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Publications of Felipe De Brigard    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
@book{fds320136,
   Author = {Muñoz-Suárez, C and de Brigard, F and Daniel,
             D},
   Title = {Content and consciousness revisited},
   Pages = {1-220},
   Publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9783319173733},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0},
   Abstract = {© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015. What
             are the grounds for the distinction between the mental and
             the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing
             mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior?
             Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner
             evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between
             personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain?
             Answers to these and other questions were developed in
             Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness
             (1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework
             for views that are now considered foundational in cognitive
             science and philosophy of mind. Content and Consciousness
             Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals
             introduced in Dennett’s seminal book, by covering its
             fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches and taking
             into account the findings and progress which have taken
             place during more than four decades. This book includes
             original and critical contributions about the relations
             between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal
             level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality,
             rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of
             scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces
             an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive
             science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind and
             cognitive psychiatry.},
   Doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0},
   Key = {fds320136}
}

@book{fds287441,
   Author = {Montañés, P and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Neuropsicologia clinica y cognoscitiva},
   Pages = {267 pages},
   Publisher = {Univ. Nacional de Colombia},
   Year = {2001},
   ISBN = {9588063043},
   url = {http://www.bdigital.unal.edu.co/1511/},
   Key = {fds287441}
}


%% Papers Published   
@article{fds343341,
   Author = {Henne, P and Niemi, L and Pinillos, Á and De Brigard and F and Knobe,
             J},
   Title = {A counterfactual explanation for the action effect in causal
             judgment.},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {190},
   Pages = {157-164},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006},
   Abstract = {People's causal judgments are susceptible to the action
             effect, whereby they judge actions to be more causal than
             inactions. We offer a new explanation for this effect, the
             counterfactual explanation: people judge actions to be more
             causal than inactions because they are more inclined to
             consider the counterfactual alternatives to actions than to
             consider counterfactual alternatives to inactions.
             Experiment 1a conceptually replicates the original action
             effect for causal judgments. Experiment 1b confirms a novel
             prediction of the new explanation, the reverse action
             effect, in which people judge inactions to be more causal
             than actions in overdetermination cases. Experiment 2
             directly compares the two effects in joint-causation and
             overdetermination scenarios and conceptually replicates them
             with new scenarios. Taken together, these studies provide
             support for the new counterfactual explanation for the
             action effect in causal judgment.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006},
   Key = {fds343341}
}

@article{fds335559,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Hanna, E and St Jacques and PL and Schacter,
             DL},
   Title = {How thinking about what could have been affects how we feel
             about what was.},
   Journal = {Cognition and Emotion},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {646-659},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2018.1478280},
   Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thoughts (CFT) and autobiographical
             memories (AM) involve the reactivation and recombination of
             episodic memory components into mental simulations. Upon
             reactivation, memories become labile and prone to
             modification. Thus, reactivating AM in the context of
             mentally generating CFT may provide an opportunity for
             editing processes to modify the content of the original
             memory. To examine this idea, this paper reports the results
             of two studies that investigated the effect of reactivating
             negative and positive AM in the context of either imagining
             a better (i.e. upward CFT) or a worse (i.e. downward CFT)
             alternative to an experienced event, as opposed to
             attentively retrieving the memory without mental
             modification (i.e. remembering) or no reactivation. Our
             results suggest that attentive remembering was the best
             strategy to both reduce the negative affect associated with
             negative AM, and to prevent the decay of positive affect
             associated with positive AM. In addition, reactivating
             positive, but not negative, AM with or without CFT
             modification reduces the perceived arousal of the original
             memory over time. Finally, reactivating negative AM in a
             downward CFT or an attentive remembering condition increases
             the perceived detail of the original memory over
             time.},
   Doi = {10.1080/02699931.2018.1478280},
   Key = {fds335559}
}

@article{fds332864,
   Author = {Murray, S and Murray, ED and Stewart, G and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
             Brigard, F},
   Title = {Responsibility for forgetting},
   Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
   Volume = {176},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {1177-1201},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature. In this paper, we focus on whether and to
             what extent we judge that people are responsible for the
             consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of
             behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility
             for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that
             we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their
             forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent
             is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the
             level of care that the agent exhibits toward performing the
             forgotten action does not. We argue that this result has
             important implications for a long-running debate about the
             nature of responsible agency.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
   Key = {fds332864}
}

@article{fds342766,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Langella, S and Stanley, ML and Castel, AD and Giovanello, KS},
   Title = {Age-related differences in recognition in associative
             memory.},
   Journal = {Neuropsychology, Development, and Cognition. Section B,
             Aging, Neuropsychology and Cognition},
   Pages = {1-13},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13825585.2019.1607820},
   Abstract = {Aging is often accompanied by associative memory changes,
             although their precise nature remains unclear. This study
             examines how recognition of item position in the context of
             associative memory differs between younger and older adults.
             Participants studied word pairs (A-B, C-D) and were later
             tested with intact (A-B), reversed (D-C), recombined (A-D),
             and recombined and reversed (B-C) pairs. When participants
             were instructed to respond "Old" to both intact and reversed
             pairs, and "New" to recombined, and recombined and reversed
             pairs, older adults showed worse recognition for recombined
             and reversed pairs relative to younger adults (Experiment
             1). This finding also emerged when flexible retrieval
             demands were increased by asking participants to respond
             "Old" only to intact pairs (Experiment 2). These results
             suggest that as conditions for flexible retrieval become
             more demanding, older adults may show worse recognition in
             associative memory tasks relative to younger
             adults.},
   Doi = {10.1080/13825585.2019.1607820},
   Key = {fds342766}
}

@article{fds341029,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Remembering moral and immoral actions in constructing the
             self.},
   Journal = {Memory & Cognition},
   Volume = {47},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {441-454},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0880-y},
   Abstract = {Having positive moral traits is central to one's sense of
             self, and people generally are motivated to maintain a
             positive view of the self in the present. But it remains
             unclear how people foster a positive, morally good view of
             the self in the present. We suggest that recollecting and
             reflecting on moral and immoral actions from the personal
             past jointly help to construct a morally good view of the
             current self in complementary ways. More specifically,
             across four studies we investigated the extent to which
             people believe they have changed over time after
             recollecting their own moral or immoral behaviors from the
             personal past. Our results indicate that recollecting past
             immoral actions is associated with stronger impressions of
             dissimilarity and change in the sense of self over time than
             recollecting past moral actions. These effects held for
             diverse domains of morality (i.e., honesty/dishonesty,
             helping/harming, fairness/unfairness, and
             loyalty/disloyalty), and they remained even after accounting
             for objective, calendar time. Further supporting a
             motivational explanation, these effects held when people
             recollected their own past actions but not when they
             recollected the actions of other people.},
   Doi = {10.3758/s13421-018-0880-y},
   Key = {fds341029}
}

@article{fds341881,
   Author = {Henne, P and Semler, J and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies
             ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and
             Furniture},
   Journal = {Philosophia},
   Volume = {47},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {131-139},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature. Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’
             implies ‘can’. In light of recent empirical evidence,
             however, some skeptics conclude that philosophers should
             stop assuming the principle unconditionally. Streumer,
             however, does not simply assume the principle’s truth; he
             provides arguments for it. In this article, we argue that
             his arguments fail to support the claim that ‘ought’
             implies ‘can’.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
   Key = {fds341881}
}

@article{fds341030,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Parikh, N},
   Title = {Episodic Counterfactual Thinking},
   Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
   Volume = {28},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {59-66},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721418806512},
   Abstract = {© The Author(s) 2018. Our tendency to engage in episodic
             counterfactual thinking—namely, imagining alternative ways
             in which past personal events could have occurred but did
             not—is ubiquitous. Although widely studied by cognitive
             and social psychologists, this autobiographically based
             variety of counterfactual thought has been connected only
             recently to research on the cognitive and neuroscientific
             basis of episodic memory and mental simulation. In the
             current article, we offer an empirical characterization of
             episodic counterfactual thinking by contrasting it with
             related varieties of mental simulation along three
             dimensions: temporal context, degree of episodic detail, and
             modal profile (i.e., perceived possibility or
             impossibility). In so doing, we offer a practical strategy
             to navigate the nascent literature on episodic
             counterfactual thinking within the context of other mental
             simulations, and we argue that the evidence surveyed
             strongly indicates that although connected along the
             aforementioned dimensions, episodic counterfactual thinking
             is a psychological process different from episodic memory,
             episodic future thinking, and semantic counterfactual
             thinking.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0963721418806512},
   Key = {fds341030}
}

