = {50-62},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The paper argues that the evident features of all human
affairs of interest to the social scientist demand Darwinian
explanations. It must however be recognized that the range
of regularities, models, theories that a successful
Darwinian research program will inspire must be
heterogeneous, operate at very different scales, identify a
diversity of distinct and often unrepeated processes
operating through multifarious instances of blind variation
and environmental selection. There will be no canonical
statement of a Darwinian theory of cultural and/or social
affairs.},
Key = {fds371630}
}
%% Articles and Chapters
@article{fds244543,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Partial Interpretation and Microeconomics},
Pages = {93-109},
Booktitle = {Developments in the Methodology of Social Science: Theory
and Decision Library},
Publisher = {Dordrecht: Reidel},
Editor = {Leinfellner, W and Kohler, W},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244543}
}
@article{fds244544,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Braybrooke, D},
Title = {Vincula Revindicata},
Pages = {217-222},
Booktitle = {Philosophical Problems of Causation},
Publisher = {Encino, CA: Dickenson},
Editor = {Beauchamp, TL},
Year = {1974},
Key = {fds244544}
}
@article{fds244545,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Towards the Assimilation of Rules to Generalizations},
Pages = {156-172},
Booktitle = {Basic Issues in Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {New York: Science History Publications},
Editor = {Shea, W},
Year = {1976},
Key = {fds244545}
}
@article{fds244546,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Ruse’s Treatment of the Evidence for Evolution: A
Reconsideration},
Pages = {83-93},
Booktitle = {PSA},
Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
Editor = {Giere, and Asquith},
Year = {1980},
Key = {fds244546}
}
@article{fds244547,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {A Skeptical History of Microeconomic Theory
(Reprint)},
Pages = {47-62},
Booktitle = {Philosophy in Economics},
Publisher = {Dordrecht: Reidel},
Editor = {Pitt, J},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds244547}
}
@article{fds244548,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Interaction of Evolutionary and Genetic
Theory},
Pages = {207-219},
Booktitle = {Pragmatism and Purpose},
Publisher = {Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press},
Editor = {Summer, S and Wilson},
Year = {1981},
Key = {fds244548}
}
@article{fds244549,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Causation and Teleology in Contemporary Philosophy of
Science},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {51-86},
Booktitle = {Contemporary Philosophy, A New Survey},
Publisher = {The Hague: Nijhoff},
Year = {1982},
Key = {fds244549}
}
@article{fds244550,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Human Science and Biological Science},
Pages = {37-52},
Booktitle = {Scientific Explanation and Understanding},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: University Presses of America},
Editor = {Rescher, N},
Year = {1983},
Key = {fds244550}
}
@article{fds244551,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Straussman, JD},
Title = {Maximization, Markets and the Measurement of Productivity in
the Public Sector},
Pages = {280-287},
Booktitle = {New Directions in Public Administration},
Publisher = {Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole},
Editor = {Bozeman, and Straussman},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds244551}
}
@article{fds244552,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Public Sector Monopolies},
Pages = {219-233},
Booktitle = {Productivity and Public Policy},
Publisher = {Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications},
Editor = {Holzer, and Nagle},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds244552}
}
@article{fds244553,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Interanimation of Micro and Macroeconomics
(Reprint)},
Series = {1st},
Pages = {324-343},
Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Economics},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Hausman, D},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds244553}
}
@article{fds244554,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Supervenience of Biological Concepts
(Reprint)},
Pages = {99-116},
Booktitle = {Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology},
Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press},
Editor = {Sober, E},
Year = {1984},
Key = {fds244554}
}
@article{fds244555,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Prospects for the Elimination of Tastes in Economics and
Ethics (Reprint)},
Pages = {48-69},
Booktitle = {Ethics and Economics},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
Editor = {Paul, EF and Paul, J and Miller, FD},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244555}
}
@article{fds244556,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Davidson’s Unintended Attack on Psychology},
Pages = {399-407},
Booktitle = {Actions and Events},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
Editor = {LePore, E},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244556}
}
@article{fds244557,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Adaptionalist Imperatives and Panglossian
Paradigms},
Pages = {161-179},
Booktitle = {Sociobiology and Epistemology},
Publisher = {Dordrecht: Reidel},
Editor = {Fetzer, JM},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244557}
}
@article{fds244558,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Science and the Potential for Knowledge in
Social Sciences},
