%% Books
@book{fds38183,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {Natural Moralities},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press 2006},
Year = {2006},
Month = {October},
Abstract = {“Moral relativism” is overwhelmingly a term of
condemnation, frequently of scorn or derision, a term for
putting one’s opponent immediately on the defensive:
“you sound like a relativist—explain yourself!” or
“you are a relativist—shame on you!” The prosecutor
usually takes on the persona of the lone voice of reason
beating back the howling dogs of spineless, trendy
relativists. The rounds of accusation remind me of the
children’s game, “Tag, you’re it.” If you get
touched by the “it” kid, you are condemned to run after
the others until you manage to touch the next unlucky
“it” kid. Social conservatives accuse liberals of moral
relativism for defending reproductive, gay and lesbian
rights. Some liberals in turn accuse multiculturalists of
moral relativism for not defending the universality of
reproductive, gay and lesbian rights. The rhetoric portrays
these crimes as falling but a few slippery steps short of
collaboration with the Nazis. The only ones who don’t get
to play this game are the ones who accept the label of moral
relativists, but curiously enough, there are very few people
willing to do so. If they are a howling pack, they do not
come when their name is called! Anglo-American philosophy,
(I suspect this is true in at least some other philosophical
communities) engages in the same sort of game, except in a
more genteel fashion. The aim of most philosophical
discussions of relativism is to establish its manifest
falsity. The standard characterizations of relativism make
it an easy target and seldom reveal what really motivates
people who are attracted to it. Introductory textbooks in
ethics frequently portray the view as an extreme variety of
subjectivism (or conventionalism)--a person's (or group's)
accepting that something is right makes it right for that
person (or group). Such a discussion usually comes early in
the standard textbook—to get it out of the way so that the
“serious” philosophy can start. The argumentative
strategy is almost always negative in attacking the
arguments on behalf of the view or purports to show some
incoherence in it. Rarely does someone try to formulate some
version of relativism that is nuanced and plausibly
motivated. The role of the howling pack of relativists is
often awarded to confused students in Introduction to
Philosophy classes, or more recently, to literary theorists.
In other words, people typically use the term
‘relativism’ as a substitute for confronting hard
questions. Here is how it works. The rhetorical use of the
term imposes on the audience a dichotomy: either accept
relativism, defined in the most extreme way possible, or
accept absolutism or universalism. I use the terms
‘absolutism’ and ‘universalism’ for two different
kinds of views about moral truth. Moral universalism is the
view that there is a single true morality for all societies
and times. Moral absolutism is universalism plus the view
that the core of the single true morality is a set of
general principles or rules, all of which hold true without
exception. Often the further claim is made that these rules
hold no matter what the consequences. For example, some
assert that individuals have rights that can never be set
aside for the sake of avoiding bad consequences—never,
even if the heavens should fall. The more popular
denunciations of moral relativism often do not distinguish
these different possibilities and sometimes end up
criticizing “situational” ethics that judge what is
right by the context or circumstances. This is the criticism
of relativism as the rejection of absolutism, but note that
one could be a universalist and a “situational” ethicist
at the same time. One could hold, that is, that right varies
with the context in such a way that anyone reasoning
correctly and with all the relevant facts would judge in the
same way, regardless of one’s society or culture. I am
among the handful of philosophers who are willing to be
associated with relativism. The version I defend constitutes
an alternative to universalism and to relativism as these
views are usually defined. My alternative agrees with one
implication of relativism as it is usually defined: that
there is no single true morality. However, it recognizes
significant limits on what can count as a true morality.
There is a plurality of true moralities, but that plurality
does not include all moralities. This theory occupies the
territory between universalism—the view that there is a
single true morality—and the easy target typically defined
as relativism—the view that any morality is as good as any
other. This book further develops lines of thought initiated
in Moral Relativity. I argued there for a version of moral
relativism that accounted for many aspects of the
objectivity we attribute to morality. Morality, I argued,
comprises an idealized set of norms in imperatival form
(“A is to do X under conditions C) abstracted from the
practices and institutions of a society that serves to
regulate conflicts of interest, both between persons and
within the psychological economy of a single person. A
particular morality is distinguished from others not merely
by its norms and by which norms have priority in case of
conflict, but also by its criteria for determining what
counts as an adequate morality. Some of these criteria may
be universally valid across all kinds of societies because
of the very purpose of morality to regulate conflicts of
interest. No adequate morality, for example, could allow
torture of another person on one's whim. Nevertheless, I
argued, such universally valid criteria do not begin to
determine a morality with content sufficiently robust and
determinate to guide action. As a consequence, some criteria
for adequate moralities will be local to a given society.
