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| Publications of Judith Kelley :chronological combined listing:
%% Books
@book{fds270005,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and
Incentives},
Pages = {288 pages},
Publisher = {Princeton University Press},
Year = {2004},
ISBN = {9781400835652},
Abstract = {This book's simultaneous assessment of soft diplomacy
and stricter conditionality advances a long overdue dialogue
between proponents rational choice models and social
constructivists.},
Key = {fds270005}
}
@book{fds12950,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and
Incentives. 2004},
Publisher = {Princeton University Press},
Year = {2004},
url = {http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/7875.html},
Abstract = {This detailed account of ethnic minority politics explains
when and how European institutions successfully used norms
and incentives to shape domestic policy toward ethnic
minorities and why those measures sometimes failed. Going
beyond traditional analyses, Kelley examines the pivotal
engagement by the European Union, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council for
Europe in the creation of such policies. Following language,
education, and citizenship issues during the 1990s in
Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, and Romania, she shows how the
combination of membership conditionality and norm-based
diplomacy was surprisingly effective at overcoming even
significant domestic opposition. However, she also finds
that diplomacy alone, without the offer of membership, was
ineffective unless domestic opposition to the proposed
policies was quite limited. As one of the first systematic
analyses of political rather than economic conditionality,
the book illustrates under what conditions and through what
mechanisms institutions influenced domestic policy in the
decade, preparing the way for the historic enlargement of
the European Union. This thoughtful and thorough discussion,
based on case studies, quantitative analysis, and interviews
with more than seventy-five policymakers and experts, tells
an important story about how European organizations helped
facilitate peaceful solutions to ethnic tensions--in sharp
contrast to the ethnic bloodshed that occurred in the former
Yugoslavia during this time. And it advances a long overdue
dialogue between proponents of rational choice models and
social constructivists. As political requirements
increasingly become part of conditionality, it also provides
keen policy insights for the strategic choices made by
actors in international institutions. Judith G. Kelley is
Assistant Professor of Public Policy Studies and Political
Science at Duke University. Endorsements: "Kelley's analysis
is compelling, theoretically innovative, and empirically
rich. By exploring not only cases where international
institutions have an impact, but also instances where they
fail, she shows how the international community has been
able to bring about progressive change. This book fills an
important gap."--Jeffrey T. Checkel, University of Oslo "A
well-researched book written by an author who is well
acquainted with the details of the negotiations between the
European Union and candidate countries."--Ilya Prizel,
University of Pittsburgh},
Key = {fds12950}
}
@book{fds270007,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Monitoring
Works and Why It Often Fails},
Pages = {338 pages},
Publisher = {Princeton University Press},
Year = {2012},
ISBN = {9780691152783},
Abstract = {What is novel about this book--and what stands as Judith
Kelley's singular achievement--is her comprehensive and
systematic collection of evidence.},
Key = {fds270007}
}
@book{fds325396,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Scorecard Diplomacy Grading States to Influence their
Reputation and Behavior},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {May},
ISBN = {9781316649138},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108186100},
Abstract = {What can the international community do when countries would
rather ignore a thorny problem? Scorecard Diplomacy shows
that, despite lacking traditional force, public grades are
potent symbols that can evoke countries’ concerns about
their reputations and motivate them to address the problem.
The book develops an unconventional but careful argument
about the growing phenomenon of such ratings and rankings.
It supports this by examining the United States foreign
policy on human trafficking using a global survey of NGOs,
case studies, thousands of diplomatic cables, media stories,
90 interviews worldwide, and other documents. All of this is
gathered together in a format that walks the reader through
the mechanisms of scorecard diplomacy, including assessment
of the outcomes. Scorecard Diplomacy speaks both to those
keen to understand the pros and cons of the US policy on
human trafficking and to those interested in the central
question of influence in international relations.},
Doi = {10.1017/9781108186100},
Key = {fds325396}
}
@book{fds339453,
Title = {The Power of Global Performance Indicators},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
Editor = {Kelley, J and Simmons, B},
Year = {2020},
Key = {fds339453}
}
%% Chapters in Books
@misc{fds217734,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {The Potential for Organizational Membership Rules to Enhance
Regional Cooperation?},
Pages = {78-103},
Booktitle = {Integrating Regions: Asia in Comparative
Perspective},
Publisher = {Stanford University Press},
Address = {Palo Alto},
Editor = {Miles Kahler and Andrew MacIntyre},
Year = {2013},
Key = {fds217734}
}
%% Journal Articles
@article{fds376223,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Reputation and Policy Conclusion},
Pages = {230-262},
Booktitle = {SCORECARD DIPLOMACY: GRADING STATES TO INFLUENCE THEIR
REPUTATION AND BEHAVIOR},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-316-64913-8},
Key = {fds376223}
}
@article{fds376215,
Author = {Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
Title = {The Power of Global Performance Indicators
Introduction},
Pages = {1-21},
Booktitle = {POWER OF GLOBAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS},
Year = {2020},
ISBN = {978-1-108-48720-7},
Key = {fds376215}
}
@article{fds376220,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {When Does It Work?},
Pages = {182-204},
Booktitle = {SCORECARD DIPLOMACY: GRADING STATES TO INFLUENCE THEIR
REPUTATION AND BEHAVIOR},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-316-64913-8},
Key = {fds376220}
}
@article{fds223293,
Author = {Judith Kelley and Jon Pevehouse},
Title = {An Opportunity Cost Theory of Treaty Ratification},
Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
Year = {2012},
Abstract = {It is a striking feature of multilateral cooperation that
although the United States often leads in the creation of
treaties, it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so
only after considerable delay. Most international relations
theory expects states to join treaties as long as the
benefits outweigh the costs. Domestic theories modify this
with the constraints of institutional veto players. Yet,
sometimes neither of these arguments explains the delay or
absence of US participation. This paper supplements these
explanations with an opportunity cost theory that argues
that the advice and consent process sometimes slows or
stalls because it imposes costs in terms of legislative time
and political capital that politicians prefer to spend on
other priorities. These costs alter the calculus of key
players and may obstruct or delay the process, sometimes
leading the President and Senators to deprioritize treaties
despite their interests in their success. Statistical
analysis of the stages of the treaty process supports the
argument. The priority the Senate and President give to
treaties depends not only on the value they assign to the
treaty, but also on the value of other possible policy
achievements. Presidents are less, not more likely to
transmit treaties to the Senate the more support he has in
Congress. Furthermore, the more support the President has in
Congress, the more the cost of Senate floor time matters for
advice and consent.},
Key = {fds223293}
}
@article{fds270002,
Author = {Kelley, JG and Pevehouse, JCW},
Title = {An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior},
Journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
Volume = {59},
Number = {3},
Pages = {531-543},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2015},
Month = {September},
ISSN = {0020-8833},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12185},
Abstract = {The United States often leads in the creation of treaties,
but it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so only
after considerable delay. This presents an interesting
puzzle. Most international relations theory expects states
to join treaties as long as the benefits outweigh the costs.
