Publications of Carlotta Pavese    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Papers Published   
@article{fds343712,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {The psychological reality of practical representation},
   Journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
   Volume = {32},
   Number = {5},
   Pages = {785-822},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1612214},
   Doi = {10.1080/09515089.2019.1612214},
   Key = {fds343712}
}

@article{fds340900,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {Know-how, action, and luck},
   Journal = {Synthese},
   Pages = {1-23},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1823-7},
   Abstract = {© 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of
             Springer Nature A good surgeon knows how to perform a
             surgery; a good architect knows how to design a house. We
             value their know-how. We ordinarily look for it. What makes
             it so valuable? A natural response is that know-how is
             valuable because it explains success. A surgeon’s know-how
             explains their success at performing a surgery. And an
             architect’s know-how explains their success at designing
             houses that stand up. We value know-how because of its
             special explanatory link to success. But in virtue of what
             is know-how explanatorily linked to success? This essay
             provides a novel argument for the thesis that know-how’s
             special link to success is to be explained at least in part
             in terms of its being, or involving, a doxastic attitude
             that is epistemically alike propositional knowledge. It is
             argued that the role played by know-how in explaining
             intentional success shows that the epistemic differences
             between know-how and knowledge, if any, are less than
             usually thought; and that “revisionary intellectualism”,
             the view that know-how is true belief that might well fall
             short of knowledge, is not really a stable position. If its
             explanatory link to success is what makes know-how valuable,
             an upshot of my argument is that the value of know-how is
             due, to a considerable extent, to its being, or involving, a
             kind of propositional knowledge.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-1823-7},
   Key = {fds340900}
}

@article{fds340901,
   Author = {Beddor, B and Pavese, C},
   Title = {Modal Virtue Epistemology},
   Journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12562},
   Doi = {10.1111/phpr.12562},
   Key = {fds340901}
}

@article{fds329157,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {A theory of practical meaning},
   Journal = {Philosophical Topics},
   Volume = {45},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {65-96},
   Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics201745214},
   Abstract = {This essay introduces the notion of practical meaning by
             looking at a certain kind of procedural system-the motor
             system-that plays a central role in computational models of
             motor behavior. I suggest that a semantics for motor
             commands has to appeal to a distinctively practical kind of
             meaning. Defending the explanatory relevance of motor
             representation and of its semantic properties in a
             computational explanation of motor behavior, my argument
             concludes that practical meanings play a central role in an
             adequate explanation of motor behavior that is based on
             these computational models. In the second part of this
             essay, I generalize and clarify the notion of practical
             meaning, and I defend the intelligibility of practical
             meanings against an important objection.},
   Doi = {10.5840/philtopics201745214},
   Key = {fds329157}
}

@article{fds328610,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {Know-how and gradability},
   Journal = {The Philosophical Review},
   Volume = {126},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {345-383},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3878493},
   Abstract = {© 2017 by Cornell University. Orthodoxy has it that
             knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees
             (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other
             hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability
             of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when
             we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that
             one knows how to do something better than somebody else.
             When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions
             of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against
             intellectualism about know-how—the view that know-how is a
             species of propositional knowledge. This essay defends
             intellectualism from the argument of gradability. It is
             argued that the gradability of ascriptions of know-how
             should be discounted as a rather superficial linguistic
             phenomenon, one that can be explained in a way compatible
             with the absoluteness of the state reported.},
   Doi = {10.1215/00318108-3878493},
   Key = {fds328610}
}

@article{fds327430,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {On the meaning of 'therefore'},
   Journal = {Analysis},
   Volume = {77},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {88-97},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx040},
   Doi = {10.1093/analys/anx040},
   Key = {fds327430}
}

@article{fds321609,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {Skill in epistemology II: Skill and know
             how},
   Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
   Volume = {11},
   Number = {11},
   Pages = {650-660},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12364},
   Abstract = {© 2016 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2016 John Wiley
             & Sons Ltd The prequel to this paper has discussed the
             relation between knowledge and skill and introduced the
             topic of the relationship between skill and know how. This
             sequel continues the discussion. First, I survey the recent
             debate on intellectualism about knowing how (Sections
             1–3). Then, I tackle the question as to whether
             intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about skill and
             intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about know how
             fall or stand together (Sections 4–5).},
   Doi = {10.1111/phc3.12364},
   Key = {fds321609}
}

@article{fds321610,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {Skill in epistemology I: Skill and knowledge},
   Journal = {Philosophy Compass},
   Volume = {11},
   Number = {11},
   Pages = {642-649},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {November},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12359},
   Abstract = {© 2016 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2016 John Wiley
             & Sons Ltd Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. In
             this essay, I discuss the question of their relationship and
             of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of
             explanation. I review some of the answers that have been
             given thus far in the literature, with a particular focus on
             the many foundational issues in epistemology that intersect
             with the philosophy of skill.},
   Doi = {10.1111/phc3.12359},
   Key = {fds321610}
}

@article{fds310114,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {Knowing a rule},
   Journal = {Philosophical Issues},
   Volume = {25},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {165-188},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {October},
   ISSN = {1533-6077},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phis.12045},
   Doi = {10.1111/phis.12045},
   Key = {fds310114}
}

@article{fds310113,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {Practical senses},
   Journal = {Philosophers Imprint},
   Volume = {15},
   Number = {29},
   Pages = {1-25},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {January},
   Key = {fds310113}
}

@article{fds330842,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {Meanings, propositions and decitationalism},
   Journal = {Iride},
   Volume = {20},
   Number = {51},
   Pages = {361-368},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1414/25524},
   Doi = {10.1414/25524},
   Key = {fds330842}
}


%% Journal Articles   
@article{fds324408,
   Author = {Pavese, C},
   Title = {Logical Inference and Its Dynamics},
   Journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems},
   Pages = {203-219},
   Publisher = {COLLEGE PUBLICATIONS},
   Editor = {Roy, O and Tamminga, A and Willer, M},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   Key = {fds324408}
}