They neither follow from nor are ruled out by the
universally valid criteria. They are the source of moral
relativity. One of the main sources of relativity I
identified in Moral Relativity was the difference between
rights-centered moralities and virtue-centered moralities.
The latter are concerned with a good common to all members
of a community, a good partially constituted by a shared
life and structured by a set of norms specifying the
contribution of each member to the sustenance of that life.
Notions of a common good and shared life are not central to
the former. Instead there is an emphasis on what each member
of a community is entitled to claim from the others. Though
not all moralities exemplifying these types are adequate
moralities, some from each type are. That is, the rules from
some of each type satisfy all universally valid criteria for
adequate moral systems, and they satisfy the local criteria
that flesh out a society's ideal for moralities. I argued
that moral statements about what agents ought to do have
truth conditions deriving from these universal and local
criteria, and since the local criteria differ, so will the
truth conditions. Moral statements are a kind of second
order normative language indicating what actions are
required by the norms of an adequate moral system, where
adequacy is spelled out by the universal and local criteria.
Two speakers may mean something different on the level of
truth conditions by “adequate moral system,” and
therefore each may be saying something true even when one is
prescribing that an action X be done and the other is
prescribing that it not be done. Their judgments conflict on
the practical level because one cannot conform to both
judgments at the same time. I include within my conception
of a morality not only its norms in imperatival form and the
relations of priority between them that constitute a moral
system of norms but statements with explicitly normative
terms such as “A ought to do X” and “A’s doing X is
right” statements. Such statements specify what actions
and attitudes are required by an adequate moral system of
norms. It follows from my view that there is more than one
single true morality. Let me emphasize that speaking of
moral truth in my sense is compatible with radically
different general theories of what truth is: minimalist
theories and correspondence theories alike. I do not hold
that truth is relative. I hold that the meaning and truth
conditions of moral language can vary in such a way that
moral statements conflicting on the prescriptive and
pragmatic level can be consistent on the level of truth. I
remain committed to the main outlines of the relativism with
limits defended in the first book (in what follows, I
indicate where I have changed my mind on certain matters).
However, in that book, I primarily focused on the task of
refuting universalism while defending a good measure of
moral objectivity. My conception of the universally valid
criteria for the adequacy of moralities was rather sketchy.
In this book I offer a robust conception of such criteria,
such that they rule out a significant range of moralities as
inadequate. Whereas the first book focused on the relativity
in my theory of relativism with limits, this book focuses to
a much greater extent on the limits. A second new
development in this book is based on my keener appreciation
for the ways in which different types of moralities share
important values and are typically distinguished by their
differing priorities and emphases on these shared values.
This appreciation plays a much larger role in my argument,
and it goes into my explanation of the widespread phenomenon
of “moral ambivalence.” Such ambivalence consists in
recognition of severe conflicts between important values and
of the possibility that reasonable people could take
different paths in the face of these conflicts. I argue that
moral ambivalence, in conjunction with a naturalistic
conception of morality, supports the conclusion that there
is no single true morality. I also argue, however, that the
most plausible explanation for the overlap of values between
different moralities implies that there are limits on the
range of true moralities. Thirdly, there is here a new
emphasis on taking a naturalistic approach to understanding
morality, an approach marked not by a commitment to a purely
physicalistic ontology (as naturalistic approaches are
sometimes conceived) but rather by a commitment to integrate
the understanding of morality with the most relevant
empirical theories about human beings and society, such as
evolutionary theory and developmental psychology. A
naturalistic approach to morality, when applied to moral
ambivalence, will support both the denial of a single true
morality and the existence of significant limits on the
plurality of true moralities. Hence the title of this book,
Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism. A
fourth new development in this book is a greater focus on
the problems posed by moral relativity for commitment to a
particular configuration of values. Here too, my treatment
of these problems was sketchy in the first book. I lacked
then but think I have now a theory of reasons to be moral.