Pages = {339-346},
Booktitle = {Pluralisms and Subjectivities in Social Science},
Publisher = {Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Fiske, D and Schweder, R},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244558}
}
@article{fds244559,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinism Today–Tomorrow, But Not Yesterday},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {157-173},
Booktitle = {PSA 1984},
Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
Editor = {Kitcher, P and Asquith, P},
Year = {1985},
Key = {fds244559}
}
@article{fds244560,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Autonomy and Provincialism (Reprint)},
Pages = {10-21},
Booktitle = {Holisme en Reductionisme en de Empirishe
Wetenschappen},
Publisher = {Groningen, Studium Generale},
Editor = {Geinert, G},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds244560}
}
@article{fds303573,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Political Philosophy of Biological Endowments: Some
Considerations (Reprint)},
Pages = {1-31},
Booktitle = {Equal Opportunity},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell},
Editor = {Paul, M and Ahrens},
Year = {1987},
Key = {fds303573}
}
@article{fds244563,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {From Reductionism to Instrumentalism},
Pages = {245-262},
Booktitle = {What Philosophy of Biology is},
Publisher = {Dordrecht: Kluwer},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds244563}
}
@article{fds303574,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Are Generic Predictions Enough (reprint)},
Pages = {43-68},
Booktitle = {Philosophy and Economics II},
Publisher = {Dordrecht: Kluwer},
Editor = {Hamminga, B},
Year = {1989},
Key = {fds303574}
}
@article{fds244564,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {A quoi bon la theorie de l’equilibre general?”},
Pages = {170-187},
Booktitle = {La Methodologie de L’economie Theorique et Applique
Aujourd’hui},
Publisher = {Paris Nathan},
Editor = {Wolff, J and al, E},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds244564}
}
@article{fds244565,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Fitness, Reinforcement and Underlying Mechanisms
(reprint)},
Pages = {57-59},
Booktitle = {The Selection of Behavior},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Catania, C and Harnad, S},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds244565}
}
@article{fds244566,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is There an Evolutionary Biology of Play?},
Pages = {180-196},
Booktitle = {Interpretation and Explanation in the Study of Annual
Behavior},
Publisher = {Boulder, CO: Westview Press},
Editor = {Bekoff, M and Jameson},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds244566}
}
@article{fds244567,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Teleology},
Pages = {391-393},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Metaphysics},
Publisher = {Munich, Germany: Philosophia Verlag},
Editor = {Burkhardt, EA},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds244567}
}
@article{fds244568,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {What’s So Special About General Equilibrium?},
Pages = {10-133},
Booktitle = {Economics, Culture, Education},
Publisher = {London: Elgar},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds244568}
}
@article{fds303575,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario
(Reprint)},
Pages = {86-101},
Booktitle = {Ethics, Politics and Human Nature},
Editor = {Paul, M and Rowe},
Year = {1991},
Key = {fds303575}
}
@article{fds244570,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Hume and the Philosophy of Science},
Pages = {64-89},
Booktitle = {Cambridge Companion to Hume},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Norton},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244570}
}
@article{fds244571,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Evolutionary Biology and Neoclassical Economics: Strange
Bedfellows},
Volume = {1},
Pages = {174-183},
Booktitle = {PSA},
Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244571}
}
@article{fds244572,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Altruism: Theoretical Context},
Pages = {20-28},
Booktitle = {Keywords in Evolutionary Biology},
Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press},
Editor = {Fox-Keller, E and Lloyd, L},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244572}
}
@article{fds244573,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Common Knowledge, Equilibrium and Other Idealizations:
Commentary Bicchieri},
Pages = {189-194},
Booktitle = {Postpopperian Methodology of Economics},
Publisher = {Boston: Dordrecht},
Editor = {DeMarchi, N},
Year = {1992},
Key = {fds244573}
}
@article{fds244574,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {If Economics Isn’t a Science, What Is It?
(Reprint)},
Pages = {426-442},
Booktitle = {The Philosophy and Methodology of Economics},
Publisher = {Aldershot, UK: Elgar},
Editor = {Caldwell, B},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244574}
}
@article{fds244575,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {How is Eliminative Materialism Possible?},
Booktitle = {Mind and Common Sense},
Publisher = {Cambridge:Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Bogdan, R},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244575}
}
@article{fds244576,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Subversive Reflections on the Human Genome
Project},
Volume = {2},
Pages = {329-338},
Booktitle = {PSA},
Publisher = {East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244576}
}
@article{fds244577,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {If Economics Isn’t a Science, What Is It?
