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| Publications of Nicholas W. Carnes :chronological alphabetical combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds371821,
Author = {Carnes, N and Lupu, N},
Title = {The Economic Backgrounds of Politicians},
Volume = {26},
Pages = {253-270},
Year = {2023},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102946},
Abstract = {Research on the economic backgrounds of politicians is once
again flourishing in political science. In this article, we
describe the economic characteristics that scholars have
recently studied and the common threads that have emerged in
modern work on this topic. This growing literature is
largely united by a shared concern about the unequal
economic makeup of institutions: Recent studies generally
agree that politicians tend to be vastly better off than
citizens on every economic measure and that politicians from
different economic backgrounds tend to think and behave
differently in office. However, the literature is far from a
consensus regarding why politicians are so economically
advantaged. Going forward, there are numerous opportunities
for future work to address this gap; to extend the
literature to new countries, institutions, and time periods;
and to better understand how economic backgrounds intersect
with race, gender, and other social characteristics.},
Doi = {10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102946},
Key = {fds371821}
}
@book{fds220410,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {White-collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in
Economic Policy Making},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2013},
Month = {November},
Key = {fds220410}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds323129,
Author = {Carnes, N and Lupu, N},
Title = {What good is a college degree? Education and leader quality
reconsidered},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {78},
Number = {1},
Pages = {35-49},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/683027},
Abstract = {Do people with more formal education make better political
leaders? In this article we analyze cross-national data on
random leadership transitions, data on close elections in
the US Congress, and data on randomly audited municipalities
in Brazil. Across a wide range of outcomes, we consistently
find that college-educated leaders perform about the same as
or worse than leaders with less formal education.
Politicians with college degrees do not tend to govern over
more prosperous nations, do not pass more bills, do not tend
to do better at the polls, and are no less likely to be
corrupt. These findings have important implications for how
citizens evaluate candidates, how scholars measure leader
quality, and how we think about the role of education in
policy making.},
Doi = {10.1086/683027},
Key = {fds323129}
}
%% Papers Published
@article{fds372685,
Author = {Bartels, LM and Carnes, N},
Title = {House Republicans were rewarded for supporting Donald
Trump's 'stop the steal' efforts.},
Journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America},
Volume = {120},
Number = {34},
Pages = {e2309072120},
Year = {2023},
Month = {August},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2309072120},
Abstract = {In early 2021, members of Congress cast a series of
high-profile roll call votes forcing them to choose between
condoning or opposing Donald Trump's efforts to overturn the
2020 presidential election. Substantial majorities of House
Republicans supported Trump, first by opposing the
certification of electoral votes from Arizona and
Pennsylvania on January 6th, then by opposing the
president's impeachment for inciting the attack on the US
Capitol, and then by opposing a bill that would have created
a national commission to investigate the events of January
6th. We examine whether the House Republicans who voted to
support Trump in 2021 were rewarded or punished in the 2022
congressional midterm elections. We find no evidence that
members who supported Trump did better or worse in contested
general election races. However, Trump supporters were less
likely to lose primary elections, more likely to run
unopposed in the general election, more likely to run for
higher office, and less likely to retire from politics.
Overall, there seem to have been no significant political
costs and some significant rewards in 2022 for House
Republicans who supported Trump's undemocratic
behavior.},
Doi = {10.1073/pnas.2309072120},
Key = {fds372685}
}
@article{fds347005,
Author = {Broockman, DE and Carnes, N and Crowder-Meyer, M and Skovron,
C},
Title = {Why Local Party Leaders Don't Support Nominating
Centrists},
Journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {51},
Number = {2},
Pages = {724-749},
Year = {2021},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000309},
Abstract = {Would giving party leaders more influence in primary
elections in the United States decrease elite polarization?
Some scholars have argued that political party leaders tend
to support centrist candidates in the hopes of winning
general elections. In contrast, the authors argue that many
local party leaders - especially Republicans - may not
believe that centrists perform better in elections and
therefore may not support nominating them. They test this
argument using data from an original survey of 1,118
county-level party leaders. In experiments, they find that
local party leaders most prefer nominating candidates who
are similar to typical co-partisans, not centrists.
Moreover, given the choice between a more centrist and more
extreme candidate, they strongly prefer extremists:
Democrats do so by about 2 to 1 and Republicans by 10 to 1.