This theory provides an answer to the worry that admitting
the relativity of our present moral commitments undermines
our confidence in them. It is not an answer that will
satisfy in the way that many might desire or expect. The
theory undermines the terms in which the problem of
confidence is usually framed. Nevertheless, it is a major
theme in this book that admitting moral relativity must
affect the way we must act toward those with whom we are in
serious moral disagreement. It must also affect the way we
must seek confidence in our moral commitments. Finally, my
recognition of the ways in which different moralities can
overlap and yet constitute different approaches to human
problems has been fed by my work in comparative ethics and
in Chinese and Western ethics in particular. While I have
concluded that the Chinese tradition in some important cases
simply poses different questions than those dominant in the
Western tradition, I have also concluded that in other cases
the two traditions have a lot that is useful to the other on
common problems—what it takes to foster effective moral
agency, whether moral commitments are compatible with
individual flourishing, and whether the acceptance of
relativism undermines confidence I one’s moral
commitments. The aim of Part One is to sketch the outlines
of a more formidable version of relativism that I call
"pluralistic relativism." The theory is relativistic because
it holds there is no single true morality. It is pluralistic
because it recognizes limits on what can count as a true
morality. Gilbert Harman once suggested that naturalistic
conceptions of morality tended (though not in every case) to
lead to relativist positions, while non-naturalist
conceptions tended (though again not in every case) to lead
to universalist positions. Whether one gets to a relativist
or universalist position when starting from a naturalist
approach depends both on the specific version of that
approach and on other views one holds about morality. In
Chapter One, I argue for a certain understanding of moral
conflict that I call moral ambivalence, which stems from the
plural sources of value and duty. In Chapter Two, I argue
that moral ambivalence is best explained using a
naturalistic approach to morality. The result is the theory
of pluralistic relativism, which can accommodate many
intuitions we have about the potential objectivity of moral
judgments. In Chapter Three, I address the main objections
to pluralistic relativism, and discuss the ways in which the
theory has significant consequences for the ways in which we
judge and act toward others who are in serious disagreement
with us. Part Two supplies a closer look at a theme that is
introduced in Chapter Two: that the naturalistic functions
of morality, human nature, the human condition, and the more
particular circumstances of a group at a given time all work
together to impose constraints of varying levels of
generality on what constitutes an adequate morality for that
group. In Chapter Four, I discuss the general shape a
morality must take if it is to promote effective moral
agency in human beings. Such a constraint helps to explain
the universality of certain types of special duties toward
particular others, such as duties to family members. I also
use my conclusions about what is required for effective
agency to argue that a life of relationships governed by
special moral duties is a necessary part of a flourishing
life. Chapter Four therefore partially confirms certain
themes developed by the recent communitarian and
neo-Aristotelian movements. Communitarianism is usually
opposed (by its defenders and critics) to liberalism. I
question this opposition in Chapter Five, arguing that
certain themes central to communitarian must and can be
incorporated by liberalism. I go on to argue that a
satisfactory moral ideal of family life can incorporate
mutually supporting communitarian and liberal themes. In
Chapter Six, I discuss some contemporary attempts to derive
constraints on morality from considerations about what it is
realistic to expect of human beings. I argue that we need a
more nuanced view of how such considerations do yield
adequacy constraints. In particular I suggest that we need
to distinguish the constraints imposed by human nature from
constraints caused by more local factors such as our
particular cultural circumstances and the way they have
shaped us. The discussion of realistic possibility in
Chapter 6 also illustrates the way that we often make
unfounded assumptions about what it is realistic to expect
of human beings in order (perhaps unconsciously) to justify
our falling short of our own values. It therefore
illustrates a way in which pluralistic relativism can allow
for fundamental criticism of one's own morality. Part Three
brings into closer focus the issues raised in Chapter One:
the difficulties for moral commitment stemming from
recognizing a plurality of true moralities. Chapter Seven
presents a theory of the reasons to be moral that enables us
to partially resolve these difficulties. The theory I defend
undermines the usual sense in which we mean the question
"Why be moral?” I argue that there is no real answer to
that question, because it presupposes that a commitment to
moral values can be validated by a pre-moral rationality,
and such a presupposition is false. There is no answer to
the question "Why be Moral?" in the sense in which moral
philosophers usually take it, but I argue that we should
never have expected an answer. Nevertheless, we must answer
a serious challenge to the reasonableness of moral
commitment. We cannot show that it is irrational to be
amoral or immoral, but we can ask whether fulfills human
needs to be moral. Chapter Eight addresses this question and
the challenge raised to this sort of answer by Foucault’s
insight into the pervasiveness of power relationships. I
argue that it is possible to turn back that challenge to
some degree, but that defenders of modern liberal moralities
have not fully answered some of its main points. Even if the
above challenges could be met, we still may wonder whether
the pluralism of alternative adequate moralities undermines
our confidence in the commitments we have made to particular
moralities. I address this problem in Chapter Nine, bringing
to bear the philosophy of Zhuangzi, who teaches us that
recognizing the worth of other ways of life is not a threat
to be avoided but an opportunity for enrichment. Finally, we
must deal with our moral conflicts with others even if we
have nurtured a confidence in our own moral commitments.
Chapter Nine supplies a detailed picture of the role of the
value of accommodation in our attempts to cope with serious
moral disagreement. I give examples of the way in which this
value might be applied to moral conflicts such as the ones
over abortion and over distributive justice. Finally I
propose a role for a certain kind of ritual, as derived from
reflection on the Chinese tradition, in strengthening the
dispositions of citizens to act on the value of
accommodation.},
Key = {fds38183}
}
@book{fds29466,
Author = {Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong},
Title = {Confucian Ethics: a Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy
and Community},
Publisher = {New York: Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
Abstract = {A collection of comparative essays on Chinese and Western
philosophy with special focus on the topics of individual
rights and moral psychology.},
Key = {fds29466}
}
@book{fds29472,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {Moral Relativity},
Publisher = {University of California Press},
Year = {1984},
Abstract = {Argument for the thesis that there is no single true
morality.},
Key = {fds29472}
}
%% Papers Published
@article{fds164562,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral
Motivation},
Journal = {Philosophical Issues (metaethics issue of
Nous)},
Volume = {19},
Pages = {343-367},
Year = {2009},
Month = {October},
Abstract = {In some recent work I have developed a theory of moral
reasons and their relation to the agent’s motivations. The
theory is naturalistic in its approach, meaning that it
seeks to integrate a conception of what moral reasons are
and how they motivate with the best and most relevant
science we currently have. I here develop my theory of moral
reasons in relation to some of the most recent work in
psychology on the nature of emotion and the ways in which it
both underpins and undermines cognition. While the results
in these fields are still evolving and to a degree
speculative, there is enough there that ought to command the
attention of philosophers with a naturalistic bent, and to
challenge philosophers who do not possess such a bent. I
also apply my theory of moral reasons to a real life case in
which emotionally charged cognition changes a person’s
motivations.},
Key = {fds164562}
}
@article{fds144270,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Constructing Normative Objectivity in Ethics"},
Journal = {Social Philosophy and Policy},
Volume = {25},
Number = {1},
Pages = {237-266},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {I defend a naturalistic explanation of moral reasons that
does not make them merely hypothetical imperatives but
rather capable of entering into the constitution of selfhood
and agency. Moral reasons play a crucial role in making
cooperation possible by shaping and reinforcing the diverse
and potentially conflicting array of human motivations so
that they are better suited for cooperative
life.},
Key = {fds144270}
}
@article{fds154623,
Author = {D. Wong and trans. Jan Rovensky},