(Reprint)},
Pages = {661-674},
Booktitle = {Readings in the philosophy of Social Science},
Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: MIT Press},
Editor = {Martin, M and McIntyre, L},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244577}
}
@article{fds244578,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Does Evolutionary Theory Give Aid or Comfort to
Economics},
Pages = {384-407},
Booktitle = {Natural Images in Economic Thought},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Mirowski, P},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244578}
}
@article{fds244579,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Cognitive Status of Economic theory},
Pages = {216-235},
Booktitle = {Nature of Economic Method},
Publisher = {London: Routledge},
Editor = {Backhouse},
Year = {1994},
Key = {fds244579}
}
@article{fds244580,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario
(Reprint)},
Booktitle = {Ethics and Biology},
Publisher = {SUNY Press},
Editor = {Thompson, P},
Year = {1995},
Key = {fds244580}
}
@article{fds244582,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Human Genome Project: Research Tactics and Economic
Strategies (Reprint)},
Pages = {1-26},
Booktitle = {Scientific Innovation, Philosophy and Public
Policy},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Paul, E and Miller, F and Paul, J},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244582}
}
@article{fds244583,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Economics},
Pages = {582-583},
Booktitle = {Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Audi, R},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244583}
}
@article{fds244584,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is There an Evolutionary Biology of Play?
(Reprint)},
Pages = {217-228},
Booktitle = {Readings in Animal Cognition},
Publisher = {Cambridge, MA: MIT Press},
Editor = {Bekoff, M and Jameson, D},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds244584}
}
@article{fds303576,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Biology},
Volume = {Supplementary},
Pages = {407-411},
Booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {New York, NY: Simon-Schuster McMillan},
Editor = {Borchert, D},
Year = {1996},
Key = {fds303576}
}
@article{fds244585,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Sociobiology},
Booktitle = {Blackwell’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwells},
Editor = {Craig, E},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244585}
}
@article{fds244586,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Problems of the Philosophy of Social Science},
Booktitle = {Blackwell’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Oxford: Blackwells},
Editor = {Craig, E},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244586}
}
@article{fds244587,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Altruism: theoretical Considerations (Reprint)},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Hull, and Ruse},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244587}
}
@article{fds244588,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Human Genome Project: Research Tactics and Economic
Strategies (Reprint)},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Hull, and Ruse},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244588}
}
@article{fds244589,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Folk Psychology},
Booktitle = {Handbook of Economic Methodology},
Publisher = {Aldershot, UK: Elgar},
Editor = {Davis, JB},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244589}
}
@article{fds244591,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The Character Concept in Taxonomy, Evolution, and
Development},
Pages = {199-214},
Booktitle = {The Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology},
Publisher = {New Haven, CT: Yale University Press},
Editor = {Wagner, G},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244591}
}
@article{fds244593,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Limits to Biology},
Pages = {247-265},
Booktitle = {Science at Century’s End},
Publisher = {Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
Press},
Editor = {Carrier, M and Ruetsche, L and Massey, G},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244593}
}
@article{fds244594,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Laws, History and the Nature of Scientific
Understanding},
Volume = {32},
Pages = {51-71},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Biology},
Publisher = {New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers},
Editor = {Hecht, M and Clegg},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244594}
}
@article{fds244595,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of Social Science},
Pages = {451-460},
Booktitle = {A Companion to the Philosophy of Science},
Publisher = {London: Blackwell},
Editor = {Newton-Smith, W},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds244595}
}
@article{fds287553,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The problem of enforcement: Is there an alternative to
Leviathan},
Pages = {236-239},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Origins of Morality},
Publisher = {Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic},
Editor = {Katz, L},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds287553}
}
@article{fds303577,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Privacy as a Matter of Taste and Right (Reprint)},
Pages = {68-91},
Booktitle = {The Right to Privacy},
Publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Paul, M and Paul},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds303577}
}
@article{fds244596,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophy of molecular biology},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Life Sciences},
Publisher = {London: McMillan},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds244596}
}
@article{fds244597,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
Title = {Fitness},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244597}
}
@article{fds244598,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Good ideas and human welfare},
Booktitle = {Proceedings of International Conference on Economics,
Development and Ethics, University of Cape
Woen},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Ross, D},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244598}
}
@article{fds244599,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism in a historical science},
Pages = {125-155},
Booktitle = {Promises and Limits of Reductionism in the Biomedical
Sciences},
Publisher = {John Wiley},
Editor = {Hull, D and Regenmortel, MV},
