Philosophy Faculty Database
Arts & Sciences
Duke University

 HOME > Arts & Sciences > Philosophy > Faculty    Search Help Login pdf version printable version 

Publications of Andrew Janiak    :chronological  by type listing:

   Author = {Janiak, A and Schliesser, E},
   Title = {Interpreting Newton: Critical essays},
   Pages = {i-iv},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780521766180},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2012. This collection of
             specially-commissioned essays by leading scholars presents
             new research on Isaac Newton and his main philosophical
             interlocutors and critics. The essays analyze Newton's
             relation to his contemporaries, especially Barrow,
             Descartes, Leibniz and Locke, and discuss the ways in which
             a broad range of figures, including Hume, Maclaurin,
             Maupertuis, and Kant, reacted to his thought. The wide range
             of topics discussed includes the laws of nature, the notion
             of force, the relation of mathematics to nature, Newton's
             argument for universal gravitation, his attitude toward
             philosophical empiricism, his use of “fluxions,” his
             approach toward measurement problems, and his concept of
             absolute motion, together with new interpretations of
             Newton's matter theory. The volume concludes with an
             extended essay that analyzes the changes in physics wrought
             by Newton's Principia. A substantial introduction and
             bibliography provide essential reference
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511994845},
   Key = {fds306214}

   Author = {Janiak, A and Schliesser, E},
   Title = {Introduction},
   Pages = {1-10},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780521766180},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2012. It may be anachronistic
             to say that Isaac Newton and his Principia decisively
             changed physics and philosophy, because separate fields of
             physics and philosophy did not yet exist. But the notion of
             decisive change captures something significant about the
             continuing relevance of studying Newton. What has been aptly
             termed “Newton's new way of inquiry” (Harper and Smith
             1995) was baffling for even his most sophisticated
             contemporaries, and it took Europe's brightest astronomers
             and mathematically inclined natural philosophers almost a
             century in order to evaluate and assimilate the Principia.
             But for reasons that need not detain us here, few of these
             figures (e.g., Clairaut, Euler, Laplace), who were fully
             immersed in Newton's work, really offered a definitive
             account of the methodology of the Principia. Of course, many
             scholars from Newton's day onward have offered
             interpretations of Newton's explicit methodological claims,
             but surprisingly few have combined this approach with
             detailed knowledge of Newton's technical practice. As is
             well known, by the time physics became enshrined as the
             leading part of the disciplinary structure of science, its
             attitude toward its own history did not encourage close
             scrutiny of past practices. In this volume, the three
             chapters on methodology by George Smith, William Harper, and
             Ori Belkind all capture important aspects of Newton's new
             way of inquiry. Newton also changed philosophy in two
             important ways. First, the body of work eventually known as
             “Newtonian mechanics” became a privileged form of
             knowledge that had to be dealt with somehow within
             metaphysics and epistemology. Second, it initiated a slow
             process in which philosophy defined itself in terms that
             often contrasted with – or were modeled on – Newtonian
             success. But as a consequence, in philosophy's evolving
             self-conception Newton stopped being central to the history
             of philosophy. Somewhat surprisingly, philosophical interest
             in Newton revived at the beginning of the twentieth century,
             precisely when his physical theory was called into question
             by Einstein's revolutionary work. Most of the papers in this
             volume engage with Newton's place within the history of
             philosophy. Before we turn to a detailed description of the
             chapters collected here, we offer a brief introduction to
             the scholarship that in many ways forms the shared
             background of recent philosophically motivated work on Isaac
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511994845.001},
   Key = {fds311980}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Isaac Newton},
   Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds244493}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Kant as Philosopher of Science},
   Journal = {Perspectives on Science},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {337-361},
   Publisher = {MIT Press - Journals},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {June},
   ISSN = {1063-6145},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Michael Friedman's Kant and the Exact Sciences (1992)
             refocused scholarly attention on Kant's status as a
             philosopher of the sciences, especially (but not
             exclusively) of the broadly Newtonian science of the
             eighteenth century. The last few years have seen a plethora
             of articles and monographs concerned with characterizing
             that status. This recent scholarship illuminates Kant's
             views on a diverse group of topics: science and its relation
             to metaphysics; dynamics and the theory of matter; causation
             and Hume's critique of it; and, the limits of mechanism and
             of mechanical intelligibility. I argue that recent
             interpretations of Kant's views on these topics should
             influence our understanding of his principal metaphysical
             and epistemological arguments and positions. © 2004 by The
             Massachusetts Institute of Technology.},
   Doi = {10.1162/1063614042795453},
   Key = {fds244494}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Kant's conception of moral character: The 'critical' link of
             morality, anthropology and reflective judgment},
   Journal = {History of Political Thought},
   Volume = {23},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {545-546},
   Year = {2002},
   ISSN = {0143-781X},
   url = {},
   Key = {fds311983}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Kant, Herder and the birth of anthropology},
   Journal = {History of Political Thought},
   Volume = {25},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {163-164},
   Year = {2004},
   ISSN = {0143-781X},
   url = {},
   Key = {fds311981}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Kant, Herder and the Birth of Anthropology (U Chicago
   Journal = {History of Political Thought},
   Volume = {25},
   Year = {2003},