@article{fds343711,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Moral Memories and the Belief in the Good
             Self},
   Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721419847990},
   Abstract = {© The Author(s) 2019. Most people believe they are morally
             good, and this belief plays an integral role in
             constructions of personal identity. Yet people commit moral
             transgressions with surprising frequency in everyday life.
             In this article, we characterize two mechanisms involving
             autobiographical memory that are utilized to foster a belief
             in a morally good self in the present—despite frequent and
             repeated immoral behavior. First, there is a tendency for
             people to willfully and actively forget details about their
             own moral transgressions but not about their own morally
             praiseworthy deeds. Second, when past moral transgressions
             are not forgotten, people strategically compare their more
             recent unethical behaviors with their more distant unethical
             behaviors to foster a perception of personal moral
             improvement over time. This, in turn, helps to portray the
             current self favorably. These two complementary mechanisms
             help to explain pervasive inconsistencies between people’s
             personal beliefs about their own moral goodness and the
             frequency with which they behave immorally.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0963721419847990},
   Key = {fds343711}
}

@article{fds341027,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Gessell, B and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Network modularity as a foundation for neural
             reuse},
   Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
   Volume = {86},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {23-46},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/701037},
   Abstract = {© 2019 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights
             reserved. The neural reuse framework developed primarily by
             Michael Anderson proposes that brain regions are involved in
             multiple and diverse cognitive tasks and that brain regions
             flexibly and dynamically interact in different combinations
             to carry out cognitive functioning. We argue that the
             evidence cited by Anderson and others falls short of
             supporting the fundamental principles of neural reuse. We
             map out this problem and provide solutions by drawing on
             recent advances in network neuroscience, and we argue that
             methods employed in network neuroscience provide the means
             to fully engage in a research program operating under the
             principles of neural reuse.},
   Doi = {10.1086/701037},
   Key = {fds341027}
}

@article{fds341028,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Yang, BW and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and
             Polarization},
   Journal = {Political Behavior},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09526-z},
   Abstract = {© 2019, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of
             Springer Nature. People seem more divided than ever before
             over social and political issues, entrenched in their
             existing beliefs and unwilling to change them. Empirical
             research on mechanisms driving this resistance to belief
             change has focused on a limited set of well-known, charged,
             contentious issues and has not accounted for deliberation
             over reasons and arguments in belief formation prior to
             experimental sessions. With a large, heterogeneous sample
             (N = 3001), we attempt to overcome these existing
             problems, and we investigate the causes and consequences of
             resistance to belief change for five diverse and less
             contentious socio-political issues. After participants chose
             initially to support or oppose a given socio-political
             position, they were provided with reasons favoring their
             chosen position (affirming reasons), reasons favoring the
             other, unchosen position (conflicting reasons), or all
             reasons for both positions (reasons for both sides). Our
             results indicate that participants are more likely to stick
             with their initial decisions than to change them no matter
             which reasons are considered, and that this resistance to
             belief change is likely due to a motivated, biased
             evaluation of the reasons to support their initial beliefs
             (prior-belief bias). More specifically, they rated affirming
             reasons more favorably than conflicting reasons—even after
             accounting for reported prior knowledge about the issue, the
             novelty of the reasons presented, and the reported strategy
             used to make the initial decision. In many cases,
             participants who did not change their positions tended to
             become more confident in the superiority of their positions
             after considering many reasons for both sides.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11109-019-09526-z},
   Key = {fds341028}
}

@article{fds335558,
   Author = {Parikh, N and Ruzic, L and Stewart, GW and Spreng, RN and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {What if? Neural activity underlying semantic and episodic
             counterfactual thinking.},
   Journal = {Neuroimage},
   Volume = {178},
   Pages = {332-345},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.05.053},
   Abstract = {Counterfactual thinking (CFT) is the process of mentally
             simulating alternative versions of known facts. In the past
             decade, cognitive neuroscientists have begun to uncover the
             neural underpinnings of CFT, particularly episodic CFT
             (eCFT), which activates regions in the default network (DN)
             also activated by episodic memory (eM) recall. However, the
             engagement of DN regions is different for distinct kinds of
             eCFT. More plausible counterfactuals and counterfactuals
             about oneself show stronger activity in DN regions compared
             to implausible and other- or object-focused counterfactuals.
             The current study sought to identify a source for this
             difference in DN activity. Specifically, self-focused
             counterfactuals may also be more plausible, suggesting that
             DN core regions are sensitive to the plausibility of a
             simulation. On the other hand, plausible and self-focused
             counterfactuals may involve more episodic information than
             implausible and other-focused counterfactuals, which would
             imply DN sensitivity to episodic information. In the current
             study, we compared episodic and semantic counterfactuals
             generated to be plausible or implausible against episodic
             and semantic memory reactivation using fMRI. Taking
             multivariate and univariate approaches, we found that the DN
             is engaged more during episodic simulations, including eM
             and all eCFT, than during semantic simulations. Semantic
             simulations engaged more inferior temporal and lateral
             occipital regions. The only region that showed strong
             plausibility effects was the hippocampus, which was
             significantly engaged for implausible CFT but not for
             plausible CFT, suggestive of binding more disparate
             information. Consequences of these findings for the
             cognitive neuroscience of mental simulation are
             discussed.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.05.053},
   Key = {fds335558}
}

@article{fds336415,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Yang, BW and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {No evidence for unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A
             failed replication and extension.},
   Journal = {Memory & Cognition},
   Volume = {46},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {787-795},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0803-y},
   Abstract = {In a recent study, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that
             memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of
             whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we
             argue in the current study, their claim that people develop
             "unethical amnesia" confuses two distinct and dissociable
             memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology of
             remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To
             further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory
             accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical
             amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N
             = 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from
             Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory
             accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to
             replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino
             (2016), while including several additional variables meant
             to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study
             (N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the
             same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new
             vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not
             find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy
             in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon
             the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined
             unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study
             memory for moral and immoral actions are
             discussed.},
   Doi = {10.3758/s13421-018-0803-y},
   Key = {fds336415}
}

@article{fds329104,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Dougherty, AM and Yang, BW and Henne, P and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {Reasons probably won't change your mind: The role of reasons
             in revising moral decisions.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology. General},
   Volume = {147},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {962-987},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000368},
   Abstract = {Although many philosophers argue that making and revising
             moral decisions ought to be a matter of deliberating over
             reasons, the extent to which the consideration of reasons
             informs people's moral decisions and prompts them to change
             their decisions remains unclear. Here, after making an
             initial decision in 2-option moral dilemmas, participants
             examined reasons for only the option initially chosen
             (affirming reasons), reasons for only the option not
             initially chosen (opposing reasons), or reasons for both
             options. Although participants were more likely to change
             their initial decisions when presented with only opposing
             reasons compared with only affirming reasons, these effect
             sizes were consistently small. After evaluating reasons,
             participants were significantly more likely not to change
             their initial decisions than to change them, regardless of
             the set of reasons they considered. The initial decision
             accounted for most of the variance in predicting the final
             decision, whereas the reasons evaluated accounted for a
             relatively small proportion of the variance in predicting
             the final decision. This resistance to changing moral
             decisions is at least partly attributable to a biased,
             motivated evaluation of the available reasons: participants
             rated the reasons supporting their initial decisions more
             favorably than the reasons opposing their initial decisions,
             regardless of the reported strategy used to make the initial
             decision. Overall, our results suggest that the
             consideration of reasons rarely induces people to change
             their initial decisions in moral dilemmas. (PsycINFO
             Database Record},
   Doi = {10.1037/xge0000368},
   Key = {fds329104}
}