Year = {2002},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds244599}
}
@article{fds303578,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Bouchard, F},
Title = {Drift, fitness, and the foundations of probability},
Booktitle = {Indeterminism in Physics and Biology},
Publisher = {Paderborn: Mentis},
Editor = {Hutterman, A},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds303578}
}
@article{fds244600,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Brandon, R},
Title = {Problems of the Philosophy of Biology},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Science Today},
Publisher = {Oxford: Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Clark, P and Hawley, K},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244600}
}
@article{fds244602,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinism in Moral Philosophy and Social
Theory},
Booktitle = {Cambridge Companion to Darwin},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Hodge, and Radick},
Year = {2003},
Key = {fds244602}
}
@article{fds244758,
Author = {Bouchard, F and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Drift, fitness and the foundations of probability},
Journal = {DETERMINISM IN PHYSICS AND BIOLOGY},
Pages = {108-135},
Booktitle = {Indeterminism in Physics and Biology},
Publisher = {Paderborn: Mentis},
Editor = {Adreas Hutterman},
Year = {2003},
ISBN = {3-89785-371-X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000230579000008&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds244758}
}
@article{fds244603,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Genomics and cultural evolution},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology,},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Boniolo, G and Anna, GD},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds244603}
}
@article{fds244604,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Will genomics do more for metaphysics than
Locke},
Pages = {186-206},
Booktitle = {Scientific Evidence},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins Unversity},
Editor = {Achinstein, P},
Year = {2005},
ISBN = {9780521856294},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498428.012},
Abstract = {Origin of man now solved. He who understands baboon would do
more for metaphysics than Locke. Darwin, Notebooks. THE
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND “JUST-SO STORIES”.
Darwin's claim is probably guilty of pardonable
exaggeration. After all he did not prove the origin of man,
and Locke's greatest contributions were to political
philosophy, not metaphysics. But it may turn out that
Darwin's twentieth-century grandchild, genomics, vindicates
this claim with respect to both metaphysics and political
philosophy. Here I focus on the latter claim alone, however.
From the year that William Hamilton first introduced the
concept of inclusive fitness and the mechanism of kin
selection, biologists, psychologists, game theorists,
philosophers, and others have been adding details to answer
the question of how altruism is possible as a biological
disposition. We now have a fairly well-articulated story of
how wecould havegotten from there, nature red in tooth and
claw, to here, an almost universal commitment to morality.
That is, there is now a scenario showing how a lineage of
organisms selected for maximizing genetic representation in
subsequent generations could come eventually to be composed
of cooperating creatures. Establishing this bare possibility
was an important turning point for biological anthropology,
for human sociobiology, and for evolutionary psychology.
Prior to Hamilton's breakthrough it was intellectually
permissible to write off Darwinism as irrelevant to
distinctively human behavior and human institutions.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511498428.012},
Key = {fds244604}
}
@article{fds244605,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Good Ideas and Human Welfare: Big Pharma versus the
Developing Nations},
Booktitle = {Developmental Dilemmas},
Publisher = {London: Routledge},
Editor = {Ayogu, M and Ross, D},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds244605}
}
@article{fds244606,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism in molecular biology},
Booktitle = {Oxford handbook in Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Hull, D and Ruse, M},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244606}
}
@article{fds244607,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism},
Booktitle = {Handbook for the Philosophy of Science, v.3 Philosophy of
Biology},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244607}
}
@article{fds244609,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Biology, Philosophy of},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of
Science},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Curd, M and Psillos, S},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds244609}
}
@article{fds320323,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is epigenetic inheritance a counterexample to the central
dogma?},
Journal = {History and philosophy of the life sciences},
Volume = {28},
Number = {4},
Pages = {549-565},
Year = {2006},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {This paper argues that nothing that has been discovered in
the increasingly complex delails of gene regulation has
provided any grounds to retract or qualify Crick's version
of the central dogma. In particular it defends the role of
the genes as the sole bearers of information, and argues
that the mechanism of epigenetic modification of the DNA is
but another vindication of Crick's version of the central
dogma. The paper shows that arguments of C.K. Waters for the
distinctive causual role of the genes are equivalent in
important respects to the present ones and concludes with a
defense of the informational role of the genes against an
argument from trans-acting genetic regulation due to
Stotz.},
Key = {fds320323}
}
@article{fds331103,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism (and antireductionism) in biology},
Pages = {120-138},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of
Biology},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2007},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780521851282},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521851282.007},
Abstract = {Accelerating developments in molecular biology since 1953
have strongly encouraged the advocacy of reductionism by a
number of important biologists, including Crick, Monod, and
E. O. Wilson, and strong opposition by equally prominent
biologists, especially Lewontin, along with most
philosophers of biology. Reductionism is a metaphysical
thesis, a claim about explanations, and a research program.