Title = {Translation into Czech of "Rights and Community in
Confucianism," originally published in Confucian Ethics:
a Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy and
Community},
Booktitle = {An Intercultural Dialogue on Human Rights: The Western,
Islamic and Confucian Perspectives},
Publisher = {Publishing House Filosofia},
Editor = {Marek Hrubec},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds154623}
}
@article{fds154615,
Author = {D. Wong and trans. Wen Haimin},
Title = {Translation into Chinese of "Comparative Philosophy: Chinese
and Western" originally in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy},
Booktitle = {Philosophy},
Publisher = {Renmin University Press},
Editor = {Jiyuan Yu},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds154615}
}
@article{fds68555,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Moral Reasons: Internal and External"},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {72 (2006)},
Number = {3},
Pages = {536-58},
Year = {2007},
Abstract = {Addresses the question of whether moral reasons stem from
existing desires of the agent, from the nature of practical
rationality or from outside the agent herself.},
Key = {fds68555}
}
@article{fds141494,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {For other new publications in books see "Articles and
chapters" below},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds141494}
}
@article{fds48840,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Attachment and Detachment in Daoism, Buddhism, and
Stoicism},
Journal = {Dao},
Volume = {V},
Number = {2},
Pages = {207-19},
Year = {2006},
Month = {June},
Abstract = {Both Buddhism and Stoicism would appear to recommend the
complete elimination of emotional attachment to others. The
promise is release from the suffering that arises from loss
or anticipated loss of others dear to the self, as
emphasized by Buddhism, and tranquility and release from the
tumult of wrenching passion as emphasized by Stoicism. Yet
it is not so clear what kind of detachment Buddhism and
Stoicism recommend. For example, on Martha Nussbaum’s
interpretation, Stoicism bids us to extirpate special
feeling for others. On Lawrence Becker’s interpretation,
Stoicism bids us to cultivate resilience, to
“encapsulate” special feeling so that the loss of its
object has a limited effect on our lives. In this essay I
argue that detachment as resilience is more desirable than
detachment as extirpation. The cost of eliminating special
feeling for others simply deprives too much value from human
life, and arguably deprives life of much of its humanness.
We would be better off preserving special feeling while
achieving a kind of equilibrium that is not destroyed by
loss. It is a challenge, however, to conceive how this could
be possible. How could one continue to hold others close to
one’s heart without making oneself extremely vulnerable to
their loss? Can the strong and deep feelings we have for
particular others really be encapsulated in the way Becker
suggests? I suggest that the Zhuangzi, which also recommends
a kind of detachment, has the most promising suggestions as
to what attachment conducive to resilience would feel like
in a genuinely human life.},
Key = {fds48840}
}
@article{fds38652,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being
Right”},
Journal = {History of Philosophy Quarterly},
Volume = {22},
Number = {2},
Pages = {91-107},
Year = {2005},
Month = {Spring},
Abstract = {Perhaps the primary interpretive problem in interpreting the
Daoist text Zhuangzi is that it alternates between skeptical
questioning of purported knowledge claims and apparent
advocacy of a certain way of life. I offer an interpretation
of the kind of skepticism embodied by the Zhuangzi that
makes perfect sense of the accompanying advocacy of a dao or
way.},
Key = {fds38652}
}
@article{fds38169,
Author = {Marion Hourdequin and David B. Wong},
Title = {“A Relational Approach to Environmental
Ethics”},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Pages = {19-33},
Year = {2005},
Abstract = {The Chinese self is often said to be relational. We discuss
how this is true and the implications for a different
approach to environmental ethics that offers an alternative
to the standard positions that the environment has intrinsic
value independent of human beings and that the environment
has value only in relation to human interests.},
Key = {fds38169}
}
@article{fds29468,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Relational and Autonomous Selves”},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Volume = {31},
Number = {4},
Pages = {419-432},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Winter},
Abstract = {I discuss the way that the Chinese self could truly be said
to be relational and argue that this sense of relationality
is compatible with a significant form of moral autonomy that