Domestic theories modify this with the constraints of
institutional veto players. Yet, sometimes neither of these
arguments explains the delay or absence of US participation.
We supplement these explanations with an opportunity cost
theory. We argue that the advice and consent process
sometimes slows or stalls because it imposes costs in terms
of legislative time and political capital. These costs alter
the calculus of key players and may obstruct the process.
Statistical analysis supports the argument. The priority the
Senate and President give to treaties depends not only on
the value they assign to the treaty, but also on the value
of the time needed to process the treaty. Presidents are
less, not more, likely to transmit treaties to the Senate
the more support they have in Congress. Furthermore, the
more support the President has in Congress, the more the
cost of Senate floor time matters for advice and
consent.},
Doi = {10.1111/isqu.12185},
Key = {fds270002}
}
@article{fds270020,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of
International Election Monitoring},
Journal = {International Organization},
Volume = {62},
Number = {2},
Pages = {221-255},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2008},
Month = {Spring},
ISSN = {0020-8183},
url = {http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1825128&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0020818308080089},
Abstract = {Given that states have long considered elections a purely
domestic matter, the dramatic growth of international
election monitoring in the 1990s was remarkable. Why did
states allow international organizations and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) to interfere and why did international
election monitoring spread so quickly? Why did election
monitoring become institutionalized in so many
organizations? Perhaps most puzzling, why do countries
invite monitors and nevertheless cheat? This article
develops a rigorous method for investigating the causal
mechanisms underlying the rise of election monitoring, and
"norm cascades" more generally. The evolution and spread of
norms, as with many other social processes, are complex
combinations of normative, instrumental, and other
constraints and causes of action. The rise of election
monitoring has been driven by an interaction of
instrumentalism, emergent norms, and fundamental power
shifts in the international system. By dissecting this
larger theoretical complexity into specific subclaims that
can be empirically investigated, this article examines the
role of each of these causal factors, their mutual tensions,
and their interactive contributions to the evolution of
election monitoring. © 2008 by The IO Foundation.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0020818308080089},
Key = {fds270020}
}
@article{fds326148,
Author = {Heiss, A and Kelley, J},
Title = {Between a rock and a hard place: International NGOs and the
dual pressures of donors and host governments},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Volume = {79},
Number = {2},
Pages = {732-741},
Publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
Year = {2017},
Month = {April},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/691218},
Doi = {10.1086/691218},
Key = {fds326148}
}
@article{fds376216,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Country Perspectives},
Pages = {205-229},
Booktitle = {SCORECARD DIPLOMACY: GRADING STATES TO INFLUENCE THEIR
REPUTATION AND BEHAVIOR},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-316-64913-8},
Key = {fds376216}
}
@article{fds270013,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {D-Minus elections: The politics and norms of international
election observation},
Journal = {International Organization},
Volume = {63},
Number = {4},
Pages = {765-787},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2009},
Month = {Fall},
ISSN = {0020-8183},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309990117},
Abstract = {As international election monitors have grown active
worldwide, their announcements have gained influence.
Sometimes, however, they endorse highly flawed elections.
Because their leverage rests largely on their credibility,
this is puzzling. Understanding the behavior of election
monitors is important because they help the international
community to evaluate the legitimacy of governments and
because their assessments inform the data used by scholars
to study democracy. Furthermore, election monitors are also
particularly instructive to study because the variety of
both intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations
that observe elections makes it possible to compare them
across many countries and political contexts. This study
uses a new dataset of 591 international election-monitoring
missions. It shows that despite their official mandate to
focus on election norms, monitors do not only consider the
elections' quality; their assessments also reflect the
interests of their member states or donors as well as other
tangential organizational norms. Thus, even when accounting
as best as possible for the nature and level of
irregularities in an election, monitors' concerns about
democracy promotion, violent instability, and organizational
politics and preferences are associated with election
endorsement. The study also reveals differences in the
behavior of intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations and explains why neither can pursue their core
objectives single-mindedly. © 2009 The IO
Foundation.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0020818309990117},
Key = {fds270013}
}
@article{fds270015,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {Do international election monitors increase or decrease
opposition boycotts?},
Journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
Volume = {44},
Number = {11},
Pages = {1527-1556},
Publisher = {SAGE Publications},
Year = {2011},
Month = {November},
ISSN = {0010-4140},
url = {http://cps.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/03/10/0010414011399885.abstract},
Abstract = {Election boycotts are over twice as common when
international observers are present. Do international
observers increase election boycotts as this correlation and
past research suggest? This article argues not. Observers
tend to go to elections with many problems, and it is
primarily these, rather than monitors, that drive boycotts.
