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Publications of Judith Kelley    :chronological  alphabetical  combined listing:

%% Books   
   Title = {The Power of Global Performance Indicators},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Editor = {Kelley, J and Simmons, B},
   Year = {2020},
   Key = {fds339453}

   Author = {Kelley, JG},
   Title = {Scorecard Diplomacy Grading States to Influence their
             Reputation and Behavior},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {May},
   ISBN = {131664913X},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108186100},
   Abstract = {What can the international community do when countries would
             rather ignore a thorny problem? Scorecard Diplomacy shows
             that, despite lacking traditional force, public grades are
             potent symbols that can evoke countries’ concerns about
             their reputations and motivate them to address the problem.
             The book develops an unconventional but careful argument
             about the growing phenomenon of such ratings and rankings.
             It supports this by examining the United States foreign
             policy on human trafficking using a global survey of NGOs,
             case studies, thousands of diplomatic cables, media stories,
             90 interviews worldwide, and other documents. All of this is
             gathered together in a format that walks the reader through
             the mechanisms of scorecard diplomacy, including assessment
             of the outcomes. Scorecard Diplomacy speaks both to those
             keen to understand the pros and cons of the US policy on
             human trafficking and to those interested in the central
             question of influence in international relations.},
   Doi = {10.1017/9781108186100},
   Key = {fds325396}

   Author = {Kelley, JG},
   Title = {Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Monitoring
             Works and Why It Often Fails},
   Pages = {338 pages},
   Publisher = {Princeton University Press},
   Year = {2012},
   ISBN = {0691152780},
   Abstract = {What is novel about this book--and what stands as Judith
             Kelley's singular achievement--is her comprehensive and
             systematic collection of evidence.},
   Key = {fds270007}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and
             Incentives. 2004},
   Publisher = {Princeton University Press},
   Year = {2004},
   url = {http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/7875.html},
   Abstract = {This detailed account of ethnic minority politics explains
             when and how European institutions successfully used norms
             and incentives to shape domestic policy toward ethnic
             minorities and why those measures sometimes failed. Going
             beyond traditional analyses, Kelley examines the pivotal
             engagement by the European Union, the Organization for
             Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council for
             Europe in the creation of such policies. Following language,
             education, and citizenship issues during the 1990s in
             Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, and Romania, she shows how the
             combination of membership conditionality and norm-based
             diplomacy was surprisingly effective at overcoming even
             significant domestic opposition. However, she also finds
             that diplomacy alone, without the offer of membership, was
             ineffective unless domestic opposition to the proposed
             policies was quite limited. As one of the first systematic
             analyses of political rather than economic conditionality,
             the book illustrates under what conditions and through what
             mechanisms institutions influenced domestic policy in the
             decade, preparing the way for the historic enlargement of
             the European Union. This thoughtful and thorough discussion,
             based on case studies, quantitative analysis, and interviews
             with more than seventy-five policymakers and experts, tells
             an important story about how European organizations helped
             facilitate peaceful solutions to ethnic tensions--in sharp
             contrast to the ethnic bloodshed that occurred in the former
             Yugoslavia during this time. And it advances a long overdue
             dialogue between proponents of rational choice models and
             social constructivists. As political requirements
             increasingly become part of conditionality, it also provides
             keen policy insights for the strategic choices made by
             actors in international institutions. Judith G. Kelley is
             Assistant Professor of Public Policy Studies and Political
             Science at Duke University. Endorsements: "Kelley's analysis
             is compelling, theoretically innovative, and empirically
             rich. By exploring not only cases where international
             institutions have an impact, but also instances where they
             fail, she shows how the international community has been
             able to bring about progressive change. This book fills an
             important gap."--Jeffrey T. Checkel, University of Oslo "A
             well-researched book written by an author who is well
             acquainted with the details of the negotiations between the
             European Union and candidate countries."--Ilya Prizel,
             University of Pittsburgh},
   Key = {fds12950}

   Author = {Kelley, JG},
   Title = {Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and
   Pages = {288 pages},
   Publisher = {Princeton University Press},
   Year = {2004},
   ISBN = {1400835658},
   Abstract = {This book's simultaneous assessment of soft diplomacy
             and stricter conditionality advances a long overdue dialogue
             between proponents rational choice models and social
   Key = {fds270005}

%% Chapters in Books   
   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {The Potential for Organizational Membership Rules to Enhance
             Regional Cooperation?},
   Pages = {78-103},
   Booktitle = {Integrating Regions: Asia in Comparative
   Publisher = {Stanford University Press},
   Address = {Palo Alto},
   Editor = {Miles Kahler and Andrew MacIntyre},
   Year = {2013},
   Key = {fds217734}

