Publications of Alexander Kirshner    :chronological  alphabetical  by type listing:

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@article{fds373551,
   Author = {Kirshner, AS and Spinner-Halev, J},
   Title = {Why Political Philosophy Should Be Robust},
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Year = {2023},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000898},
   Abstract = {Political philosophers and theorists make arguments about
             high-stakes problems. This article shows that those theories
             would be more credible if political philosophers ensured
             their work was robust: capable of withstanding reasonable
             changes to their assumptions and to the cases to which their
             arguments apply. The world is varied and inconstant. As a
             result, scientists and social scientists recognize the
             virtue of robustness. This article shows why political
             philosophers should also do so. It defines robustness,
             demonstrates its value, and shows how it can be evaluated.
             Illustrating the stakes of robustness, the article assesses
             prominent arguments concerning multiculturalism and open
             borders. Avoiding misunderstanding and confusion should be a
             central aim of political philosophy. To sidestep these
             outcomes and to reassure scholars that one's theory is not
             subject to concerns about its credibility, it will often be
             reasonable for philosophers to explicitly test their
             theories for robustness.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0003055423000898},
   Key = {fds373551}
}

@book{fds365862,
   Author = {Kirshner, AS},
   Title = {Legitimate opposition},
   Pages = {1-282},
   Year = {2022},
   Month = {September},
   ISBN = {9780300243468},
   Abstract = {In political systems defined by legitimate opposition, those
             who hold power allow their rivals to peacefully challenge
             and displace them, and those who have lost power do not seek
             to sabotage the winners. Legitimate opposition came under
             assault at the American capitol on January 6, 2021, and is
             menaced by populists and autocrats across the globe.
             Alexander Kirshner provides the first sustained theory of
             legitimate opposition since the Cold War. On the orthodox
             view, democracy is lost when legitimate opposition is
             subverted. But efforts to reconcile opposition with
             democracy fail to identify the value of the frequently
             imperfect, unfair and inegalitarian real-world practice.
             Marshaling a revisionist reconstruction of opposition's
             history, Kirshner's book provides a new account of
             opposition's value fit for the twenty-first century and
             shows why, given the difficult conditions of political life,
             legitimate opposition is an achievement worth
             defending.},
   Key = {fds365862}
}

@article{fds349186,
   Author = {Kirshner, AS},
   Title = {Can liberal integrity handle disagreement? Perhaps
             not},
   Journal = {Critical Review of International Social and Political
             Philosophy},
   Volume = {24},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {642-649},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2020.1744078},
   Abstract = {Can liberal integrity handle disagreement? I suggest that it
             cannot. Shmuel Nili’ s The People’s Duty outlines a
             pedagogical approach to collective, liberal integrity–Nili
             claims that individuals act with integrity when they accept
             and act on the right projects and commitments, projects and
             commitments that they may not recognize as their own. The
             People’s Duty argues that this conception of integrity
             simplifies and clarifies the duties of a liberal national
             collective. When members of a national collective disagree,
             however, I argue we have reason to suspect that a
             pedagogical conception of integrity will not simplify and
             clarify our duties.},
   Doi = {10.1080/13698230.2020.1744078},
   Key = {fds349186}
}

@article{fds373382,
   Author = {Kirshner, A},
   Title = {What Is Christian Democracy? Politics, Religion and
             Ideology. By Carlo Invernizzi Accetti. Cambridge: Cambridge
             University Press, 2019. 396p. $120.00 cloth.},
   Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {938-939},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2020},
   Month = {September},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592720001875},
   Doi = {10.1017/s1537592720001875},
   Key = {fds373382}
}

@article{fds335624,
   Author = {Rubenstein, J and Dovi, S and Pineda, ER and Woodly, D and Kirshner, AS and El Amine and L and Muirhead, R},
   Title = {Political and ethical action in the age of
             Trump},
   Journal = {Contemporary Political Theory},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {331-362},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41296-018-0225-4},
   Doi = {10.1057/s41296-018-0225-4},
   Key = {fds335624}
}

@article{fds333911,
   Author = {Kirshner, AS},
   Title = {Nonideal democratic authority: The case of undemocratic
             elections},
   Journal = {Politics, Philosophy and Economics},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {257-276},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2018},
   Month = {August},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594X17732068},
   Abstract = {Empirical research has transformed our understanding of
             autocratic institutions (Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2006;
             Schedler, 2009). Yet democratic theorists remain
             laser-focused on ideal democracies, often contending that
             political equality is necessary to generate democratic
             authority (Buchanan, 2002; Christiano, 2008; Estlund, 2008;
             Kolodny, 2014B; Shapiro, 2002; Viehoff, 2014B, Waldron,
             1999). Those analyses neglect most nonideal democracies and
             autocracies – regimes featuring inequality and practices
             like gerrymandering. This essay fills that fundamental gap,
             outlining the difficulties of applying theories of
             democratic authority to nonideal regimes and challenging
             long-standing views about democratic authority. Focusing on
             autocrats that lose elections (for example, Sri Lanka,
             2015), I outline the democratic authority of nonideal,
             flawed procedures. Flawed elections are unjustifiably biased
             toward incumbents. But under certain conditions, ignoring an
             incumbent’s loss would require not treating one’s fellow
             citizens as equals. Under those conditions, therefore,
             citizens are bound to obey those electoral outcomes – that
             is, flawed procedures can possess democratic
             authority.},
   Doi = {10.1177/1470594X17732068},
   Key = {fds333911}
}