Furthermore, opposition parties have reasons to hope that
observers can improve the quality of the election or that
they will increase attention to election fraud, and
therefore opposition parties may actually abandon boycott
plans. Whether they do, however, depends on their
expectations about how the observers will behave. This makes
it important to account for the varying reputation of
observer organizations. Thus, using matching to address the
selection problem, this article shows that international
observers can actually deter boycotts, but only if the
observers are reputable. © The Author(s)
2011.},
Doi = {10.1177/0010414011399885},
Key = {fds270015}
}
@article{fds270023,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {Does domestic politics limit the influence of external
actors on ethnic politics?},
Journal = {Human Rights Review},
Volume = {4},
Number = {3},
Pages = {34-54},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2003},
ISSN = {1524-8879},
url = {http://www.metapress.com/content/3k2ugrpm4v0r/?p=b41809fc9a4c4e66bee119471a5fe37b&pi=15},
Abstract = {Conclusion: Domestic politics is naturally important in
ethnic policies. However, in spite of their potency,
domestic political factors are not always the most decisive.
International organizations have influenced the Latvian and
Estonian governments, and at times the Slovak and Romanian
governments. However, the ability of different
organizational strategies to overcome domestic opposition
and thus bring about their desired policy varies widely. In
most cases, actors need to use conditionality and aim it at
the appropriate decision makers. In spite of their
widespread use, efforts that rely solely on persuasion and
diplomacy tend only to work when the domestic opposition is
initially quite low or when ethnic minorities themselves
have some bargaining power in the government. The key policy
implication is that domestic factors do not make failure, or
success for that matter, a foregone conclusion. For example,
ethnic minority representation within the government
coalition is not in itself a guarantee of passage of the
policy preferences of the minorities. Conversely, the
presence of authoritarian-style leadership does not
automatically mean a rejection ethnic minority accommodation
either, if organizations present their suggestions so that
such leaders view it as being in their greater interests to
maintain power. Conditionality that targets incentives to
fit goals of the leadership can work. External actors are
thus not justified in backing off from action based purely
on a domestic analysis. © 2003 Springer.},
Doi = {10.1007/s12142-003-1011-z},
Key = {fds270023}
}
@article{fds270016,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {Election observers and their biases},
Journal = {Journal of Democracy},
Volume = {21},
Number = {3},
Pages = {158-172},
Publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
Year = {2010},
ISSN = {1045-5736},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/4625 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {Why do election monitors sometimes issue contradictory
statements or endorse flawed elections? The answers are not
always straightforward; in some cases, the monitors' good
intentions may undermine their credibility. © 2010 National
Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University
Press.},
Doi = {10.1353/jod.0.0173},
Key = {fds270016}
}
@article{fds317786,
Author = {Kelley, JG and Kolev, K},
Title = {Election Quality and International Observation 1975-2004:
Two New Datasets},
Year = {2010},
Month = {October},
Abstract = {This paper introduces two new datasets on national level
elections from 1975 to 2004. The data are grouped into two
separate datasets, the Quality of Elections Data and the
Data on International Election Monitoring. Together these
data sets provide original information on elections,
election observation and election quality, and will enable
researchers to study a variety of research questions. The
datasets will be publicly available and are maintained at a
project website.},
Key = {fds317786}
}
@article{fds270011,
Author = {Vidmar, N},
Title = {Foreword},
Volume = {71},
Number = {1},
Pages = {I-V},
Year = {2009},
ISSN = {0023-9186},
Key = {fds270011}
}
@article{fds376221,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {From Reputational Concerns to Effects on Laws, Practices,
and Norms},
Pages = {151-181},
Booktitle = {SCORECARD DIPLOMACY: GRADING STATES TO INFLUENCE THEIR
REPUTATION AND BEHAVIOR},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-316-64913-8},
Key = {fds376221}
}
@article{fds330372,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {From the Trenches: A Global Survey of Anti-TIP NGOs and
their Views of US Efforts},
Journal = {Journal of Human Trafficking},
Volume = {Forthcoming},
Number = {3},
Pages = {231-254},
Publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
Year = {2017},
Month = {July},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322705.2016.1199241},
Abstract = {Amid the academic and policy critiques of the United
States’ 15-year push to eliminate human trafficking, the
perspective of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
working with anti-trafficking advocacy and services has been
largely ignored. This article presents the results of a
global survey of nearly 500 anti-trafficking NGOs working in
133 countries and is the first NGO-focused survey of its
kind. Based on the results of the survey, we provide an
overview of the anti-trafficking NGO sector as a whole,
detail the relationship between anti-trafficking NGOs and
the United States and account for some of the variation in
NGO opinions of U.S. efforts. Notably, we find that NGOs are
remarkably satisfied with U.S.-led efforts—despite their
acknowledged flaws—and that NGOs believe that American
anti-TIP policies are important and, on balance, helpful.
