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| Publications of Karen Neander :chronological alphabetical combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds331100,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {A mark of the mental: In defense of informational
teleosemantics},
Pages = {1-327},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {0262339862},
Abstract = {© 2017 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A Mark of the
Mental, Karen Neander considers the representational power
of mental states -- described by the cognitive scientist
Zenon Pylyshyn as the “second hardest puzzle” of
philosophy of mind (the first being consciousness). The
puzzle at the heart of the book is sometimes called “the
problem of mental content," “Brentano’s problem," or
“the problem of intentionality." Its motivating mystery is
how neurobiological states can have semantic properties such
as meaning or reference. Neander proposes a naturalistic
account for sensory-perceptual (nonconceptual)
representations. Neander draws on insights from state-space
semantics (which appeals to relations of second-order
similarity between representing and represented domains),
causal theories of reference (which claim the reference
relation is a causal one), and teleosemantic theories (which
claim that semantic norms, at their simplest, depend on
functional norms). She proposes and defends an intuitive,
theoretically well-motivated but highly controversial
thesis: sensory-perceptual systems have the function to
produce inner state changes that are the analogs of as well
as caused by their referents. Neander shows that the three
main elements -- functions, causal-information relations,
and relations of second-order similarity -- complement
rather than conflict with each other. After developing an
argument for teleosemantics by examining the nature of
explanation in the mind and brain sciences, she develops a
theory of mental content and defends it against six main
content-determinacy challenges to a naturalized
semantics.},
Key = {fds331100}
}
%% Papers Published
@article{fds326195,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Functional analysis and the species design},
Journal = {Synthese},
Volume = {194},
Number = {4},
Pages = {1147-1168},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2017},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0940-9},
Abstract = {© 2015, The Author(s). This paper argues that a minimal
notion of function and a notion of normal-proper function
are used in explaining how bodies and brains operate.
Neither is Cummins’ (1975) notion, as originally defined,
and yet his is often taken to be the clearly relevant notion
for such an explanatory context. This paper also explains
how adverting to normal-proper functions, even if these are
selected functions, can play a significant scientific role
in the operational explanations of complex systems that
physiologists and neurophysiologists provide, despite a lack
of relevant causal efficacy on the part of such
functions.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0940-9},
Key = {fds326195}
}
@article{fds336416,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Does biology need teleology?},
Pages = {64-76},
Booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Evolution and Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781138789555},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315764863},
Abstract = {© 2018 Taylor & Francis. To ask the function of short-term
memory one might ask, “What is short-term memory for?" 1
Or, to ascribe a function to eyelashes one might say,
“Eyelashes divert airflow to protect the eye.” 2 If a
function of x is to z, it is for z-ing or is there to z.
This manner of speaking has a teleological flavor, but do
biologists really use a teleological notion of function in
contemporary biology, and, if so, what (if any) scientific
purpose is it serving?.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315764863},
Key = {fds336416}
}
@article{fds336417,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {The methodological argument for informational
teleosemantics},
Pages = {121-140},
Booktitle = {How Biology Shapes Philosophy: New Foundations for
Naturalism},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
ISBN = {9781107055834},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781107295490.007},
Abstract = {© Cambridge University Press 2017. The Bare-Bones Version
Dennis Stampe (1977) and Fred Dretske (1986) proposed that
mental reference to content supervenes on
information-carrying functions. Their proposal endorsed two
main theses: (1) that mental reference to content is
grounded in the normal-proper functions of components of
cognitive systems (teleosemantics) and (2) that mental
reference to content is grounded in the natural information
processed by these systems (informational semantics). My aim
here is to make explicit a methodological argument in
support of this dual thesis (“informational
teleosemantics”). The argument is methodological in the
sense that it relies on certain claims concerning
explanatory concepts and practices in the mind and brain
sciences. This first section gives the bare-bones version of
the methodological argument. Later sections discuss each of
the premises in turn, and then they discuss the kind and
degree of support that the argument provides for the
conclusion. Without further ado, here is the bare-bones
version: P1: A notion of normal-proper function is central
to the multilevel componential analyses (aka “functional
analyses”) of the operation of bodies and brains that are
currently provided by physiologists and neurophysiologists.
