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@article{fds376061,
Author = {Niemi, L and Washington, N and Workman, C and Arcila-Valenzuela, M and De Brigard and F},
Title = {The emotional impact of baseless discrediting of knowledge:
An empirical investigation of epistemic injustice.},
Journal = {Acta psychologica},
Volume = {244},
Pages = {104157},
Year = {2024},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104157},
Abstract = {According to theoretical work on epistemic injustice,
baseless discrediting of the knowledge of people with
marginalized social identities is a central driver of
prejudice and discrimination. Discrediting of knowledge may
sometimes be subtle, but it is pernicious, inducing chronic
stress and coping strategies such as emotional avoidance. In
this research, we sought to deepen the understanding of
epistemic injustice's impact by examining emotional
responses to being discredited and assessing if marginalized
social group membership predicts these responses. We
conducted a novel series of three experiments (Total
N = 1690) in which participants (1) shared their factual
knowledge about how a game worked or their personal feelings
about the game; (2) received discrediting feedback
(invalidating remarks), validating feedback (affirming
remarks), or insulting feedback (general negative social
evaluation); and then (3) reported their affect. In all
three studies, on average, affective responses to
discrediting feedback were less negative than to insulting
feedback, and more negative than to validating feedback.
Participants who shared their knowledge reported more
negative affect after discrediting feedback than
participants who shared their feelings. There were
consistent individual differences, including a
twice-replicated finding of reduced negative affect after
receiving discrediting and insulting feedback for Black men
compared to White men and women and Black women. Black men's
race-based traumatic symptom scores predicted their
affective responses to discrediting and insulting feedback,
suggesting that experience with discrimination contributed
to the emotional processing of a key aspect of epistemic
injustice: remarks conveying baseless discrediting of
knowledge.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104157},
Key = {fds376061}
}
@article{fds376898,
Author = {Krasich, K and O'Neill, K and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Looking at Mental Images: Eye-Tracking Mental Simulation
During Retrospective Causal Judgment.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {48},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e13426},
Year = {2024},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13426},
Abstract = {How do people evaluate causal relationships? Do they just
consider what actually happened, or do they also consider
what could have counterfactually happened? Using eye
tracking and Gaussian process modeling, we investigated how
people mentally simulated past events to judge what caused
the outcomes to occur. Participants played a virtual
ball-shooting game and then-while looking at a blank
screen-mentally simulated (a) what actually happened, (b)
what counterfactually could have happened, or (c) what
caused the outcome to happen. Our findings showed that
participants moved their eyes in patterns consistent with
the actual or counterfactual events that they mentally
simulated. When simulating what caused the outcome to occur,
participants moved their eyes consistent with simulations of
counterfactual possibilities. These results favor
counterfactual theories of causal reasoning, demonstrate how
eye movements can reflect simulation during this reasoning
and provide a novel approach for investigating retrospective
causal reasoning and counterfactual thinking.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.13426},
Key = {fds376898}
}
@article{fds373975,
Author = {Krasich, K and O'Neill, K and Murray, S and Brockmole, JR and De
Brigard, F and Nuthmann, A},
Title = {A computational modeling approach to investigating mind
wandering-related adjustments to gaze behavior during scene
viewing.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {242},
Pages = {105624},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105624},
Abstract = {Research on gaze control has long shown that increased
visual-cognitive processing demands in scene viewing are
associated with longer fixation durations. More recently,
though, longer durations have also been linked to mind
wandering, a perceptually decoupled state of attention
marked by decreased visual-cognitive processing. Toward
better understanding the relationship between fixation
durations and visual-cognitive processing, we ran
simulations using an established random-walk model for
saccade timing and programming and assessed which model
parameters best predicted modulations in fixation durations
associated with mind wandering compared to attentive
viewing. Mind wandering-related fixation durations were best
described as an increase in the variability of the
fixation-generating process, leading to more
variable-sometimes very long-durations. In contrast, past
research showed that increased processing demands increased
the mean duration of the fixation-generating process. The
findings thus illustrate that mind wandering and processing
demands modulate fixation durations through different
mechanisms in scene viewing. This suggests that processing
demands cannot be inferred from changes in fixation
durations without understanding the underlying mechanism by
which these changes were generated.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105624},
Key = {fds373975}
}
@article{fds373542,
Author = {Miceli, K and Morales-Torres, R and Khoudary, A and Faul, L and Parikh,
N and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Perceived plausibility modulates hippocampal activity in
episodic counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {Hippocampus},
Volume = {34},
Number = {1},
Pages = {2-6},
Year = {2024},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hipo.23583},
Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thinking (ECT) consists of imagining
alternative outcomes to past personal events. Previous
research has shown that ECT shares common neural substrates
with episodic future thinking (EFT): our ability to imagine
possible future events. Both ECT and EFT have been shown to
critically depend on the hippocampus, and past research has
explored hippocampal engagement as a function of the
perceived plausibility of an imagined future event. However,
the extent to which the hippocampus is modulated by
perceived plausibility during ECT is unknown. In this study,
we combine two functional magnetic resonance imaging
datasets to investigate whether perceived plausibility
modulates hippocampal activity during ECT. Our results
indicate that plausibility parametrically modulates
hippocampal activity during ECT, and that such modulation is
confined to the left anterior portion of the hippocampus.
Moreover, our results indicate that this modulation is
positive, such that increased activity in the left anterior
hippocampus is associated with higher ratings of ECT
plausibility. We suggest that neither effort nor difficulty
alone can account for these results, and instead suggest
possible alternatives to explain the role of the hippocampus
during the construction of plausible and implausible
ECT.},
Doi = {10.1002/hipo.23583},
Key = {fds373542}
}
@article{fds374206,
Author = {Morales-Torres, R and De Brigard and F},
Title = {On the frequency and nature of the cues that elicit déjà
vu and involuntary autobiographical memories.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {46},
Pages = {e370},
Year = {2023},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x23000134},
Abstract = {Barzykowski and Moulin suggest that déjà vu and
involuntary autobiographical memories recruit similar
retrieval processes. Here, we invite the authors to clarify
three issues: (1) What mechanism prevents déjà vu to
happen more frequently? (2) What is the role of semantic
cues in involuntary autobiographical retrieval? and (3) How
déjà vu relates to non-believed memories?},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x23000134},
Key = {fds374206}
}
@article{fds369853,
Author = {Murray, S and Bermúdez, JP and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Moralization and self-control strategy selection.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {30},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1586-1595},
Year = {2023},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-023-02257-7},
Abstract = {To manage conflicts between temptation and commitment,
people use self-control. The process model of self-control
outlines different strategies for managing the onset and
experience of temptation. However, little is known about the
decision-making factors underlying strategy selection.
Across three experiments (N = 317), we tested whether the
moral valence of a commitment predicts how people advise
attentional self-control strategies. In Experiments 1 and 2,
people rated attentional focus strategies as significantly
more effective for people tempted to break moral relative to
immoral commitments, even when controlling for perceived
temptation and trait self-control. Experiment 3 showed that
as people perceived commitments to have more positive moral
valence, they judged attentional focus strategies to be
significantly more effective relative to attentional
distraction strategies. Moreover, this effect was partly
mediated by perceived differences in motivation. These
results indicate that moralization informs decision-making
processes related to self-control strategy
selection.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-023-02257-7},
Key = {fds369853}
}
@article{fds371448,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {"Repressed Memory" Makes No Sense.},
Journal = {Topics in cognitive science},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12677},
Abstract = {The expression "repressed memory" was introduced over 100
years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an
unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's
seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized
cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked-yet
the term "repressed memory" seems to remain. In this paper,
I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this
theoretical term as well as an argument to question its
scientific status by comparing it to other cases of
theoretical terms that have either survived scientific
change-such as "atom" or "gene"-or that have perished, such
as "black bile." Ultimately, I argue that "repressed memory"
is more like "black bile" than "atom" or "gene" and, thus,
recommend its demotion from our scientific
vocabulary.},
Doi = {10.1111/tops.12677},
Key = {fds371448}
}
@article{fds369341,
Author = {Boone, T and Van Rooy and N and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Not Every Thing Must Go.},
Journal = {Journal of cognitive neuroscience},
Volume = {35},
Number = {3},
Pages = {376-379},
Year = {2023},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_01931},
Abstract = {In The Entangled Brain, Pessoa criticizes standard
approaches in cognitive neuroscience in which the brain is
seen as a functionally decomposable, modular system with
causal operations built up hierarchically. Instead, he
advocates for an emergentist perspective whereby dynamic
brain networks are associated, not with traditional
psychological categories, but with behavioral functions
characterized in evolutionary terms. Here, we raise a number
of concerns with such a radical approach. We ultimately
believe that although much revision to cognitive
neuroscience is welcome and needed, Pessoa's more radical
proposals may be counterproductive.},
Doi = {10.1162/jocn_a_01931},
Key = {fds369341}
}
@article{fds365621,
Author = {Murray, S and Krasich, K and Irving, Z and Nadelhoffer, T and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent
wrongdoing.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {152},
Number = {1},
Pages = {120-138},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0001262},
Abstract = {Third-personal judgments of blame are typically sensitive to
what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act
negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not
desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do
people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose
that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based
on perceived <i>mental</i> <i>control</i>, or the degree to
which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over
time. To acquire information about others' mental control,
people self-project their own perceived mental control to
anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and
concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four
experiments (<i>N</i> = 841), we tested whether perceptions
of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame
for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with
which people can counterfactually imagine an individual
being non-negligent mediated the relationship between
judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated
that perceived mental control has a strong effect on
judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that
first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately
correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for
negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical
memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of
forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal
episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent
wrongdoers less harshly compared with a control group for
whom past episodes of negligence were not salient.
Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal
judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments
of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role
for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of
responsibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all
rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0001262},
Key = {fds365621}
}
@article{fds372917,
Author = {Uddin, LQ and Betzel, RF and Cohen, JR and Damoiseaux, JS and De
Brigard, F and Eickhoff, SB and Fornito, A and Gratton, C and Gordon,
EM and Laird, AR and Larson-Prior, L and McIntosh, AR and Nickerson, LD and Pessoa, L and Pinho, AL and Poldrack, RA and Razi, A and Sadaghiani, S and Shine, JM and Yendiki, A and Yeo, BTT and Spreng,
RN},
Title = {Controversies and progress on standardization of large-scale
brain network nomenclature.},
Journal = {Network neuroscience (Cambridge, Mass.)},
Volume = {7},
Number = {3},
Pages = {864-905},
Publisher = {M I T PRESS},
Year = {2023},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/netn_a_00323},
Abstract = {Progress in scientific disciplines is accompanied by
standardization of terminology. Network neuroscience, at the
level of macroscale organization of the brain, is beginning
to confront the challenges associated with developing a
taxonomy of its fundamental explanatory constructs. The
Workgroup for HArmonized Taxonomy of NETworks (WHATNET) was
formed in 2020 as an Organization for Human Brain Mapping
(OHBM)-endorsed best practices committee to provide
recommendations on points of consensus, identify open
questions, and highlight areas of ongoing debate in the
service of moving the field toward standardized reporting of
network neuroscience results. The committee conducted a
survey to catalog current practices in large-scale brain
network nomenclature. A few well-known network names (e.g.,
default mode network) dominated responses to the survey, and
a number of illuminating points of disagreement emerged. We
summarize survey results and provide initial considerations
and recommendations from the workgroup. This perspective
piece includes a selective review of challenges to this
enterprise, including (1) network scale, resolution, and
hierarchies; (2) interindividual variability of networks;
(3) dynamics and nonstationarity of networks; (4)
consideration of network affiliations of subcortical
structures; and (5) consideration of multimodal information.
We close with minimal reporting guidelines for the cognitive
and network neuroscience communities to adopt.},
Doi = {10.1162/netn_a_00323},
Key = {fds372917}
}
@article{fds368517,
Author = {Krasich, K and Simmons, C and O'Neill, K and Giattino, CM and De
Brigard, F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and Mudrik, L and Woldorff,
MG},
Title = {Prestimulus oscillatory brain activity interacts with evoked
recurrent processing to facilitate conscious visual
perception.},
Journal = {Sci Rep},
Volume = {12},
Number = {1},
Pages = {22126},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-25720-2},
Abstract = {We investigated whether prestimulus alpha-band oscillatory
activity and stimulus-elicited recurrent processing interact
to facilitate conscious visual perception. Participants
tried to perceive a visual stimulus that was perceptually
masked through object substitution masking (OSM). We showed
that attenuated prestimulus alpha power was associated with
greater negative-polarity stimulus-evoked ERP activity that
resembled the visual awareness negativity (VAN), previously
argued to reflect recurrent processing related to conscious
perception. This effect, however, was not associated with
better perception. Instead, when prestimulus alpha power was
elevated, a preferred prestimulus alpha phase was associated
with a greater VAN-like negativity, which was then
associated with better cue perception. Cue perception was
worse when prestimulus alpha power was elevated but the
stimulus occurred at a nonoptimal prestimulus alpha phase
and the VAN-like negativity was low. Our findings suggest
that prestimulus alpha activity at a specific phase enables
temporally selective recurrent processing that facilitates
conscious perception in OSM.},
Doi = {10.1038/s41598-022-25720-2},
Key = {fds368517}
}
@article{fds363449,
Author = {Setton, R and Mwilambwe-Tshilobo, L and Girn, M and Lockrow, AW and Baracchini, G and Hughes, C and Lowe, AJ and Cassidy, BN and Li, J and Luh,
W-M and Bzdok, D and Leahy, RM and Ge, T and Margulies, DS and Misic, B and Bernhardt, BC and Stevens, WD and De Brigard and F and Kundu, P and Turner,
GR and Spreng, RN},
Title = {Age differences in the functional architecture of the human
brain.},
Journal = {Cerebral cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991)},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1},
Pages = {114-134},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhac056},
Abstract = {The intrinsic functional organization of the brain changes
into older adulthood. Age differences are observed at
multiple spatial scales, from global reductions in
modularity and segregation of distributed brain systems, to
network-specific patterns of dedifferentiation. Whether
dedifferentiation reflects an inevitable, global shift in
brain function with age, circumscribed, experience-dependent
changes, or both, is uncertain. We employed a multimethod
strategy to interrogate dedifferentiation at multiple
spatial scales. Multi-echo (ME) resting-state fMRI was
collected in younger (n = 181) and older (n = 120)
healthy adults. Cortical parcellation sensitive to
individual variation was implemented for precision
functional mapping of each participant while preserving
group-level parcel and network labels. ME-fMRI processing
and gradient mapping identified global and macroscale
network differences. Multivariate functional connectivity
methods tested for microscale, edge-level differences. Older
adults had lower BOLD signal dimensionality, consistent with
global network dedifferentiation. Gradients were largely
age-invariant. Edge-level analyses revealed discrete,
network-specific dedifferentiation patterns in older adults.