@article{fds335560,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Brady, WJ},
   Title = {Correction to: The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our
             Judgments of Responsibility (Review of Philosophy and
             Psychology, (2013), 4, 2, (259-269), 10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8)},
   Journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {447},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0389-0},
   Abstract = {© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature. On pages 263, 265, and 266, incorrect
             degrees of freedom and t values were reported. The
             statistical conclusions are not affected by these reporting
             errors, but the corrected values are shown
             below.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s13164-018-0389-0},
   Key = {fds335560}
}

@article{fds335561,
   Author = {De Freitas and J and Sarkissian, H and Newman, GE and Grossmann, I and De
             Brigard, F and Luco, A and Knobe, J},
   Title = {Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and
             Three Interdependent Cultures.},
   Journal = {Cognitive Science},
   Volume = {42 Suppl 1},
   Pages = {134-160},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12505},
   Abstract = {People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an
             essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the
             true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to
             believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep
             inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good
             ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with
             optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does
             it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people
             understand the self? To address this question, we tested the
             good true self theory against two potential boundary
             conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about
             the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual
             differences in misanthropy-the tendency to view humans
             negatively-predict beliefs about the good true self in an
             American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in
             a good true self, even among individuals who have an
             explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true
             self-attributions across cultural groups, by comparing
             samples from an independent country (USA) and a diverse set
             of interdependent countries (Russia, Singapore, and
             Colombia). Results indicated that the direction and
             magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we
             tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across
             groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy,
             suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the
             true self as morally good.},
   Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12505},
   Key = {fds335561}
}

@article{fds335563,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Gessell, B},
   Title = {Why episodic memory may not be for communication.},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {41},
   Pages = {e8},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x17001303},
   Abstract = {Three serious challenges to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) proposal
             are presented. First, we argue that the epistemic attitude
             that they claim is unique to remembering also applies to
             some forms of imaginative simulations that aren't memories.
             Second, we argue that their account cannot accommodate
             critical neuropsychological evidence. Finally, we argue that
             their proposal looks unconvincing when compared to more
             parsimonious evolutionary accounts.},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x17001303},
   Key = {fds335563}
}

@article{fds340469,
   Author = {Gessell, B and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {The discontinuity of levels in cognitive
             science},
   Journal = {Teorema},
   Volume = {37},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {151-165},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {© 2018; KRK Ediciones. All rights reserved. We begin by
             characterizing Dennett’s “homuncular functionalist”
             view of the mind, as described in his early work. We then
             contrast that view with the one outlined in From Bacteria to
             Bach and Back. We argue that recent changes in Dennett’s
             view have produced tension in the way he conceives of
             functional decompositions. Functional decompositions based
             on the intentional stance are supposed to reach a bottom,
             “dumb” level which can be explained mechanically;
             however, since Dennett now believes that neurons may need to
             be described intentionally, it is not clear whether our
             explanations of cognitive functions can ever align with our
             explanations of neuronal and network behaviors. We explore
             the consequences of this tension for Dennett’s view, and
             for cognitive neuroscience in general.},
   Key = {fds340469}
}

@article{fds329948,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Parikh, N and Stewart, GW and Szpunar, KK and Schacter, DL},
   Title = {Neural activity associated with repetitive simulation of
             episodic counterfactual thoughts.},
   Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
   Volume = {106},
   Pages = {123-132},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.09.022},
   Abstract = {When people revisit past autobiographical events they often
             imagine alternative ways in which such events could have
             occurred. Often these episodic counterfactual thoughts
             (eCFT) are momentary and fleeting, but sometimes they are
             simulated frequently and repeatedly. However, little is
             known about the neural differences between frequently versus
             infrequently repeated eCFT. The current study explores this
             issue. In a three-session study, participants were asked to
             simulate alternative ways positive, negative, and neutral
             autobiographical memories could have occurred. Half of these
             eCFT were repeatedly re-simulated while the other half were
             not. Immediately after, participants were asked to simulate
             all these eCFT again while undergoing fMRI. A partial least
             squares analysis on the resultant fMRI data revealed that
             eCFT that were not frequently repeated preferentially
             engaged brain regions including middle (BA 21) and superior
             temporal gyri (BA 38/39), middle (BA 11) and superior
             frontal gyri (BA 9), and hippocampus. By contrast,
             frequently repeated eCFT preferentially engaged regions
             including medial frontal gyri (BA 10), anterior cingulate
             cortex, insula, and inferior parietal lobule (BA 40). Direct
             contrasts for each type of eCFT were also conducted. The
             results of these analyses suggest differential contributions
             of regions traditionally associated with eCFT, such as BA
             10, anterior cingulate cortex, and hippocampus, as a
             function of kind of eCFT and frequency of repetition.
             Consequences for future research on eCFT and rumination are
             considered.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.09.022},
   Key = {fds329948}
}

@article{fds326194,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Iyengar, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
             Brigard, F},
   Title = {I'm not the person I used to be: The self and
             autobiographical memories of immoral actions.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology. General},
   Volume = {146},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {884-895},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000317},
   Abstract = {People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways:
             They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people,
             and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in
             the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories.
             The authors investigate the role of autobiographical
             memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a
             positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally
             harming others, participants judge their own actions as less
             morally wrong and less negative than those in which other
             people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore,
             people judge those actions that happened further in the past
             to be more morally wrong than those that happened more
             recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they
             believed that they were very different people than they are
             now, participants judge their actions to be more morally
             wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of
             their pasts when they believed that they were very similar
             to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in
             relation to theories about the function of autobiographical
             memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving
             the self over time. (PsycINFO Database Record},
   Doi = {10.1037/xge0000317},
   Key = {fds326194}
}

@article{fds327002,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Cognitive systems and the changing brain},
   Journal = {Philosophical Explorations},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {224-241},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1312503},
   Abstract = {© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
             Group. The notion of cognitive system is widely used in
             explanations in cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
             Traditional approaches define cognitive systems in an
             agent-relative way, that is, via top-down functional
             decomposition that assumes a cognitive agent as starting
             point. The extended cognition movement challenged that
             approach by questioning the primacy of the notion of
             cognitive agent. In response, [Adams, F., and K. Aizawa.
             2001. The Bounds of Cognition. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.]
             suggested that to have a clear understanding of what a
             cognitive system is we may need to solve “the demarcation
             challenge”: the problem of identifying a reliable way to
             determine which mechanisms that are causally responsible for
             the production of a certain cognitive process constitute a
             cognitive system responsible for such process and which ones
             do not. Recently, [Rupert, R. 2009. Cognitive Systems and
             the Extended Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.] offered
             a solution based on the idea that the mechanisms that
             constitute a cognitive system are integrated in a particular
             sense. In this paper I critically review Rupert’s solution
             and argue against it. Additionally, I argue that a
             successful account of cognitive system must accommodate the
             fact that the neural mechanisms causally responsible for the
             production of a cognitive process are diachronically dynamic
             and yet functionally stable. At the end, I offer a
             suggestion as to how to accommodate this diachronic
             dynamicity without losing functional stability. I conclude
             by drawing some implications for the discussion on cognitive
             ontologies.},
   Doi = {10.1080/13869795.2017.1312503},
   Key = {fds327002}
}