These results also provide a warning for the future of the
United States’ anti-trafficking advocacy, suggesting that
the United States avoid politicizing its annual Trafficking
in Persons Report.},
Doi = {10.1080/23322705.2016.1199241},
Key = {fds330372}
}
@article{fds376214,
Author = {Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
Title = {Global Performance Indicators: Themes, Findings, and an
Agenda for Future Research},
Pages = {409-424},
Booktitle = {POWER OF GLOBAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS},
Year = {2020},
ISBN = {978-1-108-48720-7},
Key = {fds376214}
}
@article{fds355799,
Author = {Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
Title = {Governance by other Means: Rankings as regulatory
systems},
Journal = {International Theory},
Volume = {13},
Number = {1},
Pages = {169-178},
Year = {2021},
Month = {March},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971920000457},
Abstract = {This article takes the challenges of global governance and
legitimacy seriously and looks at new ways in which
international organizations (IOs) have attempted to
‘govern’ without explicit legal or regulatory
directives. Specifically, we explore the growth of global
performance indicators as a form of social control that
appears to have certain advantages even as states and civil
society actors push back against international regulatory
authority. This article discusses the ways in which Michael
Zürn’s diagnosis of governance dilemmas helps to explain
the rise of such ranking systems. These play into favored
paradigms that give information and market performance
greater social acceptance than rules, laws, and directives
designed by international organizations. We discuss how and
why these schemes can constitute governance systems, and
some of the evidence regarding their effects on actors’
behaviors. Zürn’s book provides a useful context for
understanding the rise and effectiveness of Governance by
Other Means: systems that ‘inform’ and provoke
competition among states, shaping outcomes without directly
legislating performance.},
Doi = {10.1017/S1752971920000457},
Key = {fds355799}
}
@article{fds376218,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {How Third Parties Boost Reputational Concerns},
Pages = {95-114},
Booktitle = {SCORECARD DIPLOMACY: GRADING STATES TO INFLUENCE THEIR
REPUTATION AND BEHAVIOR},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-316-64913-8},
Key = {fds376218}
}
@article{fds369107,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership
Conditionality and Socialization by International
Institutions},
Pages = {393-425},
Year = {2017},
Month = {January},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315254234-28},
Abstract = {International relations scholars increasingly debate when
and how international institutions influence domestic
policy. This examination of ethnic politics in four Baltic
and East European countries during the 1990s shows how
European institutions shaped domestic policy, and why these
institutions sometimes failed. Comparing traditional
rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality
with more socialization-based efforts, I argue that
conditionality motivated most behavior changes, but that
socialization-based efforts often guided them. Furthermore,
using new case studies, statistics, and counterfactual
analysis, I find that domestic opposition posed far greater
obstacles to socialization-based methods than it did to
conditionality: when used alone, socialization-based methods
rarely changed behavior; when they did, the domestic
opposition was usually low and the effect was only moderate.
In contrast, incentive-based methods such as membership
conditionality were crucial in changing policy: As domestic
opposition grew, membership conditionality was not only
increasingly necessary to change behavior, but it was also
surprisingly effective.},
Doi = {10.4324/9781315254234-28},
Key = {fds369107}
}
@article{fds270018,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {International actors on the domestic scene: Membership
conditionally and socialization by international
institutions},
Journal = {International Organization},
Volume = {58},
Number = {3},
Pages = {425-457},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Summer},
ISSN = {0020-8183},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000223447300001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Abstract = {International relations scholars increasingly debate when
and how international institutions influence domestic
policy. This examination of ethnic politics in four Baltic
and East European countries during the 1990s shows how
European institutions shaped domestic policy, and why these
institutions sometimes failed. Comparing traditional
rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality
with more socialization-based efforts, I argue that
conditionality motivated most behavior changes, but that
socialization-based efforts often guided them. Furthermore,
using new case studies, statistics, and counterfactual
analysis, I find that domestic opposition posed far greater
obstacles to socialization-based methods than it did to
conditionality: when used alone, socialization-based methods
rarely changed behavior; when they did, the domestic
opposition was usually low and the effect was only moderate.
In contrast, incentive-based methods such as membership
conditionality were crucial in changing policy: As domestic
opposition grew, membership conditionality was not only
increasingly necessary to change behavior, but it was also
surprisingly effective.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0020818304583017},
Key = {fds270018}
}
@article{fds317787,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {International Influences on Election Quality and
Turnover},
Year = {2010},
Abstract = {This chapter is part of a book manuscript with the working
title “MONITORING DEMOCRACY: When international election
monitoring works and why it often fails.” This chapter
follows a theoretical chapter that discusses the possible
influence of international monitors on election quality. The
present chapter is purely empirical. It examines the
influence of international monitors on the quality of
individual elections. Using quantitative data to examine the
quality of elections provides a far greater breadth of
analysis than case studies alone can accomplish. However,
using quantitative data to explore the effects of monitors
on a given election is complicated. As a previous book
chapter discusses, whether an election is monitored depends
both on the organizations’ interest in observing an
election and on domestic willingness to host observers. Both
of these factors are likely to be related to the expected
quality of an election. This is the classic problem with
analyzing data on any form of nonrandom intervention. This
chapter begins with a discussion of the measures used to
evaluate election quality. It then uses a mix of approaches
to explore the data. First it presents some descriptive
overviews. It then applies some of the most cutting-edge
statistical techniques to reduce the bias introduced by the
selection problem discussed above and identify the effect of
monitors on election quality. Two appendices are referred to
throughout the chapter. Please contact the author for those