is highly valued in Confucianism. It is in fact a kind of
autonomy free of questionable assumptions about the
exemption of human beings from the laws of
nature.},
Key = {fds29468}
}
@article{fds18014,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Crossing Cultures in Moral Psychology”},
Journal = {Philosophy Today},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {7-10},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds18014}
}
@article{fds19574,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {Entry on Cultural Relativism},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds19574}
}
%% Papers Accepted
@article{fds154624,
Author = {D. Wong and trans. Xiamei Yang},
Title = {Translation of "Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being Right"
into Chinese},
Booktitle = {Chinese Philosophy in the English Speaking
World},
Publisher = {Renmin University Press},
Editor = {Xinyan Jiang},
Year = {2010},
Key = {fds154624}
}
@article{fds154618,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Identifying with the Nonhuman in Early Daoism"},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Philosophy},
Year = {2009},
Abstract = {Daoism, and the <i>Zhuangzi</i> in particular, calls upon us
to identify with the whole of nature and to transcend (in
part) our identification with humanity. How is this
psychologically possible? An answer is put
forward.},
Key = {fds154618}
}
@article{fds154584,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Moral Ambivalence and Relativism"},
Booktitle = {Relativism: A Compendium},
Publisher = {Columbia University Press},
Editor = {Michael Krausz},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds154584}
}
@article{fds154617,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Emotion and the Cognition of Reasons in Moral
Motivation”},
Journal = {Philosophical Issues (supplementary volume on
metaethics to Nous)},
Publisher = {Blackwell},
Editor = {Enrique Villanueva and Ernest Sosa},
Year = {2009},
Abstract = {I draw from studies in psychology and neuroscience and also
a case study to argue for a theory of the way that
recognizing moral reasons can influence motivation and
emotion in particular. The empirical work, I argue,
undermines theories that hold motivation to follow
immediately from the recognition of reasons, and also
undermines Humean instrumentalist theories.},
Key = {fds154617}
}
@article{fds141482,
Author = {D. Wong and Nicole Hassoun},
Title = {"Conserving Nature, Preserving Identity"},
Booktitle = {Indigenous Knowledge},
Publisher = {University of Arizona Press},
Editor = {Kay Matthiesen and Don Nichols},
Year = {2008},
Abstract = {What can environmentalists say about the rights of
indigenous peoples to their lands? Fundamental approaches to
environmental ethics currently seem polarized between two
broad varieties: the “conservationist” approach on which
we should conserve the environment when it is in our
interest to do so and the “preservationist” approach on
which we should preserve the environment even when it is not
in our interest to do so. Some people worry that
preservationism has led to the removal of indigenous peoples
such as the Batwa people of Uganda and the Masaii people of
Eastern Africa from their ancestral lands because these
lands and their wildlife have been declared in need of
protection. Conservationism would seem to pose a lesser
threat to the interests of indigenous peoples since it
starts from the idea that nature can be used for human
interests. However, like preservationism, conservationism
can also provide a reason to remove people from their lands
when it is difficult for indigenous peoples to use their
lands wisely. In this essay we deploy a third approach to
dealing with environmental problems “relationalism” that
we believe is friendlier to indigenous peoples.
Relationalism starts from a relational conception of human
identity. The basic idea is that the nonhuman world may
enter into who we are, just as other human beings and
communities may enter into who we are. If we, as persons,
have value, whatever is bound up with us in positive ways
ought also be valued. This gives us reason to care for
nature while respecting the identities of indigenous peoples
whose identities are often closely tied to their
lands.},
Key = {fds141482}
}
%% Book Reviews
@article{fds154585,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {Review of François Jullien, Vital Nourishment: Departing
from Happiness},
Journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews},
Year = {2008},
Month = {April},
Key = {fds154585}
}
@article{fds53298,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {Review of A Chinese Ethics for the New Century: The Ch’ien
Mu Lectures in History and Culture, and Other Essays on
Science and Confucian Ethics by Donald J.