@article{fds342710,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Stewart, GW and Brigard, FD},
   Title = {Counterfactual Plausibility and Comparative
             Similarity.},
   Journal = {Cognitive Science},
   Volume = {41 Suppl 5},
   Pages = {1216-1228},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12451},
   Abstract = {Counterfactual thinking involves imagining hypothetical
             alternatives to reality. Philosopher David Lewis (1973,
             1979) argued that people estimate the subjective
             plausibility that a counterfactual event might have occurred
             by comparing an imagined possible world in which the
             counterfactual statement is true against the current, actual
             world in which the counterfactual statement is false.
             Accordingly, counterfactuals considered to be true in
             possible worlds comparatively more similar to ours are
             judged as more plausible than counterfactuals deemed true in
             possible worlds comparatively less similar. Although Lewis
             did not originally develop his notion of comparative
             similarity to be investigated as a psychological construct,
             this study builds upon his idea to empirically investigate
             comparative similarity as a possible psychological strategy
             for evaluating the perceived plausibility of counterfactual
             events. More specifically, we evaluate judgments of
             comparative similarity between episodic memories and
             episodic counterfactual events as a factor influencing
             people's judgments of plausibility in counterfactual
             simulations, and we also compare it against other factors
             thought to influence judgments of counterfactual
             plausibility, such as ease of simulation and prior
             simulation. Our results suggest that the greater the
             perceived similarity between the original memory and the
             episodic counterfactual event, the greater the perceived
             plausibility that the counterfactual event might have
             occurred. While similarity between actual and counterfactual
             events, ease of imagining, and prior simulation of the
             counterfactual event were all significantly related to
             counterfactual plausibility, comparative similarity best
             captured the variance in ratings of counterfactual
             plausibility. Implications for existing theories on the
             determinants of counterfactual plausibility are
             discussed.},
   Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12451},
   Key = {fds342710}
}

@article{fds327003,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Rodriguez, DC and Montañés,
             P},
   Title = {Exploring the experience of episodic past, future, and
             counterfactual thinking in younger and older adults: A study
             of a Colombian sample.},
   Journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
   Volume = {51},
   Pages = {258-267},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.007},
   Abstract = {Although extant evidence suggests that many neural and
             cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic past, future, and
             counterfactual thinking overlap, recent results have
             uncovered differences among these three processes. However,
             the extent to which there may be age-related differences in
             the phenomenological characteristics associated with
             episodic past, future and counterfactual thinking remains
             unclear. This study used adapted versions of the Memory
             Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical
             Interview in younger and older adults to investigate the
             subjective experience of episodic past, future and
             counterfactual thinking. The results suggest that, across
             all conditions, younger adults generated more internal
             details than older adults. However, older adults generated
             more external details for episodic future and counterfactual
             thinking than younger adults. Additionally, younger and
             older adults generated more internal details, and gave
             higher sensory and contextual ratings, for memories rather
             than future and counterfactual thoughts. Methodological and
             theoretical consequences for extant theories of mental
             simulation are discussed.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.007},
   Key = {fds327003}
}

@article{fds318357,
   Author = {Henne, P and Pinillos, Á and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering
             Plants},
   Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {95},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {270-283},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567},
   Abstract = {© 2016 Australasian Association of Philosophy. People
             generally accept that there is causation by omission—that
             the omission of some events cause some related events. But
             this acceptance elicits the selection problem, or the
             difficulty of explaining the selection of a particular
             omissive cause or class of causes from the causal
             conditions. Some theorists contend that dependence theories
             of causation cannot resolve this problem. In this paper, we
             argue that the appeal to norms adequately resolves the
             selection problem for dependence theories, and we provide
             novel experimental evidence for it.},
   Doi = {10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567},
   Key = {fds318357}
}

@article{fds323231,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Parikh, N and Stewart, GW and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and
             counterfactual thinking.},
   Journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
   Volume = {48},
   Pages = {283-291},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {February},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.013},
   Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thoughts-imagined alternative ways
             in which personal past events might have occurred-are
             frequently accompanied by intense emotions. Here,
             participants recollected positive and negative
             autobiographical memories and then generated better and
             worse episodic counterfactual events from those memories.
             Our results suggest that the projected emotional intensity
             during the simulated remembered/imagined event is
             significantly higher than but typically positively related
             to the emotional intensity while remembering/imagining the
             event. Furthermore, repeatedly simulating counterfactual
             events heightened the emotional intensity felt while
             simulating the counterfactual event. Finally, for both the
             emotional intensity accompanying the experience of
             remembering/imagining and the projected emotional intensity
             during the simulated remembered/imagined event, the
             emotional intensity of negative memories was greater than
             the emotional intensity of upward counterfactuals generated
             from them but lower than the emotional intensity of downward
             counterfactuals generated from them. These findings are
             discussed in relation to clinical work and functional
             theories of counterfactual thinking.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.013},
   Key = {fds323231}
}

@article{fds323662,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Brady, TF and Ruzic, L and Schacter,
             DL},
   Title = {Tracking the emergence of memories: A category-learning
             paradigm to explore schema-driven recognition.},
   Journal = {Memory & Cognition},
   Volume = {45},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {105-120},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0643-6},
   Abstract = {Previous research has shown that prior knowledge structures
             or schemas affect recognition memory. However, since the
             acquisition of schemas occurs over prolonged periods of
             time, few paradigms allow the direct manipulation of schema
             acquisition to study their effect on memory performance.
             Recently, a number of parallelisms in recognition memory
             between studies involving schemas and studies involving
             category learning have been identified. The current paper
             capitalizes on these findings and offers a novel
             experimental paradigm that allows manipulation of category
             learning between individuals to study the effects of schema
             acquisition on recognition. First, participants learn to
             categorize computer-generated items whose category-inclusion
             criteria differ between participants. Next, participants
             study items that belong to either the learned category, the
             non-learned category, both, or neither. Finally,
             participants receive a recognition test that includes old
             and new items, either from the learned, the non-learned, or
             neither category. Using variations on this paradigm, four
             experiments were conducted. The results from the first three
             studies suggest that learning a category increases hit rates
             for old category-consistent items and false alarm rates for
             new category-consistent lures. Absent the category learning,
             no such effects are evident, even when participants are
             exposed to the same learning trials as those who learned the
             categories. The results from the fourth experiment suggest
             that, at least for false alarm rates, the effects of
             category learning are not solely attributable to frequency
             of occurrence of category-consistent items during learning.
             Implications for recognition memory as well as advantages of
             the proposed paradigm are discussed.},
   Doi = {10.3758/s13421-016-0643-6},
   Key = {fds323662}
}

@article{fds331533,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Responsibility and the relevance of alternative future
             possibilities},
   Journal = {Teoria},
   Volume = {37},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {25-35},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   Abstract = {In the past decade, philosophical and psychological research
             on people's beliefs about free will and responsibility has
             skyrocketed. For the most part, these vignette-based studies
             have exclusively focused on participants' judgments of the
             causal history of the events leading up to an agent's action
             and considerations about what the agent could have done
             differently in the past. However, recent evidence suggests
             that, when judging whether or not an individual is
             responsible for a certain action - even in concrete,
             emotionally laden and fully deterministic scenarios -
             considerations about alternative future possibilities may
             become relevant. This paper reviews this evidence and
             suggests a way of interpreting the nature of these effects
             as well as some consequences for experimental philosophy and
             psychology of free will and responsibility going
             forward.},
   Key = {fds331533}
}

@article{fds320134,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Giovanello, KS and Stewart, GW and Lockrow, AW and O'Brien, MM and Spreng, RN},
   Title = {Characterizing the subjective experience of episodic past,
             future, and counterfactual thinking in healthy younger and
             older adults.},
   Journal = {Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
             (2006)},
   Volume = {69},
   Number = {12},
   Pages = {2358-2375},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1115529},
   Abstract = {Recent evidence demonstrates remarkable overlap in the
             neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic memory,
             episodic future thinking, and episodic counterfactual
             thinking. However, the extent to which the phenomenological
             characteristics associated with these mental simulations
             change as a result of ageing remains largely unexplored. The
             current study employs adapted versions of the Memory
             Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical
             Interview to compare the phenomenological characteristics
             associated with both positive and negative episodic past,
             future, and counterfactual simulations in younger and older
             adults. Additionally, it explores the influence of perceived
             likelihood in the experience of such simulations. The
             results indicate that, across all simulations, older adults
             generate more external details and report higher ratings of
             vividness, composition, and intensity than young adults.
             Conversely, younger adults generate more internal details
             across all conditions and rated positive and negative likely
             future events as more likely than did older adults.
             Additionally, both younger and older adults reported higher
             ratings for sensory, composition, and intensity factors
             during episodic memories relative to future and
             counterfactual thoughts. Finally, for both groups, ratings
             of spatial coherence and composition were higher for likely
             counterfactuals than for both unlikely counterfactuals and
             future simulations. Implications for the psychology of
             mental simulation and ageing are discussed.},
   Doi = {10.1080/17470218.2015.1115529},
   Key = {fds320134}
}