Visual and somatosensory regions were more integrated within
the functional connectome; default and frontoparietal
control network regions showed greater connectivity; and the
dorsal attention network was more integrated with
heteromodal regions. These findings highlight the importance
of multiscale, multimethod approaches to characterize the
architecture of functional brain aging.},
Doi = {10.1093/cercor/bhac056},
Key = {fds363449}
}
@article{fds367649,
Author = {Khoudary, A and O'Neill, K and Faul, L and Murray, S and Smallman, R and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Neural differences between internal and external episodic
counterfactual thoughts.},
Journal = {Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London.
Series B, Biological sciences},
Volume = {377},
Number = {1866},
Pages = {20210337},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0337},
Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thoughts (eCFT) consist of imagining
alternative outcomes to past experiences. A common sub-class
of eCFT-<i>upward</i> eCFT-involves imagining how past
negative experiences could have been <i>better</i>, either
because one could have done something differently (internal)
or because something about the circumstances could have been
different (external). Although previous neuroimaging
research has shown that the brain's default mode network
(DMN) supports upward eCFT, it is unclear how it is
differentially recruited during internal versus external
upward eCFT. We collected functional magnetic resonance
imaging data while participants remembered negative
autobiographical memories, generated either internal or
external upward eCFT for the memory, and then rated the
plausibility, perceived control and difficulty of eCFT
generation. Both internal and external eCFT engaged midline
regions of cingulate cortex, a central node of the DMN. Most
activity differentiating eCFT, however, occurred outside the
DMN. External eCFT engaged cuneus, angular gyrus and
precuneus, whereas internal eCFT engaged posterior cingulate
and precentral gyrus. Angular gyrus and precuneus were
additionally sensitive to perceived plausibility of external
eCFT, while postcentral gyrus and insula activity scaled
with perceived plausibility of internal eCFT. These results
highlight the key brain regions that might be involved in
cases of maladaptive mental simulations. This article is
part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities:
mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.},
Doi = {10.1098/rstb.2021.0337},
Key = {fds367649}
}
@article{fds368059,
Author = {Khoudary, A and Hanna, E and O'Neill, K and Iyengar, V and Clifford, S and Cabeza, R and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {A functional neuroimaging investigation of Moral Foundations
Theory.},
Journal = {Social neuroscience},
Volume = {17},
Number = {6},
Pages = {491-507},
Year = {2022},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2022.2148737},
Abstract = {Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that the human mind
contains modules (or "foundations") that are functionally
specialized to moralize unique dimensions of the social
world: Authority, Loyalty, Purity, Harm, Fairness, and
Liberty. Despite this strong claim about cognitive
architecture, it is unclear whether neural activity during
moral reasoning exhibits this modular structure. Here, we
use spatiotemporal partial least squares correlation (PLSC)
analyses of fMRI data collected during judgments of
foundation-specific violations to investigate whether MFT's
cognitive modularity claim extends to the neural level. A
mean-centered PLSC analysis returned two latent variables
that differentiated between social norm and moral foundation
violations, functionally segregated Purity, Loyalty,
Physical Harm, and Fairness from the other foundations, and
suggested that Authority has a different neural basis than
other binding foundations. Non-rotated PLSC analyses
confirmed that neural activity distinguished social norm
from moral foundation violations, and distinguished
individualizing and binding moral foundations if Authority
is dropped from the binding foundations. Purity violations
were persistently associated with amygdala activity, whereas
moral foundation violations more broadly tended to engage
the default network. Our results constitute partial evidence
for neural modularity and motivate further research on the
novel groupings identified by the PLSC analyses.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470919.2022.2148737},
Key = {fds368059}
}
@article{fds363780,
Author = {Faul, L and De Brigard and F},
Title = {The moderating effects of nostalgia on mood and optimism
during the COVID-19 pandemic.},
Journal = {Memory (Hove, England)},
Volume = {30},
Number = {9},
Pages = {1103-1117},
Year = {2022},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2022.2082481},
Abstract = {The initial waves of the coronavirus pandemic amplified
feelings of depression, psychological fatigue and pessimism
for the future. Past research suggests that nostalgia helps
to repair negative moods by boosting current and
future-oriented positive affect, thereby strengthening
psychological resilience. Accordingly, the present study
investigated whether nostalgia moderated the relationship
between pandemic experience and individual differences in
mood and optimism. Across two studies we assessed
psychosocial self-report data from a total of 293 online
participants (22-72 years old; mean age 38; 109 females, 184
males) during the first two waves of the pandemic.
Participants completed comprehensive questionnaires that
probed state and trait characteristics related to mood and
memory, such as the Profile of Mood States, Nostalgia
Inventory and State Optimism Measure. Our findings indicate
that during the initial wave of coronavirus cases, higher
levels of nostalgia buffered against deteriorating mood
states associated with concern over the pandemic. Nostalgia
also boosted optimism for participants experiencing negative
mood, and optimism predicted subjective mood improvement one
week later. This shielding effect of nostalgia on optimism
was replicated during the second wave of coronavirus cases.
The present findings support the role of nostalgia in
promoting emotional homeostasis and resilience during
periods of psychological distress.},
Doi = {10.1080/09658211.2022.2082481},
Key = {fds363780}
}
@article{fds362040,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Henne, P and Bello, P and Pearson, J and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Confidence and gradation in causal judgment.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {223},
Pages = {105036},
Year = {2022},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105036},
Abstract = {When comparing the roles of the lightning strike and the dry
climate in causing the forest fire, one might think that the
lightning strike is more of a cause than the dry climate, or
one might think that the lightning strike completely caused
the fire while the dry conditions did not cause it at all.
Psychologists and philosophers have long debated whether
such causal judgments are graded; that is, whether people
treat some causes as stronger than others. To address this
debate, we first reanalyzed data from four recent studies.
We found that causal judgments were actually multimodal:
although most causal judgments made on a continuous scale
were categorical, there was also some gradation. We then
tested two competing explanations for this gradation: the
confidence explanation, which states that people make graded
causal judgments because they have varying degrees of belief
in causal relations, and the strength explanation, which
states that people make graded causal judgments because they
believe that causation itself is graded. Experiment 1 tested
the confidence explanation and showed that gradation in
causal judgments was indeed moderated by confidence: people
tended to make graded causal judgments when they were
unconfident, but they tended to make more categorical causal
judgments when they were confident. Experiment 2 tested the
causal strength explanation and showed that although
confidence still explained variation in causal judgments, it
did not explain away the effects of normality, causal
structure, or the number of candidate causes. Overall, we
found that causal judgments were multimodal and that people
make graded judgments both when they think a cause is weak
and when they are uncertain about its causal
role.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105036},
Key = {fds362040}
}
@article{fds358346,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Liu, A and Yin, S and Brady, T and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Effects of category learning strategies on recognition
memory.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {50},
Number = {3},
Pages = {512-526},
Year = {2022},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-021-01207-9},
Abstract = {Extant research has shown that previously acquired
categorical knowledge affects recognition memory, and that
differences in category learning strategies impact
classification accuracy. However, it is unknown whether
different learning strategies also have downstream effects
on subsequent recognition memory. The present study
investigates the effect of two unidimensional rule-based
category learning strategies - learning (a) with or without
explicit instruction, and (b) with or without supervision -
on subsequent recognition memory. Our findings suggest that
acquiring categorical knowledge increased both hits
(Experiments 1 and 2) and false-alarms (Experiment 1) for
category-congruent items regardless of the particular
strategy employed in initially learning these categories.
There were, however, small processing speed advantages
during recognition memory for both explicit instruction and
supervised practice relative to neither (Experiment 2). We
discuss these findings in the context of how prior knowledge
influences recognition memory, and in relation to similar
findings showing schematic effects on episodic
memory.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-021-01207-9},
Key = {fds358346}
}
@article{fds362477,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Umanath, S and Irish, M},
Title = {Rethinking the distinction between episodic and semantic
memory: Insights from the past, present, and
future.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {50},
Number = {3},
Pages = {459-463},
Year = {2022},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-022-01299-x},
Abstract = {On the 50th anniversary of Tulving's introduction of the
celebrated distinction between episodic and semantic memory,
it seems more than fitting to revisit his proposal in light
of recent conceptual and methodological advances in the
field. This Special Issue of Memory & Cognition brings
together researchers doing cutting-edge work at the
intersection between episodic and semantic memory to
showcase studies directly probing this psychological
distinction, as well as articles that seek to provide
conceptual and theoretical accounts to understand their
interaction. The 14 articles presented here highlight the
need to critically examine the way in which we conceptualize
not only the relationship between episodic and semantic
memory, but also the interplay between declarative and
non-declarative memory, and the myriad implications of such
conceptual changes. In many ways, we suggest this Special
Issue might serve as a call to action for our field,
inspiring future work to challenge pre-existing conceptions
and stimulate new directions in this fast-moving
field.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-022-01299-x},
Key = {fds362477}
}
@article{fds372918,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = { Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory
Edited by Fiona Macpherson and Fabian
Dorsch},
Journal = {Analysis},
Volume = {81},
Number = {4},
Pages = {827-831},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2022},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab001},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anab001},
Key = {fds372918}
}
@article{fds358756,
Author = {Lipkus, IM and Mays, D and Sheeran, P and Pan, W and Cameron, LD and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Effects of mental simulation of future waterpipe tobacco
smoking on attitudes, perceived harms and intended use among
young adults.},
Journal = {Journal of behavioral medicine},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {76-89},
Year = {2022},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10865-021-00245-7},
Abstract = {The desire to engage in waterpipe tobacco smoking (WTS) may
occur when smokers and nonsmokers conjure positive mental
simulations of WTS. However, effects of these simulations on
desire to smoke waterpipe tobacco and potential mediators
are unexplored. This research addressed these effects among
young adult waterpipe tobacco smokers and nonsmokers. Two
online studies were conducted with adults ages 18-30. In
Study 1, 200 smokers, 190 susceptible nonsmokers, and 182
nonsusceptible nonsmokers were randomized to mentally
simulate or not WTS in the future. In Study 2, 234 smokers
and 241 susceptible nonsmokers were randomized to four arms:
no simulation or simulations that varied valence of
experience (positive, negative or no valence provided). Main
outcomes were immediate desire to smoke waterpipe tobacco,
cognitive and affective attitudes, and perceived harms. In
Study 1, mental simulations increased the desire to smoke
waterpipe tobacco among smokers. In Study 2, asking
participants to simulate WTS positively or with no valence
instruction increased desire to smoke relative to negative
valence instruction or no simulation. Negative simulations
reduced perceived probability of smoking within a month
compared to positive simulations. Effects on desire to
engage in WTS were mediated by cognitive and affective
attitudes among susceptible nonsmokers and by cognitive
attitudes among smokers. These findings suggest that
exploring when and how often mental simulations about WTS
are evoked and their potency for promoting prevention and
cessation of WTS merit further attention.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10865-021-00245-7},
Key = {fds358756}
}
@article{fds367259,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Robins, S},
Title = {Memory},
Pages = {325-343},
Booktitle = {Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical
Introduction},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138392342},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003241898-24},
Abstract = {The idea that there are different kinds of memory is old.
Aristotle, for instance, famously distinguished between
memory and reminiscence, the former roughly corresponding to
the retention of temporally based information from past
events, and the latter to the act of retrieving previously
stored information. Cognitive psychologists and
neuroscientists also agree that remembering is a diachronic
process, but they tend to think that it involves three
stages: encoding, storage, and retrieval. Declarative or
explicit memory is often divided into two subclasses as
well, thanks to Tulving's influential distinction between
episodic memory and semantic memory. The shifting of
memories from one system to another is thought to aid in
overall memory storage by preventing the hippocampus from
becoming too overloaded with memories. The precise timescale
for systems consolidation is a matter of some debate; it is
thought to occur anywhere from a few weeks or months to
possibly even years or decades after the initial
encoding.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781003241898-24},
Key = {fds367259}
}
@article{fds369061,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Henne, P and Pearson, J and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Measuring and Modeling Confidence in Human Causal
Judgment},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 44th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Cognitive Diversity, CogSci
2022},
Pages = {446-452},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {The human capacity for causal judgment has long been thought
to depend on an ability to consider counterfactual
alternatives: the lightning strike caused the forest fire
because had it not struck, the forest fire would not have
ensued. To accommodate psychological effects on causal
judgment, a range of recent accounts of causal judgment have
proposed that people probabilistically sample counterfactual
alternatives from which they compute a graded index of
causal strength. While such models have had success in
describing the influence of probability on causal judgments,
among other effects, we show that these models make further
untested predictions: probability should also influence
people's metacognitive confidence in their causal judgments.
In a large (N=3020) sample of participants in a causal
judgment task, we found evidence that normality indeed
influences people's confidence in their causal judgments and
that these influences were predicted by a counterfactual
sampling model. We take this result as supporting evidence
for existing Bayesian accounts of causal
judgment.},
Key = {fds369061}
}
@article{fds369062,
Author = {Krasich, K and O'Neill, K and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Eye-tracking mental simulation during retrospective causal
reasoning},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 44th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Cognitive Diversity, CogSci
2022},
Pages = {1004-1010},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {There are conflicting theories about how people reason
through cause and effect. A key distinction between two
prominent accounts pertains to whether, in judging an
event's causal relevance, people preferentially consider
what actually happened (as predicted by process theories) or
whether they also consider what could have happened under
different conditions (as predicted by counterfactual
theories). Toward adjudicating between these theories, the
current work used eye tracking and Gaussian Process modeling
to investigate how people form causal judgments
retrospectively and in the absence of ongoing visual input.
Participants played a virtual ball-shooting game: after
choosing to move left or right, they encoded a video of the
actual outcome and then were prompted to mentally simulate
either (a) what actually happened, (b) what could have
happened, or (c) what caused the outcome to happen while
looking at a blank screen. During causal judgment, we found
evidence that participants visually mentally simulated
counterfactual possibilities: they moved their eyes in
similar patterns as when they imagined a counterfactual
alternative. Altogether, these results favor counterfactual
theories of causal reasoning, demonstrate how visual mental
simulation can support this reasoning, and provide a novel
methodological approach for using eye movements to
investigate causal reasoning and counterfactual thinking
more broadly.},
Key = {fds369062}
}
@article{fds376732,
Author = {Stanley, ML and De Brigard and FD},
Title = {The Importance of Morality for One’s Self-Concept Predicts
Perceptions of Personal Change after Remembering
Wrongdoings},
Pages = {143-156},
Booktitle = {Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the
Self},
Year = {2022},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781350246898},
Key = {fds376732}
}
@article{fds363370,
Author = {Ayala, OD and Banta, D and Hovhannisyan, M and Duarte, L and Lozano, A and García, JR and Montañés, P and Davis, SW and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Episodic Past, Future, and counterfactual thinking in
Relapsing-Remitting Multiple sclerosis.},
Journal = {Neuroimage Clin},
Volume = {34},
Pages = {103033},
Year = {2022},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nicl.2022.103033},
Abstract = {Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a progressive disease
characterized by widespread white matter lesions in the
brain and spinal cord. In addition to well-characterized
motor deficits, MS results in cognitive impairments in
several domains, notably in episodic autobiographical
memory. Recent studies have also revealed that patients with
MS exhibit deficits in episodic future thinking, i.e., our
capacity to imagine possible events that may occur in our
personal future. Both episodic memory and episodic future
thinking have been shown to share cognitive and neural
mechanisms with a related kind of hypothetical simulation
known as episodic counterfactual thinking: our capacity to
imagine alternative ways in which past personal events could
have occurred but did not. However, the extent to which
episodic counterfactual thinking is affected in MS is still
unknown. The current study sought to explore this issue by
comparing performance in mental simulation tasks involving
either past, future or counterfactual thoughts in
relapsing-remitting MS. Diffusion weighted imaging (DWI)
measures were also extracted to determine whether changes in
structural pathways connecting the brain's default mode
network (DMN) would be associated with group differences in
task performance. Relative to controls, patients showed
marked reductions in the number of internal details across
all mental simulations, but no differences in the number of
external and semantic-based details. It was also found that,
relative to controls, patients with relapsing-remitting MS
reported reduced composition ratings for episodic
simulations depicting counterfactual events, but not so for
actual past or possible future episodes. Additionally, three
DWI measures of white matter integrity-fractional
anisotropy, radial diffusivity and streamline counts-showed
reliable differences between patients with
relapsing-remitting MS and matched healthy controls.