The metaphysical thesis that reductionists advance (and
antireductionists accept) is physicalism, the thesis that
all facts, including the biological facts, are fixed by the
physical and chemical facts; there are no nonphysical
events, states, or processes, and so biological events,
states, and processes are “nothing but” physical ones.
This metaphysical thesis is one reductionists share with
antireductionists. The reductionist argues that the
metaphysical thesis has consequences for biological
explanations: they need to be completed, corrected, made
more precise, or otherwise deepened by more fundamental
explanations in molecular biology. The antireductionist
denies this inference, arguing that nonmolecular biological
explanations are adequate and need no macromolecular
correction, completion, or grounding. The research program
that reductionists claim follows from the conclusion about
explanations can be framed as the methodological moral that
biologists should seek such macromolecular
explanations.},
Doi = {10.1017/CCOL9780521851282.007},
Key = {fds331103}
}
@article{fds244756,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism in biology},
Pages = {349-368},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780444515438},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50018-6},
Abstract = {Reductionism is a thesis about formal logical relations
among theories that were undermined by the philosophers of
science with the powers of mathematical logic to illuminate
interesting and important methodological matters such as
explanation and theory testing. A major problem of
reductionism in both molecular biology, and in functional
biology is the absence of laws, either at the level of the
reducing theory or the reduced theory, or between them. The
real dispute is not about the derivability or undesirability
of laws in functional biology from laws in molecular
biology, but since there is only one general theory in
biology, Darwinism. Reductionism claims that the most
complete, correct, and adequate explanations of historical
facts uncovered in functional biology is by appealing to
other historical facts uncovered in molecular biology, plus
some laws that operate at the level of molecular biology.
Reductionism in biology turns out to be the radical thesis
that ultimate explanations must give way to proximate ones
and that these latter will be molecular explanations. ©
2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50018-6},
Key = {fds244756}
}
@article{fds244620,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {If economics is a science, what kind of a science is
it?},
Pages = {55-68},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Kincaid, H},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds244620}
}
@article{fds303579,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism in Biology},
Pages = {550-567},
Booktitle = {A Companion to the Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING LTD},
Editor = {Plutinsky, A and Sarkar, S},
Year = {2008},
Month = {April},
ISBN = {9781405125727},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470696590.ch29},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470696590.ch29},
Key = {fds303579}
}
@article{fds244610,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinism in moral philosophy and social
theory},
Booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Darwin, 2d Edition},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Raddick, G and Hodge, J},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244610}
}
@article{fds244611,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Lessons from neurogenomics for cognitive
science},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Bickle, J},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244611}
}
@article{fds320321,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Lessons for Cognitive Science from Neurogenomics},
Booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {September},
ISBN = {9780195304787},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0007},
Abstract = {This article discusses the lessons from neurogenomics that
are applicable to cognitive science. It argues that the work
of some leading cognitive scientists who employed the
resources of neurogenomics has already provided strong
grounds to be pessimistic about the representations to which
a computational theory of mind is committed, and to be
optimistic about the syntactic character of processes of
thinking and reasoning in the brain. It also discusses
research findings concerning how the brain recalls memories
and the storage of explicit memories.},
Doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0007},
Key = {fds320321}
}
@article{fds244612,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {How physics fakes design},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Biology: Coneptual, Ethical Religion
Issues},
Publisher = {Cambridge U.P.},
Editor = {Thompson, and Walsh},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds244612}
}
@article{fds200378,
Author = {A. Rosenberg},
Title = {"How physcis fakes design"},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Biology: Coneptual, Ethical Religion
Issues},
Publisher = {Cambridge U.P.},
Editor = {Thompson and Walsh},
Year = {2011},
Month = {Winter},
Key = {fds200378}
}
@article{fds244613,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Designing an alternative to the patent as a second best
solution to the problem of intellectual property},
Booktitle = {New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual
Property},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Lever, A},
Year = {2012},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds244613}
}
@article{fds183673,
Author = {A. Rosenberg},
Title = {"Why do spatiotemporally restricted regularities explain in
the social sciences?"},
Journal = {British Journal for Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {63},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-26},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/63/1/1.full},
Abstract = {Br J Philos Sci (2012) 63 (1): 1-26.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/axr014},
Key = {fds183673}
}
@article{fds320320,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Designing a successor to the patent as second best solution
to the problem of optimum provision of good
ideas},
Pages = {88-109},
Booktitle = {New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual
Property},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107009318},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511920837.004},
Abstract = {This chapter reviews welfarist arguments for government
intervention to optimize the provision of good ideas that
arise from their nature. It shows that, paradoxically, these
same considerations provide reasons to think that, as a
solution to the good idea-optimization problem, the patent
will increasingly fail to be effective. This ineffectiveness
is accelerated by technological developments as well. The
problem that welfarism thus faces is to provide a new
institution or regime that encourages the optimum provision
and utilization of good ideas that will avoid the
difficulties which the patent must inevitably impose and
which technological developments are hastening. An
examination of the reward system of pure science, however,
suggests such a solution, and the chapter goes on to sketch
ways in which this solution pure science uses can be
implemented more broadly. The near-public goods character of
good ideas and argument for intellectual property rights The
welfarist argument for intellectual property rights is based
on the near-public goods properties of good ideas. In a
competitive market among economically rational agents that
lacks property rights in good ideas, there must inevitably
be an undersupply of good ideas: discovering and testing
good ideas is costly and risky. Consider the obvious example
of crop rotation. Establishing its enhancement of
agricultural yields takes several growing seasons, during
which some fields are removed from production altogether. No
one has an incentive to undertake the experiment, but
everyone has an incentive to watch others undertake it and
copy the early adopters should the innovation work. But if
no one has the appropriate incentive, there are no early
adopters and crop rotation is unlikely ever to be invented.
Ergo, the absence of property rights in good ideas leads to
underinvestment in and undersupply of them.},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511920837.004},
Key = {fds320320}
}
@article{fds244614,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Disenchanted Naturalism},
Pages = {17-36},
Booktitle = {Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its
Implications},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Address = {London},
Editor = {Bashour, B and Muller, H},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244614}
}
@article{fds244615,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Can naturalism save the humanities?},
Pages = {39-42},
Booktitle = {The Armchair or the Laboratory},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Haug, M},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244615}
}
@article{fds244616,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reply to critics},
Series = {Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion},
Booktitle = {Is Faith in God Reasonable? Debates in Philosophy, Science
and Rhetoric},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Miller, C and Gould, P},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244616}
}
@article{fds244617,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Why I am a naturalist},
Pages = {32-35},
Booktitle = {The Armchair or the Laboratory},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Haug, M},
Year = {2013},
ISBN = {978-0-415-53131-3},
Key = {fds244617}
}
@article{fds244618,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Theism and Allism},
Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Peter Van Inwagen},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Keller, JCA},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds244618}
}
@article{fds358345,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Biology},
Pages = {575-585},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Science},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415518741},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203744857-65},
Abstract = {It is only since the 1950s that philosophers of science
began to pay serious attention to biology. Initially
philosophers used biological examples to test the claims
about science that logical positivists and logical
empiricists had drawn from their studies of physics. Over
the same time the revolution in biological theorizing - both
evolutionary and molecular - gave rise to a number of
abstract questions that have jointly interested biologists
and philosophers with no independent interest in assessing
positivism or the post-positivist picture of science that
succeeded it (Monod 1971; Wilson 1975; Dawkins 1976).