@article{fds318358,
   Author = {Chituc, V and Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {Blame, not ability, impacts moral "ought" judgments for
             impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of
             "ought" implies "can".},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {150},
   Pages = {20-25},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
   Abstract = {Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts
             including obligation, blame, and ability. While little
             empirical work has studied the relationships among these
             concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a
             relationship in the principle that "ought" implies "can,"
             which states that if someone ought to do something, then
             they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of
             these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported
             here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent
             ought to keep a promise that he is unable to keep, but only
             when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows
             that such "ought" judgments correlate with judgments of
             blame, rather than with judgments of the agent's ability.
             Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral "ought"
             judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral
             "ought" judgments, such as what someone ought to do to
             fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk
             moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed
             philosophical principle that "ought" implies "can." Instead,
             judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments
             of obligation.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
   Key = {fds318358}
}

@article{fds325468,
   Author = {Henne, P and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
             W},
   Title = {An Empirical Refutation of 'Ought' Implies
             'Can'},
   Journal = {Analysis},
   Volume = {76},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {283-290},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw041},
   Doi = {10.1093/analys/anw041},
   Key = {fds325468}
}

@article{fds341031,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Consciousness and moral responsibility},
   Journal = {Analysis},
   Volume = {75},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {661-667},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv012},
   Doi = {10.1093/analys/anv012},
   Key = {fds341031}
}

@article{fds320135,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Nathan Spreng and R and Mitchell, JP and Schacter,
             DL},
   Title = {Neural activity associated with self, other, and
             object-based counterfactual thinking.},
   Journal = {Neuroimage},
   Volume = {109},
   Pages = {12-26},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.075},
   Abstract = {Previous research has shown that autobiographical episodic
             counterfactual thinking-i.e., mental simulations about
             alternative ways in which one's life experiences could have
             occurred-engages the brain's default network (DN). However,
             it remains unknown whether or not the DN is also engaged
             during impersonal counterfactual thoughts, specifically
             those involving other people or objects. The current study
             compares brain activity during counterfactual simulations
             involving the self, others and objects. In addition,
             counterfactual thoughts involving others were manipulated in
             terms of similarity and familiarity with the simulated
             characters. The results indicate greater involvement of DN
             during person-based (i.e., self and other) as opposed to
             object-based counterfactual simulations. However, the
             involvement of different regions of the DN during
             other-based counterfactual simulations was modulated by how
             close and/or similar the simulated character was perceived
             to be by the participant. Simulations involving unfamiliar
             characters preferentially recruited dorsomedial prefrontal
             cortex. Simulations involving unfamiliar similar characters,
             characters with whom participants identified personality
             traits, recruited lateral temporal gyrus. Finally, our
             results also revealed differential coupling of right
             hippocampus with lateral prefrontal and temporal cortex
             during counterfactual simulations involving familiar similar
             others, but with left transverse temporal gyrus and medial
             frontal and inferior temporal gyri during counterfactual
             simulations involving either oneself or unfamiliar
             dissimilar others. These results suggest that different
             brain mechanisms are involved in the simulation of personal
             and impersonal counterfactual thoughts, and that the extent
             to which regions associated with autobiographical memory are
             recruited during the simulation of counterfactuals involving
             others depends on the perceived similarity and familiarity
             with the simulated individuals.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.075},
   Key = {fds320135}
}

@article{fds305551,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Eliminando el fantasma de la máquina. Del alma al software
             1},
   Journal = {Revista Colombiana De Psiquiatría},
   Volume = {32},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {175-192},
   Publisher = {Asociacion Colombiana de Psiquiatria},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0034-7450},
   Key = {fds305551}
}

@article{fds305552,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {El advenimiento de la metáfora mente-computador. Del alma
             al software 3},
   Journal = {Revista Colombiana De Psiquiatría},
   Volume = {33},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {64-85},
   Publisher = {Asociacion Colombiana de Psiquiatria},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0034-7450},
   Key = {fds305552}
}

@article{fds305553,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Capas limítrofes y dominios de evidencia en ciencia
             cognitiva},
   Journal = {Universitas Philosophica},
   Volume = {45},
   Pages = {53-77},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {0120-5323},
   url = {http://people.duke.edu/~fd13/De_Brigard_2006_UnivPhil.pdf},
   Key = {fds305553}
}

@article{fds305555,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Attention, Consciousness, and Commonsense},
   Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {9/10},
   Pages = {189-201},
   Publisher = {Imprint Academic},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1355-8250},
   Key = {fds305555}
}

@article{fds305557,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Review of “Attention is Cognitive Unison”. Christopher
             Mole. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).},
   Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {1/2},
   Pages = {239-247},
   Publisher = {Imprint Academic},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1355-8250},
   Key = {fds305557}
}

@article{fds305558,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {In defense of the self-stultification objection},
   Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {5/6},
   Pages = {120-130},
   Publisher = {Imprint Academic},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1355-8250},
   Key = {fds305558}
}

@article{fds287445,
   Author = {Schacter, DL and Benoit, RG and De Brigard and F and Szpunar,
             KK},
   Title = {Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual
             thinking: intersections between memory and
             decisions.},
   Journal = {Neurobiology of Learning and Memory},
   Volume = {117},
   Pages = {14-21},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1074-7427},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008},
   Abstract = {This article considers two recent lines of research
             concerned with the construction of imagined or simulated
             events that can provide insight into the relationship
             between memory and decision making. One line of research
             concerns episodic future thinking, which involves simulating
             episodes that might occur in one's personal future, and the
             other concerns episodic counterfactual thinking, which
             involves simulating episodes that could have happened in
             one's personal past. We first review neuroimaging studies
             that have examined the neural underpinnings of episodic
             future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking. We
             argue that these studies have revealed that the two forms of
             episodic simulation engage a common core network including
             medial parietal, prefrontal, and temporal regions that also
             supports episodic memory. We also note that neuroimaging
             studies have documented neural differences between episodic
             future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking,
             including differences in hippocampal responses. We next
             consider behavioral studies that have delineated both
             similarities and differences between the two kinds of
             episodic simulation. The evidence indicates that episodic
             future and counterfactual thinking are characterized by
             similarly reduced levels of specific detail compared with
             episodic memory, but that the effects of repeatedly
             imagining a possible experience have sharply contrasting
             effects on the perceived plausibility of those events during
             episodic future thinking versus episodic counterfactual
             thinking. Finally, we conclude by discussing the functional
             consequences of future and counterfactual simulations for
             decisions.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008},
   Key = {fds287445}
}

@article{fds318359,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Hanna, E},
   Title = {Clinical applications of counterfactual thinking during
             memory reactivation.},
   Journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
   Volume = {38},
   Pages = {e5},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x14000351},
   Abstract = {The Integrative Memory Model offers a strong foundation upon
             which to build successful strategies for clinical
             intervention. The next challenge is to figure out which
             cognitive strategies are more likely to bring about
             successful and beneficial modifications of reactivated
             memories during therapy. In this commentary we suggest that
             exercising emotional regulation during episodic
             counterfactual thinking is likely to be a successful
             therapeutic strategy to bring about beneficial memory
             modifications.},
   Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x14000351},
   Key = {fds318359}
}

@article{fds320137,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {In defence of the self-stultification objection},
   Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {5-6},
   Pages = {120-130},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {May},
   Abstract = {© Imprint Academic, 2014. Epiphenomenalism holds that
             mental events are caused by physical events while not
             causing any physical effects whatsoever. The
             self-stultification objection is a venerable argument
             against epiphenomenalism according to which, if
             epiphenomenalism were true, we would not have knowledge of
             our own sensations. For the past three decades, W.S.
             Robinson has called into question the soundness of this
             objection, offering several arguments against it. Many of
             his arguments attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the
             opponents of epiphenomenalism, hoping to show that
             epiphenomenalism is no less stultifying than its contenders,
             such as dualism, functionalism, or identity theory. In the
             current paper I attempt to shift the burden of proof back to
             Robinson, and thus to defend the self-stultification
             objection, by offering two counterarguments against one of
             Robinson's objections to one of the key premises of the
             self-stultification objection.},
   Key = {fds320137}
}