%% Journal Articles   
   Author = {Strezhnev, A and Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
   Title = {Testing for Negative Spillovers: Is Promoting Human Rights
             Really Part of the Problem?},
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {75},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {71-102},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000661},
   Abstract = {The international community often seeks to promote political
             reforms in recalcitrant states. Recently, some scholars have
             argued that, rather than helping, international law and
             advocacy create new problems because they have negative
             spillovers that increase rights violations. We review three
             mechanisms for such spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, and
             counteraction and concentrate on the last of these. Some
             researchers assert that governments sometimes counteract
             international human rights pressures by strategically
             substituting violations in adjacent areas that are either
             not targeted or are harder to monitor. However, most such
             research shows only that both outcomes correlate with an
             intervention - the targeted positively and the spillover
             negatively. The burden of proof, however, should be as
             rigorous as those for studies of first-order policy
             consequences. We show that these correlations by themselves
             are insufficient to demonstrate counteraction outside of the
             narrow case where the intervention is assumed to have no
             direct effect on the spillover, a situation akin to having a
             valid instrumental variable design. We revisit two prominent
             findings and show that the evidence for the counteraction
             claim is weak in both cases. The article contributes
             methodologically to the study of negative spillovers in
             general by proposing mediation and sensitivity analysis
             within an instrumental variables framework for assessing
             such arguments. It revisits important prior findings that
             claim negative consequences to human rights law and/or
             advocacy, and raises critical normative questions regarding
             how we empirically evaluate hypotheses about causal
   Doi = {10.1017/S0020818320000661},
   Key = {fds355176}

   Author = {Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
   Title = {Governance by Other Means: Rankings as Regulatory
   Journal = {International Theory},
   Pages = {169-178},
   Year = {2021},
   Month = {January},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971920000457},
   Abstract = {This article takes the challenges of global governance and
             legitimacy seriously and looks at new ways in which
             international organizations (IOs) have attempted to 'govern'
             without explicit legal or regulatory directives.
             Specifically, we explore the growth of global performance
             indicators as a form of social control that appears to have
             certain advantages even as states and civil society actors
             push back against international regulatory authority. This
             article discusses the ways in which Michael Zürn's
             diagnosis of governance dilemmas helps to explain the rise
             of such ranking systems. These play into favored paradigms
             that give information and market performance greater social
             acceptance than rules, laws, and directives designed by
             international organizations. We discuss how and why these
             schemes can constitute governance systems, and some of the
             evidence regarding their effects on actors' behaviors.
             Zürn's book provides a useful context for understanding the
             rise and effectiveness of Governance by Other Means: systems
             that 'inform' and provoke competition among states, shaping
             outcomes without directly legislating performance.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S1752971920000457},
   Key = {fds355799}

   Author = {Nielson, DL and Hyde, SD and Kelley, J},
   Title = {The elusive sources of legitimacy beliefs: Civil society
             views of international election observers},
   Journal = {Review of International Organizations},
   Volume = {14},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {685-715},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {December},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9331-6},
   Abstract = {When do members of civil society view international election
             observers as legitimate? Motivated by recent work on the
             legitimacy of international organizations, we evaluate what
             type of information affects non-governmental
             organizations’ (NGOs) beliefs about international election
             observer groups, which include both intergovernmental
             organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental
             organizations (INGOs) that seek to exercise authority, often
             regarding the same elections. Specifically, we examine the
             effects of two different types of information: information
             about the observers’ objective substantive features versus
             information that serves as heuristic shortcuts. Three
             survey-based experiments – one in Kenya and the others
             global – prime NGO respondents with information about both
             real and hypothetical election observer groups in ways
             intended to affect their votes for which organizations
             should be invited to observe the next election in their
             countries. In general, the primes about the objective
             substantive sources of legitimacy beliefs failed to produce
             consistent, measurable changes in responses among NGOs
             across both the hypothetical and real-world observer groups.
             That is, telling NGOs about the qualities of the
             organizations work failed to change perceptions. What
             mattered instead, however, was an organizations’
             prominence or type, features that likely served as heuristic
             shortcuts. The findings, however, varied depending on
             whether we used hypothetical or real organizations. With
             hypothetical organizations, NGO respondents preferred other
             NGOs, suggesting an isomorphism heuristic. Conversely, with
             real organizations NGO respondents preferred more prominent
             and well-known intergovernmental organizations. This
             suggests that the isomorphism and prominence of observer
             organizations can drive legitimacy beliefs. Given the
             differences between using real versus hypothetical
             organizations, however, it also cautions against using
             hypothetical actors in survey experiments.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s11558-018-9331-6},
   Key = {fds339454}

   Author = {Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
   Title = {Introduction: The Power of Global Performance
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {73},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {491-510},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000146},
   Abstract = {In recent decades, IGOs, NGOs, private firms and even states
             have begun to regularly package and distribute information
             on the relative performance of states. From the World Bank's
             Ease of Doing Business Index to the Financial Action Task
             Force blacklist, global performance indicators (GPIs) are
             increasingly deployed to influence governance globally. We
             argue that GPIs derive influence from their ability to frame
             issues, extend the authority of the creator, and-most
             importantly-to invoke recurrent comparison that stimulates
             governments' concerns for their own and their country's
             reputation. Their public and ongoing ratings and rankings of
             states are particularly adept at capturing attention not
             only at elite policy levels but also among other domestic
             and transnational actors. GPIs thus raise new questions for
             research on politics and governance globally. What are the
             social and political effects of this form of information on
             discourse, policies and behavior? What types of actors can
             effectively wield GPIs and on what types of issues? In this
             symposium introduction, we define GPIs, describe their rise,
             and theorize and discuss these questions in light of the
             findings of the symposium contributions.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0020818319000146},
   Key = {fds341722}