appendices or other parts of the manuscript if
interested.},
Key = {fds317787}
}
@article{fds270012,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {International influences on elections in new multiparty
states},
Journal = {Annual Review of Political Science},
Volume = {15},
Number = {1},
Pages = {203-220},
Publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
Year = {2012},
Month = {June},
ISSN = {1094-2939},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-030810-110805},
Abstract = {Practitioners and politicians have long debated the wisdom
of pushing countries to hold elections, with some arguing
for its necessity and others warning of its futility and
even danger. Yet, research on how varying types of
international activities affect the conduct and structure of
elections still has a long way to go to be able to inform
this debate. This article discusses the myriad international
forms of engagement with elections and reviews the research
on their ability to improve election quality. It also
explores the more nefarious international activities, which
are even less well understood than the efforts to improve
elections. Given the mixed outcomes and findings, much work
remains to be done, especially in specifying the conditions
under which various effects occur. Such work has both
practical and theoretical merits and can shed light on
broader scholarly inquiries about the international
dimensions of democratization. Copyright © 2012 by Annual
Reviews. All rights reserved.},
Doi = {10.1146/annurev-polisci-030810-110805},
Key = {fds270012}
}
@article{fds341722,
Author = {Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
Title = {Introduction: The Power of Global Performance
Indicators},
Journal = {International Organization},
Volume = {73},
Number = {3},
Pages = {491-510},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000146},
Abstract = {In recent decades, IGOs, NGOs, private firms and even states
have begun to regularly package and distribute information
on the relative performance of states. From the World Bank's
Ease of Doing Business Index to the Financial Action Task
Force blacklist, global performance indicators (GPIs) are
increasingly deployed to influence governance globally. We
argue that GPIs derive influence from their ability to frame
issues, extend the authority of the creator, and-most
importantly-to invoke recurrent comparison that stimulates
governments' concerns for their own and their country's
reputation. Their public and ongoing ratings and rankings of
states are particularly adept at capturing attention not
only at elite policy levels but also among other domestic
and transnational actors. GPIs thus raise new questions for
research on politics and governance globally. What are the
social and political effects of this form of information on
discourse, policies and behavior? What types of actors can
effectively wield GPIs and on what types of issues? In this
symposium introduction, we define GPIs, describe their rise,
and theorize and discuss these questions in light of the
findings of the symposium contributions.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0020818319000146},
Key = {fds341722}
}
@article{fds376217,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Micro-Level Evidence of Reputational Concerns},
Pages = {117-150},
Booktitle = {SCORECARD DIPLOMACY: GRADING STATES TO INFLUENCE THEIR
REPUTATION AND BEHAVIOR},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-316-64913-8},
Key = {fds376217}
}
@article{fds270022,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaption in
The new European Neighborhood Policy},
Journal = {Journal of Common Market Studies},
Volume = {44},
Number = {1},
Pages = {29-55},
Publisher = {WILEY},
Year = {2006},
url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00613.x},
Abstract = {The EU’s newly launched European Neighborhood Policy is a
fascinating case study in organizational management theory
of how the Commission strategically adapted enlargement
policies to expand its foreign policy domain. From the use
of Action Plans, regular reports and negotiations to the
larger conceptualization and use of socialization and
conditionality, the development of the policy shows
significant mechanical borrowing from the enlargement
strategies. Given the lack of the membership carrot, the
question is whether such adaptation from enlargement can
promote political reforms in the ENP countries, which are
generally poor, often autocratic and in some cases embroiled
in domestic conflicts.},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00613.x},
Key = {fds270022}
}
@article{fds270008,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional
Choice in the European Union},
Journal = {Political Science Quarterly},
Volume = {120},
Number = {2},
Pages = {332-333},
Publisher = {Oxford University Press (OUP)},
Year = {2005},
Month = {Summer},
ISSN = {0032-3195},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000230374200028&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1002/j.1538-165x.2005.tb01377.x},
Key = {fds270008}
}
@article{fds376225,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Scorecard Diplomacy Grading States to Influence Their
Reputation and Behavior Introduction},
Pages = {3-30},
Booktitle = {SCORECARD DIPLOMACY: GRADING STATES TO INFLUENCE THEIR
REPUTATION AND BEHAVIOR},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-316-64913-8},
Key = {fds376225}
}
@article{fds376224,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Scorecard Diplomacy Grading States to Influence Their
Reputation and Behavior Preface},
Pages = {XVII-+},
Booktitle = {SCORECARD DIPLOMACY: GRADING STATES TO INFLUENCE THEIR
REPUTATION AND BEHAVIOR},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-316-64913-8},
Key = {fds376224}
}
@article{fds376219,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Scorecard Diplomacy and Reputation},
Pages = {31-63},
Booktitle = {SCORECARD DIPLOMACY: GRADING STATES TO INFLUENCE THEIR
REPUTATION AND BEHAVIOR},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-316-64913-8},
Key = {fds376219}
}
@article{fds270024,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: Why Iraq was
not just about Iraq},
Journal = {International Politics},
Volume = {42},
Number = {2},
Pages = {153-173},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2005},
Month = {June},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10161/6649 Duke open
access},
Abstract = {Many commentators explain recent transatlantic rifts by
pointing to diverging norms, interests and geopolitical
preferences. This paper proceeds from the premise that not
all situations of conflict are necessarily due to underlying
deadlocked preferences. Rather, non-cooperation may be a
strategic form of soft balancing. That is, more generally,
if they believe that they are being shortchanged in terms of
influence and payoffs, weaker states may deliberately reject
possible cooperation in the short run to improve their
influence vis-à-vis stronger states in the long run. This
need not be due to traditional relative gains concern.
States merely calculate that their reputation as a weak
negotiator will erode future bargaining power and
subsequently their future share of absolute gains. Strategic
non-cooperation is therefore a rational signal of resolve.