Likewise, in open-ended questions, Democratic Party leaders
are twice as likely to say they look for extreme candidates
relative to centrists; Republican Party leaders are five
times as likely. Potentially driving these partisan
differences, Republican leaders are especially likely to
believe that extremists can win general elections and
overestimate the electorate's conservatism by double
digits.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0007123419000309},
Key = {fds347005}
}
@article{fds349967,
Author = {Carnes, N and Lupu, N},
Title = {The white working class and the 2016 election},
Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
Volume = {19},
Number = {1},
Pages = {55-72},
Year = {2021},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720001267},
Abstract = {Academics and political pundits alike attribute rising
support for right-wing political options across advanced
democracies to the working classes. In the United States,
authors claim that the white working class offered
unprecedented and crucial support for Donald Trump in the
2016 election. But what is the evidence for this claim? We
examine all of the available academic survey data gathered
around the election, along with a number of surveys from
prior elections. We test four common claims about the white
working class in 2016: (1) that most Trump voters were white
working-class Americans; (2) that most white working-class
voters supported Trump; (3) that unusually large numbers of
white working-class voters switched from Obama in 2012 to
Trump in 2016; and (4) that white working-class voters were
pivotal to Trump's victory in several swing states. We find
that three of the four are not supported by the available
data, and the other lacks crucial context that casts doubt
on the idea that Trump uniquely appealed to working-class
Americans. White working-class Americans have been
supporting Republican presidential candidates at higher
rates in recent elections, but that process long predates
2016, and narratives that center on Trump's alleged appeal
obscure this important long-term trend.},
Doi = {10.1017/S1537592720001267},
Key = {fds349967}
}
@article{fds340965,
Author = {Hansen, ER and Carnes, N and Gray, V},
Title = {What Happens When Insurers Make Insurance Laws? State
Legislative Agendas and the Occupational Makeup of
Government},
Journal = {State Politics and Policy Quarterly},
Volume = {19},
Number = {2},
Pages = {155-179},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440018813013},
Abstract = {Do the occupational backgrounds of politicians affect the
government’s agenda? Businesses have long thought so. The
first occupational data on state legislators were collected
by the Insurance Information Institute, an interest group
representing major insurance companies. In this paper, we
test one potential motive for these kinds of efforts: the
idea that the occupational makeup of governments affects the
agendas they pursue, an argument that has been largely
neglected in research on politicians’ occupational
backgrounds. We focus here on the insurance industry. Using
original data, we find that state legislatures with more
former insurers consider fewer bills regulating insurance
(negative agenda control), that former insurers play a
disproportionate role in drafting the insurance bills that
are introduced (positive agenda control), and that the bills
former insurers introduce tend to be more favorable to the
industry than those that their colleagues introduce
(positive agenda control). The occupational makeup of
legislatures may indeed affect their agendas, as industry
groups have long suspected.},
Doi = {10.1177/1532440018813013},
Key = {fds340965}
}
@article{fds342398,
Author = {Carnes, N and Holbein, J},
Title = {Do public officials exhibit social class biases when they
handle casework? Evidence from multiple correspondence
experiments.},
Journal = {PloS one},
Volume = {14},
Number = {3},
Pages = {e0214244},
Year = {2019},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0214244},
Abstract = {Are public officials more responsive to requests from
affluent or poor constituents? A growing body of evidence
suggests that lawmakers are more responsive to the rich when
they craft policy. However, some scholars theorize that
officials also exhibit a corresponding bias in favor of the
poor when they handle casework, essentially giving policy to
the rich and services to the poor. In this paper, we test
this casework prediction using four experiments in which
confederates sent simple requests to state or local
officials. In each, our confederates' reported social
classes were randomly assigned and signaled with a brief
introductory statement mentioning the sender's occupation or
economic situation. Across our samples, we find
precisely-estimated null effects of social class biases: the
officials we studied were equally likely to respond
regardless of the constituent's class. These findings raise
doubts about whether casework is really a class-biased
process.},
Doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0214244},
Key = {fds342398}
}
@article{fds329270,
Author = {Carnes, N},
Title = {Adam Smith would be spinning in His Grave: Government by the
rich in the United States},
Journal = {Forum (Germany)},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {151-165},
Publisher = {WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH},
Year = {2017},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/for-2017-0009},
Abstract = {Politicians in the US tend to be vastly better off than the
people they represent. But why, and does it matter? In the