   Author = {Doshi, R and Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
   Title = {The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator
             and Global Regulatory Behavior},
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {73},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {611-643},
   Year = {2019},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000158},
   Abstract = {We argue that the World Bank has successfully marshaled the
             Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index to amass considerable
             influence over business regulations worldwide. The Ease of
             Doing is a global performance indicator (GPI), and
             GPIs-especially those that rate and rank states against one
             another-are intended to package information to influence the
             views of an audience important to the target, such as
             foreign investors or voters, thus generating pressures that
             induce a change in the target's behavior. The World Bank has
             succeeded in shaping the global regulatory environment even
             though the bank has no explicit mandate over regulatory
             policy and despite questions about EDB accuracy and required
             policy tradeoffs. We show that the EDB has a dominating
             market share among business climate indicators. We then use
             media analyses and observational data to show that EDB has
             motivated state regulatory shifts. States respond to being
             publicly ranked and some restructure bureaucracies
             accordingly. Next we explore plausible influence channels
             for the EDB ranking and use an experiment involving US
             portfolio managers to build on existing economics research
             and examine whether the rankings influence investor
             sentiment within the experiment. Using a case study of
             India's multiyear interagency effort to rise in the EDB
             rankings, as well as its decision to create subnational EDB
             rankings, we bring the strands of the argument together by
             showing how politicians see the ranking as affecting
             domestic politics, altering investor sentiment, and engaging
             bureaucratic reputation. Overall, a wide variety of evidence
             converges to illustrate the pressures through which the
             World Bank has used state rankings to achieve its vision of
             regulatory reform.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0020818319000158},
   Key = {fds341723}

   Author = {Kelley, J},
   Title = {From the Trenches: A Global Survey of Anti-TIP NGOs and
             their Views of US Efforts},
   Journal = {Journal of Human Trafficking},
   Volume = {Forthcoming},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {231-254},
   Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {July},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322705.2016.1199241},
   Abstract = {Amid the academic and policy critiques of the United
             States’ 15-year push to eliminate human trafficking, the
             perspective of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
             working with anti-trafficking advocacy and services has been
             largely ignored. This article presents the results of a
             global survey of nearly 500 anti-trafficking NGOs working in
             133 countries and is the first NGO-focused survey of its
             kind. Based on the results of the survey, we provide an
             overview of the anti-trafficking NGO sector as a whole,
             detail the relationship between anti-trafficking NGOs and
             the United States and account for some of the variation in
             NGO opinions of U.S. efforts. Notably, we find that NGOs are
             remarkably satisfied with U.S.-led efforts—despite their
             acknowledged flaws—and that NGOs believe that American
             anti-TIP policies are important and, on balance, helpful.
             These results also provide a warning for the future of the
             United States’ anti-trafficking advocacy, suggesting that
             the United States avoid politicizing its annual Trafficking
             in Persons Report.},
   Doi = {10.1080/23322705.2016.1199241},
   Key = {fds330372}

   Author = {Heiss, A and Kelley, J},
   Title = {Between a rock and a hard place: International NGOs and the
             dual pressures of donors and host governments},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Volume = {79},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {732-741},
   Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
   Year = {2017},
   Month = {April},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/691218},
   Doi = {10.1086/691218},
   Key = {fds326148}

   Author = {Kelley, JG and Pevehouse, JCW},
   Title = {An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Volume = {59},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {531-543},
   Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
   Year = {2015},
   Month = {September},
   ISSN = {0020-8833},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12185},
   Abstract = {The United States often leads in the creation of treaties,
             but it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so only
             after considerable delay. This presents an interesting
             puzzle. Most international relations theory expects states
             to join treaties as long as the benefits outweigh the costs.
             Domestic theories modify this with the constraints of
             institutional veto players. Yet, sometimes neither of these
             arguments explains the delay or absence of US participation.
             We supplement these explanations with an opportunity cost
             theory. We argue that the advice and consent process
             sometimes slows or stalls because it imposes costs in terms
             of legislative time and political capital. These costs alter
             the calculus of key players and may obstruct the process.
             Statistical analysis supports the argument. The priority the
             Senate and President give to treaties depends not only on
             the value they assign to the treaty, but also on the value
             of the time needed to process the treaty. Presidents are
             less, not more, likely to transmit treaties to the Senate
             the more support they have in Congress. Furthermore, the
             more support the President has in Congress, the more the
             cost of Senate floor time matters for advice and
   Doi = {10.1111/isqu.12185},
   Key = {fds270002}