Importantly, DWI measures associated with reduced white
matter integrity in three association tracts on the DMN-the
right superior longitudinal fasciculus, the left hippocampal
portion of the cingulum and the left inferior longitudinal
fasciculus-predicted reductions in the number of internal
details during episodic counterfactual simulations. Taken
together, these results help to illuminate impairments in
episodic simulation in relapsing-remitting MS and show, for
the first time, a differential association between white
matter integrity and deficits in episodic counterfactual
thinking in individuals with relapsing-remitting
MS.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.nicl.2022.103033},
Key = {fds363370}
}
@article{fds372919,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Neuroscience and Philosophy Introduction},
Pages = {1-13},
Booktitle = {NEUROSCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY},
Year = {2022},
ISBN = {978-0-262-04543-8},
Key = {fds372919}
}
@article{fds359026,
Author = {Gessell, B and Geib, B and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Multivariate pattern analysis and the search for neural
representations},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {199},
Number = {5-6},
Pages = {12869-12889},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03358-3},
Abstract = {Multivariate pattern analysis, or MVPA, has become one of
the most popular analytic methods in cognitive neuroscience.
Since its inception, MVPA has been heralded as offering much
more than regular univariate analyses, for—we are
told—it not only can tell us which brain regions are
engaged while processing particular stimuli, but also which
patterns of neural activity represent the categories the
stimuli are selected from. We disagree, and in the current
paper we offer four conceptual challenges to the use of MVPA
to make claims about neural representation. Our view is that
the use of MVPA to make claims about neural representation
is problematic.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-021-03358-3},
Key = {fds359026}
}
@article{fds361803,
Author = {Huang, S and Faul, L and Sevinc, G and Mwilambwe-Tshilobo, L and Setton,
R and Lockrow, AW and Ebner, NC and Turner, GR and Spreng, RN and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Age differences in intuitive moral decision-making:
Associations with inter-network neural connectivity.},
Journal = {Psychology and aging},
Volume = {36},
Number = {8},
Pages = {902-916},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pag0000633},
Abstract = {Positions of power involving moral decision-making are often
held by older adults (OAs). However, little is known about
age differences in moral decision-making and the intrinsic
organization of the aging brain. In this study, younger
adults (YAs; <i>n</i> = 117, <i>M</i><sub>age</sub> = 22.11)
and OAs (<i>n</i> = 82, <i>M</i><sub>age</sub> = 67.54) made
decisions in hypothetical moral dilemmas and completed
resting-state multi-echo functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) scans. Relative to YAs, OAs were more likely
to endorse deontological decisions (i.e., decisions based on
adherence to a moral principle or duty), but only when the
choice was immediately compelling or <i>intuitive</i>. By
contrast, there was no difference between YAs and OAs in
utilitarian decisions (i.e., decisions aimed at maximizing
collective well-being) when the utilitarian choice was
intuitive. Enhanced connections between the posterior medial
core of the default network (pmDN) and the dorsal attention
network, and overall reduced segregation of pmDN from the
rest of the brain, were associated with this increased
deontological-intuitive moral decision-making style in OAs.
The present study contributes to our understanding of age
differences in decision-making styles by taking into account
the intuitiveness of the moral choice, and it offers further
insights as to how age differences in intrinsic brain
connectivity relate to these distinct moral decision-making
styles in YAs and OAs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021
APA, all rights reserved).},
Doi = {10.1037/pag0000633},
Key = {fds361803}
}
@article{fds356451,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Niemi, L and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Making moral principles suit yourself.},
Journal = {Psychonomic bulletin & review},
Volume = {28},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1735-1741},
Year = {2021},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-021-01935-8},
Abstract = {Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer
general moral principles for people to follow. These moral
principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid,
offering reliable guides for moral judgment and
decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found
consistent evidence that agreement with general moral
principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed
in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of
moral principles, participants agreed less strongly with
those very principles-relative to participants who recalled
events in which other people violated the principles. This
shift in agreement was explained, in part, by people's
willingness to excuse their own moral transgressions, but
not the transgressions of others. These results have
important implications for understanding the roles memory
and personal identity in moral judgment. People's commitment
to moral principles may be maintained when they recall
others' past violations, but their commitment may wane when
they recall their own violations.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13423-021-01935-8},
Key = {fds356451}
}
@article{fds357557,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Cabeza, R and Smallman, R and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Memory and Counterfactual Simulations for Past Wrongdoings
Foster Moral Learning and Improvement.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {45},
Number = {6},
Pages = {e13007},
Year = {2021},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13007},
Abstract = {In four studies, we investigated the role of remembering,
reflecting on, and mutating personal past moral
transgressions to learn from those moral mistakes and to
form intentions for moral improvement. Participants reported
having ruminated on their past wrongdoings, particularly
their more severe transgressions, and they reported having
frequently thought about morally better ways in which they
could have acted instead (i.e., morally upward
counterfactuals; Studies 1-3). The more that participants
reported having mentally simulated morally better ways in
which they could have acted, the stronger their intentions
were to improve in the future (Studies 2 and 3).
Implementing an experimental manipulation, we then found
that making accessible a morally upward counterfactual after
committing a moral transgression strengthened reported
intentions for moral improvement-relative to resimulating
the remembered event and considering morally worse ways in
which they could have acted instead (Study 4). We discuss
the implications of these results for competing theoretical
views on the relationship between memory and morality and
for functional theories of counterfactual
thinking.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.13007},
Key = {fds357557}
}
@article{fds355019,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Henne, P and Stanley, ML},
Title = {Perceived similarity of imagined possible worlds affects
judgments of counterfactual plausibility.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {209},
Pages = {104574},
Year = {2021},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104574},
Abstract = {People frequently entertain counterfactual thoughts, or
mental simulations about alternative ways the world could
have been. But the perceived plausibility of those
counterfactual thoughts varies widely. The current article
interfaces research in the philosophy and semantics of
counterfactual statements with the psychology of mental
simulations, and it explores the role of perceived
similarity in judgments of counterfactual plausibility. We
report results from seven studies (N = 6405) jointly
supporting three interconnected claims. First, the perceived
plausibility of a counterfactual event is predicted by the
perceived similarity between the possible world in which the
imagined situation is thought to occur and the actual world.
Second, when people attend to differences between imagined
possible worlds and the actual world, they think of the
imagined possible worlds as less similar to the actual world
and tend to judge counterfactuals in such worlds as less
plausible. Lastly, when people attend to what is identical
between imagined possible worlds and the actual world, they
think of the imagined possible worlds as more similar to the
actual world and tend to judge counterfactuals in such
worlds as more plausible. We discuss these results in light
of philosophical, semantic, and psychological theories of
counterfactual thinking.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104574},
Key = {fds355019}
}
@article{fds372920,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Henne, P and Bello, P and Pearson, J and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Confidence and Gradation in Causal Judgment},
Year = {2021},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/m5w9c},
Abstract = {<p>When comparing the roles of the lightning strike and the
dry climate in causing the forest fire, one might think that
the lightning strike is more of a cause than the dry
climate, or one might think that the lightning strike
completely caused the fire while the dry conditions did not
cause it at all. Psychologists and philosophers have long
debated whether such causal judgments are graded; that is,
whether people treat some causes as stronger than others. To
address this debate, we first reanalyzed data from four
recent studies. We found that causal judgments were actually
multimodal: although most causal judgments made on a
continuous scale were categorical, there was also some
gradation. We then tested two competing explanations for
this gradation: the confidence explanation, which states
that people make graded causal judgments because they have
varying degrees of belief in causal relations, and the
strength explanation, which states that people make graded
causal judgments because they believe that causation itself
is graded. Experiment 1 tested the confidence explanation
and showed that gradation in causal judgments was indeed
moderated by confidence: people tended to make graded causal
judgments when they were unconfident, but they tended to
make more categorical causal judgments when they were
confident. Experiment 2 tested the causal strength
explanation and showed that although confidence still
explained variation in causal judgments, it did not explain
away the effects of normality, causal structure, or the
number of candidate causes. Overall, we found that causal
judgments were multimodal and that people make graded
judgments both when they think a cause is weak and when they
are uncertain about its causal role.</p>},
Doi = {10.31219/osf.io/m5w9c},
Key = {fds372920}
}
@article{fds355198,
Author = {Henne, P and O'Neill, K and Bello, P and Khemlani, S and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Norms Affect Prospective Causal Judgments.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {e12931},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12931},
Abstract = {People more frequently select norm-violating factors,
relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of some
outcome. Until recently, this abnormal-selection effect has
been studied using retrospective vignette-based paradigms.
We use a novel set of video stimuli to investigate this
effect for prospective causal judgments-that is, judgments
about the cause of some future outcome. Four experiments
show that people more frequently select norm-violating
factors, relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of
some future outcome. We show that the abnormal-selection
effects are not primarily explained by the perception of
agency (Experiment 4). We discuss these results in relation
to recent efforts to model causal judgment.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12931},
Key = {fds355198}
}
@article{fds356452,
Author = {Gessell, B and Stanley, M and Geib, B and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Prediction and Topological Models in Neuroscience},
Volume = {17},
Pages = {35-55},
Booktitle = {Studies in Brain and Mind},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_3},
Abstract = {In the last two decades, philosophy of neuroscience has
predominantly focused on explanation. Indeed, it has been
argued that mechanistic models are the standards of
explanatory success in neuroscience over, among other
things, topological models. However, explanatory power is
only one virtue of a scientific model. Another is its
predictive power. Unfortunately, the notion of prediction
has received comparatively little attention in the
philosophy of neuroscience, in part because predictions seem
disconnected from interventions. In contrast, we argue that
topological predictions can and do guide interventions in
science, both inside and outside of neuroscience.
Topological models allow researchers to predict many
phenomena, including diseases, treatment outcomes, aging,
and cognition, among others. Moreover, we argue that these
predictions also offer strategies for useful interventions.
Topology-based predictions play this role regardless of
whether they do or can receive a mechanistic interpretation.
We conclude by making a case for philosophers to focus on
prediction in neuroscience in addition to explanation
alone.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_3},
Key = {fds356452}
}
@article{fds361804,
Author = {Parikh, N and De Brigard and F and LaBar, KS},
Title = {The Efficacy of Downward Counterfactual Thinking for
Regulating Emotional Memories in Anxious
Individuals.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {12},
Pages = {712066},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.712066},
Abstract = {Aversive autobiographical memories sometimes prompt
maladaptive emotional responses and contribute to affective
dysfunction in anxiety and depression. One way to regulate
the impact of such memories is to create a downward
counterfactual thought-a mental simulation of how the event
could have been worse-to put what occurred in a more
positive light. Despite its intuitive appeal, counterfactual
thinking has not been systematically studied for its
regulatory efficacy. In the current study, we compared the
regulatory impact of downward counterfactual thinking,
temporal distancing, and memory rehearsal in 54 adult
participants representing a spectrum of trait anxiety.
Participants recalled regretful experiences and rated them
on valence, arousal, regret, and episodic detail. Two to six
days later, they created a downward counterfactual of the
remembered event, thought of how they might feel about it 10
years from now, or simply rehearsed it. A day later,
participants re-rated the phenomenological characteristics
of the events. Across all participants, downward
counterfactual thinking, temporal distancing, and memory
rehearsal were equally effective at reducing negative affect
associated with a memory. However, in individuals with
higher trait anxiety, downward counterfactual thinking was
more effective than rehearsal for reducing regret, and it
was as effective as distancing in reducing arousal. We
discuss these results in light of the functional theory of
counterfactual thinking and suggest that they motivate
further investigation into downward counterfactual thinking
as a means to intentionally regulate emotional memories in
affective disorders.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2021.712066},
Key = {fds361804}
}
@article{fds361924,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Stanley, ML},
Title = {Moral Memories and Identity Protection},
Journal = {Psychological Inquiry},
Volume = {32},
Number = {4},
Pages = {240-246},
Year = {2021},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2021.2004817},
Doi = {10.1080/1047840X.2021.2004817},
Key = {fds361924}
}
@article{fds372921,
Author = {O'Neill, K and Henne, P and Pearson, J and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Modeling Confidence in Causal Judgments},
Year = {2021},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/cgvwf},
Abstract = {<p>The human capacity for causal judgment has long been
thought to depend on an ability to consider counterfactual
alternatives: the lightning strike caused the forest fire
because had it not struck, the forest fire would not have
ensued. To accommodate psychological effects on causal
judgment, a range of recent accounts of causal judgment have
proposed that people probabilistically sample counterfactual
alternatives from which they compute a graded index of
causal strength. While such models have had success in
describing the influence of probability on causal judgments,
among other effects, we show that these models make further
untested predictions: probability should also influence
people's metacognitive confidence in their causal judgments.
In a large (N=3020) sample of participants in a causal
judgment task, we found evidence that normality indeed
influences people's confidence in their causal judgments and
that these influences were predicted by a counterfactual
sampling model. We take this result as supporting evidence
for existing Bayesian accounts of causal
judgment.</p>},
Doi = {10.31234/osf.io/cgvwf},
Key = {fds372921}
}
@article{fds351193,
Author = {Parikh, N and LaBar, KS and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Phenomenology of counterfactual thinking is dampened in
anxious individuals.},
Journal = {Cognition & emotion},
Volume = {34},
Number = {8},
Pages = {1737-1745},
Year = {2020},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2020.1802230},
Abstract = {Counterfactual thinking (CFT), or simulating alternative
versions of occurred events, is a common psychological
strategy people use to process events in their lives.