P2: The brain’s normal-proper functions include cognitive
functions. P3: The same notion of function (mentioned in P1)
is central to the functional analyses of cognition that
cognitive scientists provide. P4: An assumption in the
mainstream branches of the cognitive sciences is that
cognition involves information processing. P5: The
(relevant) notion of information involved in talk of
information processing in cognitive science is a notion of
natural, factive information. P6: Cognitive science posits
“normative aboutness,” with the norms derived from the
normal-proper functions and the aboutness from the natural,
factive information. C: Some version of informational
teleosemantics (broadly conceived) is supported by the
explanations of cognition that the mind and brain sciences
currently provide. Though probably implicit in the
suggestions made by Stampe and Dretske, this argument has
not been fully articulated before. I try to cast some light
on the reasons for this in the discussion that follows.
Premise 1 The first premise says that a notion of
normal-proper function is central to the multilevel
componential analyses (aka “functional analyses”) of the
operation of bodies and brains that are currently provided
by physiologists and neurophysiologists.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781107295490.007},
Key = {fds336417}
}
@article{fds244514,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Biological Functions},
Booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2013},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds244514}
}
@article{fds219962,
Author = {Karen Neander and Alex Rosenberg},
Title = {Solving the Circularity Problem for Functions},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Year = {2012},
Month = {September},
Keywords = {functions, etiological, modal theory},
Abstract = {A response to the circularity objection to an etiological
theory of functions and critique of the modal theory of
functions.},
Key = {fds219962}
}
@article{fds299423,
Author = {Neander, K and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Solving the circularity problem for functions: A response to
Nanay},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {109},
Number = {10},
Pages = {613-622},
Publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0022-362X},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000322685100003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.5840/jphil20121091030},
Key = {fds299423}
}
@article{fds244522,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Toward an Informational Teleosemantics},
Pages = {21-41},
Booktitle = {Millikan and Her Critics},
Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL},
Editor = {Kingsbury, J and Ryder, D},
Year = {2012},
ISBN = {0470656859},
Abstract = {This argues against Millikan’s admonishments to the
contrary that a teleosemantic theory of mental content can
be a causal theory of content. Objections to the effect that
functions are selected effects and so are not causes are
mistaken about what follows from an etiological theory of
functions. There can be information carrying functions on an
appropriate understanding of natural functions and natural
information.},
Key = {fds244522}
}
@article{fds244513,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {"Teleological theories of mental content"},
Booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds244513}
}
@article{fds244541,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Solving the circularity problem for functions},
Journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
Year = {2011},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds244541}
}
@article{fds244521,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {"Comment les traits sont-ils types dans le but leur
attribuuer des fonctions?" (How are traits typed for the
purpose of ascribing functions to them?)},
Pages = {99-124},
Booktitle = {Les Fonctions: des organismes aux Artifacts},
Publisher = {Press Universitaires France},
Editor = {Gayon, J},
Year = {2010},
Month = {Fall},
Keywords = {functions • vestigial traits • exaptations •
selection • selection for • Cummins •
etiological theory of functions},
Abstract = {This paper discusses how traits are to be classified, not by
functions, but for the purpose of ascribing functions to
them.},
Key = {fds244521}
}
@article{fds244526,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Are homolgies function free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {1-39},
Year = {2009},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds244526}
}
@article{fds244542,
Author = {Neander, KL and Rosenberg, A},
Title = {Are Homologies SE (or CR) Function-Free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1464-3537},
Key = {fds244542}
}
@article{fds299430,
Author = {Rosenberg, A and Neander, K},
Title = {Are homologies (selected effect or causal role) function
free?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {76},
Number = {3},
Pages = {307-334},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2009},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000273398800003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {This article argues that at least very many judgments of
homology rest on prior attributions of selected-effect (SE)
function, and that many of the "parts" of biological systems
that are rightly classified as homologous are constituted by
(are so classified in virtue of) their consequence
etiologies. We claim that SE functions are often used in the
prior identification of the parts deemed to be homologous
and are often used to differentiate more restricted
homologous kinds within less restricted ones. In doing so,
we discuss recent criticism of this view that has been
offered (especially that offered by Paul Griffiths).