   Author = {Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
   Title = {The Power of Performance Indicators: Rankings, Ratings and
             Reactivity in International Relations},
   Year = {2014},
   Abstract = {Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) are increasingly used
             to rank, rate or categorize states in a number of issue
             areas. Many of these new indicators are short-lived efforts
             to grab attention and are unlikely to matter much. But we
             believe there are good reasons to think that some GPIs
             affect important areas of state policy. Indeed, we argue
             that GPIs should be thought of increasingly as tools of
             global governance, involving rule-making and the exercise of
             soft power on a global scale and that their proliferation
             constitutes a profound social trend with implications for
             governance world-wide and reflects the diversity of actors
             and institutions attempting to influence policies across and
             among states. This article defines what we mean by global
             performance indicators, and describes their features. Using
             a new dataset and a series of interviews with producers of
             various indices, we document the proliferation of GPIs,
             which have been developed and promulgated by a wide range of
             actors, both public and private; unilaterally and
             multilaterally. We then elaborate possible causal mechanisms
             that we expect to connect externally generated GPIs with
             state policy, and hypothesize about the scope conditions for
             their effects.},
   Key = {fds317785}

   Author = {Kelley, JG},
   Title = {International influences on elections in new multiparty
   Journal = {Annual Review of Political Science},
   Volume = {15},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {203-220},
   Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
   Year = {2012},
   Month = {June},
   ISSN = {1094-2939},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-030810-110805},
   Abstract = {Practitioners and politicians have long debated the wisdom
             of pushing countries to hold elections, with some arguing
             for its necessity and others warning of its futility and
             even danger. Yet, research on how varying types of
             international activities affect the conduct and structure of
             elections still has a long way to go to be able to inform
             this debate. This article discusses the myriad international
             forms of engagement with elections and reviews the research
             on their ability to improve election quality. It also
             explores the more nefarious international activities, which
             are even less well understood than the efforts to improve
             elections. Given the mixed outcomes and findings, much work
             remains to be done, especially in specifying the conditions
             under which various effects occur. Such work has both
             practical and theoretical merits and can shed light on
             broader scholarly inquiries about the international
             dimensions of democratization. Copyright © 2012 by Annual
             Reviews. All rights reserved.},
   Doi = {10.1146/annurev-polisci-030810-110805},
   Key = {fds270012}

   Author = {Judith Kelley and Jon Pevehouse},
   Title = {An Opportunity Cost Theory of Treaty Ratification},
   Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
   Year = {2012},
   Abstract = {It is a striking feature of multilateral cooperation that
             although the United States often leads in the creation of
             treaties, it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so
             only after considerable delay. Most international relations
             theory expects states to join treaties as long as the
             benefits outweigh the costs. Domestic theories modify this
             with the constraints of institutional veto players. Yet,
             sometimes neither of these arguments explains the delay or
             absence of US participation. This paper supplements these
             explanations with an opportunity cost theory that argues
             that the advice and consent process sometimes slows or
             stalls because it imposes costs in terms of legislative time
             and political capital that politicians prefer to spend on
             other priorities. These costs alter the calculus of key
             players and may obstruct or delay the process, sometimes
             leading the President and Senators to deprioritize treaties
             despite their interests in their success. Statistical
             analysis of the stages of the treaty process supports the
             argument. The priority the Senate and President give to
             treaties depends not only on the value they assign to the
             treaty, but also on the value of other possible policy
             achievements. Presidents are less, not more likely to
             transmit treaties to the Senate the more support he has in
             Congress. Furthermore, the more support the President has in
             Congress, the more the cost of Senate floor time matters for
             advice and consent.},
   Key = {fds223293}

   Author = {Kelley, J},
   Title = {Do international election monitors increase or decrease
             opposition boycotts?},
   Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {11},
   Pages = {1527-1556},
   Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {November},
   ISSN = {0010-4140},
   url = {http://cps.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/03/10/0010414011399885.abstract},
   Abstract = {Election boycotts are over twice as common when
             international observers are present. Do international
             observers increase election boycotts as this correlation and
             past research suggest? This article argues not. Observers
             tend to go to elections with many problems, and it is
             primarily these, rather than monitors, that drive boycotts.
             Furthermore, opposition parties have reasons to hope that
             observers can improve the quality of the election or that
             they will increase attention to election fraud, and
             therefore opposition parties may actually abandon boycott
             plans. Whether they do, however, depends on their
             expectations about how the observers will behave. This makes
             it important to account for the varying reputation of
             observer organizations. Thus, using matching to address the
             selection problem, this article shows that international
             observers can actually deter boycotts, but only if the
             observers are reputable. © The Author(s)
   Doi = {10.1177/0010414011399885},
   Key = {fds270015}

   Author = {J. Kelley and Susan Hyde},
   Title = {The Limits of Election Monitoring: What Independent
             Observation Can (and Can’t) Do},
   Journal = {Foreign Affairs},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67968/susan-d-hyde-and-judith-g-kelley/the-limits-of-election-monitoring},
   Key = {fds270014}