last decade, scholar of US politics have revived an old line
of inquiry into the causes and consequences of government by
the privileged, or what I call white-collar government. This
article briefly reviews what scholars have learned, and what
we still need to know. Most research to date has focused on
the effects of government by the privileged; just as the
shortage of female politicians seems to bias policy on
gender issues, the shortage of politicians from lower-income
and working-class backgrounds appears to tilt economic
policy in favor of the more conservative positions typically
favored by more affluent Americans. Why, then, do so few
lower-income and working-class Americans go on to become
politicians? On this point, scholars have more hunches than
hard evidence.},
Doi = {10.1515/for-2017-0009},
Key = {fds329270}
}
@article{fds323128,
Author = {Carnes, N and Lupu, N},
Title = {Do voters dislike working-class candidates? Voter biases and
the descriptive underrepresentation of the working
class},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {110},
Number = {4},
Pages = {832-844},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000551},
Abstract = {In most democracies, lawmakers tend to be vastly better off
than the citizens who elect them. Is that because voters
prefer more affluent politicians over leaders from
working-class backgrounds? In this article, we report the
results of candidate choice experiments embedded in surveys
in Britain, the United States, and Argentina. Using conjoint
designs, we asked voters in these different contexts to
choose between two hypothetical candidates, randomly varying
several of the candidates' personal characteristics,
including whether they had worked in blue-collar or
white-collar jobs. Contrary to the idea that voters prefer
affluent politicians, the voters in our experiments viewed
hypothetical candidates from the working class as equally
qualified, more relatable, and just as likely to get their
votes. Voters do not seem to be behind the shortage of
working-class politicians. To the contrary, British,
American, and Argentine voters seem perfectly willing to
cast their ballots for working-class candidates.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0003055416000551},
Key = {fds323128}
}
@article{fds323616,
Author = {Carnes, N and Hansen, ER},
Title = {Does paying politicians more promote economic diversity in
legislatures?},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {110},
Number = {4},
Pages = {699-716},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2016},
Month = {November},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000305541600054X},
Abstract = {If politicians in the United States were paid better, would
more middle- and working-class people become politicians?
Reformers often argue that the low salaries paid in state
and local governments make holding office economically
infeasible for lower-income citizens and contribute to the
enduring numerical under-representation of the working class
in our political institutions. Of course, raising
politicians' salaries could also make political office more
attractive to affluent professionals, increasing competition
for office and ultimately discouraging lower-income citizens
from running and winning. In this article, we test these
hypotheses using data on the salaries and economic
backgrounds of state legislators. Contrary to the notion
that paying politicians more promotes economic diversity, we
find that the descriptive representation of the working
class is the same or worse in states that pay legislators
higher salaries. These findings have important implications
for research on descriptive representation, political
compensation, and political inequality.},
Doi = {10.1017/S000305541600054X},
Key = {fds323616}
}
@article{fds305165,
Author = {Carnes, N},
Title = {White-collar government in the United States},
Journal = {Swiss Political Science Review},
Volume = {21},
Number = {2},
Pages = {213-221},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2015},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1424-7755},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12165},
Doi = {10.1111/spsr.12165},
Key = {fds305165}
}
@article{fds305164,
Author = {Bellemare, MF and Carnes, N},
Title = {Why do members of congress support agricultural
protection?},
Journal = {Food Policy},
Volume = {50},
Pages = {20-34},
Publisher = {Elsevier BV},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
ISSN = {0306-9192},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.10.010},
Abstract = {It seems paradoxical that until recently, developed
countries have continued subsidizing agriculture even though
their agricultural sectors had been declining in relative
importance since the middle of the 20th century. What drives
support for agricultural protection-the broad array of
subsidies to farmers and taxes and quotas imposed on
agricultural imports-in developed countries? We answer this
question by testing three competing hypotheses about what
drives support for agricultural protection in the US: (i)
legislator preferences, (ii) electoral incentives, or (iii)
lobbying. Using data on the roll call votes of the members
of the 106th through the 110th Congresses (1999-2009) and
the scores given to each legislator by the Farm Bureau, our
findings suggest that electoral incentives explain a great
deal of the variation in support for agricultural
protection, but that legislator preferences and lobbying
might play a role, too. Moreover, legislator preferences and
electoral incentives appear to be substitutes for one
another. Why does Congress support agricultural protection?