Copyright 2009 by the Philosophy of Science
Association.},
Doi = {10.1086/649807},
Key = {fds299430}
}
@article{fds244520,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Les explication fonctionnelles},
Pages = {5-35},
Booktitle = {Revue Philosophique},
Editor = {Lorne, MC and Forest, D},
Year = {2009},
Key = {fds244520}
}
@article{fds299424,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Les explications fonctionnelles},
Journal = {Revue Philosophique De La France Et De L'Étranger},
Volume = {134},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-5},
Publisher = {CAIRN},
Year = {2009},
ISSN = {0035-3833},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000263338100002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.3917/rphi.091.0005},
Key = {fds299424}
}
@article{fds244527,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Naturalistic Theories of Reference},
Pages = {374-391},
Publisher = {BLACKWELL PUBLISHING LTD},
Year = {2008},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470757031.ch19},
Doi = {10.1002/9780470757031.ch19},
Key = {fds244527}
}
@article{fds244512,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Teleological Theories of Mental Content: Can Darwin Solve
the Problem of Intentionality?},
Pages = {381-409},
Booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Ruse, M},
Year = {2008},
Keywords = {content • mental content • teleological theories
of mental content • teleosemantics •
representation • Dretske • Millikan •
Fodor},
Abstract = {Survey and critique of teleological theories of mental
content.},
Key = {fds244512}
}
@article{fds244540,
Author = {Lycan, W and Neander, K},
Title = {Teleofunctionalism},
Journal = {Scholarpedia},
Volume = {3},
Number = {7},
Pages = {5358-5358},
Publisher = {Scholarpedia},
Year = {2008},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4249/scholarpedia.5358},
Doi = {10.4249/scholarpedia.5358},
Key = {fds244540}
}
@article{fds311265,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Biological Approaches To Mental Representation},
Pages = {549-565},
Booktitle = {Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Year = {2007},
Month = {December},
ISBN = {9780444515438},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50025-3},
Abstract = {As per Brentano, one cannot have any mental attitude towards
a thing unless it is present in one's mind. One cannot hope,
doubt, taste, believe, or remember that thing unless the
thing and its characteristics are present in mind.
Teleosemantic theories are diverse range of answers on how
do minds and brains represent things and what is these
reference to these contents? But each teleosemantic theory
maintains that the answer involves a normative and
teleological notion of function, or in other words a notion
of function that underwrites talk of malfunction and that is
construed as a notion of what traits or items are for. There
are a number of different teleological theories of mental
content. Certainly there is a specific normative notion of
function that underwrites certain normative notion of
content. Content is said to be normative because some mental
states that have content may represent correctly or may also
misrepresent. Teleological theories of mental content, like
others, attempt to provide naturalistic theories of mental
content. According to Ontological Behaviorism, mental terms
have a behavioral analysis. The first analysis is that
mental states cannot be reduced to brain states because
mental states are multiply realizable and second analysis is
that mental states can be characterized in terms of their
functional role. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50025-3},
Key = {fds311265}
}
@article{fds244539,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Moths and Metaphors. Review Essay on Organisms and
Artifacts: Design in Nature and Elsewhere by Tim
Lewens},
Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
Volume = {21},
Number = {4},
Pages = {591-602},
Publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
Year = {2006},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000242448800009&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/s10539-005-9006-6},
Key = {fds244539}
}
@article{fds244510,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {“Biological Approaches to Mental Representation”},
Pages = {561-77},
Booktitle = {Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 3: The
Philosophy of Biology},
Publisher = {Elsevier},
Editor = {Matthen, M and Stevens, C},
Year = {2006},
ISBN = {9780444515438},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50025-3},
Keywords = {content • mental content • representation •
teleological • teleosemantics • Millikan •
Dretske • Papineau},
Abstract = {Survey and critique of teleological (teleosemantic) theories
of mental content.},
Doi = {10.1016/B978-044451543-8/50025-3},
Key = {fds244510}
}
@article{fds244511,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {“Naturalistic Theories of Reference”},
Pages = {374-391},
Booktitle = {The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of
Language},
Publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
Editor = {Devitt, M and Hanley, R},
Year = {2006},
Keywords = {content • mental content • representation •
naturalistic • reference • Fodor • Millikan
• Dretske},
Abstract = {A survey of contemporary naturalistic theories of reference
in so far as they concern mental representations.},
Key = {fds244511}
}
@article{fds244519,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Content for Cognitive Science},
Pages = {140-159},
Booktitle = {Teleosemantics},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Papineau, D and McDonald, G},
Year = {2006},
Keywords = {teleosemantics • teleological theories of mental
content • content • mental content •
representation • cognitive science • Millikan
• Dretske • Fodor},
Abstract = {This paper on mental representation argues that only certain
contents are suitable for mainstream cognitive science and
information processing explanations of cognitive capacities.