   Author = {Kelley, JG and Kolev, K},
   Title = {Election Quality and International Observation 1975-2004:
             Two New Datasets},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {October},
   Abstract = {This paper introduces two new datasets on national level
             elections from 1975 to 2004. The data are grouped into two
             separate datasets, the Quality of Elections Data and the
             Data on International Election Monitoring. Together these
             data sets provide original information on elections,
             election observation and election quality, and will enable
             researchers to study a variety of research questions. The
             datasets will be publicly available and are maintained at a
             project website.},
   Key = {fds317786}

   Author = {Kelley, J},
   Title = {Election observers and their biases},
   Journal = {Journal of Democracy},
   Volume = {21},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {158-172},
   Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
   Year = {2010},
   ISSN = {1045-5736},
   url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/4625 Duke open
   Abstract = {Why do election monitors sometimes issue contradictory
             statements or endorse flawed elections? The answers are not
             always straightforward; in some cases, the monitors' good
             intentions may undermine their credibility. © 2010 National
             Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University
   Doi = {10.1353/jod.0.0173},
   Key = {fds270016}

   Author = {Kelley, JG},
   Title = {International Influences on Election Quality and
   Year = {2010},
   Abstract = {This chapter is part of a book manuscript with the working
             title “MONITORING DEMOCRACY: When international election
             monitoring works and why it often fails.” This chapter
             follows a theoretical chapter that discusses the possible
             influence of international monitors on election quality. The
             present chapter is purely empirical. It examines the
             influence of international monitors on the quality of
             individual elections. Using quantitative data to examine the
             quality of elections provides a far greater breadth of
             analysis than case studies alone can accomplish. However,
             using quantitative data to explore the effects of monitors
             on a given election is complicated. As a previous book
             chapter discusses, whether an election is monitored depends
             both on the organizations’ interest in observing an
             election and on domestic willingness to host observers. Both
             of these factors are likely to be related to the expected
             quality of an election. This is the classic problem with
             analyzing data on any form of nonrandom intervention. This
             chapter begins with a discussion of the measures used to
             evaluate election quality. It then uses a mix of approaches
             to explore the data. First it presents some descriptive
             overviews. It then applies some of the most cutting-edge
             statistical techniques to reduce the bias introduced by the
             selection problem discussed above and identify the effect of
             monitors on election quality. Two appendices are referred to
             throughout the chapter. Please contact the author for those
             appendices or other parts of the manuscript if
   Key = {fds317787}

   Author = {Kelley, J},
   Title = {D-Minus elections: The politics and norms of international
             election observation},
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {63},
   Number = {4},
   Pages = {765-787},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {Fall},
   ISSN = {0020-8183},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309990117},
   Abstract = {As international election monitors have grown active
             worldwide, their announcements have gained influence.
             Sometimes, however, they endorse highly flawed elections.
             Because their leverage rests largely on their credibility,
             this is puzzling. Understanding the behavior of election
             monitors is important because they help the international
             community to evaluate the legitimacy of governments and
             because their assessments inform the data used by scholars
             to study democracy. Furthermore, election monitors are also
             particularly instructive to study because the variety of
             both intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations
             that observe elections makes it possible to compare them
             across many countries and political contexts. This study
             uses a new dataset of 591 international election-monitoring
             missions. It shows that despite their official mandate to
             focus on election norms, monitors do not only consider the
             elections' quality; their assessments also reflect the
             interests of their member states or donors as well as other
             tangential organizational norms. Thus, even when accounting
             as best as possible for the nature and level of
             irregularities in an election, monitors' concerns about
             democracy promotion, violent instability, and organizational
             politics and preferences are associated with election
             endorsement. The study also reveals differences in the
             behavior of intergovernmental and nongovernmental
             organizations and explains why neither can pursue their core
             objectives single-mindedly. © 2009 The IO
   Doi = {10.1017/S0020818309990117},
   Key = {fds270013}

   Author = {Kelley, J},
   Title = {The more the merrier? the effects of having multiple
             international election monitoring organizations},
   Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
   Volume = {7},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {59-64},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2009},
   Month = {March},
   ISSN = {1537-5927},
   url = {http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=3998560},
   Abstract = {As the pressure to invite international election monitors
             rose at the end of the Cold War, states refused to grant the
             United Nations a dominant role. Thus, today multiple
             intergovernmental, regional, and international
             non-governmental organizations often monitor the same
             elections with equal authority. This article examines the
             costs and benefits of this complex regime to highlight some
             possible broader implications of regime complexity. It
             argues that the availability of many different organizations
             facilitates action that might otherwise have been blocked
             for political reasons. Furthermore, when different
             international election monitoring agencies agree, their
             consensus can bolster their individual legitimacy as well as
             the legitimacy of the international norms they stress, and
             thus magnify their influence on domestic politics.
             Unfortunately the election monitoring example also suggests
             that complex regimes can engender damaging
             inter-organizational politics and that the different biases,
             capabilities, and standards of organizations sometime can
             lead organizations to outright contradict each other or work
             at cross-purposes. © 2009 Copyright American Political
             Science Association.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S1537592709090094},
   Key = {fds270017}