This paper develops the concept of strategic non-cooperation
as a soft balancing tool and applies it to the Iraq case in
2002-2003. © 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.},
Doi = {10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800105},
Key = {fds270024}
}
@article{fds270009,
Author = {KELLEY, J},
Title = {Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and
Slovakia by Zsuzsa Csergo},
Journal = {Nations and Nationalism},
Volume = {14},
Number = {3},
Pages = {626-628},
Publisher = {Wiley},
Year = {2008},
Month = {July},
ISSN = {1354-5078},
url = {http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000257569800020&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=47d3190e77e5a3a53558812f597b0b92},
Doi = {10.1111/j.1469-8129.2008.00361_9.x},
Key = {fds270009}
}
@article{fds355176,
Author = {Strezhnev, A and Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
Title = {Testing for Negative Spillovers: Is Promoting Human Rights
Really Part of the Problem?},
Journal = {International Organization},
Volume = {75},
Number = {1},
Pages = {71-102},
Year = {2021},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000661},
Abstract = {The international community often seeks to promote political
reforms in recalcitrant states. Recently, some scholars have
argued that, rather than helping, international law and
advocacy create new problems because they have negative
spillovers that increase rights violations. We review three
mechanisms for such spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, and
counteraction and concentrate on the last of these. Some
researchers assert that governments sometimes counteract
international human rights pressures by strategically
substituting violations in adjacent areas that are either
not targeted or are harder to monitor. However, most such
research shows only that both outcomes correlate with an
intervention - the targeted positively and the spillover
negatively. The burden of proof, however, should be as
rigorous as those for studies of first-order policy
consequences. We show that these correlations by themselves
are insufficient to demonstrate counteraction outside of the
narrow case where the intervention is assumed to have no
direct effect on the spillover, a situation akin to having a
valid instrumental variable design. We revisit two prominent
findings and show that the evidence for the counteraction
claim is weak in both cases. The article contributes
methodologically to the study of negative spillovers in
general by proposing mediation and sensitivity analysis
within an instrumental variables framework for assessing
such arguments. It revisits important prior findings that
claim negative consequences to human rights law and/or
advocacy, and raises critical normative questions regarding
how we empirically evaluate hypotheses about causal
mechanisms.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0020818320000661},
Key = {fds355176}
}
@article{fds376222,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {The Case of Human Trafficking},
Pages = {64-94},
Booktitle = {SCORECARD DIPLOMACY: GRADING STATES TO INFLUENCE THEIR
REPUTATION AND BEHAVIOR},
Year = {2017},
ISBN = {978-1-316-64913-8},
Key = {fds376222}
}
@article{fds376213,
Author = {Kelley, J and Simmons, B and Doshi, R},
Title = {The Competitive Pressures of Rankings: Experimental Evidence
of Rankings’ Influence on Domestic Priorities},
Booktitle = {The Complexity of Human Rights From Vernacularization to
Quantification},
Publisher = {Hart Publishing},
Editor = {Alston, P},
Year = {2024},
Month = {February},
ISBN = {9781509972869},
Abstract = {The use of indicators in global governance has the potential
to alter the forms, the exercise, and perhaps even the
distributions of power in certain spheres of
governance},
Key = {fds376213}
}
@article{fds270019,
Author = {Bradley, C and Kelley, J},
Title = {The Concept of International Delegation},
Journal = {Law & Contemporary Problems},
Volume = {71},
Number = {1},
Pages = {1-36},
Year = {2008},
Month = {Winter},
ISSN = {0023-9186},
Abstract = {This article defines and clarifies the concept of
international delegation from both a legal and social
science perspective. An international delegation, the
article explains, involves a grant of authority by two or
more states to an international body to make decisions or
take actions. After defending this definition, the article
describes the types of international bodies to which states
may grant authority. To capture the multilayered nature of
international delegation, the article considers grants of
authority not only to bureaucracies, but also to collective
bodies, sub-groups of states, and courts. The article then
identifies eight types of authority that states may grant:
legislative, adjudicative, regulatory, monitoring and
enforcement, agenda-setting, research and advice, policy
implementation, and re-delegation. Next, the article
discusses how the extent of an international delegation can
vary depending on its legal effect and the degree of
independence of the international body. The article then
considers some of the benefits and costs of international
delegation in light of this typology. The article concludes
with a discussion of some of the questions raised by the
typology and its implications for further
research.},
Key = {fds270019}
}
@article{fds339454,
Author = {Nielson, DL and Hyde, SD and Kelley, J},
Title = {The elusive sources of legitimacy beliefs: Civil society
views of international election observers},
Journal = {Review of International Organizations},
Volume = {14},
Number = {4},
Pages = {685-715},
Publisher = {Springer Nature},
Year = {2019},
Month = {December},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9331-6},
Abstract = {When do members of civil society view international election
observers as legitimate? Motivated by recent work on the
legitimacy of international organizations, we evaluate what
type of information affects non-governmental
organizations’ (NGOs) beliefs about international election
observer groups, which include both intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs) that seek to exercise authority, often
regarding the same elections. Specifically, we examine the
effects of two different types of information: information
about the observers’ objective substantive features versus
information that serves as heuristic shortcuts. Three
survey-based experiments – one in Kenya and the others
global – prime NGO respondents with information about both
real and hypothetical election observer groups in ways
intended to affect their votes for which organizations
should be invited to observe the next election in their
countries. In general, the primes about the objective
substantive sources of legitimacy beliefs failed to produce
consistent, measurable changes in responses among NGOs
across both the hypothetical and real-world observer groups.