Because many members have electoral incentives to-and
because many of those who do not still have other personal
or strategic interests at stake.},
Doi = {10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.10.010},
Key = {fds305164}
}
@article{fds305168,
Author = {Carnes, N and Lupu, N},
Title = {Rethinking the comparative perspective on class and
representation: Evidence from latin america},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {59},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-18},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12112},
Abstract = {Does it matter that working-class citizens are numerically
underrepresented in political offices throughout the world?
For decades, the conventional wisdom in comparative politics
has been that it does not, that lawmakers from different
classes think and behave roughly the same in office. In this
article, we argue that this conclusion is misguided. Past
research relied on inappropriate measures of officeholders'
class backgrounds, attitudes, and choices. Using data on 18
Latin American legislatures, we show that lawmakers from
different classes bring different economic attitudes to the
legislative process. Using data on one least likely case, we
also show that pre-voting decisions like sponsoring
legislation often differ dramatically along social class
lines, even when political parties control higher-visibility
decisions like roll-call votes. The unequal numerical or
descriptive representation of social classes in the world's
legislatures has important consequences for the substantive
representation of different class interests.},
Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12112},
Key = {fds305168}
}
@article{fds323130,
Author = {Carnes, N and Sadin, ML},
Title = {The "mill worker's son" heuristic: How voters perceive
politicians from working-class families-And how they really
behave in office},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {77},
Number = {1},
Pages = {285-298},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2015},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/678530},
Abstract = {Politicians often highlight how hard their families had it
when they were growing up, presumably in the hopes that
voters will see them as more supportive of policies that
benefit middle-and working-class Americans. What do voters
actually infer from how candidates were raised? And what
should they infer? We use a set of candidate evaluation
experiments (and an external validity test drawing on actual
congressional election returns) to study how Americans
perceive politicians raised in more and less affluent
families. We then compare these perceptions to data on how
lawmakers brought up in different classes actually behave in
office. Although voters often infer that politicians from
less privileged families are more economically progressive,
these lawmakers don't actually stand out on standard
measures of legislative voting. The "mill worker's son"
heuristic appears to be a misleading shortcut, a cue that
leads voters to make faulty inferences about candidates'
political priorities.},
Doi = {10.1086/678530},
Key = {fds323130}
}
@article{fds305167,
Author = {Carnes, N and Lupu, N},
Title = {Rethinking the comparative perspective on class and
representation: Evidence from Latin America},
Journal = {Working Paper of the Helen Kellogg Institute for
International Studies},
Volume = {59},
Number = {394},
Pages = {1-33},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2013},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0092-5853},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12112},
Abstract = {Does it matter that working-class citizens are numerically
underrepresented in political offices throughout the world?
For decades, the conventional wisdom in comparative politics
has been that it does not, that lawmakers from different
classes think and behave roughly the same in office. In this
paper, we argue that this conclusion is misguided. Past
research relied on inappropriate measures of officeholders'
class backgrounds, attitudes, and choices. Using data on 18
Latin American legislatures, we show that lawmakers from
different classes bring different economic attitudes to the
legislative process. And using data on one least-likely
case, we show that pre-voting decisions like sponsoring
legislation often differ dramatically along social class
lines, even when political parties control higher-visibility
decisions like roll-call votes. The unequal numerical or
descriptive representation of social classes in the world's
legislatures has important consequences for the substantive
representation of different class interests.},
Doi = {10.1111/ajps.12112},
Key = {fds305167}
}
@article{fds305169,
Author = {Arnold, RD and Carnes, N},
Title = {Holding Mayors Accountable: New York's Executives from Koch
to Bloomberg},
Journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
Volume = {56},
Number = {4},
Pages = {949-963},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2012},
Month = {October},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00603.x},
Abstract = {How do citizens evaluate the performance of their mayors?