   Author = {Vidmar, N},
   Title = {Foreword},
   Volume = {71},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {I-V},
   Year = {2009},
   ISSN = {0023-9186},
   Key = {fds270011}

   Author = {KELLEY, J},
   Title = {Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and
             Slovakia by Zsuzsa Csergo},
   Journal = {Nations and Nationalism},
   Volume = {14},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {626-628},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {July},
   ISSN = {1354-5078},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000257569800020&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1469-8129.2008.00361_9.x},
   Key = {fds270009}

   Author = {Bradley, C and Kelley, J},
   Title = {The Concept of International Delegation},
   Journal = {Law & Contemporary Problems},
   Volume = {71},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {1-36},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {Winter},
   ISSN = {0023-9186},
   Abstract = {This article defines and clarifies the concept of
             international delegation from both a legal and social
             science perspective. An international delegation, the
             article explains, involves a grant of authority by two or
             more states to an international body to make decisions or
             take actions. After defending this definition, the article
             describes the types of international bodies to which states
             may grant authority. To capture the multilayered nature of
             international delegation, the article considers grants of
             authority not only to bureaucracies, but also to collective
             bodies, sub-groups of states, and courts. The article then
             identifies eight types of authority that states may grant:
             legislative, adjudicative, regulatory, monitoring and
             enforcement, agenda-setting, research and advice, policy
             implementation, and re-delegation. Next, the article
             discusses how the extent of an international delegation can
             vary depending on its legal effect and the degree of
             independence of the international body. The article then
             considers some of the benefits and costs of international
             delegation in light of this typology. The article concludes
             with a discussion of some of the questions raised by the
             typology and its implications for further
   Key = {fds270019}

   Author = {Kelley, JG},
   Title = {Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of
             International Election Monitoring},
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {62},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {221-255},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2008},
   Month = {Spring},
   ISSN = {0020-8183},
   url = {http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1825128&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0020818308080089},
   Abstract = {Given that states have long considered elections a purely
             domestic matter, the dramatic growth of international
             election monitoring in the 1990s was remarkable. Why did
             states allow international organizations and nongovernmental
             organizations (NGOs) to interfere and why did international
             election monitoring spread so quickly? Why did election
             monitoring become institutionalized in so many
             organizations? Perhaps most puzzling, why do countries
             invite monitors and nevertheless cheat? This article
             develops a rigorous method for investigating the causal
             mechanisms underlying the rise of election monitoring, and
             "norm cascades" more generally. The evolution and spread of
             norms, as with many other social processes, are complex
             combinations of normative, instrumental, and other
             constraints and causes of action. The rise of election
             monitoring has been driven by an interaction of
             instrumentalism, emergent norms, and fundamental power
             shifts in the international system. By dissecting this
             larger theoretical complexity into specific subclaims that
             can be empirically investigated, this article examines the
             role of each of these causal factors, their mutual tensions,
             and their interactive contributions to the evolution of
             election monitoring. © 2008 by The IO Foundation.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0020818308080089},
   Key = {fds270020}

   Author = {Kelley, J},
   Title = {Who keeps international commitments and why? The
             international criminal court and bilateral nonsurrender
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Volume = {101},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {573-589},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {August},
   ISSN = {0003-0554},
   url = {http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?jid=PSR&volumeId=101&issueId=03},
   Abstract = {What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty,
             but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation
             of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried
             to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to
             the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender
             Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others
             not? Given United States power and threats of military
             sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell
             only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states
             emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states
             with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance
             of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances
             two classic arguments that typically are difficult to
             substantiate; namely, state preferences are indeed partly
             normative, and international commitments do not just screen
             states; they also constrain.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0003055407070426},
   Key = {fds270021}

   Author = {Kelley, JG},
   Title = {Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The
             International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-Surrender
   Journal = {American Political Science Review},
   Volume = {3},
   Number = {101},
   Pages = {573-589},
   Year = {2007},
   Month = {August},
   Key = {fds341079}

   Author = {Kelley, J},
   Title = {New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaption in
             The new European Neighborhood Policy},
   Journal = {Journal of Common Market Studies},
   Volume = {44},
   Number = {1},
   Pages = {29-55},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2006},
   url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00613.x},
   Abstract = {The EU’s newly launched European Neighborhood Policy is a
             fascinating case study in organizational management theory
             of how the Commission strategically adapted enlargement
             policies to expand its foreign policy domain. From the use
             of Action Plans, regular reports and negotiations to the
             larger conceptualization and use of socialization and
             conditionality, the development of the policy shows
             significant mechanical borrowing from the enlargement
             strategies. Given the lack of the membership carrot, the
             question is whether such adaptation from enlargement can
             promote political reforms in the ENP countries, which are
             generally poor, often autocratic and in some cases embroiled
             in domestic conflicts.},
   Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00613.x},
   Key = {fds270022}