However, CFT is also a core component of ruminative thinking
that contributes to psychopathology. Though prior studies
have tried to distinguish adaptive from maladaptive CFT, our
study provides a novel demonstration that identifies
phenomenological differences across CFT in participants with
varying levels of trait anxiety. Participants
(<i>N </i>= 96) identified negative, regretful memories
from the past 5 years and created a better counterfactual
alternative (upward CFT), a worse counterfactual alternative
(downward CFT), or simply recalled each memory. Participants
with high levels of trait anxiety used more negative
language when describing their mental simulations, reported
lower ratings of composition during upward CFT, and reported
more difficulty in imagining the emotion they would have
felt had negative events turned out to be better.
Additionally, participants with high anxiety thought that
upward CFT was less likely to occur relative to individuals
with low anxiety. These results help to clarify how mental
simulations of aversive life events are altered in anxiety
and serve as a stepping stone to future research uncovering
the mechanisms of ruminative thought patterns.},
Doi = {10.1080/02699931.2020.1802230},
Key = {fds351193}
}
@article{fds341028,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Yang, BW and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and
Polarization},
Journal = {Political Behavior},
Volume = {42},
Number = {3},
Pages = {891-913},
Year = {2020},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09526-z},
Abstract = {People seem more divided than ever before over social and
political issues, entrenched in their existing beliefs and
unwilling to change them. Empirical research on mechanisms
driving this resistance to belief change has focused on a
limited set of well-known, charged, contentious issues and
has not accounted for deliberation over reasons and
arguments in belief formation prior to experimental
sessions. With a large, heterogeneous sample (N = 3001),
we attempt to overcome these existing problems, and we
investigate the causes and consequences of resistance to
belief change for five diverse and less contentious
socio-political issues. After participants chose initially
to support or oppose a given socio-political position, they
were provided with reasons favoring their chosen position
(affirming reasons), reasons favoring the other, unchosen
position (conflicting reasons), or all reasons for both
positions (reasons for both sides). Our results indicate
that participants are more likely to stick with their
initial decisions than to change them no matter which
reasons are considered, and that this resistance to belief
change is likely due to a motivated, biased evaluation of
the reasons to support their initial beliefs (prior-belief
bias). More specifically, they rated affirming reasons more
favorably than conflicting reasons—even after accounting
for reported prior knowledge about the issue, the novelty of
the reasons presented, and the reported strategy used to
make the initial decision. In many cases, participants who
did not change their positions tended to become more
confident in the superiority of their positions after
considering many reasons for both sides.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11109-019-09526-z},
Key = {fds341028}
}
@article{fds349388,
Author = {Faul, L and St Jacques and PL and DeRosa, JT and Parikh, N and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Differential contribution of anterior and posterior midline
regions during mental simulation of counterfactual and
perspective shifts in autobiographical memories.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {215},
Pages = {116843},
Year = {2020},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2020.116843},
Abstract = {Retrieving autobiographical memories induces a natural
tendency to mentally simulate alternate versions of past
events, either by reconstructing the perceptual details of
the originally experienced perspective or the conceptual
information of what actually occurred. Here we examined
whether the episodic system recruited during imaginative
experiences functionally dissociates depending on the nature
of this reconstruction. Using fMRI, we evaluated
differential patterns of neural activity and hippocampal
connectivity when twenty-nine participants naturally
recalled past negative events, shifted visual perspective,
or imagined better or worse outcomes than what actually
occurred. We found that counterfactual thoughts were
distinguished by neural recruitment in dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, whereas shifts in visual perspective were
uniquely supported by the precuneus. Additionally,
connectivity with the anterior hippocampus changed depending
upon the mental simulation that was performed - with
enhanced hippocampal connectivity with medial prefrontal
cortex for counterfactual simulations and precuneus for
shifted visual perspectives. Together, our findings provide
a novel assessment of differences between these common
methods of mental simulation and a more detailed account for
the neural network underlying episodic retrieval and
reconstruction.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2020.116843},
Key = {fds349388}
}
@article{fds342766,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Langella, S and Stanley, ML and Castel, AD and Giovanello, KS},
Title = {Age-related differences in recognition in associative
memory.},
Journal = {Neuropsychology, development, and cognition. Section B,
Aging, neuropsychology and cognition},
Volume = {27},
Number = {2},
Pages = {289-301},
Year = {2020},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13825585.2019.1607820},
Abstract = {Aging is often accompanied by associative memory changes,
although their precise nature remains unclear. This study
examines how recognition of item position in the context of
associative memory differs between younger and older adults.
Participants studied word pairs (A-B, C-D) and were later
tested with intact (A-B), reversed (D-C), recombined (A-D),
and recombined and reversed (B-C) pairs. When participants
were instructed to respond "Old" to both intact and reversed
pairs, and "New" to recombined, and recombined and reversed
pairs, older adults showed worse recognition for recombined
and reversed pairs relative to younger adults (Experiment
1). This finding also emerged when flexible retrieval
demands were increased by asking participants to respond
"Old" <i>only</i> to intact pairs (Experiment 2). These
results suggest that as conditions for flexible retrieval
become more demanding, older adults may show worse
recognition in associative memory tasks relative to younger
adults.},
Doi = {10.1080/13825585.2019.1607820},
Key = {fds342766}
}
@article{fds348484,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Bedrov, A and Cabeza, R and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {The centrality of remembered moral and immoral actions in
constructing personal identity.},
Journal = {Memory (Hove, England)},
Volume = {28},
Number = {2},
Pages = {278-284},
Year = {2020},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2019.1708952},
Abstract = {There is a widespread belief that morally good traits and
qualities are particularly central to psychological
constructions of personal identity. People have a strong
tendency to believe that they truly are morally good. We
suggest that autobiographical memories of past events
involving moral actions may inform how we come to believe
that we are morally good. In two studies, we investigated
the role of remembered past events involving moral and
immoral actions in constructing perceived personal identity.
For morally right actions only, we found that remembered
actions judged to be more morally right relative to less
morally right were more central to personal identity (Study
1). We then found that remembered morally right actions were
more central to personal identity than remembered morally
wrong actions (Study 2). We discuss these findings in
relation to recent research on morality and personal
identity.},
Doi = {10.1080/09658211.2019.1708952},
Key = {fds348484}
}
@article{fds366567,
Author = {Huang, S and Stanley, ML and De Brigard and F},
Title = {The phenomenology of remembering our moral
transgressions.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {48},
Number = {2},
Pages = {277-286},
Year = {2020},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-019-01009-0},
Abstract = {People tend to believe that they truly are morally good, and
yet they commit moral transgressions with surprising
frequency in their everyday lives. To explain this
phenomenon, some theorists have suggested that people
remember their moral transgressions with fewer details,
lower vivacity, and less clarity, relative to their morally
good deeds and other kinds of past events. These
phenomenological differences are thought to help alleviate
psychological discomfort and to help people maintain a
morally good self-concept. Given these motivations to
alleviate discomfort and to maintain a morally good
self-concept, we might expect our more egregious moral
transgressions, relative to our more minor transgressions,
to be remembered less frequently, with fewer details, with
lower vivacity, and with a reduced sense of reliving. More
severe moral transgressions might also be less central to
constructions of personal identity. In contrast to these
expectations, our results suggest that participants' more
severe moral transgressions are actually remembered more
frequently, more vividly, and with more detail. More severe
moral transgressions also tend to be more central to
personal identity. We discuss the implications of these
results for the motivation to maintain a morally good
self-concept and for the functions of autobiographical
memory.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-019-01009-0},
Key = {fds366567}
}
@article{fds349624,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Gessell, B and Yang, BW and Stewart, G and Marsh,
EJ},
Title = {Remembering possible times: Memory for details of past,
future, and counterfactual simulations.},
Journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory Research, and
Practice},
Volume = {7},
Number = {4},
Pages = {331-339},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000220},
Abstract = {People’s capacity to mentally simulate future events
(episodic future thinking) as well as what could have
occurred in the past but did not (episodic counterfactual
thinking) critically depends on their capacity to retrieve
episodic memories. All 3 mental simulations are likely
adaptive in that they involve rehearsing possible scenarios
with the goal of improving future performance. However, the
extent to which these mental simulations are useful at a
later time depends on how well they are later remembered.
Unfortunately, little is known about how such simulations
are remembered. In the current study, we explored this issue
by asking participants to retrieve episodic memories and
generate future and counterfactual simulations in response
to 4 cues: particular places, people, objects, and times. A
day later participants received 3 of the 4 cues and were
asked to recall the remaining 1. Our results indicate that
people and locations are equally well remembered, regardless
of the temporal orientation of the mental simulation. In
contrast, objects in future simulations are recalled less
frequently than are those in memories. Time was poorly
remembered across conditions but especially when remembering
a future or a counterfactual simulation. In light of these
results, we discuss how temporal information may be
incorporated into our hypothetical episodic simulations.
(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights
reserved)},
Doi = {10.1037/cns0000220},
Key = {fds349624}
}
@article{fds354585,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Do we need another kind of memory?},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {27},
Number = {11-12},
Pages = {134-144},
Year = {2020},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds354585}
}
@article{fds372922,
Author = {Henne, P and O'Neill, K and Bello, P and Khemlani, S and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Norms Affect Prospective Causal Judgments},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/2nwb4},
Abstract = {<p>People more frequently select norm-violating factors,
relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of some
outcome. Until recently, this abnormal-selection effect has
been studied using retrospective vignette-based paradigms.
We use a novel set of video stimuli to investigate this
effect for prospective causal judgments—i.e., judgments
about the cause of some future outcome. Four experiments
show that people more frequently select norm-violating
factors, relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of
some future outcome. We show that the abnormal-selection
effects are not primarily explained by the perception of
agency (Experiment 4). We discuss these results in relation
to recent efforts to model causal judgment.</p>},
Doi = {10.31219/osf.io/2nwb4},
Key = {fds372922}
}
@article{fds347639,
Author = {De Brigard and F and O'Neill, K},
Title = {Two challenges for a dual system approach to temporal
cognition.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {42},
Pages = {e247},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x19000645},
Abstract = {Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) propose a two-system account of
temporal cognition. We suggest that, following other classic
proposals where cognitive systems are putatively
independent, H&M's two-system hypothesis should, at a
minimum, involve (1) a difference in the nature of the
representations upon which each system operates, and (2) a
difference in the computations they carry out. In this
comment we offer two challenges aimed at showing that H&M's
proposal does not meet the minimal requirements (1) and
(2).},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x19000645},
Key = {fds347639}
}
@article{fds343341,
Author = {Henne, P and Niemi, L and Pinillos, Á and De Brigard and F and Knobe,
J},
Title = {A counterfactual explanation for the action effect in causal
judgment.},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {190},
Pages = {157-164},
Year = {2019},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006},
Abstract = {People's causal judgments are susceptible to the action
effect, whereby they judge actions to be more causal than
inactions. We offer a new explanation for this effect, the
counterfactual explanation: people judge actions to be more
causal than inactions because they are more inclined to
consider the counterfactual alternatives to actions than to
consider counterfactual alternatives to inactions.