Previous studies have examined mayoral performance either
with cross-sectional surveys or by comparing pairs of
consecutive elections. In this paper, we use 150 surveys
conducted in New York City between 1984 and 2009 to carry
out the first time series analysis of mayoral approval. We
show that fluctuations in crime and the economy affect
mayors’ ratings, and that black and white citizens react
similarly to changing local conditions (although their
initial evaluations of mayors often diverge sharply). We
also show that how New Yorkers rate mayors in the polls is
closely related to how they vote for mayors at the
polls.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00603.x},
Key = {fds305169}
}
@article{fds305170,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class
in Congress Matter?},
Journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
Volume = {37},
Number = {1},
Pages = {5-34},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
url = {http://www.duke.edu/~nwc8/Carnes_LSQ_Revised_Submission.pdf},
Abstract = {Working-class citizens have been numerically
underrepresented in policymaking institutions throughout
most of America‟s history. Little is known, however, about
the political consequences of this enduring feature of our
democratic system. This essay examines the relationship
between legislators‟ class backgrounds and their votes on
economic policy in the House of Representatives during the
20th century. Like ordinary Americans, representatives from
working-class occupations exhibit more liberal economic
preferences than other legislators, especially those from
profit-oriented professions. These findings provide the
first evidence of a link between the descriptive and
substantive representation of social classes in the United
States.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00033.x},
Key = {fds305170}
}
%% Papers Submitted
@article{fds220430,
Author = {Marc F. Bellemare and Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {Why Do Members of Congress Support Agricultural
Protection?},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {It seems paradoxical that developed countries continue
subsidizing agriculture even though their agricultural
sectors have been declining in relative importance since the
middle of the 20th century. What drives support for
agricultural protection in developed countries? We answer
this question by testing three competing hypotheses about
what drives support for agricultural protection in the US:
(i) legislator preferences, (ii) electoral incentives, or
(iii) lobbying. Using data on the roll call votes of the
members of the 106th through the 110th Congresses
(1999-2009) and the scores given to each legislator by the
Farm Bureau, our findings suggest electoral incentives
explain a great deal of the variation in support for
agricultural protection, but that legislator preferences and
lobbying play a role, too. Moreover, legislator preferences
and electoral incentives appear to be substitutes for one
another. Why does Congress support agricultural protection?
Because many members have electoral incentives to — and
because many of those who do not still have other personal
or strategic interests at stake.},
Key = {fds220430}
}
@article{fds220432,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {Is Working-class Representation a Threat to Women and
Minorities?},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {As women and minorities have gained more seats in Congress
and state legislatures, working-class Americans have lost
ground in these institutions. Does it have to be that way?
Are the political fortunes of women and minorities tied to
the political misfortunes of the working class? Would
greater working-class representation pose a threat to women
and minorities? This study develops a simple theory to
predict when the descriptive representation of one group
will “crowd out” other underrepresented groups. I then
use the Local Elections in America Project’s (LEAP) data
on California elections to explore the links between the
racial, gender, and social class makeup of candidates and
officeholders in local and county elections. The
representation of workers does not appear to imperil female
or minority candidates. To the contrary, many working class
candidates are women and minorities, and those who aren’t
don’t seem to pose any threat to the political progress of
other historically underrepresented groups.},
Key = {fds220432}
}
@article{fds220433,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {Who Votes for Inequality?},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {In an age of soaring economic inequality, what good is our
Congress? Should we expect lawmakers to push back against
the economic and social changes that are driving wealth into
fewer and fewer hands? Or do legislators have incentives to
let the broadly shared prosperity America enjoyed a half
century ago become the stuff of history books?},
Key = {fds220433}
}
@article{fds212228,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes and John Holbein},
Title = {Don’t Take It Personally: Affluence, Influence, and
Prejudice},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {Why is the political process more responsive to affluent
Americans? This paper tests the troubling possibility that
some officeholders are prejudiced against the less
fortunate. Building on recent work on racial prejudice, we
conducted two field experiments to determine whether
lawmakers prioritize requests from affluent citizens when
they have few incentives to do so. We find that lawmakers
are equally likely to agree to these requests regardless of
the citizen’s class. Inequalities eventually emerge when
the stakes are higher. However, these biases probably do not