   Author = {Kelley, J},
   Title = {Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional
             Choice in the European Unionby Joseph
   Journal = {Political Science Quarterly},
   Volume = {120},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {332-333},
   Publisher = {WILEY},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {Summer},
   ISSN = {0032-3195},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000230374200028&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Doi = {10.1002/j.1538-165x.2005.tb01377.x},
   Key = {fds270008}

   Author = {Kelley, J},
   Title = {Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: Why Iraq was
             not just about Iraq},
   Journal = {International Politics},
   Volume = {42},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {153-173},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {June},
   url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/6649 Duke open
   Abstract = {Many commentators explain recent transatlantic rifts by
             pointing to diverging norms, interests and geopolitical
             preferences. This paper proceeds from the premise that not
             all situations of conflict are necessarily due to underlying
             deadlocked preferences. Rather, non-cooperation may be a
             strategic form of soft balancing. That is, more generally,
             if they believe that they are being shortchanged in terms of
             influence and payoffs, weaker states may deliberately reject
             possible cooperation in the short run to improve their
             influence vis-à-vis stronger states in the long run. This
             need not be due to traditional relative gains concern.
             States merely calculate that their reputation as a weak
             negotiator will erode future bargaining power and
             subsequently their future share of absolute gains. Strategic
             non-cooperation is therefore a rational signal of resolve.
             This paper develops the concept of strategic non-cooperation
             as a soft balancing tool and applies it to the Iraq case in
             2002-2003. © 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.},
   Doi = {10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800105},
   Key = {fds270024}

   Author = {Kelley, JG},
   Title = {International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership
             Conditionality and Socialization by International
   Journal = {International Organization},
   Volume = {58},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {425-457},
   Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {Summer},
   ISSN = {0020-8183},
   url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000223447300001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
   Abstract = {International relations scholars increasingly debate when
             and how international institutions influence domestic
             policy. This examination of ethnic politics in four Baltic
             and East European countries during the 1990s shows how
             European institutions shaped domestic policy, and why these
             institutions sometimes failed. Comparing traditional
             rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality
             with more socialization-based efforts, I argue that
             conditionality motivated most behavior changes, but that
             socialization-based efforts often guided them. Furthermore,
             using new case studies, statistics, and counterfactual
             analysis, I find that domestic opposition posed far greater
             obstacles to socialization-based methods than it did to
             conditionality: when used alone, socialization-based methods
             rarely changed behavior; when they did, the domestic
             opposition was usually low and the effect was only moderate.
             In contrast, incentive-based methods such as membership
             conditionality were crucial in changing policy: As domestic
             opposition grew, membership conditionality was not only
             increasingly necessary to change behavior, but it was also
             surprisingly effective.},
   Doi = {10.1017/S0020818304583017},
   Key = {fds270018}

   Author = {Kelley, J},
   Title = {Does domestic politics limit the influence of external
             actors on ethnic politics?},
   Journal = {Human Rights Review},
   Volume = {4},
   Number = {3},
   Pages = {34-54},
   Publisher = {Springer Nature},
   Year = {2003},
   ISSN = {1524-8879},
   url = {http://www.metapress.com/content/3k2ugrpm4v0r/?p=b41809fc9a4c4e66bee119471a5fe37b&pi=15},
   Abstract = {Conclusion: Domestic politics is naturally important in
             ethnic policies. However, in spite of their potency,
             domestic political factors are not always the most decisive.
             International organizations have influenced the Latvian and
             Estonian governments, and at times the Slovak and Romanian
             governments. However, the ability of different
             organizational strategies to overcome domestic opposition
             and thus bring about their desired policy varies widely. In
             most cases, actors need to use conditionality and aim it at
             the appropriate decision makers. In spite of their
             widespread use, efforts that rely solely on persuasion and
             diplomacy tend only to work when the domestic opposition is
             initially quite low or when ethnic minorities themselves
             have some bargaining power in the government. The key policy
             implication is that domestic factors do not make failure, or
             success for that matter, a foregone conclusion. For example,
             ethnic minority representation within the government
             coalition is not in itself a guarantee of passage of the
             policy preferences of the minorities. Conversely, the
             presence of authoritarian-style leadership does not
             automatically mean a rejection ethnic minority accommodation
             either, if organizations present their suggestions so that
             such leaders view it as being in their greater interests to
             maintain power. Conditionality that targets incentives to
             fit goals of the leadership can work. External actors are
             thus not justified in backing off from action based purely
             on a domestic analysis. © 2003 Springer.},
   Doi = {10.1007/s12142-003-1011-z},
   Key = {fds270023}

