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| Publications of Alexander Kirshner :chronological combined listing:%% Books @book{fds219487, Author = {A.S. Kirshner}, Title = {A Theory of Militant Democracy: The Ethics of Combating Political Extremism}, Publisher = {Yale University Press}, Year = {2014}, Month = {January}, url = {http://www.amazon.com/Theory-Militant-Democracy-Combatting-Political/dp/0300188242}, Key = {fds219487} } @book{fds297070, Author = {Kirshner, AS}, Title = {A theory of militant democracy: The ethics of combatting political extremism}, Pages = {1-208}, Year = {2014}, Month = {June}, ISBN = {9780300188240}, Abstract = {How should pro-democratic forces safeguard representative government from anti-democratic forces? By granting rights of participation to groups that do not share democratic values, democracies may endanger the very rights they have granted; but denying these rights may also undermine democratic values. Alexander Kirshner offers a set of principles for determining when one may reasonably refuse rights of participation, and he defends this theory through real-world examples, ranging from the far-right British Nationalist Party to Turkey's Islamist Welfare Party to America's Democratic Party during Reconstruction. © 2014 by Alexander S. Kirshner. All rights reserved.}, Key = {fds297070} } @book{fds365862, Author = {Kirshner, AS}, Title = {Legitimate opposition}, Pages = {1-282}, Year = {2022}, Month = {September}, ISBN = {9780300243468}, Abstract = {In political systems defined by legitimate opposition, those who hold power allow their rivals to peacefully challenge and displace them, and those who have lost power do not seek to sabotage the winners. Legitimate opposition came under assault at the American capitol on January 6, 2021, and is menaced by populists and autocrats across the globe. Alexander Kirshner provides the first sustained theory of legitimate opposition since the Cold War. On the orthodox view, democracy is lost when legitimate opposition is subverted. But efforts to reconcile opposition with democracy fail to identify the value of the frequently imperfect, unfair and inegalitarian real-world practice. Marshaling a revisionist reconstruction of opposition's history, Kirshner's book provides a new account of opposition's value fit for the twenty-first century and shows why, given the difficult conditions of political life, legitimate opposition is an achievement worth defending.}, Key = {fds365862} } @book{fds313395, Author = {Shapiro, I and Stokes, SC and Wood, EJ and Kirshner, AS}, Title = {Political representation}, Pages = {1-368}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, ISBN = {9780521111270}, url = {http://www.cambridge.org/mx/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/political-theory/political-representation}, Abstract = {Political representation lies at the core of modern politics. Democracies, with their vast numbers of citizens, could not operate without representative institutions. Yet relations between the democratic ideal and the everyday practice of political representation have never been well defined and remain the subject of vigorous debate among historians, political theorists, lawyers, and citizens. In this volume, an eminent group of scholars move forward the debates about political representation on a number of fronts. Drawing on insights from political science, history, political theory, economics, and anthropology, the authors provide much-needed clarity to some of the most vexing questions about political representation. They also reveal new and enlightening perspectives on this fundamental political practice. Topics discussed include representation before democracy, political parties, minorities, electoral competition, and ideology. This volume is essential reading for anyone interested in the ideal and the reality of political representation.}, Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511813146}, Key = {fds313395} } %% Journal Articles @article{fds349186, Author = {Kirshner, AS}, Title = {Can liberal integrity handle disagreement? Perhaps not}, Journal = {Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy}, Volume = {24}, Number = {4}, Pages = {642-649}, Year = {2021}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2020.1744078}, Abstract = {Can liberal integrity handle disagreement? I suggest that it cannot. Shmuel Nili’ s The People’s Duty outlines a pedagogical approach to collective, liberal integrity–Nili claims that individuals act with integrity when they accept and act on the right projects and commitments, projects and commitments that they may not recognize as their own. The People’s Duty argues that this conception of integrity simplifies and clarifies the duties of a liberal national collective. When members of a national collective disagree, however, I argue we have reason to suspect that a pedagogical conception of integrity will not simplify and clarify our duties.}, Doi = {10.1080/13698230.2020.1744078}, Key = {fds349186} } @article{fds313394, Author = {Kirshner, AS}, Title = {Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the People}, Journal = {Political Science Quarterly}, Volume = {130}, Number = {3}, Pages = {554-555}, Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)}, Year = {2015}, Month = {September}, ISSN = {0032-3195}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000364586500018&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1002/polq.12369}, Key = {fds313394} } @article{fds373383, Author = {Shapiro, I and Stokes, SC and Wood, EJ and Kirshner, AS}, Title = {Editors’ introduction}, Journal = {Political Representation}, Pages = {1-12}, Year = {2010}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813146.002}, Abstract = {Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion, high respect; their business, unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion. Edmund Burke, 3 November 1774 (Burke 1999) How should we reconcile the ideal that citizens in democracies aspire to control their political representatives with the reality that elected representatives have substantial leeway to act as they themselves see fit? This leeway, which is sometimes described as the monitoring problem, is often portrayed as a defect of the representative process – to be minimized if it cannot be abolished. But, as Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol suggests, this is not the only possible view of the matter.}, Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511813146.002}, Key = {fds373383} } @article{fds320385, Author = {Kirshner, AS}, Title = {Legitimate opposition, ostracism, and the law of democracy in ancient athens}, Journal = {Journal of Politics}, Volume = {78}, Number = {4}, Pages = {1094-1106}, Publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, Year = {2016}, Month = {October}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/686028}, Abstract = {Traditionally, scholars have tied the emergence of legitimate opposition to the rise of political parties in the nineteenth century. Once governments acknowledged parties' and partisans' essential roles in representative government, they also established limits on legitimate opposition. Illegitimate opposition was now defined as the pursuit of unconstitutional, extreme, or disloyal ideals. This article upends the traditional understanding of legitimate opposition. Athenian democracy did not feature parties, but it did feature intense political competition. As I demonstrate, that competition was structured by a recognizable form of legitimate opposition. Focusing on the fifth century, I illustrate how Athens fostered contestation and where it drew the boundaries of opposition. Competitors were not sanctioned because of their ideals. Instead, Athenian institutions were antimonopolistic, blocking individuals from wielding excessive power. Recognizing Athens' distinctive, partyless model of legitimate opposition should lead us to fundamentally reconsider the practice and the dominant approaches to regulating political competition today.}, Doi = {10.1086/686028}, Key = {fds320385} } @article{fds333911, Author = {Kirshner, AS}, Title = {Nonideal democratic authority: The case of undemocratic elections}, Journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics}, Volume = {17}, Number = {3}, Pages = {257-276}, Publisher = {SAGE Publications}, Year = {2018}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X17732068}, Abstract = {Empirical research has transformed our understanding of autocratic institutions (Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2006; Schedler, 2009). Yet democratic theorists remain laser-focused on ideal democracies, often contending that political equality is necessary to generate democratic authority (Buchanan, 2002; Christiano, 2008; Estlund, 2008; Kolodny, 2014B; Shapiro, 2002; Viehoff, 2014B, Waldron, 1999). Those analyses neglect most nonideal democracies and autocracies – regimes featuring inequality and practices like gerrymandering. This essay fills that fundamental gap, outlining the difficulties of applying theories of democratic authority to nonideal regimes and challenging long-standing views about democratic authority. Focusing on autocrats that lose elections (for example, Sri Lanka, 2015), I outline the democratic authority of nonideal, flawed procedures. Flawed elections are unjustifiably biased toward incumbents. But under certain conditions, ignoring an incumbent’s loss would require not treating one’s fellow citizens as equals. Under those conditions, therefore, citizens are bound to obey those electoral outcomes – that is, flawed procedures can possess democratic authority.}, Doi = {10.1177/1470594X17732068}, Key = {fds333911} } @article{fds335624, Author = {Rubenstein, J and Dovi, S and Pineda, ER and Woodly, D and Kirshner, AS and El Amine and L and Muirhead, R}, Title = {Political and ethical action in the age of Trump}, Journal = {Contemporary Political Theory}, Volume = {17}, Number = {3}, Pages = {331-362}, Publisher = {Springer Nature}, Year = {2018}, Month = {August}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41296-018-0225-4}, Doi = {10.1057/s41296-018-0225-4}, Key = {fds335624} } @article{fds297071, Author = {Kirshner, AS}, Title = {Proceduralism and Popular Threats to Democracy}, Journal = {JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY}, Volume = {18}, Number = {4}, Pages = {405-424}, Publisher = {WILEY}, Year = {2010}, ISSN = {0963-8016}, url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000282873900003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92}, Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9760.2010.00370.x}, Key = {fds297071} } @article{fds373382, Author = {Kirshner, A}, Title = {What Is Christian Democracy? Politics, Religion and Ideology. By Carlo Invernizzi Accetti. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 396p. $120.00 cloth.}, Journal = {Perspectives on Politics}, Volume = {18}, Number = {3}, Pages = {938-939}, Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, Year = {2020}, Month = {September}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592720001875}, Doi = {10.1017/s1537592720001875}, Key = {fds373382} } @article{fds373551, Author = {Kirshner, AS and Spinner-Halev, J}, Title = {Why Political Philosophy Should Be Robust}, Journal = {American Political Science Review}, Year = {2023}, Month = {January}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000898}, Abstract = {Political philosophers and theorists make arguments about high-stakes problems. This article shows that those theories would be more credible if political philosophers ensured their work was robust: capable of withstanding reasonable changes to their assumptions and to the cases to which their arguments apply. The world is varied and inconstant. As a result, scientists and social scientists recognize the virtue of robustness. This article shows why political philosophers should also do so. It defines robustness, demonstrates its value, and shows how it can be evaluated. Illustrating the stakes of robustness, the article assesses prominent arguments concerning multiculturalism and open borders. Avoiding misunderstanding and confusion should be a central aim of political philosophy. To sidestep these outcomes and to reassure scholars that one's theory is not subject to concerns about its credibility, it will often be reasonable for philosophers to explicitly test their theories for robustness.}, Doi = {10.1017/S0003055423000898}, Key = {fds373551} } %% Papers Submitted @article{fds223447, Author = {A.S. Kirshner}, Title = {Ostracism, Legitimate Opposition, and the Law of Democracy in Ancient Athens}, Year = {2013}, url = {http://polisci.duke.edu/uploads/media_items/alexkirshner.original.pdf}, Abstract = {In this essay I overturn a long standing belief that the practice of legitimate opposition was discovered in the late 18th century in United States and Great Britain. Examining the institutions and practices of fifth century Athens, I show that the Athenians engaged in the practice. I draw out a series of important normative and theoretical implications on the basis of this conclusion.}, Key = {fds223447} } | |
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