That is, telling NGOs about the qualities of the
organizations work failed to change perceptions. What
mattered instead, however, was an organizations’
prominence or type, features that likely served as heuristic
shortcuts. The findings, however, varied depending on
whether we used hypothetical or real organizations. With
hypothetical organizations, NGO respondents preferred other
NGOs, suggesting an isomorphism heuristic. Conversely, with
real organizations NGO respondents preferred more prominent
and well-known intergovernmental organizations. This
suggests that the isomorphism and prominence of observer
organizations can drive legitimacy beliefs. Given the
differences between using real versus hypothetical
organizations, however, it also cautions against using
hypothetical actors in survey experiments.},
Doi = {10.1007/s11558-018-9331-6},
Key = {fds339454}
}
@article{fds270014,
Author = {J. Kelley and Susan Hyde},
Title = {The Limits of Election Monitoring: What Independent
Observation Can (and Can’t) Do},
Journal = {Foreign Affairs},
Year = {2011},
Month = {June},
url = {http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67968/susan-d-hyde-and-judith-g-kelley/the-limits-of-election-monitoring},
Key = {fds270014}
}
@article{fds270017,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {The more the merrier? the effects of having multiple
international election monitoring organizations},
Journal = {Perspectives on Politics},
Volume = {7},
Number = {1},
Pages = {59-64},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2009},
Month = {March},
ISSN = {1537-5927},
url = {http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=3998560},
Abstract = {As the pressure to invite international election monitors
rose at the end of the Cold War, states refused to grant the
United Nations a dominant role. Thus, today multiple
intergovernmental, regional, and international
non-governmental organizations often monitor the same
elections with equal authority. This article examines the
costs and benefits of this complex regime to highlight some
possible broader implications of regime complexity. It
argues that the availability of many different organizations
facilitates action that might otherwise have been blocked
for political reasons. Furthermore, when different
international election monitoring agencies agree, their
consensus can bolster their individual legitimacy as well as
the legitimacy of the international norms they stress, and
thus magnify their influence on domestic politics.
Unfortunately the election monitoring example also suggests
that complex regimes can engender damaging
inter-organizational politics and that the different biases,
capabilities, and standards of organizations sometime can
lead organizations to outright contradict each other or work
at cross-purposes. © 2009 Copyright American Political
Science Association.},
Doi = {10.1017/S1537592709090094},
Key = {fds270017}
}
@article{fds317785,
Author = {Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
Title = {The Power of Performance Indicators: Rankings, Ratings and
Reactivity in International Relations},
Year = {2014},
Abstract = {Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) are increasingly used
to rank, rate or categorize states in a number of issue
areas. Many of these new indicators are short-lived efforts
to grab attention and are unlikely to matter much. But we
believe there are good reasons to think that some GPIs
affect important areas of state policy. Indeed, we argue
that GPIs should be thought of increasingly as tools of
global governance, involving rule-making and the exercise of
soft power on a global scale and that their proliferation
constitutes a profound social trend with implications for
governance world-wide and reflects the diversity of actors
and institutions attempting to influence policies across and
among states. This article defines what we mean by global
performance indicators, and describes their features. Using
a new dataset and a series of interviews with producers of
various indices, we document the proliferation of GPIs,
which have been developed and promulgated by a wide range of
actors, both public and private; unilaterally and
multilaterally. We then elaborate possible causal mechanisms
that we expect to connect externally generated GPIs with
state policy, and hypothesize about the scope conditions for
their effects.},
Key = {fds317785}
}
@article{fds341723,
Author = {Doshi, R and Kelley, JG and Simmons, BA},
Title = {The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator
and Global Regulatory Behavior},
Journal = {International Organization},
Volume = {73},
Number = {3},
Pages = {611-643},
Booktitle = {POWER OF GLOBAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS},
Year = {2019},
Month = {June},
ISBN = {978-1-108-48720-7},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000158},
Abstract = {We argue that the World Bank has successfully marshaled the
Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index to amass considerable
influence over business regulations worldwide. The Ease of
Doing is a global performance indicator (GPI), and
GPIs-especially those that rate and rank states against one
another-are intended to package information to influence the
views of an audience important to the target, such as
foreign investors or voters, thus generating pressures that
induce a change in the target's behavior. The World Bank has
succeeded in shaping the global regulatory environment even
though the bank has no explicit mandate over regulatory
policy and despite questions about EDB accuracy and required
policy tradeoffs. We show that the EDB has a dominating
market share among business climate indicators. We then use
media analyses and observational data to show that EDB has
motivated state regulatory shifts. States respond to being
publicly ranked and some restructure bureaucracies
accordingly. Next we explore plausible influence channels
for the EDB ranking and use an experiment involving US
portfolio managers to build on existing economics research
and examine whether the rankings influence investor
sentiment within the experiment. Using a case study of
India's multiyear interagency effort to rise in the EDB
rankings, as well as its decision to create subnational EDB
rankings, we bring the strands of the argument together by
showing how politicians see the ranking as affecting
domestic politics, altering investor sentiment, and engaging
bureaucratic reputation. Overall, a wide variety of evidence
converges to illustrate the pressures through which the
World Bank has used state rankings to achieve its vision of
regulatory reform.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0020818319000158},
Key = {fds341723}
}
@article{fds341079,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The
International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-Surrender
Agreements},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {3},
Number = {101},
Pages = {573-589},
Year = {2007},
Month = {August},
Key = {fds341079}
}
@article{fds270021,
Author = {Kelley, J},
Title = {Who keeps international commitments and why? The
international criminal court and bilateral nonsurrender
agreements},
Journal = {American Political Science Review},
Volume = {101},
Number = {3},
Pages = {573-589},
Publisher = {Cambridge University Press (CUP)},
Year = {2007},
Month = {August},
ISSN = {0003-0554},
url = {http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?jid=PSR&volumeId=101&issueId=03},
Abstract = {What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty,
but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation
of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried
to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to
the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender
Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others
not? Given United States power and threats of military
sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell
only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states
emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states
with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance
of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances
two classic arguments that typically are difficult to
substantiate; namely, state preferences are indeed partly
normative, and international commitments do not just screen
states; they also constrain.},
Doi = {10.1017/S0003055407070426},
Key = {fds270021}
}
%% Book Reviews
@article{fds198838,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Book review The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election
Observation Became an International Norm. By Susan Hyde.