Nonetheless, this work was done with enough knowledge of the
details of the biological revolution and developments in
philosophy of science to draw conclusions about the adequacy
or failure of post-positivist accounts of laws, theories,
explanations, reduction, and scientic method. This essay
examines the main issues that interest contemporary
philosophers of biology, issues that clearly show the
relevance of biology not only for philosophy of science but
for philosophy in general.},
Doi = {10.4324/9780203744857-65},
Key = {fds358345}
}
@article{fds244619,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Craig, WL},
Title = {The debate: Is faith in God reasonable?},
Series = {Routledge Studies inthe Philosophy of Religion},
Booktitle = {Is Faith in God Reasonable? Debates in Philosophy, Science
and Rhetoric},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Miller, C and Gould, P},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds244619}
}
@article{fds331101,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Replies to critics: Very brief, very selective, rather
snarky},
Pages = {166-170},
Booktitle = {Is Faith in God Reasonable?: Debates in Philosophy, Science,
and Rhetoric},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780415709408},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315885544-12},
Abstract = {The notion that a serious discussion of the existence of God
should require pro and con, response and rejoinder,
timekeepers, votes of who “won”, and judges of rhetoric
is laughable. Paul Moser is a serious and influential
epistemologist. He employs expertise in the area to identify
an epistemic location from which you can defend a belief in
God as responsible while ungrounded by justification. And
the mere fact of acquaintance suffices to justify Moser’s
belief in God in the absence of any argument in which, for
example, an assertion of his/her/its presence would serve as
a premise. Knowledge by acquaintance is a familiar device in
epistemology. Moser Conveniently, however, Moser provides it
himself earlier in his own essay: “Neither mere claims nor
mere subjective experiences are self-attesting about
objective reality”. Hence Christian philosophers would do
well to focus on these problems if they really want to
convince anyone but themselves that their views are not
irrational.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315885544-12},
Key = {fds331101}
}
@article{fds320319,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {The biological character of social theory},
Pages = {31-58},
Booktitle = {Handbook on Evolution and Society: Toward an Evolutionary
Social Science},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781612058146},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315634203},
Abstract = {This chapter argues that all social sciences need to take
seriously their status as divisions of biology, and that, as
such, they need to recognize the central role of Darwinian
processes in all the phenomena they seek to explain. The
argument is formulated in terms of a small number of
relatively precise premises that focus on the nature of the
kinds and taxonomies of all the social sciences. The
analytical taxonomy of the social sciences is shown to
require a Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a
nativist or genetically driven framework. Hie fundamental
role of Darwinian processes in human cultural evolution
establishes limitations on the explanatory aspirations of
alternative theories in the social sciences, including
especially rational choice theory, the currently most
fashionable explanatory approach in several social and
behavioral sciences. An apparently widespread objection to a
biological approach to human affairs proceeds from the
denial that there are "replicators," and in particular
"menies," in human affairs. This objection is shown to be
misdirected. The chapter goes on to expound a general
account of how Darwinian processes operate in human affairs
by selecting for strategies and sets of strategies humans
employ. The last section shows how a great deal of social
science can be organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s
approach to biological inquiry, an approach required by the
fact that the social sciences are all divisions of biology,
and in particular the studies of one particular biological
species.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315634203},
Key = {fds320319}
}
@article{fds336420,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwinism as philosophy can the universal acid be
contained?},
Pages = {23-50},
Booktitle = {How Biology Shapes Philosophy: New Foundations for
Naturalism},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107055834},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781107295490.003},
Abstract = {The history of science has a broad pattern. Each science,
including mathematics, began its life as a subdiscipline of
philosophy, or at least as among the concerns of
philosophers. Mathematics - at first mainly the science of
space - separated itself from philosophy in the time of
Plato and Euclid, physics in the period from Galileo to
Newton, chemistry in a process that mainly took place during
the lifetimes of figures from Boyle to Lavoisier, and
biology from 1859, when the “Newton of the blade of
grass” was compelled to publish On the Origin of Species.
As each of these disciplines separated itself from
philosophy, it left questions to philosophy that it didn’t
need to answer or was unable to answer, questions that
looked like they should be addressed by the science that
relegated them to “mere” philosophy. Two obvious
examples: mathematicians never seemed to need to answer the
question, “What is a number?" Physicists have for the most
part steered clear of addressing the question, “What is
time?" The agenda of philosophy is replete with questions
the sciences (and mathematics) can’t answer yet, may never
be able to answer, and don’t need to answer. In addition
to this first set of questions the sciences cannot (yet or
perhaps ever) answer or don’t need to answer, there are
the second-order questions about why the sciences can’t
(yet) or don’t need to answer the first set of questions.
This pattern in the history of science was finally broken by
Darwin. Instead of leaving questions to philosophy, his
breakthrough enabled the sciences, in particular, biology,
to begin to take on questions that from Aristotle’s time
onward had been the exclusive preserve of philosophy. It
took more than a century of repeated forays by biologists
and philosophers inspired by Darwin to convince the
disciplines - biology and philosophy - that the former could
deal with the questions of the latter and then to shape the
answers biology provides to a host of perennial questions in
philosophy. The prominence of “naturalism” in
metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, the
philosophy of language, and moral philosophy is evidence of
this achievement. Nowadays, philosophical “naturalism”
pretty much means philosophy driven by mainly insights from
Darwin.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781107295490.003},
Key = {fds336420}
}
@article{fds363773,
Author = {Graves, L and Horan, BL and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Is Indeterminism the Source of the Statistical Character of
Evolutionary Theory?},
Pages = {237-254},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {Brandon and Carson (1996) [hereafter BC] dispute at least
one part of these analyses. They hold that the theory of
evolution [hereafter ET] "is fundamentally indeterministic."