Experiment 1a conceptually replicates the original action
effect for causal judgments. Experiment 1b confirms a novel
prediction of the new explanation, the reverse action
effect, in which people judge inactions to be more causal
than actions in overdetermination cases. Experiment 2
directly compares the two effects in joint-causation and
overdetermination scenarios and conceptually replicates them
with new scenarios. Taken together, these studies provide
support for the new counterfactual explanation for the
action effect in causal judgment.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006},
Key = {fds343341}
}
@article{fds343711,
Author = {Stanley, ML and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Moral Memories and the Belief in the Good
Self},
Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
Volume = {28},
Number = {4},
Pages = {387-391},
Year = {2019},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721419847990},
Abstract = {Most people believe they are morally good, and this belief
plays an integral role in constructions of personal
identity. Yet people commit moral transgressions with
surprising frequency in everyday life. In this article, we
characterize two mechanisms involving autobiographical
memory that are utilized to foster a belief in a morally
good self in the present—despite frequent and repeated
immoral behavior. First, there is a tendency for people to
willfully and actively forget details about their own moral
transgressions but not about their own morally praiseworthy
deeds. Second, when past moral transgressions are not
forgotten, people strategically compare their more recent
unethical behaviors with their more distant unethical
behaviors to foster a perception of personal moral
improvement over time. This, in turn, helps to portray the
current self favorably. These two complementary mechanisms
help to explain pervasive inconsistencies between people’s
personal beliefs about their own moral goodness and the
frequency with which they behave immorally.},
Doi = {10.1177/0963721419847990},
Key = {fds343711}
}
@article{fds335559,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Hanna, E and St Jacques and PL and Schacter,
DL},
Title = {How thinking about what could have been affects how we feel
about what was.},
Journal = {Cognition & emotion},
Volume = {33},
Number = {4},
Pages = {646-659},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2018.1478280},
Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thoughts (CFT) and autobiographical
memories (AM) involve the reactivation and recombination of
episodic memory components into mental simulations. Upon
reactivation, memories become labile and prone to
modification. Thus, reactivating AM in the context of
mentally generating CFT may provide an opportunity for
editing processes to modify the content of the original
memory. To examine this idea, this paper reports the results
of two studies that investigated the effect of reactivating
negative and positive AM in the context of either imagining
a better (i.e. upward CFT) or a worse (i.e. downward CFT)
alternative to an experienced event, as opposed to
attentively retrieving the memory without mental
modification (i.e. remembering) or no reactivation. Our
results suggest that attentive remembering was the best
strategy to both reduce the negative affect associated with
negative AM, and to prevent the decay of positive affect
associated with positive AM. In addition, reactivating
positive, but not negative, AM with or without CFT
modification reduces the perceived arousal of the original
memory over time. Finally, reactivating negative AM in a
downward CFT or an attentive remembering condition increases
the perceived detail of the original memory over
time.},
Doi = {10.1080/02699931.2018.1478280},
Key = {fds335559}
}
@article{fds332864,
Author = {Murray, S and Murray, ED and Stewart, G and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {Responsibility for forgetting},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {176},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1177-1201},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2019},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
Abstract = {In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we
judge that people are responsible for the consequences of
their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies
to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences
of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to
hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The
level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates
judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that
the agent exhibits toward performing the forgotten action
does not. We argue that this result has important
implications for a long-running debate about the nature of
responsible agency.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
Key = {fds332864}
}
@article{fds341029,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Remembering moral and immoral actions in constructing the
self.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {47},
Number = {3},
Pages = {441-454},
Year = {2019},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0880-y},
Abstract = {Having positive moral traits is central to one's sense of
self, and people generally are motivated to maintain a
positive view of the self in the present. But it remains
unclear how people foster a positive, morally good view of
the self in the present. We suggest that recollecting and
reflecting on moral and immoral actions from the personal
past jointly help to construct a morally good view of the
current self in complementary ways. More specifically,
across four studies we investigated the extent to which
people believe they have changed over time after
recollecting their own moral or immoral behaviors from the
personal past. Our results indicate that recollecting past
immoral actions is associated with stronger impressions of
dissimilarity and change in the sense of self over time than
recollecting past moral actions. These effects held for
diverse domains of morality (i.e., honesty/dishonesty,
helping/harming, fairness/unfairness, and
loyalty/disloyalty), and they remained even after accounting
for objective, calendar time. Further supporting a
motivational explanation, these effects held when people
recollected their own past actions but not when they
recollected the actions of other people.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-018-0880-y},
Key = {fds341029}
}
@article{fds341881,
Author = {Henne, P and Semler, J and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
Title = {Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies
‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and
Furniture},
Journal = {Philosophia (United States)},
Volume = {47},
Number = {1},
Pages = {131-139},
Year = {2019},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
Abstract = {Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
In light of recent empirical evidence, however, some
skeptics conclude that philosophers should stop assuming the
principle unconditionally. Streumer, however, does not
simply assume the principle’s truth; he provides arguments
for it. In this article, we argue that his arguments fail to
support the claim that ‘ought’ implies
‘can’.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7},
Key = {fds341881}
}
@article{fds341030,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Parikh, N},
Title = {Episodic Counterfactual Thinking},
Journal = {Current Directions in Psychological Science},
Volume = {28},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-66},
Year = {2019},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721418806512},
Abstract = {Our tendency to engage in episodic counterfactual
thinking—namely, imagining alternative ways in which past
personal events could have occurred but did not—is
ubiquitous. Although widely studied by cognitive and social
psychologists, this autobiographically based variety of
counterfactual thought has been connected only recently to
research on the cognitive and neuroscientific basis of
episodic memory and mental simulation. In the current
article, we offer an empirical characterization of episodic
counterfactual thinking by contrasting it with related
varieties of mental simulation along three dimensions:
temporal context, degree of episodic detail, and modal
profile (i.e., perceived possibility or impossibility). In
so doing, we offer a practical strategy to navigate the
nascent literature on episodic counterfactual thinking
within the context of other mental simulations, and we argue
that the evidence surveyed strongly indicates that although
connected along the aforementioned dimensions, episodic
counterfactual thinking is a psychological process different
from episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and semantic
counterfactual thinking.},
Doi = {10.1177/0963721418806512},
Key = {fds341030}
}
@article{fds341027,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Gessell, B and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Network modularity as a foundation for neural
reuse},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {86},
Number = {1},
Pages = {23-46},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/701037},
Abstract = {The neural reuse framework developed primarily by Michael
Anderson proposes that brain regions are involved in
multiple and diverse cognitive tasks and that brain regions
flexibly and dynamically interact in different combinations
to carry out cognitive functioning. We argue that the
evidence cited by Anderson and others falls short of
supporting the fundamental principles of neural reuse. We
map out this problem and provide solutions by drawing on
recent advances in network neuroscience, and we argue that
methods employed in network neuroscience provide the means
to fully engage in a research program operating under the
principles of neural reuse.},
Doi = {10.1086/701037},
Key = {fds341027}
}
@article{fds345881,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {32},
Number = {5},
Pages = {719-758},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607280},
Abstract = {A longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between
knowthatand know-how. This traditional “anti-intellectualist”
view is soentrenched in folk psychology that it is often
invoked in supportof an allegedly equivalent distinction
between explicit and implicitmemory, derived from the
so-called “standard model of memory.”In the last two
decades, the received philosophical view has beenchallenged
by an “intellectualist” view of know-how. Surprisingly,
defenders of the anti-intellectualist view have turned to
the cognitivescience of memory, and to the standard model in
particular, todefend their view. Here, I argue that this
strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer
scrutiny, the evidence from cognitivepsychology and
neuroscience of memory does not support theanti-intellectualist
approach, mainly because the standard modelof memory is
likely wrong. However, this need not be interpretedas good
news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that
theempirical evidence necessarily supports their view
either. I arguethat, currently, the philosophical debate is
couched in terms thatdo not correspond to categories in
psychological science. As aresult, the debate has to either
be re-interpreted in a vocabularythat is amenable to
experimental scrutiny, or it cannot be settledempirically.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2019.1607280},
Key = {fds345881}
}
@article{fds345882,
Author = {Pavese, C and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Editor’s introduction},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {32},
Number = {5},
Pages = {585-587},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607964},
Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2019.1607964},
Key = {fds345882}
}
@article{fds367332,
Author = {Henne, P and Bello, P and Khemlani, S and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Norms and the meaning of omissive enabling
conditions},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Creativity + Cognition + Computation,
CogSci 2019},
Pages = {1901-1907},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196777},
Abstract = {People often reason about omissions. One line of research
shows that people can distinguish between the semantics of
omissive causes and omissive enabling conditions: for
instance, not flunking out of college enabled you (but
didn't cause you) to graduate. Another line of work shows
that people rely on the normative status of omissive events
in inferring their causal role: if the outcome came about
because the omission violated some norm, reasoners are more
likely to select that omission as a cause. We designed a
novel paradigm that tests how norms interact with the
semantics of omissive enabling conditions. The paradigm
concerns the circuitry of a mechanical device that plays
music. Two experiments used the paradigm to stipulate norms
and present a distinct set of possibilities to participants.
Participants chose which causal verb best described the
operations of the machine. The studies revealed that
participants' responses are best predicted by their tendency
to consider the semantics of omissive relations. In
contrast, norms had little to no effect in participants'
responses. We conclude by marshaling the evidence and
considering what role norms may play in people's
understanding of omissions.},
Key = {fds367332}
}
@article{fds367333,
Author = {Yin, S and O'Neill, K and Brady, TF and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {The Effect for Category Learning on Recognition Memory: A
Signal Detection Theory Analysis},
Journal = {Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society: Creativity + Cognition + Computation,
CogSci 2019},
Pages = {3165-3171},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9780991196777},
Abstract = {Previous studies have shown that category learning affects
subsequent recognition memory. However, questions remain as
to how category learning affects discriminability during
recognition. In this three-stage study, we employed sets of
simulated flowers with category- and non-category-inclusion
features appearing with equal probabilities. In the learning
stage, participants were asked to categorize flowers by
identifying the category-inclusion feature. Next, in the
studying stage, participants memorized a new set of flowers,
a third of which belonged to the learned category. Finally,
in the testing stage, participants received a recognition
test with old and new flowers, some from the learned
category, some from a not-learned category, some from both
categories, and some from neither category. We applied
hierarchical Bayesian signal detection theory models to
recognition performance and found that prior category
learning affected both discriminability as well as criterion
bias. That is, people that learned the category well,
exhibited improved discriminability and a shifted bias
toward flowers from the learned relative to the not learned
category.},
Key = {fds367333}
}
@article{fds335558,
Author = {Parikh, N and Ruzic, L and Stewart, GW and Spreng, RN and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {What if? Neural activity underlying semantic and episodic
counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {178},
Pages = {332-345},
Year = {2018},
Month = {September},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.05.053},
Abstract = {Counterfactual thinking (CFT) is the process of mentally
simulating alternative versions of known facts. In the past
decade, cognitive neuroscientists have begun to uncover the
neural underpinnings of CFT, particularly episodic CFT
(eCFT), which activates regions in the default network (DN)
also activated by episodic memory (eM) recall. However, the
engagement of DN regions is different for distinct kinds of
eCFT. More plausible counterfactuals and counterfactuals
about oneself show stronger activity in DN regions compared
to implausible and other- or object-focused counterfactuals.
The current study sought to identify a source for this
difference in DN activity. Specifically, self-focused
counterfactuals may also be more plausible, suggesting that
DN core regions are sensitive to the plausibility of a
simulation. On the other hand, plausible and self-focused
counterfactuals may involve more episodic information than
implausible and other-focused counterfactuals, which would
imply DN sensitivity to episodic information. In the current
study, we compared episodic and semantic counterfactuals
generated to be plausible or implausible against episodic
and semantic memory reactivation using fMRI. Taking
multivariate and univariate approaches, we found that the DN
is engaged more during episodic simulations, including eM
and all eCFT, than during semantic simulations. Semantic
simulations engaged more inferior temporal and lateral
occipital regions. The only region that showed strong
plausibility effects was the hippocampus, which was
significantly engaged for implausible CFT but not for
plausible CFT, suggestive of binding more disparate
information. Consequences of these findings for the
cognitive neuroscience of mental simulation are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.05.053},
Key = {fds335558}
}
@article{fds336415,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Yang, BW and De Brigard and F},
Title = {No evidence for unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A
failed replication and extension.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {46},
Number = {5},
Pages = {787-795},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-018-0803-y},
Abstract = {In a recent study, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that
memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of
whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we
argue in the current study, their claim that people develop
"unethical amnesia" confuses two distinct and dissociable
memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology of
remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To
further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory
accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical
amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N
= 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from
Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory
accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to
replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino
(2016), while including several additional variables meant
to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study
(N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the
same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new
vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not
find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy
in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon
the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined
unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study
memory for moral and immoral actions are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-018-0803-y},
Key = {fds336415}
}
@article{fds329104,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Dougherty, AM and Yang, BW and Henne, P and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Reasons probably won't change your mind: The role of reasons
in revising moral decisions.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {147},
Number = {7},
Pages = {962-987},
Year = {2018},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000368},
Abstract = {Although many philosophers argue that making and revising
moral decisions ought to be a matter of deliberating over
reasons, the extent to which the consideration of reasons
informs people's moral decisions and prompts them to change
their decisions remains unclear. Here, after making an
initial decision in 2-option moral dilemmas, participants
examined reasons for only the option initially chosen
(affirming reasons), reasons for only the option not
initially chosen (opposing reasons), or reasons for both
options. Although participants were more likely to change
their initial decisions when presented with only opposing
reasons compared with only affirming reasons, these effect
sizes were consistently small. After evaluating reasons,
participants were significantly more likely not to change
their initial decisions than to change them, regardless of
the set of reasons they considered. The initial decision
accounted for most of the variance in predicting the final
decision, whereas the reasons evaluated accounted for a
relatively small proportion of the variance in predicting
the final decision. This resistance to changing moral
decisions is at least partly attributable to a biased,
motivated evaluation of the available reasons: participants
rated the reasons supporting their initial decisions more
favorably than the reasons opposing their initial decisions,
regardless of the reported strategy used to make the initial
decision. Overall, our results suggest that the
consideration of reasons rarely induces people to change
their initial decisions in moral dilemmas. (PsycINFO
Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0000368},
Key = {fds329104}
}
@article{fds335560,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Brady, WJ},
Title = {Correction to: The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our
Judgments of Responsibility (Review of Philosophy and
Psychology, (2013), 4, 2, (259-269), 10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8)},
Journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
Volume = {9},
Number = {2},
Pages = {447},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2018},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0389-0},
Abstract = {On pages 263, 265, and 266, incorrect degrees of freedom and
t values were reported. The statistical conclusions are not
affected by these reporting errors, but the corrected values
are shown below.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13164-018-0389-0},
Key = {fds335560}
}
@article{fds335561,
Author = {De Freitas and J and Sarkissian, H and Newman, GE and Grossmann, I and De
Brigard, F and Luco, A and Knobe, J},
Title = {Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and
Three Interdependent Cultures.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {42 Suppl 1},
Pages = {134-160},
Year = {2018},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12505},
Abstract = {People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an
essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the
true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to
believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep
inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good
ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with
optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does
it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people
understand the self? To address this question, we tested the
good true self theory against two potential boundary
conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about
the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual
differences in misanthropy-the tendency to view humans
negatively-predict beliefs about the good true self in an
American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in
a good true self, even among individuals who have an
explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true
self-attributions across cultural groups, by comparing
samples from an independent country (USA) and a diverse set
of interdependent countries (Russia, Singapore, and
Colombia). Results indicated that the direction and
magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we
tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across
groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy,
suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the
true self as morally good.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12505},
Key = {fds335561}
}
@article{fds372923,
Author = {Stanley, M and Yang, B and De Brigard and F},
Title = {No Evidence for Unethical Amnesia for Imagined Actions: A
Failed Replication and Extension},
Year = {2018},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/kn8ce},
Abstract = {<p>In a recent paper, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that
memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of
whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we
argue in the current paper, their claim that people develop
“unethical amnesia” confuses two distinct and
dissociable memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology
of remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To
further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory
accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical
amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N
= 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from
Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory
accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to
replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino
(2016), while including several additional variables meant
to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study
(N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the
same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new
vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not
find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy
in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon
the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined
unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study
memory for moral and immoral actions are
discussed.</p>},
Doi = {10.31234/osf.io/kn8ce},
Key = {fds372923}
}
@article{fds337053,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Memory and the intentional stance},
Pages = {62-91},
Booktitle = {The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Year = {2018},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9780199367511},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0005},
Abstract = {Despite Dennett's vast scholarship, he seemed to only have
directly addressed the topic of memory in a relatively
unknown coauthored article published in a somewhat obscure
volume. The current chapter attempts to reconstruct the
ideas from this old article, and argues that it offers a
viable and coherent view of episodic memory with substantial
empirical support. Specifically, the chapter uncovers three
empirically supported theses. A functional thesis, according
to which our memory system not only processes information
about past events but also uses this information to
construct useful anticipations of possible future events. A
computational thesis, according to which statistical
regularities, along with individual limitations and goals,
probabilistically constrain the search space examined during
memory retrieval. And a metaphysical thesis, according to
which memories do not exist as subpersonal-level brain
structures encoding particular intentional contents but
rather as personal-level psychological phenomena only
accessible from the intentional stance.},
Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0005},
Key = {fds337053}
}
@article{fds335562,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Memory, attention, and joint reminiscing},
Pages = {200-220},
Booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138065604},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591},
Abstract = {When people jointly reminisce, they often talk about past
objects, which may or may no longer exist. How can two or
more people jointly refer to an object that is long gone-or
at least, that is not present in their surrounding? In this
chapter, I offer a three-part answer to this question.
First, I suggest that our capacity to remember intentional
objects during memory retrieval depends on our capacity to
direct our attention inwardly toward the relevant component
of a memorial content-a mental act I call mental ostension.
Second, I argue that, for us to refer to remembered
intentional objects, we must possess the ability to refer to
them indirectly or “deferredly” by way of mentally
ostending toward a present mental content; in short, we must
be capable of deferred mental ostension. Finally, I claim
that to jointly reminisce, we must have the capacity to
guide someone else’s attention inwardly toward the
relevant aspect of the mental content we want them to focus
on so that they become aware of the past object we are
deferredly ostending; that is, we need concerted deferred
mental ostension.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315159591},
Key = {fds335562}
}
@article{fds335563,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Gessell, B},
Title = {Why episodic memory may not be for communication.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {41},
Pages = {e8},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x17001303},
Abstract = {Three serious challenges to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) proposal
are presented. First, we argue that the epistemic attitude
that they claim is unique to remembering also applies to
some forms of imaginative simulations that aren't memories.