It also argues via a detailed look at toad neuroethology
that standard teleosemantic theories (e.g., Millikan’s and
Sterelny’s) do not generate suitable content ascriptions
for simple systems (frogs and the like), though other
teleosemantic theories may do so (e.g., Neander’s and
Dretske’s).},
Key = {fds244519}
}
@article{fds219965,
Author = {K.L. Neander},
Title = {"Moths and Metaphors: A Critical Essay on Organisms and
Artifacts: Design in Nature and Elsewhere" by Tim
Lewens},
Journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds219965}
}
@article{fds244509,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {"Evolutionary Theory and Natural Selection"},
Booktitle = {Encyclopdia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Macmillan},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds244509}
}
@article{fds244523,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Teleology},
Journal = {Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Macmillan},
Year = {2005},
Key = {fds244523}
}
@article{fds244517,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Types of Traits: The Importance of Functional
Homologues},
Booktitle = {Functions: New Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology and
Biology},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press},
Editor = {Ariew, A and Cummins, R and Perlman, M},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244517}
}
@article{fds244518,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Warum Geschichte zahlt: Vier Theorien von Funktionen (Why
History Matters: Four Theories of Function in
Biology)},
Booktitle = {Formen der Erklaerung in der Biologie},
Publisher = {Verlag fuer Wissenschaft und Bildung},
Editor = {Weingarten, M and Schlosser, G},
Year = {2002},
Key = {fds244518}
}
@article{fds244516,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Fitness and the Fate of Unicorns},
Pages = {3-26},
Booktitle = {Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays},
Publisher = {Bradford, MIT Press},
Address = {Cambridge, Mass},
Editor = {Hardcastle, V},
Year = {1999},
Key = {fds244516}
}
@article{fds244538,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for
representational theories of consciousness},
Journal = {Nous},
Volume = {32},
Number = {SUPPL. 12},
Pages = {411-434},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1998},
Month = {October},
ISSN = {0029-4624},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000076800200018&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.18},
Key = {fds244538}
}
@article{fds244508,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {MENTAL ILLNESS, concept of},
Booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
Publisher = {Routledge},
Editor = {Craig, E and Jackson, S-EBF},
Year = {1998},
Key = {fds244508}
}
@article{fds244530,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {The Function of Cognition: Godfrey-Smith's Environmental
Complexity Thesis},
Journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
Volume = {12},
Number = {4},
Pages = {567-580},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1997},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0169-3867},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006524203891},
Doi = {10.1023/A:1006524203891},
Key = {fds244530}
}
@article{fds244533,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Dretske's innate modesty},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {74},
Number = {2},
Pages = {258-274},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1996},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1996UL62300002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1080/00048409612347241},
Key = {fds244533}
}
@article{fds244532,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Swampman Meets Swampcow},
Journal = {Mind & Language},
Volume = {11},
Number = {1},
Pages = {118-129},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {1996},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0268-1064},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1996UW16900010&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00036.x},
Key = {fds244532}
}
@article{fds244529,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Explaining complex adaptations: A reply to sober's 'reply to
neander'},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {46},
Number = {4},
Pages = {583-587},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1995},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0007-0882},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.4.583},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/46.4.583},
Key = {fds244529}
}
@article{fds244531,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Misrepresenting & malfunctioning},
Journal = {Philosophical Studies},
Volume = {79},
Number = {2},
Pages = {109-141},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {1995},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0031-8116},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1995RP14800001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1007/BF00989706},
Key = {fds244531}
}
@article{fds244534,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Pruning the tree of life},
Journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {46},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-80},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1995},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0007-0882},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1995QL53800003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {Some (eg. Elliott Sober) argue that natural selection does
not explain the genotypic arid phenotypic properties of
individuals. On this view, natural selection explains the
adaptedness of individuals, not by explaining why the
individuals that exist have the adaptations they do, but
rather by explaining why the individuals that exist are the
ones with those adaptations. This paper argues that this
'Negative' view of natural selection ignores the fact that
natural selection is a cumulative selection process. So
