Publications of Paul Henne    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Journal Articles   
@article{fds343595,
   Author = {Henne, P and Niemi, L and Pinillos, Á and De Brigard and F and Knobe,
             J},
   Title = {A counterfactual explanation for the action effect in causal
             judgment.},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {190},
   Pages = {157-164},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006},
   Abstract = {People's causal judgments are susceptible to the action
             effect, whereby they judge actions to be more causal than
             inactions. We offer a new explanation for this effect, the
             counterfactual explanation: people judge actions to be more
             causal than inactions because they are more inclined to
             consider the counterfactual alternatives to actions than to
             consider counterfactual alternatives to inactions.
             Experiment 1a conceptually replicates the original action
             effect for causal judgments. Experiment 1b confirms a novel
             prediction of the new explanation, the reverse action
             effect, in which people judge inactions to be more causal
             than actions in overdetermination cases. Experiment 2
             directly compares the two effects in joint-causation and
             overdetermination scenarios and conceptually replicates them
             with new scenarios. Taken together, these studies provide
             support for the new counterfactual explanation for the
             action effect in causal judgment.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006},
   Key = {fds343595}
}

@article{fds337722,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Dougherty, AM and Yang, BW and Henne, P and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {Reasons probably won't change your mind: The role of reasons
             in revising moral decisions.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology. General},
   Volume = {147},
   Number = {7},
   Pages = {962-987},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000368},
   Abstract = {Although many philosophers argue that making and revising
             moral decisions ought to be a matter of deliberating over
             reasons, the extent to which the consideration of reasons
             informs people's moral decisions and prompts them to change
             their decisions remains unclear. Here, after making an
             initial decision in 2-option moral dilemmas, participants
             examined reasons for only the option initially chosen
             (affirming reasons), reasons for only the option not
             initially chosen (opposing reasons), or reasons for both
             options. Although participants were more likely to change
             their initial decisions when presented with only opposing
             reasons compared with only affirming reasons, these effect
             sizes were consistently small. After evaluating reasons,
             participants were significantly more likely not to change
             their initial decisions than to change them, regardless of
             the set of reasons they considered. The initial decision
             accounted for most of the variance in predicting the final
             decision, whereas the reasons evaluated accounted for a
             relatively small proportion of the variance in predicting
             the final decision. This resistance to changing moral
             decisions is at least partly attributable to a biased,
             motivated evaluation of the available reasons: participants
             rated the reasons supporting their initial decisions more
             favorably than the reasons opposing their initial decisions,
             regardless of the reported strategy used to make the initial
             decision. Overall, our results suggest that the
             consideration of reasons rarely induces people to change
             their initial decisions in moral dilemmas. (PsycINFO
             Database Record},
   Doi = {10.1037/xge0000368},
   Key = {fds337722}
}

@article{fds337723,
   Author = {Stanley, ML and Henne, P and Iyengar, V and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De
             Brigard, F},
   Title = {I'm not the person I used to be: The self and
             autobiographical memories of immoral actions.},
   Journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology. General},
   Volume = {146},
   Number = {6},
   Pages = {884-895},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000317},
   Abstract = {People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways:
             They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people,
             and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in
             the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories.
             The authors investigate the role of autobiographical
             memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a
             positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally
             harming others, participants judge their own actions as less
             morally wrong and less negative than those in which other
             people lied to or emotionally harmed them. Furthermore,
             people judge those actions that happened further in the past
             to be more morally wrong than those that happened more
             recently. Finally, for periods of the past when they
             believed that they were very different people than they are
             now, participants judge their actions to be more morally
             wrong and more negative than those actions from periods of
             their pasts when they believed that they were very similar
             to who they are now. The authors discuss these findings in
             relation to theories about the function of autobiographical
             memory and moral cognition in constructing and perceiving
             the self over time. (PsycINFO Database Record},
   Doi = {10.1037/xge0000317},
   Key = {fds337723}
}

@article{fds318389,
   Author = {Henne, P and Pinillos, Á and De Brigard and F},
   Title = {Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering
             Plants},
   Journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
   Volume = {95},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {270-283},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567},
   Abstract = {© 2016 Australasian Association of Philosophy. People
             generally accept that there is causation by omission—that
             the omission of some events cause some related events. But
             this acceptance elicits the selection problem, or the
             difficulty of explaining the selection of a particular
             omissive cause or class of causes from the causal
             conditions. Some theorists contend that dependence theories
             of causation cannot resolve this problem. In this paper, we
             argue that the appeal to norms adequately resolves the
             selection problem for dependence theories, and we provide
             novel experimental evidence for it.},
   Doi = {10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567},
   Key = {fds318389}
}

@article{fds318390,
   Author = {Chituc, V and Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W and De Brigard,
             F},
   Title = {Blame, not ability, impacts moral "ought" judgments for
             impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of
             "ought" implies "can".},
   Journal = {Cognition},
   Volume = {150},
   Pages = {20-25},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {May},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
   Abstract = {Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts
             including obligation, blame, and ability. While little
             empirical work has studied the relationships among these
             concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a
             relationship in the principle that "ought" implies "can,"
             which states that if someone ought to do something, then
             they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of
             these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported
             here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent
             ought to keep a promise that he is unable to keep, but only
             when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows
             that such "ought" judgments correlate with judgments of
             blame, rather than with judgments of the agent's ability.
             Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral "ought"
             judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral
             "ought" judgments, such as what someone ought to do to
             fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk
             moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed
             philosophical principle that "ought" implies "can." Instead,
             judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments
             of obligation.},
   Doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013},
   Key = {fds318390}
}

@article{fds318388,
   Author = {Henne, P and Chituc, V and De Brigard and F and Sinnott-Armstrong,
             W},
   Title = {An Empirical Refutation of 'Ought' Implies
             'Can'},
   Journal = {Analysis},
   Volume = {76},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {283-290},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw041},
   Doi = {10.1093/analys/anw041},
   Key = {fds318388}
}


%% Chapters in Books   
@misc{fds337721,
   Author = {Henne, P and Sinnott-Armstrong, W},
   Title = {Does neuroscience undermine morality?},
   Pages = {54-67},
   Booktitle = {Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age
             of Neuroscience},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780190460723},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
   Abstract = {© Oxford University Press 2018. In Chapter 4, the authors
             explore whether neuroscience undermines morality. The
             authors distinguish, analyze, and assess the main arguments
             for neuroscientific skepticism about morality and argue that
             neuroscience does not undermine all of our moral judgments,
             focusing the majority of their attention on one argument in
             particular-the idea that neuroscience and psychology might
             undermine moral knowledge by showing that our moral beliefs
             result from unreliable processes. They argue that the
             background arguments needed to bolster the main premise fail
             to adequately support it. They conclude that the overall
             issue of neuroscience undermining morality is unsettled,
             but, they contend, we can reach some tentative and qualified
             conclusions. Neuroscience is, then, not a general
             underminer, but can play a constructive role in moral
             theory, although not by itself. In order to make progress,
             neuroscience and normative moral theory must work
             together.},
   Doi = {10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004},
   Key = {fds337721}
}