   Key = {fds244497}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Kant’s Views on Space and Time},
   Series = {Spring 2009 edition},
   Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
   Editor = {Zalta, E},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds244495}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Mathematics and infinity in descartes and
   Pages = {209-230},
   Booktitle = {Trends in the History of Science},
   Publisher = {Birkhauser},
   Editor = {De Risi and V},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {© 2015, Springer International Publishing Switzerland. The
             concept of the infinite has often been regarded as
             inherently problematic in mathematics and in philosophy. The
             idea that the universe itself might be infinite has been the
             subject of intense debate not only on mathematical and
             philosophical grounds, but for theological and political
             reasons as well. When Copernicus and his followers
             challenged the old Aristotelian and Ptolemaic conceptions of
             the world’s finiteness, if not its boundedness, the idea
             of an infinite, if not merely unbounded, world seemed more
             attractive. Indeed, the infinity of space has been called
             the “fundamental principle of the new ontology” (Koyré
             in From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Johns
             Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1957, p. 126).
             Influential scholarship in the first half of the twentieth
             century helped to solidify the idea that it was specifically
             in the seventeenth century that astronomers and natural
             philosophers fully embraced the infinity of the universe. As
             Kuhn writes in his Copernican Revolution (1957, p. 289):
             “From Bruno ’s death in 1600 to the publication of
             Descartes ’s Principles of Philosophy in 1644, no
             Copernican of any prominence appears to have espoused the
             infinite universe, at least in public. After Descartes,
             however, no Copernican seems to have opposed the
             conception.” That same year saw the publication of
             Alexandre Koyré ’s sweeping volume about the scientific
             revolution, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe.
             The decision to describe and conceive of the world as
             infinite might be seen as a crucial, if not decisive, aspect
             of the overthrow of Scholasticism. As Kuhn and Koyré knew,
             one finds a particularly invigorating expression of this
             historical-philosophical interpretation in an earlier
             article by Marjorie Nicholson (Studies in Philology
             25:356–374, 1929, p. 370).},
   Doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-12102-4_9},
   Key = {fds244491}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy in Descartes and
   Journal = {Foundations of Science},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {403-417},
   Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {August},
   ISSN = {1233-1821},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10699-011-9277-0},
   Key = {fds244505}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Newton and descartes: Theology and natural
   Journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {50},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {414-435},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {0038-4283},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {Scholars have long recognized that Newton regarded Descartes
             as his principal philosophical interlocutor when composing
             the first edition of Philosophiae Naturalis Principia
             Mathematica in 1687. The arguments in the Scholium on space
             and time, for instance, can profitably be interpreted as
             focusing on the conception of space and motion in part two
             of Descartes's Principles of Philosophy (1644). What is less
             well known, however, is that this Cartesian conception,
             along with Descartes's attempt to avoid Galileo's fate in
             1633, serves as an essential background to understanding
             Newton's own (poorly understood) view of the theological
             implications of his theory of space and motion. In
             particular, after withdrawing Le Monde from publication in
             1633 because of its Copernican leanings, Descartes later
             introduced what some regard as a "fudge factor" into the
             theory of motion in the Principles: from an ordinary
             perspective the earth does move; but from a philosophical
             one, it does not. This background indicates the novelty and
             originality of Newton's own attempt to explicate how
             scriptural passages concerning the motions of the heavenly
             bodies can be reconciled with the philosophical views he
             developed during the 1680s. New evidence from archival
             sources and correspondence supports this argument, shedding
             light on the Scholium and on Newton's conception of
             philosophy's relation to theology. © 2012 The University of
   Doi = {10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00130.x},
   Key = {fds244502}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Newton and the reality of force},
   Journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy},
   Volume = {45},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {127-147},
   Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0022-5053},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1353/hph.2007.0010},
   Key = {fds244506}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Newton as philosopher},
   Pages = {1-196},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780521862868},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {© Andrew Janiak 2008 and Cambridge University Press, 2009.
             Newton's philosophical views are unique and uniquely
             difficult to categorise. in the course of a long career from
             the early 1670s until his death in 1727, he articulated
             profound responses to Cartesian natural philosophy and to
             the prevailing mechanical philosophy of his day. Newton as
             Philosopher presents Newton as an original and sophisticated
             contributor to natural philosophy, one who engaged with the
             principal ideas of his most important predecessor, René
             Descartes, and of his most influential critic, G. W.
             Leibniz. Unlike Descartes and Leibniz, Newton was systematic
             and philosophical without presenting a philosophical system,
             but over the course of his life, he developed a novel
             picture of nature, our place within it, and its relation to
             the creator. This rich treatment of his philosophical ideas,
             the first in English for thirty years, will be of wide
             interest to historians of philosophy, science, and
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511481512},
   Key = {fds244503}