%% Book Reviews   
   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Book Review: Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, Means to an
             End: US Interests in the International Criminal Court
             Brookings, 2009},
   Journal = {Human Rights Review},
   Volume = {2011},
   Number = {12},
   Pages = {137-138},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds198839}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Book review The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election
             Observation Became an International Norm. By Susan Hyde.
             (Cornell University Press, 2011},
   Journal = {Journal of Politics},
   Year = {2011},
   Key = {fds198838}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Book Review: Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, Means to an
             End: US Interests in the International Criminal Court
             Brookings, 2009},
   Journal = {Human Rights Review},
   Volume = {2011},
   Number = {12},
   Pages = {137-138},
   Year = {2010},
   Month = {February},
   Key = {fds166552}

%% Other   
   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Putin 'victory' rests on narrow definition of fraud, Letter
             to the Editor},
   Journal = {Financial Times},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds213231}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Commentator},
   Journal = {Voice of Russia},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds213233}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Interviewee},
   Journal = {Radio - New Zealand's Sunday Morning program},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds213235}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Data on International Election Monitoring: Three Global
             Datasets on Election Quality, Election Events and
             International Election Observation.},
   Journal = {[Computer file]. ICPSR31461-v1. Ann Arbor, MI:
             Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
             Research [distributor]},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {December},
   Abstract = {This data collection focuses on elections and election
             monitoring throughout the world. Dataset 1, Data on
             International Election Monitoring (DIEM), codes the
             assessement and activities of international election
             monitoring organizations to national-level legislative and
             presidential elections in 108 countries from 1980-2004.
             Dataset 2, Quality of Elections Data (QED), codes the
             quality of national-level legislative and presidential
             elections in 172 countries from 1978 to 2004. Dataset 3,
             Supplementary Election Data, includes supplementary
             information on all direct presidential and legislative
             elections in 182 countries from 1975-2004.},
   Key = {fds198274}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Letter to the editor: Financial Times},
   Series = {US Edition},
   Year = {2008},
   Key = {fds147645}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Letters to the editor},
   Journal = {Financial Times, US edition},
   Year = {2006},
   Key = {fds146538}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {"The Transatlantic Alliance." Symposium on The Future of
             European and Transatlantic Security Cooperation.
             (Contribution along with Secretary-General of the Council of
             the EU & High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and
             Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, among
   Journal = {Young Europeans for Security, March 2005.},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://www.yes-dk.dk/},
   Key = {fds146539}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {"The Transatlantic Alliance." Symposium on The Future of
             European and Transatlantic Security Cooperation.},
   Publisher = {Young Europeans for Security},
   Year = {2005},
   Month = {March},
   url = {http://www.yes-dk.dk},
   Key = {fds147649}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {"Big Stick Diplomacy III Serves our Course." Commentary. The
             News and Observer},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds147650}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Transatlantic Tensions: Opportunities for
   Journal = {European Union Studies Association Review},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {9-10},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {Spring},
   Key = {fds146540}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {"Transatlantic Tensions: Opportunities for Learning."
             European Union Studies Association Review},
   Volume = {17},
   Number = {2},
   Pages = {9-10},
   Year = {2004},
   Month = {Spring},
   Key = {fds147647}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Big Stick Diplomacy Ill Serves our Cause},
   Journal = {The News and Observer},
   Volume = {December 4},
   Year = {2004},
   Key = {fds146541}

%% Published Policy Briefs and Comments   
   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Election Monitoring: Power, Limits, Risks. A Markets and
             Democracy Brief},
   Journal = {Council on Foreign Relations},
   Year = {2012},
   Key = {fds213229}

   Author = {J. Kelley},
   Title = {Election Monitoring: the Good, the Bad and the
   Journal = {International Institute for Electoral Democracy},
   Address = {Stockholm, Sweden},
   Year = {2011},
   Month = {December},
   Key = {fds198840}

   Author = {Kelley, JG},
   Title = {The Role of Membership Rules in Regional
   Number = {No. 53},
   Publisher = {Asian Development Bank},
   Year = {2010},
   url = {http://aric.adb.org/pdf/workingpaper/WP53_Membership_Rules.pdf},
   Abstract = {This paper argues that success in the struggle for regional
             integration hinges foremost on the degree of heterogeneity
             among regional states. Regional organizations therefore must
             consider how to optimize their leverage to forge convergence
             that will foster agreement and cooperation. To do so,
             regional organizations can rely on inclusive designs that
             admit member states and then seek to mold their behavior ex
             post, or they can use exclusive designs that condition
             membership on ex ante changes in state behavior. This paper
             examines the success of these designs in using various ex
             ante versus ex post tools in soliciting cooperative behavior
             among regional states, arguing that ex ante tools generally
             have greater advantages. However, because the advantages
             vary by issue areas, regions may benefit from creating
             layers of institutions with different designs. Finally, even
             after admitting states, regional organizations have options
             for varying membership rules across different areas of
             cooperation. Drawing especially on the European experience,
             the paper considers these various forms of differentiated
             rules that organizations can use to forge cooperation among
             different groups of member states despite remaining
   Key = {fds270010}

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