Second, we argue that their account cannot accommodate
critical neuropsychological evidence. Finally, we argue that
their proposal looks unconvincing when compared to more
parsimonious evolutionary accounts.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x17001303},
Key = {fds335563}
}
@article{fds340469,
Author = {Gessell, B and De Brigard and F},
Title = {The discontinuity of levels in cognitive
science},
Journal = {Teorema},
Volume = {37},
Number = {3},
Pages = {151-165},
Year = {2018},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {We begin by characterizing Dennett’s “homuncular
functionalist” view of the mind, as described in his early
work. We then contrast that view with the one outlined in
From Bacteria to Bach and Back. We argue that recent changes
in Dennett’s view have produced tension in the way he
conceives of functional decompositions. Functional
decompositions based on the intentional stance are supposed
to reach a bottom, “dumb” level which can be explained
mechanically; however, since Dennett now believes that
neurons may need to be described intentionally, it is not
clear whether our explanations of cognitive functions can
ever align with our explanations of neuronal and network
behaviors. We explore the consequences of this tension for
Dennett’s view, and for cognitive neuroscience in
general.},
Key = {fds340469}
}
@article{fds329948,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Parikh, N and Stewart, GW and Szpunar, KK and Schacter, DL},
Title = {Neural activity associated with repetitive simulation of
episodic counterfactual thoughts.},
Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
Volume = {106},
Pages = {123-132},
Year = {2017},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.09.022},
Abstract = {When people revisit past autobiographical events they often
imagine alternative ways in which such events could have
occurred. Often these episodic counterfactual thoughts
(eCFT) are momentary and fleeting, but sometimes they are
simulated frequently and repeatedly. However, little is
known about the neural differences between frequently versus
infrequently repeated eCFT. The current study explores this
issue. In a three-session study, participants were asked to
simulate alternative ways positive, negative, and neutral
autobiographical memories could have occurred. Half of these
eCFT were repeatedly re-simulated while the other half were
not. Immediately after, participants were asked to simulate
all these eCFT again while undergoing fMRI. A partial least
squares analysis on the resultant fMRI data revealed that
eCFT that were not frequently repeated preferentially
engaged brain regions including middle (BA 21) and superior
temporal gyri (BA 38/39), middle (BA 11) and superior
frontal gyri (BA 9), and hippocampus. By contrast,
frequently repeated eCFT preferentially engaged regions
including medial frontal gyri (BA 10), anterior cingulate
cortex, insula, and inferior parietal lobule (BA 40). Direct
contrasts for each type of eCFT were also conducted. The
results of these analyses suggest differential contributions
of regions traditionally associated with eCFT, such as BA
10, anterior cingulate cortex, and hippocampus, as a
function of kind of eCFT and frequency of repetition.
Consequences for future research on eCFT and rumination are
considered.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.09.022},
Key = {fds329948}
}
@article{fds329949,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Memory and imagination},
Pages = {127-140},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {9781138909366},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315687315},
Key = {fds329949}
}
@article{fds326194,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Iyengar, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
Brigard, F},
Title = {I'm not the person I used to be: The self and
autobiographical memories of immoral actions.},
Journal = {Journal of experimental psychology. General},
Volume = {146},
Number = {6},
Pages = {884-895},
Year = {2017},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000317},
Abstract = {People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways:
They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people,
and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in
the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories.
The authors investigate the role of autobiographical
memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a
positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally
harming others, participants judge their own actions as less
morally wrong and less negative than those in which other
people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore,
people judge those actions that happened further in the past
to be more morally wrong than those that happened more
recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they
believed that they were very different people than they are
now, participants judge their actions to be more morally
wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of
their pasts when they believed that they were very similar
to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in
relation to theories about the function of autobiographical
memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving
the self over time. (PsycINFO Database Record},
Doi = {10.1037/xge0000317},
Key = {fds326194}
}
@article{fds327002,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Cognitive systems and the changing brain},
Journal = {Philosophical Explorations},
Volume = {20},
Number = {2},
Pages = {224-241},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1312503},
Abstract = {The notion of cognitive system is widely used in
explanations in cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
Traditional approaches define cognitive systems in an
agent-relative way, that is, via top-down functional
decomposition that assumes a cognitive agent as starting
point. The extended cognition movement challenged that
approach by questioning the primacy of the notion of
cognitive agent. In response, [Adams, F., and K. Aizawa.
2001. The Bounds of Cognition. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.]
suggested that to have a clear understanding of what a
cognitive system is we may need to solve “the demarcation
challenge”: the problem of identifying a reliable way to
determine which mechanisms that are causally responsible for
the production of a certain cognitive process constitute a
cognitive system responsible for such process and which ones
do not. Recently, [Rupert, R. 2009. Cognitive Systems and
the Extended Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.] offered
a solution based on the idea that the mechanisms that
constitute a cognitive system are integrated in a particular
sense. In this paper I critically review Rupert’s solution
and argue against it. Additionally, I argue that a
successful account of cognitive system must accommodate the
fact that the neural mechanisms causally responsible for the
production of a cognitive process are diachronically dynamic
and yet functionally stable. At the end, I offer a
suggestion as to how to accommodate this diachronic
dynamicity without losing functional stability. I conclude
by drawing some implications for the discussion on cognitive
ontologies.},
Doi = {10.1080/13869795.2017.1312503},
Key = {fds327002}
}
@article{fds342710,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Stewart, GW and Brigard, FD},
Title = {Counterfactual Plausibility and Comparative
Similarity.},
Journal = {Cognitive science},
Volume = {41 Suppl 5},
Pages = {1216-1228},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12451},
Abstract = {Counterfactual thinking involves imagining hypothetical
alternatives to reality. Philosopher David Lewis (1973,
1979) argued that people estimate the subjective
plausibility that a counterfactual event might have occurred
by comparing an imagined possible world in which the
counterfactual statement is true against the current, actual
world in which the counterfactual statement is false.
Accordingly, counterfactuals considered to be true in
possible worlds comparatively more similar to ours are
judged as more plausible than counterfactuals deemed true in
possible worlds comparatively less similar. Although Lewis
did not originally develop his notion of comparative
similarity to be investigated as a psychological construct,
this study builds upon his idea to empirically investigate
comparative similarity as a possible psychological strategy
for evaluating the perceived plausibility of counterfactual
events. More specifically, we evaluate judgments of
comparative similarity between episodic memories and
episodic counterfactual events as a factor influencing
people's judgments of plausibility in counterfactual
simulations, and we also compare it against other factors
thought to influence judgments of counterfactual
plausibility, such as ease of simulation and prior
simulation. Our results suggest that the greater the
perceived similarity between the original memory and the
episodic counterfactual event, the greater the perceived
plausibility that the counterfactual event might have
occurred. While similarity between actual and counterfactual
events, ease of imagining, and prior simulation of the
counterfactual event were all significantly related to
counterfactual plausibility, comparative similarity best
captured the variance in ratings of counterfactual
plausibility. Implications for existing theories on the
determinants of counterfactual plausibility are
discussed.},
Doi = {10.1111/cogs.12451},
Key = {fds342710}
}
@article{fds327003,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Rodriguez, DC and Montañés,
P},
Title = {Exploring the experience of episodic past, future, and
counterfactual thinking in younger and older adults: A study
of a Colombian sample.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {51},
Pages = {258-267},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.007},
Abstract = {Although extant evidence suggests that many neural and
cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic past, future, and
counterfactual thinking overlap, recent results have
uncovered differences among these three processes. However,
the extent to which there may be age-related differences in
the phenomenological characteristics associated with
episodic past, future and counterfactual thinking remains
unclear. This study used adapted versions of the Memory
Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical
Interview in younger and older adults to investigate the
subjective experience of episodic past, future and
counterfactual thinking. The results suggest that, across
all conditions, younger adults generated more internal
details than older adults. However, older adults generated
more external details for episodic future and counterfactual
thinking than younger adults. Additionally, younger and
older adults generated more internal details, and gave
higher sensory and contextual ratings, for memories rather
than future and counterfactual thoughts. Methodological and
theoretical consequences for extant theories of mental
simulation are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2017.04.007},
Key = {fds327003}
}
@article{fds318357,
Author = {Henne, P and Pinillos, Á and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering
Plants},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {95},
Number = {2},
Pages = {270-283},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2017},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567},
Abstract = {People generally accept that there is causation by
omission—that the omission of some events cause some
related events. But this acceptance elicits the selection
problem, or the difficulty of explaining the selection of a
particular omissive cause or class of causes from the causal
conditions. Some theorists contend that dependence theories
of causation cannot resolve this problem. In this paper, we
argue that the appeal to norms adequately resolves the
selection problem for dependence theories, and we provide
novel experimental evidence for it.},
Doi = {10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567},
Key = {fds318357}
}
@article{fds323231,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Parikh, N and Stewart, GW and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and
counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {48},
Pages = {283-291},
Year = {2017},
Month = {February},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.013},
Abstract = {Episodic counterfactual thoughts-imagined alternative ways
in which personal past events might have occurred-are
frequently accompanied by intense emotions. Here,
participants recollected positive and negative
autobiographical memories and then generated better and
worse episodic counterfactual events from those memories.
Our results suggest that the projected emotional intensity
during the simulated remembered/imagined event is
significantly higher than but typically positively related
to the emotional intensity while remembering/imagining the
event. Furthermore, repeatedly simulating counterfactual
events heightened the emotional intensity felt while
simulating the counterfactual event. Finally, for both the
emotional intensity accompanying the experience of
remembering/imagining and the projected emotional intensity
during the simulated remembered/imagined event, the
emotional intensity of negative memories was greater than
the emotional intensity of upward counterfactuals generated
from them but lower than the emotional intensity of downward
counterfactuals generated from them. These findings are
discussed in relation to clinical work and functional
theories of counterfactual thinking.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.013},
Key = {fds323231}
}
@article{fds323662,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Brady, TF and Ruzic, L and Schacter,
DL},
Title = {Tracking the emergence of memories: A category-learning
paradigm to explore schema-driven recognition.},
Journal = {Memory & cognition},
Volume = {45},
Number = {1},
Pages = {105-120},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0643-6},
Abstract = {Previous research has shown that prior knowledge structures
or schemas affect recognition memory. However, since the
acquisition of schemas occurs over prolonged periods of
time, few paradigms allow the direct manipulation of schema
acquisition to study their effect on memory performance.
Recently, a number of parallelisms in recognition memory
between studies involving schemas and studies involving
category learning have been identified. The current paper
capitalizes on these findings and offers a novel
experimental paradigm that allows manipulation of category
learning between individuals to study the effects of schema
acquisition on recognition. First, participants learn to
categorize computer-generated items whose category-inclusion
criteria differ between participants. Next, participants
study items that belong to either the learned category, the
non-learned category, both, or neither. Finally,
participants receive a recognition test that includes old
and new items, either from the learned, the non-learned, or
neither category. Using variations on this paradigm, four
experiments were conducted. The results from the first three
studies suggest that learning a category increases hit rates
for old category-consistent items and false alarm rates for
new category-consistent lures. Absent the category learning,
no such effects are evident, even when participants are
exposed to the same learning trials as those who learned the
categories. The results from the fourth experiment suggest
that, at least for false alarm rates, the effects of
category learning are not solely attributable to frequency
of occurrence of category-consistent items during learning.
Implications for recognition memory as well as advantages of
the proposed paradigm are discussed.},
Doi = {10.3758/s13421-016-0643-6},
Key = {fds323662}
}
@article{fds359515,
Author = {Brigard, FD},
Title = {The problem of consciousness for philosophy of mind and of
psychiatry},
Journal = {Ideas y Valores},
Volume = {66},
Pages = {15-45},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n3Supl.65652},
Abstract = {Psychiatrists often encounter patients whose symptoms
include disorders or impairments of consciousness.
Unfortunately, the meaning of the term consciousness is not
altogether clear. This article presents a systematic review
of various meanings attributed to this term, as well as of
diverse associated philosophical problems. Likewise, it
reconstructs some philosophical and scientific theories of
consciousness, identifying their advantages and
disadvantages. Finally, it offers some suggestions for the
use of the term consciousness in psychiatry.},
Doi = {10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n3Supl.65652},
Key = {fds359515}
}
@article{fds331533,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Responsibility and the relevance of alternative future
possibilities},
Journal = {Teoria},
Volume = {37},
Number = {2},
Pages = {25-35},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
Abstract = {In the past decade, philosophical and psychological research
on people's beliefs about free will and responsibility has
skyrocketed. For the most part, these vignette-based studies
have exclusively focused on participants' judgments of the
causal history of the events leading up to an agent's action
and considerations about what the agent could have done
differently in the past. However, recent evidence suggests
that, when judging whether or not an individual is
responsible for a certain action - even in concrete,
emotionally laden and fully deterministic scenarios -
considerations about alternative future possibilities may
become relevant. This paper reviews this evidence and
suggests a way of interpreting the nature of these effects
as well as some consequences for experimental philosophy and
psychology of free will and responsibility going
forward.},
Key = {fds331533}
}
@article{fds320134,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Giovanello, KS and Stewart, GW and Lockrow, AW and O'Brien, MM and Spreng, RN},
Title = {Characterizing the subjective experience of episodic past,
future, and counterfactual thinking in healthy younger and
older adults.},
Journal = {Quarterly journal of experimental psychology
(2006)},
Volume = {69},
Number = {12},
Pages = {2358-2375},
Year = {2016},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1115529},
Abstract = {Recent evidence demonstrates remarkable overlap in the
neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic memory,
episodic future thinking, and episodic counterfactual
thinking. However, the extent to which the phenomenological
characteristics associated with these mental simulations
change as a result of ageing remains largely unexplored. The
current study employs adapted versions of the Memory
Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical
Interview to compare the phenomenological characteristics
associated with both positive and negative episodic past,
future, and counterfactual simulations in younger and older
adults. Additionally, it explores the influence of perceived
likelihood in the experience of such simulations. The
results indicate that, across all simulations, older adults
generate more external details and report higher ratings of
vividness, composition, and intensity than young adults.
Conversely, younger adults generate more internal details
across all conditions and rated positive and negative likely
future events as more likely than did older adults.
Additionally, both younger and older adults reported higher
ratings for sensory, composition, and intensity factors
during episodic memories relative to future and
counterfactual thoughts. Finally, for both groups, ratings
of spatial coherence and composition were higher for likely
counterfactuals than for both unlikely counterfactuals and
future simulations. Implications for the psychology of
mental simulation and ageing are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1080/17470218.2015.1115529},
Key = {fds320134}
}
@article{fds325468,
Author = {Henne, P and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
W},
Title = {An Empirical Refutation of 'Ought' Implies
'Can'},
Journal = {Analysis (United Kingdom)},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {283-290},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw041},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anw041},
Key = {fds325468}
}
@article{fds318358,
Author = {Chituc, V and Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De Brigard,
F},
Title = {Blame, not ability, impacts moral "ought" judgments for
impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of
"ought" implies "can".},
Journal = {Cognition},
Volume = {150},
Pages = {20-25},
Year = {2016},
Month = {May},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
Abstract = {Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts
including obligation, blame, and ability. While little
empirical work has studied the relationships among these
concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a
relationship in the principle that "ought" implies "can,"
which states that if someone ought to do something, then
they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of
these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported
here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent
ought to keep a promise that he is unable to keep, but only
when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows
that such "ought" judgments correlate with judgments of
blame, rather than with judgments of the agent's ability.
Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral "ought"
judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral
"ought" judgments, such as what someone ought to do to
fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk
moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed
philosophical principle that "ought" implies "can." Instead,
judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments
of obligation.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
Key = {fds318358}
}
@article{fds347942,
Author = {Stanley, ML and Brigard, FD},
Title = {Modularity in network neuroscience and neural
reuse.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {39},
Pages = {e133},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x15001673},
Abstract = {Neural reuse allegedly stands in stark contrast against a
modular view of the brain. However, the development of
unique modularity algorithms in network science has provided
the means to identify functionally cooperating, specialized
subsystems in a way that remains consistent with the neural
reuse view and offers a set of rigorous tools to fully
engage in Anderson's (2014) research program.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x15001673},
Key = {fds347942}
}
@article{fds341031,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Consciousness and moral responsibility},
Journal = {Analysis (United Kingdom)},
Volume = {75},
Number = {4},
Pages = {661-667},
Year = {2015},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv012},
Doi = {10.1093/analys/anv012},
Key = {fds341031}
}
@article{fds320135,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Nathan Spreng and R and Mitchell, JP and Schacter,
DL},
Title = {Neural activity associated with self, other, and
object-based counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {NeuroImage},
Volume = {109},
Pages = {12-26},
Year = {2015},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.075},
Abstract = {Previous research has shown that autobiographical episodic
counterfactual thinking-i.e., mental simulations about
alternative ways in which one's life experiences could have
occurred-engages the brain's default network (DN). However,
it remains unknown whether or not the DN is also engaged
during impersonal counterfactual thoughts, specifically
those involving other people or objects. The current study
compares brain activity during counterfactual simulations
involving the self, others and objects. In addition,
counterfactual thoughts involving others were manipulated in
terms of similarity and familiarity with the simulated
characters. The results indicate greater involvement of DN
during person-based (i.e., self and other) as opposed to
object-based counterfactual simulations. However, the
involvement of different regions of the DN during
other-based counterfactual simulations was modulated by how
close and/or similar the simulated character was perceived
to be by the participant. Simulations involving unfamiliar
characters preferentially recruited dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex. Simulations involving unfamiliar similar characters,
characters with whom participants identified personality
traits, recruited lateral temporal gyrus. Finally, our
results also revealed differential coupling of right
hippocampus with lateral prefrontal and temporal cortex
during counterfactual simulations involving familiar similar
others, but with left transverse temporal gyrus and medial
frontal and inferior temporal gyri during counterfactual
simulations involving either oneself or unfamiliar
dissimilar others. These results suggest that different
brain mechanisms are involved in the simulation of personal
and impersonal counterfactual thoughts, and that the extent
to which regions associated with autobiographical memory are
recruited during the simulation of counterfactuals involving
others depends on the perceived similarity and familiarity
with the simulated individuals.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.075},
Key = {fds320135}
}
@article{fds347943,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Book review: Involuntary autobiographical memories: An
introduction to the unbidden past},
Journal = {Memory Studies},
Volume = {8},
Number = {2},
Pages = {255-257},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2015},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750698014534786},
Doi = {10.1177/1750698014534786},
Key = {fds347943}
}
@misc{fds305550,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Finding Memory: Interview with Daniel L.
Schacter},
Journal = {Universitas Psychologica},
Volume = {12},
Number = {5},
Pages = {2605-1610},
Publisher = {Pontificia Universidad Javeriana},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {2011-2777},
Key = {fds305550}
}
@article{fds305551,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Eliminando el fantasma de la máquina. Del alma al software
1},
Journal = {Revista Colombiana de Psiquiatría},
Volume = {32},
Number = {2},
Pages = {175-192},
Publisher = {Asociacion Colombiana de Psiquiatria},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0034-7450},
Key = {fds305551}
}
@article{fds305552,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {El advenimiento de la metáfora mente-computador. Del alma
al software 3},
Journal = {Revista Colombiana de Psiquiatría},
Volume = {33},
Number = {1},
Pages = {64-85},
Publisher = {Asociacion Colombiana de Psiquiatria},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0034-7450},
Key = {fds305552}
}
@article{fds305553,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Capas limítrofes y dominios de evidencia en ciencia
cognitiva},
Journal = {Universitas Philosophica},
Volume = {45},
Pages = {53-77},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0120-5323},
url = {http://people.duke.edu/~fd13/De_Brigard_2006_UnivPhil.pdf},
Key = {fds305553}
}
@article{fds305555,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Attention, Consciousness, and Commonsense},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies: controversies in science
and the humanities},
Volume = {17},
Number = {9/10},
Pages = {189-201},
Publisher = {Imprint Academic},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1355-8250},
Key = {fds305555}
}
@article{fds305556,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Memoria, neurociencia y educación},
Pages = {179-194},
Booktitle = {La pizarra de Babel: Puentes entre neurociencia, psicologia
y educación},
Publisher = {Libros del Zorzal},
Editor = {Lipina, S and Sigman, M},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds305556}
}
@article{fds305557,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Review of “Attention is Cognitive Unison”. Christopher
Mole. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies: controversies in science
and the humanities},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1/2},
Pages = {239-247},
Publisher = {Imprint Academic},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1355-8250},
Key = {fds305557}
}
@article{fds305558,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {In defense of the self-stultification objection},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies: controversies in science
and the humanities},
Volume = {21},
Number = {5/6},
Pages = {120-130},
Publisher = {Imprint Academic},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1355-8250},
Key = {fds305558}
}
@article{fds287445,
Author = {Schacter, DL and Benoit, RG and De Brigard and F and Szpunar,
KK},
Title = {Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual
thinking: intersections between memory and
decisions.},
Journal = {Neurobiology of learning and memory},
Volume = {117},
Pages = {14-21},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1074-7427},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008},
Abstract = {This article considers two recent lines of research
concerned with the construction of imagined or simulated
events that can provide insight into the relationship
between memory and decision making. One line of research
concerns episodic future thinking, which involves simulating
episodes that might occur in one's personal future, and the
other concerns episodic counterfactual thinking, which
involves simulating episodes that could have happened in
one's personal past. We first review neuroimaging studies
that have examined the neural underpinnings of episodic
future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking. We
argue that these studies have revealed that the two forms of
episodic simulation engage a common core network including
medial parietal, prefrontal, and temporal regions that also
supports episodic memory. We also note that neuroimaging
studies have documented neural differences between episodic
future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking,
including differences in hippocampal responses. We next
consider behavioral studies that have delineated both
similarities and differences between the two kinds of
episodic simulation. The evidence indicates that episodic
future and counterfactual thinking are characterized by
similarly reduced levels of specific detail compared with
episodic memory, but that the effects of repeatedly
imagining a possible experience have sharply contrasting
effects on the perceived plausibility of those events during
episodic future thinking versus episodic counterfactual
thinking. Finally, we conclude by discussing the functional
consequences of future and counterfactual simulations for
decisions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008},
Key = {fds287445}
}
@book{fds320136,
Author = {Muñoz-Suárez, C and de Brigard, F and Daniel,
D},
Title = {Content and consciousness revisited},
Pages = {1-220},
Publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9783319173733},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0},
Abstract = {What are the grounds for the distinction between the mental
and the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing
mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior?
Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner
evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between
personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain?
Answers to these and other questions were developed in
Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness
(1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework
for views that are now considered foundational in cognitive
science and philosophy of mind. Content and Consciousness
Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals
introduced in Dennett’s seminal book, by covering its
fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches and taking
into account the findings and progress which have taken
place during more than four decades. This book includes
original and critical contributions about the relations
between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal
level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality,
rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of
scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces
an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive
science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind and
cognitive psychiatry.},
Doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0},
Key = {fds320136}
}
@article{fds318359,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Hanna, E},
Title = {Clinical applications of counterfactual thinking during
memory reactivation.},
Journal = {The Behavioral and brain sciences},
Volume = {38},
Pages = {e5},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x14000351},
Abstract = {The Integrative Memory Model offers a strong foundation upon
which to build successful strategies for clinical
intervention. The next challenge is to figure out which
cognitive strategies are more likely to bring about
successful and beneficial modifications of reactivated
memories during therapy. In this commentary we suggest that
exercising emotional regulation during episodic
counterfactual thinking is likely to be a successful
therapeutic strategy to bring about beneficial memory
modifications.},
Doi = {10.1017/s0140525x14000351},
Key = {fds318359}
}
@article{fds320137,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {In defence of the self-stultification objection},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {21},
Number = {5-6},
Pages = {120-130},
Year = {2014},
Month = {May},
Abstract = {Epiphenomenalism holds that mental events are caused by
physical events while not causing any physical effects
whatsoever. The self-stultification objection is a venerable
argument against epiphenomenalism according to which, if
epiphenomenalism were true, we would not have knowledge of
our own sensations. For the past three decades, W.S.
Robinson has called into question the soundness of this
objection, offering several arguments against it. Many of
his arguments attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the
opponents of epiphenomenalism, hoping to show that
epiphenomenalism is no less stultifying than its contenders,
such as dualism, functionalism, or identity theory. In the
current paper I attempt to shift the burden of proof back to
Robinson, and thus to defend the self-stultification
objection, by offering two counterarguments against one of
Robinson's objections to one of the key premises of the
self-stultification objection.},
Key = {fds320137}
}
@article{fds287446,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {The nature of memory traces},
Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
Volume = {9},
Number = {6},
Pages = {402-414},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12133},
Abstract = {Memory trace was originally a philosophical term used to
explain the phenomenon of remembering. Once debated by
Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno of Citium, the notion seems more
recently to have become the exclusive province of cognitive
psychologists and neuroscientists. Nonetheless, this modern
appropriation should not deter philosophers from thinking
carefully about the nature of memory traces. On the
contrary, scientific research on the nature of memory traces
can rekindle philosopher's interest on this notion. With
that general aim in mind, the present paper has three
specific goals. First, it attempts to chart the most
relevant philosophical views on the nature of memory traces
from both a thematic and historical perspective. Second, it
reviews critical findings in the psychology and the
neuroscience of memory traces. Finally, it explains how such
results lend support to or discredit specific philosophical
positions on the nature of memory traces. This paper also
touches upon the issues raised by recent empirical research
that theories of memory traces need to accommodate in order
to succeed. © 2014 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2014
John Wiley & Sons Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1111/phc3.12133},
Key = {fds287446}
}
@article{fds287451,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of
episodic hypothetical thinking},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {191},
Number = {2},
Pages = {155-185},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2014},
Month = {January},
url = {http://people.duke.edu/~fd13/De_Brigard_2013_Synthese.pdf},
Abstract = {Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in
our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the
function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering
is typically thought to happen because our memory system
malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of
misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In
particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of
misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory's
malfunction, but rather as the normal result of a larger
cognitive system that performs a different function, and for
which remembering is just one operation. Building upon
extant psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I offer a
picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system
that supports not only thinking of what was the case and
what potentially could be the case, but also what could have
been the case. More precisely, I claim that remembering is a
particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the
flexible recombination of different components of encoded
traces into representations of possible past events that
might or might not have occurred, in the service of
constructing mental simulations of possible future events.
So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for
diverse considerations hath diverse names. Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan 1.2. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media
Dordrecht.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-013-0247-7},
Key = {fds287451}
}
@misc{fds287428,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {The New Paideia},
Journal = {3:AM Magazine},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287428}
}
@misc{fds287429,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {The Anatomy of Amnesia},
Journal = {Scientific American Mind},
Pages = {33-37},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287429}
}
@article{fds287444,
Author = {Banerjee, S and Cox, J and De Brigard and F and et. al.},
Title = {The significance of cognitive neuroscience: Findings,
applications and challenges},
Pages = {1071-1078},
Booktitle = {The Cognitive Neuroscience V},
Publisher = {MIT Press},
Address = {Cambridge, MA},
Editor = {Mangum, R and Gazzaniga, M},
Year = {2014},
Key = {fds287444}
}
@article{fds287448,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Addis, DR and Ford, JH and Schacter, DL and Giovanello, KS},
Title = {Remembering what could have happened: neural correlates of
episodic counterfactual thinking.},
Journal = {Neuropsychologia},
Volume = {51},
Number = {12},
Pages = {2401-2414},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.015},
Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that our capacities to remember the
past and to imagine what might happen in the future largely
depend on the same core brain network that includes the
middle temporal lobe, the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial
cortex, the inferior parietal lobe, the medial prefrontal
cortex, and the lateral temporal cortex. However, the extent
to which regions of this core brain network are also
responsible for our capacity to think about what could have
happened in our past, yet did not occur (i.e., episodic
counterfactual thinking), is still unknown. The present
study examined this issue. Using a variation of the
experimental recombination paradigm (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser,
& Schacter, 2009. Neuropsychologia. 47: 2222-2238),
participants were asked both to remember personal past
events and to envision alternative outcomes to such events
while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Three sets of analyses were performed on the imaging data in
order to investigate two related issues. First, a
mean-centered spatiotemporal partial least square (PLS)
analysis identified a pattern of brain activity across
regions of the core network that was common to episodic
memory and episodic counterfactual thinking. Second, a
non-rotated PLS analysis identified two different patterns
of brain activity for likely and unlikely episodic
counterfactual thoughts, with the former showing significant
overlap with the set of regions engaged during episodic
recollection. Finally, a parametric modulation was conducted
to explore the differential engagement of brain regions
during counterfactual thinking, revealing that areas such as
the parahippocampal gyrus and the right hippocampus were
modulated by the subjective likelihood of counterfactual
simulations. These results suggest that episodic
counterfactual thinking engages regions that form the core
brain network, and also that the subjective likelihood of
our counterfactual thoughts modulates the engagement of
different areas within this set of regions.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.015},
Key = {fds287448}
}
@article{fds287450,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Szpunar, KK and Schacter, DL},
Title = {Coming to grips with the past: effect of repeated simulation
on the perceived plausibility of episodic counterfactual
thoughts.},
Journal = {Psychological science},
Volume = {24},
Number = {7},
Pages = {1329-1334},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2013},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612468163},
Abstract = {When people revisit previous experiences, they often engage
in episodic counterfactual thinking: mental simulations of
alternative ways in which personal past events could have
occurred. The present study employed a novel experimental
paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation on
the perceived plausibility of upward, downward, and neutral
episodic counterfactual thoughts. Participants were asked to
remember negative, positive, and neutral autobiographical
memories. One week later, they self-generated upward,
downward, and neutral counterfactual alternatives to those
memories. The following day, they resimulated each of those
counterfactuals either once or four times. The results
indicate that repeated simulation of upward, downward, and
neutral episodic counterfactual events decreases their
perceived plausibility while increasing ratings of the ease,
detail, and valence of the simulations. This finding
suggests a difference between episodic counterfactual
thoughts and other kinds of self-referential simulations.