understood, it explains how the genetic sequences that
individuals inherit and that are responsible for their
complex (and co-adapted) adaptations first arose in the
gene-pool. © 1995 Oxford University Press.},
Doi = {10.1093/bjps/46.1.59},
Key = {fds244534}
}
@article{fds299422,
Author = {Neander, KD and Flohr, HJ},
Title = {The tautly stretched bedsheet as a trigger for decubitus
ulcers},
Journal = {Krankenpflege Journal},
Volume = {33},
Number = {3},
Pages = {65-67},
Year = {1995},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0174-108X},
Key = {fds299422}
}
@article{fds244515,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Comments on Stich and Laurence},
Pages = {120-124},
Booktitle = {Prospects for Intentionality},
Editor = {Neander, K and Ravenscroft, I},
Year = {1993},
Key = {fds244515}
}
@article{fds244535,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {The teleological notion of 'function},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {69},
Number = {4},
Pages = {454-468},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {1991},
Month = {December},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1991GR92500005&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1080/00048409112344881},
Key = {fds244535}
}
@article{fds244536,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's
Defense},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {58},
Number = {2},
Pages = {168-184},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1991},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1991FQ15000002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/289610},
Key = {fds244536}
}
@article{fds244528,
Author = {Neander, K and Menzies, P},
Title = {David omens on levels of explanation},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {99},
Number = {395},
Pages = {459-466},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1990},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {0026-4423},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1990DR99100010&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/mind/XCIX.395.459},
Key = {fds244528}
}
@article{fds340356,
Author = {NEANDER, K and MENZIES, P},
Title = {OWENS,DAVID ON LEVELS OF EXPLANATION},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {99},
Number = {395},
Pages = {459-466},
Year = {1990},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds340356}
}
@article{fds219969,
Author = {K.L. Neander and Peter Menzies},
Title = {David Owens on Levels of Explanation},
Journal = {Mind},
Volume = {XCIX},
Number = {395},
Pages = {459-466},
Year = {1990},
Key = {fds219969}
}
@article{fds299421,
Author = {Neander, KD},
Title = {Prevention of decubitus ulcer--current perceptions},
Journal = {Krankenpflege Journal},
Volume = {27},
Number = {5},
Pages = {204-211},
Year = {1989},
Month = {May},
ISSN = {0174-108X},
Key = {fds299421}
}
@article{fds299427,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {What Does Natural Selection Explain? Correction to
Sober},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Volume = {55},
Number = {3},
Pages = {422-426},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {1988},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0031-8248},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1988P877200007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1086/289446},
Key = {fds299427}
}
@article{fds299428,
Author = {NEANDER, K},
Title = {ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE - THE VERY IDEA -
HAUGELAND,J},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {66},
Number = {2},
Pages = {269-271},
Year = {1988},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1988P747700016&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds299428}
}
@article{fds244525,
Author = {Neander, KL},
Title = {Discussion: What Does Natural Selection Explain?},
Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
Pages = {422-426},
Year = {1988},
Key = {fds244525}
}
@article{fds244537,
Author = {Neander, K},
Title = {Pictorial representation: A matter of resemblance},
Journal = {The British Journal of Aesthetics},
Volume = {27},
Number = {3},
Pages = {213-226},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {1987},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {0007-0904},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1987J128400002&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1093/bjaesthetics/27.3.213},
Key = {fds244537}
}
@article{fds299429,
Author = {NEANDER, K},
Title = {THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION -
CUMMINS,R},
Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
Volume = {64},
Number = {1},
Pages = {104-108},
Year = {1986},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {0004-8402},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1986C175500014&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Key = {fds299429}
}
@article{fds244524,
Author = {Neander, KL and Mortensen, C and Speck, C},
Title = {Art, Representation and Values},
Journal = {Journal of the Institute of Art Education},
Volume = {10},
Number = {1},
Pages = {63-66},
Year = {1986},
Key = {fds244524}
}
@article{fds219963,
Author = {K.L. Neander},
Title = {"Toward an Informational Teleosemantics"},
Booktitle = {Millikan and Her Critics},
Editor = {Justine Kingsbury},
Keywords = {Teleolosemantics, functions, information, representation,
content, distal content, Millikan, Papineau.},
Abstract = {This paper argues that there are response functions. Systems
can have the function to produce one thing in response to
another. This has consequences for the kind of
teleosemantics that can be offered. Contrary to claims made
by Millikan and Papineau, sensory representations can have
contents that are determined by the functions of sensory
systems to respond to stimuli in certain ways. This paper
further explores these implications and offers a
teleosemantic and yet informational theory for sensory
representations. It further offers a solution to the problem
of distal content.},
Key = {fds219963}
}
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