@article{fds320385,
   Author = {Kirshner, AS},
   Title = {Legitimate opposition, ostracism, and the law of democracy
             in ancient athens},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {78},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {1094-1106},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2016},
   Month = {October},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/686028},
   Abstract = {Traditionally, scholars have tied the emergence of
             legitimate opposition to the rise of political parties in
             the nineteenth century. Once governments acknowledged
             parties' and partisans' essential roles in representative
             government, they also established limits on legitimate
             opposition. Illegitimate opposition was now defined as the
             pursuit of unconstitutional, extreme, or disloyal ideals.
             This article upends the traditional understanding of
             legitimate opposition. Athenian democracy did not feature
             parties, but it did feature intense political competition.
             As I demonstrate, that competition was structured by a
             recognizable form of legitimate opposition. Focusing on the
             fifth century, I illustrate how Athens fostered contestation
             and where it drew the boundaries of opposition. Competitors
             were not sanctioned because of their ideals. Instead,
             Athenian institutions were antimonopolistic, blocking
             individuals from wielding excessive power. Recognizing
             Athens' distinctive, partyless model of legitimate
             opposition should lead us to fundamentally reconsider the
             practice and the dominant approaches to regulating political
             competition today.},
   Doi = {10.1086/686028},
   Key = {fds320385}
}

@article{fds313394,
   Author = {Kirshner, AS},
   Title = {Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the
             People},
   Journal = {Political Science Quarterly},
   Volume = {130},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {554-555},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {0032-3195},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000364586500018&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.1002/polq.12369},
   Key = {fds313394}
}

@book{fds297070,
   Author = {Kirshner, AS},
   Title = {A theory of militant democracy: The ethics of combatting
             political extremism},
   Pages = {1-208},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {June},
   ISBN = {9780300188240},
   Abstract = {How should pro-democratic forces safeguard representative
             government from anti-democratic forces? By granting rights
             of participation to groups that do not share democratic
             values, democracies may endanger the very rights they have
             granted; but denying these rights may also undermine
             democratic values. Alexander Kirshner offers a set of
             principles for determining when one may reasonably refuse
             rights of participation, and he defends this theory through
             real-world examples, ranging from the far-right British
             Nationalist Party to Turkey's Islamist Welfare Party to
             America's Democratic Party during Reconstruction. © 2014 by
             Alexander S. Kirshner. All rights reserved.},
   Key = {fds297070}
}

@book{fds219487,
   Author = {A.S. Kirshner},
   Title = {A Theory of Militant Democracy: The Ethics of Combating
             Political Extremism},
   Publisher = {Yale University Press},
   Year = {2014},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://www.amazon.com/Theory-Militant-Democracy-Combatting-Political/dp/0300188242},
   Key = {fds219487}
}

@article{fds223447,
   Author = {A.S. Kirshner},
   Title = {Ostracism, Legitimate Opposition, and the Law of Democracy
             in Ancient Athens},
   Year = {2013},
   url = {http://polisci.duke.edu/uploads/media_items/alexkirshner.original.pdf},
   Abstract = {In this essay I overturn a long standing belief that the
             practice of legitimate opposition was discovered in the late
             18th century in United States and Great Britain. Examining
             the institutions and practices of fifth century Athens, I
             show that the Athenians engaged in the practice. I draw out
             a series of important normative and theoretical implications
             on the basis of this conclusion.},
   Key = {fds223447}
}

@book{fds313395,
   Author = {Shapiro, I and Stokes, SC and Wood, EJ and Kirshner,
             AS},
   Title = {Political representation},
   Pages = {1-368},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   ISBN = {9780521111270},
   url = {http://www.cambridge.org/mx/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/political-theory/political-representation},
   Abstract = {Political representation lies at the core of modern
             politics. Democracies, with their vast numbers of citizens,
             could not operate without representative institutions. Yet
             relations between the democratic ideal and the everyday
             practice of political representation have never been well
             defined and remain the subject of vigorous debate among
             historians, political theorists, lawyers, and citizens. In
             this volume, an eminent group of scholars move forward the
             debates about political representation on a number of
             fronts. Drawing on insights from political science, history,
             political theory, economics, and anthropology, the authors
             provide much-needed clarity to some of the most vexing
             questions about political representation. They also reveal
             new and enlightening perspectives on this fundamental
             political practice. Topics discussed include representation
             before democracy, political parties, minorities, electoral
             competition, and ideology. This volume is essential reading
             for anyone interested in the ideal and the reality of
             political representation.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511813146},
   Key = {fds313395}
}

@article{fds373383,
   Author = {Shapiro, I and Stokes, SC and Wood, EJ and Kirshner,
             AS},
   Title = {Editors’ introduction},
   Journal = {Political Representation},
   Pages = {1-12},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813146.002},
   Abstract = {Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory
             of a representative to live in the strictest union, the
             closest correspondence, and the most unreserved
             communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to
             have great weight with him; their opinion, high respect;
             their business, unremitted attention. It is his duty to
             sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to
             theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer
             their interest to his own. But his unbiassed opinion, his
             mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to
             sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living.
             These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from
             the law and the constitution. They are a trust from
             Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable.
             Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his
             judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he
             sacrifices it to your opinion. Edmund Burke, 3 November 1774
             (Burke 1999) How should we reconcile the ideal that citizens
             in democracies aspire to control their political
             representatives with the reality that elected
             representatives have substantial leeway to act as they
             themselves see fit? This leeway, which is sometimes
             described as the monitoring problem, is often portrayed as a
             defect of the representative process – to be minimized if
             it cannot be abolished. But, as Burke's speech to the
             electors of Bristol suggests, this is not the only possible
             view of the matter.},
   Doi = {10.1017/CBO9780511813146.002},
   Key = {fds373383}
}

@article{fds297071,
   Author = {Kirshner, AS},
   Title = {Proceduralism and Popular Threats to Democracy},
   Journal = {JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY},
   Volume = {18},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {405-424},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2010},
   ISSN = {0963-8016},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000282873900003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9760.2010.00370.x},
   Key = {fds297071}
}