@article{fds287446,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {The nature of memory traces},
   Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
   Volume = {9},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {402-414},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12133},
   Abstract = {Memory trace was originally a philosophical term used to
             explain the phenomenon of remembering. Once debated by
             Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno of Citium, the notion seems more
             recently to have become the exclusive province of cognitive
             psychologists and neuroscientists. Nonetheless, this modern
             appropriation should not deter philosophers from thinking
             carefully about the nature of memory traces. On the
             contrary, scientific research on the nature of memory traces
             can rekindle philosopher's interest on this notion. With
             that general aim in mind, the present paper has three
             specific goals. First, it attempts to chart the most
             relevant philosophical views on the nature of memory traces
             from both a thematic and historical perspective. Second, it
             reviews critical findings in the psychology and the
             neuroscience of memory traces. Finally, it explains how such
             results lend support to or discredit specific philosophical
             positions on the nature of memory traces. This paper also
             touches upon the issues raised by recent empirical research
             that theories of memory traces need to accommodate in order
             to succeed. © 2014 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2014
             John Wiley & Sons Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1111/phc3.12133},
   Key = {fds287446}
}

@article{fds287451,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of
             episodic hypothetical thinking},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Volume = {191},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {155-185},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://people.duke.edu/~fd13/De_Brigard_2013_Synthese.pdf},
   Abstract = {Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in
             our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the
             function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering
             is typically thought to happen because our memory system
             malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of
             misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In
             particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of
             misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory's
             malfunction, but rather as the normal result of a larger
             cognitive system that performs a different function, and for
             which remembering is just one operation. Building upon
             extant psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I offer a
             picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system
             that supports not only thinking of what was the case and
             what potentially could be the case, but also what could have
             been the case. More precisely, I claim that remembering is a
             particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the
             flexible recombination of different components of encoded
             traces into representations of possible past events that
             might or might not have occurred, in the service of
             constructing mental simulations of possible future events.
             So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for
             diverse considerations hath diverse names. Thomas Hobbes,
             Leviathan 1.2. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media
             Dordrecht.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11229-013-0247-7},
   Key = {fds287451}
}

@article{fds287448,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Addis, DR and Ford, JH and Schacter, DL and Giovanello, KS},
   Title = {Remembering what could have happened: neural correlates of
             episodic counterfactual thinking.},
   Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
   Volume = {51},
   Number = {12},
   Pages = {2401-2414},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.015},
   Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that our capacities to remember the
             past and to imagine what might happen in the future largely
             depend on the same core brain network that includes the
             middle temporal lobe, the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial
             cortex, the inferior parietal lobe, the medial prefrontal
             cortex, and the lateral temporal cortex. However, the extent
             to which regions of this core brain network are also
             responsible for our capacity to think about what could have
             happened in our past, yet did not occur (i.e., episodic
             counterfactual thinking), is still unknown. The present
             study examined this issue. Using a variation of the
             experimental recombination paradigm (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser,
             & Schacter, 2009. Neuropsychologia. 47: 2222-2238),
             participants were asked both to remember personal past
             events and to envision alternative outcomes to such events
             while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging.
             Three sets of analyses were performed on the imaging data in
             order to investigate two related issues. First, a
             mean-centered spatiotemporal partial least square (PLS)
             analysis identified a pattern of brain activity across
             regions of the core network that was common to episodic
             memory and episodic counterfactual thinking. Second, a
             non-rotated PLS analysis identified two different patterns
             of brain activity for likely and unlikely episodic
             counterfactual thoughts, with the former showing significant
             overlap with the set of regions engaged during episodic
             recollection. Finally, a parametric modulation was conducted
             to explore the differential engagement of brain regions
             during counterfactual thinking, revealing that areas such as
             the parahippocampal gyrus and the right hippocampus were
             modulated by the subjective likelihood of counterfactual
             simulations. These results suggest that episodic
             counterfactual thinking engages regions that form the core
             brain network, and also that the subjective likelihood of
             our counterfactual thoughts modulates the engagement of
             different areas within this set of regions.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.015},
   Key = {fds287448}
}

@article{fds287450,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Szpunar, KK and Schacter, DL},
   Title = {Coming to grips with the past: effect of repeated simulation
             on the perceived plausibility of episodic counterfactual
             thoughts.},
   Journal = {Psychological Science},
   Volume = {24},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {1329-1334},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612468163},
   Abstract = {When people revisit previous experiences, they often engage
             in episodic counterfactual thinking: mental simulations of
             alternative ways in which personal past events could have
             occurred. The present study employed a novel experimental
             paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation on
             the perceived plausibility of upward, downward, and neutral
             episodic counterfactual thoughts. Participants were asked to
             remember negative, positive, and neutral autobiographical
             memories. One week later, they self-generated upward,
             downward, and neutral counterfactual alternatives to those
             memories. The following day, they resimulated each of those
             counterfactuals either once or four times. The results
             indicate that repeated simulation of upward, downward, and
             neutral episodic counterfactual events decreases their
             perceived plausibility while increasing ratings of the ease,
             detail, and valence of the simulations. This finding
             suggests a difference between episodic counterfactual
             thoughts and other kinds of self-referential simulations.
             Possible implications of this finding for pathological and
             nonpathological anxiety are discussed.},
   Doi = {10.1177/0956797612468163},
   Key = {fds287450}
}

@article{fds287449,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Brady, WJ},
   Title = {The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our Judgments of
             Responsibility},
   Journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
   Volume = {4},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {259-269},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8},
   Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that if a deterministic description
             of the events leading up to a morally questionable action is
             couched in mechanistic, reductionistic, concrete and/or
             emotionally salient terms, people are more inclined toward
             compatibilism than when those descriptions use
             non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic, abstract and/or
             emotionally neutral terms. To explain these results, it has
             been suggested that descriptions of the first kind are
             processed by a concrete cognitive system, while those of the
             second kind are processed by an abstract cognitive system.
             The current paper reports the results of three studies
             exploring whether or not considerations about possible
             future consequences of holding an agent responsible at a
             present time affect people's judgments of responsibility.
             The results obtained suggest first that the concrete system
             does not produce compatibilist judgments of responsibility
             unconditionally, even when facing appropriately mechanistic,
             reductionistic, emotionally loaded and concretely worded
             deterministic scenarios. Second, these results suggest that
             considerations about possible future consequences for
             innocent third parties that may follow as a result of
             holding an agent responsible affect people's judgment as to
             whether or not the agent is responsible for what she did.
             Finally, it is proposed that these results compliment extant
             evidence on the so-called "Side-effect effect", as they
             suggest that emotional reactions toward possible future side
             effects influence people's judgment of responsibility. The
             impact of these results for philosophy and moral psychology
             is discussed. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media
             Dordrecht.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8},
   Key = {fds287449}
}

@article{fds320138,
   Author = {Acevedo-Triana, C and Fernando Cardenas and P and de Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {Finding memory: Interview with Daniel L.
             Schacter},
   Journal = {Universitas Psychologica},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {1605-1610},
   Publisher = {Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana},
   Year = {2013},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.UPSY12-5.fmid},
   Abstract = {The present interview offers an annotated dialogue with Dr.
             Daniel L. Schacter, in which we had the chance to learn
             about his findings, his current studies, in their
             implications for memory and cognition. Dr. Schacter is
             currently William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Psychology at
             Harvard University. With more than 40 years of professional
             experience in research on cognition, Dr. Schacter has
             published over 400 articles, many in top scientific
             journals, and some have been cited thousands of times. For
             his multiple theoretical and empirical contributions to the
             field of psychology, Dr. Schacter recently received the
             American Psychological Association's Award for Distinguished
             Scientific Contributions.},
   Doi = {10.11144/Javeriana.UPSY12-5.fmid},
   Key = {fds320138}
}