More fully, they argue for a conditional: What we have shown
is that if one is a realist in one's attitude towards
science-that if one thinks that a primary aim of doing
science is to develop theories that truly describe the
mechanisms producing the phenomena, and if one takes
theoretical fruitfulness and experimental confirmation as
evidence for the reality of theoretical entities-then one
should conclude that ET is fundamentally indeterministic.
(336) Actually we suspect that this statement ofBC's
misstates their position: that evolution (not, as they say
here, evolutionary theory) is indeterministic, and that is
why the theory is statistical. We shall therefore assume
that their argument is that the theory is statistical
because the phenomena are indeterministic.},
Key = {fds363773}
}
@article{fds363774,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Reductionism Redux: Computing the Embryo},
Pages = {447-472},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {This paper argues that the consensus physicalist
antireductionism in the philosophy of biology cannot
accommodate the research strategy or indeed the recent
findings of molecular developmental biology. After
describing Wolpert's programmatic claims on its behaW and
recent work by Gehring and others to identify the molecular
determinants of development, the paper attempts to identify
the relationship between evolutionary and developmental
biology by rcconciling two apparcntly conflicting accounts
ofbio-function - Wright's and Nagcl's (as elaborated by
Cummins). Finally, the paper seeks a way of defending the
two central theses of physicalist antireductionism in the
light of the research program of molecular developmental
biology, by sharply reducing their metaphysical
force.},
Key = {fds363774}
}
@article{fds363775,
Author = {Bouchard, F and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Fitness, Probability and the Principles of Natural
Selection},
Pages = {299-318},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology: Volume
I},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627531},
Abstract = {We argue that a fashionable interpretation of the theory of
natural selection as a claim exclusively about populations
is mistaken. The interpretation rests on adopting an
analysis of fitness as a probabilistic propensity which
cannot be substantiated, draws parallels with thermodynamics
which are without foundations, and fails to do justice to
the fundamental distinction between drift and selection.
This distinction requires a notion of fitness as a pairwise
comparison between individuals taken two at a time, and so
vitiates the interpretation of the theory as one about
populations exclusively.},
Key = {fds363775}
}
@article{fds368058,
Author = {Sommers, T and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Darwin's Nihilistic Idea: Evolution and the Meaninglessness
of Life},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {169-184},
Booktitle = {Evolutionary Ethics: Volume III},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780754627586},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315255767-19},
Abstract = {No one has expressed the destructive power of Darwinian
theory more effectively than Daniel Dennett. Others have
recognized that the theory of evolution offers us a
universal acid. but Dennett, bless his heart, coined the
term. Many have appreciated that the mechanism of random
variation and natural selection is a substrate-neutral
algorithm that operates at every level of organization from
the macromolecular to the mental, at every time scale from
the geological epoch to the nanosecond. But it took Dennett
to express the idea in a polysyllable or two. These two
features of Darwinism undermine more wishful thinking about
the way the world is than any other brace of notions since
mechanism was vindicated in physics.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315255767-19},
Key = {fds368058}
}
@article{fds340757,
Author = {Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Philosophical challenges for scientism (and how to meet
them?)},
Pages = {83-105},
Booktitle = {Scientism: Prospects and Problems},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {August},
ISBN = {9780190462758},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0004},
Abstract = {<p>Scientism is expounded. Then its two major challenges are
stated and responses to them sketched. The first challenge
is to its epistemology of mathematics-how we know the
necessary truths of mathematics. The second challenge is to
the very coherence of its eliminativist account of
cognition. The first of these problems is likely to be taken
more seriously by philosophers than by other advocates of
scientism. It is a problem that has absorbed philosophers
since Plato and on which little progress has been made. The
second is often unnoticed, even among those who endorse
scientism, since they don’t recognize their own commitment
to eliminativism and so do not appreciate the threat of
incoherence it poses. It is important for scientism to
acknowledge these challenges.</p>},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0004},
Key = {fds340757}
}
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