Munro},
Journal = {Journal of Chinese Studies},
Volume = {46},
Pages = {447-54.},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds53298}
}
@article{fds18005,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {Review of Fieldwork in Familiar Places by Michele
Moody-Adams},
Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
Volume = {63},
Pages = {716-720},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds18005}
}
%% Articles and Chapters
@article{fds163300,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Cultural Pluralism and Moral Identity"},
Booktitle = {Personality, Identity, and Character: Explorations in
Moral Psychology },
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Darcia Narvaez and Dan Lapsley},
Year = {2009},
Abstract = {I develop a new "conversational" conception of culture that
accommodates the characteristics of fluidity and internal
diversity of values that have been highlighted by
cosmopolitan and postmodern critics of the the essentialist
conception of culture. I then draw out implications for the
kinds of moral identities that can arise in fluid and
internally diverse cultures. I argue that internal
consistency and stability of moral identities are not
necessarily healthy characteristics of moral identity given
a realistic conception of culture.},
Key = {fds163300}
}
@article{fds144271,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Chinese Ethics"},
Journal = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Editor = {Edward N. Zalta},
Year = {2008},
ISSN = {URL = .},
Key = {fds144271}
}
@article{fds71129,
Author = {D. Wong and Owen Flanagan and Hagop Sarkissian},
Title = {What is the Nature of Morality? A Response to Casebeer,
Railton, and Ruse},
Pages = {45-52},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology, v.1, The Evolution of Morality:
Adaptations and Innateness},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds71129}
}
@article{fds71128,
Author = {D. Wong and Owen Flanagan and Hagop Sarkissian},
Title = {"Naturalizing Ethics"},
Pages = {1-25},
Booktitle = {Moral Psychology: v.1, The Evolution of Morality:
Adaptations and Innateness},
Publisher = {MIT},
Editor = {Walter Sinott-Armstrong},
Year = {2007},
Key = {fds71128}
}
@article{fds141477,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"If We Are Not by Ourselves, If We Are Not
Strangers"},
Pages = {331-349},
Booktitle = {Polishing the Chinese Mirror: Essays in Honor of Henry
Rosemont, Jr.},
Publisher = {Association of Chinese Philosophers in America},
Editor = {Ronnie Littlejohn and Marthe Chandler},
Year = {2007},
Abstract = {This article continues development of the theme that
Confucian ethics both recognizes and the relational nature
of human identity and furthermore prizes relational
identities that are also morally autonomous. I explore the
formation of morally autonomous identities within the
context of student-teacher relationships.},
Key = {fds141477}
}
@article{fds71132,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {Evil and the Morality of Conviction},
Booktitle = {Naming Evil Judging Evil},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Editor = {Ruth Grant},
Year = {2006},
Abstract = {This essay is about the moral psychology of those who do
evil as they wage war upon evil. My focus is the “morality
of conviction” that simplifies and polarizes for the sake
of meaning, certitude and decisiveness. My primary example
will be the downward spiral dance between those Islamists
who invoke fundamentalist views to motivate and justify
terrorist attacks on the U.S. and its allies (many who hold
radical fundamentalist views, of course, deny that attacks
on civilians are justified), and those in the U.S. who
oppose them but are fundamentally alike in misperceiving the
motivations of the other side. By saying they fundamentally
alike in this respect, I am not saying that what is done on
both sides is morally equivalent all things considered, nor
do I want to say that the fact of one’s actions being
somewhat or even a lot less worse than those on the other
side constitutes a good excuse for those actions. A final
qualification to make clear at the outset is that the
perception of the other side as malignantly evil is but one
motivating factor for the terrorist attacks and the U.S.
response, and there is no claim here for the primacy of this
perception as a motivating factor. The assumption of this
paper, however, is that it was and continues to be a
significant factor in the readiness to use violence without
the usual acknowledged constraints.},
Key = {fds71132}
}
@article{fds71131,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Where Charity Begins"},
Booktitle = {Davidson's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy:
Constructive Engagement},
Publisher = {Brill Academic Publishers},
Editor = {Bo Mou},
Year = {2006},
Abstract = {This paper discusses Davidson's guiding principle for the
interpretation of what others believe, desire, and value.