@article{fds287447,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Review of “Involuntary Autobiographical Memories”.
             Dorthe Berntsen. (Cambridge University Press.
             2009)},
   Journal = {Memory Studies},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds287447}
}

@article{fds287438,
   Author = {Giovanello, KS and De Brigard and F and Hennessey Ford and J and Kaufer,
             DI and Burke, JR and Browndyke, JN and Welsh-Bohmer,
             KA},
   Title = {Event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging changes
             during relational retrieval in normal aging and amnestic
             mild cognitive impairment.},
   Journal = {J Int Neuropsychol Soc},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {886-897},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {1355-6177},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1355617712000689},
   Abstract = {The earliest cognitive deficits observed in amnestic mild
             cognitive impairment (aMCI) appear to center on memory tasks
             that require relational memory (RM), the ability to link or
             integrate unrelated pieces of information. RM impairments in
             aMCI likely reflect neural changes in the medial temporal
             lobe (MTL) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC). We tested
             the hypothesis that individuals with aMCI, as compared to
             cognitively normal (CN) controls, would recruit neural
             regions outside of the MTL and PPC to support relational
             memory. To this end, we directly compared the neural
             underpinnings of successful relational retrieval in aMCI and
             CN groups, using event-related functional magnetic resonance
             imaging (fMRI), holding constant the stimuli and encoding
             task. The fMRI data showed that the CN, compared to the
             aMCI, group activated left precuneus, left angular gyrus,
             right posterior cingulate, and right parahippocampal cortex
             during relational retrieval, while the aMCI group, relative
             to the CN group, activated superior temporal gyrus and
             supramarginal gyrus for this comparison. Such findings
             indicate an early shift in the functional neural
             architecture of relational retrieval in aMCI, and may prove
             useful in future studies aimed at capitalizing on
             functionally intact neural regions as targets for treatment
             and slowing of the disease course. (JINS, 2012, 18,
             1-12).},
   Doi = {10.1017/S1355617712000689},
   Key = {fds287438}
}

@article{fds287439,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Giovanello, KS},
   Title = {Influence of outcome valence in the subjective experience of
             episodic past, future, and counterfactual
             thinking.},
   Journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {1085-1096},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {1053-8100},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.06.007},
   Abstract = {Recent findings suggest that our capacity to imagine the
             future depends on our capacity to remember the past.
             However, the extent to which episodic memory is involved in
             our capacity to think about what could have happened in our
             past, yet did not occur (i.e., episodic counterfactual
             thinking), remains largely unexplored. The current
             experiments investigate the phenomenological characteristics
             and the influence of outcome valence on the experience of
             past, future and counterfactual thoughts. Participants were
             asked to mentally simulate past, future, and counterfactual
             events with positive or negative outcomes. Features of their
             subjective experiences during each type of simulation were
             measured using questionnaires and autobiographical
             interviews. The results suggest that clarity and vividness
             were higher for past than future and counterfactual
             simulations. Additionally, emotional intensity was lower for
             counterfactual simulations than past and future simulations.
             Finally, outcome valence influenced participants' judgment
             of probability for future and counterfactual
             simulations.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2012.06.007},
   Key = {fds287439}
}

@article{fds287436,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {The role of attention in conscious recollection.},
   Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
   Volume = {3},
   Pages = {29},
   Publisher = {FRONTIERS MEDIA SA},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00029},
   Abstract = {Most research on the relationship between attention and
             consciousness has been limited to perception. However,
             perceptions are not the only kinds of mental contents of
             which we can be conscious. An important set of conscious
             states that has not received proper treatment within this
             discussion is that of memories. This paper reviews
             compelling evidence indicating that attention may be
             necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious
             recollection. However, it is argued that unlike the case of
             conscious perception, the kind of attention required during
             recollection is internal, as opposed to external, attention.
             As such, the surveyed empirical evidence is interpreted as
             suggesting that internal attention is necessary, but
             probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. The
             paper begins by justifying the need for clear distinctions
             among different kinds of attention, and then emphasizes the
             difference between internal and external attention. Next,
             evidence from behavioral, neuropsychological, and
             neuroimaging studies suggesting that internal attention is
             required for the successful retrieval of memorial contents
             is reviewed. In turn, it is argued that internal attention
             during recollection is what makes us conscious of the
             contents of retrieved memories; further evidence in support
             of this claim is also provided. Finally, it is suggested
             that internal attention is probably not sufficient for
             conscious recollection. Open questions and possible avenues
             for future research are also mentioned.},
   Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00029},
   Key = {fds287436}
}

@article{fds287437,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Predictive memory and the surprising gap.},
   Journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
   Volume = {3},
   Pages = {420},
   Publisher = {FRONTIERS MEDIA SA},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00420},
   Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00420},
   Key = {fds287437}
}

@article{fds320139,
   Author = {de Brigard, F},
   Title = {Consciousness, attention and commonsense},
   Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {9-10},
   Pages = {189-201},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {October},
   Abstract = {In a recent paper, Christopher Mole (2008) argued in favour
             of the view that, according to our commonsense psychology,
             while consciousness is necessary for attention, attention
             isn't necessary for consciousness. In this paper I offer an
             argument against this view. More precisely, I offer an
             argument against the claim that, according to our
             commonsense psychology, consciousness is necessary for
             attention. However, I don't claim it follows from this
             argument that commonsense has it the other way around, viz.
             that consciousness isn't necessary for attention. Instead, I
             want to motivate the claim that there isn't such a thing as
             the view of commonsense psychology about the relation
             between attention and consciousness. I argue that people's
             use of these terms - and, presumably, of their corresponding
             concepts - seems to be context dependent. I conclude with a
             discussion of the possible implications of this claim for
             the empirical study of attention and consciousness. ©
             Imprint Academic 2010.},
   Key = {fds320139}
}

@article{fds287435,
   Author = {Sarkissian, H and Chatterjee, A and De brigard, F and Knobe, J and Nichols, S and Sirker, S},
   Title = {Is belief in free will a cultural universal?},
   Journal = {Mind & Language},
   Volume = {25},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {346-358},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {June},
   ISSN = {0268-1064},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x},
   Abstract = {Recent experimental research has revealed surprising
             patterns in people's intuitions about free will and moral
             responsibility. One limitation of this research, however, is
             that it has been conducted exclusively on people from
             Western cultures. The present paper extends previous
             research by presenting a cross-cultural study examining
             intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in
             subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and
             Colombia. The results revealed a striking degree of
             cross-cultural convergence. In all four cultural groups, the
             majority of participants said that (a) our universe is
             indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not
             compatible with determinism. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing
             Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x},
   Key = {fds287435}
}

@article{fds305554,
   Author = {de Brigard, F},
   Title = {If you like it, does it matter if it's real?},
   Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
   Volume = {23},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {43-57},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {February},
   ISSN = {1465-394X},
   url = {http://people.duke.edu/~fd13/De_Brigard_2010_PhilPsych.pdf},
   Abstract = {Most people's intuitive reaction after considering Nozick's
             experience machine thought-experiment seems to be just like
             his: we feel very little inclination to plug in to a virtual
             reality machine capable of providing us with pleasurable
             experiences. Many philosophers take this empirical fact as
             sufficient reason to believe that, more than pleasurable
             experiences, people care about "living in contact with
             reality." Such claim, however, assumes that people's
             reaction to the experience machine thought-experiment is due
             to the fact that they value reality over virtual
             experiences-an assumption that has seldom (if ever) been
             questioned. This paper challenges that very assumption. I
             report some experimental evidence suggesting that the
             intuition elicited by the thoughtexperiment may be
             explainable by the fact that people are averse to abandon
             the life they have been experiencing so far, regardless of
             whether such life is virtual or real. I use then an
             explanatory model, derived from what behavioral economists
             and psychologists call the status quo bias, to make sense of
             these results. Finally, I argue that since this explanation
             also accounts for people's reaction toward Nozick's
             thought-experiment, it would be wrong to take such intuition
             as evidence that people value being in touch with reality.
             © 2010 Taylor & Francis.},
   Doi = {10.1080/09515080903532290},
   Key = {fds305554}
}