   Author = {A. Janiak},
   Title = {Newton: Philosophical Writings},
   Series = {SECOND EDITION},
   Pages = {199 pages},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Janiak, A},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds306213}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Newton’s Forces in Kant’s Critique},
   Booktitle = {Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of
             History and Philosophy of Science},
   Publisher = {Open Court Press},
   Editor = {Dickson, M and Domski, M},
   Year = {2010},
   Key = {fds244492}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Newton’s Philosophy},
   Series = {SECOND EDITION},
   Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
   Publisher = {S},
   Editor = {Zalta, E},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {May},
   Key = {fds244496}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Review of Garber and Longuenesse, Kant and the early Moderns
             (Princeton Press)},
   Journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds244499}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Review of Thomas Holden, The Architecture of
   Journal = {Mind},
   Volume = {115},
   Number = {460},
   Pages = {1130-1133},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2006},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {0026-4423},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl1130},
   Key = {fds244498}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Science and religion (Steven Weinberg's review of Richard
             Dawkins's The 'God Delusion')},
   Journal = {Tls the Times Literary Supplement},
   Number = {5418},
   Pages = {17-17},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {February},
   ISSN = {0307-661X},
   url = {},
   Key = {fds311982}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Space and motion in nature and Scripture: Galileo,
             Descartes, Newton.},
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
   Volume = {51},
   Pages = {89-99},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {June},
   ISSN = {0039-3681},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {In the Scholium to the Definitions in Principia mathematica,
             Newton departs from his main task of discussing space, time
             and motion by suddenly mentioning the proper method for
             interpreting Scripture. This is surprising, and it has long
             been ignored by scholars. In this paper, I argue that the
             Scripture passage in the Scholium is actually far from
             incidental: it reflects Newton's substantive concern, one
             evident in correspondence and manuscripts from the 1680s,
             that any general understanding of space, time and motion
             must enable readers to recognize the veracity of Biblical
             claims about natural phenomena, including the motion of the
             earth. This substantive concern sheds new light on an aspect
             of Newton's project in the Scholium. It also underscores
             Newton's originality in dealing with the famous problem of
             reconciling theological and philosophical conceptions of
             nature in the seventeenth century.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.02.004},
   Key = {fds311979}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Space, atoms and mathematical divisibility in
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
   Volume = {31},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {203-230},
   Year = {2000},
   Month = {January},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.1016/S0039-3681(00)00003-0},
   Key = {fds331597}

   Title = {Space: history of a concept},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Editor = {Janiak, A},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   Key = {fds303572}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Substance and Action in Descartes and Newton},
   Journal = {The Monist},
   Volume = {93},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {657-677},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Editor = {Sugden, SJB},
   Year = {2010},
   ISSN = {0026-9662},
   url = {},
   Doi = {10.5840/monist201093437},
   Key = {fds244500}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {The Kantian Spirit: how to resist realism in the philosophy
             of science (Review Essay)},
   Journal = {Metascience},
   Volume = {20},
   Pages = {153-157},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds244501}

   Author = {Janiak, A},
   Title = {Three concepts of causation in Newton},
   Journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {396-407},
   Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {0039-3681},
   url = {},
   Abstract = {In this paper, I argue that recent debates about Newton's
             attitude toward action at a distance have been hampered by a
             lack of conceptual clarity. To clarify the metaphysical
             background of the debates, I distinguish three kinds of
             causes within Newton's work: mechanical, dynamical, and
             substantial causes. This threefold distinction enables us to
             recognize that although Newton clearly regards gravity as an
             impressed force that operates across vast distances, he
             denies that this commitment requires him to think that some
             substance acts at a distance on another substance.
             (Dynamical causation is distinct from substantial
             causation.) Newton's denial of substantial action at a
             distance may strike his interpreters as questionable, so I
             provide an argument to show that it is in fact acceptable.
             © 2012 Elsevier Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.10.009},
   Key = {fds244504}

Duke University * Arts & Sciences * Philosophy * Faculty * Staff * Grad * Reload * Login