reflect ingrained prejudices. Lawmakers often privilege the
affluent, but not because they hate the poor.},
Key = {fds212228}
}
@article{fds220413,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes and Meredith L. Sadin},
Title = {The Other John Edwards Lie: How Voters Perceive Politicians
from Working-class Families--and How They Really Behave in
Office},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {Politicians often highlight how hard their families had it
when they were growing up, presumably in the hopes that
voters will see them as more supportive of policies that
benefit middle- and working-class Americans. What do voters
actually infer about a candidate’s policy positions from
how a candidate was raised? And what should they infer? We
use a nationally representative candidate evaluation
experiment to study how the public perceives politicians
raised in more and less affluent families. We then compare
these perceptions to data on how lawmakers brought up in
different classes actually behave in office. Although voters
consistently infer that politicians from less privileged
families are more economically progressive, those
politicians don’t actually stand out on standard measures
of legislative voting. The “Mill Worker’s Son”
heuristic, as we call it, is a misleading shortcut, a cue
that drives voters—even well-informed ones—to make
faulty inferences about candidates’ political
priorities.},
Key = {fds220413}
}
@article{fds220467,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {Why Are There So Few Working-class People in Political
Office? Evidence from State Legislatures},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds220467}
}
%% Op-eds
@misc{fds220434,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {We Need Blue-Collar Candidates},
Journal = {Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (October 10, 2013), Raleigh News and
Observer (October 10, 2013), Contra Costa Times (October 11,
2013), Oakland Tribune (October 11, 2013), Newark
Star-Ledger (October 15, 2013), and Detroit Free Press
(October 17, 2013)},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds220434}
}
@misc{fds220435,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {How Poorer Politicians can Shatter the Cash
Ceiling},
Journal = {Bangor Daily News},
Year = {2013},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds220435}
}
@misc{fds220436,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes and Noam Lupu},
Title = {Como Afecta el Gobierno de los Privilegiados a la
Democracia?},
Journal = {Condistintosacentos},
Year = {2013},
Month = {September},
Key = {fds220436}
}
@misc{fds220441,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {A Tax Reform Plan that Rewards the Wealthy and Stalls the
State},
Journal = {Raleigh News and Observer},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds220441}
}
@misc{fds212238,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {Which Millionaire Are You Voting For?},
Journal = {The New York Times Sunday Review},
Year = {2012},
Month = {October},
Key = {fds212238}
}
%% Book Reviews
@article{fds220412,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {Book Review: The Not-So-Special Interests: Interest Groups,
Public Representation, and American Governance},
Journal = {American Review of Politics},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Summer},
Key = {fds220412}
}
%% Other
@misc{fds199709,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {“normal.survey,” “logit.survey,”
“probit.survey,” “gamma.survey,” and
“poisson.survey” (survey-weighted regression estimation
procedures)},
Journal = {Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software (Kosuke Imai, Gary
King, and Olivia Lau)},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds199709}
}
%% Published Policy Briefs and Comments
@misc{fds220438,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes and David Broockman},
Title = {The Promise of Union Programs that Recruit and Support
Workers to Run for Public Office},
Journal = {SSN Basic Facts},
Year = {2013},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds220438}
}
@misc{fds220439,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes and Noam Lupu},
Title = {How Government by the Privileged Distorts
Democracies},
Journal = {SSN Key Findings},
Year = {2013},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds220439}
}
@misc{fds220442,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes and John Holbein},
Title = {Are Politicians Prejudiced Against the Poor?},
Journal = {SSN Key Findings},
Year = {2013},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds220442}
}
@misc{fds220440,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {The Cash Ceiling},
Journal = {SSN Forum on Money in Politics},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds220440}
}
@misc{fds212239,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {Economic Inequality and White-collar Government},
Journal = {States, Power, and Societies},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2},
Year = {2012},
Month = {July},
Key = {fds212239}
}
@misc{fds212241,
Author = {Nicholas Carnes},
Title = {How Government by the Privileged Distorts Economic
Policy},
Journal = {SSN Key Findings},
Year = {2012},
Month = {January},
Key = {fds212241}
}
%% Book Chapter
@misc{fds337135,
Author = {Carnes, N},
Title = {Who votes for inequality?},
Pages = {106-134},
Booktitle = {Congress and Policy Making in the 21st Century},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2016},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9781107126381},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316411117.005},
Doi = {10.1017/CBO9781316411117.005},
Key = {fds337135}
}
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