Possible implications of this finding for pathological and
nonpathological anxiety are discussed.},
Doi = {10.1177/0956797612468163},
Key = {fds287450}
}
@article{fds287449,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Brady, WJ},
Title = {The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our Judgments of
Responsibility},
Journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
Volume = {4},
Number = {2},
Pages = {259-269},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8},
Abstract = {Recent evidence suggests that if a deterministic description
of the events leading up to a morally questionable action is
couched in mechanistic, reductionistic, concrete and/or
emotionally salient terms, people are more inclined toward
compatibilism than when those descriptions use
non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic, abstract and/or
emotionally neutral terms. To explain these results, it has
been suggested that descriptions of the first kind are
processed by a concrete cognitive system, while those of the
second kind are processed by an abstract cognitive system.
The current paper reports the results of three studies
exploring whether or not considerations about possible
future consequences of holding an agent responsible at a
present time affect people's judgments of responsibility.
The results obtained suggest first that the concrete system
does not produce compatibilist judgments of responsibility
unconditionally, even when facing appropriately mechanistic,
reductionistic, emotionally loaded and concretely worded
deterministic scenarios. Second, these results suggest that
considerations about possible future consequences for
innocent third parties that may follow as a result of
holding an agent responsible affect people's judgment as to
whether or not the agent is responsible for what she did.
Finally, it is proposed that these results compliment extant
evidence on the so-called "Side-effect effect", as they
suggest that emotional reactions toward possible future side
effects influence people's judgment of responsibility. The
impact of these results for philosophy and moral psychology
is discussed. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media
Dordrecht.},
Doi = {10.1007/s13164-013-0133-8},
Key = {fds287449}
}
@article{fds320138,
Author = {Acevedo-Triana, C and Fernando Cardenas and P and de Brigard,
F},
Title = {Finding memory: Interview with Daniel L.
Schacter},
Journal = {Universitas Psychologica},
Volume = {12},
Number = {5},
Pages = {1605-1610},
Publisher = {Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.UPSY12-5.fmid},
Abstract = {The present interview offers an annotated dialogue with Dr.
Daniel L. Schacter, in which we had the chance to learn
about his findings, his current studies, in their
implications for memory and cognition. Dr. Schacter is
currently William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Psychology at
Harvard University. With more than 40 years of professional
experience in research on cognition, Dr. Schacter has
published over 400 articles, many in top scientific
journals, and some have been cited thousands of times. For
his multiple theoretical and empirical contributions to the
field of psychology, Dr. Schacter recently received the
American Psychological Association's Award for Distinguished
Scientific Contributions.},
Doi = {10.11144/Javeriana.UPSY12-5.fmid},
Key = {fds320138}
}
@article{fds347944,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Attention is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in Philosophical
Psychology},
Journal = {JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES},
Volume = {20},
Number = {1-2},
Pages = {239-247},
Publisher = {IMPRINT ACADEMIC},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds347944}
}
@article{fds221957,
Author = {(5) Schacter, D.L. and Benoit, R. and De Brigard and F. and Szpunar,
K.K},
Title = {Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual
thinking: Intersections between memory and
decisions.},
Journal = {Neurobiology of Learning and Memory},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds221957}
}
@article{fds287440,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Giovanello, KS and Kaufer, D},
Title = {Neuroanatomy of Memory},
Booktitle = {Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychiatry},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Editor = {Arcinegas, DB and Anderson, CA and Filley, CM},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287440}
}
@article{fds287442,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {What was I thinking? Dennett’s Content and Consciousness
and the reality of propositional attitudes},
Booktitle = {Content and Consciousness Revisited},
Publisher = {Springer},
Editor = {Muñoz-Suárez, CM and De Brigard and F},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287442}
}
@article{fds287443,
Author = {St Jacques and P and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Neural correlates of autobiographical memory: Methodological
Considerations.},
Booktitle = {The Handbook on the Cognitive Neuroscience of
Memory.},
Publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
Editor = {Durte, A and Barense, M and Addis, D},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287443}
}
@article{fds287447,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Review of “Involuntary Autobiographical Memories”.
Dorthe Berntsen. (Cambridge University Press.
2009)},
Journal = {Memory Studies},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds287447}
}
@article{fds287438,
Author = {Giovanello, KS and De Brigard and F and Hennessey Ford and J and Kaufer,
DI and Burke, JR and Browndyke, JN and Welsh-Bohmer,
KA},
Title = {Event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging changes
during relational retrieval in normal aging and amnestic
mild cognitive impairment.},
Journal = {J Int Neuropsychol Soc},
Volume = {18},
Number = {5},
Pages = {886-897},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {1355-6177},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1355617712000689},
Abstract = {The earliest cognitive deficits observed in amnestic mild
cognitive impairment (aMCI) appear to center on memory tasks
that require relational memory (RM), the ability to link or
integrate unrelated pieces of information. RM impairments in
aMCI likely reflect neural changes in the medial temporal
lobe (MTL) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC). We tested
the hypothesis that individuals with aMCI, as compared to
cognitively normal (CN) controls, would recruit neural
regions outside of the MTL and PPC to support relational
memory. To this end, we directly compared the neural
underpinnings of successful relational retrieval in aMCI and
CN groups, using event-related functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), holding constant the stimuli and encoding
task. The fMRI data showed that the CN, compared to the
aMCI, group activated left precuneus, left angular gyrus,
right posterior cingulate, and right parahippocampal cortex
during relational retrieval, while the aMCI group, relative
to the CN group, activated superior temporal gyrus and
supramarginal gyrus for this comparison. Such findings
indicate an early shift in the functional neural
architecture of relational retrieval in aMCI, and may prove
useful in future studies aimed at capitalizing on
functionally intact neural regions as targets for treatment
and slowing of the disease course. (JINS, 2012, 18,
1-12).},
Doi = {10.1017/S1355617712000689},
Key = {fds287438}
}
@article{fds287439,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Giovanello, KS},
Title = {Influence of outcome valence in the subjective experience of
episodic past, future, and counterfactual
thinking.},
Journal = {Consciousness and cognition},
Volume = {21},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1085-1096},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {1053-8100},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.06.007},
Abstract = {Recent findings suggest that our capacity to imagine the
future depends on our capacity to remember the past.
However, the extent to which episodic memory is involved in
our capacity to think about what could have happened in our
past, yet did not occur (i.e., episodic counterfactual
thinking), remains largely unexplored. The current
experiments investigate the phenomenological characteristics
and the influence of outcome valence on the experience of
past, future and counterfactual thoughts. Participants were
asked to mentally simulate past, future, and counterfactual
events with positive or negative outcomes. Features of their
subjective experiences during each type of simulation were
measured using questionnaires and autobiographical
interviews. The results suggest that clarity and vividness
were higher for past than future and counterfactual
simulations. Additionally, emotional intensity was lower for
counterfactual simulations than past and future simulations.
Finally, outcome valence influenced participants' judgment
of probability for future and counterfactual
simulations.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2012.06.007},
Key = {fds287439}
}
@article{fds287436,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {The role of attention in conscious recollection.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {29},
Publisher = {FRONTIERS MEDIA SA},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00029},
Abstract = {Most research on the relationship between attention and
consciousness has been limited to perception. However,
perceptions are not the only kinds of mental contents of
which we can be conscious. An important set of conscious
states that has not received proper treatment within this
discussion is that of memories. This paper reviews
compelling evidence indicating that attention may be
necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious
recollection. However, it is argued that unlike the case of
conscious perception, the kind of attention required during
recollection is internal, as opposed to external, attention.
As such, the surveyed empirical evidence is interpreted as
suggesting that internal attention is necessary, but
probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. The
paper begins by justifying the need for clear distinctions
among different kinds of attention, and then emphasizes the
difference between internal and external attention. Next,
evidence from behavioral, neuropsychological, and
neuroimaging studies suggesting that internal attention is
required for the successful retrieval of memorial contents
is reviewed. In turn, it is argued that internal attention
during recollection is what makes us conscious of the
contents of retrieved memories; further evidence in support
of this claim is also provided. Finally, it is suggested
that internal attention is probably not sufficient for
conscious recollection. Open questions and possible avenues
for future research are also mentioned.},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00029},
Key = {fds287436}
}
@article{fds287437,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Predictive memory and the surprising gap.},
Journal = {Frontiers in psychology},
Volume = {3},
Pages = {420},
Publisher = {FRONTIERS MEDIA SA},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00420},
Doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00420},
Key = {fds287437}
}
@article{fds320139,
Author = {de Brigard, F},
Title = {Consciousness, attention and commonsense},
Journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
Volume = {17},
Number = {9-10},
Pages = {189-201},
Year = {2010},
Month = {October},
Abstract = {In a recent paper, Christopher Mole (2008) argued in favour
of the view that, according to our commonsense psychology,
while consciousness is necessary for attention, attention
isn't necessary for consciousness. In this paper I offer an
argument against this view. More precisely, I offer an
argument against the claim that, according to our
commonsense psychology, consciousness is necessary for
attention. However, I don't claim it follows from this
argument that commonsense has it the other way around, viz.
that consciousness isn't necessary for attention. Instead, I
want to motivate the claim that there isn't such a thing as
the view of commonsense psychology about the relation
between attention and consciousness. I argue that people's
use of these terms - and, presumably, of their corresponding
concepts - seems to be context dependent. I conclude with a
discussion of the possible implications of this claim for
the empirical study of attention and consciousness. ©
Imprint Academic 2010.},
Key = {fds320139}
}
@article{fds287435,
Author = {Sarkissian, H and Chatterjee, A and De brigard, F and Knobe, J and Nichols, S and Sirker, S},
Title = {Is belief in free will a cultural universal?},
Journal = {Mind and Language},
Volume = {25},
Number = {3},
Pages = {346-358},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2010},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0268-1064},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x},
Abstract = {Recent experimental research has revealed surprising
patterns in people's intuitions about free will and moral
responsibility. One limitation of this research, however, is
that it has been conducted exclusively on people from
Western cultures. The present paper extends previous
research by presenting a cross-cultural study examining
intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in
subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and
Colombia. The results revealed a striking degree of
cross-cultural convergence. In all four cultural groups, the
majority of participants said that (a) our universe is
indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not
compatible with determinism. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing
Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x},
Key = {fds287435}
}
@article{fds305554,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {If you like it, does it matter if it’s
real?},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {23},
Number = {1},
Pages = {43-57},
Publisher = {Taylor & Francis (Routledge)},
Year = {2010},
Month = {February},
ISSN = {1465-394X},
url = {http://people.duke.edu/~fd13/De_Brigard_2010_PhilPsych.pdf},
Abstract = {Most people's intuitive reaction after considering Nozick's
experience machine thought-experiment seems to be just like
his: we feel very little inclination to plug in to a virtual
reality machine capable of providing us with pleasurable
experiences. Many philosophers take this empirical fact as
sufficient reason to believe that, more than pleasurable
experiences, people care about "living in contact with
reality." Such claim, however, assumes that people's
reaction to the experience machine thought-experiment is due
to the fact that they value reality over virtual
experiences-an assumption that has seldom (if ever) been
questioned. This paper challenges that very assumption. I
report some experimental evidence suggesting that the
intuition elicited by the thoughtexperiment may be
explainable by the fact that people are averse to abandon
the life they have been experiencing so far, regardless of
whether such life is virtual or real. I use then an
explanatory model, derived from what behavioral economists
and psychologists call the status quo bias, to make sense of
these results. Finally, I argue that since this explanation
also accounts for people's reaction toward Nozick's
thought-experiment, it would be wrong to take such intuition
as evidence that people value being in touch with reality.
© 2010 Taylor & Francis.},
Doi = {10.1080/09515080903532290},
Key = {fds305554}
}
@article{fds287434,
Author = {De Brigard and F and Prinz, J},
Title = {Attention and consciousness.},
Journal = {Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive
science},
Volume = {1},
Number = {1},
Pages = {51-59},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2010},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {1939-5078},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.27},
Abstract = {For the past three decades there has been a substantial
amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that
attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual
representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be
something that it is like to experience a representational
perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently
questioned on the basis of some alleged counterevidence. In
this paper we survey some of the most important recent
findings. In doing so, we have two primary goals. The first
is descriptive: we provide a literature review for those
seeking an understanding of the present debate. The second
is editorial: we suggest that the evidence alleging
dissociations between consciousness and attention is not
decisive. Thus, this is an opinionated overview of the
debate. By presenting our assessment, we hope to bring out
both sides in the debate and to underscore that the issues
here remain matters of intense controversy and ongoing
investigation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For
further resources related to this article, please visit the
WIREs website.},
Doi = {10.1002/wcs.27},
Key = {fds287434}
}
@article{fds287433,
Author = {de Brigard, F and Mandelbaum, E and Ripley, D},
Title = {Responsibility and the brain sciences},
Journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
Volume = {12},
Number = {5},
Pages = {511-524},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2009},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {1386-2820},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9143-5},
Abstract = {Some theorists think that the more we get to know about the
neural underpinnings of our behaviors, the less likely we
will be to hold people responsible for their actions. This
intuition has driven some to suspect that as neuroscience
gains insight into the neurological causes of our actions,
people will cease to view others as morally responsible for
their actions, thus creating a troubling quandary for our
legal system. This paper provides empirical evidence against
such intuitions. Particularly, our studies of folk
intuitions suggest that (1) when the causes of an action are
described in neurological terms, they are not found to be
any more exculpatory than when described in psychological
terms, and (2) agents are not held fully responsible even
for actions that are fully neurologically caused. ©
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008.},
Doi = {10.1007/s10677-008-9143-5},
Key = {fds287433}
}
@article{fds287431,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Review of The Origins of Meaning: Language in the Light of
Evolution},
Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
Volume = {22},
Number = {4},
Pages = {529-533},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2009},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0951-5089},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080903157924},
Doi = {10.1080/09515080903157924},
Key = {fds287431}
}
@article{fds287432,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Comentario crítico a “Las dificultades del compatibilismo
de Dennett”de José Antonio Guerrero del
Amo},
Journal = {Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía},
Volume = {58},
Number = {141},
Pages = {262-268},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds287432}
}
@misc{fds287427,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {Estados Unidos: Entre ilusiones y prejuicios},
Journal = {Revista Javeriana},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds287427}
}
@article{fds287430,
Author = {De Brigard and F},
Title = {En busca de la mente cerebral. Del alma al software
2},
Journal = {Revista Colombiana de Psiquiatría},
Volume = {32},
Number = {4},
Pages = {373-390},
Publisher = {Asociacion Colombiana de Psiquiatria},
Year = {2003},
ISSN = {0034-7450},
Key = {fds287430}
}
@book{fds287441,
Author = {Montañés, P and De Brigard and F},
Title = {Neuropsicologia clinica y cognoscitiva},
Pages = {267 pages},
Publisher = {Univ. Nacional de Colombia},
Year = {2001},
ISBN = {9789588063041},
url = {http://www.bdigital.unal.edu.co/1511/},
Key = {fds287441}
}
|