(Cornell University Press, 2011},
Journal = {Journal of Politics},
Year = {2011},
Key = {fds198838}
}
@article{fds198839,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Book Review: Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, Means to an
End: US Interests in the International Criminal Court
Brookings, 2009},
Journal = {Human Rights Review},
Volume = {2011},
Number = {12},
Pages = {137-138},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds198839}
}
@article{fds166552,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Book Review: Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, Means to an
End: US Interests in the International Criminal Court
Brookings, 2009},
Journal = {Human Rights Review},
Volume = {2011},
Number = {12},
Pages = {137-138},
Year = {2010},
Month = {February},
Key = {fds166552}
}
%% Other
@misc{fds147650,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {"Big Stick Diplomacy III Serves our Course." Commentary. The
News and Observer},
Year = {2004},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds147650}
}
@misc{fds147649,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {"The Transatlantic Alliance." Symposium on The Future of
European and Transatlantic Security Cooperation.},
Publisher = {Young Europeans for Security},
Year = {2005},
Month = {March},
url = {http://www.yes-dk.dk},
Key = {fds147649}
}
@misc{fds146539,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {"The Transatlantic Alliance." Symposium on The Future of
European and Transatlantic Security Cooperation.
(Contribution along with Secretary-General of the Council of
the EU & High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, among
others).},
Journal = {Young Europeans for Security, March 2005.},
Year = {2005},
Month = {March},
url = {http://www.yes-dk.dk/},
Key = {fds146539}
}
@misc{fds147647,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {"Transatlantic Tensions: Opportunities for Learning."
European Union Studies Association Review},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2},
Pages = {9-10},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Spring},
Key = {fds147647}
}
@misc{fds146541,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Big Stick Diplomacy Ill Serves our Cause},
Journal = {The News and Observer},
Volume = {December 4},
Year = {2004},
Key = {fds146541}
}
@misc{fds213233,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Commentator},
Journal = {Voice of Russia},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds213233}
}
@misc{fds198274,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Data on International Election Monitoring: Three Global
Datasets on Election Quality, Election Events and
International Election Observation.},
Journal = {[Computer file]. ICPSR31461-v1. Ann Arbor, MI:
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research [distributor]},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
Abstract = {This data collection focuses on elections and election
monitoring throughout the world. Dataset 1, Data on
International Election Monitoring (DIEM), codes the
assessement and activities of international election
monitoring organizations to national-level legislative and
presidential elections in 108 countries from 1980-2004.
Dataset 2, Quality of Elections Data (QED), codes the
quality of national-level legislative and presidential
elections in 172 countries from 1978 to 2004. Dataset 3,
Supplementary Election Data, includes supplementary
information on all direct presidential and legislative
elections in 182 countries from 1975-2004.},
Key = {fds198274}
}
@misc{fds213235,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Interviewee},
Journal = {Radio - New Zealand's Sunday Morning program},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds213235}
}
@misc{fds147645,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Letter to the editor: Financial Times},
Series = {US Edition},
Year = {2008},
Key = {fds147645}
}
@misc{fds146538,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Letters to the editor},
Journal = {Financial Times, US edition},
Year = {2006},
Key = {fds146538}
}
@misc{fds213231,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Putin 'victory' rests on narrow definition of fraud, Letter
to the Editor},
Journal = {Financial Times},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds213231}
}
@misc{fds146540,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Transatlantic Tensions: Opportunities for
Learning},
Journal = {European Union Studies Association Review},
Volume = {17},
Number = {2},
Pages = {9-10},
Year = {2004},
Month = {Spring},
Key = {fds146540}
}
%% Published Policy Briefs and Comments
@misc{fds213229,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Election Monitoring: Power, Limits, Risks. A Markets and
Democracy Brief},
Journal = {Council on Foreign Relations},
Year = {2012},
Key = {fds213229}
}
@misc{fds198840,
Author = {J. Kelley},
Title = {Election Monitoring: the Good, the Bad and the
Ugly},
Journal = {International Institute for Electoral Democracy},
Address = {Stockholm, Sweden},
Year = {2011},
Month = {December},
Key = {fds198840}
}
@misc{fds270010,
Author = {Kelley, JG},
Title = {The Role of Membership Rules in Regional
Organizations},
Number = {No. 53},
Publisher = {Asian Development Bank},
Year = {2010},
url = {http://aric.adb.org/pdf/workingpaper/WP53_Membership_Rules.pdf},
Abstract = {This paper argues that success in the struggle for regional
integration hinges foremost on the degree of heterogeneity
among regional states. Regional organizations therefore must
consider how to optimize their leverage to forge convergence
that will foster agreement and cooperation. To do so,
regional organizations can rely on inclusive designs that
admit member states and then seek to mold their behavior ex
post, or they can use exclusive designs that condition
membership on ex ante changes in state behavior. This paper
examines the success of these designs in using various ex
ante versus ex post tools in soliciting cooperative behavior
among regional states, arguing that ex ante tools generally
have greater advantages. However, because the advantages
vary by issue areas, regions may benefit from creating
layers of institutions with different designs. Finally, even
after admitting states, regional organizations have options
for varying membership rules across different areas of
cooperation. Drawing especially on the European experience,
the paper considers these various forms of differentiated
rules that organizations can use to forge cooperation among
different groups of member states despite remaining
differences.},
Key = {fds270010}
}
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