@article{fds287434,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Prinz, J},
   Title = {Attention and consciousness.},
   Journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews. Cognitive
             Science},
   Volume = {1},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {51-59},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {1939-5078},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.27},
   Abstract = {For the past three decades there has been a substantial
             amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that
             attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual
             representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be
             something that it is like to experience a representational
             perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently
             questioned on the basis of some alleged counterevidence. In
             this paper we survey some of the most important recent
             findings. In doing so, we have two primary goals. The first
             is descriptive: we provide a literature review for those
             seeking an understanding of the present debate. The second
             is editorial: we suggest that the evidence alleging
             dissociations between consciousness and attention is not
             decisive. Thus, this is an opinionated overview of the
             debate. By presenting our assessment, we hope to bring out
             both sides in the debate and to underscore that the issues
             here remain matters of intense controversy and ongoing
             investigation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For
             further resources related to this article, please visit the
             WIREs website.},
   Doi = {10.1002/wcs.27},
   Key = {fds287434}
}

@article{fds287433,
   Author = {de Brigard, F and Mandelbaum, E and Ripley, D},
   Title = {Responsibility and the brain sciences},
   Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {511-524},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {November},
   ISSN = {1386-2820},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9143-5},
   Abstract = {Some theorists think that the more we get to know about the
             neural underpinnings of our behaviors, the less likely we
             will be to hold people responsible for their actions. This
             intuition has driven some to suspect that as neuroscience
             gains insight into the neurological causes of our actions,
             people will cease to view others as morally responsible for
             their actions, thus creating a troubling quandary for our
             legal system. This paper provides empirical evidence against
             such intuitions. Particularly, our studies of folk
             intuitions suggest that (1) when the causes of an action are
             described in neurological terms, they are not found to be
             any more exculpatory than when described in psychological
             terms, and (2) agents are not held fully responsible even
             for actions that are fully neurologically caused. ©
             Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s10677-008-9143-5},
   Key = {fds287433}
}

@article{fds287431,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Review of The Origins of Meaning: Language in the Light of
             Evolution},
   Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
   Volume = {22},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {529-533},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {August},
   ISSN = {0951-5089},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080903157924},
   Doi = {10.1080/09515080903157924},
   Key = {fds287431}
}

@article{fds287432,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Comentario crítico a “Las dificultades del compatibilismo
             de Dennett”de José Antonio Guerrero del
             Amo},
   Journal = {Ideas Y Valores: Revista Colombiana De Filosofía},
   Volume = {58},
   Number = {141},
   Pages = {262-268},
   Year = {2009},
   Key = {fds287432}
}

@article{fds287430,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {En busca de la mente cerebral. Del alma al software
             2},
   Journal = {Revista Colombiana De Psiquiatría},
   Volume = {32},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {373-390},
   Publisher = {Asociacion Colombiana de Psiquiatria},
   Year = {2003},
   ISSN = {0034-7450},
   Key = {fds287430}
}


%% Papers Accepted   
@article{fds337053,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Memory and the intentional stance},
   Pages = {62-91},
   Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {February},
   ISBN = {9780199367511},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0005},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. All rights reserved.
             Despite Dennett's vast scholarship, he seemed to only have
             directly addressed the topic of memory in a relatively
             unknown coauthored article published in a somewhat obscure
             volume. The current chapter attempts to reconstruct the
             ideas from this old article, and argues that it offers a
             viable and coherent view of episodic memory with substantial
             empirical support. Specifically, the chapter uncovers three
             empirically supported theses. A functional thesis, according
             to which our memory system not only processes information
             about past events but also uses this information to
             construct useful anticipations of possible future events. A
             computational thesis, according to which statistical
             regularities, along with individual limitations and goals,
             probabilistically constrain the search space examined during
             memory retrieval. And a metaphysical thesis, according to
             which memories do not exist as subpersonal-level brain
             structures encoding particular intentional contents but
             rather as personal-level psychological phenomena only
             accessible from the intentional stance.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0005},
   Key = {fds337053}
}

@article{fds335562,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Memory, attention, and joint reminiscing},
   Pages = {200-220},
   Booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9781138065604},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591},
   Abstract = {© 2018 Taylor & Francis. When people jointly reminisce,
             they often talk about past objects, which may or may no
             longer exist. How can two or more people jointly refer to an
             object that is long gone-or at least, that is not present in
             their surrounding? In this chapter, I offer a three-part
             answer to this question. First, I suggest that our capacity
             to remember intentional objects during memory retrieval
             depends on our capacity to direct our attention inwardly
             toward the relevant component of a memorial content-a mental
             act I call mental ostension. Second, I argue that, for us to
             refer to remembered intentional objects, we must possess the
             ability to refer to them indirectly or “deferredly” by
             way of mentally ostending toward a present mental content;
             in short, we must be capable of deferred mental ostension.
             Finally, I claim that to jointly reminisce, we must have the
             capacity to guide someone else’s attention inwardly toward
             the relevant aspect of the mental content we want them to
             focus on so that they become aware of the past object we are
             deferredly ostending; that is, we need concerted deferred
             mental ostension.},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781315159591},
   Key = {fds335562}
}

@article{fds329949,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Memory and imagination},
   Pages = {127-140},
   Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
   Publisher = {Routledge},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {June},
   ISBN = {9781138909366},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315},
   Doi = {10.4324/9781315687315},
   Key = {fds329949}
}

@article{fds305556,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Memoria, neurociencia y educación},
   Pages = {179-194},
   Booktitle = {La pizarra de Babel: Puentes entre neurociencia, psicologia
             y educación},
   Publisher = {Libros del Zorzal},
   Editor = {Lipina, S and Sigman, M},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   Key = {fds305556}
}

@article{fds287444,
   Author = {Banerjee, S and Cox, J and De Brigard and F and et. al.},
   Title = {The significance of cognitive neuroscience: Findings,
             applications and challenges},
   Pages = {1071-1078},
   Booktitle = {The Cognitive Neuroscience V},
   Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
   Address = {Cambridge, MA},
   Editor = {Mangum, R and Gazzaniga, M},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds287444}
}

@article{fds221957,
   Author = {(5) Schacter, D.L. and Benoit, R. and De Brigard and F. and Szpunar,
             K.K},
   Title = {Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual
             thinking: Intersections between memory and
             decisions.},
   Journal = {Neurobiology of Learning and Memory},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds221957}
}

@article{fds287440,
   Author = {De Brigard and F and Giovanello, KS and Kaufer, D},
   Title = {Neuroanatomy of Memory},
   Booktitle = {Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychiatry},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Editor = {Arcinegas, DB and Anderson, CA and Filley, CM},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds287440}
}

@article{fds287442,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {What was I thinking? Dennett’s Content and Consciousness
             and the reality of propositional attitudes},
   Booktitle = {Content and Consciousness Revisited},
   Publisher = {SPRINGER},
   Editor = {Muñoz-Suárez, CM and De Brigard and F},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds287442}
}

@article{fds287443,
   Author = {St Jacques and P and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Neural correlates of autobiographical memory: Methodological
             Considerations.},
   Booktitle = {The Handbook on the Cognitive Neuroscience of
             Memory.},
   Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL},
   Editor = {Durte, A and Barense, M and Addis, D},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds287443}
}


%% Chapters in Books   
@misc{fds305550,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Finding Memory: Interview with Daniel L.
             Schacter},
   Journal = {Universitas Psychologica},
   Volume = {12},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {2605-1610},
   Publisher = {Pontificia Universidad Javeriana},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   ISSN = {2011-2777},
   Key = {fds305550}
}

@misc{fds287428,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {The New Paideia},
   Journal = {3:Am Magazine},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds287428}
}

@misc{fds287429,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {The Anatomy of Amnesia},
   Journal = {Scientific American Mind},
   Pages = {33-37},
   Year = {2014},
   Key = {fds287429}
}

@misc{fds287427,
   Author = {De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Estados Unidos: Entre ilusiones y prejuicios},
   Journal = {Revista Javeriana},
   Year = {2005},
   Key = {fds287427}
}


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