Davidson holds that we use ourselves as models for
understanding others, and since we regard our own beliefs as
true, our own desires as the rational ones to have, and our
own values as the right ones, we must apply a principle of
"charity" and regard others as holding much the same
beliefs, values and desires. I criticize this principle,
pointing out that the "we" who hold certain beliefs, desires
and values comprehends considerable diversity, and that it
is this diversity that enables us to comprehend a range of
different ways of being human. I then inquire as to how we
regard a range of different beliefs, desires and values as
being normal for human beings.},
Key = {fds71131}
}
@article{fds141492,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Rights and Community in Confucianism"},
Booktitle = {Confucian Ethics: a Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy and
Community},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong},
Year = {2004},
Month = {November},
Abstract = {This paper argues that there is a basis in the Confucian
moral tradition for defending a right to dissent and to free
speech, but that this right would be defended on a
"communal" ground that such a right would help to promote
the common good, rather than an "autonomy" ground that
individuals have an interest in expressing themselves that
must be defended against the interests of the community. I
argue that rights that are grounded in either the common
good or the good of individual autonomy are dependent on
certain forms of community for their defense and
realization.},
Key = {fds141492}
}
@article{fds38167,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Rights and Community in Confucianism"},
Pages = {31-48},
Booktitle = {Confucian Ethics: a Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy
and Community},
Publisher = {New York: Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
Abstract = {Rights to speech and dissent have a basis in the Confucian
tradition, but not in the value of autonomy. Rather, they
have a basis in the value of speech and dissent to the
communal good.},
Key = {fds38167}
}
@article{fds38168,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Confucian Perspectives on Pluralism, Gender Relations,
and the Family"},
Booktitle = {The Politics of Affective Relations: East Asia and
Beyond},
Publisher = {Lanham, MD: Lexington Books},
Editor = {Hahm Chaihark and Hahm Chaibong and Daniel Bell},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Fall},
Abstract = {Both Confucianism and feminist philosophy have recognized in
a way that standard liberal views have not the relevance of
family relationships for the moral quality of a society, I
explore strengths and problems for their
approaches.},
Key = {fds38168}
}
@article{fds38165,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Dwelling in Humanity or Free and Easy Wandering?"},
Pages = {400-415},
Booktitle = {Technology and Cultural Values: On the Edge of the Third
Millenium},
Publisher = {Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press},
Editor = {Peter D. Hershock and Marietta Stepaniants and Roger T.
Ames},
Year = {2003},
Abstract = {About the Chinese philosophers Zhuangzi and Xunzi, and the
way that the dialectic between them on questions of
universalism and relativism bears on the dilemmas of value
commitment for contemporary liberals in the
West.},
Key = {fds38165}
}
@article{fds38166,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Cultural Relativism"},
Booktitle = {Online Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems,
"Institutitional Issues Involving Ethics and Justice" under
the more general category of "Institutional and
Infrastructural Resources"},
Publisher = {Oxford, UK: Eolss Publishers},
Editor = {Robert Charles Elliot (for the "Ethics and Justice"
division},
Year = {2003},
url = {http://www.eolss.net/},
Abstract = {A discussion of different kinds of relativism that involve
cultural difference, an assessment of the arguments for and
against each kind, and discussion of the normative
implications for these relativisms with special reference to
issues of cultural conflict, development, and gender
equality.},
Key = {fds38166}
}
@article{fds38163,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Mo Tzu"},
Pages = {453-461},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy},
Publisher = {New York: Routledge},
Editor = {Antonio Cua},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds38163}
}
@article{fds38164,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Comparative Philosophy”},
Pages = {51-58},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy},
Publisher = {New York: Routledge},
Editor = {Antonio Cua},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds38164}
}
@article{fds48842,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi"},
Booktitle = {Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi},
Publisher = {Hackett Publishing Company},
Editor = {Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds48842}
}
@article{fds38159,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Comparative Philosophy: Chinese and Western”},
Series = {Online, continuous},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Stanford University},
Editor = {Edward N. Zalta},
Year = {2001},
url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/comparphil-chiwes/},
Key = {fds38159}
}
@article{fds38160,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {“Moral Relativism” revised version},
Series = {2nd},
Pages = {1164-1168},
Booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Ethics},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Lawrence Becker},
Year = {2001},
Key = {fds38160}
}
@article{fds38158,
Author = {D. Wong},
Title = {"Fragmentation in Civil Society and the Good"},
Booktitle = {Civility},
Publisher = {Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press},
Editor = {Leroy Rouner},
Year = {2000},
Key = {fds38158}
}